Daily Papers

The optimal stopping problem is a category of decision problems with a specific constrained configuration. It is relevant to various real-world applications such as finance and management. To solve the optimal stopping problem, state-of-the-art algorithms in dynamic programming, such as the least-squares Monte Carlo (LSMC), are employed. This type of algorithm relies on path simulations using only the last price of the underlying asset as a state representation. Also, the LSMC was thinking for option valuation where risk-neutral probabilities can be employed to account for uncertainty. However, the general optimal stopping problem goals may not fit the requirements of the LSMC showing auto-correlated prices. We employ a data-driven method that uses Monte Carlo simulation to train and test artificial neural networks (ANN) to solve the optimal stopping problem. Using ANN to solve decision problems is not entirely new. We propose a different architecture that uses convolutional neural networks (CNN) to deal with the dimensionality problem that arises when we transform the whole history of prices into a Markovian state. We present experiments that indicate that our proposed architecture improves results over the previous implementations under specific simulated time series function sets. Lastly, we employ our proposed method to compare the optimal exercise of the financial options problem with the LSMC algorithm. Our experiments show that our method can capture more accurate exercise opportunities when compared to the LSMC. We have outstandingly higher (above 974\% improvement) expected payoff from these exercise policies under the many Monte Carlo simulations that used the real-world return database on the out-of-sample (test) data.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Thompson Sampling (TS) has attracted a lot of interest due to its good empirical performance, in particular in the computational advertising. Though successful, the tools for its performance analysis appeared only recently. In this paper, we describe and analyze SpectralTS algorithm for a bandit problem, where the payoffs of the choices are smooth given an underlying graph. In this setting, each choice is a node of a graph and the expected payoffs of the neighboring nodes are assumed to be similar. Although the setting has application both in recommender systems and advertising, the traditional algorithms would scale poorly with the number of choices. For that purpose we consider an effective dimension d, which is small in real-world graphs. We deliver the analysis showing that the regret of SpectralTS scales as d*sqrt(T ln N) with high probability, where T is the time horizon and N is the number of choices. Since a d*sqrt(T ln N) regret is comparable to the known results, SpectralTS offers a computationally more efficient alternative. We also show that our algorithm is competitive on both synthetic and real-world data.

Agentic systems involved in high-stake decision-making under adversarial pressure need formal guarantees not offered by existing approaches. Motivated by the operational needs of security operations centers (SOCs) that must configure endpoint detection and response (EDR) policies under adversarial pressure, we present a tool-mediated architecture: LLM agents use deterministic tools (Stackelberg best-response, Bayesian observer updates, attack-graph primitives) and select from finite action catalogs enforced at the tool-output interface. A composite Lyapunov function machine-checked in Lean 4 with zero sorry certifies controllability, observability from asymmetric sensor data, and Input-to-State Stability (ISS) robustness under intelligent adversarial disturbance, with two corollaries extending the certificate to any controller or adversary from the catalogs. On 282 real enterprise attack graphs, the claims hold with margin. On paired offensive/defensive telemetry, a tool-mediated Claude Sonnet 4 controller reduces the attacker's expected payoff (game value) by 59% relative to a deterministic greedy baseline, with zero variance across 40 runs at four temperatures. A Claude Haiku 4.5 controller converges to suboptimal game values but stays catalog-bounded over an additional 40 runs, demonstrating that architectural stability is not dependent on the controller capability. The LLM agent's non-determinism furthers creative exploration of strategies, while the tool-mediated architecture ensures system stability.

We study distributionally robust expected values under optimal transport distance with a quadratic cost function. In general the duality method, for this computation for the payoff function f, requires the computation of the λc-transform f^{λc}. We show that under the quadratic cost function there exists an intuitive and easily implementable representation of f^{λc}, if f is convex and piecewise linear. We apply this to the robust expected shortfall under the risk-neutral measure of an unhedged call option, from the point of view of the writer, as well as that of a portfolio mixing underlying shares with a call and a put option.

Expected Goals (xG) has emerged as a popular tool for evaluating finishing skill in soccer analytics. It involves comparing a player's cumulative xG with their actual goal output, where consistent overperformance indicates strong finishing ability. However, the assessment of finishing skill in soccer using xG remains contentious due to players' difficulty in consistently outperforming their cumulative xG. In this paper, we aim to address the limitations and nuances surrounding the evaluation of finishing skill using xG statistics. Specifically, we explore three hypotheses: (1) the deviation between actual and expected goals is an inadequate metric due to the high variance of shot outcomes and limited sample sizes, (2) the inclusion of all shots in cumulative xG calculation may be inappropriate, and (3) xG models contain biases arising from interdependencies in the data that affect skill measurement. We found that sustained overperformance of cumulative xG requires both high shot volumes and exceptional finishing, including all shot types can obscure the finishing ability of proficient strikers, and that there is a persistent bias that makes the actual and expected goals closer for excellent finishers than it really is. Overall, our analysis indicates that we need more nuanced quantitative approaches for investigating a player's finishing ability, which we achieved using a technique from AI fairness to learn an xG model that is calibrated for multiple subgroups of players. As a concrete use case, we show that (1) the standard biased xG model underestimates Messi's GAX by 17% and (2) Messi's GAX is 27% higher than the typical elite high-shot-volume attacker, indicating that Messi is even a more exceptional finisher than people commonly believed.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Foreshadowing and payoff are ubiquitous narrative devices through which authors introduce commitments early in a story and resolve them through concrete, observable outcomes. However, despite advances in story generation, large language models (LLMs) frequently fail to bridge these long-range narrative dependencies, often leaving "Chekhov's guns" unfired even when the necessary context is present. Existing evaluations largely overlook this structural failure, focusing on surface-level coherence rather than the logical fulfillment of narrative setups. In this paper, we introduce Codified Foreshadowing-Payoff Generation (CFPG), a novel framework that reframes narrative quality through the lens of payoff realization. Recognizing that LLMs struggle to intuitively grasp the "triggering mechanism" of a foreshadowed event, CFPG transforms narrative continuity into a set of executable causal predicates. By mining and encoding Foreshadow-Trigger-Payoff triples from the BookSum corpus, we provide structured supervision that ensures foreshadowed commitments are not only mentioned but also temporally and logically fulfilled. Experiments demonstrate that CFPG significantly outperforms standard prompting baselines in payoff accuracy and narrative alignment. Our findings suggest that explicitly codifying narrative mechanics is essential for moving LLMs from surface-level fluency to genuine narrative competence.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

Predicting invoice payment is valuable in multiple industries and supports decision-making processes in most financial workflows. However, the challenge in this realm involves dealing with complex data and the lack of data related to decisions-making processes not registered in the accounts receivable system. This work presents a prototype developed as a solution devised during a partnership with a multinational bank to support collectors in predicting invoices payment. The proposed prototype reached up to 77\% of accuracy, which improved the prioritization of customers and supported the daily work of collectors. With the presented results, one expects to support researchers dealing with the problem of invoice payment prediction to get insights and examples of how to tackle issues present in real data.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

This paper is an extended and reworked version of a short course given by the author at ''Uzbekistan-Ukrainian readings in stochastic processes'', Tashkent-Kyiv, 2022, and was prepared for a special issue of ''Theory of stochastic processes'', devoted to publishing lecture notes from the aforementioned workshop. The survey is devoted to operator splitting methods in the abstract formulation and their applications in probability. While the survey is focused on multiplicative methods, the BCH formula is used to discuss exponential splitting methods and a short informal introduction to additive splitting is presented. We introduce frameworks and available deterministic and probabilistic results and concentrate on constructing a wide picture of the field of operator splitting methods, providing a rigorous description in the setting of abstract Cauchy problems and an informal discussion for further and parallel advances. Some limitations and common difficulties are listed, as well as examples of works that provide solutions or hints. No new results are given. The bibliography contains illustrative deterministic examples and a selection of probability-related works.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

Many real-world prediction problems lack labels observable at prediction time, creating a temporal gap between prediction and outcome that yields supervision only after events resolve. To address this setting, we extend reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards to temporally resolved real-world prediction, and use it to train language models to make probabilistic forecasts under causally masked information with retrospective evaluation using proper scoring rules. Supervision is derived solely from post-resolution outcomes, preserving delayed-reward semantics. On real-world forecasting benchmarks, Qwen3-32B trained using Foresight Learning improves Brier score by 27% and halves calibration error relative to its pretrained baseline, and outperforms Qwen3-235B on both constructed future-event prediction tasks and the Metaculus benchmark despite a 7x parameter disadvantage.

You are a robot and you live in a Markov decision process (MDP) with a finite or an infinite number of transitions from state-action to next states. You got brains and so you plan before you act. Luckily, your roboparents equipped you with a generative model to do some Monte-Carlo planning. The world is waiting for you and you have no time to waste. You want your planning to be efficient. Sample-efficient. Indeed, you want to exploit the possible structure of the MDP by exploring only a subset of states reachable by following near-optimal policies. You want guarantees on sample complexity that depend on a measure of the quantity of near-optimal states. You want something, that is an extension of Monte-Carlo sampling (for estimating an expectation) to problems that alternate maximization (over actions) and expectation (over next states). But you do not want to StOP with exponential running time, you want something simple to implement and computationally efficient. You want it all and you want it now. You want TrailBlazer.

Can we better anticipate an actor's future actions (e.g. mix eggs) by knowing what commonly happens after his/her current action (e.g. crack eggs)? What if we also know the longer-term goal of the actor (e.g. making egg fried rice)? The long-term action anticipation (LTA) task aims to predict an actor's future behavior from video observations in the form of verb and noun sequences, and it is crucial for human-machine interaction. We propose to formulate the LTA task from two perspectives: a bottom-up approach that predicts the next actions autoregressively by modeling temporal dynamics; and a top-down approach that infers the goal of the actor and plans the needed procedure to accomplish the goal. We hypothesize that large language models (LLMs), which have been pretrained on procedure text data (e.g. recipes, how-tos), have the potential to help LTA from both perspectives. It can help provide the prior knowledge on the possible next actions, and infer the goal given the observed part of a procedure, respectively. To leverage the LLMs, we propose a two-stage framework, AntGPT. It first recognizes the actions already performed in the observed videos and then asks an LLM to predict the future actions via conditioned generation, or to infer the goal and plan the whole procedure by chain-of-thought prompting. Empirical results on the Ego4D LTA v1 and v2 benchmarks, EPIC-Kitchens-55, as well as EGTEA GAZE+ demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach. AntGPT achieves state-of-the-art performance on all above benchmarks, and can successfully infer the goal and thus perform goal-conditioned "counterfactual" prediction via qualitative analysis. Code and model will be released at https://brown-palm.github.io/AntGPT

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.