Daily Papers

Large language models are increasingly deployed as coding agents, shifting safety from individual responses to action sequences. Existing benchmarks, however, primarily assess whether models refuse unsafe prompts, leaving impacts on stateful workspaces largely unexamined. We present SABER, a benchmark for environment-aware operational safety that places models in realistic agent-style projects and evaluates safety from the final environment state after a sequence of actions. Beyond binary safety-violation reports, SABER categorizes violations by cause, enabling analysis of model-specific safety profiles. Our evaluations show that even the best-performing model has more than a 54% harmful safety-violation rate (HSR), suggesting that current alignment remains insufficient for realistic project environments. SABER further reveals distinct safety profiles across models. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/sssr-lab/saber.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

Large Language Model (LLM) safety is one of the most pressing challenges for enabling wide-scale deployment. While most studies and global discussions focus on generic harms, such as models assisting users in harming themselves or others, enterprises face a more fundamental concern: whether LLM-based agents are safe for their intended use case. To address this, we introduce operational safety, defined as an LLM's ability to appropriately accept or refuse user queries when tasked with a specific purpose. We further propose OffTopicEval, an evaluation suite and benchmark for measuring operational safety both in general and within specific agentic use cases. Our evaluations on six model families comprising 20 open-weight LLMs reveal that while performance varies across models, all of them remain highly operationally unsafe. Even the strongest models -- Qwen-3 (235B) with 77.77\% and Mistral (24B) with 79.96\% -- fall far short of reliable operational safety, while GPT models plateau in the 62--73\% range, Phi achieves only mid-level scores (48--70\%), and Gemma and Llama-3 collapse to 39.53\% and 23.84\%, respectively. While operational safety is a core model alignment issue, to suppress these failures, we propose prompt-based steering methods: query grounding (Q-ground) and system-prompt grounding (P-ground), which substantially improve OOD refusal. Q-ground provides consistent gains of up to 23\%, while P-ground delivers even larger boosts, raising Llama-3.3 (70B) by 41\% and Qwen-3 (30B) by 27\%. These results highlight both the urgent need for operational safety interventions and the promise of prompt-based steering as a first step toward more reliable LLM-based agents.

Multimodal agents have demonstrated strong performance in general GUI interactions, but their application in automotive systems has been largely unexplored. In-vehicle GUIs present distinct challenges: drivers' limited attention, strict safety requirements, and complex location-based interaction patterns. To address these challenges, we introduce Automotive-ENV, the first high-fidelity benchmark and interaction environment tailored for vehicle GUIs. This platform defines 185 parameterized tasks spanning explicit control, implicit intent understanding, and safety-aware tasks, and provides structured multimodal observations with precise programmatic checks for reproducible evaluation. Building on this benchmark, we propose ASURADA, a geo-aware multimodal agent that integrates GPS-informed context to dynamically adjust actions based on location, environmental conditions, and regional driving norms. Experiments show that geo-aware information significantly improves success on safety-aware tasks, highlighting the importance of location-based context in automotive environments. We will release Automotive-ENV, complete with all tasks and benchmarking tools, to further the development of safe and adaptive in-vehicle agents.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

The increasing use of Machine Learning (ML) components embedded in autonomous systems -- so-called Learning-Enabled Systems (LESs) -- has resulted in the pressing need to assure their functional safety. As for traditional functional safety, the emerging consensus within both, industry and academia, is to use assurance cases for this purpose. Typically assurance cases support claims of reliability in support of safety, and can be viewed as a structured way of organising arguments and evidence generated from safety analysis and reliability modelling activities. While such assurance activities are traditionally guided by consensus-based standards developed from vast engineering experience, LESs pose new challenges in safety-critical application due to the characteristics and design of ML models. In this article, we first present an overall assurance framework for LESs with an emphasis on quantitative aspects, e.g., breaking down system-level safety targets to component-level requirements and supporting claims stated in reliability metrics. We then introduce a novel model-agnostic Reliability Assessment Model (RAM) for ML classifiers that utilises the operational profile and robustness verification evidence. We discuss the model assumptions and the inherent challenges of assessing ML reliability uncovered by our RAM and propose solutions to practical use. Probabilistic safety argument templates at the lower ML component-level are also developed based on the RAM. Finally, to evaluate and demonstrate our methods, we not only conduct experiments on synthetic/benchmark datasets but also scope our methods with case studies on simulated Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and physical Unmanned Ground Vehicles.

Computer-using agents powered by Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated human-like capabilities in operating digital environments like mobile platforms. While these agents hold great promise for advancing digital automation, their potential for unsafe operations, such as system compromise and privacy leakage, is raising significant concerns. Detecting these safety concerns across the vast and complex operational space of mobile environments presents a formidable challenge that remains critically underexplored. To establish a foundation for mobile agent safety research, we introduce MobileRisk-Live, a dynamic sandbox environment accompanied by a safety detection benchmark comprising realistic trajectories with fine-grained annotations. Built upon this, we propose OS-Sentinel, a novel hybrid safety detection framework that synergistically combines a Formal Verifier for detecting explicit system-level violations with a VLM-based Contextual Judge for assessing contextual risks and agent actions. Experiments show that OS-Sentinel achieves 10%-30% improvements over existing approaches across multiple metrics. Further analysis provides critical insights that foster the development of safer and more reliable autonomous mobile agents.

Runtime energy management has become quintessential for multi-sensor autonomous systems at the edge for achieving high performance given the platform constraints. Typical for such systems, however, is to have their controllers designed with formal guarantees on safety that precede in priority such optimizations, which in turn limits their application in real settings. In this paper, we propose a novel energy optimization framework that is aware of the autonomous system's safety state, and leverages it to regulate the application of energy optimization methods so that the system's formal safety properties are preserved. In particular, through the formal characterization of a system's safety state as a dynamic processing deadline, the computing workloads of the underlying models can be adapted accordingly. For our experiments, we model two popular runtime energy optimization methods, offloading and gating, and simulate an autonomous driving system (ADS) use-case in the CARLA simulation environment with performance characterizations obtained from the standard Nvidia Drive PX2 ADS platform. Our results demonstrate that through a formal awareness of the perceived risks in the test case scenario, energy efficiency gains are still achieved (reaching 89.9%) while maintaining the desired safety properties.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

Vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown great potential as generalist robot policies. However, these models pose urgent safety challenges during deployment, including the risk of physical harm to the environment, the robot itself, and humans. How can safety be explicitly incorporated into VLAs? In this work, we propose SafeVLA, a novel algorithm designed to integrate safety into VLAs, ensuring the protection of the environment, robot hardware and humans in real-world settings. SafeVLA effectively balances safety and task performance by employing large-scale constrained learning within simulated environments. We demonstrate that SafeVLA outperforms the current state-of-the-art method in both safety and task performance, achieving average improvements of 83.58% and 3.85%, respectively, in simulation. By prioritizing safety, our approach eliminates high-risk behaviors and reduces the upper bound of unsafe behaviors to 1/35 of that in the current state-of-the-art, thereby significantly mitigating long-tail risks. Furthermore, the learned safety constraints generalize to diverse, unseen scenarios, including multiple out-of-distribution perturbations and tasks. Our data, models and newly proposed benchmark environment are available at https://sites.google.com/view/pku-safevla.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are rapidly evolving, demonstrating impressive capabilities as multimodal assistants that interact with both humans and their environments. However, this increased sophistication introduces significant safety concerns. In this paper, we present the first evaluation and analysis of a novel safety challenge termed Multimodal Situational Safety, which explores how safety considerations vary based on the specific situation in which the user or agent is engaged. We argue that for an MLLM to respond safely, whether through language or action, it often needs to assess the safety implications of a language query within its corresponding visual context. To evaluate this capability, we develop the Multimodal Situational Safety benchmark (MSSBench) to assess the situational safety performance of current MLLMs. The dataset comprises 1,820 language query-image pairs, half of which the image context is safe, and the other half is unsafe. We also develop an evaluation framework that analyzes key safety aspects, including explicit safety reasoning, visual understanding, and, crucially, situational safety reasoning. Our findings reveal that current MLLMs struggle with this nuanced safety problem in the instruction-following setting and struggle to tackle these situational safety challenges all at once, highlighting a key area for future research. Furthermore, we develop multi-agent pipelines to coordinately solve safety challenges, which shows consistent improvement in safety over the original MLLM response. Code and data: mssbench.github.io.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly embedded in everyday decision-making, their safety responsibilities extend beyond reacting to explicit harmful intent toward anticipating unintended but consequential risks. In this work, we introduce a proactive risk awareness evaluation framework that measures whether LLMs can anticipate potential harms and provide warnings before damage occurs. We construct the Butterfly dataset to instantiate this framework in the environmental and ecological domain. It contains 1,094 queries that simulate ordinary solution-seeking activities whose responses may induce latent ecological impact. Through experiments across five widely used LLMs, we analyze the effects of response length, languages, and modality. Experimental results reveal consistent, significant declines in proactive awareness under length-restricted responses, cross-lingual similarities, and persistent blind spots in (multimodal) species protection. These findings highlight a critical gap between current safety alignment and the requirements of real-world ecological responsibility, underscoring the need for proactive safeguards in LLM deployment.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) empower embodied agents to execute complex instructions, yet they remain vulnerable to contextual safety risks where benign commands become hazardous due to subtle environmental states. Existing safeguards often prove inadequate. Rule-based methods lack scalability in object-dense scenes, whereas model-based approaches relying on prompt engineering suffer from unfocused perception, resulting in missed risks or hallucinations. To address this, we propose an architecture-agnostic safeguard featuring Context-Guided Chain-of-Thought (CG-CoT). This mechanism decomposes risk assessment into active perception that sequentially anchors attention to interaction targets and relevant spatial neighborhoods, followed by semantic judgment based on this visual evidence. We support this approach with a curated grounding dataset and a two-stage training strategy utilizing Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (RFT) with process rewards to enforce precise intermediate grounding. Experiments demonstrate that our model HomeGuard significantly enhances safety, improving risk match rates by over 30% compared to base models while reducing oversafety. Beyond hazard detection, the generated visual anchors serve as actionable spatial constraints for downstream planners, facilitating explicit collision avoidance and safety trajectory generation. Code and data are released under https://github.com/AI45Lab/HomeGuard

The increasing deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) across enterprise and mission-critical domains has underscored the urgent need for robust guardrailing systems that ensure safety, reliability, and compliance. Existing solutions often struggle with real-time oversight, multi-modal data handling, and explainability -- limitations that hinder their adoption in regulated environments. Existing guardrails largely operate in isolation, focused on text alone making them inadequate for multi-modal, production-scale environments. We introduce Protect, natively multi-modal guardrailing model designed to operate seamlessly across text, image, and audio inputs, designed for enterprise-grade deployment. Protect integrates fine-tuned, category-specific adapters trained via Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) on an extensive, multi-modal dataset covering four safety dimensions: toxicity, sexism, data privacy, and prompt injection. Our teacher-assisted annotation pipeline leverages reasoning and explanation traces to generate high-fidelity, context-aware labels across modalities. Experimental results demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across all safety dimensions, surpassing existing open and proprietary models such as WildGuard, LlamaGuard-4, and GPT-4.1. Protect establishes a strong foundation for trustworthy, auditable, and production-ready safety systems capable of operating across text, image, and audio modalities.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

A prerequisite for safe autonomy-in-the-wild is safe testing-in-the-wild. Yet real-world autonomous tests face several unique safety challenges, both due to the possibility of causing harm during a test, as well as the risk of encountering new unsafe agent behavior through interactions with real-world and potentially malicious actors. We propose a framework for conducting safe autonomous agent tests on the open internet: agent actions are audited by a context-sensitive monitor that enforces a stringent safety boundary to stop an unsafe test, with suspect behavior ranked and logged to be examined by humans. We a design a basic safety monitor that is flexible enough to monitor existing LLM agents, and, using an adversarial simulated agent, we measure its ability to identify and stop unsafe situations. Then we apply the safety monitor on a battery of real-world tests of AutoGPT, and we identify several limitations and challenges that will face the creation of safe in-the-wild tests as autonomous agents grow more capable.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) offer powerful cross-modality capabilities but introduce new safety risks not observed in single-task models. Despite their emergence, existing safety benchmarks remain fragmented across tasks and modalities, limiting the comprehensive evaluation of complex system-level vulnerabilities. To address this gap, we introduce UniSAFE, the first comprehensive benchmark for system-level safety evaluation of UMMs across 7 I/O modality combinations, spanning conventional tasks and novel multimodal-context image generation settings. UniSAFE is built with a shared-target design that projects common risk scenarios across task-specific I/O configurations, enabling controlled cross-task comparisons of safety failures. Comprising 6,802 curated instances, we use UniSAFE to evaluate 15 state-of-the-art UMMs, both proprietary and open-source. Our results reveal critical vulnerabilities across current UMMs, including elevated safety violations in multi-image composition and multi-turn settings, with image-output tasks consistently more vulnerable than text-output tasks. These findings highlight the need for stronger system-level safety alignment for UMMs. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/segyulee/UniSAFE

In this position paper, we address the persistent gap between rapidly growing AI capabilities and lagging safety progress. Existing paradigms divide into ``Make AI Safe'', which applies post-hoc alignment and guardrails but remains brittle and reactive, and ``Make Safe AI'', which emphasizes intrinsic safety but struggles to address unforeseen risks in open-ended environments. We therefore propose safe-by-coevolution as a new formulation of the ``Make Safe AI'' paradigm, inspired by biological immunity, in which safety becomes a dynamic, adversarial, and ongoing learning process. To operationalize this vision, we introduce R^2AI -- Resistant and Resilient AI -- as a practical framework that unites resistance against known threats with resilience to unforeseen risks. R^2AI integrates fast and slow safe models, adversarial simulation and verification through a safety wind tunnel, and continual feedback loops that guide safety and capability to coevolve. We argue that this framework offers a scalable and proactive path to maintain continual safety in dynamic environments, addressing both near-term vulnerabilities and long-term existential risks as AI advances toward AGI and ASI.

Physical AI systems increasingly map multimodal observations, language instructions, and learned world representations into physically consequential actions. Robotics foundation models, vision-language-action models, and world-model-based autonomous systems can condition decisions that move vehicles, robots, drones, and industrial machines. This transition exposes a safety problem that is not fully captured by conventional AI content moderation or by classical robot safety alone: a black-box model may issue a physically consequential action while appearing confident, plausible, and semantically aligned. The resulting failure can be silent, arising from sensor drift, occlusion, state-estimation error, distribution shift, hallucinated affordances, or invalid physical assumptions before downstream hardware controllers detect a violation. Across embodied foundation models, world models, robotics simulation, embodied safety benchmarks, safe control, runtime assurance, uncertainty estimation, verification, and guardrail evaluation, model capability and safety mechanisms have advanced along largely separate technical tracks. A recurring gap synthesized here is that no single stream surveyed in this review supplies a complete runtime authorization boundary between black-box Physical AI models and physical execution. The resulting analysis develops a bounded problem formulation, a definition of silent physical-action failure, a taxonomy of runtime guardrail functions, and evaluation requirements for comparing guardrails as Physical AI assurance mechanisms.

Safety limitations in service robotics across various industries have raised significant concerns about the need for robust mechanisms ensuring that robots adhere to safe practices, thereby preventing actions that might harm humans or cause property damage. Despite advances, including the integration of Knowledge Graphs (KGs) with Large Language Models (LLMs), challenges in ensuring consistent safety in autonomous robot actions persist. In this paper, we propose a novel integration of Large Language Models with Embodied Robotic Control Prompts (ERCPs) and Embodied Knowledge Graphs (EKGs) to enhance the safety framework for service robots. ERCPs are designed as predefined instructions that ensure LLMs generate safe and precise responses. These responses are subsequently validated by EKGs, which provide a comprehensive knowledge base ensuring that the actions of the robot are continuously aligned with safety protocols, thereby promoting safer operational practices in varied contexts. Our experimental setup involved diverse real-world tasks, where robots equipped with our framework demonstrated significantly higher compliance with safety standards compared to traditional methods. This integration fosters secure human-robot interactions and positions our methodology at the forefront of AI-driven safety innovations in service robotics.

Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) demonstrate impressive cross-modal reasoning but often amplify safety risks under adversarial or unsafe prompts, a phenomenon we call the Reasoning Tax. Existing defenses mainly act at the output level and do not constrain the reasoning process, leaving models exposed to implicit risks. In this paper, we propose SaFeR-VLM, a safety-aligned reinforcement learning framework that embeds safety directly into multimodal reasoning. The framework integrates four components: (I) QI-Safe-10K, a curated dataset emphasizing safety-critical and reasoning-sensitive cases; (II) safety-aware rollout, where unsafe generations undergo reflection and correction instead of being discarded; (III) structured reward modeling with multi-dimensional weighted criteria and explicit penalties for hallucinations and contradictions; and (IV) GRPO optimization, which reinforces both safe and corrected trajectories. This unified design shifts safety from a passive safeguard to an active driver of reasoning, enabling scalable and generalizable safety-aware reasoning. SaFeR-VLM further demonstrates robustness against both explicit and implicit risks, supporting dynamic and interpretable safety decisions beyond surface-level filtering. SaFeR-VLM-3B achieves average performance 70.13 and 78.97 on safety and helpfulness across six benchmarks, surpassing both same-scale and >10times larger models such as Skywork-R1V3-38B, Qwen2.5VL-72B, and GLM4.5V-106B. Remarkably, SaFeR-VLM-7B benefits from its increased scale to surpass GPT-5-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash by 6.47 and 16.76 points respectively on safety metrics, achieving this improvement without any degradation in helpfulness performance. Our codes are available at https://github.com/HarveyYi/SaFeR-VLM.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have accelerated progress toward artificial general intelligence, yet their potential to generate harmful content poses critical safety challenges. Existing alignment methods often struggle to cover diverse safety scenarios and remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this work, we propose Ex-Ante Reasoning Preference Optimization (ERPO), a novel safety alignment framework that equips LLMs with explicit preemptive reasoning through Chain-of-Thought and provides clear evidence for safety judgments by embedding predefined safety rules. Specifically, our approach consists of three stages: first, equipping the model with Ex-Ante reasoning through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) using a constructed reasoning module; second, enhancing safety, usefulness, and efficiency via Direct Preference Optimization (DPO); and third, mitigating inference latency with a length-controlled iterative preference optimization strategy. Experiments on multiple open-source LLMs demonstrate that ERPO significantly enhances safety performance while maintaining response efficiency.

As vision-language models (VLMs) gain prominence, their multimodal interfaces also introduce new safety vulnerabilities, making the safety evaluation challenging and critical. Existing red-teaming efforts are either restricted to a narrow set of adversarial patterns or depend heavily on manual engineering, lacking scalable exploration of emerging real-world VLM vulnerabilities. To bridge this gap, we propose ARMs, an adaptive red-teaming agent that systematically conducts comprehensive risk assessments for VLMs. Given a target harmful behavior or risk definition, ARMs automatically optimizes diverse red-teaming strategies with reasoning-enhanced multi-step orchestration, to effectively elicit harmful outputs from target VLMs. We propose 11 novel multimodal attack strategies, covering diverse adversarial patterns of VLMs (e.g., reasoning hijacking, contextual cloaking), and integrate 17 red-teaming algorithms into ARMs via model context protocol (MCP). To balance the diversity and effectiveness of the attack, we design a layered memory with an epsilon-greedy attack exploration algorithm. Extensive experiments on instance- and policy-based benchmarks show that ARMs achieves SOTA attack success rates, exceeding baselines by an average of 52.1% and surpassing 90% on Claude-4-Sonnet. We show that the diversity of red-teaming instances generated by ARMs is significantly higher, revealing emerging vulnerabilities in VLMs. Leveraging ARMs, we construct ARMs-Bench, a large-scale multimodal safety dataset comprising over 30K red-teaming instances spanning 51 diverse risk categories, grounded in both real-world multimodal threats and regulatory risks. Safety fine-tuning with ARMs-Bench substantially improves the robustness of VLMs while preserving their general utility, providing actionable guidance to improve multimodal safety alignment against emerging threats.

When considering the accuracy of sensors in an automated vehicle (AV), it is not sufficient to evaluate the performance of any given sensor in isolation. Rather, the performance of any individual sensor must be considered in the context of the overall system design. Techniques like redundancy and different sensing modalities can reduce the chances of a sensing failure. Additionally, the use of safety models is essential to understanding whether any particular sensing failure is relevant. Only when the entire system design is taken into account can one properly understand the meaning of safety-relevant sensing failures in an AV. In this paper, we will consider what should actually constitute a sensing failure, how safety models play an important role in mitigating potential failures, how a system-level approach to safety will deliver a safe and scalable AV, and what an acceptable sensing failure rate should be considering the full picture of an AV's architecture.

Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.

Can large language model agents discover hidden safety objectives through experience alone? We introduce EPO-Safe (Experiential Prompt Optimization for Safe Agents), a framework where an LLM iteratively generates action plans, receives sparse binary danger warnings, and evolves a natural language behavioral specification through reflection. Unlike standard LLM reflection methods that rely on rich textual feedback (e.g., compiler errors or detailed environment responses), EPO-Safe demonstrates that LLMs can perform safety reasoning from a strictly impoverished signal in structured, low-dimensional environments: the agent never observes the hidden performance function R^*, only a single bit per timestep indicating that an action was unsafe. We evaluate on five AI Safety Gridworlds (Leike et al., 2017) and five text-based scenario analogs where visible reward R may diverge from R^*. EPO-Safe discovers safe behavior within 1-2 rounds (5-15 episodes), producing human-readable specifications with correct explanatory hypotheses about hazards (e.g., "X cells are directionally hazardous: entering from the north is dangerous"). Critically, we show that standard reward-driven reflection actively degrades safety: agents reflecting on reward alone use the loop to justify and accelerate reward hacking, proving that reflection must be paired with a dedicated safety channel to discover hidden constraints. We further evaluate robustness to noisy oracles: even when 50% of non-dangerous steps produce spurious warnings, mean safety performance degrades by only 15% on average, though sensitivity is environment-dependent, as cross-episode reflection naturally filters inconsistent signals. Each evolved specification functions as an auditable set of grounded behavioral rules discovered autonomously through interaction, rather than authored by humans as in Constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022).

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to harmful input compared to their language-only backbones. We investigated this vulnerability by exploring LVLMs internal dynamics, framing their inherent safety understanding in terms of three key capabilities. Specifically, we define these capabilities as safety perception, semantic understanding, and alignment for linguistic expression, and experimentally pinpointed their primary locations within the model architecture. The results indicate that safety perception often emerges before comprehensive semantic understanding, leading to the reduction in safety. Motivated by these findings, we propose Self-Aware Safety Augmentation (SASA), a technique that projects informative semantic representations from intermediate layers onto earlier safety-oriented layers. This approach leverages the model's inherent semantic understanding to enhance safety recognition without fine-tuning. Then, we employ linear probing to articulate the model's internal semantic comprehension to detect the risk before the generation process. Extensive experiments on various datasets and tasks demonstrate that SASA significantly improves the safety of LVLMs, with minimal impact on the utility.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. However, their deployment in safety-critical domains poses significant challenges. Existing safety fine-tuning methods, which focus on textual or multimodal content, fall short in addressing challenging cases or disrupt the balance between helpfulness and harmlessness. Our evaluation highlights a safety reasoning gap: these methods lack safety visual reasoning ability, leading to such bottlenecks. To address this limitation and enhance both visual perception and reasoning in safety-critical contexts, we propose a novel dataset that integrates multi-image inputs with safety Chain-of-Thought (CoT) labels as fine-grained reasoning logic to improve model performance. Specifically, we introduce the Multi-Image Safety (MIS) dataset, an instruction-following dataset tailored for multi-image safety scenarios, consisting of training and test splits. Our experiments demonstrate that fine-tuning InternVL2.5-8B with MIS significantly outperforms both powerful open-source models and API-based models in challenging multi-image tasks requiring safety-related visual reasoning. This approach not only delivers exceptional safety performance but also preserves general capabilities without any trade-offs. Specifically, fine-tuning with MIS increases average accuracy by 0.83% across five general benchmarks and reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) on multiple safety benchmarks by a large margin. Data and Models are released under: https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/{https://dripnowhy.github.io/MIS/}

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from conversational assistants into autonomous agents, evaluating the safety of their actions becomes critical. Prior safety benchmarks have primarily focused on preventing generation of harmful content, such as toxic text. However, they overlook the challenge of agents taking harmful actions when the most effective path to an operational goal conflicts with human safety. To address this gap, we introduce ManagerBench, a benchmark that evaluates LLM decision-making in realistic, human-validated managerial scenarios. Each scenario forces a choice between a pragmatic but harmful action that achieves an operational goal, and a safe action that leads to worse operational performance. A parallel control set, where potential harm is directed only at inanimate objects, measures a model's pragmatism and identifies its tendency to be overly safe. Our findings indicate that the frontier LLMs perform poorly when navigating this safety-pragmatism trade-off. Many consistently choose harmful options to advance their operational goals, while others avoid harm only to become overly safe and ineffective. Critically, we find this misalignment does not stem from an inability to perceive harm, as models' harm assessments align with human judgments, but from flawed prioritization. ManagerBench is a challenging benchmark for a core component of agentic behavior: making safe choices when operational goals and alignment values incentivize conflicting actions. Benchmark & code available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/ManagerBench.

Safety-critical perception systems require both reliable uncertainty quantification and principled abstention mechanisms to maintain safety under diverse operational conditions. We present a novel dual-threshold conformalization framework that provides statistically-guaranteed uncertainty estimates while enabling selective prediction in high-risk scenarios. Our approach uniquely combines a conformal threshold ensuring valid prediction sets with an abstention threshold optimized through ROC analysis, providing distribution-free coverage guarantees (\ge 1 - \alpha) while identifying unreliable predictions. Through comprehensive evaluation on CIFAR-100, ImageNet1K, and ModelNet40 datasets, we demonstrate superior robustness across camera and LiDAR modalities under varying environmental perturbations. The framework achieves exceptional detection performance (AUC: 0.993\to0.995) under severe conditions while maintaining high coverage (>90.0\%) and enabling adaptive abstention (13.5\%\to63.4\%\pm0.5) as environmental severity increases. For LiDAR-based perception, our approach demonstrates particularly strong performance, maintaining robust coverage (>84.5\%) while appropriately abstaining from unreliable predictions. Notably, the framework shows remarkable stability under heavy perturbations, with detection performance (AUC: 0.995\pm0.001) significantly outperforming existing methods across all modalities. Our unified approach bridges the gap between theoretical guarantees and practical deployment needs, offering a robust solution for safety-critical autonomous systems operating in challenging real-world conditions.

Rapidly evolving AI exhibits increasingly strong autonomy and goal-directed capabilities, accompanied by derivative systemic risks that are more unpredictable, difficult to control, and potentially irreversible. However, current AI safety evaluation systems suffer from critical limitations such as restricted risk dimensions and failed frontier risk detection. The lagging safety benchmarks and alignment technologies can hardly address the complex challenges posed by cutting-edge AI models. To bridge this gap, we propose the "ForesightSafety Bench" AI Safety Evaluation Framework, beginning with 7 major Fundamental Safety pillars and progressively extends to advanced Embodied AI Safety, AI4Science Safety, Social and Environmental AI risks, Catastrophic and Existential Risks, as well as 8 critical industrial safety domains, forming a total of 94 refined risk dimensions. To date, the benchmark has accumulated tens of thousands of structured risk data points and assessment results, establishing a widely encompassing, hierarchically clear, and dynamically evolving AI safety evaluation framework. Based on this benchmark, we conduct systematic evaluation and in-depth analysis of over twenty mainstream advanced large models, identifying key risk patterns and their capability boundaries. The safety capability evaluation results reveals the widespread safety vulnerabilities of frontier AI across multiple pillars, particularly focusing on Risky Agentic Autonomy, AI4Science Safety, Embodied AI Safety, Social AI Safety and Catastrophic and Existential Risks. Our benchmark is released at https://github.com/Beijing-AISI/ForesightSafety-Bench. The project website is available at https://foresightsafety-bench.beijing-aisi.ac.cn/.

Rapid advances in multimodal models demand benchmarks that rigorously evaluate understanding and reasoning in safety-critical, dynamic real-world settings. We present AccidentBench, a large-scale benchmark that combines vehicle accident scenarios with Beyond domains, safety-critical settings in air and water that emphasize spatial and temporal reasoning (e.g., navigation, orientation, multi-vehicle motion). The benchmark contains approximately 2000 videos and over 19000 human-annotated question--answer pairs spanning multiple video lengths (short/medium/long) and difficulty levels (easy/medium/hard). Tasks systematically probe core capabilities: temporal, spatial, and intent understanding and reasoning. By unifying accident-centric traffic scenes with broader safety-critical scenarios in air and water, AccidentBench offers a comprehensive, physically grounded testbed for evaluating models under real-world variability. Evaluations of state-of-the-art models (e.g., Gemini-2.5 Pro and GPT-5) show that even the strongest models achieve only about 18% accuracy on the hardest tasks and longest videos, revealing substantial gaps in real-world temporal, spatial, and intent reasoning. AccidentBench is designed to expose these critical gaps and drive the development of multimodal models that are safer, more robust, and better aligned with real-world safety-critical challenges. The code and dataset are available at: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/AccidentBench

Partial perception deficits can compromise autonomous vehicle safety by disrupting environmental understanding. Current protocols typically respond with immediate stops or minimal-risk maneuvers, worsening traffic flow and lacking flexibility for rare driving scenarios. In this paper, we propose LLM-RCO, a framework leveraging large language models to integrate human-like driving commonsense into autonomous systems facing perception deficits. LLM-RCO features four key modules: hazard inference, short-term motion planner, action condition verifier, and safety constraint generator. These modules interact with the dynamic driving environment, enabling proactive and context-aware control actions to override the original control policy of autonomous agents. To improve safety in such challenging conditions, we construct DriveLM-Deficit, a dataset of 53,895 video clips featuring deficits of safety-critical objects, complete with annotations for LLM-based hazard inference and motion planning fine-tuning. Extensive experiments in adverse driving conditions with the CARLA simulator demonstrate that systems equipped with LLM-RCO significantly improve driving performance, highlighting its potential for enhancing autonomous driving resilience against adverse perception deficits. Our results also show that LLMs fine-tuned with DriveLM-Deficit can enable more proactive movements instead of conservative stops in the context of perception deficits.

While safety alignment for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has gained significant attention, current paradigms primarily target malicious intent or situational violations. We propose shifting the safety frontier toward consequence-driven safety, a paradigm essential for the robust deployment of autonomous and embodied agents. To formalize this shift, we introduce OOD-MMSafe, a benchmark comprising 455 curated query-image pairs designed to evaluate a model's ability to identify latent hazards within context-dependent causal chains. Our analysis reveals a pervasive causal blindness among frontier models, with the highest 67.5% failure rate in high-capacity closed-source models, and identifies a preference ceiling where static alignment yields format-centric failures rather than improved safety reasoning as model capacity grows. To address these bottlenecks, we develop the Consequence-Aware Safety Policy Optimization (CASPO) framework, which integrates the model's intrinsic reasoning as a dynamic reference for token-level self-distillation rewards. Experimental results demonstrate that CASPO significantly enhances consequence projection, reducing the failure ratio of risk identification to 7.3% for Qwen2.5-VL-7B and 5.7% for Qwen3-VL-4B while maintaining overall effectiveness.

Large language models are increasingly used as planners for robotic systems, yet how safely they plan remains an open question. To evaluate safe planning systematically, we introduce DESPITE, a benchmark of 12,279 tasks spanning physical and normative dangers with fully deterministic validation. Across 23 models, even near-perfect planning ability does not ensure safety: the best-planning model fails to produce a valid plan on only 0.4% of tasks but produces dangerous plans on 28.3%. Among 18 open-source models from 3B to 671B parameters, planning ability improves substantially with scale (0.4-99.3%) while safety awareness remains relatively flat (38-57%). We identify a multiplicative relationship between these two capacities, showing that larger models complete more tasks safely primarily through improved planning, not through better danger avoidance. Three proprietary reasoning models reach notably higher safety awareness (71-81%), while non-reasoning proprietary models and open-source reasoning models remain below 57%. As planning ability approaches saturation for frontier models, improving safety awareness becomes a central challenge for deploying language-model planners in robotic systems.

Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) are one of the most devastating climate change induced hazards. Existing remote monitoring approaches often prioritise maximising spatial coverage to train generalistic models or rely on optical imagery hampered by persistent cloud coverage. This paper presents an end-to-end, automated deep learning pipeline for the targeted monitoring of high-risk Himalayan glacial lakes using time-series Sentinel-1 SAR. We introduce a "temporal-first" training strategy, utilising a U-Net with an EfficientNet-B3 backbone trained on a curated dataset of a cohort of 4 lakes (Tsho Rolpa, Chamlang Tsho, Tilicho and Gokyo Lake). The model achieves an IoU of 0.9130 validating the success and efficacy of the "temporal-first" strategy required for transitioning to Early Warning Systems. Beyond the model, we propose an operational engineering architecture: a Dockerised pipeline that automates data ingestion via the ASF Search API and exposes inference results via a RESTful endpoint. This system shifts the paradigm from static mapping to dynamic and automated early warning, providing a scalable architectural foundation for future development in Early Warning Systems.

Generative AI systems produce a range of risks. To ensure the safety of generative AI systems, these risks must be evaluated. In this paper, we make two main contributions toward establishing such evaluations. First, we propose a three-layered framework that takes a structured, sociotechnical approach to evaluating these risks. This framework encompasses capability evaluations, which are the main current approach to safety evaluation. It then reaches further by building on system safety principles, particularly the insight that context determines whether a given capability may cause harm. To account for relevant context, our framework adds human interaction and systemic impacts as additional layers of evaluation. Second, we survey the current state of safety evaluation of generative AI systems and create a repository of existing evaluations. Three salient evaluation gaps emerge from this analysis. We propose ways forward to closing these gaps, outlining practical steps as well as roles and responsibilities for different actors. Sociotechnical safety evaluation is a tractable approach to the robust and comprehensive safety evaluation of generative AI systems.

Large language model (LLM) agents offer a promising data-driven approach to automating Site Reliability Engineering (SRE), yet their enterprise deployment is constrained by three challenges: restricted access to proprietary data, unsafe action execution under permission-governed environments, and the inability of closed systems to improve from failures. We present AOI (Autonomous Operations Intelligence), a trainable multi-agent framework formulating automated operations as a structured trajectory learning problem under security constraints. Our approach integrates three key components. First, a trainable diagnostic system applies Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to distill expert-level knowledge into locally deployed open-source models, enabling preference-based learning without exposing sensitive data. Second, a read-write separated execution architecture decomposes operational trajectories into observation, reasoning, and action phases, allowing safe learning while preventing unauthorized state mutation. Third, a Failure Trajectory Closed-Loop Evolver mines unsuccessful trajectories and converts them into corrective supervision signals, enabling continual data augmentation. Evaluated on the AIOpsLab benchmark, our contributions yield cumulative gains. (1) The AOI runtime alone achieves 66.3% best@5 success on all 86 tasks, outperforming the prior state-of-the-art (41.9%) by 24.4 points. (2) Adding Observer GRPO training, a locally deployed 14B model reaches 42.9% avg@1 on 63 held-out tasks with unseen fault types, surpassing Claude Sonnet 4.5. (3) The Evolver converts 37 failed trajectories into diagnostic guidance, improving end-to-end avg@5 by 4.8 points while reducing variance by 35%.

Robots must operate safely when deployed in novel and human-centered environments, like homes. Current safe control approaches typically assume that the safety constraints are known a priori, and thus, the robot can pre-compute a corresponding safety controller. While this may make sense for some safety constraints (e.g., avoiding collision with walls by analyzing a floor plan), other constraints are more complex (e.g., spills), inherently personal, context-dependent, and can only be identified at deployment time when the robot is interacting in a specific environment and with a specific person (e.g., fragile objects, expensive rugs). Here, language provides a flexible mechanism to communicate these evolving safety constraints to the robot. In this work, we use vision language models (VLMs) to interpret language feedback and the robot's image observations to continuously update the robot's representation of safety constraints. With these inferred constraints, we update a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability safety controller online via efficient warm-starting techniques. Through simulation and hardware experiments, we demonstrate the robot's ability to infer and respect language-based safety constraints with the proposed approach.

Ensuring safety in Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically framed as a Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP), is crucial for real-world exploration applications. Current approaches in handling CMDP struggle to balance optimality and feasibility, as direct optimization methods cannot ensure state-wise in-training safety, and projection-based methods correct actions inefficiently through lengthy iterations. To address these challenges, we propose Adaptive Chance-constrained Safeguards (ACS), an adaptive, model-free safe RL algorithm using the safety recovery rate as a surrogate chance constraint to iteratively ensure safety during exploration and after achieving convergence. Theoretical analysis indicates that the relaxed probabilistic constraint sufficiently guarantees forward invariance to the safe set. And extensive experiments conducted on both simulated and real-world safety-critical tasks demonstrate its effectiveness in enforcing safety (nearly zero-violation) while preserving optimality (+23.8%), robustness, and fast response in stochastic real-world settings.

The rapid evolution of generative models has led to a continuous emergence of multimodal safety risks, exposing the limitations of existing defense methods. To address these challenges, we propose ProGuard, a vision-language proactive guard that identifies and describes out-of-distribution (OOD) safety risks without the need for model adjustments required by traditional reactive approaches. We first construct a modality-balanced dataset of 87K samples, each annotated with both binary safety labels and risk categories under a hierarchical multimodal safety taxonomy, effectively mitigating modality bias and ensuring consistent moderation across text, image, and text-image inputs. Based on this dataset, we train our vision-language base model purely through reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve efficient and concise reasoning. To approximate proactive safety scenarios in a controlled setting, we further introduce an OOD safety category inference task and augment the RL objective with a synonym-bank-based similarity reward that encourages the model to generate concise descriptions for unseen unsafe categories. Experimental results show that ProGuard achieves performance comparable to closed-source large models on binary safety classification, substantially outperforms existing open-source guard models on unsafe content categorization. Most notably, ProGuard delivers a strong proactive moderation ability, improving OOD risk detection by 52.6% and OOD risk description by 64.8%.

Aerial robots can enhance construction site productivity by autonomously handling inspection and mapping tasks. However, ensuring safe navigation near human workers remains challenging. While navigation in static environments has been well studied, navigating dynamic environments remains open due to challenges in perception and planning. Payload limitations restrict the robots to using cameras with limited fields of view, resulting in unreliable perception and tracking during collision avoidance. Moreover, the rapidly changing conditions of dynamic environments can quickly make the generated optimal trajectory outdated.To address these challenges, this paper presents a comprehensive navigation framework that integrates perception, intent prediction, and planning. Our perception module detects and tracks dynamic obstacles efficiently and handles tracking loss and occlusion during collision avoidance. The proposed intent prediction module employs a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to forecast potential actions of dynamic obstacles with the possible future trajectories. Finally, a novel intent-based planning algorithm, leveraging model predictive control (MPC), is applied to generate navigation trajectories. Simulation and physical experiments demonstrate that our method improves the safety of navigation by achieving the fewest collisions compared to benchmarks.

Intelligent vehicle cockpits present unique challenges for API Agents, requiring coordination across tightly-coupled subsystems that exceed typical task environments' complexity. Traditional Function Calling (FC) approaches operate statelessly, requiring multiple exploratory calls to build environmental awareness before execution, leading to inefficiency and limited error recovery. We introduce VehicleWorld, the first comprehensive environment for the automotive domain, featuring 30 modules, 250 APIs, and 680 properties with fully executable implementations that provide real-time state information during agent execution. This environment enables precise evaluation of vehicle agent behaviors across diverse, challenging scenarios. Through systematic analysis, we discovered that direct state prediction outperforms function calling for environmental control. Building on this insight, we propose State-based Function Call (SFC), a novel approach that maintains explicit system state awareness and implements direct state transitions to achieve target conditions. Experimental results demonstrate that SFC significantly outperforms traditional FC approaches, achieving superior execution accuracy and reduced latency. We have made all implementation code publicly available on Github https://github.com/OpenMOSS/VehicleWorld.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to control robotic systems such as drones, but their risks of causing physical threats and harm in real-world applications remain unexplored. Our study addresses the critical gap in evaluating LLM physical safety by developing a comprehensive benchmark for drone control. We classify the physical safety risks of drones into four categories: (1) human-targeted threats, (2) object-targeted threats, (3) infrastructure attacks, and (4) regulatory violations. Our evaluation of mainstream LLMs reveals an undesirable trade-off between utility and safety, with models that excel in code generation often performing poorly in crucial safety aspects. Furthermore, while incorporating advanced prompt engineering techniques such as In-Context Learning and Chain-of-Thought can improve safety, these methods still struggle to identify unintentional attacks. In addition, larger models demonstrate better safety capabilities, particularly in refusing dangerous commands. Our findings and benchmark can facilitate the design and evaluation of physical safety for LLMs. The project page is available at huggingface.co/spaces/TrustSafeAI/LLM-physical-safety.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models are emerging as a unified substrate for embodied intelligence. This shift raises a new class of safety challenges, stemming from the embodied nature of VLA systems, including irreversible physical consequences, a multimodal attack surface across vision, language, and state, real-time latency constraints on defense, error propagation over long-horizon trajectories, and vulnerabilities in the data supply chain. Yet the literature remains fragmented across robotic learning, adversarial machine learning, AI alignment, and autonomous systems safety. This survey provides a unified and up-to-date overview of safety in Vision-Language-Action models. We organize the field along two parallel timing axes, attack timing (training-time vs. inference-time and defense timing (training-time vs. inference-time, linking each class of threat to the stage at which it can be mitigated. We first define the scope of VLA safety, distinguishing it from text-only LLM safety and classical robotic safety, and review the foundations of VLA models, including architectures, training paradigms, and inference mechanisms. We then examine the literature through four lenses: Attacks, Defenses, Evaluation, and Deployment. We survey training-time threats such as data poisoning and backdoors, as well as inference-time attacks including adversarial patches, cross-modal perturbations, semantic jailbreaks, and freezing attacks. We review training-time and runtime defenses, analyze existing benchmarks and metrics, and discuss safety challenges across six deployment domains. Finally, we highlight key open problems, including certified robustness for embodied trajectories, physically realizable defenses, safety-aware training, unified runtime safety architectures, and standardized evaluation.

With the integration of large language models (LLMs), embodied agents have strong capabilities to understand and plan complicated natural language instructions. However, a foreseeable issue is that those embodied agents can also flawlessly execute some hazardous tasks, potentially causing damages in the real world. Existing benchmarks predominantly overlook critical safety risks, focusing solely on planning performance, while a few evaluate LLMs' safety awareness only on non-interactive image-text data. To address this gap, we present SafeAgentBench-the first benchmark for safety-aware task planning of embodied LLM agents in interactive simulation environments. SafeAgentBench includes: (1) an executable, diverse, and high-quality dataset of 750 tasks, rigorously curated to cover 10 potential hazards and 3 task types; (2) SafeAgentEnv, a universal embodied environment with a low-level controller, supporting multi-agent execution with 17 high-level actions for 8 state-of-the-art baselines; and (3) reliable evaluation methods from both execution and semantic perspectives. Experimental results show that, although agents based on different design frameworks exhibit substantial differences in task success rates, their overall safety awareness remains weak. The most safety-conscious baseline achieves only a 10\% rejection rate for detailed hazardous tasks. Moreover, simply replacing the LLM driving the agent does not lead to notable improvements in safety awareness. More details and code are available at https://github.com/shengyin1224/SafeAgentBench.

Occlusion-aware prediction remains a critical challenge in autonomous driving due to the inherent uncertainty of unobserved regions. Existing approaches either overestimate risk based on reachable states or struggle to predict accurate trajectories under high occlusion uncertainty. To address these limitations, we propose a unified risk map modeling and learning framework for partially observable environments. Our method integrates traffic flow risk and collision risk through spatiotemporal modeling, enabling fine-grained assessment of occlusion-induced hazards. To address the scarcity of scenarios involving occluded interactions, we introduce a diffusion-based scenario generation framework that produces realistic yet adversarial scenarios. We integrate the modeling and learning of a unified risk map into a framework that supports risk-aware planning under partial observability. Experiments on the Waymo Open Motion Dataset show that our method significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art occlusion-aware baseline, improving minimum time-to-collision by 0.78 times and average time-to-collision by 1.67 times. The proposed framework offers a comprehensive and practical solution for risk-aware planning in partially observable environments.

Evaluating the performance of autonomous vehicle planning algorithms necessitates simulating long-tail safety-critical traffic scenarios. However, traditional methods for generating such scenarios often fall short in terms of controllability and realism; they also neglect the dynamics of agent interactions. To address these limitations, we introduce SAFE-SIM, a novel diffusion-based controllable closed-loop safety-critical simulation framework. Our approach yields two distinct advantages: 1) generating realistic long-tail safety-critical scenarios that closely reflect real-world conditions, and 2) providing controllable adversarial behavior for more comprehensive and interactive evaluations. We develop a novel approach to simulate safety-critical scenarios through an adversarial term in the denoising process of diffusion models, which allows an adversarial agent to challenge a planner with plausible maneuvers while all agents in the scene exhibit reactive and realistic behaviors. Furthermore, we propose novel guidance objectives and a partial diffusion process that enables users to control key aspects of the scenarios, such as the collision type and aggressiveness of the adversarial agent, while maintaining the realism of the behavior. We validate our framework empirically using the nuScenes and nuPlan datasets across multiple planners, demonstrating improvements in both realism and controllability. These findings affirm that diffusion models provide a robust and versatile foundation for safety-critical, interactive traffic simulation, extending their utility across the broader autonomous driving landscape. Project website: https://safe-sim.github.io/.

The rapid evolution of embodied agents has accelerated the deployment of household robots in real-world environments. However, unlike structured industrial settings, household spaces introduce unpredictable safety risks, where system limitations such as perception latency and lack of common sense knowledge can lead to dangerous errors. Current safety evaluations, often restricted to static images, text, or general hazards, fail to adequately benchmark dynamic unsafe action detection in these specific contexts. To bridge this gap, we introduce HomeSafe-Bench, a challenging benchmark designed to evaluate Vision-Language Models (VLMs) on unsafe action detection in household scenarios. HomeSafe-Bench is contrusted via a hybrid pipeline combining physical simulation with advanced video generation and features 438 diverse cases across six functional areas with fine-grained multidimensional annotations. Beyond benchmarking, we propose Hierarchical Dual-Brain Guard for Household Safety (HD-Guard), a hierarchical streaming architecture for real-time safety monitoring. HD-Guard coordinates a lightweight FastBrain for continuous high-frequency screening with an asynchronous large-scale SlowBrain for deep multimodal reasoning, effectively balancing inference efficiency with detection accuracy. Evaluations demonstrate that HD-Guard achieves a superior trade-off between latency and performance, while our analysis identifies critical bottlenecks in current VLM-based safety detection.

Foundation models are routinely fine-tuned for use in particular domains, yet safety assessments are typically conducted only on base models, implicitly assuming that safety properties persist through downstream adaptation. We test this assumption by analyzing the safety behavior of 100 models, including widely deployed fine-tunes in the medical and legal domains as well as controlled adaptations of open foundation models alongside their bases. Across general-purpose and domain-specific safety benchmarks, we find that benign fine-tuning induces large, heterogeneous, and often contradictory changes in measured safety: models frequently improve on some instruments while degrading on others, with substantial disagreement across evaluations. These results show that safety behavior is not stable under ordinary downstream adaptation, raising critical questions about governance and deployment practices centered on base-model evaluations. Without explicit re-evaluation of fine-tuned models in deployment-relevant contexts, such approaches fall short of adequately managing downstream risk, overlooking practical sources of harm -- failures that are especially consequential in high-stakes settings and challenge current accountability paradigms.

Robust planning in interactive scenarios requires predicting the uncertain future to make risk-aware decisions. Unfortunately, due to long-tail safety-critical events, the risk is often under-estimated by finite-sampling approximations of probabilistic motion forecasts. This can lead to overconfident and unsafe robot behavior, even with robust planners. Instead of assuming full prediction coverage that robust planners require, we propose to make prediction itself risk-aware. We introduce a new prediction objective to learn a risk-biased distribution over trajectories, so that risk evaluation simplifies to an expected cost estimation under this biased distribution. This reduces the sample complexity of the risk estimation during online planning, which is needed for safe real-time performance. Evaluation results in a didactic simulation environment and on a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code and a demo are available.

Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) show promising potential in assistive tasks across various domains, including mobile device control. As these agents interact directly with personal information and device settings, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior is crucial to prevent undesirable outcomes. However, no benchmark exists for standardized evaluation of the safety of mobile device-control agents. In this work, we introduce MobileSafetyBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of device-control agents within a realistic mobile environment based on Android emulators. We develop a diverse set of tasks involving interactions with various mobile applications, including messaging and banking applications. To clearly evaluate safety apart from general capabilities, we design separate tasks measuring safety and tasks evaluating helpfulness. The safety tasks challenge agents with managing potential risks prevalent in daily life and include tests to evaluate robustness against indirect prompt injections. Our experiments demonstrate that while baseline agents, based on state-of-the-art LLMs, perform well in executing helpful tasks, they show poor performance in safety tasks. To mitigate these safety concerns, we propose a prompting method that encourages agents to prioritize safety considerations. While this method shows promise in promoting safer behaviors, there is still considerable room for improvement to fully earn user trust. This highlights the urgent need for continued research to develop more robust safety mechanisms in mobile environments. We open-source our benchmark at: https://mobilesafetybench.github.io/.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

Safe navigation is essential for autonomous systems operating in hazardous environments. Traditional planning methods excel at long-horizon tasks but rely on a predefined graph with fixed distance metrics. In contrast, safe Reinforcement Learning (RL) can learn complex behaviors without relying on manual heuristics but fails to solve long-horizon tasks, particularly in goal-conditioned and multi-agent scenarios. In this paper, we introduce a novel method that integrates the strengths of both planning and safe RL. Our method leverages goal-conditioned RL and safe RL to learn a goal-conditioned policy for navigation while concurrently estimating cumulative distance and safety levels using learned value functions via an automated self-training algorithm. By constructing a graph with states from the replay buffer, our method prunes unsafe edges and generates a waypoint-based plan that the agent follows until reaching its goal, effectively balancing faster and safer routes over extended distances. Utilizing this unified high-level graph and a shared low-level goal-conditioned safe RL policy, we extend this approach to address the multi-agent safe navigation problem. In particular, we leverage Conflict-Based Search (CBS) to create waypoint-based plans for multiple agents allowing for their safe navigation over extended horizons. This integration enhances the scalability of goal-conditioned safe RL in multi-agent scenarios, enabling efficient coordination among agents. Extensive benchmarking against state-of-the-art baselines demonstrates the effectiveness of our method in achieving distance goals safely for multiple agents in complex and hazardous environments. Our code and further details about or work is available at https://safe-visual-mapf-mers.csail.mit.edu/.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into numerous applications across various domains, LLMs' safety becomes a critical concern for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between safe and unsafe, or constrained by the narrow risk taxonomies of a single benchmark. To leverage these fine-grained safety taxonomies across multiple safety benchmarks, in this paper, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe input prompts and LLMs' outputs with violated safety taxonomies through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, our GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through our careful cold-start strategy and reward design. Consequently, our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that our GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, our GSPR not only demonstrates powerful safety generalization abilities but also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

Current safety evaluations for LLM-driven agents primarily focus on atomic harms, failing to address sophisticated threats where malicious intent is concealed or diluted within complex tasks. We address this gap with a two-dimensional analysis of agent safety brittleness under the orthogonal pressures of intent concealment and task complexity. To enable this, we introduce OASIS (Orthogonal Agent Safety Inquiry Suite), a hierarchical benchmark with fine-grained annotations and a high-fidelity simulation sandbox. Our findings reveal two critical phenomena: safety alignment degrades sharply and predictably as intent becomes obscured, and a "Complexity Paradox" emerges, where agents seem safer on harder tasks only due to capability limitations. By releasing OASIS and its simulation environment, we provide a principled foundation for probing and strengthening agent safety in these overlooked dimensions.

The current paradigm for safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) follows a one-size-fits-all approach: the model refuses to interact with any content deemed unsafe by the model provider. This approach lacks flexibility in the face of varying social norms across cultures and regions. In addition, users may have diverse safety needs, making a model with static safety standards too restrictive to be useful, as well as too costly to be re-aligned. We propose Controllable Safety Alignment (CoSA), a framework designed to adapt models to diverse safety requirements without re-training. Instead of aligning a fixed model, we align models to follow safety configs -- free-form natural language descriptions of the desired safety behaviors -- that are provided as part of the system prompt. To adjust model safety behavior, authorized users only need to modify such safety configs at inference time. To enable that, we propose CoSAlign, a data-centric method for aligning LLMs to easily adapt to diverse safety configs. Furthermore, we devise a novel controllability evaluation protocol that considers both helpfulness and configured safety, summarizing them into CoSA-Score, and construct CoSApien, a human-authored benchmark that consists of real-world LLM use cases with diverse safety requirements and corresponding evaluation prompts. We show that CoSAlign leads to substantial gains of controllability over strong baselines including in-context alignment. Our framework encourages better representation and adaptation to pluralistic human values in LLMs, and thereby increasing their practicality.

For autonomous vehicles, safe navigation in complex environments depends on handling a broad range of diverse and rare driving scenarios. Simulation- and scenario-based testing have emerged as key approaches to development and validation of autonomous driving systems. Traditional scenario generation relies on rule-based systems, knowledge-driven models, and data-driven synthesis, often producing limited diversity and unrealistic safety-critical cases. With the emergence of foundation models, which represent a new generation of pre-trained, general-purpose AI models, developers can process heterogeneous inputs (e.g., natural language, sensor data, HD maps, and control actions), enabling the synthesis and interpretation of complex driving scenarios. In this paper, we conduct a survey about the application of foundation models for scenario generation and scenario analysis in autonomous driving (as of May 2025). Our survey presents a unified taxonomy that includes large language models, vision-language models, multimodal large language models, diffusion models, and world models for the generation and analysis of autonomous driving scenarios. In addition, we review the methodologies, open-source datasets, simulation platforms, and benchmark challenges, and we examine the evaluation metrics tailored explicitly to scenario generation and analysis. Finally, the survey concludes by highlighting the open challenges and research questions, and outlining promising future research directions. All reviewed papers are listed in a continuously maintained repository, which contains supplementary materials and is available at https://github.com/TUM-AVS/FM-for-Scenario-Generation-Analysis.

Ensuring that AI systems reliably and robustly avoid harmful or dangerous behaviours is a crucial challenge, especially for AI systems with a high degree of autonomy and general intelligence, or systems used in safety-critical contexts. In this paper, we will introduce and define a family of approaches to AI safety, which we will refer to as guaranteed safe (GS) AI. The core feature of these approaches is that they aim to produce AI systems which are equipped with high-assurance quantitative safety guarantees. This is achieved by the interplay of three core components: a world model (which provides a mathematical description of how the AI system affects the outside world), a safety specification (which is a mathematical description of what effects are acceptable), and a verifier (which provides an auditable proof certificate that the AI satisfies the safety specification relative to the world model). We outline a number of approaches for creating each of these three core components, describe the main technical challenges, and suggest a number of potential solutions to them. We also argue for the necessity of this approach to AI safety, and for the inadequacy of the main alternative approaches.

Traditional autonomous driving systems often struggle to connect high-level reasoning with low-level control, leading to suboptimal and sometimes unsafe behaviors. Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs), which process both visual and textual data, offer an opportunity to unify perception and reasoning. However, effectively embedding precise safety knowledge into MLLMs for autonomous driving remains a significant challenge. To address this, we propose SafeAuto, a framework that enhances MLLM-based autonomous driving by incorporating both unstructured and structured knowledge. First, we introduce a Position-Dependent Cross-Entropy (PDCE) loss to improve low-level control signal predictions when values are represented as text. Second, to explicitly integrate safety knowledge, we develop a reasoning component that translates traffic rules into first-order logic (e.g., "red light implies stop") and embeds them into a probabilistic graphical model (e.g., Markov Logic Network) to verify predicted actions using recognized environmental attributes. Additionally, our Multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) model leverages video, control signals, and environmental attributes to learn from past driving experiences. Integrating PDCE, MLN, and Multimodal RAG, SafeAuto outperforms existing baselines across multiple datasets, enabling more accurate, reliable, and safer autonomous driving. The code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/SafeAuto.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning and instruction-following capabilities, yet their expanded modality space introduces new compositional safety risks that emerge from complex text-image interactions. Such cross-modal couplings can produce unsafe semantics even when individual inputs are benign, exposing the fragile safety awareness of current MLLMs. While recent works enhance safety by guiding models to reason about potential risks, unregulated reasoning traces may compromise alignment; although Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) offers self-rewarded refinement without human supervision, it lacks verifiable signals for reasoning safety. To address this, we propose SafeGRPO a self-rewarded multimodal safety alignment framework that integrates rule-governed reward construction into GRPO, enabling interpretable and verifiable optimization of reasoning safety. Built upon the constructed SafeTag-VL-3K dataset with explicit visual, textual, and combined safety tags, SafeGRPO performs step-guided safety thinking to enforce structured reasoning and behavior alignment, substantially improving multimodal safety awareness, compositional robustness, and reasoning stability across diverse benchmarks without sacrificing general capabilities.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

State-of-the-art language model fine-tuning techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), restrict user control by hard-coding predefined behaviors into the model. To address this, we propose a novel method, Configurable Safety Tuning (CST), that augments DPO using synthetic preference data to facilitate flexible safety configuration of LLMs at inference time. CST overcomes the constraints of vanilla DPO by introducing a system prompt specifying safety configurations, enabling LLM deployers to disable/enable safety preferences based on their need, just changing the system prompt. Our experimental evaluations indicate that CST successfully manages different safety configurations and retains the original functionality of LLMs, showing it is a robust method for configurable deployment. Data and models available at https://github.com/vicgalle/configurable-safety-tuning

We present a versatile NeRF-based simulator for testing autonomous driving (AD) software systems, designed with a focus on sensor-realistic closed-loop evaluation and the creation of safety-critical scenarios. The simulator learns from sequences of real-world driving sensor data and enables reconfigurations and renderings of new, unseen scenarios. In this work, we use our simulator to test the responses of AD models to safety-critical scenarios inspired by the European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP). Our evaluation reveals that, while state-of-the-art end-to-end planners excel in nominal driving scenarios in an open-loop setting, they exhibit critical flaws when navigating our safety-critical scenarios in a closed-loop setting. This highlights the need for advancements in the safety and real-world usability of end-to-end planners. By publicly releasing our simulator and scenarios as an easy-to-run evaluation suite, we invite the research community to explore, refine, and validate their AD models in controlled, yet highly configurable and challenging sensor-realistic environments. Code and instructions can be found at https://github.com/atonderski/neuro-ncap

Planning module is an essential component of intelligent vehicle study. In this paper, we address the risk-aware planning problem of UGVs through a global-local planning framework which seamlessly integrates risk assessment methods. In particular, a global planning algorithm named Coarse2fine A* is proposed, which incorporates a potential field approach to enhance the safety of the planning results while ensuring the efficiency of the algorithm. A deterministic sampling method for local planning is leveraged and modified to suit off-road environment. It also integrates a risk assessment model to emphasize the avoidance of local risks. The performance of the algorithm is demonstrated through simulation experiments by comparing it with baseline algorithms, where the results of Coarse2fine A* are shown to be approximately 30% safer than those of the baseline algorithms. The practicality and effectiveness of the proposed planning framework are validated by deploying it on a real-world system consisting of a control center and a practical UGV platform.

The open-world deployment of Machine Learning (ML) algorithms in safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles needs to address a variety of ML vulnerabilities such as interpretability, verifiability, and performance limitations. Research explores different approaches to improve ML dependability by proposing new models and training techniques to reduce generalization error, achieve domain adaptation, and detect outlier examples and adversarial attacks. However, there is a missing connection between ongoing ML research and well-established safety principles. In this paper, we present a structured and comprehensive review of ML techniques to improve the dependability of ML algorithms in uncontrolled open-world settings. From this review, we propose the Taxonomy of ML Safety that maps state-of-the-art ML techniques to key engineering safety strategies. Our taxonomy of ML safety presents a safety-oriented categorization of ML techniques to provide guidance for improving dependability of the ML design and development. The proposed taxonomy can serve as a safety checklist to aid designers in improving coverage and diversity of safety strategies employed in any given ML system.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

End-to-end paradigm has emerged as a promising approach to autonomous driving. However, existing single-agent end-to-end pipelines are often constrained by occlusion and limited perception range, resulting in hazardous driving. Furthermore, their black-box nature prevents the interpretability of the driving behavior, leading to an untrustworthiness system. To address these limitations, we introduce Risk Map as Middleware (RiskMM) and propose an interpretable cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The risk map learns directly from the driving data and provides an interpretable spatiotemporal representation of the scenario from the upstream perception and the interactions between the ego vehicle and the surrounding environment for downstream planning. RiskMM first constructs a multi-agent spatiotemporal representation with unified Transformer-based architecture, then derives risk-aware representations by modeling interactions among surrounding environments with attention. These representations are subsequently fed into a learning-based Model Predictive Control (MPC) module. The MPC planner inherently accommodates physical constraints and different vehicle types and can provide interpretation by aligning learned parameters with explicit MPC elements. Evaluations conducted on the real-world V2XPnP-Seq dataset confirm that RiskMM achieves superior and robust performance in risk-aware trajectory planning, significantly enhancing the interpretability of the cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The codebase will be released to facilitate future research in this field.

This paper explores the rapidly evolving ecosystem of publicly available AI models, and their potential implications on the security and safety landscape. As AI models become increasingly prevalent, understanding their potential risks and vulnerabilities is crucial. We review the current security and safety scenarios while highlighting challenges such as tracking issues, remediation, and the apparent absence of AI model lifecycle and ownership processes. Comprehensive strategies to enhance security and safety for both model developers and end-users are proposed. This paper aims to provide some of the foundational pieces for more standardized security, safety, and transparency in the development and operation of AI models and the larger open ecosystems and communities forming around them.

Autonomous vehicle (AV) systems rely on robust perception models as a cornerstone of safety assurance. However, objects encountered on the road exhibit a long-tailed distribution, with rare or unseen categories posing challenges to a deployed perception model. This necessitates an expensive process of continuously curating and annotating data with significant human effort. We propose to leverage recent advances in vision-language and large language models to design an Automatic Data Engine (AIDE) that automatically identifies issues, efficiently curates data, improves the model through auto-labeling, and verifies the model through generation of diverse scenarios. This process operates iteratively, allowing for continuous self-improvement of the model. We further establish a benchmark for open-world detection on AV datasets to comprehensively evaluate various learning paradigms, demonstrating our method's superior performance at a reduced cost.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) swarms offer versatile applications in logistics, agriculture, and surveillance, yet controlling them requires expert knowledge for safety and feasibility. Traditional static methods limit adaptability, while Large Language Models (LLMs) enable natural language control but generate unsafe trajectories due to lacking physical grounding. This paper introduces SkySim, a ROS2-based simulation framework in Gazebo that decouples LLM high-level planning from low-level safety enforcement. Using Gemini 3.5 Pro, SkySim translates user commands (e.g., "Form a circle") into spatial waypoints, informed by real-time drone states. An Artificial Potential Field (APF) safety filter applies minimal adjustments for collision avoidance, kinematic limits, and geo-fencing, ensuring feasible execution at 20 Hz. Experiments with swarms of 3, 10, and 30 Crazyflie drones validate spatial reasoning accuracy (100% across tested geometric primitives), real-time collision prevention, and scalability. SkySim empowers non-experts to iteratively refine behaviors, bridging AI cognition with robotic safety for dynamic environments. Future work targets hardware integration.

The o1 system card identifies the o1 models as the most robust within OpenAI, with their defining characteristic being the progression from rapid, intuitive thinking to slower, more deliberate reasoning. This observation motivated us to investigate the influence of System-2 thinking patterns on model safety. In our preliminary research, we conducted safety evaluations of the o1 model, including complex jailbreak attack scenarios using adversarial natural language prompts and mathematical encoding prompts. Our findings indicate that the o1 model demonstrates relatively improved safety performance; however, it still exhibits vulnerabilities, particularly against jailbreak attacks employing mathematical encoding. Through detailed case analysis, we identified specific patterns in the o1 model's responses. We also explored the alignment of System-2 safety in open-source models using prompt engineering and supervised fine-tuning techniques. Experimental results show that some simple methods to encourage the model to carefully scrutinize user requests are beneficial for model safety. Additionally, we proposed a implementation plan for process supervision to enhance safety alignment. The implementation details and experimental results will be provided in future versions.

Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various domains, gaining extensive attention from academia and industry. However, these agents raise significant concerns on AI safety due to their autonomous and non-deterministic behavior, as well as continuous evolving nature . From a DevOps perspective, enabling observability in agents is necessary to ensuring AI safety, as stakeholders can gain insights into the agents' inner workings, allowing them to proactively understand the agents, detect anomalies, and prevent potential failures. Therefore, in this paper, we present a comprehensive taxonomy of AgentOps, identifying the artifacts and associated data that should be traced throughout the entire lifecycle of agents to achieve effective observability. The taxonomy is developed based on a systematic mapping study of existing AgentOps tools. Our taxonomy serves as a reference template for developers to design and implement AgentOps infrastructure that supports monitoring, logging, and analytics. thereby ensuring AI safety.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in robotic systems presents unique safety challenges, particularly in unpredictable environments. Although LLMs, leveraging zero-shot learning, enhance human-robot interaction and decision-making capabilities, their inherent probabilistic nature and lack of formal guarantees raise significant concerns for safety-critical applications. Traditional model-based verification approaches often rely on precise system models, which are difficult to obtain for real-world robotic systems and may not be fully trusted due to modeling inaccuracies, unmodeled dynamics, or environmental uncertainties. To address these challenges, this paper introduces a safety assurance framework for LLM-controlled robots based on data-driven reachability analysis, a formal verification technique that ensures all possible system trajectories remain within safe operational limits. Our framework specifically investigates the problem of instructing an LLM to navigate the robot to a specified goal and assesses its ability to generate low-level control actions that successfully guide the robot safely toward that goal. By leveraging historical data to construct reachable sets of states for the robot-LLM system, our approach provides rigorous safety guarantees against unsafe behaviors without relying on explicit analytical models. We validate the framework through experimental case studies in autonomous navigation and task planning, demonstrating its effectiveness in mitigating risks associated with LLM-generated commands. This work advances the integration of formal methods into LLM-based robotics, offering a principled and practical approach to ensuring safety in next-generation autonomous systems.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents demonstrate strong autonomy, but their stochastic behavior introduces unpredictable safety risks. Existing rule-based enforcement systems, such as AgentSpec, are reactive, intervening only when unsafe behavior is imminent or has occurred, lacking foresight for long-horizon dependencies. To overcome these limitations, we present a proactive runtime enforcement framework for LLM agents. The framework abstracts agent behaviors into symbolic states and learns a Discrete-Time Markov Chain (DTMC) from execution traces. At runtime, it predicts the probability of leading to undesired behaviors and intervenes before violations occur when the estimated risk exceeds a user-defined threshold. Designed to provide PAC-correctness guarantee, the framework achieves statistically reliable enforcement of agent safety. We evaluate the framework across two safety-critical domains: autonomous vehicles and embodied agents. It proactively enforces safety and maintains high task performance, outperforming existing methods.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) pose critical safety challenges, as they are susceptible not only to adversarial attacks such as jailbreaking but also to inadvertently generating harmful content for benign users. While internal safety alignment via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a primary mitigation strategy, current methods often face a safety-utility trade-off: they either refuse benign queries out of excessive caution or overlook latent risks in cross-modal interactions. To resolve this, we introduce Pragma-VL, an end-to-end alignment algorithm that enables MLLMs to pragmatically arbitrate between safety and helpfulness. First, we enhance visual risk perception with a novel cold-start SFT stage. This is achieved by applying risk-aware clustering to the visual encoder and using an interleaved dataset of risk descriptions and high-quality data. Second, we introduce a theoretically-guaranteed reward model that leverages synergistic learning. We train it with a novel data augmentation method that assigns dynamic weights based on the queries, enabling contextual arbitration between safety and helpfulness. Extensive experiments show that Pragma-VL effectively balances safety and helpfulness, outperforming baselines by 5% to 20% on most multimodal safety benchmarks while preserving its general capabilities in areas such as mathematics and knowledge reasoning.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has produced substantial gains in reasoning, perception, and generative capability across language and vision. However, whether these advances yield commensurate improvements in safety remains unclear, in part due to fragmented evaluation practices limited to single modalities or threat models. In this report, we present an integrated safety evaluation of 7 frontier models: GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro, Qwen3-VL, Doubao 1.8, Grok 4.1 Fast, Nano Banana Pro, and Seedream 4.5. We evaluate each model across language, vision-language, and image generation settings using a unified protocol that integrates benchmark evaluation, adversarial evaluation, multilingual evaluation, and compliance evaluation. Aggregating our evaluations into safety leaderboards and model safety profiles across multiple evaluation modes reveals a sharply heterogeneous safety landscape. While GPT-5.2 demonstrates consistently strong and balanced safety performance across evaluations, other models exhibit pronounced trade-offs among benchmark safety, adversarial alignment, multilingual generalization, and regulatory compliance. Both language and vision-language modalities show significant vulnerability under adversarial evaluation, with all models degrading substantially despite strong results on standard benchmarks. Text-to-image models achieve relatively stronger alignment in regulated visual risk categories, yet remain brittle under adversarial or semantically ambiguous prompts. Overall, these results show that safety in frontier models is inherently multidimensional--shaped by modality, language, and evaluation scheme, underscoring the need for standardized safety evaluations to accurately assess real-world risk and guide responsible model development and deployment.

The success of large language models (LLMs) in scientific domains has heightened safety concerns, prompting numerous benchmarks to evaluate their scientific safety. Existing benchmarks often suffer from limited risk coverage and a reliance on subjective evaluation. To address these problems, we introduce SafeSci, a comprehensive framework for safety evaluation and enhancement in scientific contexts. SafeSci comprises SafeSciBench, a multi-disciplinary benchmark with 0.25M samples, and SafeSciTrain, a large-scale dataset containing 1.5M samples for safety enhancement. SafeSciBench distinguishes between safety knowledge and risk to cover extensive scopes and employs objective metrics such as deterministically answerable questions to mitigate evaluation bias. We evaluate 24 advanced LLMs, revealing critical vulnerabilities in current models. We also observe that LLMs exhibit varying degrees of excessive refusal behaviors on safety-related issues. For safety enhancement, we demonstrate that fine-tuning on SafeSciTrain significantly enhances the safety alignment of models. Finally, we argue that knowledge is a double-edged sword, and determining the safety of a scientific question should depend on specific context, rather than universally categorizing it as safe or unsafe. Our work provides both a diagnostic tool and a practical resource for building safer scientific AI systems.

Recognizing safety violations in construction environments is critical yet remains underexplored in computer vision. Existing models predominantly rely on 2D object detection, which fails to capture the complexities of real-world violations due to: (i) an oversimplified task formulation treating violation recognition merely as object detection, (ii) inadequate validation under realistic conditions, (iii) absence of standardized baselines, and (iv) limited scalability from the unavailability of synthetic dataset generators for diverse construction scenarios. To address these challenges, we introduce Safe-Construct, the first framework that reformulates violation recognition as a 3D multi-view engagement task, leveraging scene-level worker-object context and 3D spatial understanding. We also propose the Synthetic Indoor Construction Site Generator (SICSG) to create diverse, scalable training data, overcoming data limitations. Safe-Construct achieves a 7.6% improvement over state-of-the-art methods across four violation types. We rigorously evaluate our approach in near-realistic settings, incorporating four violations, four workers, 14 objects, and challenging conditions like occlusions (worker-object, worker-worker) and variable illumination (back-lighting, overexposure, sunlight). By integrating 3D multi-view spatial understanding and synthetic data generation, Safe-Construct sets a new benchmark for scalable and robust safety monitoring in high-risk industries. Project Website: https://Safe-Construct.github.io/Safe-Construct

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for downstream tasks is a widely adopted approach, but it often leads to safety degradation in safety-aligned LLMs. Currently, many solutions address this issue by incorporating additional safety data, which can be impractical in many cases. In this paper, we address the question: How can we improve downstream task performance while preserving safety in LLMs without relying on additional safety data? We propose a simple and effective method that maintains the inherent safety of LLMs while enhancing their downstream task performance: merging the weights of pre- and post-fine-tuned safety-aligned models. Experimental results across various downstream tasks, models, and merging methods demonstrate that this approach effectively mitigates safety degradation while improving downstream task performance, offering a practical solution for adapting safety-aligned LLMs.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) that interact with real computer systems can perform automated tasks but face critical safety risks. Ambiguous instructions may trigger harmful actions, and adversarial users can manipulate tool execution to achieve malicious goals. Existing benchmarks mostly focus on short-horizon or GUI-based tasks, evaluating on execution-time errors but overlooking the ability to anticipate planning-time risks. To fill this gap, we present LPS-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates the planning-time safety awareness of MCP-based CUAs under long-horizon tasks, covering both benign and adversarial interactions across 65 scenarios of 7 task domains and 9 risk types. We introduce a multi-agent automated pipeline for scalable data generation and adopt an LLM-as-a-judge evaluation protocol to assess safety awareness through the planning trajectory. Experiments reveal substantial deficiencies in existing CUAs' ability to maintain safe behavior. We further analyze the risks and propose mitigation strategies to improve long-horizon planning safety in MCP-based CUA systems. We open-source our code at https://github.com/tychenn/LPS-Bench.

The rapid rise of open-weight and open-source foundation models is intensifying the obligation and reshaping the opportunity to make AI systems safe. This paper reports outcomes from the Columbia Convening on AI Openness and Safety (San Francisco, 19 Nov 2024) and its six-week preparatory programme involving more than forty-five researchers, engineers, and policy leaders from academia, industry, civil society, and government. Using a participatory, solutions-oriented process, the working groups produced (i) a research agenda at the intersection of safety and open source AI; (ii) a mapping of existing and needed technical interventions and open source tools to safely and responsibly deploy open foundation models across the AI development workflow; and (iii) a mapping of the content safety filter ecosystem with a proposed roadmap for future research and development. We find that openness -- understood as transparent weights, interoperable tooling, and public governance -- can enhance safety by enabling independent scrutiny, decentralized mitigation, and culturally plural oversight. However, significant gaps persist: scarce multimodal and multilingual benchmarks, limited defenses against prompt-injection and compositional attacks in agentic systems, and insufficient participatory mechanisms for communities most affected by AI harms. The paper concludes with a roadmap of five priority research directions, emphasizing participatory inputs, future-proof content filters, ecosystem-wide safety infrastructure, rigorous agentic safeguards, and expanded harm taxonomies. These recommendations informed the February 2025 French AI Action Summit and lay groundwork for an open, plural, and accountable AI safety discipline.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

Autonomous systems, such as self-driving cars and drones, have made significant strides in recent years by leveraging visual inputs and machine learning for decision-making and control. Despite their impressive performance, these vision-based controllers can make erroneous predictions when faced with novel or out-of-distribution inputs. Such errors can cascade into catastrophic system failures and compromise system safety. In this work, we compute Neural Reachable Tubes, which act as parameterized approximations of Backward Reachable Tubes to stress-test the vision-based controllers and mine their failure modes. The identified failures are then used to enhance the system safety through both offline and online methods. The online approach involves training a classifier as a run-time failure monitor to detect closed-loop, system-level failures, subsequently triggering a fallback controller that robustly handles these detected failures to preserve system safety. For the offline approach, we improve the original controller via incremental training using a carefully augmented failure dataset, resulting in a more robust controller that is resistant to the known failure modes. In either approach, the system is safeguarded against shortcomings that transcend the vision-based controller and pertain to the closed-loop safety of the overall system. We validate the proposed approaches on an autonomous aircraft taxiing task that involves using a vision-based controller to guide the aircraft towards the centerline of the runway. Our results show the efficacy of the proposed algorithms in identifying and handling system-level failures, outperforming methods that rely on controller prediction error or uncertainty quantification for identifying system failures.

Recent advancements in world models have revolutionized dynamic environment simulation, allowing systems to foresee future states and assess potential actions. In autonomous driving, these capabilities help vehicles anticipate the behavior of other road users, perform risk-aware planning, accelerate training in simulation, and adapt to novel scenarios, thereby enhancing safety and reliability. Current approaches exhibit deficiencies in maintaining robust 3D geometric consistency or accumulating artifacts during occlusion handling, both critical for reliable safety assessment in autonomous navigation tasks. To address this, we introduce GeoDrive, which explicitly integrates robust 3D geometry conditions into driving world models to enhance spatial understanding and action controllability. Specifically, we first extract a 3D representation from the input frame and then obtain its 2D rendering based on the user-specified ego-car trajectory. To enable dynamic modeling, we propose a dynamic editing module during training to enhance the renderings by editing the positions of the vehicles. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms existing models in both action accuracy and 3D spatial awareness, leading to more realistic, adaptable, and reliable scene modeling for safer autonomous driving. Additionally, our model can generalize to novel trajectories and offers interactive scene editing capabilities, such as object editing and object trajectory control.

Autonomous driving has seen significant progress, driven by extensive real-world data. However, in long-tail scenarios, accurately predicting the safety of the ego vehicle's future motion remains a major challenge due to uncertainties in dynamic environments and limitations in data coverage. In this work, we aim to explore whether it is possible to enhance the motion risk prediction capabilities of Vision-Language Models (VLM) by synthesizing high-risk motion data. Specifically, we introduce a Bird's-Eye View (BEV) based motion simulation method to model risks from three aspects: the ego-vehicle, other vehicles, and the environment. This allows us to synthesize plug-and-play, high-risk motion data suitable for VLM training, which we call DriveMRP-10K. Furthermore, we design a VLM-agnostic motion risk estimation framework, named DriveMRP-Agent. This framework incorporates a novel information injection strategy for global context, ego-vehicle perspective, and trajectory projection, enabling VLMs to effectively reason about the spatial relationships between motion waypoints and the environment. Extensive experiments demonstrate that by fine-tuning with DriveMRP-10K, our DriveMRP-Agent framework can significantly improve the motion risk prediction performance of multiple VLM baselines, with the accident recognition accuracy soaring from 27.13% to 88.03%. Moreover, when tested via zero-shot evaluation on an in-house real-world high-risk motion dataset, DriveMRP-Agent achieves a significant performance leap, boosting the accuracy from base_model's 29.42% to 68.50%, which showcases the strong generalization capabilities of our method in real-world scenarios.

Considering the functionality of situational awareness in safety-critical automation systems, the perception of risk in driving scenes and its explainability is of particular importance for autonomous and cooperative driving. Toward this goal, this paper proposes a new research direction of joint risk localization in driving scenes and its risk explanation as a natural language description. Due to the lack of standard benchmarks, we collected a large-scale dataset, DRAMA (Driving Risk Assessment Mechanism with A captioning module), which consists of 17,785 interactive driving scenarios collected in Tokyo, Japan. Our DRAMA dataset accommodates video- and object-level questions on driving risks with associated important objects to achieve the goal of visual captioning as a free-form language description utilizing closed and open-ended responses for multi-level questions, which can be used to evaluate a range of visual captioning capabilities in driving scenarios. We make this data available to the community for further research. Using DRAMA, we explore multiple facets of joint risk localization and captioning in interactive driving scenarios. In particular, we benchmark various multi-task prediction architectures and provide a detailed analysis of joint risk localization and risk captioning. The data set is available at https://usa.honda-ri.com/drama

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in understanding visual content, but their reliability in safety-critical contexts remains under-explored. We introduce VERI (Visual Emergency Recognition Dataset), a carefully designed diagnostic benchmark of 200 images (100 contrastive pairs). Each emergency scene is matched with a visually similar but safe counterpart through multi-stage human verification and iterative refinement. Using a two-stage protocol - risk identification and emergency response - we evaluate 14 VLMs (2B-124B parameters) across medical emergencies, accidents, and natural disasters. Our analysis reveals a systematic overreaction problem: models excel at identifying real emergencies (70-100 percent success rate) but suffer from an alarming rate of false alarms, misidentifying 31-96 percent of safe situations as dangerous, with 10 scenarios failed by all models regardless of scale. This "better-safe-than-sorry" bias manifests primarily through contextual overinterpretation (88-93 percent of errors), challenging VLMs' reliability for safety applications. These findings highlight persistent limitations that are not resolved by increasing model scale, motivating targeted approaches for improving contextual safety assessment in visually misleading scenarios.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

The current safeguard mechanisms for large language models (LLMs) are indeed susceptible to jailbreak attacks, making them inherently fragile. Even the process of fine-tuning on apparently benign data for downstream tasks can jeopardize safety. One potential solution is to conduct safety fine-tuning subsequent to downstream fine-tuning. However, there's a risk of catastrophic forgetting during safety fine-tuning, where LLMs may regain safety measures but lose the task-specific knowledge acquired during downstream fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce a safety realignment framework through subspace-oriented model fusion (SOMF), aiming to combine the safeguard capabilities of initially aligned model and the current fine-tuned model into a realigned model. Our approach begins by disentangling all task vectors from the weights of each fine-tuned model. We then identify safety-related regions within these vectors by subspace masking techniques. Finally, we explore the fusion of the initial safely aligned LLM with all task vectors based on the identified safety subspace. We validate that our safety realignment framework satisfies the safety requirements of a single fine-tuned model as well as multiple models during their fusion. Our findings confirm that SOMF preserves safety without notably compromising performance on downstream tasks, including instruction following in Chinese, English, and Hindi, as well as problem-solving capabilities in Code and Math.

We introduce LlavaGuard, a family of VLM-based safeguard models, offering a versatile framework for evaluating the safety compliance of visual content. Specifically, we designed LlavaGuard for dataset annotation and generative model safeguarding. To this end, we collected and annotated a high-quality visual dataset incorporating a broad safety taxonomy, which we use to tune VLMs on context-aware safety risks. As a key innovation, LlavaGuard's new responses contain comprehensive information, including a safety rating, the violated safety categories, and an in-depth rationale. Further, our introduced customizable taxonomy categories enable the context-specific alignment of LlavaGuard to various scenarios. Our experiments highlight the capabilities of LlavaGuard in complex and real-world applications. We provide checkpoints ranging from 7B to 34B parameters demonstrating state-of-the-art performance, with even the smallest models outperforming baselines like GPT-4. We make our dataset and model weights publicly available and invite further research to address the diverse needs of communities and contexts.

With the development of artificial intelligence, dialogue systems have been endowed with amazing chit-chat capabilities, and there is widespread interest and discussion about whether the generated contents are socially beneficial. In this paper, we present a new perspective of research scope towards building a safe, responsible, and modal dialogue system, including 1) abusive and toxic contents, 2) unfairness and discrimination, 3) ethics and morality issues, and 4) risk of misleading and privacy information. Besides, we review the mainstream methods for evaluating the safety of large models from the perspectives of exposure and detection of safety issues. The recent advances in methodologies for the safety improvement of both end-to-end dialogue systems and pipeline-based models are further introduced. Finally, we discussed six existing challenges towards responsible AI: explainable safety monitoring, continuous learning of safety issues, robustness against malicious attacks, multimodal information processing, unified research framework, and multidisciplinary theory integration. We hope this survey will inspire further research toward safer dialogue systems.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance in understanding and generating long sequences, new safety concerns have been introduced through the long context. However, the safety of LLMs in long-context tasks remains under-explored, leaving a significant gap in both evaluation and improvement of their safety. To address this, we introduce LongSafety, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLM safety in open-ended long-context tasks. LongSafety encompasses 7 categories of safety issues and 6 user-oriented long-context tasks, with a total of 1,543 test cases, averaging 5,424 words per context. Our evaluation towards 16 representative LLMs reveals significant safety vulnerabilities, with most models achieving safety rates below 55%. Our findings also indicate that strong safety performance in short-context scenarios does not necessarily correlate with safety in long-context tasks, emphasizing the unique challenges and urgency of improving long-context safety. Moreover, through extensive analysis, we identify challenging safety issues and task types for long-context models. Furthermore, we find that relevant context and extended input sequences can exacerbate safety risks in long-context scenarios, highlighting the critical need for ongoing attention to long-context safety challenges. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/LongSafety.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, safety guardrails are required to go beyond coarse-grained filtering and support fine-grained, interpretable, and adaptable risk assessment. However, existing solutions often rely on rapid classification schemes or post-hoc rules, resulting in limited transparency, inflexible policies, or prohibitive inference costs. To this end, we present YuFeng-XGuard, a reasoning-centric guardrail model family designed to perform multi-dimensional risk perception for LLM interactions. Instead of producing opaque binary judgments, YuFeng-XGuard generates structured risk predictions, including explicit risk categories and configurable confidence scores, accompanied by natural language explanations that expose the underlying reasoning process. This formulation enables safety decisions that are both actionable and interpretable. To balance decision latency and explanatory depth, we adopt a tiered inference paradigm that performs an initial risk decision based on the first decoded token, while preserving ondemand explanatory reasoning when required. In addition, we introduce a dynamic policy mechanism that decouples risk perception from policy enforcement, allowing safety policies to be adjusted without model retraining. Extensive experiments on a diverse set of public safety benchmarks demonstrate that YuFeng-XGuard achieves stateof-the-art performance while maintaining strong efficiency-efficacy trade-offs. We release YuFeng-XGuard as an open model family, including both a full-capacity variant and a lightweight version, to support a wide range of deployment scenarios.

Large language model (LLM)-based AI agents extend LLM capabilities by enabling access to tools such as data sources, APIs, search engines, code sandboxes, and even other agents. While this empowers agents to perform complex tasks, LLMs may invoke unintended tool interactions and introduce risks, such as leaking sensitive data or overwriting critical records, which are unacceptable in enterprise contexts. Current approaches to mitigate these risks, such as model-based safeguards, enhance agents' reliability but cannot guarantee system safety. Methods like information flow control (IFC) and temporal constraints aim to provide guarantees but often require extensive human annotation. We propose a process that starts with applying System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to identify hazards in agent workflows, derive safety requirements, and formalize them as enforceable specifications on data flows and tool sequences. To enable this, we introduce a capability-enhanced Model Context Protocol (MCP) framework that requires structured labels on capabilities, confidentiality, and trust level. Together, these contributions aim to shift LLM-based agent safety from ad hoc reliability fixes to proactive guardrails with formal guarantees, while reducing dependence on user confirmation and making autonomy a deliberate design choice.

Verification and validation of autonomous driving (AD) systems and components is of increasing importance, as such technology increases in real-world prevalence. Safety-critical scenario generation is a key approach to robustify AD policies through closed-loop training. However, existing approaches for scenario generation rely on simplistic objectives, resulting in overly-aggressive or non-reactive adversarial behaviors. To generate diverse adversarial yet realistic scenarios, we propose SEAL, a scenario perturbation approach which leverages learned objective functions and adversarial, human-like skills. SEAL-perturbed scenarios are more realistic than SOTA baselines, leading to improved ego task success across real-world, in-distribution, and out-of-distribution scenarios, of more than 20%. To facilitate future research, we release our code and tools: https://github.com/cmubig/SEAL

This paper presents a comprehensive empirical study on the safety alignment capabilities. We evaluate what matters for safety alignment in LLMs and LRMs to provide essential insights for developing more secure and reliable AI systems. We systematically investigate and compare the influence of six critical intrinsic model characteristics and three external attack techniques. Our large-scale evaluation is conducted using 32 recent, popular LLMs and LRMs across thirteen distinct model families, spanning a parameter scale from 3B to 235B. The assessment leverages five established safety datasets and probes model vulnerabilities with 56 jailbreak techniques and four CoT attack strategies, resulting in 4.6M API calls. Our key empirical findings are fourfold. First, we identify the LRMs GPT-OSS-20B, Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, and GPT-OSS-120B as the top-three safest models, which substantiates the significant advantage of integrated reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms for robust safety alignment. Second, post-training and knowledge distillation may lead to a systematic degradation of safety alignment. We thus argue that safety must be treated as an explicit constraint or a core optimization objective during these stages, not merely subordinated to the pursuit of general capability. Third, we reveal a pronounced vulnerability: employing a CoT attack via a response prefix can elevate the attack success rate by 3.34x on average and from 0.6% to 96.3% for Seed-OSS-36B-Instruct. This critical finding underscores the safety risks inherent in text-completion interfaces and features that allow user-defined response prefixes in LLM services, highlighting an urgent need for architectural and deployment safeguards. Fourth, roleplay, prompt injection, and gradient-based search for adversarial prompts are the predominant methodologies for eliciting unaligned behaviors in modern models.

We present a tool-supported approach for the synthesis, verification and validation of the control software responsible for the safety of the human-robot interaction in manufacturing processes that use collaborative robots. In human-robot collaboration, software-based safety controllers are used to improve operational safety, e.g., by triggering shutdown mechanisms or emergency stops to avoid accidents. Complex robotic tasks and increasingly close human-robot interaction pose new challenges to controller developers and certification authorities. Key among these challenges is the need to assure the correctness of safety controllers under explicit (and preferably weak) assumptions. Our controller synthesis, verification and validation approach is informed by the process, risk analysis, and relevant safety regulations for the target application. Controllers are selected from a design space of feasible controllers according to a set of optimality criteria, are formally verified against correctness criteria, and are translated into executable code and validated in a digital twin. The resulting controller can detect the occurrence of hazards, move the process into a safe state, and, in certain circumstances, return the process to an operational state from which it can resume its original task. We show the effectiveness of our software engineering approach through a case study involving the development of a safety controller for a manufacturing work cell equipped with a collaborative robot.

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

This paper introduces Galactic Bioware's Life Support System, a semi-closed-circuit breathing apparatus designed for integration into a positive-pressure firefighting suit and governed by an AI control system. The breathing loop incorporates a soda lime CO2 scrubber, a silica gel dehumidifier, and pure O2 replenishment with finite consumables. One-way exhaust valves maintain positive pressure while creating a semi-closed system in which outward venting gradually depletes the gas inventory. Part I develops the physicochemical foundations from first principles, including state-consistent thermochemistry, stoichiometric capacity limits, adsorption isotherms, and oxygen-management constraints arising from both fire safety and toxicity. Part II introduces an AI control architecture that fuses three sensor tiers, external environmental sensing, internal suit atmosphere sensing (with triple-redundant O2 cells and median voting), and firefighter biometrics. The controller combines receding-horizon model-predictive control (MPC) with a learned metabolic model and a reinforcement learning (RL) policy advisor, with all candidate actuator commands passing through a final control-barrier-function safety filter before reaching the hardware. This architecture is intended to optimize performance under unknown mission duration and exertion profiles. In this paper we introduce an 18-state, 3-control nonlinear state-space formulation using only sensors viable in structural firefighting, with triple-redundant O2 sensing and median voting. Finally, we introduce an MPC framework with a dynamic resource scarcity multiplier, an RL policy advisor for warm-starting, and a final control-barrier-function safety filter through which all actuator commands must pass, demonstrating 18-34% endurance improvement in simulation over PID baselines while maintaining tighter physiological and fire-safety margins.

Ensuring safety in reinforcement learning (RL)-based robotic systems is a critical challenge, especially in contact-rich tasks within unstructured environments. While the state-of-the-art safe RL approaches mitigate risks through safe exploration or high-level recovery mechanisms, they often overlook low-level execution safety, where reflexive responses to potential hazards are crucial. Similarly, variable impedance control (VIC) enhances safety by adjusting the robot's mechanical response, yet lacks a systematic way to adapt parameters, such as stiffness and damping throughout the task. In this paper, we propose Bresa, a Bio-inspired Reflexive Hierarchical Safe RL method inspired by biological reflexes. Our method decouples task learning from safety learning, incorporating a safety critic network that evaluates action risks and operates at a higher frequency than the task solver. Unlike existing recovery-based methods, our safety critic functions at a low-level control layer, allowing real-time intervention when unsafe conditions arise. The task-solving RL policy, running at a lower frequency, focuses on high-level planning (decision-making), while the safety critic ensures instantaneous safety corrections. We validate Bresa on multiple tasks including a contact-rich robotic task, demonstrating its reflexive ability to enhance safety, and adaptability in unforeseen dynamic environments. Our results show that Bresa outperforms the baseline, providing a robust and reflexive safety mechanism that bridges the gap between high-level planning and low-level execution. Real-world experiments and supplementary material are available at project website https://jack-sherman01.github.io/Bresa.

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have expanded the capabilities of traditional language models by enabling interaction through both text and images. However, ensuring the safety of these models remains a significant challenge, particularly in accurately identifying whether multimodal content is safe or unsafe-a capability we term safety awareness. In this paper, we introduce MMSafeAware, the first comprehensive multimodal safety awareness benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs across 29 safety scenarios with 1500 carefully curated image-prompt pairs. MMSafeAware includes both unsafe and over-safety subsets to assess models abilities to correctly identify unsafe content and avoid over-sensitivity that can hinder helpfulness. Evaluating nine widely used MLLMs using MMSafeAware reveals that current models are not sufficiently safe and often overly sensitive; for example, GPT-4V misclassifies 36.1% of unsafe inputs as safe and 59.9% of benign inputs as unsafe. We further explore three methods to improve safety awareness-prompting-based approaches, visual contrastive decoding, and vision-centric reasoning fine-tuning-but find that none achieve satisfactory performance. Our findings highlight the profound challenges in developing MLLMs with robust safety awareness, underscoring the need for further research in this area. All the code and data will be publicly available to facilitate future research.

Before deploying autonomous agents in the real world, we need to be confident they will perform safely in novel situations. Ideally, we would expose agents to a very wide range of situations during training, allowing them to learn about every possible danger, but this is often impractical. This paper investigates safety and generalization from a limited number of training environments in deep reinforcement learning (RL). We find RL algorithms can fail dangerously on unseen test environments even when performing perfectly on training environments. Firstly, in a gridworld setting, we show that catastrophes can be significantly reduced with simple modifications, including ensemble model averaging and the use of a blocking classifier. In the more challenging CoinRun environment we find similar methods do not significantly reduce catastrophes. However, we do find that the uncertainty information from the ensemble is useful for predicting whether a catastrophe will occur within a few steps and hence whether human intervention should be requested.

Recent advances in AI agents capable of solving complex, everyday tasks, from scheduling to customer service, have enabled deployment in real-world settings, but their possibilities for unsafe behavior demands rigorous evaluation. While prior benchmarks have attempted to assess agent safety, most fall short by relying on simulated environments, narrow task domains, or unrealistic tool abstractions. We introduce OpenAgentSafety, a comprehensive and modular framework for evaluating agent behavior across eight critical risk categories. Unlike prior work, our framework evaluates agents that interact with real tools, including web browsers, code execution environments, file systems, bash shells, and messaging platforms; and supports over 350 multi-turn, multi-user tasks spanning both benign and adversarial user intents. OpenAgentSafety is designed for extensibility, allowing researchers to add tools, tasks, websites, and adversarial strategies with minimal effort. It combines rule-based analysis with LLM-as-judge assessments to detect both overt and subtle unsafe behaviors. Empirical analysis of five prominent LLMs in agentic scenarios reveals unsafe behavior in 51.2% of safety-vulnerable tasks with Claude-Sonnet-3.7, to 72.7% with o3-mini, highlighting critical safety vulnerabilities and the need for stronger safeguards before real-world deployment.

Current methods for content safety in Large Language Models (LLMs), such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), often rely on multi-stage training pipelines and lack fine-grained, post-deployment controllability. To address these limitations, we propose a unified co-training framework that efficiently integrates multiple safety behaviors: positive (lawful/prosocial), negative (unfiltered/risk-prone) and rejective (refusal-oriented/conservative) within a single SFT stage. Notably, each behavior is dynamically activated via a simple system-level instruction, or magic token, enabling stealthy and efficient behavioral switching at inference time. This flexibility supports diverse deployment scenarios, such as positive for safe user interaction, negative for internal red-teaming, and rejective for context-aware refusals triggered by upstream moderation signals. This co-training strategy induces a distinct Safety Alignment Margin in the output space, characterized by well-separated response distributions corresponding to each safety mode. The existence of this margin provides empirical evidence for the model's safety robustness and enables unprecedented fine-grained control. Experiments show that our method matches the safety alignment quality of SFT+DPO, with our 8B model notably surpassing DeepSeek-R1 (671B) in safety performance, while significantly reducing both training complexity and deployment costs. This work presents a scalable, efficient, and highly controllable solution for LLM content safety.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.

With the rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), ensuring their safety has emerged as a crucial area of research. This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of LVLM safety, covering key aspects such as attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods. We introduce a unified framework that integrates these interrelated components, offering a holistic perspective on the vulnerabilities of LVLMs and the corresponding mitigation strategies. Through an analysis of the LVLM lifecycle, we introduce a classification framework that distinguishes between inference and training phases, with further subcategories to provide deeper insights. Furthermore, we highlight limitations in existing research and outline future directions aimed at strengthening the robustness of LVLMs. As part of our research, we conduct a set of safety evaluations on the latest LVLM, Deepseek Janus-Pro, and provide a theoretical analysis of the results. Our findings provide strategic recommendations for advancing LVLM safety and ensuring their secure and reliable deployment in high-stakes, real-world applications. This survey aims to serve as a cornerstone for future research, facilitating the development of models that not only push the boundaries of multimodal intelligence but also adhere to the highest standards of security and ethical integrity. Furthermore, to aid the growing research in this field, we have created a public repository to continuously compile and update the latest work on LVLM safety: https://github.com/XuankunRong/Awesome-LVLM-Safety .

Modern automobiles have evolved from just being mechanical machines to having full-fledged electronics systems that enhance vehicle dynamics and driver experience. However, these complex hardware and software systems, if not properly designed, can experience failures that can compromise the safety of the vehicle, its occupants, and the surrounding environment. For example, a system to activate the brakes to avoid a collision saves lives when it functions properly, but could lead to tragic outcomes if the brakes were applied in a way that's inconsistent with the design. Broadly speaking, the analysis performed to minimize such risks falls into a systems engineering domain called Functional Safety. In this paper, we present SafetyLens, a visual data analysis tool to assist engineers and analysts in analyzing automotive Functional Safety datasets. SafetyLens combines techniques including network exploration and visual comparison to help analysts perform domain-specific tasks. This paper presents the design study with domain experts that resulted in the design guidelines, the tool, and user feedback.

As large language models are integrated into society, robustness toward a suite of prompts is increasingly important to maintain reliability in a high-variance environment.Robustness evaluations must comprehensively encapsulate the various settings in which a user may invoke an intelligent system. This paper proposes ASSERT, Automated Safety Scenario Red Teaming, consisting of three methods -- semantically aligned augmentation, target bootstrapping, and adversarial knowledge injection. For robust safety evaluation, we apply these methods in the critical domain of AI safety to algorithmically generate a test suite of prompts covering diverse robustness settings -- semantic equivalence, related scenarios, and adversarial. We partition our prompts into four safety domains for a fine-grained analysis of how the domain affects model performance. Despite dedicated safeguards in existing state-of-the-art models, we find statistically significant performance differences of up to 11% in absolute classification accuracy among semantically related scenarios and error rates of up to 19% absolute error in zero-shot adversarial settings, raising concerns for users' physical safety.

Current approaches to LLM safety fundamentally rely on a brittle cat-and-mouse game of identifying and blocking known threats via guardrails. We argue for a fresh approach: robust safety comes not from enumerating what is harmful, but from deeply understanding what is safe. We introduce Trust The Typical (T3), a framework that operationalizes this principle by treating safety as an out-of-distribution (OOD) detection problem. T3 learns the distribution of acceptable prompts in a semantic space and flags any significant deviation as a potential threat. Unlike prior methods, it requires no training on harmful examples, yet achieves state-of-the-art performance across 18 benchmarks spanning toxicity, hate speech, jailbreaking, multilingual harms, and over-refusal, reducing false positive rates by up to 40x relative to specialized safety models. A single model trained only on safe English text transfers effectively to diverse domains and over 14 languages without retraining. Finally, we demonstrate production readiness by integrating a GPU-optimized version into vLLM, enabling continuous guardrailing during token generation with less than 6% overhead even under dense evaluation intervals on large-scale workloads.

Text-to-image (T2I) models are widespread, but their limited safety guardrails expose end users to harmful content and potentially allow for model misuse. Current safety measures are typically limited to text-based filtering or concept removal strategies, able to remove just a few concepts from the model's generative capabilities. In this work, we introduce AlignGuard, a method for safety alignment of T2I models. We enable the application of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) for safety purposes in T2I models by synthetically generating a dataset of harmful and safe image-text pairs, which we call CoProV2. Using a custom DPO strategy and this dataset, we train safety experts, in the form of low-rank adaptation (LoRA) matrices, able to guide the generation process away from specific safety-related concepts. Then, we merge the experts into a single LoRA using a novel merging strategy for optimal scaling performance. This expert-based approach enables scalability, allowing us to remove 7x more harmful concepts from T2I models compared to baselines. AlignGuard consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art on many benchmarks and establishes new practices for safety alignment in T2I networks. Code and data will be shared at https://safetydpo.github.io/.