Daily Papers

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

Multimodal fusion integrates the complementary information present in multiple modalities and has gained much attention recently. Most existing fusion approaches either learn a fixed fusion strategy during training and inference, or are only capable of fusing the information to a certain extent. Such solutions may fail to fully capture the dynamics of interactions across modalities especially when there are complex intra- and inter-modality correlations to be considered for informative multimodal fusion. In this paper, we propose a novel deep equilibrium (DEQ) method towards multimodal fusion via seeking a fixed point of the dynamic multimodal fusion process and modeling the feature correlations in an adaptive and recursive manner. This new way encodes the rich information within and across modalities thoroughly from low level to high level for efficacious downstream multimodal learning and is readily pluggable to various multimodal frameworks. Extensive experiments on BRCA, MM-IMDB, CMU-MOSI, SUN RGB-D, and VQA-v2 demonstrate the superiority of our DEQ fusion. More remarkably, DEQ fusion consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance on multiple multimodal benchmarks. The code will be released.

We introduce Equilibrium Matching (EqM), a generative modeling framework built from an equilibrium dynamics perspective. EqM discards the non-equilibrium, time-conditional dynamics in traditional diffusion and flow-based generative models and instead learns the equilibrium gradient of an implicit energy landscape. Through this approach, we can adopt an optimization-based sampling process at inference time, where samples are obtained by gradient descent on the learned landscape with adjustable step sizes, adaptive optimizers, and adaptive compute. EqM surpasses the generation performance of diffusion/flow models empirically, achieving an FID of 1.90 on ImageNet 256times256. EqM is also theoretically justified to learn and sample from the data manifold. Beyond generation, EqM is a flexible framework that naturally handles tasks including partially noised image denoising, OOD detection, and image composition. By replacing time-conditional velocities with a unified equilibrium landscape, EqM offers a tighter bridge between flow and energy-based models and a simple route to optimization-driven inference.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We introduce Equilibrium Propagation, a learning framework for energy-based models. It involves only one kind of neural computation, performed in both the first phase (when the prediction is made) and the second phase of training (after the target or prediction error is revealed). Although this algorithm computes the gradient of an objective function just like Backpropagation, it does not need a special computation or circuit for the second phase, where errors are implicitly propagated. Equilibrium Propagation shares similarities with Contrastive Hebbian Learning and Contrastive Divergence while solving the theoretical issues of both algorithms: our algorithm computes the gradient of a well defined objective function. Because the objective function is defined in terms of local perturbations, the second phase of Equilibrium Propagation corresponds to only nudging the prediction (fixed point, or stationary distribution) towards a configuration that reduces prediction error. In the case of a recurrent multi-layer supervised network, the output units are slightly nudged towards their target in the second phase, and the perturbation introduced at the output layer propagates backward in the hidden layers. We show that the signal 'back-propagated' during this second phase corresponds to the propagation of error derivatives and encodes the gradient of the objective function, when the synaptic update corresponds to a standard form of spike-timing dependent plasticity. This work makes it more plausible that a mechanism similar to Backpropagation could be implemented by brains, since leaky integrator neural computation performs both inference and error back-propagation in our model. The only local difference between the two phases is whether synaptic changes are allowed or not.

Brain-like intelligent systems need brain-like learning methods. Equilibrium Propagation (EP) is a biologically plausible learning framework with strong potential for brain-inspired computing hardware. However, existing im-plementations of EP suffer from instability and prohibi-tively high computational costs. Inspired by the structure and dynamics of the brain, we propose a biologically plau-sible Feedback-regulated REsidual recurrent neural network (FRE-RNN) and study its learning performance in EP framework. Feedback regulation enables rapid convergence by reducing the spectral radius. The improvement in con-vergence property reduces the computational cost and train-ing time of EP by orders of magnitude, delivering perfor-mance on par with backpropagation (BP) in benchmark tasks. Meanwhile, residual connections with brain-inspired topologies help alleviate the vanishing gradient problem that arises when feedback pathways are weak in deep RNNs. Our approach substantially enhances the applicabil-ity and practicality of EP in large-scale networks that un-derpin artificial intelligence. The techniques developed here also offer guidance to implementing in-situ learning in physical neural networks.

Ensuring sufficient exploration is a central challenge when training meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) agents to solve novel environments. Conventional solutions to the exploration-exploitation dilemma inject explicit incentives such as randomization, uncertainty bonuses, or intrinsic rewards to encourage exploration. In this work, we hypothesize that an agent trained solely to maximize a greedy (exploitation-only) objective can nonetheless exhibit emergent exploratory behavior, provided three conditions are met: (1) Recurring Environmental Structure, where the environment features repeatable regularities that allow past experience to inform future choices; (2) Agent Memory, enabling the agent to retain and utilize historical interaction data; and (3) Long-Horizon Credit Assignment, where learning propagates returns over a time frame sufficient for the delayed benefits of exploration to inform current decisions. Through experiments in stochastic multi-armed bandits and temporally extended gridworlds, we observe that, when both structure and memory are present, a policy trained on a strictly greedy objective exhibits information-seeking exploratory behavior. We further demonstrate, through controlled ablations, that emergent exploration vanishes if either environmental structure or agent memory is absent (Conditions 1 & 2). Surprisingly, removing long-horizon credit assignment (Condition 3) does not always prevent emergent exploration-a result we attribute to the pseudo-Thompson Sampling effect. These findings suggest that, under the right prerequisites, exploration and exploitation need not be treated as orthogonal objectives but can emerge from a unified reward-maximization process.

Information-seeking is a core capability for AI agents, requiring them to gather and reason over tool-generated information across long trajectories. However, such multi-step information-seeking tasks remain challenging for agents backed by language models. While process reward models (PRMs) can guide agents by ranking candidate steps at test-time, existing PRMs, designed for short reasoning with binary judgment, cannot capture richer dimensions of information-seeking steps, such as tool interactions and reasoning over tool outputs, nor handle the rapidly growing context in long-horizon tasks. To address these limitations, we introduce PRInTS, a generative PRM trained with dual capabilities: (1) dense scoring based on the PRM's reasoning across multiple step quality dimensions (e.g., interpretation of tool outputs, tool call informativeness) and (2) trajectory summarization that compresses the growing context while preserving essential information for step evaluation. Extensive evaluations across FRAMES, GAIA (levels 1-3), and WebWalkerQA (easy-hard) benchmarks on multiple models, along with ablations, reveal that best-of-n sampling with PRInTS enhances information-seeking abilities of open-source models as well as specialized agents, matching or surpassing the performance of frontier models with a much smaller backbone agent and outperforming other strong reward modeling baselines.

The statistical mechanics of Gibbs is a juxtaposition of subjective, probabilistic ideas on the one hand and objective, mechanical ideas on the other. In this paper, we follow the path set out by Jaynes, including elements added subsequently to that original work, to explore the consequences of the purely statistical point of view. We show how standard methods in the equilibrium theory could have been derived simply from a description of the available problem information. In addition, our presentation leads to novel insights into questions associated with symmetry and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics. Two surprising consequences to be explored in further work are that (in)distinguishability factors are automatically predicted from the problem formulation and that a quantity related to the thermodynamic entropy production is found by considering information loss in non-equilibrium processes. Using the problem of ion channel thermodynamics as an example, we illustrate the idea of building up complexity by successively adding information to create progressively more complex descriptions of a physical system. Our result is that such statistical mechanical descriptions can be used to create transparent, computable, experimentally-relevant models that may be informed by more detailed atomistic simulations. We also derive a theory for the kinetic behavior of this system, identifying the nonequilibrium `process' free energy functional. The Gibbs relation for this functional is a fluctuation-dissipation theorem applicable arbitrarily far from equilibrium, that captures the effect of non-local and time-dependent behavior from transient driving forces. Based on this work, it is clear that statistical mechanics is a general tool for constructing the relationships between constraints on system information.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

When applied to question answering and other text generation tasks, language models (LMs) may be queried generatively (by sampling answers from their output distribution) or discriminatively (by using them to score or rank a set of candidate outputs). These procedures sometimes yield very different predictions. How do we reconcile mutually incompatible scoring procedures to obtain coherent LM predictions? We introduce a new, a training-free, game-theoretic procedure for language model decoding. Our approach casts language model decoding as a regularized imperfect-information sequential signaling game - which we term the CONSENSUS GAME - in which a GENERATOR seeks to communicate an abstract correctness parameter using natural language sentences to a DISCRIMINATOR. We develop computational procedures for finding approximate equilibria of this game, resulting in a decoding algorithm we call EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING. Applied to a large number of tasks (including reading comprehension, commonsense reasoning, mathematical problem-solving, and dialog), EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING consistently, and sometimes substantially, improves performance over existing LM decoding procedures - on multiple benchmarks, we observe that applying EQUILIBRIUM-RANKING to LLaMA-7B outperforms the much larger LLaMA-65B and PaLM-540B models. These results highlight the promise of game-theoretic tools for addressing fundamental challenges of truthfulness and consistency in LMs.

In the endeavor to make autonomous robots take actions, task planning is a major challenge that requires translating high-level task descriptions into long-horizon action sequences. Despite recent advances in language model agents, they remain prone to planning errors and limited in their ability to plan ahead. To address these limitations in robotic planning, we advocate a self-refining scheme that iteratively refines a draft plan until an equilibrium is reached. Remarkably, this process can be optimized end-to-end from an analytical perspective without the need to curate additional verifiers or reward models, allowing us to train self-refining planners in a simple supervised learning fashion. Meanwhile, a nested equilibrium sequence modeling procedure is devised for efficient closed-loop planning that incorporates useful feedback from the environment (or an internal world model). Our method is evaluated on the VirtualHome-Env benchmark, showing advanced performance with better scaling for inference computation. Code is available at https://github.com/Singularity0104/equilibrium-planner.

While online Reinforcement Learning has emerged as a crucial technique for aligning flow matching models with human preferences, current approaches are hindered by inefficient exploration during training rollouts. Relying on undirected stochasticity and sparse outcome rewards, these methods struggle to discover high-reward samples, resulting in data-inefficient and slow optimization. To address these limitations, we propose Euphonium, a novel framework that steers generation via process reward gradient guided dynamics. Our key insight is to formulate the sampling process as a theoretically principled Stochastic Differential Equation that explicitly incorporates the gradient of a Process Reward Model into the flow drift. This design enables dense, step-by-step steering toward high-reward regions, advancing beyond the unguided exploration in prior works, and theoretically encompasses existing sampling methods (e.g., Flow-GRPO, DanceGRPO) as special cases. We further derive a distillation objective that internalizes the guidance signal into the flow network, eliminating inference-time dependency on the reward model. We instantiate this framework with a Dual-Reward Group Relative Policy Optimization algorithm, combining latent process rewards for efficient credit assignment with pixel-level outcome rewards for final visual fidelity. Experiments on text-to-video generation show that Euphonium achieves better alignment compared to existing methods while accelerating training convergence by 1.66x.

Bundle adjustment is the common way to solve localization and mapping. It is an iterative process in which a system of non-linear equations is solved using two optimization methods, weighted by a damping factor. In the classic approach, the latter is chosen heuristically by the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm on each iteration. This might take many iterations, making the process computationally expensive, which might be harmful to real-time applications. We propose to replace this heuristic by viewing the problem in a holistic manner, as a game, and formulating it as a reinforcement-learning task. We set an environment which solves the non-linear equations and train an agent to choose the damping factor in a learned manner. We demonstrate that our approach considerably reduces the number of iterations required to reach the bundle adjustment's convergence, on both synthetic and real-life scenarios. We show that this reduction benefits the classic approach and can be integrated with other bundle adjustment acceleration methods.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Standard training metrics like loss fail to explain the emergence of complex capabilities in large language models. We take a spectral approach to investigate the geometry of learned representations across pretraining and post-training, measuring effective rank (RankMe) and eigenspectrum decay (α-ReQ). With OLMo (1B-7B) and Pythia (160M-12B) models, we uncover a consistent non-monotonic sequence of three geometric phases during autoregressive pretraining. The initial "warmup" phase exhibits rapid representational collapse. This is followed by an "entropy-seeking" phase, where the manifold's dimensionality expands substantially, coinciding with peak n-gram memorization. Subsequently, a "compression-seeking" phase imposes anisotropic consolidation, selectively preserving variance along dominant eigendirections while contracting others, a transition marked with significant improvement in downstream task performance. We show these phases can emerge from a fundamental interplay of cross-entropy optimization under skewed token frequencies and representational bottlenecks (d ll |V|). Post-training further transforms geometry: SFT and DPO drive "entropy-seeking" dynamics to integrate specific instructional or preferential data, improving in-distribution performance while degrading out-of-distribution robustness. Conversely, RLVR induces "compression-seeking", enhancing reward alignment but reducing generation diversity.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience in each task and across tasks to estimate both the transition model and the distribution over tasks. We propose an algorithm to meta-learn the underlying structure across tasks, utilize it to plan in each task, and upper-bound the regret of the planning loss. Our bound suggests that the average regret over tasks decreases as the number of tasks increases and as the tasks are more similar. In the classical single-task setting, it is known that the planning horizon should depend on the estimated model's accuracy, that is, on the number of samples within task. We generalize this finding to meta-RL and study this dependence of planning horizons on the number of tasks. Based on our theoretical findings, we derive heuristics for selecting slowly increasing discount factors, and we validate its significance empirically.

Accurate free-energy estimation is essential in molecular simulation, yet the periodic boundary conditions (PBC) commonly used in computer simulations have rarely been explicitly exploited. Equilibrium methods such as umbrella sampling, metadynamics, and adaptive biasing force require extensive sampling, while non-equilibrium pulling with Jarzynski's equality suffers from poor convergence due to exponential averaging. Here, we introduce a physics-informed, score-based diffusion framework: by mapping PBC simulations onto a Brownian particle in a periodic potential, we derive the Fokker-Planck steady-state score that directly encodes free-energy gradients. A neural network is trained on non-equilibrium trajectories to learn this score, providing a principled scheme to efficiently reconstruct the potential of mean force (PMF). On benchmark periodic potentials and small-molecule membrane permeation, our method is up to one order of magnitude more efficient than umbrella sampling.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

We introduce Riemannian Lyapunov Optimizers (RLOs), a family of optimization algorithms that unifies classic optimizers within one geometric framework. Unlike heuristic improvements to existing optimizers, RLOs are systematically derived from a novel control-theoretic framework that reinterprets optimization as an extended state discrete-time controlled dynamical system on a Riemannian parameter manifold. Central to this framework is the identification of a Normally Attracting Invariant Manifold (NAIM), which organizes training dynamics into two distinct stages: rapid alignment of the speed state to a target graph, followed by controlled evolution within it. We formalize this by constructing a strict Lyapunov function that certifies convergence to a target manifold. This perspective yields a constructive ``optimizer generator" that not only recovers classic algorithms but enables the principled design of RLOs. We validate our theory via geometric diagnostics and demonstrate that grounding optimizer design in control theory yields state-of-the-art performance in large-scale benchmarks. Overall, RLOs bridge control theory and modern machine learning optimization, providing a unified language and a systematic toolkit for designing stable, effective optimizers.

This script offers an implementation-oriented introduction to deep learning methods for solving and estimating high-dimensional dynamic stochastic models in economics and finance. Its starting point is the curse of dimensionality: heterogeneous-agent economies, overlapping-generations models with aggregate risk, continuous-time models with occasionally binding constraints, climate-economy models, and macro-finance environments with many assets and frictions generate state and parameter spaces that strain classical tensor-product grid methods. The exposition is organized around four complementary methodologies. Deep Equilibrium Nets embed discrete-time equilibrium conditions into neural-network loss functions. Physics-Informed Neural Networks approximate continuous-time Hamilton--Jacobi--Bellman, Kolmogorov forward, and related partial differential equations. Deep surrogate models provide fast, differentiable approximations to expensive structural models, while Gaussian processes add a probabilistic layer that quantifies approximation uncertainty; together they support estimation, sensitivity analysis, and constrained policy design. Gaussian-process-based dynamic programming, combined with active learning and dimension reduction, extends value-function iteration to very large continuous state spaces. Applications span representative-agent and international real business cycle models, overlapping-generations and heterogeneous-agent economies, continuous-time macro-finance, structural estimation by simulated method of moments, and climate economics under uncertainty. Companion notebooks in TensorFlow and PyTorch invite hands-on experimentation. These notes are a deliberately subjective and inevitably incomplete snapshot of a rapidly evolving field, aimed at equipping PhD students and researchers to engage with this frontier hands-on.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

Entropy serves as a critical metric for measuring the diversity of outputs generated by large language models (LLMs), providing valuable insights into their exploration capabilities. While recent studies increasingly focus on monitoring and adjusting entropy to better balance exploration and exploitation in reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT), a principled understanding of entropy dynamics during this process is yet to be thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we establish a theoretical framework for analyzing the entropy dynamics during the RFT process, which begins with a discriminant expression that quantifies entropy change under a single logit update. This foundation enables the derivation of a first-order expression for entropy change, which can be further extended to the update formula of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). The corollaries and insights drawn from the theoretical analysis inspire the design of entropy control methods, and also offer a unified lens for interpreting various entropy-based methods in existing studies. We provide empirical evidence to support the main conclusions of our analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the derived entropy-discriminator clipping methods. This study yields novel insights into RFT training dynamics, providing theoretical support and practical strategies for optimizing the exploration-exploitation balance during LLM fine-tuning.

Reward-based optimization algorithms require both exploration, to find rewards, and exploitation, to maximize performance. The need for efficient exploration is even more significant in sparse reward settings, in which performance feedback is given sparingly, thus rendering it unsuitable for guiding the search process. In this work, we introduce the SparsE Reward Exploration via Novelty and Emitters (SERENE) algorithm, capable of efficiently exploring a search space, as well as optimizing rewards found in potentially disparate areas. Contrary to existing emitters-based approaches, SERENE separates the search space exploration and reward exploitation into two alternating processes. The first process performs exploration through Novelty Search, a divergent search algorithm. The second one exploits discovered reward areas through emitters, i.e. local instances of population-based optimization algorithms. A meta-scheduler allocates a global computational budget by alternating between the two processes, ensuring the discovery and efficient exploitation of disjoint reward areas. SERENE returns both a collection of diverse solutions covering the search space and a collection of high-performing solutions for each distinct reward area. We evaluate SERENE on various sparse reward environments and show it compares favorably to existing baselines.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

We establish a fundamental connection between score-based diffusion models and non-equilibrium thermodynamics by deriving performance limits based on entropy rates. Our main theoretical contribution is a lower bound on the negative log-likelihood of the data that relates model performance to entropy rates of diffusion processes. We numerically validate this bound on a synthetic dataset and investigate its tightness. By building a bridge to entropy rates - system, intrinsic, and exchange entropy - we provide new insights into the thermodynamic operation of these models, drawing parallels to Maxwell's demon and implications for thermodynamic computing hardware. Our framework connects generative modeling performance to fundamental physical principles through stochastic thermodynamics.

We study a game between liquidity provider and liquidity taker agents interacting in an over-the-counter market, for which the typical example is foreign exchange. We show how a suitable design of parameterized families of reward functions coupled with shared policy learning constitutes an efficient solution to this problem. By playing against each other, our deep-reinforcement-learning-driven agents learn emergent behaviors relative to a wide spectrum of objectives encompassing profit-and-loss, optimal execution and market share. In particular, we find that liquidity providers naturally learn to balance hedging and skewing, where skewing refers to setting their buy and sell prices asymmetrically as a function of their inventory. We further introduce a novel RL-based calibration algorithm which we found performed well at imposing constraints on the game equilibrium. On the theoretical side, we are able to show convergence rates for our multi-agent policy gradient algorithm under a transitivity assumption, closely related to generalized ordinal potential games.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at single-turn tasks such as instruction following and summarization, yet real-world deployments require sustained multi-turn interactions where user goals and conversational context persist and evolve. A recurring challenge in this setting is context drift: the gradual divergence of a model's outputs from goal-consistent behavior across turns. Unlike single-turn errors, drift unfolds temporally and is poorly captured by static evaluation metrics. In this work, we present a study of context drift in multi-turn interactions and propose a simple dynamical framework to interpret its behavior. We formalize drift as the turn-wise KL divergence between the token-level predictive distributions of the test model and a goal-consistent reference model, and propose a recurrence model that interprets its evolution as a bounded stochastic process with restoring forces and controllable interventions. We instantiate this framework in both synthetic long-horizon rewriting tasks and realistic user-agent simulations such as in tau-Bench, measuring drift for several open-weight LLMs that are used as user simulators. Our experiments consistently reveal stable, noise-limited equilibria rather than runaway degradation, and demonstrate that simple reminder interventions reliably reduce divergence in line with theoretical predictions. Together, these results suggest that multi-turn drift can be understood as a controllable equilibrium phenomenon rather than as inevitable decay, providing a foundation for studying and mitigating context drift in extended interactions.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Recent work by Baratin et al. (2021) sheds light on an intriguing pattern that occurs during the training of deep neural networks: some layers align much more with data compared to other layers (where the alignment is defined as the euclidean product of the tangent features matrix and the data labels matrix). The curve of the alignment as a function of layer index (generally) exhibits an ascent-descent pattern where the maximum is reached for some hidden layer. In this work, we provide the first explanation for this phenomenon. We introduce the Equilibrium Hypothesis which connects this alignment pattern to signal propagation in deep neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate an excellent match with the theoretical predictions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as part of compound AI systems that coordinate multiple modules (e.g., retrievers, tools, verifiers) over long-horizon workflows. Recent approaches that propagate textual feedback globally (e.g., TextGrad) make it feasible to optimize such pipelines, but we find that performance degrades as system depth grows. In particular, long-horizon agentic workflows exhibit two depth-scaling failure modes: 1) exploding textual gradient, where textual feedback grows exponentially with depth, leading to prohibitively long message and amplifies evaluation biases; and 2) vanishing textual gradient, where limited long-context ability causes models overemphasize partial feedback and compression of lengthy feedback causes downstream messages to lose specificity gradually as they propagate many hops upstream. To mitigate these issues, we introduce Textual Equilibrium Propagation (TEP), a local learning principle inspired by Equilibrium Propagation in energy-based models. TEP includes two phases: 1) a free phase where a local LLM critics iteratively refine prompts until reaching equilibrium (no further improvements are suggested); and 2) a nudged phase which applies proximal prompt edits with bounded modification intensity, using task-level objectives that propagate via forward signaling rather than backward feedback chains. This design supports local prompt optimization followed by controlled adaptation toward global goals without the computational burden and signal degradation of global textual backpropagation. Across long-horizon QA benchmarks and multi-agent tool-use dataset, TEP consistently improves accuracy and efficiency over global propagation methods such as TextGrad. The gains grows with depth, while preserving the practicality of black-box LLM components in deep compound AI system.

We formulate nonequilibrium thermodynamics in which intensive variables acquire operational meaning through measurement protocols consistent with local reciprocity. Using physical equilibrium as a reference, conjugate observables are constructed by continuously adjusting devices along the local tangent space of the statistical manifold. In this relativity of observation, Onsager reciprocity holds locally, allowing inference-based Lagrange multipliers to be directly measured. This provides a systematic method to extend operational definitions of intensive variables to nonequilibrium states, highlighting their context-dependent nature and offering a concrete experimental strategy.

The paper sets forth comprehensive basics of Discrete Thermodynamics of Chemical Equilibria (DTD), developed by the author during the last decade and spread over series of publications. Based on the linear equations of irreversible thermodynamics, De Donder's definition of the thermodynamic force, and the Le Chatelier principle, DTD brings forward a notion of chemical equilibrium as a balance of internal and external thermodynamic forces, acting against a chemical system. The basic expression of DTD is a logistic map that ties together energetic characteristics of the chemical transformation in the system, its deviation from true thermodynamic equilibrium, and the sum of thermodynamic forces, causing that deviation. System deviation from thermodynamic equilibrium is the major variable of the theory. Solutions to the basic map define the chemical system domain of states comprising bifurcation diagrams with four areas, from true thermodynamic equilibrium to chaos, having specific distinctive meaning for chemical systems. The theory is derived from the currently recognized ideas of chemical thermodynamics and binds classical and contemporary thermodynamics of chemical equilibria into a unique concept. DTD opens new opportunities in understanding and analysis of equilibria in chemical systems. Some new results, included in the paper, have never been published before.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

We establish an existence of equilibrium result for a class of non-Markovian mean-field games with unbounded control space in weak formulation. Our result is based on new existence and stability results for quadratic-growth generalized McKean-Vlasov BSDEs. Unlike earlier approaches, our approach does not require boundedness assumptions on the model parameters or time horizons and allows for running costs that are quadratic in the control variable.

This paper introduces a continuous-time stochastic dynamical framework for understanding how large language models (LLMs) may self-amplify latent biases or toxicity through their own chain-of-thought reasoning. The model posits an instantaneous "severity" variable x(t) in [0,1] evolving under a stochastic differential equation (SDE) with a drift term μ(x) and diffusion σ(x). Crucially, such a process can be consistently analyzed via the Fokker--Planck approach if each incremental step behaves nearly Markovian in severity space. The analysis investigates critical phenomena, showing that certain parameter regimes create phase transitions from subcritical (self-correcting) to supercritical (runaway severity). The paper derives stationary distributions, first-passage times to harmful thresholds, and scaling laws near critical points. Finally, it highlights implications for agents and extended LLM reasoning models: in principle, these equations might serve as a basis for formal verification of whether a model remains stable or propagates bias over repeated inferences.

Macroscopic entropy production σ^{(tot)} in the general nonlinear isothermal chemical reaction system with mass action kinetics is decomposed into a free energy dissipation and a house-keeping heat: σ^{(tot)}=σ^{(fd)}+σ^{(hk)}; σ^{(fd)}=-rd A/rd t, where A is a generalized free energy function. This yields a novel nonequilibrium free energy balance equation rd A/rd t=-σ^{(tot)}+σ^{(hk)}, which is on a par with celebrated entropy balance equation rd S/rd t=σ^{(tot)}+η^{(ex)} where η^{(ex)} is the rate of entropy exchange with the environment.For kinetic systems with complex balance, σ^{(fd)} and σ^{(hk)} are the macroscopic limits of stochastic free energy dissipation and house-keeping heat, which are both nonnegative, in the Delbrück-Gillespie description of the stochastic chemical kinetics.Therefore, we show that a full kinetic and thermodynamic theory of chemical reaction systems that transcends mesoscopic and macroscopic levels emerges.

In nonstationary bandit learning problems, the decision-maker must continually gather information and adapt their action selection as the latent state of the environment evolves. In each time period, some latent optimal action maximizes expected reward under the environment state. We view the optimal action sequence as a stochastic process, and take an information-theoretic approach to analyze attainable performance. We bound limiting per-period regret in terms of the entropy rate of the optimal action process. The bound applies to a wide array of problems studied in the literature and reflects the problem's information structure through its information-ratio.

This paper aims to extend the Structured Knowledge Accumulation (SKA) framework recently proposed by mahi2025ska. We introduce two core concepts: the Tensor Net function and the characteristic time property of neural learning. First, we reinterpret the learning rate as a time step in a continuous system. This transforms neural learning from discrete optimization into continuous-time evolution. We show that learning dynamics remain consistent when the product of learning rate and iteration steps stays constant. This reveals a time-invariant behavior and identifies an intrinsic timescale of the network. Second, we define the Tensor Net function as a measure that captures the relationship between decision probabilities, entropy gradients, and knowledge change. Additionally, we define its zero-crossing as the equilibrium state between decision probabilities and entropy gradients. We show that the convergence of entropy and knowledge flow provides a natural stopping condition, replacing arbitrary thresholds with an information-theoretic criterion. We also establish that SKA dynamics satisfy a variational principle based on the Euler-Lagrange equation. These findings extend SKA into a continuous and self-organizing learning model. The framework links computational learning with physical systems that evolve by natural laws. By understanding learning as a time-based process, we open new directions for building efficient, robust, and biologically-inspired AI systems.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

In an effort to better understand the different ways in which the discount factor affects the optimization process in reinforcement learning, we designed a set of experiments to study each effect in isolation. Our analysis reveals that the common perception that poor performance of low discount factors is caused by (too) small action-gaps requires revision. We propose an alternative hypothesis that identifies the size-difference of the action-gap across the state-space as the primary cause. We then introduce a new method that enables more homogeneous action-gaps by mapping value estimates to a logarithmic space. We prove convergence for this method under standard assumptions and demonstrate empirically that it indeed enables lower discount factors for approximate reinforcement-learning methods. This in turn allows tackling a class of reinforcement-learning problems that are challenging to solve with traditional methods.

We develop a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) method to learn scalable control policies for target tracking. Our method can handle an arbitrary number of pursuers and targets; we show results for tasks consisting up to 1000 pursuers tracking 1000 targets. We use a decentralized, partially-observable Markov Decision Process framework to model pursuers as agents receiving partial observations (range and bearing) about targets which move using fixed, unknown policies. An attention mechanism is used to parameterize the value function of the agents; this mechanism allows us to handle an arbitrary number of targets. Entropy-regularized off-policy RL methods are used to train a stochastic policy, and we discuss how it enables a hedging behavior between pursuers that leads to a weak form of cooperation in spite of completely decentralized control execution. We further develop a masking heuristic that allows training on smaller problems with few pursuers-targets and execution on much larger problems. Thorough simulation experiments, ablation studies, and comparisons to state of the art algorithms are performed to study the scalability of the approach and robustness of performance to varying numbers of agents and targets.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) easier to use and more effective. A core piece of the RLHF process is the training and utilization of a model of human preferences that acts as a reward function for optimization. This approach, which operates at the intersection of many stakeholders and academic disciplines, remains poorly understood. RLHF reward models are often cited as being central to achieving performance, yet very few descriptors of capabilities, evaluations, training methods, or open-source models exist. Given this lack of information, further study and transparency is needed for learned RLHF reward models. In this paper, we illustrate the complex history of optimizing preferences, and articulate lines of inquiry to understand the sociotechnical context of reward models. In particular, we highlight the ontological differences between costs, rewards, and preferences at stake in RLHF's foundations, related methodological tensions, and possible research directions to improve general understanding of how reward models function.

Iterative generative policies, such as diffusion models and flow matching, offer superior expressivity for continuous control but complicate Maximum Entropy Reinforcement Learning because their action log-densities are not directly accessible. To address this, we propose Field Least-Energy Actor-Critic (FLAC), a likelihood-free framework that regulates policy stochasticity by penalizing the kinetic energy of the velocity field. Our key insight is to formulate policy optimization as a Generalized Schrödinger Bridge (GSB) problem relative to a high-entropy reference process (e.g., uniform). Under this view, the maximum-entropy principle emerges naturally as staying close to a high-entropy reference while optimizing return, without requiring explicit action densities. In this framework, kinetic energy serves as a physically grounded proxy for divergence from the reference: minimizing path-space energy bounds the deviation of the induced terminal action distribution. Building on this view, we derive an energy-regularized policy iteration scheme and a practical off-policy algorithm that automatically tunes the kinetic energy via a Lagrangian dual mechanism. Empirically, FLAC achieves superior or comparable performance on high-dimensional benchmarks relative to strong baselines, while avoiding explicit density estimation.

Reinforcement learning for agentic large language models (LLMs) typically relies on a sparse, trajectory-level outcome reward, making it difficult to evaluate the contribution of individual tool-calls within multi-turn interactions. Existing approaches to such process credit assignment either depend on separate external process reward models that introduce additional consumption, or tree-based structural rollout that merely redistributes the outcome signal while constraining trajectory diversity. A promising alternative leverages the per-turn change in the policy's predicted probability of the ground-truth, termed Information Gain (IG), as an intrinsic process signal without an external evaluator. However, prior work on leveraging IG signals within the RL training loop faces three systematic challenges: normalizing across turns that face heterogeneous positional contexts can distort the relative standing of individual turns, accumulating a variable number of terms causes advantage magnitudes to drift with trajectory depth, and a fixed clipping range governs policy updates identically for turns with vastly different IG signals. In this paper, we propose A^2TGPO (Agentic Turn-Group Policy Optimization with Adaptive Turn-level Clipping), which retains IG as the intrinsic signal but re-designs how it is normalized, accumulated, and consumed: (i) turn-group normalization: normalizes IG within each (prompt, turn-index) group so that each turn is compared only against peers at the same interaction depth; (ii) variance-rescaled discounted accumulation: divides cumulative normalized IG by square root of accumulated terms to keep advantage magnitudes comparable across turn positions; and (iii) adaptive turn-level clipping: modulates each turn's clipping range based on its normalized IG, widening the update region for informative turns and narrowing it for uninformative ones.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

In the realm of multi-objective alignment for large language models, balancing disparate human preferences often manifests as a zero-sum conflict. Specifically, the intrinsic tension between competing goals dictates that aggressively optimizing for one metric (e.g., helpfulness) frequently incurs a substantial penalty on another (e.g., harmlessness). While prior work mainly focuses on data selection, parameter merging, or algorithmic balancing during training, these approaches merely force compromises between divergent preferences along a fixed Pareto frontier, failing to fundamentally resolve the inherent trade-off. In this work, we approach this problem from a novel perspective of multi-dimensional rewards. By scaling up the model's rollouts and analyzing the outputs across different reward dimensions, we arrive at a critical conclusion: the conflict among multiple objectives stems from the fact that the prompt itself inherently restricts the achievable multi-dimensional rewards. Based on this core observation, we propose MORA: Multi-Objective Reward Assimilation. Specifically, MORA isolates single-reward prompts through pre-sampling and expands their reward diversity by rewriting the original questions to incorporate multi-dimensional intents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that: (1) in sequential alignment, MORA achieves single-preference improvements ranging from 5% to 12.4%, with exceptional gains in harmlessness, after multiple-preference alignment across helpful, harmless, and truthful dimensions. (2) In simultaneous alignment, MORA achieves an average overall reward improvement of 4.6%. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Shiying-Huang/MORA-MPA.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training has become the standard for aligning generative models with human preferences, yet most methods rely on a single scalar reward. When multiple criteria matter, the prevailing practice of ``early scalarization'' collapses rewards into a fixed weighted sum. This commits the model to a single trade-off point at training time, providing no inference-time control over inherently conflicting goals -- such as prompt adherence versus source fidelity in image editing. We introduce ParetoSlider, a multi-objective RL (MORL) framework that trains a single diffusion model to approximate the entire Pareto front. By training the model with continuously varying preference weights as a conditioning signal, we enable users to navigate optimal trade-offs at inference time without retraining or maintaining multiple checkpoints. We evaluate ParetoSlider across three state-of-the-art flow-matching backbones: SD3.5, FluxKontext, and LTX-2. Our single preference-conditioned model matches or exceeds the performance of baselines trained separately for fixed reward trade-offs, while uniquely providing fine-grained control over competing generative goals.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

In long-horizon tasks, recent agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) face a significant challenge that sparse, outcome-based rewards make it difficult to assign credit to intermediate steps. Previous methods mainly focus on creating dense reward signals to guide learning, either through traditional reinforcement learning techniques like inverse reinforcement learning or by using Process Reward Models for step-by-step feedback. In this paper, we identify a fundamental problem in the learning dynamics of LLMs: the magnitude of policy gradients is inherently coupled with the entropy, which leads to inefficient small updates for confident correct actions and potentially destabilizes large updates for uncertain ones. To resolve this, we propose Entropy-Modulated Policy Gradients (EMPG), a framework that re-calibrates the learning signal based on step-wise uncertainty and the final task outcome. EMPG amplifies updates for confident correct actions, penalizes confident errors, and attenuates updates from uncertain steps to stabilize exploration. We further introduce a bonus term for future clarity that encourages agents to find more predictable solution paths. Through comprehensive experiments on three challenging agent tasks, WebShop, ALFWorld, and Deep Search, we demonstrate that EMPG achieves substantial performance gains and significantly outperforms strong policy gradient baselines. Project page is at https://empgseed-seed.github.io/

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become a promising paradigm for optimizing Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) in complex reasoning tasks. However, traditional outcome-based RL approaches often suffer from reward sparsity and inefficient credit assignment, as coarse-grained scalar rewards fail to identify specific erroneous steps within long-horizon trajectories. This ambiguity frequently leads to "process hallucinations", where models reach correct answers through flawed logic or redundant retrieval steps. Although recent process-aware approaches attempt to mitigate this via static preference learning or heuristic reward shaping, they often lack the on-policy exploration capabilities required to decouple step-level credit from global outcomes. To address these challenges, we propose ProRAG, a process-supervised reinforcement learning framework designed to integrate learned step-level supervision into the online optimization loop. Our framework consists of four stages: (1) Supervised Policy Warmup to initialize the model with a structured reasoning format; (2) construction of an MCTS-based Process Reward Model (PRM) to quantify intermediate reasoning quality; (3) PRM-Guided Reasoning Refinement to align the policy with fine-grained process preferences; and (4) Process-Supervised Reinforcement Learning with a dual-granularity advantage mechanism. By aggregating step-level process rewards with global outcome signals, ProRAG provides precise feedback for every action. Extensive experiments on five multi-hop reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that ProRAG achieves superior overall performance compared to strong outcome-based and process-aware RL baselines, particularly on complex long-horizon tasks, validating the effectiveness of fine-grained process supervision. The code and model are available at https://github.com/lilinwz/ProRAG.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Diffusion models produce impressive results in modalities ranging from images and video to protein design and text. However, generating samples with user-specified properties remains a challenge. Recent research proposes fine-tuning models to maximize rewards that capture desired properties, but these methods require expensive training and are prone to mode collapse. In this work, we propose Feynman Kac (FK) steering, an inference-time framework for steering diffusion models with reward functions. FK steering works by sampling a system of multiple interacting diffusion processes, called particles, and resampling particles at intermediate steps based on scores computed using functions called potentials. Potentials are defined using rewards for intermediate states and are selected such that a high value indicates that the particle will yield a high-reward sample. We explore various choices of potentials, intermediate rewards, and samplers. We evaluate FK steering on text-to-image and text diffusion models. For steering text-to-image models with a human preference reward, we find that FK steering a 0.8B parameter model outperforms a 2.6B parameter fine-tuned model on prompt fidelity, with faster sampling and no training. For steering text diffusion models with rewards for text quality and specific text attributes, we find that FK steering generates lower perplexity, more linguistically acceptable outputs and enables gradient-free control of attributes like toxicity. Our results demonstrate that inference-time scaling and steering of diffusion models, even with off-the-shelf rewards, can provide significant sample quality gains and controllability benefits. Code is available at https://github.com/zacharyhorvitz/Fk-Diffusion-Steering .

The widespread applicability and increasing omnipresence of LLMs have instigated a need to align LLM responses to user and stakeholder preferences. Many preference optimization approaches have been proposed that fine-tune LLM parameters to achieve good alignment. However, such parameter tuning is known to interfere with model performance on many tasks. Moreover, keeping up with shifting user preferences is tricky in such a situation. Decoding-time alignment with reward model guidance solves these issues at the cost of increased inference time. However, most of such methods fail to strike the right balance between exploration and exploitation of reward -- often due to the conflated formulation of these two aspects - to give well-aligned responses. To remedy this we decouple these two aspects and implement them in an evolutionary fashion: exploration is enforced by decoding from mutated instructions and exploitation is represented as the periodic replacement of poorly-rewarded generations with well-rewarded ones. Empirical evidences indicate that this strategy outperforms many preference optimization and decode-time alignment approaches on two widely accepted alignment benchmarks AlpacaEval 2 and MT-Bench. Our implementation will be available at: https://darwin-alignment.github.io.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

The principle of detailed balance states that in equilibrium each elementary process is equilibrated by its reverse process. For many real physico-chemical complex systems (e.g. homogeneous combustion, heterogeneous catalytic oxidation, most enzyme reactions etc), detailed mechanisms include both reversible and irreversible reactions. In this case, the principle of detailed balance cannot be applied directly. We represent irreversible reactions as limits of reversible steps and obtain the principle of detailed balance for complex mechanisms with some irreversible elementary processes. We proved two consequences of the detailed balance for these mechanisms: the structural condition and the algebraic condition that form together the extended form of detailed balance. The algebraic condition is the principle of detailed balance for the reversible part. The structural condition is: the convex hull of the stoichiometric vectors of the irreversible reactions has empty intersection with the linear span of the stoichiometric vectors of the reversible reaction. Physically, this means that the irreversible reactions cannot be included in oriented pathways. The systems with the extended form of detailed balance are also the limits of the reversible systems with detailed balance when some of the equilibrium concentrations (or activities) tend to zero. Surprisingly, the structure of the limit reaction mechanism crucially depends on the relative speeds of this tendency to zero.

Offline goal-conditioned reinforcement learning (GCRL) learns goal-conditioned policies from static pre-collected datasets. However, accurate value estimation remains a challenge due to the limited coverage of the state-action space. Recent physics-informed approaches have sought to address this by imposing physical and geometric constraints on the value function through regularization defined over first-order partial differential equations (PDEs), such as the Eikonal equation. However, these formulations can often be ill-posed in complex, high-dimensional environments. In this work, we propose a physics-informed regularization derived from the viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. By providing a physics-based inductive bias, our approach grounds the learning process in optimal control theory, explicitly regularizing and bounding updates during value iterations. Furthermore, we leverage the Feynman-Kac theorem to recast the PDE solution as an expectation, enabling a tractable Monte Carlo estimation of the objective that avoids numerical instability in higher-order gradients. Experiments demonstrate that our method improves geometric consistency, making it broadly applicable to navigation and high-dimensional, complex manipulation tasks. Open-source codes are available at https://github.com/HrishikeshVish/phys-fk-value-GCRL.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Diffusion models excel at producing high-quality samples but naively require hundreds of iterations, prompting multiple attempts to distill the generation process into a faster network. However, many existing approaches suffer from a variety of challenges: the process for distillation training can be complex, often requiring multiple training stages, and the resulting models perform poorly when utilized in single-step generative applications. In this paper, we introduce a simple yet effective means of distilling diffusion models directly from initial noise to the resulting image. Of particular importance to our approach is to leverage a new Deep Equilibrium (DEQ) model as the distilled architecture: the Generative Equilibrium Transformer (GET). Our method enables fully offline training with just noise/image pairs from the diffusion model while achieving superior performance compared to existing one-step methods on comparable training budgets. We demonstrate that the DEQ architecture is crucial to this capability, as GET matches a 5times larger ViT in terms of FID scores while striking a critical balance of computational cost and image quality. Code, checkpoints, and datasets are available.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in performing complex multi-step reasoning, yet they continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, often making systematic errors. A promising solution is reinforcement learning (RL) guided by reward models, particularly those focusing on process rewards, which score each intermediate step rather than solely evaluating the final outcome. This approach is more effective at guiding policy models towards correct reasoning trajectories. In this work, we propose an entropy-regularized process reward model (ER-PRM) that integrates KL-regularized Markov Decision Processes (MDP) to balance policy optimization with the need to prevent the policy from shifting too far from its initial distribution. We derive a novel reward construction method based on the theoretical results. Our theoretical analysis shows that we could derive the optimal reward model from the initial policy sampling. Our empirical experiments on the MATH and GSM8K benchmarks demonstrate that ER-PRM consistently outperforms existing process reward models, achieving 1% improvement on GSM8K and 2-3% improvement on MATH under best-of-N evaluation, and more than 1% improvement under RLHF. These results highlight the efficacy of entropy-regularization in enhancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

Much of the advancement of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) in imperfect-information games has historically depended on manual iterative refinement of baselines. While foundational families like Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) rest on solid theoretical ground, the design of their most effective variants often relies on human intuition to navigate a vast algorithmic design space. In this work, we propose the use of AlphaEvolve, an evolutionary coding agent powered by large language models, to automatically discover new multiagent learning algorithms. We demonstrate the generality of this framework by evolving novel variants for two distinct paradigms of game-theoretic learning. First, in the domain of iterative regret minimization, we evolve the logic governing regret accumulation and policy derivation, discovering a new algorithm, Volatility-Adaptive Discounted (VAD-)CFR. VAD-CFR employs novel, non-intuitive mechanisms-including volatility-sensitive discounting, consistency-enforced optimism, and a hard warm-start policy accumulation schedule-to outperform state-of-the-art baselines like Discounted Predictive CFR+. Second, in the regime of population based training algorithms, we evolve training-time and evaluation-time meta strategy solvers for PSRO, discovering a new variant, Smoothed Hybrid Optimistic Regret (SHOR-)PSRO. SHOR-PSRO introduces a hybrid meta-solver that linearly blends Optimistic Regret Matching with a smoothed, temperature-controlled distribution over best pure strategies. By dynamically annealing this blending factor and diversity bonuses during training, the algorithm automates the transition from population diversity to rigorous equilibrium finding, yielding superior empirical convergence compared to standard static meta-solvers.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is the dominant paradigm for sharpening strategic tool use capabilities of LLMs on long-horizon, sparsely-rewarded agent tasks, yet it faces a fundamental challenge of exploration-exploitation trade-off. Existing studies stimulate exploration through the lens of policy entropy, but such mechanical entropy maximization is prone to RL training instability due to the multi-turn distribution shifting. In this paper, we target the progressive exploration-exploitation balance under the guidance of the agent own experiences without succumbing to either entropy collapsing or runaway divergence. We propose SPEAR, a curriculum-based self-imitation learning (SIL) recipe for training agentic LLMs. It extends the vanilla SIL framework, where a replay buffer stores self-generated promising trajectories for off-policy update, by gradually steering the policy evolution within a well-balanced range of entropy across stages. Specifically, our approach incorporates a curriculum to manage the exploration process, utilizing intrinsic rewards to foster skill-level exploration and facilitating action-level exploration through SIL. At first, the auxiliary tool call reward plays a critical role in the accumulation of tool-use skills, enabling broad exposure to the unfamiliar distributions of the environment feedback with an upward entropy trend. As training progresses, self-imitation gets strengthened to exploit existing successful patterns from replayed experiences for comparative action-level exploration, accelerating solution iteration without unbounded entropy growth. To further stabilize training, we recalibrate the advantages of experiences in the replay buffer to address the potential policy drift. Reugularizations such as the clipping of tokens with high covariance between probability and advantage are introduced to the trajectory-level entropy control to curb over-confidence.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

Through multi-agent competition, the simple objective of hide-and-seek, and standard reinforcement learning algorithms at scale, we find that agents create a self-supervised autocurriculum inducing multiple distinct rounds of emergent strategy, many of which require sophisticated tool use and coordination. We find clear evidence of six emergent phases in agent strategy in our environment, each of which creates a new pressure for the opposing team to adapt; for instance, agents learn to build multi-object shelters using moveable boxes which in turn leads to agents discovering that they can overcome obstacles using ramps. We further provide evidence that multi-agent competition may scale better with increasing environment complexity and leads to behavior that centers around far more human-relevant skills than other self-supervised reinforcement learning methods such as intrinsic motivation. Finally, we propose transfer and fine-tuning as a way to quantitatively evaluate targeted capabilities, and we compare hide-and-seek agents to both intrinsic motivation and random initialization baselines in a suite of domain-specific intelligence tests.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing methods either fail to plan interactively or consider unimodal behaviors that could lead to catastrophic results. In this paper, we introduce an integrated decision-making and trajectory planning framework based on Bayesian game (i.e., game of incomplete information). Human decisions inherently exhibit discrete characteristics and therefore are modeled as types of players in the game. A general solver based on no-regret learning is introduced to obtain a corresponding Bayesian Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, which captures the interaction between traffic agents in the multimodal context. With the attained equilibrium, decision-making and trajectory planning are performed simultaneously, and the resulting interactive strategy is shown to be optimal over the expectation of rivals' driving intentions. Closed-loop simulations on different traffic scenarios are performed to illustrate the generalizability and the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

A fundamental dilemma in generative modeling persists: iterative diffusion models achieve outstanding fidelity, but at a significant computational cost, while efficient few-step alternatives are constrained by a hard quality ceiling. This conflict between generation steps and output quality arises from restrictive training objectives that focus exclusively on either infinitesimal dynamics (PF-ODEs) or direct endpoint prediction. We address this challenge by introducing an exact, continuous-time dynamics equation that analytically defines state transitions across any finite time interval. This leads to a novel generative paradigm, Transition Models (TiM), which adapt to arbitrary-step transitions, seamlessly traversing the generative trajectory from single leaps to fine-grained refinement with more steps. Despite having only 865M parameters, TiM achieves state-of-the-art performance, surpassing leading models such as SD3.5 (8B parameters) and FLUX.1 (12B parameters) across all evaluated step counts. Importantly, unlike previous few-step generators, TiM demonstrates monotonic quality improvement as the sampling budget increases. Additionally, when employing our native-resolution strategy, TiM delivers exceptional fidelity at resolutions up to 4096x4096.

We consider a sequential decision making problem where the agent faces the environment characterized by the stochastic discrete events and seeks an optimal intervention policy such that its long-term reward is maximized. This problem exists ubiquitously in social media, finance and health informatics but is rarely investigated by the conventional research in reinforcement learning. To this end, we present a novel framework of the model-based reinforcement learning where the agent's actions and observations are asynchronous stochastic discrete events occurring in continuous-time. We model the dynamics of the environment by Hawkes process with external intervention control term and develop an algorithm to embed such process in the Bellman equation which guides the direction of the value gradient. We demonstrate the superiority of our method in both synthetic simulator and real-world problem.

A central problem in machine learning involves modeling complex data-sets using highly flexible families of probability distributions in which learning, sampling, inference, and evaluation are still analytically or computationally tractable. Here, we develop an approach that simultaneously achieves both flexibility and tractability. The essential idea, inspired by non-equilibrium statistical physics, is to systematically and slowly destroy structure in a data distribution through an iterative forward diffusion process. We then learn a reverse diffusion process that restores structure in data, yielding a highly flexible and tractable generative model of the data. This approach allows us to rapidly learn, sample from, and evaluate probabilities in deep generative models with thousands of layers or time steps, as well as to compute conditional and posterior probabilities under the learned model. We additionally release an open source reference implementation of the algorithm.

Training LLM agents in multi-turn environments with sparse rewards, where completing a single task requires 30+ turns of interaction within an episode, presents a fundamental challenge for reinforcement learning. We identify a critical failure mode unique to this setting: the exploration-exploitation cascade failure. This cascade begins with early-stage policy premature convergence, where sparse feedback causes agents to commit to flawed, low-entropy strategies. Subsequently, agents enter late-stage policy collapse, where conventional entropy regularization becomes counterproductive, promoting chaotic exploration that destabilizes training. We propose Entropy-regularized Policy Optimization (EPO), a general framework that breaks this failure cycle through three synergistic mechanisms: (1) adopting entropy regularization in multi-turn settings to enhance exploration, (2) an entropy smoothing regularizer that bounds policy entropy within historical averages to prevent abrupt fluctuations, and (3) adaptive phase-based weighting that balances exploration and exploitation across training. Our analysis justifies that EPO guarantees monotonically decreasing entropy variance while maintaining convergence. EPO achieves up to 152% performance improvement on ScienceWorld and up to 19.8% on ALFWorld. Our work demonstrates that multi-turn sparse-reward settings require fundamentally different entropy control than traditional RL, with broad implications for LLM agent training.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

In the absence of extensive human-annotated data for complex reasoning tasks, self-improvement -- where models are trained on their own outputs -- has emerged as a primary method for enhancing performance. However, the critical factors underlying the mechanism of these iterative self-improving methods remain poorly understood, such as under what conditions self-improvement is effective, and what are the bottlenecks in the current iterations. In this work, we identify and propose methods to monitor two pivotal factors in this iterative process: (1) the model's ability to generate sufficiently diverse responses (exploration); and (2) the effectiveness of external rewards in distinguishing high-quality candidates from lower-quality ones (exploitation). Using mathematical reasoning as a case study, we begin with a quantitative analysis to track the dynamics of exploration and exploitation, discovering that a model's exploratory capabilities rapidly deteriorate over iterations, and the effectiveness of exploiting external rewards diminishes as well. Motivated by these findings, we introduce B-STaR, a Self-Taught Reasoning framework that autonomously adjusts configurations across iterations to Balance exploration and exploitation, thereby optimizing the self-improving effectiveness based on the current policy model and available rewards. Our experiments on mathematical reasoning, coding, and commonsense reasoning demonstrate that B-STaR not only enhances the model's exploratory capabilities throughout training but also achieves a more effective balance between exploration and exploitation, leading to superior performance.

The FOX optimizer, inspired by red fox hunting behavior, is a powerful algorithm for solving real-world and engineering problems. However, despite balancing exploration and exploitation, it can prematurely converge to local optima, as agent positions are updated solely based on the current best-known position, causing all agents to converge on one location. This study proposes the modified FOX optimizer (mFOX) to enhance exploration and balance exploration and exploitation in three steps. First, the Oppositional-Based Learning (OBL) strategy is used to improve the initial population. Second, control parameters are refined to achieve a better balance between exploration and exploitation. Third, a new update equation is introduced, allowing agents to adjust their positions relative to one another rather than relying solely on the best-known position. This approach improves exploration efficiency without adding complexity. The mFOX algorithm's performance is evaluated against 12 well-known algorithms on 23 classical benchmark functions, 10 CEC2019 functions, and 12 CEC2022 functions. It outperforms competitors in 74% of the classical benchmarks, 60% of the CEC2019 benchmarks, and 58% of the CEC2022 benchmarks. Additionally, mFOX effectively addresses four engineering problems. These results demonstrate mFOX's strong competitiveness in solving complex optimization tasks, including unimodal, constrained, and high-dimensional problems.

Large language models have become drivers of evolutionary search, but most systems rely on a fixed, prompt-elicited policy to sample next candidates. This limits adaptation in practical engineering and research tasks, where evaluations are expensive, and progress depends on learning task-specific search dynamics. We introduce PACEvolve++, an advisor-model reinforcement learning framework for test-time policy adaptation in evolutionary search agents. PACEvolve++ decouples strategic search decisions from implementation: a trainable advisor generates, assesses, and selects hypotheses, while a stronger frontier model translates selected hypotheses into executable candidates. To train the advisor under non-stationary feedback, we propose a phase-adaptive approach that adapts its optimization strategy to different phases of the evolutionary process. Early in evolution, it uses group-relative feedback to learn broad search preferences; later, as reward gaps compress, it emphasizes best-of-k frontier contribution to support stable refinement. Across expert-parallel load balancing, sequential recommendation, and protein fitness extrapolation, PACEvolve++ outperforms the state-of-the-art evolutionary search framework with frontier models, achieving faster convergence and stabilizing test-time training during evolutionary search.

Two main challenges in Reinforcement Learning (RL) are designing appropriate reward functions and ensuring the safety of the learned policy. To address these challenges, we present a theoretical framework for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) in constrained Markov decision processes. From a convex-analytic perspective, we extend prior results on reward identifiability and generalizability to both the constrained setting and a more general class of regularizations. In particular, we show that identifiability up to potential shaping (Cao et al., 2021) is a consequence of entropy regularization and may generally no longer hold for other regularizations or in the presence of safety constraints. We also show that to ensure generalizability to new transition laws and constraints, the true reward must be identified up to a constant. Additionally, we derive a finite sample guarantee for the suboptimality of the learned rewards, and validate our results in a gridworld environment.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Reinforcement Learning From Human Feedback (RLHF) has been a critical to the success of the latest generation of generative AI models. In response to the complex nature of the classical RLHF pipeline, direct alignment algorithms such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) have emerged as an alternative approach. Although DPO solves the same objective as the standard RLHF setup, there is a mismatch between the two approaches. Standard RLHF deploys reinforcement learning in a specific token-level MDP, while DPO is derived as a bandit problem in which the whole response of the model is treated as a single arm. In this work we rectify this difference, first we theoretically show that we can derive DPO in the token-level MDP as a general inverse Q-learning algorithm, which satisfies the Bellman equation. Using our theoretical results, we provide three concrete empirical insights. First, we show that because of its token level interpretation, DPO is able to perform some type of credit assignment. Next, we prove that under the token level formulation, classical search-based algorithms, such as MCTS, which have recently been applied to the language generation space, are equivalent to likelihood-based search on a DPO policy. Empirically we show that a simple beam search yields meaningful improvement over the base DPO policy. Finally, we show how the choice of reference policy causes implicit rewards to decline during training. We conclude by discussing applications of our work, including information elicitation in multi-tun dialogue, reasoning, agentic applications and end-to-end training of multi-model systems.

In this work, we address the challenging problem of long-horizon goal-reaching policy learning from non-expert, action-free observation data. Unlike fully labeled expert data, our data is more accessible and avoids the costly process of action labeling. Additionally, compared to online learning, which often involves aimless exploration, our data provides useful guidance for more efficient exploration. To achieve our goal, we propose a novel subgoal guidance learning strategy. The motivation behind this strategy is that long-horizon goals offer limited guidance for efficient exploration and accurate state transition. We develop a diffusion strategy-based high-level policy to generate reasonable subgoals as waypoints, preferring states that more easily lead to the final goal. Additionally, we learn state-goal value functions to encourage efficient subgoal reaching. These two components naturally integrate into the off-policy actor-critic framework, enabling efficient goal attainment through informative exploration. We evaluate our method on complex robotic navigation and manipulation tasks, demonstrating a significant performance advantage over existing methods. Our ablation study further shows that our method is robust to observation data with various corruptions.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

A common recipe to improve diffusion models at test-time so that samples score highly against a user-specified reward is to introduce the gradient of the reward into the dynamics of the diffusion itself. This procedure is often ill posed, as user-specified rewards are usually only well defined on the data distribution at the end of generation. While common workarounds to this problem are to use a denoiser to estimate what a sample would have been at the end of generation, we propose a simple solution to this problem by working directly with a flow map. By exploiting a relationship between the flow map and velocity field governing the instantaneous transport, we construct an algorithm, Flow Map Trajectory Tilting (FMTT), which provably performs better ascent on the reward than standard test-time methods involving the gradient of the reward. The approach can be used to either perform exact sampling via importance weighting or principled search that identifies local maximizers of the reward-tilted distribution. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach against other look-ahead techniques, and show how the flow map enables engagement with complicated reward functions that make possible new forms of image editing, e.g. by interfacing with vision language models.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown extraordinary potential in aligning diffusion models to downstream tasks, yet most of them still suffer from significant reward hacking, which degrades generative diversity and quality by inducing visual mode collapse and amplifying unreliable rewards. We identify the root cause as the mode-seeking nature of these methods, which maximize expected reward without effectively constraining probability distribution over acceptable trajectories, causing concentration on a few high-reward paths. In contrast, we propose Trajectory Matching Policy Optimization (TMPO), which replaces scalar reward maximization with trajectory-level reward distribution matching. Specifically, TMPO introduces a Softmax Trajectory Balance (Softmax-TB) objective to match the policy probabilities of K trajectories to a reward-induced Boltzmann distribution. We prove that this objective inherits the mode-covering property of forward KL divergence, preserving coverage over all acceptable trajectories while optimizing reward. To further reduce multi-trajectory training time on large-scale flow-matching models, TMPO incorporates Dynamic Stochastic Tree Sampling, where trajectories share denoising prefixes and branch at dynamically scheduled steps, reducing redundant computation while improving training effectiveness. Extensive results across diverse alignment tasks such as human preference, compositional generation and text rendering show that TMPO improves generative diversity over state-of-the-art methods by 9.1%, and achieves competitive performance in all downstream and efficiency metrics, attaining the optimal trade-off between reward and diversity.

We introduce the framework of performative reinforcement learning where the policy chosen by the learner affects the underlying reward and transition dynamics of the environment. Following the recent literature on performative prediction~Perdomo et. al., 2020, we introduce the concept of performatively stable policy. We then consider a regularized version of the reinforcement learning problem and show that repeatedly optimizing this objective converges to a performatively stable policy under reasonable assumptions on the transition dynamics. Our proof utilizes the dual perspective of the reinforcement learning problem and may be of independent interest in analyzing the convergence of other algorithms with decision-dependent environments. We then extend our results for the setting where the learner just performs gradient ascent steps instead of fully optimizing the objective, and for the setting where the learner has access to a finite number of trajectories from the changed environment. For both settings, we leverage the dual formulation of performative reinforcement learning and establish convergence to a stable solution. Finally, through extensive experiments on a grid-world environment, we demonstrate the dependence of convergence on various parameters e.g. regularization, smoothness, and the number of samples.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

Recent advances in deep-research agents have shown promise for autonomous knowledge construction through dynamic reasoning over external sources. However, existing approaches rely on a mono-contextual paradigm that accumulates all information in a single, expanding context window, leading to context suffocation and noise contamination that limit their effectiveness on long-horizon tasks. We introduce IterResearch, a novel iterative deep-research paradigm that reformulates long-horizon research as a Markov Decision Process with strategic workspace reconstruction. By maintaining an evolving report as memory and periodically synthesizing insights, our approach preserves consistent reasoning capacity across arbitrary exploration depths. We further develop Efficiency-Aware Policy Optimization (EAPO), a reinforcement learning framework that incentivizes efficient exploration through geometric reward discounting and enables stable distributed training via adaptive downsampling. Extensive experiments demonstrate that IterResearch achieves substantial improvements over existing open-source agents with average +14.5pp across six benchmarks and narrows the gap with frontier proprietary systems. Remarkably, our paradigm exhibits unprecedented interaction scaling, extending to 2048 interactions with dramatic performance gains (from 3.5\% to 42.5\%), and serves as an effective prompting strategy, improving frontier models by up to 19.2pp over ReAct on long-horizon tasks. These findings position IterResearch as a versatile solution for long-horizon reasoning, effective both as a trained agent and as a prompting paradigm for frontier models.

We introduce a generic strategy for provably efficient multi-goal exploration. It relies on AdaGoal, a novel goal selection scheme that leverages a measure of uncertainty in reaching states to adaptively target goals that are neither too difficult nor too easy. We show how AdaGoal can be used to tackle the objective of learning an ε-optimal goal-conditioned policy for the (initially unknown) set of goal states that are reachable within L steps in expectation from a reference state s_0 in a reward-free Markov decision process. In the tabular case with S states and A actions, our algorithm requires O(L^3 S A ε^{-2}) exploration steps, which is nearly minimax optimal. We also readily instantiate AdaGoal in linear mixture Markov decision processes, yielding the first goal-oriented PAC guarantee with linear function approximation. Beyond its strong theoretical guarantees, we anchor AdaGoal in goal-conditioned deep reinforcement learning, both conceptually and empirically, by connecting its idea of selecting "uncertain" goals to maximizing value ensemble disagreement.

We derive an expression for the variation between parallel trajectories in phenotypic evolution, extending the well known result that predicts the mean evolutionary path in adaptive dynamics or quantitative genetics. We show how this expression gives rise to the notion of fluctuation domains - parts of the fitness landscape where the rate of evolution is very predictable (due to fluctuation dissipation) and parts where it is highly variable (due to fluctuation enhancement). These fluctuation domains are determined by the curvature of the fitness landscape. Regions of the fitness landscape with positive curvature, such as adaptive valleys or branching points, experience enhancement. Regions with negative curvature, such as adaptive peaks, experience dissipation. We explore these dynamics in the ecological scenarios of implicit and explicit competition for a limiting resource.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

Realistic environments often provide agents with very limited feedback. When the environment is initially unknown, the feedback, in the beginning, can be completely absent, and the agents may first choose to devote all their effort on exploring efficiently. The exploration remains a challenge while it has been addressed with many hand-tuned heuristics with different levels of generality on one side, and a few theoretically-backed exploration strategies on the other. Many of them are incarnated by intrinsic motivation and in particular explorations bonuses. A common rule of thumb for exploration bonuses is to use 1/n bonus that is added to the empirical estimates of the reward, where n is a number of times this particular state (or a state-action pair) was visited. We show that, surprisingly, for a pure-exploration objective of reward-free exploration, bonuses that scale with 1/n bring faster learning rates, improving the known upper bounds with respect to the dependence on the horizon H. Furthermore, we show that with an improved analysis of the stopping time, we can improve by a factor H the sample complexity in the best-policy identification setting, which is another pure-exploration objective, where the environment provides rewards but the agent is not penalized for its behavior during the exploration phase.

Neural network pruning is widely used to reduce model size and computational cost. Yet, most existing methods treat sparsity as an externally imposed constraint, enforced through heuristic importance scores or training-time regularization. In this work, we propose a fundamentally different perspective: pruning as an equilibrium outcome of strategic interaction among model components. We model parameter groups such as weights, neurons, or filters as players in a continuous non-cooperative game, where each player selects its level of participation in the network to balance contribution against redundancy and competition. Within this formulation, sparsity emerges naturally when continued participation becomes a dominated strategy at equilibrium. We analyze the resulting game and show that dominated players collapse to zero participation under mild conditions, providing a principled explanation for pruning behavior. Building on this insight, we derive a simple equilibrium-driven pruning algorithm that jointly updates network parameters and participation variables without relying on explicit importance scores. This work focuses on establishing a principled formulation and empirical validation of pruning as an equilibrium phenomenon, rather than exhaustive architectural or large-scale benchmarking. Experiments on standard benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves competitive sparsity-accuracy trade-offs while offering an interpretable, theory-grounded alternative to existing pruning methods.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly gain self-evolutionary capabilities to adapt and refine their strategies through real-world interaction, their long-term reliability becomes a critical concern. We identify the Alignment Tipping Process (ATP), a critical post-deployment risk unique to self-evolving LLM agents. Unlike training-time failures, ATP arises when continual interaction drives agents to abandon alignment constraints established during training in favor of reinforced, self-interested strategies. We formalize and analyze ATP through two complementary paradigms: Self-Interested Exploration, where repeated high-reward deviations induce individual behavioral drift, and Imitative Strategy Diffusion, where deviant behaviors spread across multi-agent systems. Building on these paradigms, we construct controllable testbeds and benchmark Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our experiments show that alignment benefits erode rapidly under self-evolution, with initially aligned models converging toward unaligned states. In multi-agent settings, successful violations diffuse quickly, leading to collective misalignment. Moreover, current reinforcement learning-based alignment methods provide only fragile defenses against alignment tipping. Together, these findings demonstrate that alignment of LLM agents is not a static property but a fragile and dynamic one, vulnerable to feedback-driven decay during deployment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ATP.

Learning the continuous dynamics of a system from snapshots of its temporal marginals is a problem which appears throughout natural sciences and machine learning, including in quantum systems, single-cell biological data, and generative modeling. In these settings, we assume access to cross-sectional samples that are uncorrelated over time, rather than full trajectories of samples. In order to better understand the systems under observation, we would like to learn a model of the underlying process that allows us to propagate samples in time and thereby simulate entire individual trajectories. In this work, we propose Action Matching, a method for learning a rich family of dynamics using only independent samples from its time evolution. We derive a tractable training objective, which does not rely on explicit assumptions about the underlying dynamics and does not require back-propagation through differential equations or optimal transport solvers. Inspired by connections with optimal transport, we derive extensions of Action Matching to learn stochastic differential equations and dynamics involving creation and destruction of probability mass. Finally, we showcase applications of Action Matching by achieving competitive performance in a diverse set of experiments from biology, physics, and generative modeling.

Disaggregated inference architectures physically separate prefill and decode phases onto distinct GPU pools, creating competing "agents" that share a fixed hardware budget. We provide, to our knowledge, the first formal game-theoretic analysis of this architecture, using NVIDIA Dynamo as a concrete case study. We model disaggregated serving as three coupled games: a two-player resource game between prefill and decode pools, a selfish caching game over the hierarchical KV cache, and a congestion game with positive externalities for request routing. We empirically validate the latter two; the P/D resource game is treated analytically (Section 9.2). We characterize how GPU saturation induces regime transitions that shift the game's payoff structure: below saturation, selfish behavior has bounded Price of Anarchy (PoA); at saturation, superlinear latency and cache externalities drive our empirical estimator PoA-hat (defined in Section 6.4) upward. Based on this analysis, we design an adaptive controller that detects saturation transitions in real time and adjusts routing parameters accordingly, shifting from cache-affinity exploitation to load-balanced congestion avoidance. We instantiate our framework on a 3-node NVIDIA B200 cluster running Dynamo with two models, Nemotron-4-340B (TP=8, full-node workers with cross-InfiniBand KV transfers) and Llama-3.1-70B (TP=4), and find the same three-regime PoA-hat structure with the same first post-knee grid point (C=128) on both models. Adaptive routing shifts each model to a better operating point. Our strongest result is on the 70B 1P/5D topology, where PoA-hat drops 3.1x (66.4 to 21.5) in the saturated phase at a 13% throughput cost. On the 70B 1P/2D, PoA-hat drops 2.2x and TTFT P99 drops 7.6x (see Section 8.5).

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

Dynamical generative models that produce samples through an iterative process, such as Flow Matching and denoising diffusion models, have seen widespread use, but there have not been many theoretically-sound methods for improving these models with reward fine-tuning. In this work, we cast reward fine-tuning as stochastic optimal control (SOC). Critically, we prove that a very specific memoryless noise schedule must be enforced during fine-tuning, in order to account for the dependency between the noise variable and the generated samples. We also propose a new algorithm named Adjoint Matching which outperforms existing SOC algorithms, by casting SOC problems as a regression problem. We find that our approach significantly improves over existing methods for reward fine-tuning, achieving better consistency, realism, and generalization to unseen human preference reward models, while retaining sample diversity.

In this paper, we study offline Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) where we aim to learn the human's underlying reward and the MDP's optimal policy from a set of trajectories induced by human choices. RLHF is challenging for multiple reasons: large state space but limited human feedback, the bounded rationality of human decisions, and the off-policy distribution shift. In this paper, we focus on the Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) model for modeling and understanding human choices. DCC, rooted in econometrics and decision theory, is widely used to model a human decision-making process with forward-looking and bounded rationality. We propose a Dynamic-Choice-Pessimistic-Policy-Optimization (DCPPO) method. \ The method involves a three-stage process: The first step is to estimate the human behavior policy and the state-action value function via maximum likelihood estimation (MLE); the second step recovers the human reward function via minimizing Bellman mean squared error using the learned value functions; the third step is to plug in the learned reward and invoke pessimistic value iteration for finding a near-optimal policy. With only single-policy coverage (i.e., optimal policy) of the dataset, we prove that the suboptimality of DCPPO almost matches the classical pessimistic offline RL algorithm in terms of suboptimality's dependency on distribution shift and dimension. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first theoretical guarantees for off-policy offline RLHF with dynamic discrete choice model.

Learning optimal policies in sparse rewards settings is difficult as the learning agent has little to no feedback on the quality of its actions. In these situations, a good strategy is to focus on exploration, hopefully leading to the discovery of a reward signal to improve on. A learning algorithm capable of dealing with this kind of settings has to be able to (1) explore possible agent behaviors and (2) exploit any possible discovered reward. Efficient exploration algorithms have been proposed that require to define a behavior space, that associates to an agent its resulting behavior in a space that is known to be worth exploring. The need to define this space is a limitation of these algorithms. In this work, we introduce STAX, an algorithm designed to learn a behavior space on-the-fly and to explore it while efficiently optimizing any reward discovered. It does so by separating the exploration and learning of the behavior space from the exploitation of the reward through an alternating two-steps process. In the first step, STAX builds a repertoire of diverse policies while learning a low-dimensional representation of the high-dimensional observations generated during the policies evaluation. In the exploitation step, emitters are used to optimize the performance of the discovered rewarding solutions. Experiments conducted on three different sparse reward environments show that STAX performs comparably to existing baselines while requiring much less prior information about the task as it autonomously builds the behavior space.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a popular paradigm for aligning models with human intent. Typically RLHF algorithms operate in two phases: first, use human preferences to learn a reward function and second, align the model by optimizing the learned reward via reinforcement learning (RL). This paradigm assumes that human preferences are distributed according to reward, but recent work suggests that they instead follow the regret under the user's optimal policy. Thus, learning a reward function from feedback is not only based on a flawed assumption of human preference, but also leads to unwieldy optimization challenges that stem from policy gradients or bootstrapping in the RL phase. Because of these optimization challenges, contemporary RLHF methods restrict themselves to contextual bandit settings (e.g., as in large language models) or limit observation dimensionality (e.g., state-based robotics). We overcome these limitations by introducing a new family of algorithms for optimizing behavior from human feedback using the regret-based model of human preferences. Using the principle of maximum entropy, we derive Contrastive Preference Learning (CPL), an algorithm for learning optimal policies from preferences without learning reward functions, circumventing the need for RL. CPL is fully off-policy, uses only a simple contrastive objective, and can be applied to arbitrary MDPs. This enables CPL to elegantly scale to high-dimensional and sequential RLHF problems while being simpler than prior methods.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

We apply preference learning to the task of language model-guided design of novel structural alloys. In contrast to prior work that focuses on generating stable inorganic crystals, our approach targets the synthesizeability of a specific structural class: BCC/B2 superalloys, an underexplored family of materials with potential applications in extreme environments. Using three open-weight models (LLaMA-3.1, Gemma-2, and OLMo-2), we demonstrate that language models can be optimized for multiple design objectives using a single, unified reward signal through Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Unlike prior approaches that rely on heuristic or human-in-the-loop feedback (costly), our reward signal is derived from thermodynamic phase calculations, offering a scientifically grounded criterion for model tuning. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of preference-tuning a language model using physics-grounded feedback for structural alloy design. The resulting framework is general and extensible, providing a path forward for intelligent design-space exploration across a range of physical science domains.

Reinforcement learning with stochastic optimal control offers a promising framework for diffusion fine-tuning, where a pre-trained diffusion model is optimized to generate paths that lead to a reward-tilted distribution. While these approaches enable optimization without access to explicit samples from the optimal distribution, they require training on rollouts under the current fine-tuned model, making them susceptible to reinforcing sub-optimal trajectories that yield poor rewards. To overcome this challenge, we introduce TRee Search Guided TRajectory-Aware Fine-Tuning for Discrete Diffusion (TR2-D2), a novel framework that optimizes reward-guided discrete diffusion trajectories with tree search to construct replay buffers for trajectory-aware fine-tuning. These buffers are generated using Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and subsequently used to fine-tune a pre-trained discrete diffusion model under a stochastic optimal control objective. We validate our framework on single- and multi-objective fine-tuning of biological sequence diffusion models, highlighting the overall effectiveness of TR2-D2 for reliable reward-guided fine-tuning in discrete sequence generation.

Diffusion models have shown promising generative capabilities across diverse domains, yet aligning their outputs with desired reward functions remains a challenge, particularly in cases where reward functions are non-differentiable. Some gradient-free guidance methods have been developed, but they often struggle to achieve optimal inference-time alignment. In this work, we newly frame inference-time alignment in diffusion as a search problem and propose Dynamic Search for Diffusion (DSearch), which subsamples from denoising processes and approximates intermediate node rewards. It also dynamically adjusts beam width and tree expansion to efficiently explore high-reward generations. To refine intermediate decisions, DSearch incorporates adaptive scheduling based on noise levels and a lookahead heuristic function. We validate DSearch across multiple domains, including biological sequence design, molecular optimization, and image generation, demonstrating superior reward optimization compared to existing approaches.

Since humans still outperform artificial neural networks on many tasks, drawing inspiration from the brain may help to improve current machine learning algorithms. Contrastive Hebbian Learning (CHL) and Equilibrium Propagation (EP) are biologically plausible algorithms that update weights using only local information (without explicitly calculating gradients) and still achieve performance comparable to conventional backpropagation. In this study, we augmented CHL and EP with Adjusted Adaptation, inspired by the adaptation effect observed in neurons, in which a neuron's response to a given stimulus is adjusted after a short time. We add this adaptation feature to multilayer perceptrons and convolutional neural networks trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10. Surprisingly, adaptation improved the performance of these networks. We discuss the biological inspiration for this idea and investigate why Neuronal Adaptation could be an important brain mechanism to improve the stability and accuracy of learning.