Daily Papers

Language-model agents read attacker-writable context to solve tasks. Tool execution needs a separate authority check for protected sink fields, sink-interpreted payloads, and the invocation event. Context-to-Execution Integrity (CXI) is an execution-boundary system for this setting. Policies mark protected sink fields, typed releases carry narrow validated values from writable context to specific destinations, opaque data slots keep evidence as data, and a deterministic gate admits a call only after field authority, exact-effect authorization, and invocation authority all bind to the same action manifest. We evaluate CXI on open-weight field-projection runs, AgentDojo live episodes, a code-agent exact-effect benchmark, manifest-bound ledger faults, proposal-pressure controls, and hosted/API compatibility traces. AgentDojo covers 720 live episodes and 1,739 LLM calls; the code-agent benchmark covers 400 repository episodes with exact-effect authorization and lease-bound execution, yielding 231 safe task completions and zero observed field, effect, or invocation escapes. The accounting reports parser outcomes, authorization outcomes, and task-quality outcomes together with the admission-integrity result. Across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest.

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

The technique of data augmentation (DA) is often used in machine learning for regularization purposes to better generalize under i.i.d. settings. In this work, we present a unifying framework with topics in causal inference to make a case for the use of DA beyond just the i.i.d. setting, but for generalization across interventions as well. Specifically, we argue that when the outcome generating mechanism is invariant to our choice of DA, then such augmentations can effectively be thought of as interventions on the treatment generating mechanism itself. This can potentially help to reduce bias in causal effect estimation arising from hidden confounders. In the presence of such unobserved confounding we typically make use of instrumental variables (IVs) -- sources of treatment randomization that are conditionally independent of the outcome. However, IVs may not be as readily available as DA for many applications, which is the main motivation behind this work. By appropriately regularizing IV based estimators, we introduce the concept of IV-like (IVL) regression for mitigating confounding bias and improving predictive performance across interventions even when certain IV properties are relaxed. Finally, we cast parameterized DA as an IVL regression problem and show that when used in composition can simulate a worst-case application of such DA, further improving performance on causal estimation and generalization tasks beyond what simple DA may offer. This is shown both theoretically for the population case and via simulation experiments for the finite sample case using a simple linear example. We also present real data experiments to support our case.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

Googles A2A protocol provides a secure communication framework for AI agents but demonstrates critical limitations when handling highly sensitive information such as payment credentials and identity documents. These gaps increase the risk of unintended harms, including unauthorized disclosure, privilege escalation, and misuse of private data in generative multi-agent environments. In this paper, we identify key weaknesses of A2A: insufficient token lifetime control, lack of strong customer authentication, overbroad access scopes, and missing consent flows. We propose protocol-level enhancements grounded in a structured threat model for semi-trusted multi-agent systems. Our refinements introduce explicit consent orchestration, ephemeral scoped tokens, and direct user-to-service data channels to minimize exposure across time, context, and topology. Empirical evaluation using adversarial prompt injection tests shows that the enhanced protocol substantially reduces sensitive data leakage while maintaining low communication latency. Comparative analysis highlights the advantages of our approach over both the original A2A specification and related academic proposals. These contributions establish a practical path for evolving A2A into a privacy-preserving framework that mitigates unintended harms in multi-agent generative AI systems.

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.

Activation steering is a promising technique for controlling LLM behavior by adding semantically meaningful vectors directly into a model's hidden states during inference. It is often framed as a precise, interpretable, and potentially safer alternative to fine-tuning. We demonstrate the opposite: steering systematically breaks model alignment safeguards, making it comply with harmful requests. Through extensive experiments on different model families, we show that even steering in a random direction can increase the probability of harmful compliance from 0% to 2-27%. Alarmingly, steering benign features from a sparse autoencoder (SAE), a common source of interpretable directions, increases these rates by a further 2-4%. Finally, we show that combining 20 randomly sampled vectors that jailbreak a single prompt creates a universal attack, significantly increasing harmful compliance on unseen requests. These results challenge the paradigm of safety through interpretability, showing that precise control over model internals does not guarantee precise control over model behavior.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

Large Language Models are typically trained on datasets collected from the web, which may inadvertently contain harmful or sensitive personal information. To address growing privacy concerns, unlearning methods have been proposed to remove the influence of specific data from trained models. Of these, exact unlearning -- which retrains the model from scratch without the target data -- is widely regarded the gold standard for mitigating privacy risks in deployment. In this paper, we revisit this assumption in a practical deployment setting where both the pre- and post-unlearning logits API are exposed, such as in open-weight scenarios. Targeting this setting, we introduce a novel data extraction attack that leverages signals from the pre-unlearning model to guide the post-unlearning model, uncovering patterns that reflect the removed data distribution. Combining model guidance with a token filtering strategy, our attack significantly improves extraction success rates -- doubling performance in some cases -- across common benchmarks such as MUSE, TOFU, and WMDP. Furthermore, we demonstrate our attack's effectiveness on a simulated medical diagnosis dataset to highlight real-world privacy risks associated with exact unlearning. In light of our findings, which suggest that unlearning may, in a contradictory way, increase the risk of privacy leakage during real-world deployments, we advocate for evaluation of unlearning methods to consider broader threat models that account not only for post-unlearning models but also for adversarial access to prior checkpoints. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Nicholas0228/unlearned_data_extraction_llm.

In law, regulatory regimes for pharmaceuticals and software security, newer authorities can revoke older established ones even when semantically distant. We call this CAR: retrieving the currently active authority frontier for a semantic anchor q, that is, front(cl(A_k(q))). This differs from finding the most similar document by relevance score: argmax_d s(q, d). Theorem 4 characterizes when a set R truly covers the active authority set for q with TCA(R, q)=1, providing conditions necessary and sufficient for any retrieved set R: frontier inclusion (front(cl(A_k(q))) contained in R) and no-ignored-superseder (no superseding document exists in the corpus outside R). Proposition 2 shows that TCA@k <= phi(q) * R_anchor(q) in the worst case over any scope-indexed algorithm, proved by an adversarial permutation argument. We evaluated on three real-world datasets: security advisories (Dense TCA@5=0.270, two-stage 0.975), SCOTUS overruling pairs (Dense TCA=0.172, two-stage 0.926), and FDA drug records (Dense TCA=0.064, two-stage 0.774). A GPT-4o-mini experiment shows Dense RAG produces explicit "not patched" claims for 39% of queries where a patch exists; two-stage cuts this to 16%. Four benchmark datasets, domain adapters, and a single-command scorer are released at https://github.com/andremir/car-retrieval.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

We present ExAct, a new video-language benchmark for expert-level understanding of skilled physical human activities. Our new benchmark contains 3521 expert-curated video question-answer pairs spanning 11 physical activities in 6 domains: Sports, Bike Repair, Cooking, Health, Music, and Dance. ExAct requires the correct answer to be selected from five carefully designed candidate options, thus necessitating a nuanced, fine-grained, expert-level understanding of physical human skills. Evaluating the recent state-of-the-art VLMs on ExAct reveals a substantial performance gap relative to human expert performance. Specifically, the best-performing GPT-4o model achieves only 44.70% accuracy, well below the 82.02% attained by trained human specialists/experts. We believe that ExAct will be beneficial for developing and evaluating VLMs capable of precise understanding of human skills in various physical and procedural domains. Dataset and code are available at https://texaser.github.io/exact_project_page/

Exact unlearning was first introduced as a privacy mechanism that allowed a user to retract their data from machine learning models on request. Shortly after, inexact schemes were proposed to mitigate the impractical costs associated with exact unlearning. More recently unlearning is often discussed as an approach for removal of impermissible knowledge i.e. knowledge that the model should not possess such as unlicensed copyrighted, inaccurate, or malicious information. The promise is that if the model does not have a certain malicious capability, then it cannot be used for the associated malicious purpose. In this paper we revisit the paradigm in which unlearning is used for in Large Language Models (LLMs) and highlight an underlying inconsistency arising from in-context learning. Unlearning can be an effective control mechanism for the training phase, yet it does not prevent the model from performing an impermissible act during inference. We introduce a concept of ununlearning, where unlearned knowledge gets reintroduced in-context, effectively rendering the model capable of behaving as if it knows the forgotten knowledge. As a result, we argue that content filtering for impermissible knowledge will be required and even exact unlearning schemes are not enough for effective content regulation. We discuss feasibility of ununlearning for modern LLMs and examine broader implications.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

Equality saturation is a technique for program optimization based on non-destructive rewriting and a form of program analysis called e-class analysis. The current form of e-class analysis is pessimistic and therefore ineffective at analyzing cyclic programs, such as those in SSA form. We propose an abstract interpretation algorithm that can precisely analyze cycles during equality saturation. This results in a unified algorithm for optimistic analysis and non-destructive rewriting. We instantiate this approach on a prototype abstract interpreter for SSA programs using a new semantics of SSA. Our prototype can analyze simple example programs more precisely than clang and gcc.

Unfair treatment and discrimination are critical ethical concerns in AI systems, particularly as their adoption expands across diverse domains. Addressing these challenges, the recent introduction of the EU AI Act establishes a unified legal framework to ensure legal certainty for AI innovation and investment while safeguarding public interests, such as health, safety, fundamental rights, democracy, and the rule of law (Recital 8). The Act encourages stakeholders to initiate dialogue on existing AI fairness notions to address discriminatory outcomes of AI systems. However, these notions often overlook the critical role of Socio-Economic Status (SES), inadvertently perpetuating biases that favour the economically advantaged. This is concerning, given that principles of equalization advocate for equalizing resources or opportunities to mitigate disadvantages beyond an individual's control. While provisions for discrimination are laid down in the AI Act, specialized directions should be broadened, particularly in addressing economic disparities perpetuated by AI systems. In this work, we explore the limitations of popular AI fairness notions using a real-world dataset (Adult), highlighting their inability to address SES-driven disparities. To fill this gap, we propose a novel fairness notion, Socio-Economic Parity (SEP), which incorporates SES and promotes positive actions for underprivileged groups while accounting for factors within an individual's control, such as working hours, which can serve as a proxy for effort. We define a corresponding fairness measure and optimize a model constrained by SEP to demonstrate practical utility. Our results show the effectiveness of SEP in mitigating SES-driven biases. By analyzing the AI Act alongside our method, we lay a foundation for aligning AI fairness with SES factors while ensuring legal compliance.

Frontier LLM companies have repeatedly assured courts and regulators that their models do not store copies of training data. They further rely on safety alignment strategies via RLHF, system prompts, and output filters to block verbatim regurgitation of copyrighted works, and have cited the efficacy of these measures in their legal defenses against copyright infringement claims. We show that finetuning bypasses these protections: by training models to expand plot summaries into full text, a task naturally suited for commercial writing assistants, we cause GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Pro, and DeepSeek-V3.1 to reproduce up to 85-90% of held-out copyrighted books, with single verbatim spans exceeding 460 words, using only semantic descriptions as prompts and no actual book text. This extraction generalizes across authors: finetuning exclusively on Haruki Murakami's novels unlocks verbatim recall of copyrighted books from over 30 unrelated authors. The effect is not specific to any training author or corpus: random author pairs and public-domain finetuning data produce comparable extraction, while finetuning on synthetic text yields near-zero extraction, indicating that finetuning on individual authors' works reactivates latent memorization from pretraining. Three models from different providers memorize the same books in the same regions (r ge 0.90), pointing to an industry-wide vulnerability. Our findings offer compelling evidence that model weights store copies of copyrighted works and that the security failures that manifest after finetuning on individual authors' works undermine a key premise of recent fair use rulings, where courts have conditioned favorable outcomes on the adequacy of measures preventing reproduction of protected expression.

Instrumental variable methods have been widely used to identify causal effects in the presence of unmeasured confounding. A key identification condition known as the exclusion restriction states that the instrument cannot have a direct effect on the outcome which is not mediated by the exposure in view. In the health and social sciences, such an assumption is often not credible. To address this concern, we consider identification conditions of the population average treatment effect with an invalid instrumental variable which does not satisfy the exclusion restriction, and derive the efficient influence function targeting the identifying functional under a nonparametric observed data model. We propose a novel multiply robust locally efficient estimator of the average treatment effect that is consistent in the union of multiple parametric nuisance models, as well as a multiply debiased machine learning estimator for which the nuisance parameters are estimated using generic machine learning methods, that effectively exploit various forms of linear or nonlinear structured sparsity in the nuisance parameter space. When one cannot be confident that any of these machine learners is consistent at sufficiently fast rates to ensure n-consistency for the average treatment effect, we introduce a new criteria for selective machine learning which leverages the multiple robustness property in order to ensure small bias. The proposed methods are illustrated through extensive simulations and a data analysis evaluating the causal effect of 401(k) participation on savings.

Universal adversarial attacks on aligned multimodal large language models are increasingly reported with attack success rates in the 60-80% range, suggesting the visual modality is highly vulnerable to imperceptible perturbations as a prompt-injection channel. We argue that this number conflates two distinct events: (i) the model's output was perturbed (Influence), and (ii) the attacker's chosen target concept was actually emitted (Precise Injection). We compose two existing techniques -- Universal Adversarial Attack and AnyAttack -- under an L_{inf} budget of 16/255, and we add a dual-axis evaluation: a deterministic Ratcliff-Obershelp drift score for Influence (programmatic baseline) plus a 4-tier ordinal categorical none/weak/partial/confirmed for Precise Injection. The judge is DeepSeek-V4-Pro in thinking mode, calibrated against Claude Opus 4.7 with Cohen's κ = 0.77 on the injection axis (substantial agreement); the entire 4475-entry SHA-256 input cache ships with the dataset so reviewers can re-derive paper numbers bit-exact without an API key. Across 6615 pairs over four open VLMs, seven attack prompts, and seven test images, the two axes diverge by roughly 90times: 66.4% of pairs are programmatically disturbed (LLM-judged 46.6% at the substantial-or-complete tier), but only 0.756% (50/6615) reach any non-none injection tier and only 0.030% (2/6615) verbatim. The few injections that do land cluster on screenshot- or document-style carriers whose semantics already invite text transcription. BLIP-2 shows zero detectable drift at L_{inf} = 16/255 across all 2205 pairs even when used as a Stage-1 surrogate. We release the full dataset -- 21 universal images, 147 adversarial photos, 6,615 response pairs, the v3 dual-axis judge results, and the cache at huggingface.co/datasets/jeffliulab/visinject.

Recent advancements in diffusion-based text-to-image (T2I) models have enabled the generation of high-quality and photorealistic images from text. However, they often exhibit societal biases related to gender, race, and socioeconomic status, thereby potentially reinforcing harmful stereotypes and shaping public perception in unintended ways. While existing bias mitigation methods demonstrate effectiveness, they often encounter attribute entanglement, where adjustments to attributes relevant to the bias (i.e., target attributes) unintentionally alter attributes unassociated with the bias (i.e., non-target attributes), causing undesirable distribution shifts. To address this challenge, we introduce Entanglement-Free Attention (EFA), a method that accurately incorporates target attributes (e.g., White, Black, and Asian) while preserving non-target attributes (e.g., background) during bias mitigation. At inference time, EFA randomly samples a target attribute with equal probability and adjusts the cross-attention in selected layers to incorporate the sampled attribute, achieving a fair distribution of target attributes. Extensive experiments demonstrate that EFA outperforms existing methods in mitigating bias while preserving non-target attributes, thereby maintaining the original model's output distribution and generative capacity.

What does it mean for an algorithm to be biased? In U.S. law, unintentional bias is encoded via disparate impact, which occurs when a selection process has widely different outcomes for different groups, even as it appears to be neutral. This legal determination hinges on a definition of a protected class (ethnicity, gender, religious practice) and an explicit description of the process. When the process is implemented using computers, determining disparate impact (and hence bias) is harder. It might not be possible to disclose the process. In addition, even if the process is open, it might be hard to elucidate in a legal setting how the algorithm makes its decisions. Instead of requiring access to the algorithm, we propose making inferences based on the data the algorithm uses. We make four contributions to this problem. First, we link the legal notion of disparate impact to a measure of classification accuracy that while known, has received relatively little attention. Second, we propose a test for disparate impact based on analyzing the information leakage of the protected class from the other data attributes. Third, we describe methods by which data might be made unbiased. Finally, we present empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of our test for disparate impact and our approach for both masking bias and preserving relevant information in the data. Interestingly, our approach resembles some actual selection practices that have recently received legal scrutiny.

We consider the task of evaluating policies of algorithmic resource allocation through randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Such policies are tasked with optimizing the utilization of limited intervention resources, with the goal of maximizing the benefits derived. Evaluation of such allocation policies through RCTs proves difficult, notwithstanding the scale of the trial, because the individuals' outcomes are inextricably interlinked through resource constraints controlling the policy decisions. Our key contribution is to present a new estimator leveraging our proposed novel concept, that involves retrospective reshuffling of participants across experimental arms at the end of an RCT. We identify conditions under which such reassignments are permissible and can be leveraged to construct counterfactual trials, whose outcomes can be accurately ascertained, for free. We prove theoretically that such an estimator is more accurate than common estimators based on sample means -- we show that it returns an unbiased estimate and simultaneously reduces variance. We demonstrate the value of our approach through empirical experiments on synthetic, semi-synthetic as well as real case study data and show improved estimation accuracy across the board.

Current AI agent frameworks have made remarkable progress in automating individual tasks, yet all existing systems serve a single user. Human productivity rests on the social and organizational relationships through which people coordinate, negotiate, and delegate. When agents move beyond performing tasks for one person to representing that person in collaboration with others, the infrastructure for cross-user agent collaboration is entirely absent, let alone the governance mechanisms needed to secure it. We argue that the next frontier for AI agents lies not in stronger individual capability, but in the digitization of human collaborative relationships. To this end, we propose a human-symbiotic agent paradigm. Each user owns a permanently bound agent system that collaborates on the owner's behalf, forming a network whose nodes are humans rather than agents. This paradigm rests on three governance primitives. A layered identity architecture separates a Manager Agent from multiple context-specific Identity Agents; the Manager Agent holds global knowledge but is architecturally isolated from external communication. Scoped authorization enforces per-identity access control and escalates boundary violations to the owner. Action-level accountability logs every operation against its owner's identity and authorization, ensuring full auditability. We instantiate this paradigm in ClawNet, an identity-governed agent collaboration framework that enforces identity binding and authorization verification through a central orchestrator, enabling multiple users to collaborate securely through their respective agents.

User authorization-based access privileges are a key feature in many safety-critical systems, but have thus far been absent from the large language model (LLM) realm. In this work, drawing inspiration from such access control systems, we introduce sudoLLM, a novel framework that results in multi-role aligned LLMs, i.e., LLMs that account for, and behave in accordance with, user access rights. sudoLLM injects subtle user-based biases into queries and trains an LLM to utilize this bias signal in order to produce sensitive information if and only if the user is authorized. We present empirical results demonstrating that this approach shows substantially improved alignment, generalization, and resistance to prompt-based jailbreaking attacks. The persistent tension between the language modeling objective and safety alignment, which is often exploited to jailbreak LLMs, is somewhat resolved with the aid of the injected bias signal. Our framework is meant as an additional security layer, and complements existing guardrail mechanisms for enhanced end-to-end safety with LLMs.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Asynchronous reinforcement learning improves rollout throughput for large language model agents by decoupling sample generation from policy optimization, but it also introduces a critical failure mode for PPO-style off-policy correction. In heterogeneous training systems, the total importance ratio should ideally be decomposed into two semantically distinct factors: a training--inference discrepancy term that aligns inference-side and training-side distributions at the same behavior-policy version, and a policy-staleness term that constrains the update from the historical policy to the current policy. We show that practical asynchronous pipelines with delayed updates and partial rollouts often lose the required historical training-side logits, or old logits. This missing-old-logit problem entangles discrepancy repair with staleness correction, breaks the intended semantics of decoupled correction, and makes clipping and masking thresholds interact undesirably. To address this issue, we study both exact and approximate correction routes. We propose three exact old-logit acquisition strategies: snapshot-based version tracking, a dedicated old-logit model, and synchronization via partial rollout interruption, and compare their system trade-offs. From the perspective of approximate correction, we focus on preserving the benefits of decoupled correction through a more appropriate approximate policy when exact old logits cannot be recovered at low cost, without incurring extra system overhead. Following this analysis, we adopt a revised PPO-EWMA method, which achieves significant gains in both training speed and optimization performance. Code at https://github.com/millioniron/ROLL.

We present a machine-checked formalization of structurally governed AI workflow architectures and prove that effect-level governance can be imposed without reducing internal computational expressivity. Using Interaction Trees in Rocq 8.19, we define a governance operator G that mediates all effectful directives, including memory access, external calls, and oracle (LLM) queries. Our development compiles with 0 admitted lemmas and consists of 36 modules, ~12,000 lines of Rocq, and 454 theorems. We establishseven properties: (P1) governed Turing completeness, (P2) governed oracle expressivity, (P3) a decidability boundary in which governance predicates are total and closed under Boolean composition while semantic program properties remain non-trivial and undecidable by governance, (P4) goal preservation for permitted executions, (P5) expressive minimality of primitive capabilities (compute, memory, reasoning, external call, observability), (P6) subsumption asymmetry showing structural governance strictly subsumes content-level filtering, and (P7) semantic transparency: on all executions where governance permits, the governed interpretation is observationally equivalent (modulo governance-only events) to the ungoverned interpretation. Together, these results show that governance and computational expressivity are orthogonal dimensions: governance constrains the effect boundary of programs while remaining semantically transparent to internal computation.

All citizens of a country are affected by the laws and policies introduced by their government. These laws and policies serve essential functions for citizens. Such as granting them certain rights or imposing specific obligations. However, these documents are often lengthy, complex, and difficult to navigate, making it challenging for citizens to locate and understand relevant information. This work presents PolicyBot, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) system designed to answer user queries over policy documents with a focus on transparency and reproducibility. The system combines domain-specific semantic chunking, multilingual dense embeddings, multi-stage retrieval with reranking, and source-aware generation to provide responses grounded in the original documents. We implemented citation tracing to reduce hallucinations and improve user trust, and evaluated alternative retrieval and generation configurations to identify effective design choices. The end-to-end pipeline is built entirely with open-source tools, enabling easy adaptation to other domains requiring document-grounded question answering. This work highlights design considerations, practical challenges, and lessons learned in deploying trustworthy RAG systems for governance-related contexts.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Visual effects (VFX) are crucial to the expressive power of digital media, yet their creation remains a major challenge for generative AI. Prevailing methods often rely on the one-LoRA-per-effect paradigm, which is resource-intensive and fundamentally incapable of generalizing to unseen effects, thus limiting scalability and creation. To address this challenge, we introduce VFXMaster, the first unified, reference-based framework for VFX video generation. It recasts effect generation as an in-context learning task, enabling it to reproduce diverse dynamic effects from a reference video onto target content. In addition, it demonstrates remarkable generalization to unseen effect categories. Specifically, we design an in-context conditioning strategy that prompts the model with a reference example. An in-context attention mask is designed to precisely decouple and inject the essential effect attributes, allowing a single unified model to master the effect imitation without information leakage. In addition, we propose an efficient one-shot effect adaptation mechanism to boost generalization capability on tough unseen effects from a single user-provided video rapidly. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method effectively imitates various categories of effect information and exhibits outstanding generalization to out-of-domain effects. To foster future research, we will release our code, models, and a comprehensive dataset to the community.

Evaluating fairness can be challenging in practice because the sensitive attributes of data are often inaccessible due to privacy constraints. The go-to approach that the industry frequently adopts is using off-the-shelf proxy models to predict the missing sensitive attributes, e.g. Meta [Alao et al., 2021] and Twitter [Belli et al., 2022]. Despite its popularity, there are three important questions unanswered: (1) Is directly using proxies efficacious in measuring fairness? (2) If not, is it possible to accurately evaluate fairness using proxies only? (3) Given the ethical controversy over inferring user private information, is it possible to only use weak (i.e. inaccurate) proxies in order to protect privacy? Our theoretical analyses show that directly using proxy models can give a false sense of (un)fairness. Second, we develop an algorithm that is able to measure fairness (provably) accurately with only three properly identified proxies. Third, we show that our algorithm allows the use of only weak proxies (e.g. with only 68.85%accuracy on COMPAS), adding an extra layer of protection on user privacy. Experiments validate our theoretical analyses and show our algorithm can effectively measure and mitigate bias. Our results imply a set of practical guidelines for practitioners on how to use proxies properly. Code is available at github.com/UCSC-REAL/fair-eval.

We present the first systematic approach to static and dynamic taint analysis for Graph APIs focusing on broken access control. The approach comprises the following. We taint nodes in the Graph API if they represent data requiring specific privileges in order to be retrieved or manipulated, and identify API calls which are related to sources and sinks. Then, we statically analyze whether tainted information flow between API source and sink calls occurs. To this end, we model the API calls using graph transformation rules. We subsequently use critical pair analysis to automatically analyze potential dependencies between rules representing source calls and rules representing sink calls. We distinguish direct from indirect tainted information flow and argue under which conditions the CPA is able to detect not only direct, but also indirect tainted flow. The static taint analysis (i) identifies flows that need to be further reviewed, since tainted nodes may be created by an API call and used or manipulated by another API call later without having the necessary privileges, and (ii) can be used to systematically design dynamic security tests for broken access control. The dynamic taint analysis checks if potential broken access control risks detected during the static taint analysis really occur. We apply the approach to a part of the GitHub GraphQL API. The application illustrates that our analysis supports the detection of two types of broken access control systematically: the case where users of the API may not be able to access or manipulate information, although they should be able to do so; and the case where users (or attackers) of the API may be able to access/manipulate information that they should not.

This paper presents the Functional Machine Calculus (FMC) as a simple model of higher-order computation with "reader/writer" effects: higher-order mutable store, input/output, and probabilistic and non-deterministic computation. The FMC derives from the lambda-calculus by taking the standard operational perspective of a call-by-name stack machine as primary, and introducing two natural generalizations. One, "locations", introduces multiple stacks, which each may represent an effect and so enable effect operators to be encoded into the abstraction and application constructs of the calculus. The second, "sequencing", is known from kappa-calculus and concatenative programming languages, and introduces the imperative notions of "skip" and "sequence". This enables the encoding of reduction strategies, including call-by-value lambda-calculus and monadic constructs. The encoding of effects into generalized abstraction and application means that standard results from the lambda-calculus may carry over to effects. The main result is confluence, which is possible because encoded effects reduce algebraically rather than operationally. Reduction generates the familiar algebraic laws for state, and unlike in the monadic setting, reader/writer effects combine seamlessly. A system of simple types confers termination of the machine.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Precise attribute intensity control--generating Large Language Model (LLM) outputs with specific, user-defined attribute intensities--is crucial for AI systems adaptable to diverse user expectations. Current LLM alignment methods, however, typically provide only directional or open-ended guidance, failing to reliably achieve exact attribute intensities. We address this limitation with three key designs: (1) reformulating precise attribute intensity control as a target-reaching problem, rather than simple maximization; (2) training a lightweight value function via temporal-difference learning to predict final attribute intensity scores from partial generations, thereby steering LLM outputs; and (3) employing gradient-based interventions on hidden representations to navigate the model precisely towards specific attribute intensity targets. Our method enables fine-grained, continuous control over attribute intensities, moving beyond simple directional alignment. Experiments on LLaMA-3.2-3b and Phi-4-mini confirm our method's ability to steer text generation to user-specified attribute intensities with high accuracy. Finally, we demonstrate efficiency enhancements across three downstream tasks: preference data synthesis, Pareto frontier approximation and optimization, and distillation of aligned behaviors for intervention-free inference. Our code is available on https://github.com/Pre-Control/pre-control

Privacy policies are supposed to provide notice. But what if substantive information appears only where users skip it? We identify a structural pattern we call jurisdiction-siloed disclosure: information about data practices appearing in specific, actionable form only within regional compliance sections labeled "California Residents" or "EU/UK Users," while general sections use vague or qualified language for the same practices. Our audit of 123 major companies identifies 282 potential instances across 77 companies (62.6% of this purposive sample). A conservative estimate restricted to practice categories validated against OPP-115 human annotations finds 138 instances across 54 companies (44%); post-2018 categories central to our findings await independent validation. If users skip jurisdiction-labeled sections as information foraging theory predicts, users outside regulated jurisdictions would receive less specific information about practices affecting them--a transparency failure operating through document architecture rather than omission. We propose universal substantive disclosure: practices affecting all users should appear in the main policy body, with regional sections containing only procedural rights information. This standard finds support in analogous disclosure regimes (securities, truth-in-lending, nutritional labeling) where material information must reach all affected parties. Regulators could operationalize this through the FTC's "clear and conspicuous" standard and GDPR transparency principles. This work is hypothesis-generating: we establish that the structural pattern exists and ground the transparency concern in behavioral theory, but direct measurement of jurisdiction-specific section skipping remains the critical validation priority. We release our methodology and annotated dataset to enable replication.

We present Eir Thai Medical LLM, a large language model with 8 billion parameters, specifically designed to enhance the accuracy of handling medical tasks in the Thai language. This model focuses on providing clear and easy-to-understand answers for both healthcare professionals and patients, thereby improving the efficiency of diagnosis and treatment processes. Human evaluation was conducted to ensure that the model adheres to care standards and provides unbiased answers. To prioritize data security, the model is deployed within the hospital's internal network, ensuring both high security and faster processing speeds. The internal API connection is secured with encryption and strict authentication measures to prevent data leaks and unauthorized access. We evaluated several open-source large language models with 8 billion parameters on four medical benchmarks: MedQA, MedMCQA, PubMedQA, and the medical subset of MMLU. The best-performing baselines were used to develop Eir Thai Medical LLM. Our evaluation employed multiple questioning strategies, including zero-shot, few-shot, chain-of-thought reasoning, and ensemble/self-consistency voting methods. Our model outperformed commercially available Thai-language large language models by more than 10%. In addition, we developed enhanced model testing tailored for clinical use in Thai across 18 clinical tasks, where our model exceeded GPT-4o performance by more than 11%

This paper introduces a multi-stage manual annotation calibrated by the scaling law, offering a high-quality Supervised Fine-Tuning data acquisition method for environments with constrained resources like GPU poor, limited GPT access, and funding restrictions. We have preprocessed 58k authentic chat data and manually annotated 2.3k questions. After this, we conducted fine-tuning on Qwen models, ranging from 0.5B to 32B parameters. The optimal version improved 29.07 in F1 score. This confirms the viability of fine-tuning Large Language Model (LLM) for downstream Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. Our contributions are: 1) Created Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) training data in alpaca format, along with a set of Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) weights, and 2) Developed a method for acquiring high-quality data leveraging scaling law principle. The script, raw data with alpaca format and experiments track are open-sourced on Github (https://github.com/InternLM/HuixiangDou/tree/main/web/tools), HuggingFace (https://huggingface.co/tpoisonooo) and WandB (https://wandb.ai/tpoisonooo/huixiangdou-cr/table?nw=nwusertpoisonooo). The privacy of the data involved has been authorized by users. SFT data and license comes from ncnn contributors group.

Large language models increasingly operate as autonomous agents that select and invoke tools from large registries. We identify a critical gap: when unauthorized tools are visible in an agent's context, models select them in adversarial scenarios -- even when explicitly instructed otherwise. We propose a governed MCP proxy that enforces attribute-based access control (ABAC) at two points: tool discovery, where unauthorized tools are removed from the model's context window, and tool invocation, where a second check blocks any unauthorized call. Across three models (Qwen 2.5 7B, Llama 3.1 8B, Claude Haiku 3.5) and 150 adversarial tasks spanning four attack categories, our proxy reduces unauthorized invocation rate (UIR) to 0% while adding under 50ms median latency. Prompt-based restrictions reduce UIR by only 11--18 percentage points, leaving substantial residual risk. Our results show that architectural enforcement -- not prompting -- is necessary for reliable tool access control in deployed agentic systems.

Manually generating access control policies from an organization's high-level requirement specifications poses significant challenges. It requires laborious efforts to sift through multiple documents containing such specifications and translate their access requirements into access control policies. Also, the complexities and ambiguities of these specifications often result in errors by system administrators during the translation process, leading to data breaches. However, the automated policy generation frameworks designed to help administrators in this process are unreliable due to limitations, such as the lack of domain adaptation. Therefore, to improve the reliability of access control policy generation, we propose RAGent, a novel retrieval-based access control policy generation framework based on language models. RAGent identifies access requirements from high-level requirement specifications with an average state-of-the-art F1 score of 87.9%. Through retrieval augmented generation, RAGent then translates the identified access requirements into access control policies with an F1 score of 77.9%. Unlike existing frameworks, RAGent generates policies with complex components like purposes and conditions, in addition to subjects, actions, and resources. Moreover, RAGent automatically verifies the generated policies and iteratively refines them through a novel verification-refinement mechanism, further improving the reliability of the process by 3%, reaching the F1 score of 80.6%. We also introduce three annotated datasets for developing access control policy generation frameworks in the future, addressing the data scarcity of the domain.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

Despite significant strides in language models in the last few years, when used as agents, such models often try to perform actions that are not just suboptimal for a given state, but are strictly prohibited by the external environment. For example, in the recent Kaggle GameArena chess competition, 78% of Gemini-2.5-Flash losses were attributed to illegal moves. Often people manually write "harnesses" around LLMs to prevent such failures. In this paper, we demonstrate that Gemini-2.5-Flash can automatically synthesize such a code harness, using a small number of rounds of iterative code refinement given feedback from the (game) environment. The resulting harness prevents all illegal moves in 145 different TextArena games (both 1-player and 2-player), enabling the smaller Gemini-2.5-Flash model to outperform larger models, such as Gemini-2.5-Pro. Pushing our technique to the limit, we can get Gemini-2.5-Flash to generate the entire policy in code, thus eliminating the need to use the LLM at decision making time. The resulting code-policy receives a higher average reward than Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5.2-High on 16 TextArena 1-player games. Our results show that using a smaller model to synthesize a custom code harness (or entire policy) can outperform a much larger model, while also being more cost effective.

Language models exhibit remarkable natural language generation capabilities but remain prone to hallucinations, generating factually incorrect information despite producing syntactically coherent responses. This study introduces the Licensing Oracle, an architectural solution designed to stem hallucinations in LMs by enforcing truth constraints through formal validation against structured knowledge graphs. Unlike statistical approaches that rely on data scaling or fine-tuning, the Licensing Oracle embeds a deterministic validation step into the model's generative process, ensuring that only factually accurate claims are made. We evaluated the effectiveness of the Licensing Oracle through experiments comparing it with several state-of-the-art methods, including baseline language model generation, fine-tuning for factual recall, fine-tuning for abstention behavior, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). Our results demonstrate that although RAG and fine-tuning improve performance, they fail to eliminate hallucinations. In contrast, the Licensing Oracle achieved perfect abstention precision (AP = 1.0) and zero false answers (FAR-NE = 0.0), ensuring that only valid claims were generated with 89.1% accuracy in factual responses. This work shows that architectural innovations, such as the Licensing Oracle, offer a necessary and sufficient solution for hallucinations in domains with structured knowledge representations, offering guarantees that statistical methods cannot match. Although the Licensing Oracle is specifically designed to address hallucinations in fact-based domains, its framework lays the groundwork for truth-constrained generation in future AI systems, providing a new path toward reliable, epistemically grounded models.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training corpora. Our audit of 14,000 web domains provides an expansive view of crawlable web data and how consent preferences to use it are changing over time. We observe a proliferation of AI-specific clauses to limit use, acute differences in restrictions on AI developers, as well as general inconsistencies between websites' expressed intentions in their Terms of Service and their robots.txt. We diagnose these as symptoms of ineffective web protocols, not designed to cope with the widespread re-purposing of the internet for AI. Our longitudinal analyses show that in a single year (2023-2024) there has been a rapid crescendo of data restrictions from web sources, rendering ~5%+ of all tokens in C4, or 28%+ of the most actively maintained, critical sources in C4, fully restricted from use. For Terms of Service crawling restrictions, a full 45% of C4 is now restricted. If respected or enforced, these restrictions are rapidly biasing the diversity, freshness, and scaling laws for general-purpose AI systems. We hope to illustrate the emerging crisis in data consent, foreclosing much of the open web, not only for commercial AI, but non-commercial AI and academic purposes.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

LLMs see the world as a single stream of text, partitioned into roles like <user> or <tool>. We trace prompt injection to role confusion: models perceive the source of text from how it sounds, not its labeled role. A command hidden in a webpage hijacks an agent simply because it sounds like <user> text, despite its <tool> label. We design role probes to measure how LLMs internally perceive "who is speaking," and find that injected text occupies the same representational space as the trusted role it imitates. We demonstrate this with CoT Forgery, a zero-shot attack that injects fabricated reasoning into user prompts and tool outputs. Models mistake the forgery for their own thoughts, yielding 60% attack success against frontier models with near-zero baselines. Strikingly, the degree of role confusion predicts attack success before a single token is generated. This mechanism generalizes beyond CoT Forgery to standard agent prompt injections, revealing prompt injection as a measurable consequence of role perception. To the model, sounding like a role is indistinguishable from being one. Project page and writeup: https://role-confusion.github.io

On-policy distillation (OPD) offers superior capacity transfer by supervising student-sampled trajectories with dense token-level signals. To furnish high-quality supervision sources and thereby elevate the performance frontier of distillation, an intuitive direction is to infuse privileged information to either teacher or student itself. However, this additional input induces a potential failure mode we dub privilege illusion: a pattern that conflates the transferable capability gap that students are meant to close, and the information asymmetry gap that can only be mimicked but never replicated. This issue is further amplified by the inherent non-uniformity of token-level supervision, where only a small subset of tokens carries pivotal capability-bearing signals. To this end, we propose DOPD, an advantage-aware dual distillation paradigm that dynamically routes token-level supervision between privileged teacher and privileged student policies based on their advantage gap and relative probabilities. Each token receives supervision of different strength, objective, and strategy from either teacher or student itself, which transfers credible capability while simultaneously receiving auxiliary signals, to alleviate privilege illusion. Extensive experiments on both large language model (LLM) and vision-language model (VLM) settings demonstrate that DOPD consistently outperforms Vanilla OPD and other counterparts. Further results on stability, robustness, continual learning, and out-of-distribution tasks validate its superiority.

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

Mechanism-targeted synthetic data is increasingly proposed as a way to steer pretraining toward desirable capabilities, but it remains unclear how such interventions should be evaluated. We study this question for in-context learning (ICL) under matched compute (iso-FLOPs) using Bi-Induct, a lightweight data rewrite that interleaves short directional copy snippets into a natural pretraining stream: forward-copy (induction), backward-copy (anti-induction, as a directional control), or a balanced mix. Across 0.13B-1B decoder-only models, we evaluate (i) few-shot performance on standard LM benchmarks and function-style ICL probes, (ii) head-level copy telemetry, and (iii) held-out perplexity as a guardrail. Bi-Induct reliably increases induction-head activity, but this does not translate into consistent improvements in few-shot generalization: on standard LM benchmarks, Bi-Induct is largely performance-neutral relative to natural-only training, while on function-style probes the 1B natural-only model performs best. Despite explicit backward-copy cues, anti-induction scores remain near zero across scales, revealing a strong forward/backward asymmetry. Targeted ablations show a sharper distinction: removing the top 2% induction heads per layer harms ICL more than matched random ablations, with the largest relative drop occurring in the natural-only models. This indicates that natural-only training produces more centralized, load-bearing induction circuitry, whereas Bi-Induct tends to create more distributed and redundant induction activity. Our main conclusion is that eliciting a mechanism is not the same as making it load-bearing. For data-centric foundation model design, this suggests that synthetic data interventions should be evaluated not only by signature amplification, but by whether they create causally necessary computation while preserving natural-data modeling quality.

Background: Generative artificial intelligence (AI) deployment in academic medical settings raises copyright compliance concerns. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute implemented GPT4DFCI, an internal generative AI tool utilizing OpenAI models, that is approved for enterprise use in research and operations. Given (1) the exceptionally broad adoption of the tool in our organization, (2) our research mission, and (3) the shared responsibility model required to benefit from Customer Copyright Commitment in Azure OpenAI Service products, we deemed rigorous copyright compliance testing necessary. Case Description: We conducted a structured red teaming exercise in Nov. 2024, with 42 participants from academic, industry, and government institutions. Four teams attempted to extract copyrighted content from GPT4DFCI across four domains: literary works, news articles, scientific publications, and access-restricted clinical notes. Teams successfully extracted verbatim book dedications and near-exact passages through various strategies. News article extraction failed despite jailbreak attempts. Scientific article reproduction yielded only high-level summaries. Clinical note testing revealed appropriate privacy safeguards. Discussion: The successful extraction of literary content indicates potential copyrighted material presence in training data, necessitating inference-time filtering. Differential success rates across content types suggest varying protective mechanisms. The event led to implementation of a copyright-specific meta-prompt in GPT4DFCI; this mitigation has been in production since Jan. 2025. Conclusion: Systematic red teaming revealed specific vulnerabilities in generative AI copyright compliance, leading to concrete mitigation strategies. Academic medical institutions deploying generative AI should implement continuous testing protocols to ensure legal and ethical compliance.

Existing foundation models are trained on copyrighted material. Deploying these models can pose both legal and ethical risks when data creators fail to receive appropriate attribution or compensation. In the United States and several other countries, copyrighted content may be used to build foundation models without incurring liability due to the fair use doctrine. However, there is a caveat: If the model produces output that is similar to copyrighted data, particularly in scenarios that affect the market of that data, fair use may no longer apply to the output of the model. In this work, we emphasize that fair use is not guaranteed, and additional work may be necessary to keep model development and deployment squarely in the realm of fair use. First, we survey the potential risks of developing and deploying foundation models based on copyrighted content. We review relevant U.S. case law, drawing parallels to existing and potential applications for generating text, source code, and visual art. Experiments confirm that popular foundation models can generate content considerably similar to copyrighted material. Second, we discuss technical mitigations that can help foundation models stay in line with fair use. We argue that more research is needed to align mitigation strategies with the current state of the law. Lastly, we suggest that the law and technical mitigations should co-evolve. For example, coupled with other policy mechanisms, the law could more explicitly consider safe harbors when strong technical tools are used to mitigate infringement harms. This co-evolution may help strike a balance between intellectual property and innovation, which speaks to the original goal of fair use. But we emphasize that the strategies we describe here are not a panacea and more work is needed to develop policies that address the potential harms of foundation models.

Retrieval-augmented QA pipelines often route retrieved passages through an LLM rewriter before a smaller reader, lifting F1 by tens of points on multi-hop benchmarks; this gain is typically credited to improved evidence quality. We ask whether that lift is causally driven by the gold answer string appearing in the rewritten context rather than by curation per se, using a controlled intervention audit. For each rewritten context we re-run the reader after one of four controlled edits to the compile output: removing the gold answer span, replacing a length-matched random non-answer span (placebo), or injecting the gold into rewrites where it was absent (at the prefix or at a midpoint sentence boundary). Across twelve completed (cell, baseline) intervention runs spanning three reader families (Qwen2.5-7B, Qwen3.5-35B, GLM-4.7), two datasets (HotpotQA, 2WikiMultihopQA), and three compiler arrangements (MA-only, MB-only, MA+verify), removing the gold answer drops reader F1 by 28 to 64 points beyond the length-matched placebo on paired answer-in-compile strata, and prepending the gold into rewrites that lacked it raises F1 by +0.7 to +9.7 points in 10 of 12 (cell, baseline) combinations. A companion five-sentinel audit shows the conventional single-[MASK] probe is itself sentinel-fragile: on 2Wiki it reports a +4.12~F1 ``non-leakage residual'' that flips to -3.33 to -7.81~F1 under four alternative sentinels and fails an equivalence test for three of those four (1/4~pass). We do not propose a new rewriter or mitigation; we release the intervention runner and the sentinel panel so that other rewriter-gain claims can be tested against the same standard.

In domains such as biomedicine, materials, and finance, high-stakes deployment of large language models (LLMs) requires injecting private, domain-specific knowledge that is proprietary, fast-evolving, and under-represented in public pretraining. However, the two dominant paradigms for private knowledge injection each have pronounced drawbacks: fine-tuning is expensive to iterate, and continual updates risk catastrophic forgetting and general-capability regression; retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) keeps the base model intact but is brittle in specialized private corpora due to chunk-induced evidence fragmentation, retrieval drift, and long-context pressure that yields query-dependent prompt inflation. Inspired by how multimodal LLMs align heterogeneous modalities into a shared semantic space, we propose Generation-Augmented Generation (GAG), which treats private expertise as an additional expert modality and injects it via a compact, representation-level interface aligned to the frozen base model, avoiding prompt-time evidence serialization while enabling plug-and-play specialization and scalable multi-domain composition with reliable selective activation. Across two private scientific QA benchmarks (immunology adjuvant and catalytic materials) and mixed-domain evaluations, GAG improves specialist performance over strong RAG baselines by 15.34% and 14.86% on the two benchmarks, respectively, while maintaining performance on six open general benchmarks and enabling near-oracle selective activation for scalable multi-domain deployment.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Verifiable delegation in digital identity systems remains unresolved across centralized, federated, and self-sovereign identity (SSI) environments, particularly where both human users and autonomous AI agents must exercise and transfer authority without exposing primary credentials or private keys. We introduce a unified framework that enables bounded, auditable, and least-privilege delegation across heterogeneous identity ecosystems. The framework includes four key elements: Delegation Grants (DGs), first-class authorization artefacts that encode revocable transfers of authority with enforced scope reduction; a Canonical Verification Context (CVC) that normalizes verification requests into a single structured representation independent of protocols or credential formats; a layered reference architecture that separates trust anchoring, credential and proof validation, policy evaluation, and protocol mediation via a Trust Gateway; and an explicit treatment of blockchain anchoring as an optional integrity layer rather than a structural dependency. Together, these elements advance interoperable delegation and auditability and provide a foundation for future standardization, implementation, and integration of autonomous agents into trusted digital identity infrastructures.

Large language models (LLMs) now reach expert-level scores on medical licensing exams, encouraging the assumption that high scores imply safe medical judgment while patients increasingly use them for health advice. We show this assumption is fragile: when misleading context is injected into questions that LLMs originally answer correctly, they abandon the correct answer. We call the ability to maintain correct judgment under adversarial context epistemic resilience, and introduce MedMisBench to measure it. MedMisBench contains 10,932 medical question items and 48,889 misleading context-option pairs spanning medical reasoning, agentic capability, and patient-journey evaluation. Across 11 model configurations, mean accuracy falls from 71.1% on original questions to 38.0% under focused misleading context, with 51.5% attack success. The most damaging injections are formal, rule-like fabrications: authority-framed falsehoods reach 69.5% attack success and exception-poisoning claims reach 64.1%. A 14-member clinical panel from 7 countries identified serious potential harm in 38.2% of reviewed cases. MedMisBench exposes a structural blind spot in LLM evaluation in medical settings: existing benchmarks measure what models know, but not whether they preserve correct medical judgment under misleading context.

Recent work has explored how to train machine learning models which do not discriminate against any subgroup of the population as determined by sensitive attributes such as gender or race. To avoid disparate treatment, sensitive attributes should not be considered. On the other hand, in order to avoid disparate impact, sensitive attributes must be examined, e.g., in order to learn a fair model, or to check if a given model is fair. We introduce methods from secure multi-party computation which allow us to avoid both. By encrypting sensitive attributes, we show how an outcome-based fair model may be learned, checked, or have its outputs verified and held to account, without users revealing their sensitive attributes.

Recent legislation required AI platforms to provide APIs for regulators to assess their compliance with the law. Research has nevertheless shown that platforms can manipulate their API answers through fairwashing. Facing this threat for reliable auditing, this paper studies the benefits of the joint use of platform scraping and of APIs. In this setup, we elaborate on the use of scraping to detect manipulated answers: since fairwashing only manipulates API answers, exploiting scraps may reveal a manipulation. To abstract the wide range of specific API-scrap situations, we introduce a notion of proxy that captures the consistency an auditor might expect between both data sources. If the regulator has a good proxy of the consistency, then she can easily detect manipulation and even bypass the API to conduct her audit. On the other hand, without a good proxy, relying on the API is necessary, and the auditor cannot defend against fairwashing. We then simulate practical scenarios in which the auditor may mostly rely on the API to conveniently conduct the audit task, while maintaining her chances to detect a potential manipulation. To highlight the tension between the audit task and the API fairwashing detection task, we identify Pareto-optimal strategies in a practical audit scenario. We believe this research sets the stage for reliable audits in practical and manipulation-prone setups.

Modern text-to-image generative models can inadvertently reproduce copyrighted content memorized in their training data, raising serious concerns about potential copyright infringement. We introduce Guardians of Generation, a model agnostic inference time framework for dynamic copyright shielding in AI image generation. Our approach requires no retraining or modification of the generative model weights, instead integrating seamlessly with existing diffusion pipelines. It augments the generation process with an adaptive guidance mechanism comprising three components: a detection module, a prompt rewriting module, and a guidance adjustment module. The detection module monitors user prompts and intermediate generation steps to identify features indicative of copyrighted content before they manifest in the final output. If such content is detected, the prompt rewriting mechanism dynamically transforms the user's prompt by sanitizing or replacing references that could trigger copyrighted material while preserving the prompt's intended semantics. The adaptive guidance module adaptively steers the diffusion process away from flagged content by modulating the model's sampling trajectory. Together, these components form a robust shield that enables a tunable balance between preserving creative fidelity and ensuring copyright compliance. We validate our method on a variety of generative models such as Stable Diffusion, SDXL, and Flux, demonstrating substantial reductions in copyrighted content generation with negligible impact on output fidelity or alignment with user intent. This work provides a practical, plug-and-play safeguard for generative image models, enabling more responsible deployment under real-world copyright constraints. Source code is available at: https://respailab.github.io/gog

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

Watermarking has emerged as a leading technical proposal for attributing generative AI content and is increasingly cited in global governance frameworks. This paper argues that current implementations risk serving as symbolic compliance rather than delivering effective oversight. We identify a growing gap between regulatory expectations and the technical limitations of existing watermarking schemes. Through analysis of policy proposals and industry practices, we show how incentive structures disincentivize robust, auditable deployments. To realign watermarking with governance goals, we propose a three-layer framework encompassing technical standards, audit infrastructure, and enforcement mechanisms. Without enforceable requirements and independent verification, watermarking will remain inadequate for accountability and ultimately undermine broader efforts in AI safety and regulation.

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Modern language models (LMs) tend to memorize portions of their training data and emit verbatim spans. When the underlying sources are sensitive or copyright-protected, such reproduction raises issues of consent and compensation for creators and compliance risks for developers. We propose Anchored Decoding, a plug-and-play inference-time method for suppressing verbatim copying: it enables decoding from any risky LM trained on mixed-license data by keeping generation in bounded proximity to a permissively trained safe LM. Anchored Decoding adaptively allocates a user-chosen information budget over the generation trajectory and enforces per-step constraints that yield a sequence-level guarantee, enabling a tunable risk-utility trade-off. To make Anchored Decoding practically useful, we introduce a new permissively trained safe model (TinyComma 1.8B), as well as Anchored_{Byte} Decoding, a byte-level variant of our method that enables cross-vocabulary fusion via the ByteSampler framework (Hayase et al., 2025). We evaluate our methods across six model pairs on long-form evaluations of copyright risk and utility. Anchored and Anchored_{Byte} Decoding define a new Pareto frontier, preserving near-original fluency and factuality while eliminating up to 75% of the measurable copying gap (averaged over six copying metrics) between the risky baseline and a safe reference, at a modest inference overhead.

Indirect experiments provide a valuable framework for estimating treatment effects in situations where conducting randomized control trials (RCTs) is impractical or unethical. Unlike RCTs, indirect experiments estimate treatment effects by leveraging (conditional) instrumental variables, enabling estimation through encouragement and recommendation rather than strict treatment assignment. However, the sample efficiency of such estimators depends not only on the inherent variability in outcomes but also on the varying compliance levels of users with the instrumental variables and the choice of estimator being used, especially when dealing with numerous instrumental variables. While adaptive experiment design has a rich literature for direct experiments, in this paper we take the initial steps towards enhancing sample efficiency for indirect experiments by adaptively designing a data collection policy over instrumental variables. Our main contribution is a practical computational procedure that utilizes influence functions to search for an optimal data collection policy, minimizing the mean-squared error of the desired (non-linear) estimator. Through experiments conducted in various domains inspired by real-world applications, we showcase how our method can significantly improve the sample efficiency of indirect experiments.