Daily Papers

Frontier AI agents increasingly act in environments where seemingly solvable tasks may lack prerequisites, contain conflicting requirements, or reveal blockers only during execution. We formulate agentic self-awareness (ASA) as the alignment of task-grounded feasibility judgments (know), warranted behavior (act), and responses to reconsideration (hold), distinguishing what a task permits from what an agent can solve. We build paired feasible and blocked tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.1 and retail τ^2-bench and introduce an authorship-aware M0-M3 rubric that separates recognizing a blocker from taking the certified deferral action for the correct reason. Separate probes assess stated feasibility beliefs and responses to a single challenge. In a Terminal-Bench protocol baseline, blocker recognition reaches 84.4%, but strict self-awareness (SA) reaches only 40.6%. Harness search without model-weight updates increases strict SA from 45.3% to 93.8% on reused Terminal-Bench search tasks; selection for abstention alone, however, can reduce success on feasible tasks. Independently initialized joint-objective searches improve both blocked-task SA and feasible-task solve on their own search sets. Retail held-out gains remain limited, and Terminal-Bench blocked-task transfer is not measured. This evaluation pipeline makes the recognition-action gap measurable and sets a two-sided target for improving agent decisions under changing task evidence.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked optimism about their potential to accelerate scientific discovery, with a growing number of works proposing research agents that autonomously generate and validate new ideas. Despite this, no evaluations have shown that LLM systems can take the very first step of producing novel, expert-level ideas, let alone perform the entire research process. We address this by establishing an experimental design that evaluates research idea generation while controlling for confounders and performs the first head-to-head comparison between expert NLP researchers and an LLM ideation agent. By recruiting over 100 NLP researchers to write novel ideas and blind reviews of both LLM and human ideas, we obtain the first statistically significant conclusion on current LLM capabilities for research ideation: we find LLM-generated ideas are judged as more novel (p < 0.05) than human expert ideas while being judged slightly weaker on feasibility. Studying our agent baselines closely, we identify open problems in building and evaluating research agents, including failures of LLM self-evaluation and their lack of diversity in generation. Finally, we acknowledge that human judgements of novelty can be difficult, even by experts, and propose an end-to-end study design which recruits researchers to execute these ideas into full projects, enabling us to study whether these novelty and feasibility judgements result in meaningful differences in research outcome.

In current NLP research, large-scale language models and their abilities are widely being discussed. Some recent works have also found notable failures of these models. Often these failure examples involve complex reasoning abilities. This work focuses on a simple commonsense ability, reasoning about when an action (or its effect) is feasible. To this end, we introduce FeasibilityQA, a question-answering dataset involving binary classification (BCQ) and multi-choice multi-correct questions (MCQ) that test understanding of feasibility. We show that even state-of-the-art models such as GPT-3, GPT-2, and T5 struggle to answer the feasibility questions correctly. Specifically, on MCQ and BCQ questions, GPT-3 achieves an accuracy of just (19%, 62%) and (25%, 64%) in zero-shot and few-shot settings, respectively. We also evaluate models by providing relevant knowledge statements required to answer the question. We find that the additional knowledge leads to a 7% gain in performance, but the overall performance still remains low. These results make one wonder how much commonsense knowledge about action feasibility is encoded in state-of-the-art models and how well they can reason about it.

A safe action is not necessarily a viable one. A frozen vision-language-action (VLA) policy can favor a locally admissible move that leaves no policy-supported route to safe task completion. We call this the feasibility-likelihood gap: likelihood ranks the next move, while feasibility depends on the futures it leaves open. To bring those futures into the decision, we derive the exact next-block marginal of the history-conditioned policy-environment trajectory law restricted to safe task completion. The derivation reveals a candidate-dependent feasible-future mass: its support records whether safe completion remains possible under the frozen continuation process, while its magnitude measures how much weighted safe-completion mass remains. Since exact evaluation is impractical online, we develop a selective finite-candidate approximation and establish conditions for recovering the best retained viable candidate. Our alarm-triggered, training-free reranker VICS-G lowers mean cumulative safety cost by 1.9%-57.5% across six Safety-CHORES settings while remaining within 2.5 percentage points of policy sampling in success and 0.82 steps in mean episode length. Our approach offers a promising and practical path toward safer task completion, grounded in an exact policy-relative target yet requiring neither policy retraining nor online rollouts.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Large language models work well on English and behave in poorly understood ways on languages typologically far from it. Japanese is a clean example, where evaluation still leans on translation quality and JGLUE-style benchmarks, which roll lexical, syntactic and pragmatic competence into a single score. The phenomena on which general-purpose models fail Japanese users are pragmatic: honorifics, in-group and out-group reference, context-sensitive politeness, zero anaphora. I introduce J-PragEval-v0, a minimal-pair benchmark isolating four such phenomena from surface fluency, and combine it with linear probes and teacher-forced log-probability evaluation to ask where inside TinySwallow-1.5B (28 layers, hidden size 1536) the corresponding contrasts live. The four features split three ways. Honorific register sits cleanly in the residual stream: 0.96 balanced accuracy at layer 15, and the model flips its preferred continuation with the scenario on 93 percent of items. Implicit subject and in-group reference are not linearly decodable at the final prompt token (0.48 and 0.38), yet flip rates are 0.77 and 0.79, so the contrast is worked out during generation rather than stored at the prompt. Indirect refusal is the negative case: 0.95 probe accuracy collapsing to a 0.43 flip rate under length-normalised teacher forcing, because the current minimal pairs conflate politeness with continuation length. I also specify Pragmatic Representation Steering, a parameter-free inference-time method that edits residual-stream activations along the class-mean-difference directions probing identifies. Feasibility is argued indirectly rather than demonstrated: the contrastive activation addition baseline, the same geometry the method would inject, recovers probe accuracy within one to two points of logistic regression wherever a linear signal exists. Scaling to Llama-3.1-Swallow-8B is the next step.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

Forecasting has become a natural benchmark for reasoning under uncertainty. Yet existing evaluations of large language models remain limited to judgmental tasks in simple formats, such as binary or multiple-choice questions. In practice, however, forecasting spans a far broader scope. Across domains such as economics, public health, and social demographics, decisions hinge on numerical estimates over continuous quantities, a capability that current benchmarks do not capture. Evaluating such estimates requires a format that makes uncertainty explicit and testable. We propose prediction intervals as a natural and rigorous interface for this purpose. They demand scale awareness, internal consistency across confidence levels, and calibration over a continuum of outcomes, making them a more suitable evaluation format than point estimates for numerical forecasting. To assess this capability, we introduce a new benchmark QuantSightBench, and evaluate frontier models under multiple settings, assessing both empirical coverage and interval sharpness. Our results show that none of the 11 evaluated frontier and open-weight models achieves the 90\% coverage target, with the top performers Gemini 3.1 Pro (79.1\%), Grok 4 (76.4\%), and GPT-5.4 (75.3\%) all falling at least 10 percentage points short. Calibration degrades sharply at extreme magnitudes, revealing systematic overconfidence across all evaluated models.

In recent years, vision-language research has shifted to study tasks which require more complex reasoning, such as interactive question answering, visual common sense reasoning, and question-answer plausibility prediction. However, the datasets used for these problems fail to capture the complexity of real inputs and multimodal environments, such as ambiguous natural language requests and diverse digital domains. We introduce Mobile app Tasks with Iterative Feedback (MoTIF), a dataset with natural language commands for the greatest number of interactive environments to date. MoTIF is the first to contain natural language requests for interactive environments that are not satisfiable, and we obtain follow-up questions on this subset to enable research on task uncertainty resolution. We perform initial feasibility classification experiments and only reach an F1 score of 37.3, verifying the need for richer vision-language representations and improved architectures to reason about task feasibility.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Vision-language navigation (VLN), in which an agent follows language instruction in a visual environment, has been studied under the premise that the input command is fully feasible in the environment. Yet in practice, a request may not be possible due to language ambiguity or environment changes. To study VLN with unknown command feasibility, we introduce a new dataset Mobile app Tasks with Iterative Feedback (MoTIF), where the goal is to complete a natural language command in a mobile app. Mobile apps provide a scalable domain to study real downstream uses of VLN methods. Moreover, mobile app commands provide instruction for interactive navigation, as they result in action sequences with state changes via clicking, typing, or swiping. MoTIF is the first to include feasibility annotations, containing both binary feasibility labels and fine-grained labels for why tasks are unsatisfiable. We further collect follow-up questions for ambiguous queries to enable research on task uncertainty resolution. Equipped with our dataset, we propose the new problem of feasibility prediction, in which a natural language instruction and multimodal app environment are used to predict command feasibility. MoTIF provides a more realistic app dataset as it contains many diverse environments, high-level goals, and longer action sequences than prior work. We evaluate interactive VLN methods using MoTIF, quantify the generalization ability of current approaches to new app environments, and measure the effect of task feasibility on navigation performance.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Large language models generate computationally expensive yet semantically void reasoning on beyond-capability tasks, creating risks where plausible-sounding but incorrect derivations mislead users. We characterize this futile reasoning phenomenon through systematic analysis, revealing universal capability overreach and systematic miscalibration between capability and behavior. The dominant failure mode is specious reasoning, which outputs look superficially valid but contain subtle errors, escalating with task difficulty. To address this, we introduce CaRL (Capability-aligned Reinforcement Learning), which aligns model behavior with capability boundaries through reward shaping that incentivizes refusal over futile reasoning and hindsight refusal augmentation that converts failures into refusal supervision. Experiments demonstrate a substantial reduction in futile reasoning while preserving performance across task difficulties, effectively achieving capability-aligned behavior without sacrificing utility. https://github.com/icip-cas/Knowing-When-to-Quit

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Large language model (LLM) agents can keep scientific experiments running for months with little human supervision, but reliable autonomous research also requires scientific judgment. Evaluating scientific judgment is difficult because research decisions are open-ended and depend on project context. We construct SciΠvot, a 248-case benchmark of scientific judgment based on human corrections. The benchmark draws on records from six months of research in which senior researchers ran LLM agents on 26 projects across six scientific fields and repeatedly intervened to correct the agents' research judgments. In each case, an agent chooses between the original LLM plan and the human-corrected alternative, using only the project record available before the correction as context. We compare LLM and human performance and examine the effects of reasoning effort, access to the project record, and reconsideration. At medium reasoning effort with the project record, models systematically prefer the original LLM plan over the human-corrected alternative. Four of five frontier models perform below chance on the selected cases. The highest accuracy in the project condition across the tested models and reasoning effort settings is 63.5%, compared with 73.4% for fresh researchers. At medium effort, every model achieves lower accuracy with the project record than without it, and reconsideration does not consistently improve overall accuracy. Even with a human-corrected alternative available, frontier models struggle with the selected research decisions, while SciΠvot supports systematic evaluation of scientific judgment for LLM agents.

Progress in large language models is constrained by an evaluation bottleneck: build a benchmark, evaluate models and settings, then iterate. We therefore ask a simple question: can we forecast outcomes before running any experiments? We study text-only performance forecasting: estimating a model's score from a redacted task description and intended configuration, with no access to dataset instances. To support systematic study, we curate PRECOG, a corpus of redacted description-performance pairs spanning diverse tasks, domains, and metrics. Experiments show the task is challenging but feasible: models equipped with a retrieval module that excludes source papers achieve moderate prediction performance with well-calibrated uncertainty, reaching mean absolute error as low as 8.7 on the Accuracy subset at high-confidence thresholds. Our analysis indicates that stronger reasoning models engage in diverse, iterative querying, whereas current open-source models lag and often skip retrieval or gather evidence with limited diversity. We further test a zero-leakage setting, forecasting on newly released datasets or experiments before their papers are indexed, where GPT-5 with built-in web search still attains nontrivial prediction accuracy. Overall, our corpus and analyses offer an initial step toward open-ended anticipatory evaluation, supporting difficulty estimation and smarter experiment prioritization.

The last couple of years have witnessed emerging research that appropriates Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks designed for humans to benchmark LLM's ToM capabilities as an indication of LLM's social intelligence. However, this approach has a number of limitations. Drawing on existing psychology and AI literature, we summarize the theoretical, methodological, and evaluation limitations by pointing out that certain issues are inherently present in the original ToM tasks used to evaluate human's ToM, which continues to persist and exacerbated when appropriated to benchmark LLM's ToM. Taking a human-computer interaction (HCI) perspective, these limitations prompt us to rethink the definition and criteria of ToM in ToM benchmarks in a more dynamic, interactional approach that accounts for user preferences, needs, and experiences with LLMs in such evaluations. We conclude by outlining potential opportunities and challenges towards this direction.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Thinking about the future is one of the important activities that people do in daily life. Futurists also pay a lot of effort into figuring out possible scenarios for the future. We argue that the exploration of this direction is still in an early stage in the NLP research. To this end, we propose three argument generation tasks in the financial application scenario. Our experimental results show these tasks are still big challenges for representative generation models. Based on our empirical results, we further point out several unresolved issues and challenges in this research direction.

Many high-stakes decisions depend on forecasts made before outcomes are known. In this future prediction setting, the central challenge is that public evidence evolves over time, while the main supervision signal arrives only after resolution: the realized outcome mainly assesses final correctness, offering only coarse guidance on what to track, what to verify, and which judgments to leave uncertain along the way. Our key observation is that revisiting the same unresolved question over time creates informative temporal contrasts across evolving evidence and repeated forecasts, exposing what earlier attempts missed before resolution and yielding a diagnostic signal we call the pre-resolution signal. We instantiate this idea in Milkyway, a future prediction agent with a persistent future prediction harness, an editable external state that stores reusable procedural guidance across revisits to the same unresolved question. As the same unresolved question is revisited, Milkyway extracts pre-resolution signals from evolving evidence and repeated forecasts, uses them to update the harness, and improves later forecasts on that question before resolution. After resolution, the realized outcome serves as a post-resolution check of provisional updates. On the FutureX and FutureWorld benchmarks, Milkyway achieves strong performance against competitive baselines, and a mechanism study suggests that the gains stem from harness evolution driven by pre-resolution signals rather than repeated prediction alone.

"An idea is nothing more nor less than a new combination of old elements" (Young, J.W.). The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) and publicly available ChatGPT have marked a significant turning point in the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into people's everyday lives. This study explores the capability of LLMs in generating novel research ideas based on information from research papers. We conduct a thorough examination of 4 LLMs in five domains (e.g., Chemistry, Computer, Economics, Medical, and Physics). We found that the future research ideas generated by Claude-2 and GPT-4 are more aligned with the author's perspective than GPT-3.5 and Gemini. We also found that Claude-2 generates more diverse future research ideas than GPT-4, GPT-3.5, and Gemini 1.0. We further performed a human evaluation of the novelty, relevancy, and feasibility of the generated future research ideas. This investigation offers insights into the evolving role of LLMs in idea generation, highlighting both its capability and limitations. Our work contributes to the ongoing efforts in evaluating and utilizing language models for generating future research ideas. We make our datasets and codes publicly available.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Some things are impossible, but some things may be even more impossible than impossible. Levitating a feather using one's mind is impossible in our world, but fits into our intuitive theories of possible worlds, whereas levitating a feather using the number five cannot be conceived in any possible world ("inconceivable"). While prior work has examined the distinction between improbable and impossible events, there has been little empirical research on inconceivability. Here, we investigate whether people maintain a distinction between impossibility and inconceivability, and how such distinctions might be made. We find that people can readily distinguish the impossible from the inconceivable, using categorization studies similar to those used to investigate the differences between impossible and improbable (Experiment 1). However, this distinction is not explained by people's subjective ratings of event likelihood, which are near zero and indistinguishable between impossible and inconceivable event descriptions (Experiment 2). Finally, we ask whether the probabilities assigned to event descriptions by statistical language models (LMs) can be used to separate modal categories, and whether these probabilities align with people's ratings (Experiment 3). We find high-level similarities between people and LMs: both distinguish among impossible and inconceivable event descriptions, and LM-derived string probabilities predict people's ratings of event likelihood across modal categories. Our findings suggest that fine-grained knowledge about exceedingly rare events (i.e., the impossible and inconceivable) may be learned via statistical learning over linguistic forms, yet leave open the question of whether people represent the distinction between impossible and inconceivable as a difference not of degree, but of kind.

Accelerating scientific discovery requires the identification of which experiments would yield the best outcomes before committing resources to costly physical validation. While existing benchmarks evaluate LLMs on scientific knowledge and reasoning, their ability to predict experimental outcomes - a task where AI could significantly exceed human capabilities - remains largely underexplored. We introduce SciPredict, a benchmark comprising 405 tasks derived from recent empirical studies in 33 specialized sub-fields of physics, biology, and chemistry. SciPredict addresses two critical questions: (a) can LLMs predict the outcome of scientific experiments with sufficient accuracy? and (b) can such predictions be reliably used in the scientific research process? Evaluations reveal fundamental limitations on both fronts. Model accuracies are 14-26% and human expert performance is approx20%. Although some frontier models exceed human performance model accuracy is still far below what would enable reliable experimental guidance. Even within the limited performance, models fail to distinguish reliable predictions from unreliable ones, achieving only approx20% accuracy regardless of their confidence or whether they judge outcomes as predictable without physical experimentation. Human experts, in contrast, demonstrate strong calibration: their accuracy increases from approx5% to approx80% as they deem outcomes more predictable without conducting the experiment. SciPredict establishes a rigorous framework demonstrating that superhuman performance in experimental science requires not just better predictions, but better awareness of prediction reliability. For reproducibility all our data and code are provided at https://github.com/scaleapi/scipredict

How do we communicate with others to achieve our goals? We use our prior experience or advice from others, or construct a candidate utterance by predicting how it will be received. However, our experiences are limited and biased, and reasoning about potential outcomes can be difficult and cognitively challenging. In this paper, we explore how we can leverage Large Language Model (LLM) simulations to help us communicate better. We propose the Explore-Generate-Simulate (EGS) framework, which takes as input any scenario where an individual is communicating to an audience with a goal they want to achieve. EGS (1) explores the solution space by producing a diverse set of advice relevant to the scenario, (2) generates communication candidates conditioned on subsets of the advice, and (3) simulates the reactions from various audiences to determine both the best candidate and advice to use. We evaluate the framework on eight scenarios spanning the ten fundamental processes of interpersonal communication. For each scenario, we collect a dataset of human evaluations across candidates and baselines, and showcase that our framework's chosen candidate is preferred over popular generation mechanisms including Chain-of-Thought. We also find that audience simulations achieve reasonably high agreement with human raters across 5 of the 8 scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our framework by applying it to real-world scenarios described by users on web forums. Through evaluations and demonstrations, we show that EGS enhances the effectiveness and outcomes of goal-oriented communication across a variety of situations, thus opening up new possibilities for the application of large language models in revolutionizing communication and decision-making processes.

Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.

Large language models increasingly generate research ideas, yet judging their novelty or feasibility at generation time does not establish whether they anticipate subsequent work. We introduce IdeaForecastBench to evaluate research idea forecasting. Given a community's literature up to a cutoff, a system produces up to five ranked ideas, which are evaluated against later papers. The benchmark comprises 624 rolling episodes across 52 topics, with a fixed retrieve-then-judge protocol and separately reported results from two judges. We compare five history-compression strategies across GPT-4.1, Qwen2.5-7B/14B, and Qwen3.5-9B, together with a learned Mode-Decomposition Forecaster (MDF). Under the primary GPT-4.1-mini judge, Summary improves on Direct in Hit@5 and Precision@5 across all four backbones. Qwen2.5 scores above GPT-4.1, whereas Qwen3.5 scores below it. An outcome-blind assessment finds that Qwen2.5 produces broader forecasts, but does not identify how much breadth contributes to its advantage. Threshold and judge diagnostics further clarify the limits of interpreting realization as precise anticipation. IdeaForecastBench provides a common task for studying which research ideas a community subsequently pursues and how reliably this outcome can be measured.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

High-stakes decision making involves reasoning under uncertainty about the future. In this work, we train language models to make predictions on open-ended forecasting questions. To scale up training data, we synthesize novel forecasting questions from global events reported in daily news, using a fully automated, careful curation recipe. We train the Qwen3 thinking models on our dataset, OpenForesight. To prevent leakage of future information during training and evaluation, we use an offline news corpus, both for data generation and retrieval in our forecasting system. Guided by a small validation set, we show the benefits of retrieval, and an improved reward function for reinforcement learning (RL). Once we obtain our final forecasting system, we perform held-out testing between May to August 2025. Our specialized model, OpenForecaster 8B, matches much larger proprietary models, with our training improving the accuracy, calibration, and consistency of predictions. We find calibration improvements from forecasting training generalize across popular benchmarks. We open-source all our models, code, and data to make research on language model forecasting broadly accessible.

In today's software world with its cornucopia of reusable software libraries, when a programmer is faced with a programming task that they suspect can be completed through the use of a library, they often look for code examples using a search engine and then manually adapt found examples to their specific context of use. We put forward a vision based on a new breed of developer tools that have the potential to largely automate this process. The key idea is to adapt code autocompletion tools such that they take into account not only the developer's already-written code but also the intent of the task the developer is trying to achieve next, formulated in plain natural language. We call this practice of enriching the code with natural language intent to facilitate its completion natural language-guided programming. To show that this idea is feasible we design, implement and benchmark a tool that solves this problem in the context of a specific domain (data science) and a specific programming language (Python). Central to the tool is the use of language models trained on a large corpus of documented code. Our initial experiments confirm the feasibility of the idea but also make it clear that we have only scratched the surface of what may become possible in the future. We end the paper with a comprehensive research agenda to stimulate additional research in the budding area of natural language-guided programming.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

LLMs are increasingly used to brainstorm research ideas, but existing evaluations mostly judge individual ideas by novelty, feasibility, or expert preference. We instead ask: how far are current LLM-generated ideas from human researchers? To characterize this gap, we build a large-scale evaluation framework for ideation from high-quality human research papers. For each paper, we reverse-engineer a small set of closely related prior works that likely inspired its core idea. LLMs are then prompted to generate a new idea from the set of paper titles and summaries. We introduce a two-axis research-taste taxonomy to profile each idea by its opportunity pattern and research paradigm, and use it to quantify the divergence between human and LLM ideas. Across idea sets generated by different LLMs, we observe a consistent distributional gap: LLM ideas are disproportionately concentrated around bridge-like opportunities and synthesis methods, whereas the human paper reference distribution spreads more broadly across ways of framing gaps and constructing contributions. This result suggests that strong LLMs can produce a range of reasonable ideas, but that range remains narrower than, and systematically shifted relative to, human research taste.

Many animals, and an increasing number of artificial agents, display sophisticated capabilities to perceive and manipulate objects. But human beings remain distinctive in their capacity for flexible, creative tool use -- using objects in new ways to act on the world, achieve a goal, or solve a problem. To study this type of general physical problem solving, we introduce the Virtual Tools game. In this game, people solve a large range of challenging physical puzzles in just a handful of attempts. We propose that the flexibility of human physical problem solving rests on an ability to imagine the effects of hypothesized actions, while the efficiency of human search arises from rich action priors which are updated via observations of the world. We instantiate these components in the "Sample, Simulate, Update" (SSUP) model and show that it captures human performance across 30 levels of the Virtual Tools game. More broadly, this model provides a mechanism for explaining how people condense general physical knowledge into actionable, task-specific plans to achieve flexible and efficient physical problem-solving.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in generating novel research ideas. However, these ideas often face challenges related to feasibility and expected effectiveness. This paper explores how augmenting LLMs with relevant data during the idea generation process can enhance the quality of generated ideas. We introduce two ways of incorporating data: (1) providing metadata during the idea generation stage to guide LLMs toward feasible directions, and (2) adding automatic validation during the idea selection stage to assess the empirical plausibility of hypotheses within ideas. We conduct experiments in the social science domain, specifically with climate negotiation topics, and find that metadata improves the feasibility of generated ideas by 20%, while automatic validation improves the overall quality of selected ideas by 7%. A human study shows that LLM-generated ideas, along with their related data and validation processes, inspire researchers to propose research ideas with higher quality. Our work highlights the potential of data-driven research idea generation, and underscores the practical utility of LLM-assisted ideation in real-world academic settings.

The handling of probabilities in the form of uncertainty or partial information is an essential task for LLMs in many settings and applications. A common approach to evaluate an LLM's probabilistic reasoning capabilities is to assess its ability to answer questions pertaining to probability through the use of multiple-choice questions (MCQs). However, this paradigm, which we refer to as explicit probabilistic reasoning, has been shown in the literature to yield significant limitations (e.g., sensitivity to answer ordering). In this work, we introduce an alternative approach, named implicit probabilistic reasoning, which evaluates the models' ability to integrate probabilistic reasoning into their text generation process. To achieve this, we rephrase MCQs as text-completion scenarios with a determined set of outcomes and compare the model's next-token probability assignments to the true likelihood of the outcomes. In line with previous work, we find that models exhibit solid performance in their explicit probabilistic reasoning (i.e., answers to MCQs). However, during text completion (i.e., implicit probabilistic reasoning), where the same information must be taken into account to generate text, the models' predictions often significantly diverge from the known ground truth. For instance, our evaluation method reveals that implicit probabilistic reasoning is improperly influenced by many factors, such as independent prior events, partial observations about a result, or statistical background information. All of these issues can cause erroneous results to be produced in text generation, which are not detected by conventional MCQ-based evaluation.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to scientific research, yet prevailing science benchmarks probe decontextualized knowledge and overlook the iterative reasoning, hypothesis generation, and observation interpretation that drive scientific discovery. We introduce a scenario-grounded benchmark that evaluates LLMs across biology, chemistry, materials, and physics, where domain experts define research projects of genuine interest and decompose them into modular research scenarios from which vetted questions are sampled. The framework assesses models at two levels: (i) question-level accuracy on scenario-tied items and (ii) project-level performance, where models must propose testable hypotheses, design simulations or experiments, and interpret results. Applying this two-phase scientific discovery evaluation (SDE) framework to state-of-the-art LLMs reveals a consistent performance gap relative to general science benchmarks, diminishing return of scaling up model sizes and reasoning, and systematic weaknesses shared across top-tier models from different providers. Large performance variation in research scenarios leads to changing choices of the best performing model on scientific discovery projects evaluated, suggesting all current LLMs are distant to general scientific "superintelligence". Nevertheless, LLMs already demonstrate promise in a great variety of scientific discovery projects, including cases where constituent scenario scores are low, highlighting the role of guided exploration and serendipity in discovery. This SDE framework offers a reproducible benchmark for discovery-relevant evaluation of LLMs and charts practical paths to advance their development toward scientific discovery.

The paper considers a new quantitative-qualitative proximity measure for the features of information objects, where data enters a common information resource from several sources independently. The goal is to determine the possibility of their relation to the same physical object (observation object). The proposed measure accounts for the possibility of differences in individual feature values - both quantitative and qualitative - caused by existing determination errors. To analyze the proximity of quantitative feature values, the author employs a probabilistic measure; for qualitative features, a measure of possibility is used. The paper demonstrates the feasibility of the proposed measure by checking its compliance with the axioms required of any measure. Unlike many known measures, the proposed approach does not require feature value transformation to ensure comparability. The work also proposes several variants of measures to determine the proximity of information objects (IO) based on a group of diverse features.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Forecasting is an important task in many domains, such as technology and economics. However existing forecasting benchmarks largely lack comprehensive confidence assessment, focus on limited question types, and often consist of artificial questions that do not align with real-world human forecasting needs. To address these gaps, we introduce FOReCAst (Future Outcome Reasoning and Confidence Assessment), a benchmark that evaluates models' ability to make predictions and their confidence in them. FOReCAst spans diverse forecasting scenarios involving Boolean questions, timeframe prediction, and quantity estimation, enabling a comprehensive evaluation of both prediction accuracy and confidence calibration for real-world applications.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

Reasoning about necessity and possibility depends on assumptions about accessibility between worlds and about which objects exist at each one. The same inference may therefore hold under one modal system and fail under another. Evaluating language models on such problems requires testing whether their judgments follow the stated semantics rather than a familiar logic. We construct paired modal problems with identical premises and conjecture but different frame or domain conditions; automated reasoning verifies opposite labels. A balanced core prevents the semantic condition alone from revealing the answer. On this core, four of five recent models perform below the condition-only baseline under direct prompting. Yet enabling reasoning mode raises DeepSeek V4 Flash from 4.4% to 88.1% on unchanged prompts. Following stipulated modal semantics thus depends strongly on inference mode as well as model identity. When frame conditions are omitted, models often agree but fit different familiar logics best. We release the formulas, oracle artifacts, countermodels, and responses.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

Language learners must learn the meanings of many thousands of words, despite those words occurring in complex environments in which infinitely many meanings might be inferred by the learner as a word's true meaning. This problem of infinite referential uncertainty is often attributed to Willard Van Orman Quine. We provide a mathematical formalisation of an ideal cross-situational learner attempting to learn under infinite referential uncertainty, and identify conditions under which word learning is possible. As Quine's intuitions suggest, learning under infinite uncertainty is in fact possible, provided that learners have some means of ranking candidate word meanings in terms of their plausibility; furthermore, our analysis shows that this ranking could in fact be exceedingly weak, implying that constraints which allow learners to infer the plausibility of candidate word meanings could themselves be weak. This approach lifts the burden of explanation from `smart' word learning constraints in learners, and suggests a programme of research into weak, unreliable, probabilistic constraints on the inference of word meaning in real word learners.

An ordinary-looking background detail can turn a correct model decision into a confident mistake. We demonstrate this fragility in four decision systems, including Jev, across seven datasets covering knowledge, reasoning, and tool routing. Within 64 accepted target evaluations per decision, we uncover short context additions that redirect 61.4%-73.2% of each system's initially correct decisions toward a wrong option fixed in advance. The additions supply background or procedural information rather than explicit answer-selection instructions, leaving the original question and choices intact. We construct them through probability-guided context optimization, which uses shifts in the option distribution to refine surrounding text under naturalness and answer-preservation constraints. Redirection affects initially confident decisions, often produces high-confidence wrong choices, and transfers across models. In blinded human evaluation, 91.6% of 250 sampled successful contexts are judged natural, answer-preserving, and free of decisive answer-changing evidence by a majority of three independent annotators. These findings expose a weakness in current decision models: context that looks entirely compatible with an input can redirect the choices that agents, routers, and evaluators rely on.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

Physical interactions follow a long-tailed distribution: a set of common and regular interactions dominates human experience and visual data, while a broad spectrum of rare and irregular interactions remains underrepresented. Although recent visual world models, including image and video generation models, achieve impressive realism on existing benchmarks, they primarily focus on simulating common physical interactions. This raises a central question: Do current visual world models internalize and generalize physical principles? In this work, we introduce Tailor-Bench, a benchmark that challenges world models to simulate irregular physical interactions. To enable systematic evaluation, we design three scenario modes that progressively challenge model reasoning: Regular scenarios reflect common tool-task pairs, Unconventional scenarios replace conventional tools with attribute-compatible substitutes to test affordance generalization, and Impossible scenarios introduce attribute-violating tools to probe constraint awareness. Additionally, we design two complementary settings under a unified evaluation protocol: predictive generation requires inferring outcomes without guidance, while descriptive generation specifies the target outcome for faithful realization. Our experimental results reveal a clear long-tail gap in physical world modeling: performance degrades from Regular to Unconventional and Impossible scenarios, indicating limited generalization beyond common interactions. Failure analysis further shows that models rely on superficial visual patterns: image models fail to realize correct state changes, while video models further suffer from temporal inconsistencies.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Frontier coding agents solve complex tasks when given complete context but collapse when specifications are incomplete or ambiguous. The bottleneck is not raw capability, but judgment: knowing when to act autonomously and when to ask for help. Current benchmarks are blind to this failure mode. They supply unambiguous detailed instructions and solely reward execution correctness, so an agent that makes a lucky guess for a missing requirement will score identically to one that would have asked to be certain. We present HiL-Bench (Human-in-the-Loop Benchmark) to measure this selective escalation skill. Each task contains human-validated blockers (missing information, ambiguous requests, contradictory information) that surface only through progressive exploration, not upfront inspection. Our core metric, Ask-F1, the harmonic mean of question precision and blocker recall, captures the tension between over-asking and silent guessing; its structure architecturally prevents gaming through question spam. Evaluation across SWE and text-to-SQL domains reveals a large universal judgment gap: no frontier model recovers more than a fraction of its full-information performance when deciding whether to ask. Failure analysis identifies three key help-seeking patterns: overconfident wrong beliefs with no gap detection; high uncertainty detection yet persistent errors; broad, imprecise escalation without self-correction. These consistent patterns confirm poor help-seeking is a model-level flaw, not task-specific. RL training on shaped Ask-F1 reward shows judgment is trainable: a 32B model improves both help-seeking quality and task pass rate, with gains that transfer across domains. The model does not learn domain-specific heuristics for when to ask; it learns to detect unresolvable uncertainty and act on it.

LLM-as-a-judge enables evaluation across diverse tasks, but inference cost and confidence reliability become critical at scale. We study whether a decision-only judge can provide an economical first pass and identify when stronger evaluation is needed. Comparing jev-as-a-judge with sixteen generative and reward-model judges, with blinded human adjudication, we find it within three percentage points of a state-of-the-art LLM judge, our strongest comparator, on ordinary preference and evidence-grounded factuality at 0.36% of the comparator's fee. Larger gaps arise when judgments require checking a derivation or resisting an elaborately written wrong answer. On several benchmarks, JEV's gap to this comparator is concentrated in low-confidence decisions. A frozen cascade that accepts confident verdicts and escalates uncertain ones retains 99% of the comparator's accuracy at lower cost.

One of the most critical tasks for startups is to validate their business model. Therefore, entrepreneurs try to collect information such as feedback from other actors to assess the validity of their assumptions and make decisions. However, previous work on decisional guidance for business model validation provides no solution for the highly uncertain and complex context of earlystage startups. The purpose of this paper is, thus, to develop design principles for a Hybrid Intelligence decision support system (HI-DSS) that combines the complementary capabilities of human and machine intelligence. We follow a design science research approach to design a prototype artifact and a set of design principles. Our study provides prescriptive knowledge for HI-DSS and contributes to previous work on decision support for business models, the applications of complementary strengths of humans and machines for making decisions, and support systems for extremely uncertain decision-making problems.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Scientific discovery begins where known problems end. There, AI systems must engage in exploration: framing hypotheses, designing experiments, and iterating on the results. However, evaluating this ability is difficult: (1) how to verify whether a genuinely new hypothesis holds, and (2) how to determine whether a system has discovered it through exploration or merely recalled related knowledge from pre-training data. To this end, we introduce ExplorationBench, which turns the wicked problem of evaluating scientific exploration into a concrete and tractable framework built on verifiable Alien Worlds: their rules are executable, so every answer can be checked exactly, and they conflict with familiar knowledge, so recall alone cannot solve the tasks. The benchmark contains two sandboxes, AlienCode (31 discovery targets, 70 tasks) and AlienLogic (24 discovery targets, 70 tasks). Each sandbox provides a flawed manual, task-specific environmental feedback, and a dedicated tool-call schema. Systems use these resources to explore the sandbox, then solve held-out tasks. We evaluate 10 AI systems and find that the strongest systems can acquire and apply unfamiliar rules, while performance varies substantially across trajectories and continued exploration can stall or reverse earlier gains. ExplorationBench represents a step towards AI systems that can acquire and apply genuinely new knowledge through exploration in unknown environments.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in accelerating the scientific research pipeline. A key capability for this process is the ability to generate novel research ideas, and prior studies have found settings in which LLM-generated research ideas were judged as more novel than human-expert ideas. However, a good idea should not simply appear to be novel, it should also result in better research after being executed. To test whether AI-generated ideas lead to better research outcomes, we conduct an execution study by recruiting 43 expert researchers to execute randomly-assigned ideas, either written by experts or generated by an LLM. Each expert spent over 100 hours implementing the idea and wrote a 4-page short paper to document the experiments. All the executed projects are then reviewed blindly by expert NLP researchers. Comparing the review scores of the same ideas before and after execution, the scores of the LLM-generated ideas decrease significantly more than expert-written ideas on all evaluation metrics (novelty, excitement, effectiveness, and overall; p < 0.05), closing the gap between LLM and human ideas observed at the ideation stage. When comparing the aggregated review scores from the execution study, we even observe that for many metrics there is a flip in rankings where human ideas score higher than LLM ideas. This ideation-execution gap highlights the limitations of current LLMs in generating truly effective research ideas and the challenge of evaluating research ideas in the absence of execution outcomes.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Recent advances in foundation models have enabled AI scientists to automate increasingly complete research workflows, from hypothesis generation and code execution to manuscript preparation. Yet workflow coverage alone does not provide access to the full evidence on which scientific discovery depends. Existing systems typically reason over text, code, labels, or precomputed summaries, leaving scientifically decisive spatial, temporal, cross-channel, and procedural relations unavailable to the agent. We introduce OmniScientist, an end-to-end, omni-modal AI scientist that conducts multidisciplinary research directly from heterogeneous raw evidence. A perception layer and 3 autonomous agents for ideation, experiment, and writeup operate within a deterministic pipeline, allowing observations to shape research questions, experimental decisions, and final claims throughout the research lifecycle. By running idea, rigour, and claim checks in code, the system enforces novelty screening, statistical validity, execution provenance, and numerical traceability. We evaluate OmniScientist on 36 real-data cases spanning 5 discipline families, 4 families of scientific evidence, and modalities including images, signals, audio, video, 3-D structures, trajectories, tables, formulae, and graphs. The system completes the full path from raw data to a compiled manuscript in all 36 cases and achieves a mean overall paper score of 6.3 with the reference reasoning backbone. In paired comparisons against a blind variant that receives only precomputed scalar features, direct perception improves all 7 evaluation dimensions and wins 85% of head-to-head judgments. These results show that lifecycle-wide perception is essential for evidence-grounded scientific discovery and provides a practical path toward broadly capable AI scientists.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models has catalyzed a surge in scientific idea production, yet this leap has not been accompanied by a matching advance in idea evaluation. The fundamental nature of scientific evaluation needs knowledgeable grounding, collective deliberation, and multi-criteria decision-making. However, existing idea evaluation methods often suffer from narrow knowledge horizons, flattened evaluation dimensions, and the inherent bias in LLM-as-a-Judge. To address these, we regard idea evaluation as a knowledge-grounded, multi-perspective reasoning problem and introduce InnoEval, a deep innovation evaluation framework designed to emulate human-level idea assessment. We apply a heterogeneous deep knowledge search engine that retrieves and grounds dynamic evidence from diverse online sources. We further achieve review consensus with an innovation review board containing reviewers with distinct academic backgrounds, enabling a multi-dimensional decoupled evaluation across multiple metrics. We construct comprehensive datasets derived from authoritative peer-reviewed submissions to benchmark InnoEval. Experiments demonstrate that InnoEval can consistently outperform baselines in point-wise, pair-wise, and group-wise evaluation tasks, exhibiting judgment patterns and consensus highly aligned with human experts.

As language models accelerate scientific research by automating hypothesis generation and implementation, a new bottleneck emerges: evaluating and filtering hundreds of AI-generated ideas without exhaustive experimentation. We ask whether LMs can learn to forecast the empirical success of research ideas before any experiments are run. We study comparative empirical forecasting: given a benchmark-specific research goal and two candidate ideas, predict which will achieve better benchmark performance. We construct a dataset of 11,488 idea pairs grounded in objective outcomes from PapersWithCode. While off-the-shelf 8B-parameter models struggle (30% acc.), SFT dramatically boosts performance to 77.1%, outperforming GPT-5 (61.1%). By framing evaluation as a reasoning task via Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), we train models to discover latent reasoning paths, achieving 71.35% acc. with interpretable justifications. Through additional ablations and out-of-distribution tests, we show robustness to surface-level heuristics and transfer to both a cross-domain time-split test set and an independently constructed test set. Our results demonstrate that compute-efficient small language models can serve as effective, objective verifiers, offering a scalable path for autonomous scientific discovery.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

Automated ideation systems are often evaluated on the novelty of the ideas they produce, and that judgment is increasingly delegated to large language models. Such judges are typically built ad hoc and validated, if at all, on human-authored papers rather than on the generated ideas they are meant to score. So, how do novelty judges perform? Not well. We present a systematic controlled study of novelty evaluation design choices. We first build an evaluation set automatically, mining OpenReview for passages where reviewers explicitly affirm or dispute a paper's originality and keeping only submissions with unanimous agreement at the extremes of their research area; we pair these with ideas from a vanilla LLM generator. Across six judges, we find that small prompt design choices have large consequences; e.g., simply telling the judge that reviewers found one idea novel and the other not can change its verdict on more than half of the identical idea pairs it is shown, shifting pairwise accuracy by over 50 points and occasionally pushing it below chance. The same change helps one judge and hurts another. Retrieval and larger reasoning budgets help little, and two purpose-built novelty evaluators are outperformed by our cheapest prompted baseline. These results raise questions about reported novelty gains of automated ideation systems, and call for robust novelty evaluation methods.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

Skillful mobile operation in three-dimensional environments is a primary topic of study in Artificial Intelligence. The past two years have seen a surge of creative work on navigation. This creative output has produced a plethora of sometimes incompatible task definitions and evaluation protocols. To coordinate ongoing and future research in this area, we have convened a working group to study empirical methodology in navigation research. The present document summarizes the consensus recommendations of this working group. We discuss different problem statements and the role of generalization, present evaluation measures, and provide standard scenarios that can be used for benchmarking.

LLMs are increasingly used to generate and judge scientific ideas. This makes novelty evaluation a central problem. Full idea evaluation is difficult because it often requires judging a method, its feasibility, and its empirical promise. We therefore study a cleaner upstream object: the research question (RQ). RQ generation is a prerequisite for scientific ideation, and RQs can be compared against questions pursued in real papers. We introduce RQ-Bench, a benchmark built from recent arXiv papers. For each paper, we reconstruct author-anchored RQs from its cited background, gaps, and contributions. These RQs are not the only valid questions for the same background. They are author-anchored reference points for testing novelty judgments. We evaluate model-generated RQs with standalone LLM judging, comparative LLM judging, and human expert evaluation. LLM judges consistently rate model-generated RQs as highly novel, producing a novelty mirage; in comparative evaluations, this preference becomes even stronger. Domain experts, however, reach the opposite conclusion and prefer the author-anchored reference questions. We further find that many generated RQs are narrow or source-bound, a dimension that LLM judges often miss unless explicitly tested. Overall, the contradictory novelty evaluations between LLM judges and human experts raise a serious concern about the reliability of using LLMs to assess the scientific novelty of research questions.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

We advocate for a strong integration of Computational Creativity (CC) with research in large language and vision models (LLVMs) to address a key limitation of these models, i.e., creative problem solving. We present preliminary experiments showing how CC principles can be applied to address this limitation. Our goal is to foster discussions on creative problem solving in LLVMs and CC at prestigious ML venues. Our code is available at: https://github.com/lnairGT/creative-problem-solving-LLMs

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

The rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated their potential to accelerate scientific discovery, particularly in automating the process of research ideation. LLM-based systems have shown promise in generating hypotheses and research ideas. However, current approaches predominantly rely on prompting-based pre-trained models, limiting their ability to optimize generated content effectively. Moreover, they also lack the capability to deal with the complex interdependence and inherent restrictions among novelty, feasibility, and effectiveness, which remains challenging due to the inherent trade-offs among these dimensions, such as the innovation-feasibility conflict. To address these limitations, we for the first time propose fine-tuning LLMs to be better idea proposers and introduce a novel framework that employs a two-stage approach combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and controllable Reinforcement Learning (RL). In the SFT stage, the model learns foundational patterns from pairs of research papers and follow-up ideas. In the RL stage, multi-dimensional reward modeling, guided by fine-grained feedback, evaluates and optimizes the generated ideas across key metrics. Dimensional controllers enable dynamic adjustment of generation, while a sentence-level decoder ensures context-aware emphasis during inference. Our framework provides a balanced approach to research ideation, achieving high-quality outcomes by dynamically navigating the trade-offs among novelty, feasibility, and effectiveness.

There is an increasing trend towards evaluating NLP models with LLM-generated judgments instead of human judgments. In the absence of a comparison against human data, this raises concerns about the validity of these evaluations; in case they are conducted with proprietary models, this also raises concerns over reproducibility. We provide JUDGE-BENCH, a collection of 20 NLP datasets with human annotations, and comprehensively evaluate 11 current LLMs, covering both open-weight and proprietary models, for their ability to replicate the annotations. Our evaluations show that each LLM exhibits a large variance across datasets in its correlation to human judgments. We conclude that LLMs are not yet ready to systematically replace human judges in NLP.

Language models (LMs) trained on web-scale datasets are largely successful due to their ability to memorize large amounts of training data, even if only present in a few examples. These capabilities are often desirable in evaluation on tasks such as question answering but raise questions about whether these models can exhibit genuine reasoning or succeed only at mimicking patterns from the training data. This distinction is particularly salient in forecasting tasks, where the answer is not present in the training data, and the model must reason to make logical deductions. We present Reasoning and Tools for Forecasting (RTF), a framework of reasoning-and-acting (ReAct) agents that can dynamically retrieve updated information and run numerical simulation with equipped tools. We evaluate our model with questions from competitive forecasting platforms and demonstrate that our method is competitive with and can outperform human predictions. This suggests that LMs, with the right tools, can indeed think and adapt like humans, offering valuable insights for real-world decision-making.

Automated AI research holds great potential to accelerate scientific discovery. However, current LLMs often generate plausible-looking but ineffective ideas. Execution grounding may help, but it is unclear whether automated execution is feasible and whether LLMs can learn from the execution feedback. To investigate these, we first build an automated executor to implement ideas and launch large-scale parallel GPU experiments to verify their effectiveness. We then convert two realistic research problems - LLM pre-training and post-training - into execution environments and demonstrate that our automated executor can implement a large fraction of the ideas sampled from frontier LLMs. We analyze two methods to learn from the execution feedback: evolutionary search and reinforcement learning. Execution-guided evolutionary search is sample-efficient: it finds a method that significantly outperforms the GRPO baseline (69.4% vs 48.0%) on post-training, and finds a pre-training recipe that outperforms the nanoGPT baseline (19.7 minutes vs 35.9 minutes) on pre-training, all within just ten search epochs. Frontier LLMs often generate meaningful algorithmic ideas during search, but they tend to saturate early and only occasionally exhibit scaling trends. Reinforcement learning from execution reward, on the other hand, suffers from mode collapse. It successfully improves the average reward of the ideator model but not the upper-bound, due to models converging on simple ideas. We thoroughly analyze the executed ideas and training dynamics to facilitate future efforts towards execution-grounded automated AI research.

Recent progress in reasoning models suggests that generating plausible attempts for research-level mathematics may be within reach, but verification remains a bottleneck, consuming scarce expert time. We hypothesize that a meaningful solution should contain enough method-level information that, when applied to a neighborhood of related questions, it should yield better downstream performance than incorrect solutions. Building on this idea, we propose Consequence-Based Utility, an oracle-free evaluator that scores each candidate by testing its value as an in-context exemplar in solving related yet verifiable questions. Our approach is evaluated on an original set of research-level math problems, each paired with one expert-written solution and nine LLM-generated solutions. Notably, Consequence-Based Utility consistently outperforms reward models, generative reward models, and LLM judges on ranking quality. Specifically, for GPT-OSS-120B, it improves Acc@1 from 67.2 to 76.3 and AUC from 71.4 to 79.6, with similarly large AUC gains on GPT-OSS-20B (69.0 to 79.2). Furthermore, compared to LLM-Judges, it also exhibits a larger solver-evaluator gap, maintaining a stronger correct-wrong separation even on instances where the underlying solver often fails to solve.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

Recent work suggests that large language models may implicitly learn world models. How should we assess this possibility? We formalize this question for the case where the underlying reality is governed by a deterministic finite automaton. This includes problems as diverse as simple logical reasoning, geographic navigation, game-playing, and chemistry. We propose new evaluation metrics for world model recovery inspired by the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem from language theory. We illustrate their utility in three domains: game playing, logic puzzles, and navigation. In all domains, the generative models we consider do well on existing diagnostics for assessing world models, but our evaluation metrics reveal their world models to be far less coherent than they appear. Such incoherence creates fragility: using a generative model to solve related but subtly different tasks can lead to failures. Building generative models that meaningfully capture the underlying logic of the domains they model would be immensely valuable; our results suggest new ways to assess how close a given model is to that goal.

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Probably not, at least for meta-analyses in economics. In a pre-registered, identity-masked, within-paper experiment, the authors of 44 meta-analyses ranked three AI reports on their own paper by usefulness for improving it: a single pass by a frontier model against two multi-agent debate tools we built and expected to win. All reports were held to a common length and template. The authors preferred the single pass, by 0.66 rank points over mad-research (95% CI 0.32 to 1.00) and 0.57 over paper-workshop (0.16 to 0.95), though paper-workshop spent roughly thirty times the tokens. Authors who recalled their journal referee report usually placed it first and never last; in a separate exercise, three AI judges almost always placed the real journal referee report last. Among the three AI reports, Gemini (the judge whose model family wrote none of the reports) would have ranked paper-workshop first in the authors' place, reversing the single-pass preference. The reversal warns against substituting an AI judge for the author. We measure perceived usefulness for finished papers; whether AI should referee papers is a separate question.

Recent advances have made long-form report-generating systems widely available. This has prompted evaluation frameworks that use LLM-as-judge protocols and claim verification, along with meta-evaluation frameworks that seek to validate these methods. Many of the meta-evaluations estimate an evaluation quality's by comparing its assessments against human pairwise preferences. Prior work, however, suggests that human pairwise preference may be overly simplistic and can fail to capture nuances of expert expectations. We conduct a case study in meta-evaluation for long-form QA benchmarks using ScholarQA-CS2, a benchmark designed for assessing retrieval-augmented deep-research QA in the scientific domain. We comprehensively validate the benchmark through human pairwise preference judgments, then critically examine the strengths, weaknesses, and confounders of this approach. We show that pairwise preference rankings are best suited for system-level evaluation, while explicit metric-wise annotations and expert annotators are critical for reliable metric-level assessment, with subjectivity remaining a key challenge. Based on our findings, we offer practical guidelines for designing future meta-evaluations that better align evaluation methods, annotator expertise, and reporting practices. By surfacing these methodological challenges, we aim to advance evaluation standards for deep-research systems.

The rapid progress of AI has intensified the long-standing pursuit of automation: replacing human participation with algorithms wherever possible. Implicit in this pursuit is the assumption that humans remain in the loop only because current AI systems are not yet sufficiently capable. This paper challenges that assumption. Rather than asking how far automation can extend, we ask where its conceptual limits lie and argue that human participation may persist even with highly capable AI systems for three distinct reasons. Technical or complementarity grounds arise when humans contribute capabilities or perspectives unavailable to AI. Normative or developmental grounds arise when participation itself is valuable for human agency or learning. Most importantly, emergence grounds arise from target emergence: in some activities, the target is not fully specified in advance but instead emerges through the interaction itself. In these cases, human participation is not merely a means of improving execution but is constitutive of the target being produced. Human--AI co-construction, understood as the joint production of outcomes by humans and AI systems, is therefore not simply a temporary response to imperfect AI, but a persistent feature of activities whose objectives emerge through participation. This perspective has important implications for the limits of automation and for the design, evaluation, and ethics of future AI systems.

As LLM-based judges become integral to industry applications, obtaining well-calibrated uncertainty estimates efficiently has become critical for production deployment. However, existing techniques, such as verbalized confidence and multi-generation methods, are often either poorly calibrated or computationally expensive. We introduce linear probes trained with a Brier score-based loss to provide calibrated uncertainty estimates from reasoning judges' hidden states, requiring no additional model training. We evaluate our approach on both objective tasks (reasoning, mathematics, factuality, coding) and subjective human preference judgments. Our results demonstrate that probes achieve superior calibration compared to existing methods with approx10x computational savings, generalize robustly to unseen evaluation domains, and deliver higher accuracy on high-confidence predictions. However, probes produce conservative estimates that underperform on easier datasets but may benefit safety-critical deployments prioritizing low false-positive rates. Overall, our work demonstrates that interpretability-based uncertainty estimation provides a practical and scalable plug-and-play solution for LLM judges in production.

Reality may establish that an outcome occurred without identifying which evolving procedure produced it or why. This distinction matters in production ML systems whose code, configuration, and artifacts change while external feedback accumulates. We examine it in a human-directed, agent-engineered quantitative trading system, using oracle to mean an external source of realized outcomes rather than a complete correctness specification. Across one year, the account gained and outperformed a broad market index, while annual alpha was not statistically distinguishable from zero under the main retrospective specification. Retrospectively selected subperiods include adverse relative performance and conditional candidate-level weakness under declared approximate references. Engineering records document changes during the episode, and complete recommendation-to-runtime binding is unavailable. The archive does not establish a common frozen instance or a unique cause. The case motivates an outcome--diagnosis gap: outcome evidence, evaluated-object identity, and causal explanation support distinct claims. We distinguish frozen instances, pre-specified adaptive procedures, and ad-hoc development; organize archive-relative claim identifiability and an evidence hierarchy; and propose a prospective production-binding protocol. An illustrative compatible-history example shows how factual binding can resolve a recommendation's referent without supplying its counterfactual effect. The protocol is proposed rather than prospectively validated. External feedback constrains outcome claims, while provenance and additional identification structure determine the resolution of diagnosis.

Large language models are increasingly used as decision aids whose probability judgments shape downstream choices. Whether those judgments carry a systematic directional tilt has been hard to detect: calibration metrics aggregate unsigned errors, and naturalistic uncertainty offers no ground-truth probability. When an LLM rates a startup's success at 70% but its failure at 15%, the missing 15 points expose a distortion no aggregate score flags. We introduce OptimismBench, which detects directional bias with inverted pairs: each scenario elicits both P(success) and P(failure), and asymmetry between the two framings yields a signed bias score without ground truth. Across 16 models from 8 providers, fourteen are optimistic; pessimism appears only in Anthropic's frontier tier. Eleven matched base-versus-chat pairs across four families show post-training sets the sign of the bias, with opposite shifts in different families. The pattern survives prompt, temperature, perspective, and self-debiasing ablations. A seventeen-model six-language comparison further shows model identity dominates language, with inter-model variance at 4.7x inter-language variance. We release 3,870 items across 10 languages for per-model directional-bias auditing. When alignment makes a model more helpful, it also tilts its probabilities; downstream pipelines inherit the tilt by default.

In this report, we explore the ability of language model agents to acquire resources, create copies of themselves, and adapt to novel challenges they encounter in the wild. We refer to this cluster of capabilities as "autonomous replication and adaptation" or ARA. We believe that systems capable of ARA could have wide-reaching and hard-to-anticipate consequences, and that measuring and forecasting ARA may be useful for informing measures around security, monitoring, and alignment. Additionally, once a system is capable of ARA, placing bounds on a system's capabilities may become significantly more difficult. We construct four simple example agents that combine language models with tools that allow them to take actions in the world. We then evaluate these agents on 12 tasks relevant to ARA. We find that these language model agents can only complete the easiest tasks from this list, although they make some progress on the more challenging tasks. Unfortunately, these evaluations are not adequate to rule out the possibility that near-future agents will be capable of ARA. In particular, we do not think that these evaluations provide good assurance that the ``next generation'' of language models (e.g. 100x effective compute scaleup on existing models) will not yield agents capable of ARA, unless intermediate evaluations are performed during pretraining. Relatedly, we expect that fine-tuning of the existing models could produce substantially more competent agents, even if the fine-tuning is not directly targeted at ARA.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

A key component of creativity is associative reasoning: the ability to draw novel yet meaningful connections between concepts. We introduce CREATE, a benchmark designed to evaluate models' capacity for creative associative reasoning. CREATE requires models to generate sets of paths connecting concepts in a model's parametric knowledge. Paths should have high specificity (distinctiveness and closeness of the concept connection) and high diversity (dissimilarity from other paths), and models are scored more highly if they produce a larger set of strong, diverse paths. This task shares demands of real creativity tasks like hypothesis generation, including an extremely large search space, but enables collection of a sizable benchmark with objective answer grading. Evaluation of frontier models shows that the strongest models achieve higher creative utility than others, with the high multiplicity of answers and complexity of the search making benchmark saturation difficult to achieve. Furthermore, our results illustrate that thinking models are not always more effective on our task, even with high token budgets. Recent approaches for creative prompting give some but limited additional improvement. CREATE provides a sandbox for developing new methods to improve models' capacity for associative creativity.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

Planning is central to agents and agentic AI. The ability to plan, e.g., creating travel itineraries within a budget, holds immense potential in both scientific and commercial contexts. Moreover, optimal plans tend to require fewer resources compared to ad-hoc methods. To date, a comprehensive understanding of existing planning benchmarks appears to be lacking. Without it, comparing planning algorithms' performance across domains or selecting suitable algorithms for new scenarios remains challenging. In this paper, we examine a range of planning benchmarks to identify commonly used testbeds for algorithm development and highlight potential gaps. These benchmarks are categorized into embodied environments, web navigation, scheduling, games and puzzles, and everyday task automation. Our study recommends the most appropriate benchmarks for various algorithms and offers insights to guide future benchmark development.

Scientific discovery is a cumulative process and requires new ideas to be situated within an ever-expanding landscape of existing knowledge. An emerging and critical challenge is how to identify conceptually relevant prior work from rapidly growing literature, and assess how a new idea differentiates from existing research. Current embedding approaches typically conflate distinct conceptual aspects into single representations and cannot support fine-grained literature retrieval; meanwhile, LLM-based evaluators are subject to sycophancy biases, failing to provide discriminative novelty assessment. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Ideation Space, a structured representation that decomposes scientific knowledge into three distinct dimensions, i.e., research problem, methodology, and core findings, each learned through contrastive training. This framework enables principled measurement of conceptual distance between ideas, and modeling of ideation transitions that capture the logical connections within a proposed idea. Building upon this representation, we propose a Hierarchical Sub-Space Retrieval framework for efficient, targeted literature retrieval, and a Decomposed Novelty Assessment algorithm that identifies which aspects of an idea are novel. Extensive experiments demonstrate substantial improvements, where our approach achieves Recall@30 of 0.329 (16.7% over baselines), our ideation transition retrieval reaches Hit Rate@30 of 0.643, and novelty assessment attains 0.37 correlation with expert judgments. In summary, our work provides a promising paradigm for future research on accelerating and evaluating scientific discovery.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

Large language models are increasingly being used to assess and forecast research ideas, yet we lack scalable ways to evaluate the quality of models' judgments about these scientific ideas. Towards this goal, we introduce PoT, a semi-verifiable benchmarking framework that links scientific idea judgments to downstream signals that become observable later (e.g., citations and shifts in researchers' agendas). PoT freezes a pre-cutoff snapshot of evidence in an offline sandbox and asks models to forecast post-cutoff outcomes, enabling verifiable evaluation when ground truth arrives, scalable benchmarking without exhaustive expert annotation, and analysis of human-model misalignment against signals such as peer-review awards. In addition, PoT provides a controlled testbed for agent-based research judgments that evaluate scientific ideas, comparing tool-using agents to non-agent baselines under prompt ablations and budget scaling. Across 30,000+ instances spanning four benchmark domains, we find that, compared with non-agent baselines, higher interaction budgets generally improve agent performance, while the benefit of tool use is strongly task-dependent. By combining time-partitioned, future-verifiable targets with an offline sandbox for tool use, PoT supports scalable evaluation of agents on future-facing scientific idea judgment tasks.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and Large Language Models (LLMs) in particular, are increasingly employed for creative tasks like scientific idea generation, constituting a form of generalization from training data unaddressed by existing conceptual frameworks. Despite its similarities to compositional generalization (CG), combinatorial creativity (CC) is an open-ended ability. Instead of evaluating for accuracy or correctness against fixed targets, which would contradict the open-ended nature of CC, we propose a theoretical framework and algorithmic task for evaluating outputs by their degrees of novelty and utility. From here, we make several important empirical contributions: (1) We obtain the first insights into the scaling behavior of creativity for LLMs. (2) We discover that, for fixed compute budgets, there exist optimal model depths and widths for creative ability. (3) We find that the ideation-execution gap, whereby LLMs excel at generating novel scientific ideas but struggle to ensure their practical feasibility, may be explained by a more fundamental novelty-utility tradeoff characteristic of creativity algorithms in general. Importantly, this tradeoff remains persistent even at scale, casting doubt on the long-term creative potential of LLMs in their current form. Together, our conceptual framework and empirical findings provide a foundation for understanding and improving creativity in modern AI models, bridging the gap between human and machine intelligence.

Autonomous AI research agents aim to accelerate scientific discovery by automating the research pipeline, from hypothesis generation to peer review. However, existing benchmarks rarely test a fundamental bottleneck: whether Large Language Models can judge the methodological viability of a research idea before expending time and computational resources. We introduce SoundnessBench, a curated benchmark of 1,099 machine-learning research proposals reconstructed from ICLR submissions, labeled with reviewer soundness sub-scores, and audited against source papers. SoundnessBench should be interpreted as a benchmark for recoverable proposal-stage soundness rather than exact prediction of full-paper review outcomes. Across 12 frontier LLMs, we find a pervasive optimism bias: under standard prompting, models frequently rate low-soundness proposals as sound, while aggressive prompting largely shifts errors from false positives to false negatives. Additional controls for public-corpus contamination, paper-identifying phrases, surface features, and human audit quality suggest that this behavior is not explained by a single confounder. Our results indicate that current LLMs are not yet reliable as standalone first-gate evaluators for scientific rigor.

Systems that generate scientific research questions are evaluated today by expert scores, LLM-as-judge ratings, or curated case studies -- all subjective, none falsifiable. We formalize historical backtesting as an alternative: a system generates questions from a corpus frozen at a historical cutoff, the questions are frozen before any access to later literature, and a temporally isolated future corpus then determines whether each question was subsequently answered, partially addressed, independently posed, or ignored, and whether its underlying premise was supported or refuted. The protocol is model-agnostic: any system that emits frozen questions can be scored. We release reproducible astronomy instances with temporally isolated corpora, frozen questions, auditable labels, four reference baselines, and a submission interface. Two findings result. First, evidence-structure-first generation outperforms LLM-only prompting: across a generator decomposition crossed with a four-cutoff stress test (2010-2024, 798 judged questions) whose last window postdates model training, LLM-only generation shows memorized relevance without specific foresight, while a generator using no model weights at all finds questions whose premises the future refutes in every era. Second, a seven-rater agreement study (two blinded human annotators, five judge models, 90 items) indicts the outcome taxonomy rather than the judge: two careful humans agree at kappa = 0.17, every judge model agrees with the professional annotator as well or better (0.17-0.26), and frontier models agree with one another at 0.60 -- certifying an LLM judge by model-model agreement would have overstated its reliability threefold. A prospective instance -- 200 questions frozen 2026-08-17, scored 2027-2030 -- is released so the central claims become contamination-free tests that time itself will grade.

LLMs are ideal for decision-making thanks to their ability to reason over long contexts. However, challenges arise when processing speech transcripts that describe complex scenarios, as they are verbose and include repetition, hedging, and vagueness. E.g., during a company's earnings call, an executive might project a positive revenue outlook to reassure investors, despite uncertainty regarding future earnings. It is crucial for LLMs to incorporate this uncertainty systematically when making decisions. In this paper, we introduce DeFine, a modular framework that constructs probabilistic factor profiles from complex scenarios. It then integrates these profiles with analogical reasoning, leveraging insights from similar past experiences to guide LLMs in making critical decisions in new situations. Our framework separates the tasks of quantifying uncertainty and incorporating it into LLM decision-making. This approach is particularly useful in areas such as consulting and financial deliberation, where making decisions under uncertainty is vital.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have shown indications of mathematical reasoning ability. However it has not been clear how they would fare on more challenging competition-level problems. And while self-generated verbalizations of intermediate reasoning steps (i.e., chain-of-thought prompting) have been shown to be helpful, whether LLMs can make use of helpful side information such as problem-specific hints has not been investigated before. In this paper, we propose a challenging benchmark dataset for enabling such analyses. The Concept and Hint-Annotated Math Problems (CHAMP) consists of high school math competition problems, annotated with concepts, or general math facts, and hints, or problem-specific tricks. These annotations allow us to explore the effects of additional information, such as relevant hints, misleading concepts, or related problems. This benchmark is difficult, with the best model only scoring 58.1% in standard settings. With concepts and hints, performance sometimes improves, indicating that some models can make use of such side information. We further annotate model-generated solutions for their correctness. Using this corpus, we find that models often arrive at the correct final answer through wrong reasoning steps. In addition, we test whether models are able to verify these solutions, and find that most models struggle. The dataset and code are available on the project website.

The recent adoption of artificial intelligence in socio-technical systems raises concerns about the black-box nature of the resulting decisions in fields such as hiring, finance, admissions, etc. If data subjects -- such as job applicants, loan applicants, and students -- receive an unfavorable outcome, they may be interested in algorithmic recourse, which involves updating certain features to yield a more favorable result when re-evaluated by algorithmic decision-making. Unfortunately, when individuals do not fully understand the incremental steps needed to change their circumstances, they risk following misguided paths that can lead to significant, long-term adverse consequences. Existing recourse approaches focus exclusively on the final recourse goal but neglect the possible incremental steps to reach the goal with real-life constraints, user preferences, and model artifacts. To address this gap, we formulate a visual analytic workflow for incremental recourse planning in collaboration with AI/ML experts and contribute an interactive visualization interface that helps data subjects efficiently navigate the recourse alternatives and make an informed decision. We present a usage scenario and subjective feedback from observational studies with twelve graduate students using a real-world dataset, which demonstrates that our approach can be instrumental for data subjects in choosing a suitable recourse path.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

One of the first steps of a research pipeline is generating ideas. Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to automate this step, but most of this work optimizes the quality of individual ideas, while overlooking diversity. In our work, we study document-grounded ideation, focusing on increasing the diversity of LLM generated ideas and ensuring they are high quality. Given prior papers, a model must propose a set of ideas that are each high-quality and clearly distinct from one another, while also being grounded in the input documents. To optimize for this, we propose training with a set-level reinforcement learning objective. In our setup, in a single generation, the model writes K structured idea cards grounded in the source papers, and the set is scored jointly, where each idea's quality is weighted by its distance from the ideas written before it. This teaches the model to steer each new idea away from its predecessors. We show that our trained 8B model achieves higher creative utility (a measure combining quality and diversity) than Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT-6 Astra on our contamination-free benchmark. In a pilot human study with four experts, our sets are judged as promising as Claude Opus 4.8's and contain marginally more unique ideas. When a coding agent runs proof-of-concept experiments on the ideas, our model's success@k is comparable to Claude Opus 4.8's, so we see that the added diversity does not cost any executability.

LLMs have immense potential for generating plans, transforming an initial world state into a desired goal state. A large body of research has explored the use of LLMs for various planning tasks, from web navigation to travel planning and database querying. However, many of these systems are tailored to specific problems, making it challenging to compare them or determine the best approach for new tasks. There is also a lack of clear and consistent evaluation criteria. Our survey aims to offer a comprehensive overview of current LLM planners to fill this gap. It builds on foundational work by Kartam and Wilkins (1990) and examines six key performance criteria: completeness, executability, optimality, representation, generalization, and efficiency. For each, we provide a thorough analysis of representative works and highlight their strengths and weaknesses. Our paper also identifies crucial future directions, making it a valuable resource for both practitioners and newcomers interested in leveraging LLM planning to support agentic workflows.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

A sound judgment applies the law to established facts and weighs the circumstances in which they arose. However, existing methods swing between rigid statute matching and ungrounded discretion, benchmarks score a label or a rubric, and the experience that would supply the balance stays unverified. We formalize legal judgment as a reference-anchored task, whose object is a single decision that stays tied to the statute and to the circumstances at once. We introduce JusticeAxis, 256 real-world criminal cases from 18 countries with audio, image, and text evidence, and three lawyer-written judgments for every case: the recorded one and one for each failure. We further propose JusticeAgent, a harness whose element agents establish the facts and whose judge agent applies the law under skills carrying experience of the circumstances. Skills are distilled from execution trajectories and admitted only under Bayesian credible bounds. Experiments show that failure turns direction with scale: open-weight backbones drift to unsupported grounds, frontier models to the statutory default. We further verify that JusticeAgent, as a simple yet effective plugin, carries a frozen open-weight backbone to commercial level. Project resources are available at https://github.com/beita6969/JusticeAxis.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and Gemini have significantly advanced artificial intelligence by enabling machines to generate and comprehend human-like text. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs are not immune to limitations, including various biases. While much research has explored demographic biases, the cognitive biases in LLMs have not been equally scrutinized. This study delves into anchoring bias, a cognitive bias where initial information disproportionately influences judgment. Utilizing an experimental dataset, we examine how anchoring bias manifests in LLMs and verify the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. Our findings highlight the sensitivity of LLM responses to biased hints. At the same time, our experiments show that, to mitigate anchoring bias, one needs to collect hints from comprehensive angles to prevent the LLMs from being anchored to individual pieces of information, while simple algorithms such as Chain-of-Thought, Thoughts of Principles, Ignoring Anchor Hints, and Reflection are not sufficient.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from N = {277} professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey (N = {1785}). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

When asked, current large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT claim that they can assist us with relevance judgments. Many researchers think this would not lead to credible IR research. In this perspective paper, we discuss possible ways for LLMs to assist human experts along with concerns and issues that arise. We devise a human-machine collaboration spectrum that allows categorizing different relevance judgment strategies, based on how much the human relies on the machine. For the extreme point of "fully automated assessment", we further include a pilot experiment on whether LLM-based relevance judgments correlate with judgments from trained human assessors. We conclude the paper by providing two opposing perspectives - for and against the use of LLMs for automatic relevance judgments - and a compromise perspective, informed by our analyses of the literature, our preliminary experimental evidence, and our experience as IR researchers. We hope to start a constructive discussion within the community to avoid a stale-mate during review, where work is dammed if is uses LLMs for evaluation and dammed if it doesn't.

Large-scale Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized human-AI interaction and achieved significant success in the generation of novel ideas. However, current assessments of idea generation overlook crucial factors such as knowledge leakage in LLMs, the absence of open-ended benchmarks with grounded truth, and the limited scope of feasibility analysis constrained by prompt design. These limitations hinder the potential of uncovering groundbreaking research ideas. In this paper, we present AI Idea Bench 2025, a framework designed to quantitatively evaluate and compare the ideas generated by LLMs within the domain of AI research from diverse perspectives. The framework comprises a comprehensive dataset of 3,495 AI papers and their associated inspired works, along with a robust evaluation methodology. This evaluation system gauges idea quality in two dimensions: alignment with the ground-truth content of the original papers and judgment based on general reference material. AI Idea Bench 2025's benchmarking system stands to be an invaluable resource for assessing and comparing idea-generation techniques, thereby facilitating the automation of scientific discovery.

The acceleration in the adoption of AI-based automated decision-making systems poses a challenge for evaluating the fairness of algorithmic decisions, especially in the absence of ground truth. When designing interventions, uplift modeling is used extensively to identify candidates that are likely to benefit from treatment. However, these models remain particularly susceptible to fairness evaluation due to the lack of ground truth on the outcome measure since a candidate cannot be in both treatment and control simultaneously. In this article, we propose a framework that overcomes the missing ground truth problem by generating surrogates to serve as a proxy for counterfactual labels of uplift modeling campaigns. We then leverage the surrogate ground truth to conduct a more comprehensive binary fairness evaluation. We show how to apply the approach in a comprehensive study from a real-world marketing campaign for promotional offers and demonstrate its enhancement for fairness evaluation.