Daily Papers

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) enable powerful multi-agent systems, but scaling them is economically unsustainable: coordinating heterogeneous agents under information asymmetry often spirals costs. Existing paradigms, such as Mixture-of-Agents and knowledge-based routers, rely on heuristic proxies that ignore costs and collapse uncertainty structure, leading to provably suboptimal coordination. We introduce Agora, a framework that reframes coordination as a decentralized market for uncertainty. Agora formalizes epistemic uncertainty into a structured, tradable asset (perceptual, semantic, inferential), and enforces profitability-driven trading among agents based on rational economic rules. A market-aware broker, extending Thompson Sampling, initiates collaboration and guides the system toward cost-efficient equilibria. Experiments on five multimodal benchmarks (MMMU, MMBench, MathVision, InfoVQA, CC-OCR) show that Agora outperforms strong VLMs and heuristic multi-agent strategies, e.g., achieving +8.5% accuracy over the best baseline on MMMU while reducing cost by over 3x. These results establish market-based coordination as a principled and scalable paradigm for building economically viable multi-agent visual intelligence systems.

The DC Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) problem is fundamental to power system operations, requiring rapid solutions for real-time grid management. While traditional optimization solvers provide optimal solutions, their computational cost becomes prohibitive for large-scale systems requiring frequent recalculations. Machine learning approaches offer promise for acceleration but often struggle with constraint satisfaction and cost optimality. We present a novel two-stage learning framework that combines physics-informed Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) with Continuous Flow Matching (CFM) for solving DC-OPF problems. Our approach embeds fundamental physical principles--including economic dispatch optimality conditions, Kirchhoff's laws, and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) complementarity conditions--directly into the training objectives. The first stage trains a GNN to produce feasible initial solutions by learning from physics-informed losses that encode power system constraints. The second stage employs CFM, a simulation-free continuous normalizing flow technique, to refine these solutions toward optimality through learned vector field regression. Evaluated on the IEEE 30-bus system across five load scenarios ranging from 70\% to 130\% nominal load, our method achieves near-optimal solutions with cost gaps below 0.1\% for nominal loads and below 3\% for extreme conditions, while maintaining 100\% feasibility. Our framework bridges the gap between fast but approximate neural network predictions and optimal but slow numerical solvers, offering a practical solution for modern power systems with high renewable penetration requiring frequent dispatch updates.

Unfair treatment and discrimination are critical ethical concerns in AI systems, particularly as their adoption expands across diverse domains. Addressing these challenges, the recent introduction of the EU AI Act establishes a unified legal framework to ensure legal certainty for AI innovation and investment while safeguarding public interests, such as health, safety, fundamental rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Recital 8). The Act encourages stakeholders to initiate dialogue on existing AI fairness notions to address discriminatory outcomes of AI systems. However, these notions often overlook the critical role of Socio-Economic Status (SES), inadvertently perpetuating biases that favour the economically advantaged. This is concerning, given that principles of equalization advocate for equalizing resources or opportunities to mitigate disadvantages beyond an individual's control. While provisions for discrimination are laid down in the AI Act, specialized directions should be broadened, particularly in addressing economic disparities perpetuated by AI systems. In this work, we explore the limitations of popular AI fairness notions using a real-world dataset (Adult), highlighting their inability to address SES-driven disparities. To fill this gap, we propose a novel fairness notion, Socio-Economic Parity (SEP), which incorporates SES and promotes positive actions for underprivileged groups while accounting for factors within an individual's control, such as working hours, which can serve as a proxy for effort. We define a corresponding fairness measure and optimize a model constrained by SEP to demonstrate practical utility. Our results show the effectiveness of SEP in mitigating SES-driven biases. By analyzing the AI Act alongside our method, we lay a foundation for aligning AI fairness with SES factors while ensuring legal compliance.

The inference cost of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become a critical factor in determining their commercial viability and widespread adoption. This paper introduces a quantitative ``economics of inference'' framework, treating the LLM inference process as a compute-driven intelligent production activity. We analyze its marginal cost, economies of scale, and quality of output under various performance configurations. Based on empirical data from WiNEval-3.0, we construct the first ``LLM Inference Production Frontier,'' revealing three principles: diminishing marginal cost, diminishing returns to scale, and an optimal cost-effectiveness zone. This paper not only provides an economic basis for model deployment decisions but also lays an empirical foundation for the future market-based pricing and optimization of AI inference resources.

AI is undergoing a paradigm shift with the rise of models (e.g., BERT, DALL-E, GPT-3) that are trained on broad data at scale and are adaptable to a wide range of downstream tasks. We call these models foundation models to underscore their critically central yet incomplete character. This report provides a thorough account of the opportunities and risks of foundation models, ranging from their capabilities (e.g., language, vision, robotics, reasoning, human interaction) and technical principles(e.g., model architectures, training procedures, data, systems, security, evaluation, theory) to their applications (e.g., law, healthcare, education) and societal impact (e.g., inequity, misuse, economic and environmental impact, legal and ethical considerations). Though foundation models are based on standard deep learning and transfer learning, their scale results in new emergent capabilities,and their effectiveness across so many tasks incentivizes homogenization. Homogenization provides powerful leverage but demands caution, as the defects of the foundation model are inherited by all the adapted models downstream. Despite the impending widespread deployment of foundation models, we currently lack a clear understanding of how they work, when they fail, and what they are even capable of due to their emergent properties. To tackle these questions, we believe much of the critical research on foundation models will require deep interdisciplinary collaboration commensurate with their fundamentally sociotechnical nature.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

The rapid integration of agentic AI into high-stakes real-world applications requires robust oversight mechanisms. The emerging field of AI Control (AIC) aims to provide such an oversight mechanism, but practical adoption depends heavily on implementation overhead. To study this problem better, we introduce the notion of Control tax -- the operational and financial cost of integrating control measures into AI pipelines. Our work makes three key contributions to the field of AIC: (1) we introduce a theoretical framework that quantifies the Control Tax and maps classifier performance to safety assurances; (2) we conduct comprehensive evaluations of state-of-the-art language models in adversarial settings, where attacker models insert subtle backdoors into code while monitoring models attempt to detect these vulnerabilities; and (3) we provide empirical financial cost estimates for control protocols and develop optimized monitoring strategies that balance safety and cost-effectiveness while accounting for practical constraints like auditing budgets. Our framework enables practitioners to make informed decisions by systematically connecting safety guarantees with their costs, advancing AIC through principled economic feasibility assessment across different deployment contexts.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

AI and reinforcement learning (RL) have improved many areas, but are not yet widely adopted in economic policy design, mechanism design, or economics at large. At the same time, current economic methodology is limited by a lack of counterfactual data, simplistic behavioral models, and limited opportunities to experiment with policies and evaluate behavioral responses. Here we show that machine-learning-based economic simulation is a powerful policy and mechanism design framework to overcome these limitations. The AI Economist is a two-level, deep RL framework that trains both agents and a social planner who co-adapt, providing a tractable solution to the highly unstable and novel two-level RL challenge. From a simple specification of an economy, we learn rational agent behaviors that adapt to learned planner policies and vice versa. We demonstrate the efficacy of the AI Economist on the problem of optimal taxation. In simple one-step economies, the AI Economist recovers the optimal tax policy of economic theory. In complex, dynamic economies, the AI Economist substantially improves both utilitarian social welfare and the trade-off between equality and productivity over baselines. It does so despite emergent tax-gaming strategies, while accounting for agent interactions and behavioral change more accurately than economic theory. These results demonstrate for the first time that two-level, deep RL can be used for understanding and as a complement to theory for economic design, unlocking a new computational learning-based approach to understanding economic policy.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

This paper introduces a new biologically-inspired training method named Continual Learning through Adjustment Suppression and Sparsity Promotion (CLASSP). CLASSP is based on two main principles observed in neuroscience, particularly in the context of synaptic transmission and Long-Term Potentiation (LTP). The first principle is a decay rate over the weight adjustment, which is implemented as a generalization of the AdaGrad optimization algorithm. This means that weights that have received many updates should have lower learning rates as they likely encode important information about previously seen data. However, this principle results in a diffuse distribution of updates throughout the model, as it promotes updates for weights that haven't been previously updated, while a sparse update distribution is preferred to leave weights unassigned for future tasks. Therefore, the second principle introduces a threshold on the loss gradient. This promotes sparse learning by updating a weight only if the loss gradient with respect to that weight is above a certain threshold, i.e. only updating weights with a significant impact on the current loss. Both principles reflect phenomena observed in LTP, where a threshold effect and a gradual saturation of potentiation have been observed. CLASSP is implemented in a Python/PyTorch class, making it applicable to any model. When compared with Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) using Computer Vision and sentiment analysis datasets, CLASSP demonstrates superior performance in terms of accuracy and memory footprint.

A physically motivated equation that determines the number of electrons of a molecule is proposed based on chemical common sense. It shows that all molecules are entangled in the number of electrons and results in the fundamental assumption of molecular energy convexity that underpins molecular quantum mechanics. The proposed physical principle includes the molecular size consistency principle as a special case. Application of wavefunction theory to the principle shows that an individual molecule with a noninteger number of electrons is locally physical albeit locally unreal. The energy of a molecule is piecewise linear with respect to its continuous number of electrons. The continuity of the number of electrons allows the definition of an electronic chemical potential of a single molecule. A state function equivalent to the energy of a molecule can be defined using the chemical potential as a variable. The aforementioned physical principle can alternatively be expressed as a simple additivity with the new state function. The latter also shows that the quantum entanglement in the number of electrons can be viewed as all molecules sharing the same chemical potential.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

The free energy principle, and its corollary active inference, constitute a bio-inspired theory that assumes biological agents act to remain in a restricted set of preferred states of the world, i.e., they minimize their free energy. Under this principle, biological agents learn a generative model of the world and plan actions in the future that will maintain the agent in an homeostatic state that satisfies its preferences. This framework lends itself to being realized in silico, as it comprehends important aspects that make it computationally affordable, such as variational inference and amortized planning. In this work, we investigate the tool of deep learning to design and realize artificial agents based on active inference, presenting a deep-learning oriented presentation of the free energy principle, surveying works that are relevant in both machine learning and active inference areas, and discussing the design choices that are involved in the implementation process. This manuscript probes newer perspectives for the active inference framework, grounding its theoretical aspects into more pragmatic affairs, offering a practical guide to active inference newcomers and a starting point for deep learning practitioners that would like to investigate implementations of the free energy principle.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

This paper examines the fiscal and macroeconomic strategies essential for transition of India to a high income economy by 2047, aligning with the vision of Viksit Bharat. A sustainable annual GDP growth rate of 7 to 8 percent is projected as necessary to achieve this milestone while maintaining fiscal prudence through a targeted deficit threshold below 3.5 percent of GDP. The study underscores the role of disciplined fiscal management in financing critical public investments in infrastructure, human capital development and technological innovation. Given constraints on domestic resource mobilization, the paper highlights the importance of multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank, IMF and ADB, in expanding fiscal space in India through concessional financing, technical cooperation, and risk sharing mechanisms. Using econometric modeling and scenario analysis, the research identifies key policy interventions in infrastructure, healthcare, education and sustainable energy that can maximize growth while ensuring fiscal sustainability. Policy recommendations include enhancing tax buoyancy, rationalizing expenditure, optimizing public private partnerships and strengthening fiscal responsibility frameworks. The findings suggest that a calibrated approach to growth, prudent fiscal management and strategic international collaborations are critical to achieving long term economic aspirations of India.

This paper examines the profound challenges that transformative advances in AI towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) will pose for economists and economic policymakers. I examine how the Age of AI will revolutionize the basic structure of our economies by diminishing the role of labor, leading to unprecedented productivity gains but raising concerns about job disruption, income distribution, and the value of education and human capital. I explore what roles may remain for labor post-AGI, and which production factors will grow in importance. The paper then identifies eight key challenges for economic policy in the Age of AI: (1) inequality and income distribution, (2) education and skill development, (3) social and political stability, (4) macroeconomic policy, (5) antitrust and market regulation, (6) intellectual property, (7) environmental implications, and (8) global AI governance. It concludes by emphasizing how economists can contribute to a better understanding of these challenges.

Both Minsky's "society of mind" and Schmidhuber's "learning to think" inspire diverse societies of large multimodal neural networks (NNs) that solve problems by interviewing each other in a "mindstorm." Recent implementations of NN-based societies of minds consist of large language models (LLMs) and other NN-based experts communicating through a natural language interface. In doing so, they overcome the limitations of single LLMs, improving multimodal zero-shot reasoning. In these natural language-based societies of mind (NLSOMs), new agents -- all communicating through the same universal symbolic language -- are easily added in a modular fashion. To demonstrate the power of NLSOMs, we assemble and experiment with several of them (having up to 129 members), leveraging mindstorms in them to solve some practical AI tasks: visual question answering, image captioning, text-to-image synthesis, 3D generation, egocentric retrieval, embodied AI, and general language-based task solving. We view this as a starting point towards much larger NLSOMs with billions of agents-some of which may be humans. And with this emergence of great societies of heterogeneous minds, many new research questions have suddenly become paramount to the future of artificial intelligence. What should be the social structure of an NLSOM? What would be the (dis)advantages of having a monarchical rather than a democratic structure? How can principles of NN economies be used to maximize the total reward of a reinforcement learning NLSOM? In this work, we identify, discuss, and try to answer some of these questions.

Tackling real-world socio-economic challenges requires designing and testing economic policies. However, this is hard in practice, due to a lack of appropriate (micro-level) economic data and limited opportunity to experiment. In this work, we train social planners that discover tax policies in dynamic economies that can effectively trade-off economic equality and productivity. We propose a two-level deep reinforcement learning approach to learn dynamic tax policies, based on economic simulations in which both agents and a government learn and adapt. Our data-driven approach does not make use of economic modeling assumptions, and learns from observational data alone. We make four main contributions. First, we present an economic simulation environment that features competitive pressures and market dynamics. We validate the simulation by showing that baseline tax systems perform in a way that is consistent with economic theory, including in regard to learned agent behaviors and specializations. Second, we show that AI-driven tax policies improve the trade-off between equality and productivity by 16% over baseline policies, including the prominent Saez tax framework. Third, we showcase several emergent features: AI-driven tax policies are qualitatively different from baselines, setting a higher top tax rate and higher net subsidies for low incomes. Moreover, AI-driven tax policies perform strongly in the face of emergent tax-gaming strategies learned by AI agents. Lastly, AI-driven tax policies are also effective when used in experiments with human participants. In experiments conducted on MTurk, an AI tax policy provides an equality-productivity trade-off that is similar to that provided by the Saez framework along with higher inverse-income weighted social welfare.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

Generative AI technologies are growing in power, utility, and use. As generative technologies are being incorporated into mainstream applications, there is a need for guidance on how to design those applications to foster productive and safe use. Based on recent research on human-AI co-creation within the HCI and AI communities, we present a set of seven principles for the design of generative AI applications. These principles are grounded in an environment of generative variability. Six principles are focused on designing for characteristics of generative AI: multiple outcomes & imperfection; exploration & control; and mental models & explanations. In addition, we urge designers to design against potential harms that may be caused by a generative model's hazardous output, misuse, or potential for human displacement. We anticipate these principles to usefully inform design decisions made in the creation of novel human-AI applications, and we invite the community to apply, revise, and extend these principles to their own work.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.