Daily Papers

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly expected to negotiate, coordinate, and transact autonomously, yet existing benchmarks lack principled settings for evaluating language-mediated economic interaction among multiple agents. We introduce AgenticPay, a benchmark and simulation framework for multi-agent buyer-seller negotiation driven by natural language. AgenticPay models markets in which buyers and sellers possess private constraints and product-dependent valuations, and must reach agreements through multi-round linguistic negotiation rather than numeric bidding alone. The framework supports a diverse suite of over 110 tasks ranging from bilateral bargaining to many-to-many markets, with structured action extraction and metrics for feasibility, efficiency, and welfare. Benchmarking state-of-the-art proprietary and open-weight LLMs reveals substantial gaps in negotiation performance and highlights challenges in long-horizon strategic reasoning, establishing AgenticPay as a foundation for studying agentic commerce and language-based market interaction. Code and dataset are available at the link: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/AgenticPay.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Human choice prediction in economic contexts is crucial for applications in marketing, finance, public policy, and more. This task, however, is often constrained by the difficulties in acquiring human choice data. With most experimental economics studies focusing on simple choice settings, the AI community has explored whether LLMs can substitute for humans in these predictions and examined more complex experimental economics settings. However, a key question remains: can LLMs generate training data for human choice prediction? We explore this in language-based persuasion games, a complex economic setting involving natural language in strategic interactions. Our experiments show that models trained on LLM-generated data can effectively predict human behavior in these games and even outperform models trained on actual human data.

We introduce EconWebArena, a benchmark for evaluating autonomous agents on complex, multimodal economic tasks in realistic web environments. The benchmark comprises 360 curated tasks from 82 authoritative websites spanning domains such as macroeconomics, labor, finance, trade, and public policy. Each task challenges agents to navigate live websites, interpret structured and visual content, interact with real interfaces, and extract precise, time-sensitive data through multi-step workflows. We construct the benchmark by prompting multiple large language models (LLMs) to generate candidate tasks, followed by rigorous human curation to ensure clarity, feasibility, and source reliability. Unlike prior work, EconWebArena emphasizes fidelity to authoritative data sources and the need for grounded web-based economic reasoning. We evaluate a diverse set of state-of-the-art multimodal LLMs as web agents, analyze failure cases, and conduct ablation studies to assess the impact of visual grounding, plan-based reasoning, and interaction design. Our results reveal substantial performance gaps and highlight persistent challenges in grounding, navigation, and multimodal understanding, positioning EconWebArena as a rigorous testbed for economic web intelligence.

User churn, characterized by customers ending their relationship with a business, has profound economic consequences across various Business-to-Customer scenarios. For numerous system-to-user actions, such as promotional discounts and retention campaigns, predicting potential churners stands as a primary objective. In volatile sectors like fantasy sports, unpredictable factors such as international sports events can influence even regular spending habits. Consequently, while transaction history and user-product interaction are valuable in predicting churn, they demand deep domain knowledge and intricate feature engineering. Additionally, feature development for churn prediction systems can be resource-intensive, particularly in production settings serving 200m+ users, where inference pipelines largely focus on feature engineering. This paper conducts an exhaustive study on predicting user churn using historical data. We aim to create a model forecasting customer churn likelihood, facilitating businesses in comprehending attrition trends and formulating effective retention plans. Our approach treats churn prediction as multivariate time series classification, demonstrating that combining user activity and deep neural networks yields remarkable results for churn prediction in complex business-to-customer contexts.

Directly training Large Language Models (LLMs) for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) remains challenging due to intricate reward modeling, dynamic agent interactions, and demanding generalization requirements. This paper explores whether post-training techniques, specifically Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), can effectively generalize to multi-agent scenarios. We use economic reasoning as a testbed, leveraging its strong foundations in mathematics and game theory, its demand for structured analytical reasoning, and its relevance to real-world applications such as market design, resource allocation, and policy analysis. We introduce Recon (Reasoning like an ECONomist), a 7B-parameter open-source LLM post-trained on a hand-curated dataset of 2,100 high-quality economic reasoning problems. Comprehensive evaluation on economic reasoning benchmarks and multi-agent games reveals clear improvements in structured reasoning and economic rationality. These results underscore the promise of domain-aligned post-training for enhancing reasoning and agent alignment, shedding light on the roles of SFT and RL in shaping model behavior. Code is available at https://github.com/MasterZhou1/Recon .

Climate-economic modeling under uncertainty presents significant computational challenges that may limit policymakers' ability to address climate change effectively. This paper explores neural network-based approaches for solving high-dimensional optimal control problems arising from models that incorporate ambiguity aversion in climate mitigation decisions. We develop a continuous-time endogenous-growth economic model that accounts for multiple mitigation pathways, including emission-free capital and carbon intensity reductions. Given the inherent complexity and high dimensionality of these models, traditional numerical methods become computationally intractable. We benchmark several neural network architectures against finite-difference generated solutions, evaluating their ability to capture the dynamic interactions between uncertainty, technology transitions, and optimal climate policy. Our findings demonstrate that appropriate neural architecture selection significantly impacts both solution accuracy and computational efficiency when modeling climate-economic systems under uncertainty. These methodological advances enable more sophisticated modeling of climate policy decisions, allowing for better representation of technology transitions and uncertainty-critical elements for developing effective mitigation strategies in the face of climate change.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

AI is undergoing a paradigm shift with the rise of models (e.g., BERT, DALL-E, GPT-3) that are trained on broad data at scale and are adaptable to a wide range of downstream tasks. We call these models foundation models to underscore their critically central yet incomplete character. This report provides a thorough account of the opportunities and risks of foundation models, ranging from their capabilities (e.g., language, vision, robotics, reasoning, human interaction) and technical principles(e.g., model architectures, training procedures, data, systems, security, evaluation, theory) to their applications (e.g., law, healthcare, education) and societal impact (e.g., inequity, misuse, economic and environmental impact, legal and ethical considerations). Though foundation models are based on standard deep learning and transfer learning, their scale results in new emergent capabilities,and their effectiveness across so many tasks incentivizes homogenization. Homogenization provides powerful leverage but demands caution, as the defects of the foundation model are inherited by all the adapted models downstream. Despite the impending widespread deployment of foundation models, we currently lack a clear understanding of how they work, when they fail, and what they are even capable of due to their emergent properties. To tackle these questions, we believe much of the critical research on foundation models will require deep interdisciplinary collaboration commensurate with their fundamentally sociotechnical nature.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

We introduce a dynamic benchmarking system for conversational agents that evaluates their performance through a single, simulated, and lengthy userleftrightarrowagent interaction. The interaction is a conversation between the user and agent, where multiple tasks are introduced and then undertaken concurrently. We context switch regularly to interleave the tasks, which constructs a realistic testing scenario in which we assess the Long-Term Memory, Continual Learning, and Information Integration capabilities of the agents. Results from both proprietary and open-source Large-Language Models show that LLMs in general perform well on single-task interactions, but they struggle on the same tasks when they are interleaved. Notably, short-context LLMs supplemented with an LTM system perform as well as or better than those with larger contexts. Our benchmark suggests that there are other challenges for LLMs responding to more natural interactions that contemporary benchmarks have heretofore not been able to capture.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

International trade policies have recently garnered attention for limiting cross-border exchange of essential goods (e.g. steel, aluminum, soybeans, and beef). Since trade critically affects employment and wages, predicting future patterns of trade is a high-priority for policy makers around the world. While traditional economic models aim to be reliable predictors, we consider the possibility that Machine Learning (ML) techniques allow for better predictions to inform policy decisions. Open-government data provide the fuel to power the algorithms that can explain and forecast trade flows to inform policies. Data collected in this article describe international trade transactions and commonly associated economic factors. Machine learning (ML) models deployed include: ARIMA, GBoosting, XGBoosting, and LightGBM for predicting future trade patterns, and K-Means clustering of countries according to economic factors. Unlike short-term and subjective (straight-line) projections and medium-term (aggre-gated) projections, ML methods provide a range of data-driven and interpretable projections for individual commodities. Models, their results, and policies are introduced and evaluated for prediction quality.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We introduce a novel hybrid approach that augments Agent-Based Models (ABMs) with behaviors generated by Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate human trading interactions. We call our model TraderTalk. Leveraging LLMs trained on extensive human-authored text, we capture detailed and nuanced representations of bilateral conversations in financial trading. Applying this Generative Agent-Based Model (GABM) to government bond markets, we replicate trading decisions between two stylised virtual humans. Our method addresses both structural challenges, such as coordinating turn-taking between realistic LLM-based agents, and design challenges, including the interpretation of LLM outputs by the agent model. By exploring prompt design opportunistically rather than systematically, we enhance the realism of agent interactions without exhaustive overfitting or model reliance. Our approach successfully replicates trade-to-order volume ratios observed in related asset markets, demonstrating the potential of LLM-augmented ABMs in financial simulations

This study examines the relationship between trade openness, logistics performance, and economic growth within G20 economies. Using a Bootstrap Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model augmented by a dynamic error correction mechanism (ECM), the analysis quantifies both short run and long run effects of trade facilitation and logistics infrastructure, measured via the World Bank's Logistics Performance Index (LPI) from 2007 to 2023, on economic growth. The G20, as a consortium of the world's leading economies, exhibits significant variation in logistics efficiency and degrees of trade openness, providing a robust context for comparative analysis. The ARDL-ECM approach, reinforced by bootstrap resampling, delivers reliable estimates even in the presence of small samples and complex variable linkages. Findings are intended to inform policymakers seeking to enhance trade competitiveness and economic development through targeted investment in infrastructure and regulatory reforms supporting trade facilitation. The results underscore the critical role of efficient logistics specifically customs administration, physical infrastructure, and shipment reliability in driving international trade and fostering sustained economic growth. Improvements in these areas can substantially increase a country's trade capacity and overall economic performance.

This paper presents a novel methodology for predicting international bilateral trade flows, emphasizing the growing importance of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in the global trade landscape. Acknowledging the limitations of traditional models like the Gravity Model of Trade, this study introduces a two-stage approach combining explainable machine learning and factorization models. The first stage employs SHAP Explainer for effective variable selection, identifying key provisions in PTAs, while the second stage utilizes Factorization Machine models to analyze the pairwise interaction effects of these provisions on trade flows. By analyzing comprehensive datasets, the paper demonstrates the efficacy of this approach. The findings not only enhance the predictive accuracy of trade flow models but also offer deeper insights into the complex dynamics of international trade, influenced by specific bilateral trade provisions.

Socioeconomic status (SES) fundamentally influences how people interact with each other and more recently, with digital technologies like Large Language Models (LLMs). While previous research has highlighted the interaction between SES and language technology, it was limited by reliance on proxy metrics and synthetic data. We survey 1,000 individuals from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds about their use of language technologies and generative AI, and collect 6,482 prompts from their previous interactions with LLMs. We find systematic differences across SES groups in language technology usage (i.e., frequency, performed tasks), interaction styles, and topics. Higher SES entails a higher level of abstraction, convey requests more concisely, and topics like 'inclusivity' and 'travel'. Lower SES correlates with higher anthropomorphization of LLMs (using ''hello'' and ''thank you'') and more concrete language. Our findings suggest that while generative language technologies are becoming more accessible to everyone, socioeconomic linguistic differences still stratify their use to exacerbate the digital divide. These differences underscore the importance of considering SES in developing language technologies to accommodate varying linguistic needs rooted in socioeconomic factors and limit the AI Gap across SES groups.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

This paper examines the profound challenges that transformative advances in AI towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will pose for economists and economic policymakers. I examine how the Age of AI will revolutionize the basic structure of our economies by diminishing the role of labor, leading to unprecedented productivity gains but raising concerns about job disruption, income distribution, and the value of education and human capital. I explore what roles may remain for labor post-AGI, and which production factors will grow in importance. The paper then identifies eight key challenges for economic policy in the Age of AI: (1) inequality and income distribution, (2) education and skill development, (3) social and political stability, (4) macroeconomic policy, (5) antitrust and market regulation, (6) intellectual property, (7) environmental implications, and (8) global AI governance. It concludes by emphasizing how economists can contribute to a better understanding of these challenges.