Daily Papers

Existing code reasoning methods primarily supervise final code outputs, ignoring intermediate states, often leading to reward hacking where correct answers are obtained through inconsistent reasoning. We propose StepCodeReasoner, a framework that introduces explicit intermediate execution-state supervision. By automatically inserting structured print-based execution-trace anchors into code, the model is trained to predict runtime states at each step, transforming code reasoning into a verifiable, stepwise execution modeling problem. Building on this execution-aware method, we introduce Bi-Level GRPO, a reinforcement learning algorithm for structured credit assignment at two levels: inter-trajectory, comparing alternative execution paths, and intra-trajectory, rewarding intermediate accuracy based on its impact on downstream correctness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that StepCodeReasoner achieves SOTA performance in code reasoning. In particular, our 7B model achieves 91.1\% on CRUXEval and 86.5\% on LiveCodeBench, outperforming the CodeReasoner-7B baseline (86.0\% and 77.7\%) and GPT-4o (85.6\% and 75.1\%). Furthermore, on the execution-trace benchmark REval, our model scores 82.9\%, outperforming baseline CodeReasoner-7B (72.3\%), its 14B counterpart (81.1\%), and GPT-4o (77.3\%). Additionally, our approach also improves code generation performance, demonstrating that explicit execution modeling enhances both code reasoning and code generation.

Agent skills are procedural artifacts that enable LLM agents to execute workflows, verify constraints, and recover from failures. Existing self-evolving methods refine skills using accumulated trajectories. However, they struggle in cold-start settings, where only an initial, imperfect skill is available. Consequently, skill construction defaults to expert authoring or one-shot LLM generation. Expert-authored skills are costly and may not align with how LLM agents actually execute tasks, while one-shot generated skills can be syntactically well formed yet behaviorally weak. To bridge this gap, we propose SkillRevise, an execution-grounded framework designed to iteratively refine these initial skills. SkillRevise diagnoses skill defects from execution evidence, retrieves relevant repair principles from a general memory, and applies execution-anchored edits. By re-executing candidates and measuring empirical utility, it systematically retains the optimal skill version. Evaluated across three benchmarks and five LLMs, SkillRevise substantially outperforms one-shot baselines, improving the base agent's success rate on SkillsBench from 36.05% to 61.63%. Furthermore, the revised skills exhibit strong cross-model transferability, capturing generalized procedural knowledge over model-specific artifacts.

Repository-level code generation has attracted growing attention in recent years. Unlike function-level code generation, it requires the model to understand the entire repository, reasoning over complex dependencies across functions, classes, and modules. However, existing approaches such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) or context-based function selection often fall short: they primarily rely on surface-level similarity and struggle to capture the rich dependencies that govern repository-level semantics. In this paper, we introduce InlineCoder, a novel framework for repository-level code generation. InlineCoder enhances the understanding of repository context by inlining the unfinished function into its call graph, thereby reframing the challenging repository understanding as an easier function-level coding task. Given a function signature, InlineCoder first generates a draft completion, termed an anchor, which approximates downstream dependencies and enables perplexity-based confidence estimation. This anchor drives a bidirectional inlining process: (i) Upstream Inlining, which embeds the anchor into its callers to capture diverse usage scenarios; and (ii) Downstream Retrieval, which integrates the anchor's callees into the prompt to provide precise dependency context. The enriched context, combining draft completion with upstream and downstream perspectives, equips the LLM with a comprehensive repository view.

Large Language Models (LLMs) fine-tuned to align with human values often exhibit alignment drift, producing unsafe or policy-violating completions when exposed to adversarial prompts, decoding perturbations, or paraphrased jailbreaks. While prior work has behaviorally characterized alignment failure, little is known about the training-time belief sources underlying these failures. We introduce TraceAlign, a unified framework for tracing unsafe completions back to their root causes in the model's training corpus. Central to our approach is the Belief Conflict Index (BCI), which quantifies semantic inconsistency between generated spans and aligned policies, based on retrieved training documents using suffix-array matching. We propose three complementary interventions: (i) TraceShield, an inference-time safety filter that refuses completions with high-BCI spans, (ii) Contrastive Belief Deconfliction Loss, a contrastive fine-tuning objective penalizing high-BCI continuations during DPO, and (iii) Prov-Decode, a provenance-aware decoding strategy that vetoes beam expansions predicted to yield high-BCI spans. Together, these defenses reduce alignment drift by up to 85% on our curated Alignment Drift Benchmark (ADB) while preserving utility on standard tasks, with delta less than 0.2 and improved refusal quality. We further derive a theoretical upper bound on drift likelihood via suffix-array span statistics, linking memorization frequency and length to adversarial reactivation risk. TraceAlign thus provides the first scalable, traceable, and grounded toolkit for understanding and mitigating alignment failures at source. To encourage further exploration and development, we open-source our implementation at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/tracealign-2DA7

Production LLM coding agents drift over long sessions: they forget user-specified constraints, slip into mistakes the user already flagged, and confabulate prior agreements. White-box approaches such as persona vectors require model weights and so cannot be applied to closed APIs (Claude, GPT-4) that most users actually interact with. We present Nautilus Compass, a black-box persona drift detector and agent memory layer for production coding agents. The method operates entirely at the prompt-text layer: cosine similarity between user prompts and behavioral anchor texts, aggregated by a weighted top-k mean using BGE-m3 embeddings. Compass is, to our knowledge, the only public agent memory layer (among Mem0, Letta, Cognee, Zep, MemOS, smrti verified May 2026) that does not call an LLM at index time to extract facts or build a graph; raw conversation text is embedded directly. The system ships as a Claude Code plugin, an MCP 2024-11-05 A2A server (Cursor, Cline, Hermes), a CLI, and a REST API on one daemon, with a Merkle-chained audit log for tamper-evident anchor updates. On a held-out test set built from real Claude Code session traces and labeled by an independent LLM judge, Compass reaches ROC AUC 0.83 for drift detection. The embedded retrieval pipeline scores 56.6% on LongMemEval-S v0.8 and 44.4% on EverMemBench-Dynamic (n=500), topping the four published EverMemBench Table 4 baselines. LongMemEval-S 56.6% is ~30 points below recent white-box leaders (90+%); we treat that as the architectural ceiling of the no-extraction design. End-to-end reproduction cost is $3.50 (~14x cheaper than GPT-4o-judged stacks). A paired cross-vendor behavior A/B accompanies these numbers as preliminary system-level evidence. Code, anchors, frozen test data, and audit-log tooling are MIT-licensed at github.com/chunxiaoxx/nautilus-compass.

Code agents are advancing rapidly, but debugging them is becoming increasingly difficult. As frameworks orchestrate parallel tool calls and multi-stage workflows over complex tasks, making the agent's state transitions and error propagation hard to observe. In these runs, an early misstep can trap the agent in unproductive loops or even cascade into fundamental errors, forming hidden error chains that make it hard to tell when the agent goes off track and why. Existing agent tracing analyses either focus on simple interaction or rely on small-scale manual inspection, which limits their scalability and usefulness for real coding workflows. We present CodeTracer, a tracing architecture that parses heterogeneous run artifacts through evolving extractors, reconstructs the full state transition history as a hierarchical trace tree with persistent memory, and performs failure onset localization to pinpoint the failure origin and its downstream chain. To enable systematic evaluation, we construct CodeTraceBench from a large collection of executed trajectories generated by four widely used code agent frameworks on diverse code tasks (e.g., bug fixing, refactoring, and terminal interaction), with supervision at both the stage and step levels for failure localization. Experiments show that CodeTracer substantially outperforms direct prompting and lightweight baselines, and that replaying its diagnostic signals consistently recovers originally failed runs under matched budgets. Our code and data are publicly available.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

LLM-based code agents navigate repositories through keyword search but miss the structural relationships, such as call graphs, inheritance hierarchies, and configuration dependencies, that define how software actually works. This makes agent navigation stochastic and difficult to reproduce across runs. We investigate whether lightweight static analysis can provide deterministic anchors for these agents: stable structural facts injected as plain-text comments that constrain probabilistic exploration and make navigation more predictable. Starting from a strong baseline, Codex from OpenAI, we systematically inject varying granularities of structural annotations and measure their effects on localization, trajectory behavior, and run-to-run stability. Our study identifies what we call the deterministic anchoring effect: static structure helps less by making agents "smarter" and more by making their navigation disciplined and reproducible. Three observations support this finding: (1) Anchoring works: lightweight call/inheritance topology improves function-level localization (+2.2pp Func@5) and shortens trajectories (-1.6 interaction rounds); (2) Anchoring is scale-sensitive: the optimal granularity and directionality depend on repository characteristics, where denser semantics show diminishing returns and hub-heavy projects benefit from inverse-only links that expose "who-calls-me" without forward edges; (3) Anchoring stabilizes: tags raise link-following rate from 0.15-0.18 to 0.21-0.24, roughly halve run-to-run variance, and improve single-run reliability (Pass@1 +3.4 pp) on medium-scale repositories, at the cost of roughly 10% more input tokens. These observations suggest practical guidelines: default to lightweight topology on medium projects, prune forward edges in large repositories, and reserve dense tags for implicit-dependency cases.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes that recent work has made concrete. Regular expressions miss paraphrased attacks. Fine-tuned classifiers are vulnerable to adaptive adversaries: a 2025 NAACL Findings study reported that eight published indirect-injection defenses were bypassed with greater than fifty percent attack success rates under adaptive attacks. This work proposes seven detection techniques that each port a specific mechanism from a discipline outside large-language-model security: forensic linguistics, materials-science fatigue analysis, deception technology from network security, local-sequence alignment from bioinformatics, mechanism design from economics, spectral signal analysis from epidemiology, and taint tracking from compiler theory. Three of the seven techniques are implemented in the prompt-shield v0.4.1 release (Apache 2.0) and evaluated in a four-configuration ablation across six datasets including deepset/prompt-injections, NotInject, LLMail-Inject, AgentHarm, and AgentDojo. The local-alignment detector lifts F1 on deepset from 0.033 to 0.378 with zero additional false positives. The stylometric detector adds 11.1 percentage points of F1 on an indirect-injection benchmark. The fatigue tracker is validated via a probing-campaign integration test. All code, data, and reproduction scripts are released under Apache 2.0.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

LLMs demonstrate strong performance on code benchmarks, yet round-trip code execution reveals limitations in their ability to maintain consistent reasoning across forward and backward execution. We present RoundTripCodeEval (RTCE), a comprehensive benchmark consisting of four distinct code execution reasoning tasks designed to rigorously test round-trip consistency. RTCE provides an execution-free, exact-match evaluation of bijection fidelity, assessing whether models preserve a consistent one-to-one mapping between encoding and decoding operations across various algorithms and directions. We systematically evaluate state-of-the-art Code-LLMs using zero-shot prompting, supervised fine-tuning on execution traces, and self-reflection mechanisms. Each yields modest improvements, but none closes the gap, indicating that current LLMs struggle with true round-trip consistency, which demonstrates that they lack the internal coherence required for trustworthy code reasoning. RTCE surfaces several new and previously unmeasured insights that are not captured by existing I/O-prediction, execution-reasoning, or round-trip natural-language benchmarks. We will release the code and the dataset upon acceptance.

Symbolic execution detects vulnerabilities with precision, but applying it to large codebases requires harnesses that set up symbolic state, model dependencies, and specify assertions. Writing these harnesses has traditionally been a manual process requiring expert knowledge, which significantly limits the scalability of the technique. We present Static Analysis Informed and LLM-Orchestrated Symbolic Execution (SAILOR), which automates symbolic execution harness construction by combining static analysis with LLM-based synthesis. SAILOR operates in three phases: (1) static analysis identifies candidate vulnerable locations and generates vulnerability specifications; (2) an LLM uses vulnerability specifications and orchestrates harness synthesis by iteratively refining drivers, stubs, and assertions against compiler and symbolic execution feedback; symbolic execution then detects vulnerabilities using the generated harness, and (3) concrete replay validates the symbolic execution results against the unmodified project source. This design combines the scalability of static analysis, the code reasoning of LLMs, the path precision of symbolic execution, and the ground truth produced by concrete execution. We evaluate SAILOR on 10 open-source C/C++ projects totaling 6.8 M lines of code. SAILOR discovers 379 distinct, previously unknown memory-safety vulnerabilities (421 confirmed crashes). The strongest of five baselines we compare SAILOR to (agentic vulnerability detection using Claude Code with full codebase access and unlimited interaction), finds only 12 vulnerabilities. Each phase of SAILOR is critical: Without static analysis targeting confirmed vulnerabilities drop 12.2X; without iterative LLM synthesis zero vulnerabilities are confirmed; and without symbolic execution no approach can detect more than 12 vulnerabilities.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces. While safety guardrails are well-benchmarked for natural language responses, their efficacy remains largely unexplored within multi-step tool-use trajectories. To address this gap, we introduce TraceSafe-Bench, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to assess mid-trajectory safety. It encompasses 12 risk categories, ranging from security threats (e.g., prompt injection, privacy leaks) to operational failures (e.g., hallucinations, interface inconsistencies), featuring over 1,000 unique execution instances. Our evaluation of 13 LLM-as-a-guard models and 7 specialized guardrails yields three critical findings: 1) Structural Bottleneck: Guardrail efficacy is driven more by structural data competence (e.g., JSON parsing) than semantic safety alignment. Performance correlates strongly with structured-to-text benchmarks (ρ=0.79) but shows near-zero correlation with standard jailbreak robustness. 2) Architecture over Scale: Model architecture influences risk detection performance more significantly than model size, with general-purpose LLMs consistently outperforming specialized safety guardrails in trajectory analysis. 3) Temporal Stability: Accuracy remains resilient across extended trajectories. Increased execution steps allow models to pivot from static tool definitions to dynamic execution behaviors, actually improving risk detection performance in later stages. Our findings suggest that securing agentic workflows requires jointly optimizing for structural reasoning and safety alignment to effectively mitigate mid-trajectory risks.

In the realm of large language models (LLMs), the ability of models to accurately follow instructions is paramount as more agents and applications leverage LLMs for construction, where the complexity of instructions are rapidly increasing. However, on the one hand, there is only a certain amount of complex instruction evaluation data; on the other hand, there are no dedicated algorithms to improve the ability to follow complex instructions. To this end, this paper introduces TRACE, a benchmark for improving and evaluating the complex instructionfollowing ability, which consists of 120K training data and 1K evaluation data. Furthermore, we propose IOPO (Input-Output Preference Optimization) alignment method which takes both input and output preference pairs into consideration, where LLMs not only rapidly align with response preferences but also meticulously explore the instruction preferences. Extensive experiments on both in-domain and outof-domain datasets confirm the effectiveness of IOPO, showing 8.15%, 2.18% improvements on in-domain data and 6.29%, 3.13% on outof-domain data compared to SFT and DPO respectively.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed as executable systems that use tools, modify workspaces, and produce concrete artifacts. In such workflows, performance depends not only on the base model, but also on the harness: the system layer that manages context, tools, state, constraints, permissions, tracing, and recovery. However, existing benchmarks typically abstract away execution, compare complete agent systems, or hold the harness fixed, making execution-layer variation difficult to study. We introduce Harness-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark for evaluating configuration-level harness effects in realistic agent workflows. Harness-Bench evaluates representative harness configurations across multiple model backends under shared task environments, budgets, and evaluation protocols, while preserving each harness's native execution behavior. The benchmark contains 106 sandboxed offline tasks constructed from practical agent-use patterns and manually reviewed for realism, solvability, oracle-checkability, and integrity. Each run records final artifacts, execution traces, usage statistics, and validator outputs, enabling analysis beyond final completion. Across 5,194 execution trajectories, we observe substantial variation in completion, process quality, efficiency, and failure behavior across model-harness pairings. These results suggest that agent capability should be reported at the model-harness configuration level rather than attributed to the base model alone. Our analysis further identifies recurring execution-alignment failures, where plausible reasoning becomes decoupled from tool feedback, workspace state, evidence, or verifiable output contracts. Harness-Bench provides a reproducible foundation for diagnosing and improving reliable, efficient, and auditable agent execution stacks.

We study auto research as a closed empirical loop driven by external measurement. Each submitted trial carries a hypothesis, an executable code edit, an evaluator-owned outcome, and feedback that shapes the next proposal. The output is not a generated paper or a single model checkpoint, but an auditable trajectory of proposals, code diffs, experiments, scores, and failure labels. We instantiate this loop with specialist agents that partition recipe surfaces and share measured lineage across trials. The central empirical finding is that lineage feedback lets agents turn evaluator outcomes, including crashes, budget overruns, size failures, and accuracy-gate misses, into later program-level recipe edits rather than one-shot suggestions. Across 1,197 headline-run trials plus 600 Parameter Golf control trials after one-time setup and launch, humans did not choose proposals, edit recipes, override scores, or repair failed trials during the search. In the three headline runs, the same submitted-trial loop reduces Parameter Golf validation bpb by 0.81%, raises NanoChat-D12 CORE by 38.7%, and reduces CIFAR-10 Airbench96 wallclock by 4.59%, with each task measured by its own external evaluator and legality checks. The trace includes a strict architecture-domain audit of 157 headline-run submissions and program rewrites such as a NanoChat attention-kernel path change. Within this scope the loop autonomously writes code, submits experiments, absorbs feedback, applies and combines known techniques inside each environment, and improves public starting recipes.

Modern language models (LMs) tend to memorize portions of their training data and emit verbatim spans. When the underlying sources are sensitive or copyright-protected, such reproduction raises issues of consent and compensation for creators and compliance risks for developers. We propose Anchored Decoding, a plug-and-play inference-time method for suppressing verbatim copying: it enables decoding from any risky LM trained on mixed-license data by keeping generation in bounded proximity to a permissively trained safe LM. Anchored Decoding adaptively allocates a user-chosen information budget over the generation trajectory and enforces per-step constraints that yield a sequence-level guarantee, enabling a tunable risk-utility trade-off. To make Anchored Decoding practically useful, we introduce a new permissively trained safe model (TinyComma 1.8B), as well as Anchored_{Byte} Decoding, a byte-level variant of our method that enables cross-vocabulary fusion via the ByteSampler framework (Hayase et al., 2025). We evaluate our methods across six model pairs on long-form evaluations of copyright risk and utility. Anchored and Anchored_{Byte} Decoding define a new Pareto frontier, preserving near-original fluency and factuality while eliminating up to 75% of the measurable copying gap (averaged over six copying metrics) between the risky baseline and a safe reference, at a modest inference overhead.

Interactive LLM agents are becoming part of daily work, but they do not reliably become easier to work with over time: a correction remembered in one session may still be violated in the next. We study this gap between preference access and preference compliance. In tasks derived from anonymized real-user friction cases, Mem0 memory still leaves 57.5% of applicable preference checks violated. We introduce Test-time Rule Acquisition and Compiled Enforcement (TRACE), a drop-in skill-layer pipeline for coding-agent runtimes that mines user corrections, rewrites them as atomic rules, and compiles them into runtime checks that must pass before an agent completes future tasks. Unlike runtime checks written ahead of time by developers, TRACE skills come from the user's own chat corrections. We evaluate TRACE with simulated user-in-the-loop experiments on ClawArena coding-agent tasks and MemoryArena-derived memory-intensive tasks. On ClawArena, TRACE reduces held-out preference violation from 100.0% to 37.6% on in-distribution tasks and from 100.0% to 2.0% on out-of-distribution tasks. On MemoryArena-derived tasks, TRACE reduces in-distribution violation from 100.0% to 60.5% while matching or exceeding the strongest memory baseline on task pass. These results suggest that compiling corrections into runtime enforcement can address a repeated-friction failure mode that memory alone does not reliably solve, reducing the need for users to restate the same correction across future sessions. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/TRACE_exp, and the deployable skill is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/tellonce.

Smart contract transactions associated with security attacks often exhibit distinct behavioral patterns compared with historical benign transactions before the attacking events. While many runtime monitoring and guarding mechanisms have been proposed to validate invariants and stop anomalous transactions on the fly, the empirical effectiveness of the invariants used remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we studied 23 prevalent invariants of 8 categories, which are either deployed in high-profile protocols or endorsed by leading auditing firms and security experts. Using these well-established invariants as templates, we developed a tool Trace2Inv which dynamically generates new invariants customized for a given contract based on its historical transaction data. We evaluated Trace2Inv on 42 smart contracts that fell victim to 27 distinct exploits on the Ethereum blockchain. Our findings reveal that the most effective invariant guard alone can successfully block 18 of the 27 identified exploits with minimal gas overhead. Our analysis also shows that most of the invariants remain effective even when the experienced attackers attempt to bypass them. Additionally, we studied the possibility of combining multiple invariant guards, resulting in blocking up to 23 of the 27 benchmark exploits and achieving false positive rates as low as 0.32%. Trace2Inv outperforms current state-of-the-art works on smart contract invariant mining and transaction attack detection in terms of both practicality and accuracy. Though Trace2Inv is not primarily designed for transaction attack detection, it surprisingly found two previously unreported exploit transactions, earlier than any reported exploit transactions against the same victim contracts.

Continuous evaluation of LLM products relies on a strong LLM judge treated as ground truth: a cheap monitor scores every interaction and a team is paged when the score drifts down. But the judge is itself a model behind an API, and a silent version bump or scoring-prompt update changes how it scores -- so every drift alarm is ambiguous between a worse product and a changed judge. We resolve the ambiguity with a fixed, human-labeled anchor set that the current judge re-scores at a steady interleave, a second betting e-process on the judge-versus-human gap, and a guard-window rule returning a verdict in {none, system, judge}. We prove anytime-validity, one-way identification (only the judge can move the anchors), an attribution race whose design law is that the anchors must out-run the main process they guard, and process orthogonality. On two real judge changes, a silent version bump is detected as judge drift in 60/60 runs with zero judge-to-system misattribution, and a contaminating strict-prompt change is correctly attributed on 110 of 120 runs at guard width 300 -- while the industry-default rolling z-test false-alarms on 75% of drift-free streams. Every experiment replicates on a second domain (TL;DR summarization) with nothing re-tuned, and where the domains differ the differences are the ones the race predicts: the strict-prompt change shifts scores harder there, so the anchors fire faster and attribution becomes perfect (240/240). The monitor runs at approximately 0.64 of the cost of strong-judging every item, or 0.21 in a cheaper-but-deafer regime.

Large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak and direct prompt-injection attacks, yet the strongest defensive filters frequently over-refuse benign queries and degrade user experience. Previous work on jailbreak and prompt injection detection such as GradSafe, detects unsafe prompts with a single "accept all" anchor token, but its threshold is brittle and it offers no deterministic guarantee that harmful content will not be emitted once decoding begins. We introduce Gradient-Controlled Decoding (GCD), a training-free guardrail that combines an acceptance anchor token ("Sure") and refusal anchor token ("Sorry") tightening the decision boundary and significantly lowering false positives. In the mitigation stage, if a prompt is flagged, GCD preset-injects one or two refusal tokens ("Sorry, I can't...") before autoregressive decoding resumes, guaranteeing first-token safety regardless of sampling strategy. On ToxicChat, XSTest-v2, and AdvBench, GCD reduces false positives by 52% vs. GradSafe at comparable recall, lowers attack success rate by up to 10% vs. the strongest decoding-only baseline, adds under 15-20 ms latency on an average on V100 instances, transfers to LLaMA-2-7B, Mixtral-8x7B, and Qwen-2-7B, and requires only 20 demonstration templates.

Current coding-agent benchmarks usually pro- vide the full task specification upfront. Real research coding often does not: the intended system is progressively disclosed through in- teraction, requiring the agent to track durable design commitments across a long session. We introduce a benchmark for this setting and study faithfulne Ss Loss U nder eM ergent s Pecification (SLUMP), defined as the reduc- tion in final implementation faithfulness un- der emergent specification relative to a single- shot specification control. The benchmark con- tains 20 recent ML papers (10 ICML 2025, 10 NeurIPS 2025), 371 atomic verifiable compo- nents, and interaction scripts of approximately 60 coding requests that progressively disclose the target design without revealing the paper itself. Final repositories are scored with a five-level component-faithfulness rubric and accompanied by an exposure audit to verify that scored components are recoverable from the visible interaction. Evaluated on Claude Code and Codex, the single-shot specification control achieves higher overall implementation fidelity on 16/20 and 14/20 papers, respectively. Structural integration degrades under emergent specification on both platforms, while seman- tic faithfulness loss is substantial on Claude Code and small on Codex. As a mitigation case study, we introduce ProjectGuard, an exter- nal project-state layer for specification tracking. On Claude Code, ProjectGuard recovers 90% of the faithfulness gap, increases fully faith- ful components from 118 to 181, and reduces severe failures from 72 to 49. These results identify specification tracking as a distinct eval- uation target for long-horizon coding agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate code with subtle but critical bugs, especially for complex tasks. Existing automated repair methods typically rely on superficial pass/fail signals, offering limited visibility into program behavior and hindering precise error localization. In addition, without a way to learn from prior failures, repair processes often fall into repetitive and inefficient cycles. To overcome these challenges, we present TraceCoder, a collaborative multi-agent framework that emulates the observe-analyze-repair process of human experts. The framework first instruments the code with diagnostic probes to capture fine-grained runtime traces, enabling deep insight into its internal execution. It then conducts causal analysis on these traces to accurately identify the root cause of the failure. This process is further enhanced by a novel Historical Lesson Learning Mechanism (HLLM), which distills insights from prior failed repair attempts to inform subsequent correction strategies and prevent recurrence of similar mistakes. To ensure stable convergence, a Rollback Mechanism enforces that each repair iteration constitutes a strict improvement toward the correct solution. Comprehensive experiments across multiple benchmarks show that TraceCoder achieves up to a 34.43\% relative improvement in Pass@1 accuracy over existing advanced baselines. Ablation studies verify the significance of each system component, with the iterative repair process alone contributing a 65.61\% relative gain in accuracy. Furthermore, TraceCoder significantly outperforms leading iterative methods in terms of both accuracy and cost-efficiency.

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Establishing precise traceability between embedded systems datasheets and their corresponding code implementations remains a fundamental challenge in systems engineering, particularly for low-level software where manual mapping between specification documents and large code repositories is infeasible. Existing Traceability Link Recovery approaches primarily rely on lexical similarity and information retrieval techniques, which struggle to capture the semantic, structural, and symbol level relationships prevalent in embedded systems software. We present a hierarchical datasheet-to-code mapping methodology that employs large language models for semantic analysis while explicitly structuring the traceability process across multiple abstraction levels. Rather than performing direct specification-to-code matching, the proposed approach progressively narrows the search space through repository-level structure inference, file-level relevance estimation, and fine-grained symbollevel alignment. The method extends beyond function-centric mapping by explicitly covering macros, structs, constants, configuration parameters, and register definitions commonly found in systems-level C/C++ codebases. We evaluate the approach on multiple open-source embedded systems repositories using manually curated datasheet-to-code ground truth. Experimental results show substantial improvements over traditional information-retrieval-based baselines, achieving up to 73.3% file mapping accuracy. We significantly reduce computational overhead, lowering total LLM token consumption by 84% and end-to-end runtime by approximately 80%. This methodology supports automated analysis of large embedded software systems and enables downstream applications such as training data generation for systems-aware machine learning models, standards compliance verification, and large-scale specification coverage analysis.

Large language model (LLM) agents now execute long, tool-using tasks where final outcome checks can arrive too late for intervention. Online warning requires lightweight prefix monitors over heterogeneous traces, but hand-authored event schemas are brittle and deployment-time LLM judging is costly. We introduce PrefixGuard, a trace-to-monitor framework with an offline StepView induction step followed by supervised monitor training. StepView induces deterministic typed-step adapters from raw trace samples, and the monitor learns an event abstraction and prefix-risk scorer from terminal outcomes. Across WebArena, τ^2-Bench, SkillsBench, and TerminalBench, the strongest PrefixGuard monitors reach 0.900/0.710/0.533/0.557 AUPRC. Using the strongest backend within each representation, they improve over raw-text controls by an average of +0.137 AUPRC. LLM judges remain substantially weaker under the same prefix-warning protocol. We also derive an observability ceiling on score-based area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) that separates monitor error from failures lacking evidence in the observed prefix. For finite-state audit, post-hoc deterministic finite automaton (DFA) extraction remains compact on WebArena and τ^2-Bench (29 and 20 states) but expands to 151 and 187 states on SkillsBench and TerminalBench. Finally, first-alert diagnostics show that strong ranking does not imply deployment utility: WebArena ranks well yet fails to support low-false-alarm alerts, whereas τ^2-Bench and TerminalBench retain more actionable early alerts. Together, these results position PrefixGuard as a practical monitor-synthesis recipe with explicit diagnostics for when prefix warnings translate into actionable interventions.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Post-training via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) is crucial for enhancing reasoning in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), yet existing paradigms often reach a performance bottleneck due to the limitations of static data. While current methods leverage self-reflection or self-evolution to push these boundaries, they still suffer from cognitive drift and hallucinated reasoning paths caused by low-quality synthetic data. To address these challenges, we propose Anchor Evolution (AnE), a new paradigm that integrates truth-anchored data curation and model evolution, achieving faithful and steady performance gains at the reasoning frontier. Specifically, we propose Truth Anchor Expansion, which pinpoints the model failing frontier via trajectory rollouts and leverages ground-truth databases to retrieve high-fidelity anchors for faithful data curation. Subsequently, we introduce the Scaffold-Stripping Mechanism to internalize reasoning capabilities. This mechanism first anchors reasoning paths via scaffold-augmented supervision to mitigate the learning complexity and distribution drift of direct SFT on raw data, then leverages RL to strip the scaffold template, thereby effectively transitioning the reasoning paths into intrinsic model capabilities. Experimental results on multimodal reasoning benchmarks show that our method substantially advances the model performance frontier, improving the base model by 10.3\% across eight multimodal benchmarks and achieving state-of-the-art results. The code will be made publicly available.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

The ``LLM-as-a-judge'' paradigm has become a standard method for evaluating open-ended generation. To address the quadratic scalability costs of pairwise comparisons, popular benchmarks like Arena-Hard and AlpacaEval compare all models against a single anchor. However, despite its widespread use, the impact of anchor selection on the reliability of the results remains largely unexplored. In this work, we systematically investigate the effect of anchor selection by evaluating 22 different anchors on the Arena-Hard-v2.0 dataset. We find that the choice of anchor is critical: a poor anchor can dramatically reduce correlation with human rankings. We identify that common anchor choices (best-performing and worst-performing models) make poor anchors. Because these extreme anchors are consistently better or worse than all other models, they are seldom indicative of the relative ranking of the models. We further quantify the effect size of anchor selection, showing it is comparable to the selection of a judge model. We conclude with actionable recommendations. First, we conduct a power analysis, and compute sufficient benchmark sizes for anchor-based evaluation, finding that standard benchmark sizes are insufficient for pairwise evaluation and fail to distinguish between competitive models reliably. Second, we provide guidelines for selecting informative anchors to ensure reliable and efficient evaluation practices.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

A fundamental skill among human developers is the ability to understand and reason about program execution. As an example, a programmer can mentally simulate code execution in natural language to debug and repair code (aka. rubber duck debugging). However, large language models (LLMs) of code are typically trained on the surface textual form of programs, thus may lack a semantic understanding of how programs execute at run-time. To address this issue, we propose NExT, a method to teach LLMs to inspect the execution traces of programs (variable states of executed lines) and reason about their run-time behavior through chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales. Specifically, NExT uses self-training to bootstrap a synthetic training set of execution-aware rationales that lead to correct task solutions (e.g., fixed programs) without laborious manual annotation. Experiments on program repair tasks based on MBPP and HumanEval demonstrate that NExT improves the fix rate of a PaLM 2 model, by 26.1% and 14.3% absolute, respectively, with significantly improved rationale quality as verified by automated metrics and human raters. Our model can also generalize to scenarios where program traces are absent at test-time.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.

As LLMs are increasingly used as judges in code applications, they should be evaluated in realistic interactive settings that capture partial context and ambiguous intent. We present TRACE (Tool for Rubric Analysis in Code Evaluation), a framework that evaluates LLM judges' ability to predict human preferences and automatically extracts rubric items to reveal systematic biases in how humans and models weigh each item. Across three modalities -- chat-based programming, IDE autocompletion, and instructed code editing -- we use TRACE to measure how well LLM judges align with developer preferences. Among 13 different models, the best judges underperform human annotators by 12-23%. TRACE identifies 35 significant sources of misalignment between humans and judges across interaction modalities, the majority of which correspond to existing software engineering code quality criteria. For example, in chat-based coding, judges are biased towards longer code explanations while humans prefer shorter ones. We find significant misalignment on the majority of existing code quality dimensions, showing alignment gaps between LLM judges and human preference in realistic coding applications.

Intelligent document processing pipelines extract structured entities (tables, images, and text) from documents for use in downstream systems such as knowledge bases, retrieval-augmented generation, and analytics. A persistent limitation of existing pipelines is that extraction output is produced without any intrinsic mechanism to verify whether it faithfully represents the source. Model-internal confidence scores measure inference certainty, not correspondence to the document, and extraction errors pass silently into downstream consumers. We present Reconstruction as Validation (RaV-IDP), a document processing pipeline that introduces reconstruction as a first-class architectural component. After each entity is extracted, a dedicated reconstructor renders the extracted representation back into a form comparable to the original document region, and a comparator scores fidelity between the reconstruction and the unmodified source crop. This fidelity score is a grounded, label-free quality signal. When fidelity falls below a per-entity-type threshold, a structured GPT-4.1 vision fallback is triggered and the validation loop repeats. We enforce a bootstrap constraint: the comparator always anchors against the original document region, never against the extraction, preventing the validation from becoming circular. We further propose a per-stage evaluation framework pairing each pipeline component with an appropriate benchmark. The code pipeline is publicly available at https://github.com/pritesh-2711/RaV-IDP for experimentation and use.

Every call to an LLM classification endpoint produces a labeled input-output pair already retained in production logs. These pairs constitute a free, growing training set: a lightweight surrogate trained on them can absorb a significant portion of future traffic at near-zero marginal inference cost. The open questions are when the surrogate is reliable enough to deploy, what it handles versus defers, and how that boundary evolves as data accumulates. We introduce TRACER (Trace-based Adaptive Cost-Efficient Routing), an open-source system that trains ML surrogates on an LLM's own production traces and governs deployment through a parity gate: the surrogate is activated only when its agreement with the LLM exceeds a user-specified threshold α. To make the routing boundary transparent, TRACER generates interpretability artifacts describing which input regions the surrogate handles, where it plateaus, and why it defers. On a 77-class intent benchmark with a Sonnet 4.6 teacher, TRACER achieves 83-100% surrogate coverage depending on the quality target α; on a 150-class benchmark, the surrogate fully replaces the teacher. On a natural language inference task, the parity gate correctly refuses deployment because the embedding representation cannot support reliable separation. The system is available as open-source software.

Model merging is an efficient post-training strategy for integrating knowledge from multiple finetuned checkpoints of a shared foundation model. Existing methods operate in the parameter space, combining task vectors to mitigate conflicts, but remain constrained by parameter inconsistencies. We propose Functional Dual Anchors (FDAs), a framework that instead models the input-representation space. FDAs are synthetic inputs whose induced gradients align with task vectors, capturing task-specific functional shifts relative to the pretrained model. This perspective bridges joint multi-task training and post-hoc merging, offering both robustness and flexibility. We further introduce a principled initialization scheme and show that FDAs are complementary to parameter-space model merging. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of FDAs in model merging.

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning for code generation have made robust environments essential to prevent reward hacking. As LLMs increasingly serve as evaluators in code-based RL, their ability to detect reward hacking remains understudied. In this paper, we propose a novel taxonomy of reward exploits spanning across 54 categories and introduce TRACE (Testing Reward Anomalies in Code Environments), a synthetically curated and human-verified benchmark containing 517 testing trajectories. Unlike prior work that evaluates reward hack detection in isolated classification scenarios, we contrast these evaluations with a more realistic, contrastive anomaly detection setup on TRACE. Our experiments reveal that models capture reward hacks more effectively in contrastive settings than in isolated classification settings, with GPT-5.2 with highest reasoning mode achieving the best detection rate at 63%, up from 45% in isolated settings on TRACE. Building on this insight, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art models struggle significantly more with semantically contextualized reward hacks compared to syntactically contextualized ones. We further conduct qualitative analyses of model behaviors, as well as ablation studies showing that the ratio of benign to hacked trajectories and analysis cluster sizes substantially impact detection performance. We release the benchmark and evaluation harness to enable the community to expand TRACE and evaluate their models.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents that solve tasks by interacting with external tool environments. Although recent tool-use benchmarks increasingly cover complex task settings, they still largely assume clean, stable, and trustworthy tool environments, leaving tool-environment unreliability insufficiently examined. We introduce ToolBench-X, a benchmark for evaluating agents under recoverable reliability hazards. ToolBench-X contains executable multi-step tasks across diverse domains and sequential, parallel, and mixed workflows, each paired with deterministic tools and a canonical final answer for automatic evaluation. Starting from clean tool environments, ToolBench-X injects five structured hazard types: Specification Drift, Invocation Error, Execution Failure, Output Drift, and Cross-source Conflict. Crucially, each injected instance remains solvable through at least one valid recovery path, such as retrying, fallback, verification, or cross-checking. Experiments reveal a substantial reliability gap: agents that perform well with reliable tools often fail under recoverable hazards. Further analysis shows that failures are driven less by tool-use volume or inference budget than by limited hazard diagnosis and ineffective recovery. Targeted recovery hints recover many failed tasks, while test-time scaling yields more limited gains. These results suggest that tool-use evaluation should move beyond function-call accuracy toward task completion under unreliable tool environments. The code and data is available at https://github.com/Foreverskyou/ToolBench-X.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance across a wide array of tasks involving both structured and unstructured textual data. Recent results on various benchmarks for code generation, repair, or completion suggest that certain models have programming abilities comparable to or even surpass humans. In this work, we demonstrate that high performance on such benchmarks does not correlate to humans' innate ability to understand structural control flow in code. To this end, we extract solutions from the HumanEval benchmark, which the relevant models perform strongly on, and trace their execution path using function calls sampled from the respective test set. Using this dataset, we investigate the ability of seven state-of-the-art LLMs to match the execution trace and find that, despite their ability to generate semantically identical code, they possess limited ability to trace execution paths, especially for longer traces and specific control structures. We find that even the top-performing model, Gemini, can fully and correctly generate only 47% of HumanEval task traces. Additionally, we introduce a subset for three key structures not contained in HumanEval: Recursion, Parallel Processing, and Object-Oriented Programming, including concepts like Inheritance and Polymorphism. Besides OOP, we show that none of the investigated models achieve an accuracy over 5% on the relevant traces. Aggregating these specialized parts with HumanEval tasks, we present Benchmark CoCoNUT: Code Control Flow for Navigation Understanding and Testing, which measures a model's ability to trace execution of code upon relevant calls, including advanced structural components. We conclude that current LLMs need significant improvement to enhance code reasoning abilities. We hope our dataset helps researchers bridge this gap.

Universal Multimodal Retrieval requires unified embedding models capable of interpreting diverse user intents, ranging from simple keywords to complex compositional instructions. While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) possess strong reasoning capabilities, prevailing adaptations confine them to static encoders, underutilizing their generative potential. This encoder-only paradigm struggles with complex intents that demand logical deduction rather than superficial pattern matching. To address this, we introduce TRACE (Task-adaptive Reasoning And Compressing Embeddings). TRACE unifies generative reasoning with discriminative representation learning. It first generates a structured Chain-of-Thought (CoT) to explicitly reason about the query, and subsequently compresses this reasoning trace into a compact embedding via a dedicated token. To train this framework, we construct M-BEIR-CoT, a large-scale dataset featuring a difficulty-aware routing strategy. Experiments on the M-BEIR benchmark establish TRACE as the new state-of-the-art. Crucially, TRACE demonstrates a learned implicit routing behavior. It autonomously activates reasoning for complex queries while bypassing it for simpler ones, achieving an optimal balance between retrieval accuracy and inference throughput. Furthermore, by internalizing the deductive process, TRACE exhibits remarkable zero-shot transferability to unseen domains and novel constraints.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems often fail on multi-hop queries when the initial retrieval misses a bridge fact. Prior corrective approaches, such as Self-RAG, CRAG, and Adaptive-k, typically address this by adding more context or pruning existing lists. However, simply expanding the context window often leads to context dilution, where distractors crowd out relevant information. We propose SEAL-RAG, a training-free controller that adopts a ``replace, don't expand'' strategy to fight context dilution under a fixed retrieval depth k. SEAL executes a (Search rightarrow Extract rightarrow Assess rightarrow Loop) cycle: it performs on-the-fly, entity-anchored extraction to build a live gap specification (missing entities/relations), triggers targeted micro-queries, and uses entity-first ranking to actively swap out distractors for gap-closing evidence. We evaluate SEAL-RAG against faithful re-implementations of Basic RAG, CRAG, Self-RAG, and Adaptive-k in a shared environment on HotpotQA and 2WikiMultiHopQA. On HotpotQA (k=3), SEAL improves answer correctness by +3--13 pp and evidence precision by +12--18 pp over Self-RAG. On 2WikiMultiHopQA (k=5), it outperforms Adaptive-k by +8.0 pp in accuracy and maintains 96\% evidence precision compared to 22\% for CRAG. These gains are statistically significant (p<0.001). By enforcing fixed-k replacement, SEAL yields a predictable cost profile while ensuring the top-k slots are optimized for precision rather than mere breadth. We release our code and data at https://github.com/mosherino/SEAL-RAG.

We present egglog, a fixpoint reasoning system that unifies Datalog and equality saturation (EqSat). Like Datalog, it supports efficient incremental execution, cooperating analyses, and lattice-based reasoning. Like EqSat, it supports term rewriting, efficient congruence closure, and extraction of optimized terms. We identify two recent applications--a unification-based pointer analysis in Datalog and an EqSat-based floating-point term rewriter--that have been hampered by features missing from Datalog but found in EqSat or vice-versa. We evaluate egglog by reimplementing those projects in egglog. The resulting systems in egglog are faster, simpler, and fix bugs found in the original systems.

Current LLM safety research predominantly focuses on mitigating Goal Hijacking, preventing attackers from redirecting a model's high-level objective (e.g., from "summarizing emails" to "phishing users"). In this paper, we argue that this perspective is incomplete and highlight a critical vulnerability in Reasoning Alignment. We propose a new adversarial paradigm: Reasoning Hijacking and instantiate it with Criteria Attack, which subverts model judgments by injecting spurious decision criteria without altering the high-level task goal. Unlike Goal Hijacking, which attempts to override the system prompt, Reasoning Hijacking accepts the high-level goal but manipulates the model's decision-making logic by injecting spurious reasoning shortcut. Though extensive experiments on three different tasks (toxic comment, negative review, and spam detection), we demonstrate that even newest models are prone to prioritize injected heuristic shortcuts over rigorous semantic analysis. The results are consistent over different backbones. Crucially, because the model's "intent" remains aligned with the user's instructions, these attacks can bypass defenses designed to detect goal deviation (e.g., SecAlign, StruQ), exposing a fundamental blind spot in the current safety landscape. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Yuan-Hou/criteria_attack

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in solving various programming tasks, such as code generation. However, their potential for code optimization, particularly in performance enhancement, remains largely unexplored. This paper investigates the capabilities of LLMs in optimizing code for minimal execution time, addressing a critical gap in current research. The recently proposed code optimization methods construct program optimization pairs based on iterative submissions from the same programmer for the same problem. However, this approach confines LLMs to local performance improvements, neglecting global algorithmic innovation. To overcome this limitation, we adopt a completely different perspective by reconstructing the optimization pairs into a problem-oriented approach. This allows for the integration of various ideas from multiple programmers tackling the same problem. Furthermore, we observe that code optimization presents greater challenges compared to code generation, often accompanied by "optimization tax". Recognizing the inherent trade-offs in correctness and efficiency, we introduce a novel anchor verification framework to mitigate this "optimization tax". Ultimately, the problem oriented perspective combined with the anchor verification framework significantly enhances both the correct optimization ratio and speedup to new levels.

Pre-training on raw code teaches syntax but provides sparse signal for diverse real-world task formats. While synthetic data has proven transformative for language models, code remains largely unexplored beyond limited quality improvements. We present CodeAlchemy, a synthetic data generation framework that transforms publicly sourced code into semantically-rich training data through 5 strategies: CodeEnhance (quality-aware rewriting), CodeQA (template-based problems), CodeDev (developer tasks), CodeDialogue (multi-turn conversations), and CodeTrace (execution traces). We process 3 corpora across 15 languages to generate 500B+ tokens of synthetic data plus 350B reasoning tokens, orders of magnitude more than prior efforts. CodeTrace instruments and executes 1.3M+ files across 14 languages and 5K libraries, capturing control flow, state tracking, and library knowledge. We introduce DevEval (developer tasks) and TraceEval (execution prediction) benchmarks; frontier models like Claude Sonnet 4.5 achieve only 5.6% exact match on TraceEval, revealing critical gaps in semantic understanding. Our 3B models achieve 83.5% on HumanEval, 63.2% on MBPP, 8.09% win rate on DevEval, and 15.36 ROUGE-2 on TraceEval, outperforming frontier models 10x the size including 27B Gemma-3 and 32B Granite-4.0.

Compact language models (LMs) reduce cost, latency, and deployment risk for tool agents. Yet MCP-style tool use requires more than isolated function calling: an agent must discover tools from live catalogs, satisfy schemas, preserve dependencies across intermediate outputs, and ground final responses in executed evidence. Small planners often generate plausible workflow graphs that fail under tool resolution, parameter validation, dependency tracking, or execution. We argue that this failure mode is poorly handled by small-corpus distillation. A few hundred teacher traces can teach workflow format, but rarely cover the recovery behavior needed to repair failed plans over changing tool catalogs. We introduce Evoflux, an inference-time evolutionary search method that treats compact tool use as the repair of executable tool workflows. It evolves typed workflow graphs through structured edits, execution feedback, adaptive intensity, meta-guided redesign, and diversity pruning. On held-out MCP-Bench tasks spanning live MCP servers and 250 tools, Evoflux raises execution feasibility from roughly 3% to 17-24% across small planners. In contrast, SFT and SFT+DPO on the same search-mined data match, underperform, or collapse below zero-shot performance; ReAct reaches higher peaks, but with higher variance and token cost. These results show that execution-grounded search is more reliable under scarce teacher-trace budgets.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Evaluating open-ended outputs from large language models (LLMs) remains challenging due to the absence of ground truth. Existing metrics rely on final-answer accuracy or surface-level statistics, leaving the reasoning process itself unexamined. We introduce TRACE (Toulmin-based Reasoning Assessment through Constructive Elements), a metric that analyzes Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning processes. Rather than judging outcomes, TRACE inspects how arguments are constructed by integrating Toulmin's argumentation theory with Flavell's metacognitive framework to assess reasoning structure. Experiments on 26.3K QA samples across 7 reasoning models show strong correlation with benchmark accuracy (r=0.74). Furthermore, TRACE is effective as a reinforcement learning reward signal, outperforming accuracy-only baselines. Together, these results indicate that logically sound reasoning leads to higher-quality answers. TRACE thus serves as a complementary metric for evaluating open-ended outputs. Code is available at https://github.com/hyyangkisti/trace.

Autoregressive decoding remains a primary bottleneck in large language model (LLM) serving, motivating speculative decoding methods that reduce expensive teacher-model invocations by verifying multiple candidate tokens per step. Tree-structured speculation further increases parallelism, but is often brittle when ported across heterogeneous backends and accelerator stacks, where attention masking, KV-cache layouts, and indexing semantics are not interchangeable. We present EAGLE-Pangu, a reproducible system that ports EAGLE-3-style tree speculative decoding to a Pangu teacher backend on Ascend NPUs. EAGLE-Pangu contributes (i) an explicit branch/commit cache manager built on the Cache API, (ii) accelerator-safe tree tensorization that removes undefined negative indices by construction and validates structural invariants, and (iii) a fused-kernel-compatible teacher verification path with a debuggable eager fallback. On 240 turns from MT-Bench and HumanEval-style prompts, EAGLE-Pangu improves end-to-end decoding throughput by 1.27x on average, up to 2.46x at p99, over teacher-only greedy decoding in the fused-kernel performance path. We also provide a fused-kernel-free reference path with structured traces and invariant checks to support reproducible debugging and ablation across execution modes and tree budgets.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

Software requirements traceability is a critical component of the software engineering process, enabling activities such as requirements validation, compliance verification, and safety assurance. However, the cost and effort of manually creating a complete set of trace links across natural language artifacts such as requirements, design, and test-cases can be prohibitively expensive. Researchers have therefore proposed automated link-generation solutions primarily based on information-retrieval (IR) techniques; however, these solutions have failed to deliver the accuracy needed for full adoption in industrial projects. Improvements can be achieved using deep-learning traceability models; however, their efficacy is impeded by the limited size and availability of project-level artifacts and links to serve as training data. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing and evaluating several deep-learning approaches for text-to-text traceability. Our method, named NLTrace, explores three transfer learning strategies that use datasets mined from open world platforms. Through pretraining Language Models (LMs) and leveraging adjacent tracing tasks, we demonstrate that NLTrace can significantly improve the performance of LM based trace models when training links are available. In such scenarios NLTrace outperforms the best performing classical IR method with an 188% improvement in F2 score and 94.01% in Mean Average Precision (MAP). It also outperforms the general LM based trace model by 7% and 23% for F2 and MAP respectively. In addition, NLTrace can adapt to low-resource tracing scenarios where other LM models can not. The knowledge learned from adjacent tasks enables NLTrace to outperform VSM models by 28% F2 on generation challenges when presented with a small number of training examples.

Mechanistic interpretability seeks to understand the internal mechanisms of machine learning models, where localization -- identifying the important model components -- is a key step. Activation patching, also known as causal tracing or interchange intervention, is a standard technique for this task (Vig et al., 2020), but the literature contains many variants with little consensus on the choice of hyperparameters or methodology. In this work, we systematically examine the impact of methodological details in activation patching, including evaluation metrics and corruption methods. In several settings of localization and circuit discovery in language models, we find that varying these hyperparameters could lead to disparate interpretability results. Backed by empirical observations, we give conceptual arguments for why certain metrics or methods may be preferred. Finally, we provide recommendations for the best practices of activation patching going forwards.

Tool-augmented LLMs are increasingly deployed as agents that interleave natural-language reasoning with executable Python actions, as in CodeAct-style frameworks. In deployment, these agents rely on runtime state that persists across steps. By contrast, common training pipelines treat agent traces as token sequences, with execution semantics left implicit. This raises a data-centric question: Is state persistence merely an inference-time scaffold, or can models learn to exploit it when training data exposes the corresponding execution semantics? We isolate state persistence as a training-time variable. We introduce Opaque Knapsack, a procedurally generated family of partially observable optimization tasks designed to prevent one-shot solutions. Item attributes and constraints are hidden behind budgeted tool calls, forcing multi-turn control flow and iterative state revision. Holding task instances, prompts, tools, model, and supervision fixed, we generate paired trajectories differing only in whether interpreter state persists across steps or resets after each action. We then fine-tune identical base models (Qwen3-8B) on each trace variant and evaluate all four train-runtime combinations. Our 2x2 cross-evaluation shows that execution semantics primarily affect how agents reach solutions, not whether they do: solution quality is statistically indistinguishable across conditions, but token cost and stability differ substantially. A persistent-trained model in a stateless runtime triggers missing-variable errors in roughly 80% of episodes; a stateless-trained model in a persistent runtime redundantly re-derives retained state, using roughly 3.5x more tokens. Interpreter persistence should be treated as a first-class semantic of agent traces. Aligning fine-tuning data with deployment runtimes improves efficiency and reduces brittle train-runtime mismatches.

Agent evaluation requires assessing complex multi-step behaviors involving tool use and intermediate reasoning, making it costly and expertise-intensive. A natural question arises: can frontier coding assistants reliably automate this evaluation process? Our study shows that simply prompting coding assistants is insufficient for this task. Without domain-specific evaluation knowledge, frontier coding assistants achieve only a 30% execution success rate and produce over-engineered evaluations averaging 12+ metrics per agent, indicating that strong coding ability does not automatically translate to reliable agent evaluation. We introduce EvalAgent, an AI assistant that automates the end-to-end agent evaluation pipeline. EvalAgent encodes evaluation domain expertise as evaluation skills (procedural instructions, reusable code and templates, and dynamically retrieved API documentation) that compose into a trace-based pipeline producing complete evaluation artifacts including metrics, executable code, and reports. To systematically assess generated evaluations, we introduce a meta-evaluation framework alongside AgentEvalBench, a benchmark comprising 20 agents, each paired with evaluation requirements and test scenarios. We further propose the Eval@1 metric to measure whether generated evaluation code both executes and yields meaningful results on the first run. Our experiments show that EvalAgent produces focused evaluations, improving Eval@1 from 17.5% to 65%, and achieving 79.5% human expert preference over baseline approaches. Further ablation studies show that evaluation skills are critical for handling complex evaluation: removing them causes Eval@1 to drop significantly from 65% to 30%.

We study a class of optimization problems motivated by automating the design and update of AI systems like coding assistants, robots, and copilots. We propose an end-to-end optimization framework, Trace, which treats the computational workflow of an AI system as a graph akin to neural networks, based on a generalization of back-propagation. Optimization of computational workflows often involves rich feedback (e.g. console output or user's responses), heterogeneous parameters (e.g. prompts, hyper-parameters, codes), and intricate objectives (beyond maximizing a score). Moreover, its computation graph can change dynamically with the inputs and parameters. We frame a new mathematical setup of iterative optimization, Optimization with Trace Oracle (OPTO), to capture and abstract these properties so as to design optimizers that work across many domains. In OPTO, an optimizer receives an execution trace along with feedback on the computed output and updates parameters iteratively. Trace is the tool to implement OPTO in practice. Trace has a Python interface that efficiently converts a computational workflow into an OPTO instance using a PyTorch-like interface. Using Trace, we develop a general-purpose LLM-based optimizer called OptoPrime that can effectively solve OPTO problems. In empirical studies, we find that OptoPrime is capable of first-order numerical optimization, prompt optimization, hyper-parameter tuning, robot controller design, code debugging, etc., and is often competitive with specialized optimizers for each domain. We believe that Trace, OptoPrime and the OPTO framework will enable the next generation of interactive agents that automatically adapt using various kinds of feedback. Website: https://microsoft.github.io/Trace

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

As contemporary microservice systems become increasingly popular and complex-often comprising hundreds or even thousands of fine-grained, interdependent subsystems-they are facing more frequent failures. Ensuring system reliability thus demands accurate root cause localization. While traces and metrics have proven to be effective data sources for this task, existing methods either heavily rely on pre-defined schemas, which struggle to adapt to evolving operational contexts, or lack interpretability in their reasoning process, thereby leaving Site Reliability Engineers (SREs) confused. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on how SREs localize the root cause of failures, drawing insights from multiple professional SREs across different organizations. Our investigation reveals that human root cause analysis exhibits three key characteristics: recursiveness, multi-dimensional expansion, and cross-modal reasoning. Motivated by these findings, we introduce RCLAgent, an adaptive root cause localization method for microservice systems that leverages a multi-agent recursion-of-thought framework. RCLAgent employs a novel recursion-of-thought strategy to guide the LLM's reasoning process, effectively integrating data from multiple agents and tool-assisted analysis to accurately pinpoint the root cause. Experimental evaluations on various public datasets demonstrate that RCLAgent achieves superior performance by localizing the root cause using only a single request-outperforming state-of-the-art methods that depend on aggregating multiple requests. These results underscore the effectiveness of RCLAgent in enhancing the efficiency and precision of root cause localization in complex microservice environments.

Following natural instructions is crucial for the effective application of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. Despite recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs), research on assessing and improving instruction-following (IF) alignment within the RAG domain remains limited. To address this issue, we propose VIF-RAG, the first automated, scalable, and verifiable synthetic pipeline for instruction-following alignment in RAG systems. We start by manually crafting a minimal set of atomic instructions (<100) and developing combination rules to synthesize and verify complex instructions for a seed set. We then use supervised models for instruction rewriting while simultaneously generating code to automate the verification of instruction quality via a Python executor. Finally, we integrate these instructions with extensive RAG and general data samples, scaling up to a high-quality VIF-RAG-QA dataset (>100k) through automated processes. To further bridge the gap in instruction-following auto-evaluation for RAG systems, we introduce FollowRAG Benchmark, which includes approximately 3K test samples, covering 22 categories of general instruction constraints and four knowledge-intensive QA datasets. Due to its robust pipeline design, FollowRAG can seamlessly integrate with different RAG benchmarks. Using FollowRAG and eight widely-used IF and foundational abilities benchmarks for LLMs, we demonstrate that VIF-RAG markedly enhances LLM performance across a broad range of general instruction constraints while effectively leveraging its capabilities in RAG scenarios. Further analysis offers practical insights for achieving IF alignment in RAG systems. Our code and datasets are released at https://FollowRAG.github.io.

Large Language Model(LLM)-based agents have shown strong capabilities in web information seeking, with reinforcement learning (RL) becoming a key optimization paradigm. However, planning remains a bottleneck, as existing methods struggle with long-horizon strategies. Our analysis reveals a critical phenomenon, plan anchor, where the first reasoning step disproportionately impacts downstream behavior in long-horizon web reasoning tasks. Current RL algorithms, fail to account for this by uniformly distributing rewards across the trajectory. To address this, we propose Anchor-GRPO, a two-stage RL framework that decouples planning and execution. In Stage 1, the agent optimizes its first-step planning using fine-grained rubrics derived from self-play experiences and human calibration. In Stage 2, execution is aligned with the initial plan through sparse rewards, ensuring stable and efficient tool usage. We evaluate Anchor-GRPO on four benchmarks: BrowseComp, BrowseComp-Zh, GAIA, and XBench-DeepSearch. Across models from 3B to 30B, Anchor-GRPO outperforms baseline GRPO and First-step GRPO, improving task success and tool efficiency. Notably, WebAnchor-30B achieves 46.0% pass@1 on BrowseComp and 76.4% on GAIA. Anchor-GRPO also demonstrates strong scalability, getting higher accuracy as model size and context length increase.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

Large language models (LLMs) can translate natural language into optimization code, but silent failures pose a critical risk: code that executes and returns solver-feasible solutions may encode semantically incorrect formulations, creating a feasibility-correctness gap of up to 90 percentage points on compositional problems. We introduce ReLoop, addressing silent failures from two complementary directions. Structured generation decomposes code production into a four-stage reasoning chain (understand, formalize, synthesize, verify) that mirrors expert modeling practice, with explicit variable-type reasoning and self-verification to prevent formulation errors at their source. Behavioral verification detects errors that survive generation by testing whether the formulation responds correctly to solver-based parameter perturbation, without requiring ground truth -- an external semantic signal that bypasses the self-consistency problem inherent in LLM-based code review. The two mechanisms are complementary: structured generation dominates on complex compositional problems, while behavioral verification becomes the largest single contributor on problems with localized formulation defects. Together with execution recovery via IIS-enhanced diagnostics, ReLoop raises correctness from 22.6% to 31.1% and execution from 72.1% to 100.0% on the strongest model, with consistent gains across five models spanning three paradigms (foundation, SFT, RL) and three benchmarks. We additionally release RetailOpt-190, 190 compositional retail optimization scenarios targeting the multi-constraint interactions where LLMs most frequently fail.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has turned blockchains into financial infrastructure, allowing anyone to trade, lend, and build protocols without intermediaries, but this openness exposes pools of value controlled by code. Within five years, the DeFi ecosystem has lost over 15.75B USD to reported exploits. Many exploits arise from permissionless opportunities that any participant can trigger using only public state and standard interfaces, which we call Anyone-Can-Take (ACT) opportunities. Despite on-chain transparency, postmortem analysis remains slow and manual: investigations start from limited evidence, sometimes only a single transaction hash, and must reconstruct the exploit lifecycle by recovering related transactions, contract code, and state dependencies. We present TxRay, a Large Language Model (LLM) agentic postmortem system that uses tool calls to reconstruct live ACT attacks from limited evidence. Starting from one or more seed transactions, TxRay recovers the exploit lifecycle, derives an evidence-backed root cause, and generates a runnable, self-contained Proof of Concept (PoC) that deterministically reproduces the incident. TxRay self-checks postmortems by encoding incident-specific semantic oracles as executable assertions. To evaluate PoC correctness and quality, we develop PoCEvaluator, an independent agentic execution-and-review evaluator. On 114 incidents from DeFiHackLabs, TxRay produces an expert-aligned root cause and an executable PoC for 105 incidents, achieving 92.11% end-to-end reproduction. Under PoCEvaluator, 98.1% of TxRay PoCs avoid hard-coding attacker addresses, a +22.9pp lift over DeFiHackLabs. In a live deployment, TxRay delivers validated root causes in 40 minutes and PoCs in 59 minutes at median latency. TxRay's oracle-validated PoCs enable attack imitation, improving coverage by 15.6% and 65.5% over STING and APE.

Code LLMs still struggle with code execution reasoning, especially in smaller models. Existing methods rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with teacher-generated explanations, primarily in two forms: (1) input-output (I/O) prediction chains and (2) natural-language descriptions of execution traces. However, intermediate execution steps cannot be explicitly verified during SFT, so the training objective can reduce to merely matching teacher explanations. Moreover, training data is typically collected without explicit control over task difficulty. We introduce ExecVerify, which goes beyond text imitation by incorporating verifiable white-box rewards derived from execution traces, including next-statement prediction and variable value/type prediction. Our work first builds a dataset with multiple difficulty levels via constraint-based program synthesis. Then, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to reward correct answers about both intermediate execution steps and final outputs, aligning the training objective with semantic correctness at each execution step. Finally, we adopt a two-stage training pipeline that first enhances execution reasoning and then transfers to code generation. Experiments demonstrate that a 7B model trained with ExecVerify achieves performance comparable to 32B models on code reasoning benchmarks and improves pass@1 by up to 5.9\% on code generation tasks over strong post-training baselines.

Industrial-scale user representation learning requires balancing robust universality with acute task-sensitivity. However, existing paradigms primarily yield static, task-agnostic embeddings that struggle to reconcile the divergent requirements of downstream scenarios within unified vector spaces. Furthermore, heterogeneous multi-source data introduces inherent noise and modality conflicts, degrading representation. We propose Query-as-Anchor, a framework shifting user modeling from static encoding to dynamic, query-aware synthesis. To empower Large Language Models (LLMs) with deep user understanding, we first construct UserU, an industrial-scale pre-training dataset that aligns multi-modal behavioral sequences with user understanding semantics, and our Q-Anchor Embedding architecture integrates hierarchical coarse-to-fine encoders into dual-tower LLMs via joint contrastive-autoregressive optimization for query-aware user representation. To bridge the gap between general pre-training and specialized business logic, we further introduce Cluster-based Soft Prompt Tuning to enforce discriminative latent structures, effectively aligning model attention with scenario-specific modalities. For deployment, anchoring queries at sequence termini enables KV-cache-accelerated inference with negligible incremental latency. Evaluations on 10 Alipay industrial benchmarks show consistent SOTA performance, strong scalability, and efficient deployment. Large-scale online A/B testing in Alipay's production system across two real-world scenarios further validates its practical effectiveness. Our code is prepared for public release and will be available at: https://github.com/JhCircle/Q-Anchor.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Large language models (LLMs) are leading significant progress in code generation. Beyond one-pass code generation, recent works further integrate unit tests and program verifiers into LLMs to iteratively refine the generated programs. However, these works consider the generated programs as an indivisible entity, which falls short for LLMs in debugging the programs, especially when the programs contain complex logic flows and data operations. In contrast, when human developers debug programs, they typically set breakpoints and selectively examine runtime execution information. The execution flow and the intermediate variables play a crucial role in the debugging process, yet they are underutilized in the existing literature on code generation. In this study, we introduce Large Language Model Debugger (LDB), a novel debugging framework that enables LLMs to refine their generated programs with the runtime execution information. Specifically, LDB segments the programs into basic blocks and tracks the values of intermediate variables after each block throughout the runtime execution. This allows LLMs to concentrate on simpler code units within the overall execution flow, verify their correctness against the task description block by block, and efficiently pinpoint any potential errors. Experiments demonstrate that LDB consistently enhances the baseline performance by up to 9.8% across the HumanEval, MBPP, and TransCoder benchmarks, archiving new state-of-the-art performance in code debugging for various LLM selections.

Large language model (LLM) agents augmented with external tools often struggle as number of tools grow large and become domain-specific. In such settings, ambiguous tool descriptions and under-specified agent instructions frequently lead to tool mis-selection and incorrect slot/value instantiation. We hypothesize that this is due to two root causes: generic, one-size-fits-all prompts that ignore tool-specific nuances, and underspecified tool schemas that lack clear guidance on when and how to use each tool and how to format its parameters. We introduce Joint Tool-Prompt Reflective Optimization (JTPRO), a framework for improving tool-calling reliability in trace-supervised settings by iteratively using rollout-driven reflection to co-optimize global instructions and per-tool schema/argument descriptions for accurate tool selection and argument instantiation in large tool inventories. JTPRO is designed to preserve only tool-local cues needed for correct disambiguation and slot filling. We evaluate JTPRO across multi-tool benchmarks, which account for different number of tools using three metrics: Tool Selection Accuracy (TSA), Slot Filling Accuracy(SFA), and Overall Success Rate(OSR) (correct tool + correct slots + correct values). JTPRO consistently outperforms strong baselines, including CoT-style agents, and reflective prompt optimizers such as GEPA by 5%-20% (relative) on OSR. Ablations show that joint optimization of instructions and tool schemas is more effective and robust than optimizing either component in isolation.

Skill-distillation pipelines learn reusable rules from LLM agent trajectories, but they lack a key signal: how much each step costs. Without per-step cost, a pipeline cannot distinguish adding a missing step to fix a bug from removing an expensive step that never affected the outcome. We introduce ClawTrace, an agent tracing platform that records every LLM call, tool use, and sub-agent spawn during an agent session and compiles each session into a TraceCard: a compact YAML summary with per-step USD cost, token counts, and redundancy flags. Built on ClawTrace, CostCraft is a distillation pipeline that reads TraceCards and produces three types of skill patches. Preserve patches keep behaviors that led to success. Prune patches remove expensive steps that did not matter, each backed by a counterfactual argument against a named high-cost step. Repair patches fix failures grounded in oracle evidence. Ablations on 30 held-out SpreadsheetBench tasks show that both cost attribution and prune patches independently reduce quality regressions. When the same skill is applied to 30 unrelated SkillsBench tasks, an unexpected asymmetry emerges: prune rules transferred across benchmarks and cut median cost by 32%, while preserve rules, trained on benchmark-specific conventions, caused regressions on new task types. We release ClawTrace and TraceCards as open infrastructure for cost-aware agent research.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involves mediating internal representations to refuse harmful requests. Recent research has demonstrated that these safety mechanisms can be bypassed by ablating or removing specific representational directions within the model. In this paper, we propose the opposite approach: Rank-One Safety Injection (ROSI), a white-box method that amplifies a model's safety alignment by permanently steering its activations toward the refusal-mediating subspace. ROSI operates as a simple, fine-tuning-free rank-one weight modification applied to all residual stream write matrices. The required safety direction can be computed from a small set of harmful and harmless instruction pairs. We show that ROSI consistently increases safety refusal rates - as evaluated by Llama Guard 3 - while preserving the utility of the model on standard benchmarks such as MMLU, HellaSwag, and Arc. Furthermore, we show that ROSI can also re-align 'uncensored' models by amplifying their own latent safety directions, demonstrating its utility as an effective last-mile safety procedure. Our results suggest that targeted, interpretable weight steering is a cheap and potent mechanism to improve LLM safety, complementing more resource-intensive fine-tuning paradigms.

The alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values is central to their safe deployment, yet current practice produces static, brittle, and costly-to-maintain models that fail to keep pace with evolving norms and policies. This misalignment, which we term the Alignment-Reality Gap, poses a growing challenge for reliable long-term use. Existing remedies are inadequate: large-scale re-annotation is economically prohibitive, and standard unlearning methods act as blunt instruments that erode utility rather than enable precise policy updates. We introduce TRACE (Triage and Re-align by Alignment Conflict Evaluation), a framework for principled unlearning that reconceives re-alignment as a programmatic policy application problem. TRACE programmatically triages existing preference data against a new policy, identifies high-impact conflicts via a alignment impact score, and applies a hybrid optimization that cleanly inverts, discards, or preserves preferences while safeguarding model performance. Empirical results show that TRACE achieves robust re-alignment across diverse model families (Qwen2.5-7B, Gemma-2-9B, Llama-3.1-8B). On both synthetic benchmarks and the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset under complex policy shift, TRACE enforces new principles without degrading general capabilities. Our work establishes a scalable, dynamic, and cost-effective paradigm for maintaining LLM alignment, providing a foundation for sustainable and responsible AI deployment.

This paper presents a comprehensive empirical study on the safety alignment capabilities. We evaluate what matters for safety alignment in LLMs and LRMs to provide essential insights for developing more secure and reliable AI systems. We systematically investigate and compare the influence of six critical intrinsic model characteristics and three external attack techniques. Our large-scale evaluation is conducted using 32 recent, popular LLMs and LRMs across thirteen distinct model families, spanning a parameter scale from 3B to 235B. The assessment leverages five established safety datasets and probes model vulnerabilities with 56 jailbreak techniques and four CoT attack strategies, resulting in 4.6M API calls. Our key empirical findings are fourfold. First, we identify the LRMs GPT-OSS-20B, Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, and GPT-OSS-120B as the top-three safest models, which substantiates the significant advantage of integrated reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms for robust safety alignment. Second, post-training and knowledge distillation may lead to a systematic degradation of safety alignment. We thus argue that safety must be treated as an explicit constraint or a core optimization objective during these stages, not merely subordinated to the pursuit of general capability. Third, we reveal a pronounced vulnerability: employing a CoT attack via a response prefix can elevate the attack success rate by 3.34x on average and from 0.6% to 96.3% for Seed-OSS-36B-Instruct. This critical finding underscores the safety risks inherent in text-completion interfaces and features that allow user-defined response prefixes in LLM services, highlighting an urgent need for architectural and deployment safeguards. Fourth, roleplay, prompt injection, and gradient-based search for adversarial prompts are the predominant methodologies for eliciting unaligned behaviors in modern models.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) offers an effective approach for addressing question answering (QA) tasks. However, the imperfections of the retrievers in RAG models often result in the retrieval of irrelevant information, which could introduce noises and degrade the performance, especially when handling multi-hop questions that require multiple steps of reasoning. To enhance the multi-hop reasoning ability of RAG models, we propose TRACE. TRACE constructs knowledge-grounded reasoning chains, which are a series of logically connected knowledge triples, to identify and integrate supporting evidence from the retrieved documents for answering questions. Specifically, TRACE employs a KG Generator to create a knowledge graph (KG) from the retrieved documents, and then uses an Autoregressive Reasoning Chain Constructor to build reasoning chains. Experimental results on three multi-hop QA datasets show that TRACE achieves an average performance improvement of up to 14.03% compared to using all the retrieved documents. Moreover, the results indicate that using reasoning chains as context, rather than the entire documents, is often sufficient to correctly answer questions.

In Text-to-SQL, execution feedback is essential for guiding large language models (LLMs) to reason accurately and generate reliable SQL queries. However, existing methods treat execution feedback solely as a post-hoc signal for correction or selection, failing to integrate it into the generation process. This limitation hinders their ability to address reasoning errors as they occur, ultimately reducing query accuracy and robustness. To address this issue, we propose ReEx-SQL (Reasoning with Execution-Aware Reinforcement Learning), a framework for Text-to-SQL that enables models to interact with the database during decoding and dynamically adjust their reasoning based on execution feedback. ReEx-SQL introduces an execution-aware reasoning paradigm that interleaves intermediate SQL execution into reasoning paths, facilitating context-sensitive revisions. It achieves this through structured prompts with markup tags and a stepwise rollout strategy that integrates execution feedback into each stage of generation. To supervise policy learning, we develop a composite reward function that includes an exploration reward, explicitly encouraging effective database interaction. Additionally, ReEx-SQL adopts a tree-based decoding strategy to support exploratory reasoning, enabling dynamic expansion of alternative reasoning paths. Notably, ReEx-SQL achieves 88.8% on Spider and 64.9% on BIRD at the 7B scale, surpassing the standard reasoning baseline by 2.7% and 2.6%, respectively. It also shows robustness, achieving 85.2% on Spider-Realistic with leading performance. In addition, its tree-structured decoding improves efficiency and performance over linear decoding, reducing inference time by 51.9% on the BIRD development set.

Test-time scaling improves the reasoning performance of large language models but often results in token-inefficient overthinking, where models continue reasoning beyond what is necessary for a correct answer. Existing dynamic early-exit methods typically rely on single-step confidence signals, which are often unreliable for detecting reasoning convergence in multi-step settings. To mitigate this limitation, we propose TRACE, a training-free framework for efficient test-time scaling that determines when to terminate reasoning based on temporal aggregation of multi-step evidence rather than instantaneous signals. TRACE detects reasoning convergence over time by aggregating two complementary signals across recent reasoning steps: answer consistency, capturing the persistence of predicted answers, and confidence trajectory, modeling the temporal evolution of model confidence. Benefiting from these two factors, TRACE can accurately determine whether the reasoning process has converged, thereby promptly halting inference and effectively avoiding redundant reasoning steps. Extensive experiments on multiple challenging benchmarks show that TRACE reduces reasoning token usage by 25-30% on average while maintaining accuracy within 1-2% of full-length reasoning, consistently outperforming existing dynamic reasoning methods.

Diffusion large language models promise faster generation by refining many token positions in parallel, but this parallelism introduces a hidden control problem: which proposed tokens should be transferred into the partially decoded sequence at each step? We refer to this decision as token commitment. Existing frozen-generator decoders largely rely on hand-designed confidence rules or block-specific acceptance filters. We argue that token commitment can instead be learned as a reusable trace-state policy. We introduce TraceLock, a lightweight plug-in controller that instantiates this policy for a frozen diffusion language model. Since oracle commitment times are unavailable, TraceLock derives self-supervision from future stability: at decoding step t, a proposed token for position i is labeled stable if it matches the final token at position i after the full decoding trace completes. The controller scores variable-length trace states and decides which active token proposals should be committed to the partially decoded sequence. Once trained for a given frozen backbone, the controller can be deployed across local-window widths, generation lengths, and step budgets without retraining or per-setting calibration. Experiments on question answering, mathematical reasoning, and code generation show that TraceLock improves the quality-step tradeoff over heuristic and learned baselines, with particularly stable behavior under cross-setting deployment. Diagnostic analyses show that its decisions are not reducible to scalar confidence, suggesting that frozen diffusion language models expose a learnable space of commitment trajectories beyond confidence-based decoding. Code is available at https://github.com/BobSun98/TraceLock.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Autonomous language-model agents increasingly rely on installable skills and tools to complete user tasks. Static skill auditing can expose capability surface before deployment, but it cannot determine whether a particular invocation is unsafe under the current user request and runtime context. We therefore study skill invocation auditing as a continuous-risk estimation problem: given a user request, candidate skill, and runtime context, predict a score that supports ranking and triage before a hard intervention is applied. We introduce STARS, which combines a static capability prior, a request-conditioned invocation risk model, and a calibrated risk-fusion policy. To evaluate this setting, we construct SIA-Bench, a benchmark of 3,000 invocation records with group-safe splits, lineage metadata, runtime context, canonical action labels, and derived continuous-risk targets. On a held-out split of indirect prompt injection attacks, calibrated fusion reaches 0.439 high-risk AUPRC, improving over 0.405 for the contextual scorer and 0.380 for the strongest static baseline, while the contextual scorer remains better calibrated with 0.289 expected calibration error. On the locked in-distribution test split, gains are smaller and static priors remain useful. The resulting claim is therefore narrower: request-conditioned auditing is most valuable as an invocation-time risk-scoring and triage layer rather than as a replacement for static screening. Code is available at https://github.com/123zgj123/STARS.

Java remains central to enterprise software, and many applications outlive their original architecture. Migrating them across frameworks is a behavior-preserving refactoring spanning build configuration, dependency injection, persistence, request handling, and deployment. Existing software-engineering benchmarks cover bug fixing, feature implementation, and language or version modernization, but leave cross-framework refactoring largely unmeasured. We introduce ScarfBench, a benchmark for behavior-preserving cross-framework refactoring of enterprise Java applications. It is built from expert-written implementation triples across Spring, Jakarta EE, and Quarkus: 34 applications (29 focused single-layer, 5 whole) yielding 102 variants (~151K lines across 1946 source and test files) and 204 directed refactoring tasks. Each task gives an agent a working source application and a target framework; the agent must synthesize a target implementation preserving the source behavior. Correctness is evaluated by an application-specific executable oracle: the candidate must compile, deploy in a containerized target runtime, and pass behavioral tests over the application's observable interface. We evaluate five state-of-the-art coding agents on ScarfBench. The strongest achieves only 15.3% aggregate test pass on focused-layer migrations and 12.2% on whole applications, and only one of the 204 tasks yields a fully behaviorally equivalent target. Difficulty is asymmetric across framework directions and architectural layers: Spring<->Quarkus is the most tractable pair, and Jakarta-targeted migrations are hardest. From LLM-as-a-judge and expert adjudication of failed-task traces, we derive a taxonomy of recurring failure categories spanning build, deploy, and test stages. We release the benchmark, harness, and agent traces at https://scarfbench.info.

Extending context window sizes allows large language models (LLMs) to process longer sequences and handle more complex tasks. Rotary Positional Embedding (RoPE) has become the de facto standard due to its relative positional encoding properties that benefit long-context training. However, we observe that using RoPE with BFloat16 format results in numerical issues, causing it to deviate from its intended relative positional encoding, especially in long-context scenarios. This issue arises from BFloat16's limited precision and accumulates as context length increases, with the first token contributing significantly to this problem. To address this, we develop AnchorAttention, a plug-and-play attention method that alleviates numerical issues caused by BFloat16, improves long-context capabilities, and speeds up training. AnchorAttention reduces unnecessary attention computations, maintains semantic coherence, and boosts computational efficiency by treating the first token as a shared anchor with a consistent position ID, making it visible to all documents within the training context. Experiments on three types of LLMs demonstrate that AnchorAttention significantly improves long-context performance and reduces training time by over 50\% compared to standard full attention mechanisms, while preserving the original LLM's capabilities on general tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/haonan3/AnchorContext.

Despite widespread deployment of Large Language Models, systematic evaluation of instruction-following capabilities remains challenging. While comprehensive benchmarks exist, focused assessments that quickly diagnose specific instruction adherence patterns are valuable. As newer models may be trained on existing benchmarks, novel evaluation approaches are needed to assess genuine capabilities rather than memorized performance. This paper presents a streamlined evaluation framework using twenty carefully designed prompts to assess LLM instruction-following across diverse task categories. We demonstrate this framework through a large-scale empirical study conducted on October 14, 2025, testing 256 verified working models from 331 available via OpenRouter. To ensure methodological rigor and prevent selection bias, we first verified each model's basic functionality before inclusion. Unlike large-scale benchmarks requiring extensive computational resources, our approach offers a practical diagnostic tool researchers and practitioners can readily apply. Our methodology builds upon verifiable instructions while introducing a compact test suite balancing comprehensiveness with efficiency. Each prompt targets distinct aspects of instruction following, including format compliance, content constraints, logical sequencing, and multi-step task execution. We evaluate models from major providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Mistral) and emerging implementations (Qwen, DeepSeek, community models), providing comparative performance analysis. Our findings reveal consistent failure modes and identify specific instruction types posing particular challenges. This work contributes both a practical evaluation tool and one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of instruction-following capabilities across the contemporary LLM landscape.

Code agents can autonomously resolve GitHub issues, yet when they fail, current evaluation provides no visibility into where or why. Metrics such as Pass@1 collapse an entire execution into a single binary outcome, making it difficult to identify where and why the agent went wrong. To address this limitation, we introduce TRAJEVAL, a diagnostic framework that decomposes agent trajectories into three interpretable stages: search (file localization), read (function comprehension), and edit (modification targeting). For each stage, we compute precision and recall by comparing against reference patches. Analyzing 16,758 trajectories across three agent architectures and seven models, we find universal inefficiencies (all agents examine approximately 22x more functions than necessary) yet distinct failure modes: GPT-5 locates relevant code but targets edits incorrectly, while Qwen-32B fails at file discovery entirely. We validate that these diagnostics are predictive, achieving model-level Pass@1 prediction within 0.87-2.1% MAE, and actionable: real-time feedback based on trajectory signals improves two state-of-the-art models by 2.2-4.6 percentage points while reducing costs by 20-31%. These results demonstrate that our framework not only provides a more fine-grained analysis of agent behavior, but also translates diagnostic signals into tangible performance gains. More broadly, TRAJEVAL transforms agent evaluation beyond outcome-based benchmarking toward mechanism-driven diagnosis of agent success and failure.

Private macOS frameworks underpin critical services and daemons but remain undocumented and distributed only as stripped binaries, complicating security analysis. We present MOTIF, an agentic framework that integrates tool-augmented analysis with a finetuned large language model specialized for Objective-C type inference. The agent manages runtime metadata extraction, binary inspection, and constraint checking, while the model generates candidate method signatures that are validated and refined into compilable headers. On MOTIF-Bench, a benchmark built from public frameworks with groundtruth headers, MOTIF improves signature recovery from 15% to 86% compared to baseline static analysis tooling, with consistent gains in tool-use correctness and inference stability. Case studies on private frameworks show that reconstructed headers compile, link, and facilitate downstream security research and vulnerability studies. By transforming opaque binaries into analyzable interfaces, MOTIF establishes a scalable foundation for systematic auditing of macOS internals.

While large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive instruction-following capabilities, it is still unclear whether and to what extent they can respond to explicit constraints that might be entailed in various instructions. As a significant aspect of LLM alignment, it is thus important to formulate such a specialized set of instructions as well as investigate the resulting behavior of LLMs. To address this vacancy, we propose a new benchmark CoDI-Eval to systematically and comprehensively evaluate LLMs' responses to instructions with various constraints. We construct a large collection of constraints-attributed instructions as a test suite focused on both generalization and coverage. Specifically, we advocate an instruction diversification process to synthesize diverse forms of constraint expression and also deliberate the candidate task taxonomy with even finer-grained sub-categories. Finally, we automate the entire evaluation process to facilitate further developments. Different from existing studies on controllable text generation, CoDI-Eval extends the scope to the prevalent instruction-following paradigm for the first time. We provide extensive evaluations of representative LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT, Vicuna) on CoDI-Eval, revealing their limitations in following instructions with specific constraints and there is still a significant gap between open-source and commercial closed-source LLMs. We believe this benchmark will facilitate research into improving the controllability of LLMs' responses to instructions. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/Xt-cyh/CoDI-Eval.

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

LLM-based agents for program repair are increasingly built on a "generate-run-revise" paradigm, iteratively executing tests to evaluate and refine patches. This execution-based approach has become standard practice in state-of-the-art systems. However, executions can be time-consuming and expensive, yet their impact on these agents remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a two-stage empirical study over execution behavior in LLM-based program repair. To characterize execution behavior at scale, we first analyze 7,745 agent traces from SWE-bench leaderboard submissions. Second, we evaluate 3,000 end-to-end repair attempts across 200 SWE-bench instances and three agents (Claude Code, Codex, and the open-source OpenCode) under four execution paradigms, which allows for a fine-grained comparison of performance and cost. Our analysis reveals three key observations: (1) Code execution is used across all agents and models analyzed, with an average of 8.8 test runs per task. Execution behavior varies substantially across agents and models, with frequency ranging from 2 to 19 per task, and late-stage executions consistently achieve higher success rates than early-stage ones. (2) Execution restrictions have little effect on repair success: on commercial agents with SOTA models the resolve-rate gap between Prohibited and Unrestricted is only 1.25 percentage points and not statistically significant, while Prohibited saves substantial token and wall-clock cost. (3) Execution benefit is concentrated rather than uniform. These patterns suggest that current agents apply execution indiscriminately, paying its cost on instances where it provides little benefit. Execution, therefore, should be treated as a resource with an explicit cost-benefit tradeoff, not a default capability.

Test-Time Scaling (TTS) has significantly enhanced the capabilities of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) but introduces a critical side-effect known as Overthinking. We conduct a preliminary study to rethink this phenomenon from a fine-grained perspective. We observe that LRMs frequently conduct repetitive self-verification without revision even after obtaining the final answer during the reasoning process. We formally define this specific position where the answer first stabilizes as the Reasoning Anchor. By analyzing pre- and post-anchor reasoning behaviors, we uncover the structural redundancy fixed in LRMs: the meaningless repetitive verification after deriving the first complete answer, which we term the Answer-Stable Tail (AST). Motivated by this observation, we propose Anchor-based Process Reward (APR), a structure-aware reward shaping method that localizes the reasoning anchor and penalizes exclusively the post-anchor AST. Leveraging the policy optimization algorithm suitable for length penalties, our APR models achieved the performance-efficiency Pareto frontier at 1.5B and 7B scales averaged across five mathematical reasoning datasets while requiring substantially fewer computational resources for RL training.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

Reasoning over heterogeneous artifacts (PDFs, spreadsheets, slide decks, etc.) increasingly occurs within structured agent workflows that iteratively extract, transform, and reference external information. In these workflows, uncertainty is not merely an input-quality issue: it can redirect decomposition and routing decisions, reshape intermediate state, and produce qualitatively different execution trajectories. We study this phenomenon by treating uncertainty as a controlled variable: we inject structured perturbations into artifact-derived representations, execute fixed workflows under comprehensive logging, and quantify contamination via trace divergence in plans, tool invocations, and intermediate state. Across 614 paired runs on 32 GAIA tasks with three different language models, we find a decoupling: workflows may diverge substantially yet recover correct answers, or remain structurally similar while producing incorrect outputs. We characterize three manifestation types: silent semantic corruption, behavioral detours with recovery, and combined structural disruption and their control-flow signatures (rerouting, extended execution, early termination). We measure operational costs and characterize why commonly used verification guardrails fail to intercept contamination. We contribute (i) a formal taxonomy of contamination manifestations in structured workflows, (ii) a trace-based measurement framework for detecting and localizing contamination across agent interactions, and (iii) empirical evidence with implications for targeted verification, defensive design, and cost control.

Recently, given the docstring for the target problem and the target function signature, large language models (LLMs) have been used not only to generate source code, but also to generate test cases, consisting of test inputs and assertions (e.g., in the form of checking an actual output against the expected output). However, as shown by our empirical study on assertions generated by four LLMs for the HumanEval benchmark, over 62% of the generated assertions are incorrect (i.e., failed on the ground-truth problem solution). To detect incorrect assertions (given the docstring and the target function signature along with a sample of example inputs and outputs), in this paper, we propose a new approach named DeCon to effectively detect incorrect assertions via LLM-generated postconditions for the target problem (a postcondition is a predicate that must always be true just after the execution of the ground-truth problem solution). Our approach requires a small set of I/O examples (i.e., a sample of example inputs and outputs) for the target problem (e.g., the I/O examples included in the docstring for a target problem in HumanEval). We use the given I/O examples to filter out those LLM-generated postconditions that are violated by at least one given I/O example. We then use the remaining postconditions to detect incorrect assertions as those assertions that violate at least one remaining postcondition. Experimental results show that DeCon can detect averagely more than 64% (63% and 65.5% detected by GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, respectively) incorrect assertions generated by four state-of-the-art LLMs, and DeCon can also improve the effectiveness of these LLMs in code generation by 4% in terms of Pass@1. In addition, although DeCon might filter out correct assertions, the fault-finding ability of the remaining correct assertions decreases only slightly.

Industrial LLM agent systems often separate planning from execution, yet LLM planners frequently produce structurally invalid or unnecessarily long workflows, leading to brittle failures and avoidable tool and API cost. We propose SPIN, a planning wrapper that combines validated Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) planning with prefix based execution control. SPIN enforces a strict DAG contract through \_validate\_plan\_text and repair prompting, producing executable plans before downstream execution, and then evaluates DAG prefixes incrementally to stop when the current prefix is sufficient to answer the query. On AssetOpsBench, across 261 scenarios, SPIN reduces executed tasks from 1061 to 623 and improves Accomplished from 0.638 to 0.706, while reducing tool calls from 11.81 to 6.82 per run. On MCP Bench, the same wrapper improves planning, grounding, and dependency related scores for both GPT OSS1 and Llama 4 Maverick.

Memory safety violations in low-level code, written in languages like C, continues to remain one of the major sources of software vulnerabilities. One method of removing such violations by construction is to port C code to a safe C dialect. Such dialects rely on programmer-supplied annotations to guarantee safety with minimal runtime overhead. This porting, however, is a manual process that imposes significant burden on the programmer and, hence, there has been limited adoption of this technique. The task of porting not only requires inferring annotations, but may also need refactoring/rewriting of the code to make it amenable to such annotations. In this paper, we use Large Language Models (LLMs) towards addressing both these concerns. We show how to harness LLM capabilities to do complex code reasoning as well as rewriting of large codebases. We also present a novel framework for whole-program transformations that leverages lightweight static analysis to break the transformation into smaller steps that can be carried out effectively by an LLM. We implement our ideas in a tool called MSA that targets the CheckedC dialect. We evaluate MSA on several micro-benchmarks, as well as real-world code ranging up to 20K lines of code. We showcase superior performance compared to a vanilla LLM baseline, as well as demonstrate improvement over a state-of-the-art symbolic (non-LLM) technique.

Code execution is a fundamental aspect of programming language semantics that reflects the exact behavior of the code. However, most pre-trained models for code intelligence ignore the execution trace and only rely on source code and syntactic structures. In this paper, we investigate how well pre-trained models can understand and perform code execution. We develop a mutation-based data augmentation technique to create a large-scale and realistic Python dataset and task for code execution, which challenges existing models such as Codex. We then present CodeExecutor, a Transformer model that leverages code execution pre-training and curriculum learning to enhance its semantic comprehension. We evaluate CodeExecutor on code execution and show its promising performance and limitations. We also demonstrate its potential benefits for code intelligence tasks such as zero-shot code-to-code search and text-to-code generation. Our analysis provides insights into the learning and generalization abilities of pre-trained models for code execution.

Content Warning: This paper may contain unsafe or harmful content generated by LLMs that may be offensive to readers. Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as tooling platforms through structured output APIs, but the grammar-guided decoding that powers this feature opens a critical control-plane attack surface orthogonal to traditional data-plane vulnerabilities. We introduce Constrained Decoding Attack (CDA), a new jailbreak class that targets the LLM control plane. CDA is best characterized as a control-to-semantic pipeline: (1) schema-enforced logit masking injects a malicious prefix into the generation trajectory, and (2) the model itself completes the harmful intent. Unlike data-plane jailbreaks that rely on bypassing alignment with visible inputs, CDA acts on the decoding process itself, so internal safety alignment alone cannot stop it. We instantiate CDA with EnumAttack, which hides malicious content in enum fields, and the more evasive DictAttack, which decouples the payload across a benign prompt and a dictionary-based grammar. Across 13 proprietary/open-weight models and five standard benchmarks, DictAttack achieves 94.3--99.5% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on flagship models including gpt-5, gemini-2.5-pro, deepseek-r1, and gpt-oss-120b. While basic grammar auditing mitigates EnumAttack, DictAttack still sustains 75.8% ASR against SOTA jailbreak guardrails, exposing a "semantic gap" that demands cross-plane defenses bridging the data and control planes. Project page and code are available at https://ict-cda.github.io/.

Training capable OS agents requires data that simultaneously captures structured user intents, multi-turn task delegation, and grounded tool execution--properties absent from existing datasets. We propose ISE (Intent -> Simulate -> Execute), a three-stage synthesis paradigm that addresses these gaps jointly. Stage 1 constructs roughly 50000 structured intents via a 4D framework (Persona x Domain x Task x Complexity); after deduplication the pool contains 43956 unique intents and attains a Vendi Score of 61.57 over the entire pool on mpnet-base-v2 embeddings (cosine kernel, q=1). Stage 2 drives multi-turn user-agent interaction through a role-locked user simulator that grounds each user turn in actual execution outcomes, producing 23132 complete trajectories averaging 8.12 user turns and 68.24 total dialogue turns. Stage 3 runs every tool call inside a live, isolated OS workspace, generating authentic failure-recovery dynamics instead of simulated responses. Fine-tuning on ISETrace improves ClawEval pass@1 from 19.3 to 37.7 using Qwen3-8B on agent tool-use tasks with a standard protocol. This result outperforms zero-shot GPT-4o and the larger Qwen3-32B base model which is four times bigger. An ablation on Stage 2 proves multi-turn simulation brings a large portion of the performance gain. We release all source code and dataset at https://github.com/Valiere01/ISE-Trace.

Automatic program repair (APR) is crucial to reduce manual debugging efforts for developers and improve software reliability. While conventional search-based techniques typically rely on heuristic rules or a redundancy assumption to mine fix patterns, recent years have witnessed the surge of deep learning (DL) based approaches to automate the program repair process in a data-driven manner. However, their performance is often limited by a fixed set of parameters to model the highly complex search space of APR. To ease such burden on the parametric models, in this work, we propose a novel Retrieval-Augmented Patch Generation framework (RAP-Gen) by explicitly leveraging relevant fix patterns retrieved from a codebase of previous bug-fix pairs. Specifically, we build a hybrid patch retriever to account for both lexical and semantic matching based on the raw source code in a language-agnostic manner, which does not rely on any code-specific features. In addition, we adapt a code-aware language model CodeT5 as our foundation model to facilitate both patch retrieval and generation tasks in a unified manner. We adopt a stage-wise approach where the patch retriever first retrieves a relevant external bug-fix pair to augment the buggy input for the CodeT5 patch generator, which synthesizes a ranked list of repair patch candidates. Notably, RAP-Gen is a generic APR framework that can flexibly integrate different patch retrievers and generators to repair various types of bugs. We thoroughly evaluate RAP-Gen on three benchmarks in two programming languages, including the TFix benchmark in JavaScript, and Code Refinement and Defects4J benchmarks in Java, where the bug localization information may or may not be provided. Experimental results show that RAP-Gen significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art approaches on all benchmarks, e.g., repairing 15 more bugs on 818 Defects4J bugs.

Competition retrospectives are useful when they explain what a leaderboard measured, how hidden evaluation changed conclusions, and which design patterns were rewarded. We revisit the CODS 2025 challenge, a privacy-aware Codabench competition on industrial multi-agent orchestration built on . We combine final rank sheets, a 300-submission server log, 149-team registrations, best-submission exports, the organizer winners report, the companion system paper, and verified planning-track source trees. Five results stand out. First, the public planning leaderboard saturates at 72.73\%, and richer prompts do not improve that peak. Second, hidden evaluation changes the story: public and private scores correlate moderately in planning (r{=}0.69) but negatively in execution (r{=}{-}0.13), with several 45.45\% public execution systems reaching 63.64\% on the hidden set. Third, the term is numerically almost inert in the official composite -- combined on a 0--1 scale with 0--100 percentage scores, it contributes at most 0.05 points per track, and rescaling would swap the top two teams. Fourth, the competition is operationally account-based but substantively team-based: 149 registered teams reduce to 24 with non-zero public scores and 11 fully ranked, while 52.3\% of deduplicated registrations list multiple usernames. Fifth, successful execution methods mostly improve guardrails -- response selection, contamination cleanup, fallback, and context control -- rather than novel agent architectures. These findings identify which behaviors the evaluation rewarded, and motivate scale-aware composites, skill-level diagnostics, and versioned artifact release.

Understanding how aligned LLMs internally represent safety is critical for diagnosing alignment vulnerabilities, as it explains why jailbreaks succeed and informs the design of robust alignment strategies. Prior work shows that aligned LLMs encode harmfulness and refusal as separable directions in the residual stream at prompt-side token positions. We show that jailbreaks succeed at prompt encoding by suppressing either the refusal or harmfulness direction before any token is generated, with distinct attack classes occupying separable regions of the harmfulness-refusal plane. Extending the analysis to response-token positions, we find that the model recognizes harmful content while it is generating that content, even when it failed to recognize the input as harmful at the prompt side. Motivated by our findings, we introduce HARC (Harmfulness-And-Refusal Coupling), a fine-tuning method that pairs the two directions across both prompt and response positions. Since the intervention is confined to the harmfulness-refusal subspace, it leaves the rest of the residual stream intact and does not degrade general capability or inflate over-refusal. Across extensive experiments, HARC achieves the strongest robustness-capability-usability trade-off among six baselines spanning the major training-time and inference-time safety methods. The harmfulness and refusal directions at prompt and response positions transfer across the five model families and two scales we tested without architecture-specific tuning.

We present JAttack, a framework that enables template-based testing for compilers. Using JAttack, a developer writes a template program that describes a set of programs to be generated and given as test inputs to a compiler. Such a framework enables developers to incorporate their domain knowledge on testing compilers, giving a basic program structure that allows for exploring complex programs that can trigger sophisticated compiler optimizations. A developer writes a template program in the host language (Java) that contains holes to be filled by JAttack. Each hole, written using a domain-specific language, constructs a node within an extended abstract syntax tree (eAST). An eAST node defines the search space for the hole, i.e., a set of expressions and values. JAttack generates programs by executing templates and filling each hole by randomly choosing expressions and values (available within the search space defined by the hole). Additionally, we introduce several optimizations to reduce JAttack's generation cost. While JAttack could be used to test various compiler features, we demonstrate its capabilities in helping test just-in-time (JIT) Java compilers, whose optimizations occur at runtime after a sufficient number of executions. Using JAttack, we have found six critical bugs that were confirmed by Oracle developers. Four of them were previously unknown, including two unknown CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures). JAttack shows the power of combining developers' domain knowledge (via templates) with random testing to detect bugs in JIT compilers.

Diffusion language models decode text by iteratively denoising masked token sequences, making the choice of which positions to decode a central inference-time decision. Most training-free decoding strategies use model confidence for position selection, assuming that high-confidence positions are ready to be decoded. In this work, we revisit this assumption by studying when confidence misleads fully non-autoregressive (fully non-AR) decoding. EOT tokens can receive high confidence and cause incomplete generation; inserting a suffix anchor can mitigate this issue but introduces local overconfidence near the anchor, causing anchor-adjacent tokens to be decoded too early. To address these issues, we propose Suffix-Anchored Confidence Modulation, a simple training-free method that inserts a short suffix anchor to encourage response completion and modulates confidence near the anchor according to decoding progress. This preserves the response-completion benefit of suffix anchoring while reducing premature decoding of anchor-adjacent tokens. Across text-only reasoning, vision-language reasoning, and code-generation benchmarks, our method consistently improves confidence-based fully non-AR decoding, outperforms explicit EOT suppression, and preserves the parallel decoding advantage of fully non-AR generation.

Long-context large language models (LLMs), such as Gemini-2.5-Pro and Claude-Sonnet-4, are increasingly used to empower advanced AI systems, including retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines and autonomous agents. In these systems, an LLM receives an instruction along with a context--often consisting of texts retrieved from a knowledge database or memory--and generates a response that is contextually grounded by following the instruction. Recent studies have designed solutions to trace back to a subset of texts in the context that contributes most to the response generated by the LLM. These solutions have numerous real-world applications, including performing post-attack forensic analysis and improving the interpretability and trustworthiness of LLM outputs. While significant efforts have been made, state-of-the-art solutions such as TracLLM often lead to a high computation cost, e.g., it takes TracLLM hundreds of seconds to perform traceback for a single response-context pair. In this work, we propose AttnTrace, a new context traceback method based on the attention weights produced by an LLM for a prompt. To effectively utilize attention weights, we introduce two techniques designed to enhance the effectiveness of AttnTrace, and we provide theoretical insights for our design choice. We also perform a systematic evaluation for AttnTrace. The results demonstrate that AttnTrace is more accurate and efficient than existing state-of-the-art context traceback methods. We also show that AttnTrace can improve state-of-the-art methods in detecting prompt injection under long contexts through the attribution-before-detection paradigm. As a real-world application, we demonstrate that AttnTrace can effectively pinpoint injected instructions in a paper designed to manipulate LLM-generated reviews. The code is at https://github.com/Wang-Yanting/AttnTrace.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in agentic environments must exercise multiple capabilities across different task instances, where a capability is performing one or more actions in a trajectory that are necessary for successfully solving a subset of tasks in the environment. Many existing approaches either rely on synthetic training data that is not targeted to the model's actual capability deficits in the target environment or train directly on the target environment, where the model needs to implicitly learn the capabilities across tasks. We introduce TRACE (Turning Recurrent Agent failures into Capability-targeted training Environments), an end-to-end system for environment-specific agent self-improvement. TRACE contrasts successful and failed trajectories to automatically identify lacking capabilities, synthesizes a targeted training environment for each that rewards whether the capability was exercised, and trains a LoRA adapter via RL on each synthetic environment, routing to the relevant adapter at inference. Empirically, TRACE generalizes across different environments, improving over the base agent by +14.1 points on τ^2-bench (customer service) and +7 perfect scores on ToolSandbox (tool use), outperforming the strongest baseline by +7.4 points and +4 perfect scores, respectively. Given the same number of rollouts, TRACE scales more efficiently than baselines, outperforming GRPO and GEPA by +9.2 and +7.4 points on τ^2-bench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Deploying Large Language Models (LLMs) for regulatory compliance demands rigorous traceability via comprehensive citations across multi-tiered authority structures. Unlike traditional multi-hop or legal QA, this task requires structured procedural lookups and evidence-set closure rather than entity resolution or case-law reasoning. Existing RAG systems struggle here due to flattened citation edges, fragmented retrieval expansions, and fragile post-hoc attribution. We formalize Regulatory Compliance QA with RegOps-Bench, a novel benchmark featuring an Operational Knowledge Graph derived from complex national R\&D regulations. To address these bottlenecks, we propose RefWalk, a unified framework driven by a shared topic anchor. RefWalk traverses cross-document citations, fuses multi-view candidates via max-based aggregation, and enforces per-rule attribution to explicitly map claims to sources. We establish a strong baseline with substantial improvements in retrieval recall and citation accuracy. Finally, a contrastive evaluation on a U.S. health compliance dataset (HIPAA) reveals that existing systems exhibit saturation on flat-structure rules, underscoring the need for RegOps-Bench. Our code is available at https://github.com/yeongjoonJu/RefWalk.

While recent advancements in large language model (LLM) alignment have enabled the effective identification of malicious objectives involving scene nesting and keyword rewriting, our study reveals that these methods remain inadequate at detecting malicious objectives expressed through context within nested harmless objectives. This study identifies a previously overlooked vulnerability, which we term Attack via Implicit Reference (AIR). AIR decomposes a malicious objective into permissible objectives and links them through implicit references within the context. This method employs multiple related harmless objectives to generate malicious content without triggering refusal responses, thereby effectively bypassing existing detection techniques.Our experiments demonstrate AIR's effectiveness across state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) exceeding 90% on most models, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, and Qwen-2-72B. Notably, we observe an inverse scaling phenomenon, where larger models are more vulnerable to this attack method. These findings underscore the urgent need for defense mechanisms capable of understanding and preventing contextual attacks. Furthermore, we introduce a cross-model attack strategy that leverages less secure models to generate malicious contexts, thereby further increasing the ASR when targeting other models.Our code and jailbreak artifacts can be found at https://github.com/Lucas-TY/llm_Implicit_reference.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real. We present AdversaBench, an end-to-end red-teaming pipeline that mutates seed prompts with five structured operators, queries a target model, and confirms failures through a three-judge panel with a meta-judge tiebreaker. We report experiments on 45 seeds across three categories: reasoning, instruction-following, and tool use. Every seed produced a confirmed failure. Four findings stand out. First, operator effectiveness varies sharply by category: inject_distractor scores 0.00 mean reward on instruction-following seeds but 0.80-0.83 on reasoning and tool-use. Second, binary failure rate hides difficulty: instruction-following seeds required 2.4 attacker iterations on average versus 1.1 for other categories, a gap visible in survival curves. Third, pairwise judge agreement of 80-87% coexists with near-zero Cohen's kappa due to label skew; category-level disagreement rates are more informative. Fourth, adversarial prompts generated against Llama 3.1 8B transfer zero-shot to Llama 3.3 70B, suggesting the mutations exploit general behavioral patterns rather than model-specific weaknesses. Code, dataset, and analysis scripts are available at https://github.com/khanak0509/AdversaBench .