Daily Papers

Much of the advancement of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) in imperfect-information games has historically depended on manual iterative refinement of baselines. While foundational families like Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) rest on solid theoretical ground, the design of their most effective variants often relies on human intuition to navigate a vast algorithmic design space. In this work, we propose the use of AlphaEvolve, an evolutionary coding agent powered by large language models, to automatically discover new multiagent learning algorithms. We demonstrate the generality of this framework by evolving novel variants for two distinct paradigms of game-theoretic learning. First, in the domain of iterative regret minimization, we evolve the logic governing regret accumulation and policy derivation, discovering a new algorithm, Volatility-Adaptive Discounted (VAD-)CFR. VAD-CFR employs novel, non-intuitive mechanisms-including volatility-sensitive discounting, consistency-enforced optimism, and a hard warm-start policy accumulation schedule-to outperform state-of-the-art baselines like Discounted Predictive CFR+. Second, in the regime of population based training algorithms, we evolve training-time and evaluation-time meta strategy solvers for PSRO, discovering a new variant, Smoothed Hybrid Optimistic Regret (SHOR-)PSRO. SHOR-PSRO introduces a hybrid meta-solver that linearly blends Optimistic Regret Matching with a smoothed, temperature-controlled distribution over best pure strategies. By dynamically annealing this blending factor and diversity bonuses during training, the algorithm automates the transition from population diversity to rigorous equilibrium finding, yielding superior empirical convergence compared to standard static meta-solvers.

Deep Equilibrium Models (DEQs) and Neural Ordinary Differential Equations (Neural ODEs) are two branches of implicit models that have achieved remarkable success owing to their superior performance and low memory consumption. While both are implicit models, DEQs and Neural ODEs are derived from different mathematical formulations. Inspired by homotopy continuation, we establish a connection between these two models and illustrate that they are actually two sides of the same coin. Homotopy continuation is a classical method of solving nonlinear equations based on a corresponding ODE. Given this connection, we proposed a new implicit model called HomoODE that inherits the property of high accuracy from DEQs and the property of stability from Neural ODEs. Unlike DEQs, which explicitly solve an equilibrium-point-finding problem via Newton's methods in the forward pass, HomoODE solves the equilibrium-point-finding problem implicitly using a modified Neural ODE via homotopy continuation. Further, we developed an acceleration method for HomoODE with a shared learnable initial point. It is worth noting that our model also provides a better understanding of why Augmented Neural ODEs work as long as the augmented part is regarded as the equilibrium point to find. Comprehensive experiments with several image classification tasks demonstrate that HomoODE surpasses existing implicit models in terms of both accuracy and memory consumption.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

We present a new approach to modeling sequential data: the deep equilibrium model (DEQ). Motivated by an observation that the hidden layers of many existing deep sequence models converge towards some fixed point, we propose the DEQ approach that directly finds these equilibrium points via root-finding. Such a method is equivalent to running an infinite depth (weight-tied) feedforward network, but has the notable advantage that we can analytically backpropagate through the equilibrium point using implicit differentiation. Using this approach, training and prediction in these networks require only constant memory, regardless of the effective "depth" of the network. We demonstrate how DEQs can be applied to two state-of-the-art deep sequence models: self-attention transformers and trellis networks. On large-scale language modeling tasks, such as the WikiText-103 benchmark, we show that DEQs 1) often improve performance over these state-of-the-art models (for similar parameter counts); 2) have similar computational requirements to existing models; and 3) vastly reduce memory consumption (often the bottleneck for training large sequence models), demonstrating an up-to 88% memory reduction in our experiments. The code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/deq .

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

We provide a concise framework for generalized ensemble theory through a matrix-based approach. By introducing an observation matrix, any discrete probability distribution, including those for non-equilibrium steady states, can be expressed as a generalized Boltzmann distribution, with observables and conjugate variables as the basis and coordinates in a linear space. In this framework, we identify the minimal sufficient statistics required for inferring the Boltzmann distribution. Furthermore, we show that the Hadamard and Vandermonde matrices are suitable observation matrices for spin systems and random walks. In master equation systems, the probability flux observation matrix facilitates the identification of detailed balance violations. Our findings provide a new approach to developing generalized ensemble theory for non-equilibrium steady-state systems.

In this study, the spin-orbit torque (SOT) in light metal oxide systems is investigated using an experimental approach based on harmonic Hall voltage techniques in out-of-plane (OOP) angular geometry for samples with in-plane magnetic anisotropy. In parallel, an analytical derivation of this alternative OOP harmonic Hall detection geometry has been developed, followed by experimental validation to extract SOT effective fields. In addition, to accurately quantifying SOT, this method allows complete characterization of thermoelectric effects, opening promising avenues for accurate SOT characterization in related systems. In particular, this study corroborates the critical role of naturally oxidized copper interfaced with metallic Cu in the generation of orbital current in Co(2)|Pt(4)|CuOx(3), demonstrating a two-fold increase in damping-like torques compared to a reference sample with an oxidized Al capping layer. These findings offer promising directions for future research on the application aspect of non-equilibrium orbital angular momentum.

Machine learning (ML) is increasingly used in structural engineering and design, yet its broader adoption is hampered by the lack of openly accessible datasets of structural systems. We introduce BridgeNet, a publicly available graph-based dataset of 20,000 form-found bridge structures aimed at enabling Graph ML and multi-modal learning in the context of conceptual structural design. Each datapoint consists of (i) a pin-jointed equilibrium wireframe model generated with the Combinatorial Equilibrium Modeling (CEM) form-finding method, (ii) a volumetric 3D mesh obtained through force-informed materialization, and (iii) rendered images from two canonical camera angles. The resulting dataset is modality-rich and application-agnostic, supporting tasks such as CEM-specific edge classification and parameter inference, surrogate modeling of form-finding, cross-modal reconstruction between graphs, meshes and images, and generative structural design. BridgeNet addresses a key bottleneck in data-driven applications for structural engineering and design by providing a dataset that facilitates the development of new ML-based approaches for equilibrium bridge structures.

Ensuring alignment of language models' outputs with human preferences is critical to guarantee a useful, safe, and pleasant user experience. Thus, human alignment has been extensively studied recently and several methods such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), Direct Policy Optimisation (DPO) and Sequence Likelihood Calibration (SLiC) have emerged. In this paper, our contribution is two-fold. First, we show the equivalence between two recent alignment methods, namely Identity Policy Optimisation (IPO) and Nash Mirror Descent (Nash-MD). Second, we introduce a generalisation of IPO, named IPO-MD, that leverages the regularised sampling approach proposed by Nash-MD. This equivalence may seem surprising at first sight, since IPO is an offline method whereas Nash-MD is an online method using a preference model. However, this equivalence can be proven when we consider the online version of IPO, that is when both generations are sampled by the online policy and annotated by a trained preference model. Optimising the IPO loss with such a stream of data becomes then equivalent to finding the Nash equilibrium of the preference model through self-play. Building on this equivalence, we introduce the IPO-MD algorithm that generates data with a mixture policy (between the online and reference policy) similarly as the general Nash-MD algorithm. We compare online-IPO and IPO-MD to different online versions of existing losses on preference data such as DPO and SLiC on a summarisation task.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Traditional Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) often relies on reward models, frequently assuming preference structures like the Bradley-Terry model, which may not accurately capture the complexities of real human preferences (e.g., intransitivity). Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) offers a more direct alternative by framing the problem as finding a Nash equilibrium of a game defined by these preferences. In this work, we introduce Nash Mirror Prox (Nash-MP), an online NLHF algorithm that leverages the Mirror Prox optimization scheme to achieve fast and stable convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Our theoretical analysis establishes that Nash-MP exhibits last-iterate linear convergence towards the beta-regularized Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we prove that the KL-divergence to the optimal policy decreases at a rate of order (1+2beta)^{-N/2}, where N is a number of preference queries. We further demonstrate last-iterate linear convergence for the exploitability gap and uniformly for the span semi-norm of log-probabilities, with all these rates being independent of the size of the action space. Furthermore, we propose and analyze an approximate version of Nash-MP where proximal steps are estimated using stochastic policy gradients, making the algorithm closer to applications. Finally, we detail a practical implementation strategy for fine-tuning large language models and present experiments that demonstrate its competitive performance and compatibility with existing methods.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

In the endeavor to make autonomous robots take actions, task planning is a major challenge that requires translating high-level task descriptions into long-horizon action sequences. Despite recent advances in language model agents, they remain prone to planning errors and limited in their ability to plan ahead. To address these limitations in robotic planning, we advocate a self-refining scheme that iteratively refines a draft plan until an equilibrium is reached. Remarkably, this process can be optimized end-to-end from an analytical perspective without the need to curate additional verifiers or reward models, allowing us to train self-refining planners in a simple supervised learning fashion. Meanwhile, a nested equilibrium sequence modeling procedure is devised for efficient closed-loop planning that incorporates useful feedback from the environment (or an internal world model). Our method is evaluated on the VirtualHome-Env benchmark, showing advanced performance with better scaling for inference computation. Code is available at https://github.com/Singularity0104/equilibrium-planner.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Boltzmann generators approach the sampling problem in many-body physics by combining a normalizing flow and a statistical reweighting method to generate samples in thermodynamic equilibrium. The equilibrium distribution is usually defined by an energy function and a thermodynamic state. Here we propose temperature-steerable flows (TSF) which are able to generate a family of probability densities parametrized by a choosable temperature parameter. TSFs can be embedded in generalized ensemble sampling frameworks to sample a physical system across multiple thermodynamic states.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

Bundle adjustment is the common way to solve localization and mapping. It is an iterative process in which a system of non-linear equations is solved using two optimization methods, weighted by a damping factor. In the classic approach, the latter is chosen heuristically by the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on each iteration. This might take many iterations, making the process computationally expensive, which might be harmful to real-time applications. We propose to replace this heuristic by viewing the problem in a holistic manner, as a game, and formulating it as a reinforcement-learning task. We set an environment which solves the non-linear equations and train an agent to choose the damping factor in a learned manner. We demonstrate that our approach considerably reduces the number of iterations required to reach the bundle adjustment's convergence, on both synthetic and real-life scenarios. We show that this reduction benefits the classic approach and can be integrated with other bundle adjustment acceleration methods.

We present a vector-based method to balance chemical reactions. The algorithm builds candidates in a deterministic way, removes duplicates, and always prints coefficients in the lowest whole-number form. For redox cases, electrons and protons/hydroxide are treated explicitly, so both mass and charge are balanced. We also outline the basic principles of the vector formulation of stoichiometry, interpreting reactions as integer vectors in composition space, this geometric view supports compact visualizations of reagent-product interactions and helps surface distinct reaction families. The method enumerates valid balances for arbitrary user-specified species lists without special-case balancing rules or symbolic tricks, and it provides a clean foundation for developing new algorithmic variants (e.g., alternative objectives or constraints). On representative examples (neutralization, double displacement, decomposition, classical redox, small multicomponent sets) and a negative control, the method produced correct integer balances. When multiple balances exist, we report a canonical one - minimizing the total coefficient sum with a simple tie-breaker - without claiming global optimality beyond the solutions the search enumerates. The procedure applies per reaction and extends to reaction networks via consistent per-reaction application. We do not report runtimes, broader benchmarking and code/data release are planned.

In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a T-step Cournot game and a T-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems -- the upper bound by the T-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the T-step monopoly model -- can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter T for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small T usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

We consider the problem where an agent wants to find a hidden object that is randomly located in some vertex of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) according to a fixed but possibly unknown distribution. The agent can only examine vertices whose in-neighbors have already been examined. In this paper, we address a learning setting where we allow the agent to stop before having found the object and restart searching on a new independent instance of the same problem. Our goal is to maximize the total number of hidden objects found given a time budget. The agent can thus skip an instance after realizing that it would spend too much time on it. Our contributions are both to the search theory and multi-armed bandits. If the distribution is known, we provide a quasi-optimal and efficient stationary strategy. If the distribution is unknown, we additionally show how to sequentially approximate it and, at the same time, act near-optimally in order to collect as many hidden objects as possible.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

The study demonstrates the capabilities of a vector-based approach for calculating stoichiometric coefficients in chemical equations, using black powder as an illustrative example. A method is proposed for selecting and constraining intermediate interactions between reactants, as well as for identifying final products. It is shown that even a small number of components can lead to a large number of final and intermediate products. Through concrete calculations, a correlation is established between the number of possible chemical equations and the number of reactants. A methodology is proposed for computing all possible chemical equations within a reaction system for arbitrary component ratios, enabling the derivation of all feasible chemical reactions. Additionally, a method is developed for calculating the chemical composition for a fixed set of reactants, allowing for the evaluation of the set of products resulting from all possible chemical interactions given a specified initial composition.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

In the Lagrange-Newton method, where Newton's method is applied to a Lagrangian function that includes equality constraints, all stationary points are saddle points. It is therefore not possible to use a line-search method based on the value of the objective function; instead, the line search can operate on merit functions. In this report, we explore an alternative line-search method which is applicable to this case; it particulary addresses the damping of the step length in tight valleys. We propose a line-search criterion based on the divergence of the field of Newton step vectors. The visualization of the criterion for two-dimensional test functions reveals a network of ravines with flat bottom at the zero points of the criterion. The ravines are typically connected to stationary points. To traverse this ravine network in order to approach a stationary point, a zigzag strategy is devised. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the novel line-search strategy succeeds from most starting points in all test functions, but only exhibits the desired damping of the step length in some situations. At the present stage it is therefore difficult to appraise the utility of this contribution.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

Realistic environments often provide agents with very limited feedback. When the environment is initially unknown, the feedback, in the beginning, can be completely absent, and the agents may first choose to devote all their effort on exploring efficiently. The exploration remains a challenge while it has been addressed with many hand-tuned heuristics with different levels of generality on one side, and a few theoretically-backed exploration strategies on the other. Many of them are incarnated by intrinsic motivation and in particular explorations bonuses. A common rule of thumb for exploration bonuses is to use 1/n bonus that is added to the empirical estimates of the reward, where n is a number of times this particular state (or a state-action pair) was visited. We show that, surprisingly, for a pure-exploration objective of reward-free exploration, bonuses that scale with 1/n bring faster learning rates, improving the known upper bounds with respect to the dependence on the horizon H. Furthermore, we show that with an improved analysis of the stopping time, we can improve by a factor H the sample complexity in the best-policy identification setting, which is another pure-exploration objective, where the environment provides rewards but the agent is not penalized for its behavior during the exploration phase.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

We formulate nonequilibrium thermodynamics in which intensive variables acquire operational meaning through measurement protocols consistent with local reciprocity. Using physical equilibrium as a reference, conjugate observables are constructed by continuously adjusting devices along the local tangent space of the statistical manifold. In this relativity of observation, Onsager reciprocity holds locally, allowing inference-based Lagrange multipliers to be directly measured. This provides a systematic method to extend operational definitions of intensive variables to nonequilibrium states, highlighting their context-dependent nature and offering a concrete experimental strategy.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

We describe and analyse Levenberg-Marquardt methods for solving systems of nonlinear equations. More specifically, we propose an adaptive formula for the Levenberg-Marquardt parameter and analyse the local convergence of the method under Hölder metric subregularity of the function defining the equation and Hölder continuity of its gradient mapping. Further, we analyse the local convergence of the method under the additional assumption that the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality holds. We finally report encouraging numerical results confirming the theoretical findings for the problem of computing moiety conserved steady states in biochemical reaction networks. This problem can be cast as finding a solution of a system of nonlinear equations, where the associated mapping satisfies the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality assumption.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

We consider the problem of multi-objective alignment of foundation models with human preferences, which is a critical step towards helpful and harmless AI systems. However, it is generally costly and unstable to fine-tune large foundation models using reinforcement learning (RL), and the multi-dimensionality, heterogeneity, and conflicting nature of human preferences further complicate the alignment process. In this paper, we introduce Rewards-in-Context (RiC), which conditions the response of a foundation model on multiple rewards in its prompt context and applies supervised fine-tuning for alignment. The salient features of RiC are simplicity and adaptivity, as it only requires supervised fine-tuning of a single foundation model and supports dynamic adjustment for user preferences during inference time. Inspired by the analytical solution of an abstracted convex optimization problem, our dynamic inference-time adjustment method approaches the Pareto-optimal solution for multiple objectives. Empirical evidence demonstrates the efficacy of our method in aligning both Large Language Models (LLMs) and diffusion models to accommodate diverse rewards with only around 10% GPU hours compared with multi-objective RL baseline.

Reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms aim to balance exploiting the current best strategy with exploring new options that could lead to higher rewards. Most common RL algorithms use undirected exploration, i.e., select random sequences of actions. Exploration can also be directed using intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity or model epistemic uncertainty. However, effectively balancing task and intrinsic rewards is challenging and often task-dependent. In this work, we introduce a framework, MaxInfoRL, for balancing intrinsic and extrinsic exploration. MaxInfoRL steers exploration towards informative transitions, by maximizing intrinsic rewards such as the information gain about the underlying task. When combined with Boltzmann exploration, this approach naturally trades off maximization of the value function with that of the entropy over states, rewards, and actions. We show that our approach achieves sublinear regret in the simplified setting of multi-armed bandits. We then apply this general formulation to a variety of off-policy model-free RL methods for continuous state-action spaces, yielding novel algorithms that achieve superior performance across hard exploration problems and complex scenarios such as visual control tasks.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Recent advancements in meta-learning have enabled the automatic discovery of novel reinforcement learning algorithms parameterized by surrogate objective functions. To improve upon manually designed algorithms, the parameterization of this learned objective function must be expressive enough to represent novel principles of learning (instead of merely recovering already established ones) while still generalizing to a wide range of settings outside of its meta-training distribution. However, existing methods focus on discovering objective functions that, like many widely used objective functions in reinforcement learning, do not take into account the total number of steps allowed for training, or "training horizon". In contrast, humans use a plethora of different learning objectives across the course of acquiring a new ability. For instance, students may alter their studying techniques based on the proximity to exam deadlines and their self-assessed capabilities. This paper contends that ignoring the optimization time horizon significantly restricts the expressive potential of discovered learning algorithms. We propose a simple augmentation to two existing objective discovery approaches that allows the discovered algorithm to dynamically update its objective function throughout the agent's training procedure, resulting in expressive schedules and increased generalization across different training horizons. In the process, we find that commonly used meta-gradient approaches fail to discover such adaptive objective functions while evolution strategies discover highly dynamic learning rules. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a wide range of tasks and analyze the resulting learned algorithms, which we find effectively balance exploration and exploitation by modifying the structure of their learning rules throughout the agent's lifetime.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Go-Explore is a powerful family of algorithms designed to solve hard-exploration problems, built on the principle of archiving discovered states, and iteratively returning to and exploring from the most promising states. This approach has led to superhuman performance across a wide variety of challenging problems including Atari games and robotic control, but requires manually designing heuristics to guide exploration, which is time-consuming and infeasible in general. To resolve this, we propose Intelligent Go-Explore (IGE) which greatly extends the scope of the original Go-Explore by replacing these heuristics with the intelligence and internalized human notions of interestingness captured by giant foundation models (FMs). This provides IGE with a human-like ability to instinctively identify how interesting or promising any new state is (e.g. discovering new objects, locations, or behaviors), even in complex environments where heuristics are hard to define. Moreover, IGE offers the exciting and previously impossible opportunity to recognize and capitalize on serendipitous discoveries that cannot be predicted ahead of time. We evaluate IGE on a range of language-based tasks that require search and exploration. In Game of 24, a multistep mathematical reasoning problem, IGE reaches 100% success rate 70.8% faster than the best classic graph search baseline. Next, in BabyAI-Text, a challenging partially observable gridworld, IGE exceeds the previous SOTA with orders of magnitude fewer online samples. Finally, in TextWorld, we show the unique ability of IGE to succeed in settings requiring long-horizon exploration where prior SOTA FM agents like Reflexion completely fail. Overall, IGE combines the tremendous strengths of FMs and the powerful Go-Explore algorithm, opening up a new frontier of research into creating more generally capable agents with impressive exploration capabilities.

We investigate the exploration of an unknown environment when no reward function is provided. Building on the incremental exploration setting introduced by Lim and Auer [1], we define the objective of learning the set of ε-optimal goal-conditioned policies attaining all states that are incrementally reachable within L steps (in expectation) from a reference state s_0. In this paper, we introduce a novel model-based approach that interleaves discovering new states from s_0 and improving the accuracy of a model estimate that is used to compute goal-conditioned policies to reach newly discovered states. The resulting algorithm, DisCo, achieves a sample complexity scaling as O(L^5 S_{L+ε} Γ_{L+ε} A ε^{-2}), where A is the number of actions, S_{L+ε} is the number of states that are incrementally reachable from s_0 in L+ε steps, and Γ_{L+ε} is the branching factor of the dynamics over such states. This improves over the algorithm proposed in [1] in both ε and L at the cost of an extra Γ_{L+ε} factor, which is small in most environments of interest. Furthermore, DisCo is the first algorithm that can return an ε/c_{min}-optimal policy for any cost-sensitive shortest-path problem defined on the L-reachable states with minimum cost c_{min}. Finally, we report preliminary empirical results confirming our theoretical findings.

One of the challenges in online reinforcement learning (RL) is that the agent needs to trade off the exploration of the environment and the exploitation of the samples to optimize its behavior. Whether we optimize for regret, sample complexity, state-space coverage or model estimation, we need to strike a different exploration-exploitation trade-off. In this paper, we propose to tackle the exploration-exploitation problem following a decoupled approach composed of: 1) An "objective-specific" algorithm that (adaptively) prescribes how many samples to collect at which states, as if it has access to a generative model (i.e., a simulator of the environment); 2) An "objective-agnostic" sample collection exploration strategy responsible for generating the prescribed samples as fast as possible. Building on recent methods for exploration in the stochastic shortest path problem, we first provide an algorithm that, given as input the number of samples b(s,a) needed in each state-action pair, requires O(B D + D^{3/2} S^2 A) time steps to collect the B=sum_{s,a} b(s,a) desired samples, in any unknown communicating MDP with S states, A actions and diameter D. Then we show how this general-purpose exploration algorithm can be paired with "objective-specific" strategies that prescribe the sample requirements to tackle a variety of settings -- e.g., model estimation, sparse reward discovery, goal-free cost-free exploration in communicating MDPs -- for which we obtain improved or novel sample complexity guarantees.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

Understanding equilibration and thermalization in isolated many-body quantum systems is a central challenge in quantum physics. The traditional approach focuses on the study of the full state of the quantum system which, at equilibrium, is best described by the Diagonal Ensemble. Here, we present Observable Statistical Mechanics, a novel paradigm that shifts attention from the full quantum state to the statistics of measurement outcomes. This approach is grounded in the Maximum Observable Entropy Principle, positing that equilibrium measurement statistics tend to maximize observable entropy under conserved average energy. By focusing on accessible measurements, the theory accurately predicts equilibrium probability distributions without needing detailed microscopic information like the energy eigenstates. Extensive numerical experiments on 7 spin-1/2 Hamiltonians demonstrate the broad applicability and robustness of this framework.

The widespread applicability and increasing omnipresence of LLMs have instigated a need to align LLM responses to user and stakeholder preferences. Many preference optimization approaches have been proposed that fine-tune LLM parameters to achieve good alignment. However, such parameter tuning is known to interfere with model performance on many tasks. Moreover, keeping up with shifting user preferences is tricky in such a situation. Decoding-time alignment with reward model guidance solves these issues at the cost of increased inference time. However, most of such methods fail to strike the right balance between exploration and exploitation of reward -- often due to the conflated formulation of these two aspects - to give well-aligned responses. To remedy this we decouple these two aspects and implement them in an evolutionary fashion: exploration is enforced by decoding from mutated instructions and exploitation is represented as the periodic replacement of poorly-rewarded generations with well-rewarded ones. Empirical evidences indicate that this strategy outperforms many preference optimization and decode-time alignment approaches on two widely accepted alignment benchmarks AlpacaEval 2 and MT-Bench. Our implementation will be available at: https://darwin-alignment.github.io.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

We study the design of sample-efficient algorithms for reinforcement learning in the presence of rich, high-dimensional observations, formalized via the Block MDP problem. Existing algorithms suffer from either 1) computational intractability, 2) strong statistical assumptions that are not necessarily satisfied in practice, or 3) suboptimal sample complexity. We address these issues by providing the first computationally efficient algorithm that attains rate-optimal sample complexity with respect to the desired accuracy level, with minimal statistical assumptions. Our algorithm, MusIK, combines systematic exploration with representation learning based on multi-step inverse kinematics, a learning objective in which the aim is to predict the learner's own action from the current observation and observations in the (potentially distant) future. MusIK is simple and flexible, and can efficiently take advantage of general-purpose function approximation. Our analysis leverages several new techniques tailored to non-optimistic exploration algorithms, which we anticipate will find broader use.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

The symbolic discovery of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) from trajectory data plays a pivotal role in AI-driven scientific discovery. Existing symbolic methods predominantly rely on fixed, pre-collected training datasets, which often result in suboptimal performance, as demonstrated in our case study in Figure 1. Drawing inspiration from active learning, we investigate strategies to query informative trajectory data that can enhance the evaluation of predicted ODEs. However, the butterfly effect in dynamical systems reveals that small variations in initial conditions can lead to drastically different trajectories, necessitating the storage of vast quantities of trajectory data using conventional active learning. To address this, we introduce Active Symbolic Discovery of Ordinary Differential Equations via Phase Portrait Sketching (APPS). Instead of directly selecting individual initial conditions, our APPS first identifies an informative region within the phase space and then samples a batch of initial conditions from this region. Compared to traditional active learning methods, APPS mitigates the gap of maintaining a large amount of data. Extensive experiments demonstrate that APPS consistently discovers more accurate ODE expressions than baseline methods using passively collected datasets.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Reward-based optimization algorithms require both exploration, to find rewards, and exploitation, to maximize performance. The need for efficient exploration is even more significant in sparse reward settings, in which performance feedback is given sparingly, thus rendering it unsuitable for guiding the search process. In this work, we introduce the SparsE Reward Exploration via Novelty and Emitters (SERENE) algorithm, capable of efficiently exploring a search space, as well as optimizing rewards found in potentially disparate areas. Contrary to existing emitters-based approaches, SERENE separates the search space exploration and reward exploitation into two alternating processes. The first process performs exploration through Novelty Search, a divergent search algorithm. The second one exploits discovered reward areas through emitters, i.e. local instances of population-based optimization algorithms. A meta-scheduler allocates a global computational budget by alternating between the two processes, ensuring the discovery and efficient exploitation of disjoint reward areas. SERENE returns both a collection of diverse solutions covering the search space and a collection of high-performing solutions for each distinct reward area. We evaluate SERENE on various sparse reward environments and show it compares favorably to existing baselines.

Synthesizing optimal controllers for dynamical systems often involves solving optimization problems with hard real-time constraints. These constraints determine the class of numerical methods that can be applied: computationally expensive but accurate numerical routines are replaced by fast and inaccurate methods, trading inference time for solution accuracy. This paper provides techniques to improve the quality of optimized control policies given a fixed computational budget. We achieve the above via a hypersolvers approach, which hybridizes a differential equation solver and a neural network. The performance is evaluated in direct and receding-horizon optimal control tasks in both low and high dimensions, where the proposed approach shows consistent Pareto improvements in solution accuracy and control performance.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

In this paper, we present empirical evidence of skills and directed exploration emerging from a simple RL algorithm long before any successful trials are observed. For example, in a manipulation task, the agent is given a single observation of the goal state and learns skills, first for moving its end-effector, then for pushing the block, and finally for picking up and placing the block. These skills emerge before the agent has ever successfully placed the block at the goal location and without the aid of any reward functions, demonstrations, or manually-specified distance metrics. Once the agent has learned to reach the goal state reliably, exploration is reduced. Implementing our method involves a simple modification of prior work and does not require density estimates, ensembles, or any additional hyperparameters. Intuitively, the proposed method seems like it should be terrible at exploration, and we lack a clear theoretical understanding of why it works so effectively, though our experiments provide some hints.

Explaining observed phenomena through symbolic, interpretable formulas is a fundamental goal of science. Recently, large language models (LLMs) have emerged as promising tools for symbolic equation discovery, owing to their broad domain knowledge and strong reasoning capabilities. However, most existing LLM-based systems try to guess equations directly from data, without modeling the multi-step reasoning process that scientists often follow: first inferring physical properties such as symmetries, then using these as priors to restrict the space of candidate equations. We introduce KeplerAgent, an agentic framework that explicitly follows this scientific reasoning process. The agent coordinates physics-based tools to extract intermediate structure and uses these results to configure symbolic regression engines such as PySINDy and PySR, including their function libraries and structural constraints. Across a suite of physical equation benchmarks, KeplerAgent achieves substantially higher symbolic accuracy and greater robustness to noisy data than both LLM and traditional baselines.

Formulas involving fundamental mathematical constants had a great impact on various fields of science and mathematics, for example aiding in proofs of irrationality of constants. However, the discovery of such formulas has historically remained scarce, often perceived as an act of mathematical genius by great mathematicians such as Ramanujan, Euler, and Gauss. Recent efforts to automate the discovery of formulas for mathematical constants, such as the Ramanujan Machine project, relied on exhaustive search. Despite several successful discoveries, exhaustive search remains limited by the space of options that can be covered and by the need for vast amounts of computational resources. Here we propose a fundamentally different method to search for conjectures on mathematical constants: through analysis of integer sequences. We introduce the Enumerated Signed-continued-fraction Massey Approve (ESMA) algorithm, which builds on the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to identify patterns in integer sequences that represent mathematical constants. The ESMA algorithm found various known formulas for e, e^2, tan(1), and ratios of values of Bessel functions. The algorithm further discovered a large number of new conjectures for these constants, some providing simpler representations and some providing faster numerical convergence than the corresponding simple continued fractions. Along with the algorithm, we present mathematical tools for manipulating continued fractions. These connections enable us to characterize what space of constants can be found by ESMA and quantify its algorithmic advantage in certain scenarios. Altogether, this work continues in the development of augmenting mathematical intuition by computer algorithms, to help reveal mathematical structures and accelerate mathematical research.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

We address the challenge of exploration in reinforcement learning (RL) when the agent operates in an unknown environment with sparse or no rewards. In this work, we study the maximum entropy exploration problem of two different types. The first type is visitation entropy maximization previously considered by Hazan et al.(2019) in the discounted setting. For this type of exploration, we propose a game-theoretic algorithm that has mathcal{O}(H^3S^2A/varepsilon^2) sample complexity thus improving the varepsilon-dependence upon existing results, where S is a number of states, A is a number of actions, H is an episode length, and varepsilon is a desired accuracy. The second type of entropy we study is the trajectory entropy. This objective function is closely related to the entropy-regularized MDPs, and we propose a simple algorithm that has a sample complexity of order mathcal{O}(poly(S,A,H)/varepsilon). Interestingly, it is the first theoretical result in RL literature that establishes the potential statistical advantage of regularized MDPs for exploration. Finally, we apply developed regularization techniques to reduce sample complexity of visitation entropy maximization to mathcal{O}(H^2SA/varepsilon^2), yielding a statistical separation between maximum entropy exploration and reward-free exploration.

Active matter systems, from self-propelled colloids to motile bacteria, are characterized by the conversion of free energy into useful work at the microscopic scale. These systems generically involve physics beyond the reach of equilibrium statistical mechanics, and a persistent challenge has been to understand the nature of their nonequilibrium states. The entropy production rate and the magnitude of the steady-state probability current provide quantitative ways to do so by measuring the breakdown of time-reversal symmetry and the strength of nonequilibrium transport of measure. Yet, their efficient computation has remained elusive, as they depend on the system's unknown and high-dimensional probability density. Here, building upon recent advances in generative modeling, we develop a deep learning framework that estimates the score of this density. We show that the score, together with the microscopic equations of motion, gives direct access to the entropy production rate, the probability current, and their decomposition into local contributions from individual particles, spatial regions, and degrees of freedom. To represent the score, we introduce a novel, spatially-local transformer-based network architecture that learns high-order interactions between particles while respecting their underlying permutation symmetry. We demonstrate the broad utility and scalability of the method by applying it to several high-dimensional systems of interacting active particles undergoing motility-induced phase separation (MIPS). We show that a single instance of our network trained on a system of 4096 particles at one packing fraction can generalize to other regions of the phase diagram, including systems with as many as 32768 particles. We use this observation to quantify the spatial structure of the departure from equilibrium in MIPS as a function of the number of particles and the packing fraction.

Existing methods for optimal control struggle to deal with the complexity commonly encountered in real-world systems, including dimensionality, process error, model bias and data heterogeneity. Instead of tackling these system complexities directly, researchers have typically sought to simplify models to fit optimal control methods. But when is the optimal solution to an approximate, stylized model better than an approximate solution to a more accurate model? While this question has largely gone unanswered owing to the difficulty of finding even approximate solutions for complex models, recent algorithmic and computational advances in deep reinforcement learning (DRL) might finally allow us to address these questions. DRL methods have to date been applied primarily in the context of games or robotic mechanics, which operate under precisely known rules. Here, we demonstrate the ability for DRL algorithms using deep neural networks to successfully approximate solutions (the "policy function" or control rule) in a non-linear three-variable model for a fishery without knowing or ever attempting to infer a model for the process itself. We find that the reinforcement learning agent discovers an effective simplification of the problem to obtain an interpretable control rule. We show that the policy obtained with DRL is both more profitable and more sustainable than any constant mortality policy -- the standard family of policies considered in fishery management.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

We present a Learning from Demonstration method for teaching robots to perform search strategies imitated from humans in scenarios where alignment tasks fail due to position uncertainty. The method utilizes human demonstrations to learn both a state invariant dynamics model and an exploration distribution that captures the search area covered by the demonstrator. We present two alternative algorithms for computing a search trajectory from the exploration distribution, one based on sampling and another based on deterministic ergodic control. We augment the search trajectory with forces learnt through the dynamics model to enable searching both in force and position domains. An impedance controller with superposed forces is used for reproducing the learnt strategy. We experimentally evaluate the method on a KUKA LWR4+ performing a 2D peg-in-hole and a 3D electricity socket task. Results show that the proposed method can, with only few human demonstrations, learn to complete the search task.

Ongoing efforts that span over decades show a rise of AI methods for accelerating scientific discovery, yet accelerating discovery in mathematics remains a persistent challenge for AI. Specifically, AI methods were not effective in creation of formulas for mathematical constants because each such formula must be correct for infinite digits of precision, with "near-true" formulas providing no insight toward the correct ones. Consequently, formula discovery lacks a clear distance metric needed to guide automated discovery in this realm. In this work, we propose a systematic methodology for categorization, characterization, and pattern identification of such formulas. The key to our methodology is introducing metrics based on the convergence dynamics of the formulas, rather than on the numerical value of the formula. These metrics enable the first automated clustering of mathematical formulas. We demonstrate this methodology on Polynomial Continued Fraction formulas, which are ubiquitous in their intrinsic connections to mathematical constants, and generalize many mathematical functions and structures. We test our methodology on a set of 1,768,900 such formulas, identifying many known formulas for mathematical constants, and discover previously unknown formulas for pi, ln(2), Gauss', and Lemniscate's constants. The uncovered patterns enable a direct generalization of individual formulas to infinite families, unveiling rich mathematical structures. This success paves the way towards a generative model that creates formulas fulfilling specified mathematical properties, accelerating the rate of discovery of useful formulas.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

Test-time scaling has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) with remarkable reasoning capabilities, particularly in mathematical domains, through intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning before generating final answers. However, the specific sources and mechanisms underlying these reasoning capabilities remain insufficiently understood. Optimization reasoning, i.e. finding extrema under constraints, represents a fundamental abstraction that underpins critical applications in planning, control, resource allocation, and prompt search. To systematically evaluate this capability, we introduce ExtremBench, a benchmark dataset for solving mathematical extremal problems, curated from inequality exercises used for Chinese Mathematical Olympiad and transformed into 93 standardized extrema-finding problems. We conduct extensive evaluations across various state-of-the-art open-source model families, including the Qwen3, GPT-OSS, and DeepSeek. Our results reveal that LLMs' extremal-solving reasoning capabilities do not always align with those of current mathematical benchmarks such as AIME25 and MATH-500, with some models showing strong general mathematical reasoning but poor extremal-solving skills, and vice versa. This discrepancy highlights a critical gap in current evaluation practices and suggests that existing benchmarks may not comprehensively capture the full spectrum of mathematical reasoning abilities.

Balancing exploration and exploitation is a central goal in reinforcement learning (RL). Despite recent advances in enhancing language model (LM) reasoning, most methods lean toward exploitation, and increasingly encounter performance plateaus. In this work, we revisit entropy -- a signal of exploration in RL -- and examine its relationship to exploratory reasoning in LMs. Through empirical analysis, we uncover strong positive correlations between high-entropy regions and three types of exploratory reasoning actions: (1) pivotal tokens that determine or connect logical steps, (2) reflective actions such as self-verification and correction, and (3) rare behaviors under-explored by the base LMs. Motivated by this, we introduce a minimal modification to standard RL with only one line of code: augmenting the advantage function with an entropy-based term. Unlike traditional maximum-entropy methods which encourage exploration by promoting uncertainty, we encourage exploration by promoting longer and deeper reasoning chains. Notably, our method achieves significant gains on the Pass@K metric -- an upper-bound estimator of LM reasoning capabilities -- even when evaluated with extremely large K values, pushing the boundaries of LM reasoning.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Exploration bonuses in reinforcement learning guide long-horizon exploration by defining custom intrinsic objectives. Several exploration objectives like count-based bonuses, pseudo-counts, and state-entropy maximization are non-stationary and hence are difficult to optimize for the agent. While this issue is generally known, it is usually omitted and solutions remain under-explored. The key contribution of our work lies in transforming the original non-stationary rewards into stationary rewards through an augmented state representation. For this purpose, we introduce the Stationary Objectives For Exploration (SOFE) framework. SOFE requires identifying sufficient statistics for different exploration bonuses and finding an efficient encoding of these statistics to use as input to a deep network. SOFE is based on proposing state augmentations that expand the state space but hold the promise of simplifying the optimization of the agent's objective. We show that SOFE improves the performance of several exploration objectives, including count-based bonuses, pseudo-counts, and state-entropy maximization. Moreover, SOFE outperforms prior methods that attempt to stabilize the optimization of intrinsic objectives. We demonstrate the efficacy of SOFE in hard-exploration problems, including sparse-reward tasks, pixel-based observations, 3D navigation, and procedurally generated environments.

The theories of offline and online reinforcement learning, despite having evolved in parallel, have begun to show signs of the possibility for a unification, with algorithms and analysis techniques for one setting often having natural counterparts in the other. However, the notion of density ratio modeling, an emerging paradigm in offline RL, has been largely absent from online RL, perhaps for good reason: the very existence and boundedness of density ratios relies on access to an exploratory dataset with good coverage, but the core challenge in online RL is to collect such a dataset without having one to start. In this work we show -- perhaps surprisingly -- that density ratio-based algorithms have online counterparts. Assuming only the existence of an exploratory distribution with good coverage, a structural condition known as coverability (Xie et al., 2023), we give a new algorithm (GLOW) that uses density ratio realizability and value function realizability to perform sample-efficient online exploration. GLOW addresses unbounded density ratios via careful use of truncation, and combines this with optimism to guide exploration. GLOW is computationally inefficient; we complement it with a more efficient counterpart, HyGLOW, for the Hybrid RL setting (Song et al., 2022) wherein online RL is augmented with additional offline data. HyGLOW is derived as a special case of a more general meta-algorithm that provides a provable black-box reduction from hybrid RL to offline RL, which may be of independent interest.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Dynamical generative models that produce samples through an iterative process, such as Flow Matching and denoising diffusion models, have seen widespread use, but there have not been many theoretically-sound methods for improving these models with reward fine-tuning. In this work, we cast reward fine-tuning as stochastic optimal control (SOC). Critically, we prove that a very specific memoryless noise schedule must be enforced during fine-tuning, in order to account for the dependency between the noise variable and the generated samples. We also propose a new algorithm named Adjoint Matching which outperforms existing SOC algorithms, by casting SOC problems as a regression problem. We find that our approach significantly improves over existing methods for reward fine-tuning, achieving better consistency, realism, and generalization to unseen human preference reward models, while retaining sample diversity.

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Learning the continuous dynamics of a system from snapshots of its temporal marginals is a problem which appears throughout natural sciences and machine learning, including in quantum systems, single-cell biological data, and generative modeling. In these settings, we assume access to cross-sectional samples that are uncorrelated over time, rather than full trajectories of samples. In order to better understand the systems under observation, we would like to learn a model of the underlying process that allows us to propagate samples in time and thereby simulate entire individual trajectories. In this work, we propose Action Matching, a method for learning a rich family of dynamics using only independent samples from its time evolution. We derive a tractable training objective, which does not rely on explicit assumptions about the underlying dynamics and does not require back-propagation through differential equations or optimal transport solvers. Inspired by connections with optimal transport, we derive extensions of Action Matching to learn stochastic differential equations and dynamics involving creation and destruction of probability mass. Finally, we showcase applications of Action Matching by achieving competitive performance in a diverse set of experiments from biology, physics, and generative modeling.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

Many examples of cooperation exist in biology. In chemical systems however, which can sometimes be quite complex, we do not appear to observe intricate cooperative interactions. A key question for the origin of life, is then how can molecular cooperation first arise in an abiotic system prior to the emergence of biological replication. We postulate that selection at the molecular level is a driving force behind the complexification of chemical systems, particularly during the origins of life. In the theory of multilevel selection the two selective forces are: within-group and between-group, where the former tends to favor "selfish" replication of individuals and the latter favor cooperation between individuals enhancing the replication of the group as a whole. These forces can be quantified using the Price equation, which is a standard tool used in evolutionary biology to quantify evolutionary change. Our central claim is that replication and heredity in chemical systems are subject to selection, and quantifiable using the multilevel Price equation. We demonstrate this using the Graded Autocatalysis Replication Domain computer model, describing simple protocell composed out of molecules and its replication, which respectively analogue to the group and the individuals. In contrast to previous treatments of this model, we treat the lipid molecules themselves as replicating individuals and the protocells they form as groups of individuals. Our goal is to demonstrate how evolutionary biology tools and concepts can be applied in chemistry and we suggest that molecular cooperation may arise as a result of group selection. Further, the biological relation of parent-progeny is proposed to be analogue to the reactant-product relation in chemistry, thus allowing for tools from evolutionary biology to be applied to chemistry and would deepen the connection between chemistry and biology.

Sphere packing, Hilbert's eighteenth problem, asks for the densest arrangement of congruent spheres in n-dimensional Euclidean space. Although relevant to areas such as cryptography, crystallography, and medical imaging, the problem remains unresolved: beyond a few special dimensions, neither optimal packings nor tight upper bounds are known. Even a major breakthrough in dimension n=8, later recognised with a Fields Medal, underscores its difficulty. A leading technique for upper bounds, the three-point method, reduces the problem to solving large, high-precision semidefinite programs (SDPs). Because each candidate SDP may take days to evaluate, standard data-intensive AI approaches are infeasible. We address this challenge by formulating SDP construction as a sequential decision process, the SDP game, in which a policy assembles SDP formulations from a set of admissible components. Using a sample-efficient model-based framework that combines Bayesian optimisation with Monte Carlo Tree Search, we obtain new state-of-the-art upper bounds in dimensions 4-16, showing that model-based search can advance computational progress in longstanding geometric problems. Together, these results demonstrate that sample-efficient, model-based search can make tangible progress on mathematically rigid, evaluation limited problems, pointing towards a complementary direction for AI-assisted discovery beyond large-scale LLM-driven exploration.

A modified LAB algorithm is introduced in this paper. It builds upon the original LAB algorithm (Reddy et al. 2023), which is a socio-inspired algorithm that models competitive and learning behaviours within a group, establishing hierarchical roles. The proposed algorithm incorporates the roulette wheel approach and a reduction factor introducing inter-group competition and iteratively narrowing down the sample space. The algorithm is validated by solving the benchmark test problems from CEC 2005 and CEC 2017. The solutions are validated using standard statistical tests such as two-sided and pairwise signed rank Wilcoxon test and Friedman rank test. The algorithm exhibited improved and superior robustness as well as search space exploration capabilities. Furthermore, a Clustering-Based Search Space Reduction (C-SSR) method is proposed, making the algorithm capable to solve constrained problems. The C-SSR method enables the algorithm to identify clusters of feasible regions, satisfying the constraints and contributing to achieve the optimal solution. This method demonstrates its effectiveness as a potential alternative to traditional constraint handling techniques. The results obtained using the Modified LAB algorithm are then compared with those achieved by other recent metaheuristic algorithms.

Most 3D object generators focus on aesthetic quality, often neglecting physical constraints necessary in applications. One such constraint is that the 3D object should be self-supporting, i.e., remains balanced under gravity. Prior approaches to generating stable 3D objects used differentiable physics simulators to optimize geometry at test-time, which is slow, unstable, and prone to local optima. Inspired by the literature on aligning generative models to external feedback, we propose Direct Simulation Optimization (DSO), a framework to use the feedback from a (non-differentiable) simulator to increase the likelihood that the 3D generator outputs stable 3D objects directly. We construct a dataset of 3D objects labeled with a stability score obtained from the physics simulator. We can then fine-tune the 3D generator using the stability score as the alignment metric, via direct preference optimization (DPO) or direct reward optimization (DRO), a novel objective, which we introduce, to align diffusion models without requiring pairwise preferences. Our experiments show that the fine-tuned feed-forward generator, using either DPO or DRO objective, is much faster and more likely to produce stable objects than test-time optimization. Notably, the DSO framework works even without any ground-truth 3D objects for training, allowing the 3D generator to self-improve by automatically collecting simulation feedback on its own outputs.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

In online reinforcement learning (online RL), balancing exploration and exploitation is crucial for finding an optimal policy in a sample-efficient way. To achieve this, existing sample-efficient online RL algorithms typically consist of three components: estimation, planning, and exploration. However, in order to cope with general function approximators, most of them involve impractical algorithmic components to incentivize exploration, such as optimization within data-dependent level-sets or complicated sampling procedures. To address this challenge, we propose an easy-to-implement RL framework called Maximize to Explore (MEX), which only needs to optimize unconstrainedly a single objective that integrates the estimation and planning components while balancing exploration and exploitation automatically. Theoretically, we prove that MEX achieves a sublinear regret with general function approximations for Markov decision processes (MDP) and is further extendable to two-player zero-sum Markov games (MG). Meanwhile, we adapt deep RL baselines to design practical versions of MEX, in both model-free and model-based manners, which can outperform baselines by a stable margin in various MuJoCo environments with sparse rewards. Compared with existing sample-efficient online RL algorithms with general function approximations, MEX achieves similar sample efficiency while enjoying a lower computational cost and is more compatible with modern deep RL methods.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Our world is full of asymmetries. Gravity and wind can make reaching a place easier than coming back. Social artifacts such as genealogy charts and citation graphs are inherently directed. In reinforcement learning and control, optimal goal-reaching strategies are rarely reversible (symmetrical). Distance functions supported on these asymmetrical structures are called quasimetrics. Despite their common appearance, little research has been done on the learning of quasimetrics. Our theoretical analysis reveals that a common class of learning algorithms, including unconstrained multilayer perceptrons (MLPs), provably fails to learn a quasimetric consistent with training data. In contrast, our proposed Poisson Quasimetric Embedding (PQE) is the first quasimetric learning formulation that both is learnable with gradient-based optimization and enjoys strong performance guarantees. Experiments on random graphs, social graphs, and offline Q-learning demonstrate its effectiveness over many common baselines.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We propose a new method for optimistic planning in infinite-horizon discounted Markov decision processes based on the idea of adding regularization to the updates of an otherwise standard approximate value iteration procedure. This technique allows us to avoid contraction and monotonicity arguments typically required by existing analyses of approximate dynamic programming methods, and in particular to use approximate transition functions estimated via least-squares procedures in MDPs with linear function approximation. We use our method to recover known guarantees in tabular MDPs and to provide a computationally efficient algorithm for learning near-optimal policies in discounted linear mixture MDPs from a single stream of experience, and show it achieves near-optimal statistical guarantees.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

Machine learning methods can be a valuable aid in the scientific process, but they need to face challenging settings where data come from inhomogeneous experimental conditions. Recent meta-learning methods have made significant progress in multi-task learning, but they rely on black-box neural networks, resulting in high computational costs and limited interpretability. Leveraging the structure of the learning problem, we argue that multi-environment generalization can be achieved using a simpler learning model, with an affine structure with respect to the learning task. Crucially, we prove that this architecture can identify the physical parameters of the system, enabling interpreable learning. We demonstrate the competitive generalization performance and the low computational cost of our method by comparing it to state-of-the-art algorithms on physical systems, ranging from toy models to complex, non-analytical systems. The interpretability of our method is illustrated with original applications to physical-parameter-induced adaptation and to adaptive control.

Model-based reinforcement learning is a powerful tool, but collecting data to fit an accurate model of the system can be costly. Exploring an unknown environment in a sample-efficient manner is hence of great importance. However, the complexity of dynamics and the computational limitations of real systems make this task challenging. In this work, we introduce FLEX, an exploration algorithm for nonlinear dynamics based on optimal experimental design. Our policy maximizes the information of the next step and results in an adaptive exploration algorithm, compatible with generic parametric learning models and requiring minimal resources. We test our method on a number of nonlinear environments covering different settings, including time-varying dynamics. Keeping in mind that exploration is intended to serve an exploitation objective, we also test our algorithm on downstream model-based classical control tasks and compare it to other state-of-the-art model-based and model-free approaches. The performance achieved by FLEX is competitive and its computational cost is low.

The loss functions of many learning problems contain multiple additive terms that can disagree and yield conflicting update directions. For Physics-Informed Neural Networks (PINNs), loss terms on initial/boundary conditions and physics equations are particularly interesting as they are well-established as highly difficult tasks. To improve learning the challenging multi-objective task posed by PINNs, we propose the ConFIG method, which provides conflict-free updates by ensuring a positive dot product between the final update and each loss-specific gradient. It also maintains consistent optimization rates for all loss terms and dynamically adjusts gradient magnitudes based on conflict levels. We additionally leverage momentum to accelerate optimizations by alternating the back-propagation of different loss terms. We provide a mathematical proof showing the convergence of the ConFIG method, and it is evaluated across a range of challenging PINN scenarios. ConFIG consistently shows superior performance and runtime compared to baseline methods. We also test the proposed method in a classic multi-task benchmark, where the ConFIG method likewise exhibits a highly promising performance. Source code is available at https://tum-pbs.github.io/ConFIG

Large language models (LLMs) can transform education, but their optimization for direct question-answering often undermines effective pedagogy which requires strategically withholding answers. To mitigate this, we propose an online reinforcement learning (RL)-based alignment framework that can quickly adapt LLMs into effective tutors using simulated student-tutor interactions by emphasizing pedagogical quality and guided problem-solving over simply giving away answers. We use our method to train a 7B parameter tutor model without human annotations which reaches similar performance to larger proprietary models like LearnLM. We introduce a controllable reward weighting to balance pedagogical support and student solving accuracy, allowing us to trace the Pareto frontier between these two objectives. Our models better preserve reasoning capabilities than single-turn SFT baselines and can optionally enhance interpretability through thinking tags that expose the model's instructional planning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can self-improve through reinforcement learning, where they generate trajectories to explore and discover better solutions. However, this exploration process is computationally expensive, often forcing current methods to assign limited exploration budgets to each task. This uniform allocation creates problematic edge cases: easy tasks consistently succeed while difficult tasks consistently fail, both producing zero gradients during training updates for the widely used Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We address this problem from the lens of exploration budget allocation. Viewing each task's exploration as an "item" with a distinct "value" and "cost", we establish a connection to the classical knapsack problem. This formulation allows us to derive an optimal assignment rule that adaptively distributes resources based on the model's current learning status. When applied to GRPO, our method increases the effective ratio of non-zero policy gradients by 20-40% during training. Acting as a computational "free lunch", our approach could reallocate exploration budgets from tasks where learning is saturated to those where it is most impactful. This enables significantly larger budgets (e.g., 93 rollouts) for especially challenging problems, which would be computationally prohibitive under a uniform allocation. These improvements translate to meaningful gains on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, with average improvements of 2-4 points and peak gains of 9 points on specific tasks. Notably, achieving comparable performance with traditional homogeneous allocation would require about 2x the computational resources.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

The framework of reinforcement learning or optimal control provides a mathematical formalization of intelligent decision making that is powerful and broadly applicable. While the general form of the reinforcement learning problem enables effective reasoning about uncertainty, the connection between reinforcement learning and inference in probabilistic models is not immediately obvious. However, such a connection has considerable value when it comes to algorithm design: formalizing a problem as probabilistic inference in principle allows us to bring to bear a wide array of approximate inference tools, extend the model in flexible and powerful ways, and reason about compositionality and partial observability. In this article, we will discuss how a generalization of the reinforcement learning or optimal control problem, which is sometimes termed maximum entropy reinforcement learning, is equivalent to exact probabilistic inference in the case of deterministic dynamics, and variational inference in the case of stochastic dynamics. We will present a detailed derivation of this framework, overview prior work that has drawn on this and related ideas to propose new reinforcement learning and control algorithms, and describe perspectives on future research.

We address a benchmark task in agile robotics: catching objects thrown at high-speed. This is a challenging task that involves tracking, intercepting, and cradling a thrown object with access only to visual observations of the object and the proprioceptive state of the robot, all within a fraction of a second. We present the relative merits of two fundamentally different solution strategies: (i) Model Predictive Control using accelerated constrained trajectory optimization, and (ii) Reinforcement Learning using zeroth-order optimization. We provide insights into various performance trade-offs including sample efficiency, sim-to-real transfer, robustness to distribution shifts, and whole-body multimodality via extensive on-hardware experiments. We conclude with proposals on fusing "classical" and "learning-based" techniques for agile robot control. Videos of our experiments may be found at https://sites.google.com/view/agile-catching

We introduce a generic strategy for provably efficient multi-goal exploration. It relies on AdaGoal, a novel goal selection scheme that leverages a measure of uncertainty in reaching states to adaptively target goals that are neither too difficult nor too easy. We show how AdaGoal can be used to tackle the objective of learning an ε-optimal goal-conditioned policy for the (initially unknown) set of goal states that are reachable within L steps in expectation from a reference state s_0 in a reward-free Markov decision process. In the tabular case with S states and A actions, our algorithm requires O(L^3 S A ε^{-2}) exploration steps, which is nearly minimax optimal. We also readily instantiate AdaGoal in linear mixture Markov decision processes, yielding the first goal-oriented PAC guarantee with linear function approximation. Beyond its strong theoretical guarantees, we anchor AdaGoal in goal-conditioned deep reinforcement learning, both conceptually and empirically, by connecting its idea of selecting "uncertain" goals to maximizing value ensemble disagreement.