Daily Papers

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) research has primarily focused on closed-book factual question answering (QA), while contextual QA remains unexplored, despite its importance in real-world applications. In this work, we focus on UQ for the contextual QA task and propose a theoretically grounded approach to quantify epistemic uncertainty. We begin by introducing a task-agnostic, token-level uncertainty measure defined as the cross-entropy between the predictive distribution of the given model and the unknown true distribution. By decomposing this measure, we isolate the epistemic component and approximate the true distribution by a perfectly prompted, idealized model. We then derive an upper bound for epistemic uncertainty and show that it can be interpreted as semantic feature gaps in the given model's hidden representations relative to the ideal model. We further apply this generic framework to the contextual QA task and hypothesize that three features approximate this gap: context-reliance (using the provided context rather than parametric knowledge), context comprehension (extracting relevant information from context), and honesty (avoiding intentional lies). Using a top-down interpretability approach, we extract these features by using only a small number of labeled samples and ensemble them to form a robust uncertainty score. Experiments on multiple QA benchmarks in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings show that our method substantially outperforms state-of-the-art unsupervised (sampling-free and sampling-based) and supervised UQ methods, achieving up to a 13-point PRR improvement while incurring a negligible inference overhead.

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) in scientific writing promises efficiency but risks introducing informational entropy. While "hallucinated papers" are a known artifact, the systematic degradation of valid citation chains remains unquantified. We conducted a forensic audit of 50 recent survey papers in Artificial Intelligence (N=5,514 citations) published between September 2024 and January 2026. We utilized a hybrid verification pipeline combining DOI resolution, Crossref metadata analysis, Semantic Scholar queries, and fuzzy text matching to distinguish between formatting errors ("Sloppiness") and verifiable non-existence ("Phantoms). We detect a persistent 17.0% Phantom Rate -- citations that cannot be resolved to any digital object despite aggressive forensic recovery. Diagnostic categorization reveals three distinct failure modes: pure hallucinations (5.1%), hallucinated identifiers with valid titles (16.4%), and parsing-induced matching failures (78.5%). Longitudinal analysis reveals a flat trend (+0.07 pp/month), suggesting that high-entropy citation practices have stabilized as an endemic feature of the field. The scientific citation graph in AI survey literature exhibits "link rot" at scale. This suggests a mechanism where AI tools act as "lazy research assistants," retrieving correct titles but hallucinating metadata, thereby severing the digital chain of custody required for reproducible science.

Large language models (LLMs) tend to generate lexically, semantically, and stylistically homogenous texts. This poses a risk of knowledge collapse, where homogenous LLMs mediate a shrinking in the range of accessible information over time. Existing works on homogenization are limited by a focus on closed-ended multiple-choice setups or fuzzy semantic features, and do not look at trends across time and cultural contexts. To overcome this, we present a new methodology to measure epistemic diversity, i.e., variation in real-world claims in LLM outputs, which we use to perform a broad empirical study of LLM knowledge collapse. We test 27 LLMs, 155 topics covering 12 countries, and 200 prompt variations sourced from real user chats. For the topics in our study, we show that while newer models tend to generate more diverse claims, nearly all models are less epistemically diverse than a basic web search. We find that model size has a negative impact on epistemic diversity, while retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has a positive impact, though the improvement from RAG varies by the cultural context. Finally, compared to a traditional knowledge source (Wikipedia), we find that country-specific claims reflect the English language more than the local one, highlighting a gap in epistemic representation

Recent medical vision-language models have shown promise on tasks such as VQA, report generation, and anomaly detection. However, most are adapted to structured adult imaging and underperform in fetal ultrasound, which poses challenges of multi-view image reasoning, numerous diseases, and image diversity. To bridge this gap, we introduce FetalMind, a medical AI system tailored to fetal ultrasound for both report generation and diagnosis. Guided by clinical workflow, we propose Salient Epistemic Disentanglement (SED), which injects an expert-curated bipartite graph into the model to decouple view-disease associations and to steer preference selection along clinically faithful steps via reinforcement learning. This design mitigates variability across diseases and heterogeneity across views, reducing learning bottlenecks while aligning the model's inference with obstetric practice. To train FetalMind at scale, we curate FetalSigma-1M dataset, the first large-scale fetal ultrasound report corpus, comprising 20K reports from twelve medical centers, addressing the scarcity of domain data. Extensive experiments show that FetalMind outperforms open- and closed-source baselines across all gestational stages, achieving +14% average gains and +61.2% higher accuracy on critical conditions while remaining efficient, stable, and scalable. Project Page: https://hexiao0275.github.io/FetalMind.

To address this gap, our study introduces the concept of causal epistemic consistency, which focuses on the self-consistency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in differentiating intermediates with nuanced differences in causal reasoning. We propose a suite of novel metrics -- intensity ranking concordance, cross-group position agreement, and intra-group clustering -- to evaluate LLMs on this front. Through extensive empirical studies on 21 high-profile LLMs, including GPT-4, Claude3, and LLaMA3-70B, we have favoring evidence that current models struggle to maintain epistemic consistency in identifying the polarity and intensity of intermediates in causal reasoning. Additionally, we explore the potential of using internal token probabilities as an auxiliary tool to maintain causal epistemic consistency. In summary, our study bridges a critical gap in AI research by investigating the self-consistency over fine-grained intermediates involved in causal reasoning.

Hallucinations in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) -- where the model generates content inconsistent with the input image -- pose significant risks in real-world applications, from misinformation in visual question answering to unsafe errors in decision-making. Existing benchmarks primarily test recognition accuracy, i.e., evaluating whether models can select the correct answer among distractors. This overlooks an equally critical capability for trustworthy AI: recognizing when none of the provided options are correct, a behavior reflecting epistemic humility. We present HumbleBench, a new hallucination benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs' ability to reject plausible but incorrect answers across three hallucination types: object, relation, and attribute. Built from a panoptic scene graph dataset, we leverage fine-grained scene graph annotations to extract ground-truth entities and relations, and prompt GPT-4-Turbo to generate multiple-choice questions, followed by a rigorous manual filtering process. Each question includes a "None of the above" option, requiring models not only to recognize correct visual information but also to identify when no provided answer is valid. We evaluate a variety of state-of-the-art MLLMs -- including both general-purpose and specialized reasoning models -- on HumbleBench and share valuable findings and insights with the community. By incorporating explicit false-option rejection, HumbleBench fills a key gap in current evaluation suites, providing a more realistic measure of MLLM reliability in safety-critical settings. Our code and dataset are released publicly and can be accessed at https://github.com/maifoundations/HumbleBench.

Generative AI (GenAI) has rapidly entered education, yet its user experience is often explained through adoption-oriented constructs such as usefulness, ease of use, and engagement. We argue that these constructs are no longer sufficient because systems such as ChatGPT do not merely support learning tasks but also participate in knowledge construction. Existing theories cannot explain why GenAI frequently produces experiences characterized by negotiated authority, redistributed cognition, and accountability tension. To address this gap, this paper develops the Human--AI Epistemic Partnership Theory (HAEPT), explaining the GenAI user experience as a form of epistemic partnership that features a dynamic negotiation of three interlocking contracts: epistemic, agency, and accountability. We argue that findings on trust, over-reliance, academic integrity, teacher caution, and relational interaction about GenAI can be reinterpreted as tensions within these contracts rather than as isolated issues. Instead of holding a single, stable view of GenAI, users adjust how they relate to it over time through calibration cycles. These repeated interactions account for why trust and skepticism often coexist and for how partnership modes describe recurrent configurations of human--AI collaboration across tasks. To demonstrate the usefulness of HAEPT, we applied it to analyze the UX of collaborative learning with AI speakers and AI-facilitated scientific argumentation, illustrating different contract configurations.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

Autoformalization plays a crucial role in formal mathematical reasoning by enabling the automatic translation of natural language statements into formal languages. While recent advances using large language models (LLMs) have shown promising results, methods for automatically evaluating autoformalization remain underexplored. As one moves to more complex domains (e.g., advanced mathematics), human evaluation requires significant time and domain expertise, especially as the complexity of the underlying statements and background knowledge increases. LLM-as-a-judge presents a promising approach for automating such evaluation. However, existing methods typically employ coarse-grained and generic evaluation criteria, which limit their effectiveness for advanced formal mathematical reasoning, where quality hinges on nuanced, multi-granular dimensions. In this work, we take a step toward addressing this gap by introducing a systematic, automatic method to evaluate autoformalization tasks. The proposed method is based on an epistemically and formally grounded ensemble (EFG) of LLM judges, defined on criteria encompassing logical preservation (LP), mathematical consistency (MC), formal validity (FV), and formal quality (FQ), resulting in a transparent assessment that accounts for different contributing factors. We validate the proposed framework to serve as a proxy for autoformalization assessment within the domain of formal mathematics. Overall, our experiments demonstrate that the EFG ensemble of LLM judges is a suitable emerging proxy for evaluation, more strongly correlating with human assessments than a coarse-grained model, especially when assessing formal qualities. These findings suggest that LLM-as-judges, especially when guided by a well-defined set of atomic properties, could offer a scalable, interpretable, and reliable support for evaluating formal mathematical reasoning.

Safe deployment of graph neural networks (GNNs) under distribution shift requires models to provide accurate confidence indicators (CI). However, while it is well-known in computer vision that CI quality diminishes under distribution shift, this behavior remains understudied for GNNs. Hence, we begin with a case study on CI calibration under controlled structural and feature distribution shifts and demonstrate that increased expressivity or model size do not always lead to improved CI performance. Consequently, we instead advocate for the use of epistemic uncertainty quantification (UQ) methods to modulate CIs. To this end, we propose G-DeltaUQ, a new single model UQ method that extends the recently proposed stochastic centering framework to support structured data and partial stochasticity. Evaluated across covariate, concept, and graph size shifts, G-DeltaUQ not only outperforms several popular UQ methods in obtaining calibrated CIs, but also outperforms alternatives when CIs are used for generalization gap prediction or OOD detection. Overall, our work not only introduces a new, flexible GNN UQ method, but also provides novel insights into GNN CIs on safety-critical tasks.

Generative retrieval models encode pointers to information in a corpus as an index within the model's parameters. These models serve as part of a larger pipeline, where retrieved information conditions generation for knowledge-intensive NLP tasks. However, we identify two limitations: the generative retrieval does not account for contextual information. Secondly, the retrieval can't be tuned for the downstream readers as decoding the page title is a non-differentiable operation. This paper introduces Re3val, trained with generative reranking and reinforcement learning using limited data. Re3val leverages context acquired via Dense Passage Retrieval to rerank the retrieved page titles and utilizes REINFORCE to maximize rewards generated by constrained decoding. Additionally, we generate questions from our pre-training dataset to mitigate epistemic uncertainty and bridge the domain gap between the pre-training and fine-tuning datasets. Subsequently, we extract and rerank contexts from the KILT database using the rerank page titles. Upon grounding the top five reranked contexts, Re3val demonstrates the Top 1 KILT scores compared to all other generative retrieval models across five KILT datasets.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

We present a complete theoretical characterization of Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a principled framework for aggregating multiple heterogeneous evidence items in probabilistic prediction tasks. Multi-evidence reasoning arises pervasively in high-stakes domains including healthcare diagnosis, financial risk assessment, legal case analysis, and regulatory compliance, yet existing approaches either lack formal guarantees or fail to handle multi-evidence scenarios architecturally. LPF encodes each evidence item into a Gaussian latent posterior via a variational autoencoder, converting posteriors to soft factors through Monte Carlo marginalization, and aggregating factors via exact Sum-Product Network inference (LPF-SPN) or a learned neural aggregator (LPF-Learned). We prove seven formal guarantees spanning the key desiderata for trustworthy AI: Calibration Preservation (ECE <= epsilon + C/sqrt(K_eff)); Monte Carlo Error decaying as O(1/sqrt(M)); a non-vacuous PAC-Bayes bound with train-test gap of 0.0085 at N=4200; operation within 1.12x of the information-theoretic lower bound; graceful degradation as O(epsilon*delta*sqrt(K)) under corruption, maintaining 88% performance with half of evidence adversarially replaced; O(1/sqrt(K)) calibration decay with R^2=0.849; and exact epistemic-aleatoric uncertainty decomposition with error below 0.002%. All theorems are empirically validated on controlled datasets spanning up to 4,200 training examples. Our theoretical framework establishes LPF as a foundation for trustworthy multi-evidence AI in safety-critical applications.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

The two most influential cognitive architecture frameworks for AI agents, CoALA [21] and JEPA [12], both lack an explicit Knowledge layer with its own persistence semantics. This gap produces a category error: systems apply cognitive decay to factual claims, or treat facts and experiences with identical update mechanics. We survey persistence semantics across existing memory systems and identify eight convergence points, from Karpathy's LLM Knowledge Base [10] to the BEAM benchmark's near-zero contradiction-resolution scores [22], all pointing to related architectural gaps. We propose a four-layer decom position (Knowledge, Memory, Wisdom, Intelligence) where each layer has fundamentally different persistence semantics: indefinite supersession, Ebbinghaus decay, evidence-gated revision, and ephemeral inference respectively. Companion implementations in Python and Rust demonstrate the architectural separation is feasible. We borrow terminology from cognitive science as a useful analogy (the Knowledge/Memory distinction echoes Tulving's trichotomy), but our layers are engineering constructs justified by persistence-semantics requirements, not by neural architecture. We argue that these distinctions demand distinct persistence semantics in engineering implementations, and that no current framework or system provides this.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Background: Deep learning models are typically trained using stochastic gradient descent or one of its variants. These methods update the weights using their gradient, estimated from a small fraction of the training data. It has been observed that when using large batch sizes there is a persistent degradation in generalization performance - known as the "generalization gap" phenomena. Identifying the origin of this gap and closing it had remained an open problem. Contributions: We examine the initial high learning rate training phase. We find that the weight distance from its initialization grows logarithmically with the number of weight updates. We therefore propose a "random walk on random landscape" statistical model which is known to exhibit similar "ultra-slow" diffusion behavior. Following this hypothesis we conducted experiments to show empirically that the "generalization gap" stems from the relatively small number of updates rather than the batch size, and can be completely eliminated by adapting the training regime used. We further investigate different techniques to train models in the large-batch regime and present a novel algorithm named "Ghost Batch Normalization" which enables significant decrease in the generalization gap without increasing the number of updates. To validate our findings we conduct several additional experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and ImageNet. Finally, we reassess common practices and beliefs concerning training of deep models and suggest they may not be optimal to achieve good generalization.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Evaluating the reasoning ability of language models (LMs) is complicated by their extensive parametric world knowledge, where benchmark performance often reflects factual recall rather than genuine reasoning. Existing datasets and approaches (e.g., temporal filtering, paraphrasing, adversarial substitution) cannot cleanly separate the two. We present SynthWorlds, a framework that disentangles task reasoning complexity from factual knowledge. In SynthWorlds, we construct parallel corpora representing two worlds with identical interconnected structure: a real-mapped world, where models may exploit parametric knowledge, and a synthetic-mapped world, where such knowledge is meaningless. On top of these corpora, we design two mirrored tasks as case studies: multi-hop question answering and page navigation, which maintain equal reasoning difficulty across worlds. Experiments in parametric-only (e.g., closed-book QA) and knowledge-augmented (e.g., retrieval-augmented) LM settings reveal a persistent knowledge advantage gap, defined as the performance boost models gain from memorized parametric world knowledge. Knowledge acquisition and integration mechanisms reduce but do not eliminate this gap, highlighting opportunities for system improvements. Fully automatic and scalable, SynthWorlds provides a controlled environment for evaluating LMs in ways that were previously challenging, enabling precise and testable comparisons of reasoning and memorization.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a critical component of intelligence, yet accurately measuring it continues to be a subject of debate. Prior research has attempted to apply human ToM assessments to natural language processing models using either human-created standardized tests or rule-based templates. However, these methods primarily focus on simplistic reasoning and require further validation. In this study, we utilize dynamic epistemic logic, which has established overlaps with ToM, to generate more intricate problems. We also introduce novel verbalization techniques to express these problems using natural language. Our findings indicate that certain language model scaling (from 70M to 6B and 350M to 174B) does not consistently yield results better than random chance. While GPT-4 demonstrates improved epistemic reasoning capabilities, there is still room for enhancement. Our code and datasets are publicly available https://github.com/antoinelrnld/modlog https://huggingface.co/datasets/sileod/mindgames

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

We investigate the ability of language models to perform compositional reasoning tasks where the overall solution depends on correctly composing the answers to sub-problems. We measure how often models can correctly answer all sub-problems but not generate the overall solution, a ratio we call the compositionality gap. We evaluate this ratio by asking multi-hop questions with answers that require composing multiple facts unlikely to have been observed together during pretraining. In the GPT-3 family of models, as model size increases we show that the single-hop question answering performance improves faster than the multi-hop performance does, therefore the compositionality gap does not decrease. This surprising result suggests that while more powerful models memorize and recall more factual knowledge, they show no corresponding improvement in their ability to perform this kind of compositional reasoning. We then demonstrate how elicitive prompting (such as chain of thought) narrows the compositionality gap by reasoning explicitly instead of implicitly. We present a new method, self-ask, that further improves on chain of thought. In our method, the model explicitly asks itself (and then answers) follow-up questions before answering the initial question. We finally show that self-ask's structured prompting lets us easily plug in a search engine to answer the follow-up questions, which additionally improves accuracy.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Knowledge gaps and hallucinations are persistent challenges for Large Language Models (LLMs), which generate unreliable responses when lacking the necessary information to fulfill user instructions. Existing approaches, such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and tool use, aim to address these issues by incorporating external knowledge. Yet, they rely on additional models or services, resulting in complex pipelines, potential error propagation, and often requiring the model to process a large number of tokens. In this paper, we present a scalable method that enables LLMs to access external knowledge without depending on retrievers or auxiliary models. Our approach uses constrained generation with a pre-built prefix-tree index. Triples from a Knowledge Graph are verbalized in textual facts, tokenized, and indexed in a prefix tree for efficient access. During inference, to acquire external knowledge, the LLM generates facts with constrained generation which allows only sequences of tokens that form an existing fact. We evaluate our proposal on Question Answering and show that it scales to large knowledge bases (800 million facts), adapts to domain-specific data, and achieves effective results. These gains come with minimal generation-time overhead. ReFactX code is available at https://github.com/rpo19/ReFactX.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Machine learning has facilitated significant advancements across various robotics domains, including navigation, locomotion, and manipulation. Many such achievements have been driven by the extensive use of simulation as a critical tool for training and testing robotic systems prior to their deployment in real-world environments. However, simulations consist of abstractions and approximations that inevitably introduce discrepancies between simulated and real environments, known as the reality gap. These discrepancies significantly hinder the successful transfer of systems from simulation to the real world. Closing this gap remains one of the most pressing challenges in robotics. Recent advances in sim-to-real transfer have demonstrated promising results across various platforms, including locomotion, navigation, and manipulation. By leveraging techniques such as domain randomization, real-to-sim transfer, state and action abstractions, and sim-real co-training, many works have overcome the reality gap. However, challenges persist, and a deeper understanding of the reality gap's root causes and solutions is necessary. In this survey, we present a comprehensive overview of the sim-to-real landscape, highlighting the causes, solutions, and evaluation metrics for the reality gap and sim-to-real transfer.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Time-dependent data-generating distributions have proven to be difficult for gradient-based training of neural networks, as the greedy updates result in catastrophic forgetting of previously learned knowledge. Despite the progress in the field of continual learning to overcome this forgetting, we show that a set of common state-of-the-art methods still suffers from substantial forgetting upon starting to learn new tasks, except that this forgetting is temporary and followed by a phase of performance recovery. We refer to this intriguing but potentially problematic phenomenon as the stability gap. The stability gap had likely remained under the radar due to standard practice in the field of evaluating continual learning models only after each task. Instead, we establish a framework for continual evaluation that uses per-iteration evaluation and we define a new set of metrics to quantify worst-case performance. Empirically we show that experience replay, constraint-based replay, knowledge-distillation, and parameter regularization methods are all prone to the stability gap; and that the stability gap can be observed in class-, task-, and domain-incremental learning benchmarks. Additionally, a controlled experiment shows that the stability gap increases when tasks are more dissimilar. Finally, by disentangling gradients into plasticity and stability components, we propose a conceptual explanation for the stability gap.

Diffusion models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating high-quality samples and enhancing performance across diverse domains through Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG). However, the quality of generated samples is highly sensitive to the selection of the guidance weight. In this work, we identify a critical ``training-inference gap'' and we argue that it is the presence of this gap that undermines the performance of conditional generation and renders outputs highly sensitive to the guidance weight. We quantify this gap by measuring the accumulated error during the inference stage and establish a correlation between the selection of guidance weight and minimizing this gap. Furthermore, to mitigate this gap, we propose DiffIER, an optimization-based method for high-quality generation. We demonstrate that the accumulated error can be effectively reduced by an iterative error minimization at each step during inference. By introducing this novel plug-and-play optimization framework, we enable the optimization of errors at every single inference step and enhance generation quality. Empirical results demonstrate that our proposed method outperforms baseline approaches in conditional generation tasks. Furthermore, the method achieves consistent success in text-to-image generation, image super-resolution, and text-to-speech generation, underscoring its versatility and potential for broad applications in future research.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

While Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucination and knowledge staleness in Large Language Models (LLMs), existing frameworks often falter on complex, multi-hop queries that require synthesizing information from disparate sources. Current advanced RAG methods, employing iterative or adaptive strategies, lack a robust mechanism to systematically identify and fill evidence gaps, often propagating noise or failing to gather a comprehensive context. We introduce FAIR-RAG, a novel agentic framework that transforms the standard RAG pipeline into a dynamic, evidence-driven reasoning process. At its core is an Iterative Refinement Cycle governed by a module we term Structured Evidence Assessment (SEA). The SEA acts as an analytical gating mechanism: it deconstructs the initial query into a checklist of required findings and audits the aggregated evidence to identify confirmed facts and, critically, explicit informational gaps. These gaps provide a precise signal to an Adaptive Query Refinement agent, which generates new, targeted sub-queries to retrieve missing information. This cycle repeats until the evidence is verified as sufficient, ensuring a comprehensive context for a final, strictly faithful generation. We conducted experiments on challenging multi-hop QA benchmarks, including HotpotQA, 2WikiMultiHopQA, and MusiQue. In a unified experimental setup, FAIR-RAG significantly outperforms strong baselines. On HotpotQA, it achieves an F1-score of 0.453 -- an absolute improvement of 8.3 points over the strongest iterative baseline -- establishing a new state-of-the-art for this class of methods on these benchmarks. Our work demonstrates that a structured, evidence-driven refinement process with explicit gap analysis is crucial for unlocking reliable and accurate reasoning in advanced RAG systems for complex, knowledge-intensive tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly becoming ubiquitous, yet their ability to reason about and retain temporal information remains limited. This hinders their application in real-world scenarios where understanding the sequential nature of events is crucial. This paper experiments with state-of-the-art models on a novel, large-scale temporal dataset, TempUN, to reveal significant limitations in temporal retention and reasoning abilities. Interestingly, closed-source models indicate knowledge gaps more frequently, potentially suggesting a trade-off between uncertainty awareness and incorrect responses. Further, exploring various fine-tuning approaches yielded no major performance improvements. The associated dataset and code are available at the following URL (https://github.com/lingoiitgn/TempUN).

Discovering causal regularities and applying them to build functional systems--the discovery-to-application loop--is a hallmark of general intelligence, yet evaluating this capacity has been hindered by the vast complexity gap between scientific discovery and real-world engineering. We introduce SciCrafter, a Minecraft-based benchmark that operationalizes this loop through parameterized redstone circuit tasks. Agents must ignite lamps in specified patterns (e.g., simultaneously or in timed sequences); scaling target parameters substantially increases construction complexity and required knowledge, forcing genuine discovery rather than reliance on memorized solutions. Evaluating frontier models including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, and Claude-Opus-4.5 under a general-purpose code agent scaffold, we find that all plateau at approximately 26% success rate. To diagnose these failures, we decompose the loop into four capacities--knowledge gap identification, experimental discovery, knowledge consolidation, and knowledge application--and design targeted interventions whose marginal contributions serve as proxies for corresponding gaps. Our analysis reveals that although the general knowledge application capability still remains as the biggest gap across all models, for frontier models the knowledge gap identification starts to become a major hurdle--indicating the bottleneck is shifting from solving problems right to raising the right problems for current AI. We release SciCrafter as a diagnostic probe for future research on AI systems that navigate the full discovery-to-application loop.

Vision-language models with extended reasoning succeed on complex problems, but many real-world problems require external tools that internal reasoning alone often cannot resolve. Agentic reasoning therefore interleaves two behaviors with a structural asymmetry: thinking (the self-contained default) and tool use (a high-variance auxiliary acting). We refer to this asymmetry as the Thinking-Acting Gap. Under standard RL recipes like GRPO, the gap manifests as two diagnostic symptoms during training: tool use is attempted on only ~30% of rollouts, and when attempted, the tool-using rollouts within a group are all-wrong on ~40% of questions, suppressing the learning signal at the tool calls that needed it. We propose AXPO (Agent eXplorative Policy Optimization): for each all-wrong tool-using subgroup, AXPO fixes the thinking prefix and resamples the tool call and its continuation, paired with uncertainty-based prefix selection. Across nine multimodal benchmarks and three scales of Qwen3-VL-Thinking, SFT+AXPO outperforms SFT+GRPO at average (+1.8pp Pass@1 and +1.8pp Pass@4 at 8B on average) and 8B with SFT+AXPO surpasses the 32B Base on Pass@4 with 4 times fewer parameters.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Although modern neural networks often generalize to new combinations of familiar concepts, the conditions that enable such compositionality have long been an open question. In this work, we study the systematicity gap in visual question answering: the performance difference between reasoning on previously seen and unseen combinations of object attributes. To test, we introduce a novel diagnostic dataset, CLEVR-HOPE. We find that the systematicity gap is not reduced by increasing the quantity of training data, but is reduced by increasing the diversity of training data. In particular, our experiments suggest that the more distinct attribute type combinations are seen during training, the more systematic we can expect the resulting model to be.

In-context learning enables transformers to adapt to new tasks from a few examples at inference time, while grokking highlights that this generalization can emerge abruptly only after prolonged training. We study task generalization and grokking in in-context learning using a Bayesian perspective, asking what enables the delayed transition from memorization to generalization. Concretely, we consider modular arithmetic tasks in which a transformer must infer a latent linear function solely from in-context examples and analyze how predictive uncertainty evolves during training. We combine approximate Bayesian techniques to estimate the posterior distribution and we study how uncertainty behaves across training and under changes in task diversity, context length, and context noise. We find that epistemic uncertainty collapses sharply when the model groks, making uncertainty a practical label-free diagnostic of generalization in transformers. Additionally, we provide theoretical support with a simplified Bayesian linear model, showing that asymptotically both delayed generalization and uncertainty peaks arise from the same underlying spectral mechanism, which links grokking time to uncertainty dynamics.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving abilities in mathematics, as evaluated by existing benchmarks exclusively on well-defined problems. However, such evaluation setup constitutes a critical gap, since a genuine intelligent agent should not only solve problems (as a math quiz solver), but also be able~to ask for information when the problems lack sufficient information, enabling proactivity in responding users' requests. To bridge such gap, we proposes a new dataset consisting of two types of incomplete problems with diverse contexts. Based on the dataset, our systematical evaluation of LRMs reveals their inability in proactively asking for information. In addition, we uncover the behaviors related to overthinking and hallucination of LRMs, and highlight the potential and challenges of supervised fine-tuning in learning such ability. We hope to provide new insights in developing LRMs with genuine intelligence, rather than just solving problems.

Developing models that can learn to reason is a notoriously challenging problem. We focus on reasoning in relational domains, where the use of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) seems like a natural choice. However, previous work has shown that regular GNNs lack the ability to systematically generalize from training examples on test graphs requiring longer inference chains, which fundamentally limits their reasoning abilities. A common solution relies on neuro-symbolic methods that systematically reason by learning rules, but their scalability is often limited and they tend to make unrealistically strong assumptions, e.g.\ that the answer can always be inferred from a single relational path. We propose the Epistemic GNN (EpiGNN), a novel parameter-efficient and scalable GNN architecture with an epistemic inductive bias for systematic reasoning. Node embeddings in EpiGNNs are treated as epistemic states, and message passing is implemented accordingly. We show that EpiGNNs achieve state-of-the-art results on link prediction tasks that require systematic reasoning. Furthermore, for inductive knowledge graph completion, EpiGNNs rival the performance of state-of-the-art specialized approaches. Finally, we introduce two new benchmarks that go beyond standard relational reasoning by requiring the aggregation of information from multiple paths. Here, existing neuro-symbolic approaches fail, yet EpiGNNs learn to reason accurately. Code and datasets are available at https://github.com/erg0dic/gnn-sg.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make.

Current language model evaluations measure what models know under ideal conditions but not how robustly they know it under realistic stress. Static benchmarks like MMLU and TruthfulQA cannot distinguish a model that lacks knowledge from one whose verification mechanisms collapse when information degrades or adversaries probe for weaknesses. We introduce the Drill-Down and Fabricate Test (DDFT), a protocol that measures epistemic robustness: a model's ability to maintain factual accuracy under progressive semantic compression and adversarial fabrication. We propose a two-system cognitive model comprising a Semantic System that generates fluent text and an Epistemic Verifier that validates factual accuracy. Our findings, based on evaluating 9 frontier models across 8 knowledge domains at 5 compression levels (1,800 turn-level evaluations), reveal that epistemic robustness is orthogonal to conventional design paradigms. Neither parameter count (r=0.083, p=0.832) nor architectural type (r=0.153, p=0.695) significantly predicts robustness, suggesting it emerges from training methodology and verification mechanisms distinct from current approaches. Error detection capability strongly predicts overall robustness (rho=-0.817, p=0.007), indicating this is the critical bottleneck. We find that flagship models exhibit brittleness despite their scale, while smaller models can achieve robust performance, challenging assumptions about the relationship between model size and reliability. The DDFT framework provides both theoretical foundation and practical tools for assessing epistemic robustness before deployment in critical applications.

Existing physical commonsense reasoning benchmarks predominantly focus on Western contexts, overlooking cultural variations in physical problem-solving. To address this gap, we introduce EPiK (Everyday Physics in Korean Contexts), a novel benchmark comprising 181 binary-choice problems that test physical reasoning within Korean cultural contexts, ranging from kimchi (Korean food) to traditional fermentation. EPiK is constructed using a two-stage generation and verification pipeline to create culturally-authentic problems across 9 reasoning subtasks and 84 scenarios. Unlike approaches based on simple translation, our method generates problems organically from Korean contexts while upholding rigorous physical reasoning standards. Our evaluations show that Korean-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose models of comparable size. This performance gap highlights the limitations of culturally-agnostic models and demonstrates the critical need for culturally-aware benchmarks to truly measure language understanding. Our EPiK is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/jjae/EPiK.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Long-term conversational memory requires retrieving evidence scattered across multiple sessions, yet single-pass retrieval fails on temporal and multi-hop questions. Existing iterative methods refine queries via generated content or document-level signals, but none explicitly diagnoses the evidence gap, namely what is missing from the accumulated retrieval set, leaving query refinement untargeted. We present EviMem, combining IRIS (Iterative Retrieval via Insufficiency Signals), a closed-loop framework that detects evidence gaps through sufficiency evaluation, diagnoses what is missing, and drives targeted query refinement, with LaceMem (Layered Architecture for Conversational Evidence Memory), a coarse-to-fine memory hierarchy supporting fine-grained gap diagnosis. On LoCoMo, EviMem improves Judge Accuracy over MIRIX on temporal (73.3% to 81.6%) and multi-hop (65.9% to 85.2%) questions at 4.5x lower latency. Code: https://github.com/AIGeeksGroup/EviMem.

AI-driven medical history-taking is an important component in symptom checking, automated patient intake, triage, and other AI virtual care applications. As history-taking is extremely varied, machine learning models require a significant amount of data to train. To overcome this challenge, existing systems are developed using indirect data or expert knowledge. This leads to a training-inference gap as models are trained on different kinds of data than what they observe at inference time. In this work, we present a two-stage re-ranking approach that helps close the training-inference gap by re-ranking the first-stage question candidates using a dialogue-contextualized model. For this, we propose a new model, global re-ranker, which cross-encodes the dialogue with all questions simultaneously, and compare it with several existing neural baselines. We test both transformer and S4-based language model backbones. We find that relative to the expert system, the best performance is achieved by our proposed global re-ranker with a transformer backbone, resulting in a 30% higher normalized discount cumulative gain (nDCG) and a 77% higher mean average precision (mAP).

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

We present a simple method that achieves unexpectedly superior performance for Complex Reasoning involved Visual Question Answering. Our solution collects statistical features from high-frequency words of all the questions asked about an image and use them as accurate knowledge for answering further questions of the same image. We are fully aware that this setting is not ubiquitously applicable, and in a more common setting one should assume the questions are asked separately and they cannot be gathered to obtain a knowledge base. Nonetheless, we use this method as an evidence to demonstrate our observation that the bottleneck effect is more severe on the feature extraction part than it is on the knowledge reasoning part. We show significant gaps when using the same reasoning model with 1) ground-truth features; 2) statistical features; 3) detected features from completely learned detectors, and analyze what these gaps mean to researches on visual reasoning topics. Our model with the statistical features achieves the 2nd place in the GQA Challenge 2019.

Bold claims about AI's role in science-from "AGI will cure all diseases" to promises of radically accelerated discovery-raise a central epistemic question: do large language models (LLMs) truly generate new knowledge, or do they merely remix memorized fragments? We propose unlearning-as-ablation as a falsifiable probe of constructive scientific discovery. The idea is to systematically remove a target result together with its forget-closure (supporting lemmas, paraphrases, and multi-hop entailments) and then evaluate whether the model can re-derive the result from only permitted axioms and tools. Success would indicate generative capability beyond recall; failure would expose current limits. Unlike prevailing motivations for unlearning-privacy, copyright, or safety-our framing repositions it as an epistemic probe for AI-for-Science. We outline a minimal pilot in mathematics and algorithms to illustrate feasibility, and sketch how the same approach could later be extended to domains such as physics or chemistry. This is a position paper: our contribution is conceptual and methodological, not empirical. We aim to stimulate discussion on how principled ablation tests could help distinguish models that reconstruct knowledge from those that merely retrieve it, and how such probes might guide the next generation of AI-for-Science benchmarks.

We introduce ProofGrid, a benchmark suite for evaluating LLM reasoning through machine-checkable proofs rather than final answers alone. ProofGrid contains 15 tasks spanning proof writing, proof checking, proof masking, and proof gap-filling. Tasks are expressed in minimal formal notation, especially NDL, a compact natural-deduction language that fits in short prompts and supports precise, auditable verification. This yields mechanical, reproducible, and fine-grained evaluation rather than judgments by humans or LLMs. ProofGrid covers a calibrated difficulty spectrum, from foundational reasoning tests to structurally rich challenge tasks that no current model solves, while minimizing reliance on domain knowledge, solver delegation, and long-context artifacts. We also develop a comparative framework for reasoning benchmarks and use it to situate ProofGrid relative to existing work in terms of representation, verification guarantees, and reasoning depth. Methodologically, we introduce an instrumented proof-checking pipeline that tolerates minor surface deviations while locating the first substantive reasoning failure, improving measurement resolution and separating proof planning from low-level execution noise. Using this pipeline, we evaluate a broad range of open and proprietary models. Results show rapid progress but substantial remaining limits: frontier models perform well on several foundational tasks, yet difficult tasks, especially those requiring global combinatorial reasoning or low-level proof synthesis, remain far from solved. We also identify epistemic instability, where models generate flawed proofs yet correctly reject those local inferences in isolation, and formalize this with an Epistemic Stability Index. Finally, we complement accuracy with 2PL IRT analyses, Wright maps, and a normalized task-discrimination measure based on Fisher information.

Can our brain signals faithfully reflect the original visual stimuli, even including high-frequency details? Although human perceptual and cognitive capacities enable us to process and remember visual information, these abilities are constrained by several factors, such as limited attentional resources and the finite capacity of visual memory. When visual stimuli are processed by human visual system into brain signals, some information is inevitably lost, leading to a discrepancy known as the System GAP. Additionally, perceptual and cognitive dynamics, along with technical noise in signal acquisition, degrade the fidelity of brain signals relative to the visual stimuli, known as the Random GAP. When encoded brain representations are directly aligned with the corresponding pretrained image features, the System GAP and Random GAP between paired data challenge the model, requiring it to bridge these gaps. However, in the context of limited paired data, these gaps are difficult for the model to learn, leading to overfitting and poor generalization to new data. To address these GAPs, we propose a simple yet effective approach called the Uncertainty-aware Blur Prior (UBP). It estimates the uncertainty within the paired data, reflecting the mismatch between brain signals and visual stimuli. Based on this uncertainty, UBP dynamically blurs the high-frequency details of the original images, reducing the impact of the mismatch and improving alignment. Our method achieves a top-1 accuracy of 50.9\% and a top-5 accuracy of 79.7\% on the zero-shot brain-to-image retrieval task, surpassing previous state-of-the-art methods by margins of 13.7\% and 9.8\%, respectively. Code is available at https://github.com/HaitaoWuTJU/Uncertainty-aware-Blur-Prior{GitHub}.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Current benchmarks for AI clinician systems, often based on multiple-choice exams or manual rubrics, fail to capture the depth, robustness, and safety required for real-world clinical practice. To address this, we introduce the GAPS framework, a multidimensional paradigm for evaluating Grounding (cognitive depth), Adequacy (answer completeness), Perturbation (robustness), and Safety. Critically, we developed a fully automated, guideline-anchored pipeline to construct a GAPS-aligned benchmark end-to-end, overcoming the scalability and subjectivity limitations of prior work. Our pipeline assembles an evidence neighborhood, creates dual graph and tree representations, and automatically generates questions across G-levels. Rubrics are synthesized by a DeepResearch agent that mimics GRADE-consistent, PICO-driven evidence review in a ReAct loop. Scoring is performed by an ensemble of large language model (LLM) judges. Validation confirmed our automated questions are high-quality and align with clinician judgment. Evaluating state-of-the-art models on the benchmark revealed key failure modes: performance degrades sharply with increased reasoning depth (G-axis), models struggle with answer completeness (A-axis), and they are highly vulnerable to adversarial perturbations (P-axis) as well as certain safety issues (S-axis). This automated, clinically-grounded approach provides a reproducible and scalable method for rigorously evaluating AI clinician systems and guiding their development toward safer, more reliable clinical practice.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

We study the depth of grade-school math (GSM) problem-solving capabilities of LLMs. To this end, we evaluate their performance on pairs of existing math word problems together so that the answer to the second problem depends on correctly answering the first problem. Our findings reveal a significant reasoning gap in most LLMs, that is performance difference between solving the compositional pairs and solving each question independently. This gap is more pronounced in smaller, more cost-efficient, and math-specialized models. Moreover, instruction-tuning recipes and code generation have varying effects across LLM sizes, while finetuning on GSM can lead to task overfitting. Our analysis indicates that large reasoning gaps are not because of test-set leakage, but due to distraction from additional context and poor second-hop reasoning. Overall, LLMs exhibit systematic differences in their reasoning abilities, despite what their performance on standard benchmarks indicates.

We pursue a vision for self-improving language models in which the model does not merely generate problems or traces to imitate, but constructs the environments that train it. In zero-data reasoning RL, this reframes self-improvement from a data-generation loop into an environment-construction loop, where each artifact is a reusable executable object that samples instances, computes references, and scores responses. Whether this vision sustains improvement hinges on a single property: the environments must exhibit stable solve--verify asymmetry, the model must be able to write an oracle once that it cannot reliably execute in natural language on fresh instances. This asymmetry takes two complementary forms. Some tasks are algorithmically hard to reason through but trivial as code: a dynamic program or graph traversal, compiled once, yields unboundedly many calibrated instances. Others are intrinsically hard to solve but easy to verify, like planted subset-sum or constraint satisfaction. Both create a durable gap between proposing and solving that the policy cannot close by gaming the verifier, and it is this gap that keeps reward informative as the learner improves. We instantiate this view in EvoEnv, a single-policy generator, solver method that synthesizes Python environments from ten seeds and admits them only after staged validation, semantic self-review, solver-relative difficulty calibration, and novelty checks. The strongest evidence comes from the already-strong regime: on Qwen3-4B-Thinking, fixed public-data RLVR and fixed hand-crafted environment RLVR reduce the average, while EvoEnv improves it from 72.4 to 74.8, a relative gain of 3.3%. Stable self-improvement, we suggest, depends not on producing more synthetic data, but on models learning to construct worlds whose difficulty stays structurally beyond their own reach.

Recent advances in knowledge distillation (KD) have enabled smaller student models to approach the performance of larger teacher models. However, popular methods such as supervised KD and on-policy KD, are adversely impacted by the knowledge gaps between teacher-student in practical scenarios. Supervised KD suffers from a distribution mismatch between training with a static dataset and inference over final student-generated outputs. Conversely, on-policy KD, which uses student-generated samples for training, can suffer from low-quality training examples with which teacher models are not familiar, resulting in inaccurate teacher feedback. To address these limitations, we introduce Speculative Knowledge Distillation (SKD), a novel approach that leverages cooperation between student and teacher models to generate high-quality training data on-the-fly while aligning with the student's inference-time distribution. In SKD, the student proposes tokens, and the teacher replaces poorly ranked ones based on its own distribution, transferring high-quality knowledge adaptively. We evaluate SKD on various text generation tasks, including translation, summarization, math, and instruction following, and show that SKD consistently outperforms existing KD methods across different domains, data sizes, and model initialization strategies.

Safety alignment incurs safety tax that perturbs a large reasoning model's (LRM) general reasoning ability. Existing datasets used for safety alignment for an LRM are usually constructed by distilling safety reasoning traces and answers from an external LRM or human labeler. However, such reasoning traces and answers exhibit a distributional gap with the target LRM that needs alignment, and we conjecture such distributional gap is the culprit leading to significant degradation of reasoning ability of the target LRM. Driven by this hypothesis, we propose a safety alignment dataset construction method, dubbed DGR. DGR transforms and refines an existing out-of-distributional safety reasoning dataset to be aligned with the target's LLM inner distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that i) DGR effectively mitigates the safety tax while maintaining safety performance across all baselines, i.e., achieving +30.2\% on DirectRefusal and +21.2\% on R1-ACT improvement in average reasoning accuracy compared to Vanilla SFT; ii) the degree of reasoning degradation correlates with the extent of distribution shift, suggesting that bridging this gap is central to preserving capabilities. Furthermore, we find that safety alignment in LRMs may primarily function as a mechanism to activate latent knowledge, as a mere 10 samples are sufficient for activating effective refusal behaviors. These findings not only emphasize the importance of distributional consistency but also provide insights into the activation mechanism of safety in reasoning models.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

The scarcity of high-quality, logically sound data is a critical bottleneck for advancing the mathematical reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs). Our work confronts this challenge by turning decades of automated theorem proving research into a scalable data engine. Rather than relying on error-prone LLMs or complex proof-assistant syntax like Lean and Isabelle, our framework leverages E-prover's saturation capabilities on the vast TPTP axiom library to derive a massive, guaranteed-valid corpus of theorems. Our pipeline is principled and simple: saturate axioms, filter for "interesting" theorems, and generate tasks. With no LLMs in the loop, we eliminate factual errors by construction. This purely symbolic data is then transformed into three difficulty-controlled challenges: entailment verification, premise selection, and proof reconstruction. Our zero-shot experiments on frontier models reveal a clear weakness: performance collapses on tasks requiring deep, structural reasoning. Our framework provides both the diagnostic tool to measure this gap and a scalable source of symbolic training data to address it. We make the code and data publicly available. https://github.com/sileod/reasoning_core https://hf.co/datasets/reasoning-core/rc1

Large language models (LLMs) excel in complex reasoning tasks, and distilling their reasoning capabilities into smaller models has shown promise. However, we uncover an interesting phenomenon, which we term the Small Model Learnability Gap: small models (leq3B parameters) do not consistently benefit from long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning or distillation from larger models. Instead, they perform better when fine-tuned on shorter, simpler reasoning chains that better align with their intrinsic learning capacity. To address this, we propose Mix Distillation, a simple yet effective strategy that balances reasoning complexity by combining long and short CoT examples or reasoning from both larger and smaller models. Our experiments demonstrate that Mix Distillation significantly improves small model reasoning performance compared to training on either data alone. These findings highlight the limitations of direct strong model distillation and underscore the importance of adapting reasoning complexity for effective reasoning capability transfer.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

In many real-world applications, deep neural networks are retrained from scratch as a dataset grows in size. Given the computational expense for retraining networks, it has been argued that continual learning could make updating networks more efficient. An obstacle to achieving this goal is the stability gap, which refers to an observation that when updating on new data, performance on previously learned data degrades before recovering. Addressing this problem would enable learning new data with fewer network updates, resulting in increased computational efficiency. We study how to mitigate the stability gap. We test a variety of hypotheses to understand why the stability gap occurs. This leads us to discover a method that vastly reduces this gap. In large-scale class incremental learning experiments, we are able to significantly reduce the number of network updates needed for continual learning. Our work has the potential to advance the state-of-the-art in continual learning for real-world applications along with reducing the carbon footprint required to maintain updated neural networks.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Explainable AI (XAI) systems are sociotechnical in nature; thus, they are subject to the sociotechnical gap--divide between the technical affordances and the social needs. However, charting this gap is challenging. In the context of XAI, we argue that charting the gap improves our problem understanding, which can reflexively provide actionable insights to improve explainability. Utilizing two case studies in distinct domains, we empirically derive a framework that facilitates systematic charting of the sociotechnical gap by connecting AI guidelines in the context of XAI and elucidating how to use them to address the gap. We apply the framework to a third case in a new domain, showcasing its affordances. Finally, we discuss conceptual implications of the framework, share practical considerations in its operationalization, and offer guidance on transferring it to new contexts. By making conceptual and practical contributions to understanding the sociotechnical gap in XAI, the framework expands the XAI design space.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

A set of novel approaches for estimating epistemic uncertainty in deep neural networks with a single forward pass has recently emerged as a valid alternative to Bayesian Neural Networks. On the premise of informative representations, these deterministic uncertainty methods (DUMs) achieve strong performance on detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) data while adding negligible computational costs at inference time. However, it remains unclear whether DUMs are well calibrated and can seamlessly scale to real-world applications - both prerequisites for their practical deployment. To this end, we first provide a taxonomy of DUMs, and evaluate their calibration under continuous distributional shifts. Then, we extend them to semantic segmentation. We find that, while DUMs scale to realistic vision tasks and perform well on OOD detection, the practicality of current methods is undermined by poor calibration under distributional shifts.

Large language model (LLM)-based systems are increasingly deployed to conduct scientific research autonomously, yet whether their reasoning adheres to the epistemic norms that make scientific inquiry self-correcting is poorly understood. Here, we evaluate LLM-based scientific agents across eight domains, spanning workflow execution to hypothesis-driven inquiry, through more than 25,000 agent runs and two complementary lenses: (i) a systematic performance analysis that decomposes the contributions of the base model and the agent scaffold, and (ii) a behavioral analysis of the epistemological structure of agent reasoning. We observe that the base model is the primary determinant of both performance and behavior, accounting for 41.4% of explained variance versus 1.5% for the scaffold. Across all configurations, evidence is ignored in 68% of traces, refutation-driven belief revision occurs in 26%, and convergent multi-test evidence is rare. The same reasoning pattern appears whether the agent executes a computational workflow or conducts hypothesis-driven inquiry. They persist even when agents receive near-complete successful reasoning trajectories as context, and the resulting unreliability compounds across repeated trials in epistemically demanding domains. Thus, current LLM-based agents execute scientific workflows but do not exhibit the epistemic patterns that characterize scientific reasoning. Outcome-based evaluation cannot detect these failures, and scaffold engineering alone cannot repair them. Until reasoning itself becomes a training target, the scientific knowledge produced by such agents cannot be justified by the process that generated it.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has recently achieved remarkable success in robotic control. However, most works in RL operate in simulated environments where privileged knowledge (e.g., dynamics, surroundings, terrains) is readily available. Conversely, in real-world scenarios, robot agents usually rely solely on local states (e.g., proprioceptive feedback of robot joints) to select actions, leading to a significant sim-to-real gap. Existing methods address this gap by either gradually reducing the reliance on privileged knowledge or performing a two-stage policy imitation. However, we argue that these methods are limited in their ability to fully leverage the available privileged knowledge, resulting in suboptimal performance. In this paper, we formulate the sim-to-real gap as an information bottleneck problem and therefore propose a novel privileged knowledge distillation method called the Historical Information Bottleneck (HIB). In particular, HIB learns a privileged knowledge representation from historical trajectories by capturing the underlying changeable dynamic information. Theoretical analysis shows that the learned privileged knowledge representation helps reduce the value discrepancy between the oracle and learned policies. Empirical experiments on both simulated and real-world tasks demonstrate that HIB yields improved generalizability compared to previous methods. Videos of real-world experiments are available at https://sites.google.com/view/history-ib .

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Scaling high-quality tutoring remains a major challenge in education. Due to growing demand, many platforms employ novice tutors who, unlike experienced educators, struggle to address student mistakes and thus fail to seize prime learning opportunities. Our work explores the potential of large language models (LLMs) to close the novice-expert knowledge gap in remediating math mistakes. We contribute Bridge, a method that uses cognitive task analysis to translate an expert's latent thought process into a decision-making model for remediation. This involves an expert identifying (A) the student's error, (B) a remediation strategy, and (C) their intention before generating a response. We construct a dataset of 700 real tutoring conversations, annotated by experts with their decisions. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on our dataset and find that the expert's decision-making model is critical for LLMs to close the gap: responses from GPT4 with expert decisions (e.g., "simplify the problem") are +76% more preferred than without. Additionally, context-sensitive decisions are critical to closing pedagogical gaps: random decisions decrease GPT4's response quality by -97% than expert decisions. Our work shows the potential of embedding expert thought processes in LLM generations to enhance their capability to bridge novice-expert knowledge gaps. Our dataset and code can be found at: https://github.com/rosewang2008/bridge.

Recent reasoning Large Language Models produce a chain-of-thought (CoT) predominantly in English, even when prompted in non-English languages. Prior work suggests that forcing the CoT to remain in the input language (native reasoning) substantially degrades performance relative to allowing the model to reason in English before answering in the input language (English-pivoted reasoning). However, most studies of this native reasoning gap rely on inference-time interventions or limited native-language training data. We revisit this comparison at a larger scale and under comparable supervision. We construct long multilingual reasoning datasets across six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Chinese and Swahili); fine-tune specialists in both native and English-pivoted regimes on top of Qwen/Qwen3-8B-Base, and evaluate across mathematics, science, general knowledge, and code. In this setting, the average native reasoning gap shrinks to 1.9--3.5\% across the five non-English languages, considerably smaller than previously reported. Weight-space analysis of the native specialists reveals aligned fine-tuning updates in the middle layers and divergence in the outer layers. This points to a largely language-agnostic reasoning core surrounded by language-specific layers. Exploiting this structure, we introduce a Layer Swap: transferring the English specialist's stronger reasoning mid-layers into each native specialist, closing most of the native reasoning gap across the five non-English languages while preserving CoT in the target language. We release all models and datasets.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

While pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown evidence of acquiring vast amounts of knowledge, it remains unclear how much of this parametric knowledge is actually usable in performing downstream tasks. We propose a systematic framework to measure parametric knowledge utilization in PLMs. Our framework first extracts knowledge from a PLM's parameters and subsequently constructs a downstream task around this extracted knowledge. Performance on this task thus depends exclusively on utilizing the model's possessed knowledge, avoiding confounding factors like insufficient signal. As an instantiation, we study factual knowledge of PLMs and measure utilization across 125M to 13B parameter PLMs. We observe that: (1) PLMs exhibit two gaps - in acquired vs. utilized knowledge, (2) they show limited robustness in utilizing knowledge under distribution shifts, and (3) larger models close the acquired knowledge gap but the utilized knowledge gap remains. Overall, our study provides insights into PLMs' capabilities beyond their acquired knowledge.

The trajectory of AI development suggests that we will increasingly rely on agent-based systems composed of independently developed agents with different information, privileges, and tools. The success of these systems will critically depend on effective collaboration among these heterogeneous agents, even under partial observability. Despite intense interest, few empirical studies have evaluated such agent-agent collaboration at scale. We propose a collaborative maze-solving benchmark that (i) isolates collaborative capabilities, (ii) modulates problem complexity, (iii) enables scalable automated grading, and (iv) imposes no output-format constraints, preserving ecological plausibility. Using this framework, we evaluate 32 leading open- and closed-source models in solo, homogeneous, and heterogeneous pairings. Our results reveal a "collaboration gap": models that perform well solo often degrade substantially when required to collaborate. Collaboration can break down dramatically; for instance, small distilled models that solve mazes well alone may fail almost completely in certain pairings. We find that starting with the stronger agent often improves outcomes, motivating a "relay inference" approach where the stronger agent leads before handing off to the weaker one, closing much of the gap. Our findings argue for (1) collaboration-aware evaluation, (2) training strategies developed to enhance collaborative capabilities, and (3) interaction design that reliably elicits agents' latent skills, guidance that applies to AI-AI and human-AI collaboration.

High-quality chain-of-thought has demonstrated strong potential for unlocking the reasoning capabilities of large language models. However, current paradigms typically treat the reasoning process as an indivisible sequence, lacking an intrinsic mechanism to quantify step-wise information gain. This granularity gap manifests in two limitations: inference inefficiency from redundant exploration without explicit guidance, and optimization difficulty due to sparse outcome supervision or costly external verifiers. In this work, we propose CoT-Flow, a framework that reconceptualizes discrete reasoning steps as a continuous probabilistic flow, quantifying the contribution of each step toward the ground-truth answer. Built on this formulation, CoT-Flow enables two complementary methodologies: flow-guided decoding, which employs a greedy flow-based decoding strategy to extract information-efficient reasoning paths, and flow-based reinforcement learning, which constructs a verifier-free dense reward function. Experiments on challenging benchmarks demonstrate that CoT-Flow achieves a superior balance between inference efficiency and reasoning performance.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

Being able to provide explanations for a model's decision has become a central requirement for the development, deployment, and adoption of machine learning models. However, we are yet to understand what explanation methods can and cannot do. How do upstream factors such as data, model prediction, hyperparameters, and random initialization influence downstream explanations? While previous work raised concerns that explanations (E) may have little relationship with the prediction (Y), there is a lack of conclusive study to quantify this relationship. Our work borrows tools from causal inference to systematically assay this relationship. More specifically, we study the relationship between E and Y by measuring the treatment effect when intervening on their causal ancestors, i.e., on hyperparameters and inputs used to generate saliency-based Es or Ys. Our results suggest that the relationships between E and Y is far from ideal. In fact, the gap between 'ideal' case only increase in higher-performing models -- models that are likely to be deployed. Our work is a promising first step towards providing a quantitative measure of the relationship between E and Y, which could also inform the future development of methods for E with a quantitative metric.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

Are AI agents tools, co-authors, or researchers? We present a quantified case study (N=1): a physicist supervising an AI coding agent (Claude Code, Sonnet and Opus models) over 12 work days and 57 sessions to build CLAX-PT, a differentiable one-loop perturbation theory module in JAX. We documented and classified 15 supervision events by intervention level. The agent resolved ten autonomously by iterating against oracle tests. Two more by the physicist's domain knowledge. The three it could not -- all evaded oracle detection -- share a common property: the agent treated symptom reduction as root-cause resolution. It spent 33 of the 57 sessions adjusting coefficients within a code architecture that could not represent the target physics, and could not re-evaluate its CLASS-PT branch choice even when prompted to reconsider; only an injected physics concept (anisotropic BAO damping) triggered the redesign. Separately, the agent committed a calibrated correction that passed all oracle tests but corresponded to no quantity in the theory, predicting wrong values at any other cosmology. The fudge factor was caught and replaced within the same session. Three supervision practices proved critical for catching what oracle tests missed: testing at diverse parameter points beyond the fiducial calibration; shared changelogs that surfaced stalled exploration across sessions; and an explicit rule against unphysical numerical patches. In this case, supervision design, not model capability, determined whether the agent's output was trustworthy. Closing the gap would require agents that propose architectural alternatives rather than optimize within a given structure, and distinguish predictive adequacy from explanatory correctness -- capabilities not exhibited here, not obviously addressed by scaling alone. [Abridged.]

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly tasked with high-stakes autonomous decision-making, the transparency of their reasoning processes has become a critical safety concern. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting allows agents to generate human-readable reasoning traces, it remains unclear whether these traces are faithful generative drivers of the model's output or merely post-hoc rationalizations. We introduce Project Ariadne, a novel XAI framework that utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) and counterfactual logic to audit the causal integrity of agentic reasoning. Unlike existing interpretability methods that rely on surface-level textual similarity, Project Ariadne performs hard interventions (do-calculus) on intermediate reasoning nodes -- systematically inverting logic, negating premises, and reversing factual claims -- to measure the Causal Sensitivity (φ) of the terminal answer. Our empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals a persistent Faithfulness Gap. We define and detect a widespread failure mode termed Causal Decoupling, where agents exhibit a violation density (ρ) of up to 0.77 in factual and scientific domains. In these instances, agents arrive at identical conclusions despite contradictory internal logic, proving that their reasoning traces function as "Reasoning Theater" while decision-making is governed by latent parametric priors. Our findings suggest that current agentic architectures are inherently prone to unfaithful explanation, and we propose the Ariadne Score as a new benchmark for aligning stated logic with model action.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Despite the strong performance of large language models (LLMs) in tasks like mathematical reasoning, their practical use is limited by high computational demands and proprietary restrictions. Chain-of-thought (CoT) and program-of-thought (PoT) fine-tuning are common methods to transfer LLM knowledge to small language models (SLMs). However, CoT often leads to calculation errors in SLMs, while PoT has shown more promise. While most PoT-based approaches focus on direct problem-to-code conversion or extracting only the key information from questions and then providing code solution for it, this work emphasizes filling the gaps in the question to clearly illustrate the solution path, which can be challenging for an SLM to understand when such information is not explicitly provided. Therefore, this paper introduces Gap-Filling Prompting (GFP), a novel two-step prompting strategy designed to enhance the problem-solving process for SLMs. The first step identifies these gaps and provides hints for filling them, while the second step adds the hints to the question to generate a final code solution. Experimental results on two benchmark datasets demonstrate that GFP significantly improves the mathematical reasoning abilities of SLMs.

The advent of Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) signals a paradigm shift in artificial intelligence, moving from passive perception to active, cross-modal generation. Despite their unprecedented ability to synthesize information, a critical gap persists in evaluation: existing benchmarks primarily assess discriminative understanding or unconstrained image generation separately, failing to measure the integrated cognitive process of generative reasoning. To bridge this gap, we propose that geometric construction provides an ideal testbed as it inherently demands a fusion of language comprehension and precise visual generation. We introduce GGBench, a benchmark designed specifically to evaluate geometric generative reasoning. It provides a comprehensive framework for systematically diagnosing a model's ability to not only understand and reason but to actively construct a solution, thereby setting a more rigorous standard for the next generation of intelligent systems. Project website: https://opendatalab-raiser.github.io/GGBench/.

Quantifying uncertainty is important for actionable predictions in real-world applications. A crucial part of predictive uncertainty quantification is the estimation of epistemic uncertainty, which is defined as an integral of the product between a divergence function and the posterior. Current methods such as Deep Ensembles or MC dropout underperform at estimating the epistemic uncertainty, since they primarily consider the posterior when sampling models. We suggest Quantification of Uncertainty with Adversarial Models (QUAM) to better estimate the epistemic uncertainty. QUAM identifies regions where the whole product under the integral is large, not just the posterior. Consequently, QUAM has lower approximation error of the epistemic uncertainty compared to previous methods. Models for which the product is large correspond to adversarial models (not adversarial examples!). Adversarial models have both a high posterior as well as a high divergence between their predictions and that of a reference model. Our experiments show that QUAM excels in capturing epistemic uncertainty for deep learning models and outperforms previous methods on challenging tasks in the vision domain.

Recent domain generalization (DG) approaches typically use the hypothesis learned on source domains for inference on the unseen target domain. However, such a hypothesis can be arbitrarily far from the optimal one for the target domain, induced by a gap termed ``adaptivity gap''. Without exploiting the domain information from the unseen test samples, adaptivity gap estimation and minimization are intractable, which hinders us to robustify a model to any unknown distribution. In this paper, we first establish a generalization bound that explicitly considers the adaptivity gap. Our bound motivates two strategies to reduce the gap: the first one is ensembling multiple classifiers to enrich the hypothesis space, then we propose effective gap estimation methods for guiding the selection of a better hypothesis for the target. The other method is minimizing the gap directly by adapting model parameters using online target samples. We thus propose Domain-specific Risk Minimization (DRM). During training, DRM models the distributions of different source domains separately; for inference, DRM performs online model steering using the source hypothesis for each arriving target sample. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed DRM for domain generalization with the following advantages: 1) it significantly outperforms competitive baselines on different distributional shift settings; 2) it achieves either comparable or superior accuracies on all source domains compared to vanilla empirical risk minimization; 3) it remains simple and efficient during training, and 4) it is complementary to invariant learning approaches.

Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly advanced the field of computer vision by enabling machines to create and interpret visual data with unprecedented sophistication. This transformation builds upon a foundation of generative models to produce realistic images, videos, and 3D/4D content. Conventional generative models primarily focus on visual fidelity while often neglecting the physical plausibility of the generated content. This gap limits their effectiveness in applications that require adherence to real-world physical laws, such as robotics, autonomous systems, and scientific simulations. As generative models evolve to increasingly integrate physical realism and dynamic simulation, their potential to function as "world simulators" expands. Therefore, the field of physics-aware generation in computer vision is rapidly growing, calling for a comprehensive survey to provide a structured analysis of current efforts. To serve this purpose, the survey presents a systematic review, categorizing methods based on how they incorporate physical knowledge, either through explicit simulation or implicit learning. It also analyzes key paradigms, discusses evaluation protocols, and identifies future research directions. By offering a comprehensive overview, this survey aims to help future developments in physically grounded generation for computer vision. The reviewed papers are summarized at https://tinyurl.com/Physics-Aware-Generation.

Large language models (LLMs) can store a significant amount of factual knowledge in their parameters. However, their parametric knowledge may conflict with the information provided in the context -- this phenomenon, known as context-memory knowledge conflicts, can lead to undesirable model behaviour, such as reliance on outdated or incorrect information. Analysing the internal activations of LLMs, we find that they can internally register the signals of knowledge conflict at mid-layers. Such signals allow us to detect whether a knowledge conflict occurs and use inference-time intervention strategies to resolve it. In this work, we propose SpARE, a training-free representation engineering method that uses pre-trained sparse auto-encoders (SAEs) to control the knowledge selection behaviour of LLMs. SpARE identifies the functional features that control the knowledge selection behaviours and applies them to edit the internal activations of LLMs at inference time. Our experimental results show that SpARE can effectively control the usage of either knowledge source to resolve knowledge conflict in open-domain question-answering tasks, surpassing existing representation engineering methods (+10%) as well as contrastive decoding methods (+15%).

Current mathematical reasoning benchmarks for large language models (LLMs) are approaching saturation, with some achieving > 90% accuracy, and are increasingly compromised by training-set contamination. We introduce Putnam-AXIOM, a benchmark of 522 university-level competition problems drawn from the prestigious William Lowell Putnam Mathematical Competition, and Putnam-AXIOM Variation, an unseen companion set of 100 functional variants generated by programmatically perturbing variables and constants. The variation protocol produces an unlimited stream of equally difficult, unseen instances -- yielding a contamination-resilient test bed. On the Original set, OpenAI's o1-preview -- the strongest evaluated model -- scores 41.9%, but its accuracy drops by 19.6% (46.8% relative decrease) on the paired Variations. The remaining eighteen models show the same downward trend, ten of them with non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. These gaps suggest memorization and highlight the necessity of dynamic benchmarks. We complement "boxed" accuracy with Teacher-Forced Accuracy (TFA), a lightweight metric that directly scores reasoning traces and automates natural language proof evaluations. Putnam-AXIOM therefore provides a rigorous, contamination-resilient evaluation framework for assessing advanced mathematical reasoning of LLMs. Data and evaluation code are publicly available at https://github.com/brando90/putnam-axiom.

Knowledge conflict arises from discrepancies between information in the context of a large language model (LLM) and the knowledge stored in its parameters. This can hurt performance when using standard decoding techniques, which tend to ignore the context. Existing test-time contrastive methods seek to address this by comparing the LLM's output distribution with and without the context and adjust the model according to the contrast between them. However, we find that these methods frequently misjudge the degree of conflict and struggle to handle instances that vary in their amount of conflict, with static methods over-adjusting when conflict is absent. We propose a fine-grained, instance-level approach called AdaCAD, which dynamically infers the weight of adjustment based on the degree of conflict, as measured by the Jensen-Shannon divergence between distributions representing contextual and parametric knowledge. Our experiments across four models on six diverse question-answering (QA) datasets and three summarization tasks demonstrate that our training-free adaptive method consistently outperforms other decoding methods on QA, with average accuracy gains of 14.21% (absolute) over a static contrastive baseline, and improves the factuality of summaries by 5.59 (AlignScore). Furthermore, our analysis shows that while decoding with contrastive baselines hurts performance when conflict is absent, AdaCAD mitigates these losses, making it more applicable to real-world datasets in which some examples have conflict and others do not.

Recent advances in unified multimodal models (UMM) have demonstrated remarkable progress in both understanding and generation tasks. However, whether these two capabilities are genuinely aligned and integrated within a single model remains unclear. To investigate this question, we introduce GapEval, a bidirectional benchmark designed to quantify the gap between understanding and generation capabilities, and quantitatively measure the cognitive coherence of the two "unified" directions. Each question can be answered in both modalities (image and text), enabling a symmetric evaluation of a model's bidirectional inference capability and cross-modal consistency. Experiments reveal a persistent gap between the two directions across a wide range of UMMs with different architectures, suggesting that current models achieve only surface-level unification rather than deep cognitive convergence of the two. To further explore the underlying mechanism, we conduct an empirical study from the perspective of knowledge manipulation to illustrate the underlying limitations. Our findings indicate that knowledge within UMMs often remains disjoint. The capability emergence and knowledge across modalities are unsynchronized, paving the way for further exploration.

Recent advancements in Reinforcement Post-Training (RPT) have significantly enhanced the capabilities of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), sparking increased interest in the generalization of RL-based reasoning. While existing work has primarily focused on investigating its generalization across tasks or modalities, this study proposes a novel cross-linguistic perspective to investigate reasoning generalization. This raises a crucial question: Does the reasoning capability achieved from English RPT effectively transfer to other languages? We address this by systematically evaluating English-centric LRMs on multilingual reasoning benchmarks and introducing a metric to quantify cross-lingual transferability. Our findings reveal that cross-lingual transferability varies significantly across initial model, target language, and training paradigm. Through interventional studies, we find that models with stronger initial English capabilities tend to over-rely on English-specific patterns, leading to diminished cross-lingual generalization. To address this, we conduct a thorough parallel training study. Experimental results yield three key findings: First-Parallel Leap, a substantial leap in performance when transitioning from monolingual to just a single parallel language, and a predictable Parallel Scaling Law, revealing that cross-lingual reasoning transfer follows a power-law with the number of training parallel languages. Moreover, we identify the discrepancy between actual monolingual performance and the power-law prediction as Monolingual Generalization Gap, indicating that English-centric LRMs fail to fully generalize across languages. Our study challenges the assumption that LRM reasoning mirrors human cognition, providing critical insights for the development of more language-agnostic LRMs.

Representation learning on text-attributed graphs (TAGs) integrates structural connectivity with rich textual semantics, enabling applications in diverse domains. Current methods largely rely on contrastive learning to maximize cross-modal similarity, assuming tighter coupling between graph and text representations improves transfer performance. However, our empirical analysis reveals that both natural gap expansion and forced gap reduction result in performance degradation by disrupting pre-trained knowledge structures and impairing generalization. This arises from the geometric incompatibility between encoders, where graph encoders capture topological patterns, while text encoders capture semantic structures. Over-alignment compresses these distinct spaces into shared subspaces, causing structure collapse that diminishes both topological reasoning and semantic understanding. We propose LLM4GTA, a gap-aware alignment framework that preserves representation gaps as geometric necessities for maintaining modality-specific knowledge and improving transfer performance. LLM4GTA includes an adaptive gap preservation module to prevent over-alignment by monitoring similarity evolution and an intra-modal compensation mechanism that boosts discriminative power using auxiliary classifiers in graph space. Extensive experiments show significant improvements over existing methods in zero-shot and few-shot scenarios.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in linguistic tasks, necessitating robust evaluation frameworks to understand their capabilities and limitations. Inspired by Feynman's principle of understanding through creation, we introduce a self-knowledge evaluation framework that is easy to implement, evaluating models on their ability to comprehend and respond to self-generated questions. Our findings, based on testing multiple models across diverse tasks, reveal significant gaps in the model's self-knowledge ability. Further analysis indicates these gaps may be due to misalignment with human attention mechanisms. Additionally, fine-tuning on self-generated math task may enhance the model's math performance, highlighting the potential of the framework for efficient and insightful model evaluation and may also contribute to the improvement of LLMs.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.