Daily Papers

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

The integration of artificial intelligence in sports analytics has transformed soccer video understanding, enabling real-time, automated insights into complex game dynamics. Traditional approaches rely on isolated data streams, limiting their effectiveness in capturing the full context of a match. To address this, we introduce SoccerChat, a multimodal conversational AI framework that integrates visual and textual data for enhanced soccer video comprehension. Leveraging the extensive SoccerNet dataset, enriched with jersey color annotations and automatic speech recognition (ASR) transcripts, SoccerChat is fine-tuned on a structured video instruction dataset to facilitate accurate game understanding, event classification, and referee decision making. We benchmark SoccerChat on action classification and referee decision-making tasks, demonstrating its performance in general soccer event comprehension while maintaining competitive accuracy in referee decision making. Our findings highlight the importance of multimodal integration in advancing soccer analytics, paving the way for more interactive and explainable AI-driven sports analysis. https://github.com/simula/SoccerChat

The Internet of Things (IoT) consistently generates vast amounts of data, sparking increasing concern over the protection of data privacy and the limitation of data misuse. Federated learning (FL) facilitates collaborative capabilities among multiple parties by sharing machine learning (ML) model parameters instead of raw user data, and it has recently gained significant attention for its potential in privacy preservation and learning efficiency enhancement. In this paper, we highlight the digital ethics concerns that arise when human-centric devices serve as clients in FL. More specifically, challenges of game dynamics, fairness, incentive, and continuity arise in FL due to differences in perspectives and objectives between clients and the server. We analyze these challenges and their solutions from the perspectives of both the client and the server, and through the viewpoints of centralized and decentralized FL. Finally, we explore the opportunities in FL for human-centric IoT as directions for future development.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Understanding player shooting profiles is an essential part of basketball analysis: knowing where certain opposing players like to shoot from can help coaches neutralize offensive gameplans from their opponents; understanding where their players are most comfortable can lead them to developing more effective offensive strategies. An automatic tool that can provide these performance profiles in a timely manner can become invaluable for coaches to maximize both the effectiveness of their game plan as well as the time dedicated to practice and other related activities. Additionally, basketball is dictated by many variables, such as playstyle and game dynamics, that can change the flow of the game and, by extension, player performance profiles. It is crucial that the performance profiles can reflect the diverse playstyles, as well as the fast-changing dynamics of the game. We present a tool that can visualize player performance profiles in a timely manner while taking into account factors such as play-style and game dynamics. Our approach generates interpretable heatmaps that allow us to identify and analyze how non-spatial factors, such as game dynamics or playstyle, affect player performance profiles.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

Conversational Spoken Language Models (SLMs) are emerging as a promising paradigm for real-time speech interaction. However, their capacity of temporal dynamics, including the ability to manage timing, tempo and simultaneous speaking, remains a critical and unevaluated challenge for conversational fluency. To address this gap, we introduce the Game-Time Benchmark, a framework to systematically assess these temporal capabilities. Inspired by how humans learn a language through language activities, Game-Time consists of basic instruction-following tasks and advanced tasks with temporal constraints, such as tempo adherence and synchronized responses. Our evaluation of diverse SLM architectures reveals a clear performance disparity: while state-of-the-art models handle basic tasks well, many contemporary systems still struggle with fundamental instruction-following. More critically, nearly all models degrade substantially under temporal constraints, exposing persistent weaknesses in time awareness and full-duplex interaction. The Game-Time Benchmark provides a foundation for guiding future research toward more temporally-aware conversational AI. Demos and datasets are available on our project website https://ga642381.github.io/Game-Time.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly vital in dynamic domains like online gaming, yet the lack of a dedicated benchmark has impeded standardized evaluation in this area. The core difficulty lies in Dual Dynamics: the constant interplay between game content updates and the shifting focus of the player community. Furthermore, the necessity of automating such a benchmark introduces a critical requirement for player-centric authenticity to ensure generated questions are realistic. To address this integrated challenge, we introduce ChronoPlay, a novel framework for the automated and continuous generation of game RAG benchmarks. ChronoPlay utilizes a dual-dynamic update mechanism to track both forms of change, and a dual-source synthesis engine that draws from official sources and player community to ensure both factual correctness and authentic query patterns. We instantiate our framework on three distinct games to create the first dynamic RAG benchmark for the gaming domain, offering new insights into model performance under these complex and realistic conditions. Code is avaliable at: https://github.com/hly1998/ChronoPlay.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Artificial agents are increasingly central to complex interactions and decision-making tasks, yet aligning their behaviors with desired human values remains an open challenge. In this work, we investigate how human-like personality traits influence agent behavior and performance within text-based interactive environments. We introduce PANDA: Personality Adapted Neural Decision Agents, a novel method for projecting human personality traits onto agents to guide their behavior. To induce personality in a text-based game agent, (i) we train a personality classifier to identify what personality type the agent's actions exhibit, and (ii) we integrate the personality profiles directly into the agent's policy-learning pipeline. By deploying agents embodying 16 distinct personality types across 25 text-based games and analyzing their trajectories, we demonstrate that an agent's action decisions can be guided toward specific personality profiles. Moreover, certain personality types, such as those characterized by higher levels of Openness, display marked advantages in performance. These findings underscore the promise of personality-adapted agents for fostering more aligned, effective, and human-centric decision-making in interactive environments.

Generative language models are increasingly used for contract drafting and enhancement, creating a scenario where competing parties deploy different language models against each other. This introduces not only a game-theory challenge but also significant concerns related to AI safety and security, as the language model employed by the opposing party can be unknown. These competitive interactions can be seen as adversarial testing grounds, where models are effectively red-teamed to expose vulnerabilities such as generating biased, harmful or legally problematic text. Despite the importance of these challenges, the competitive robustness and safety of these models in adversarial settings remain poorly understood. In this small study, we approach this problem by evaluating the performance and vulnerabilities of major open-source language models in head-to-head competitions, simulating real-world contract negotiations. We further explore how these adversarial interactions can reveal potential risks, informing the development of more secure and reliable models. Our findings contribute to the growing body of research on AI safety, offering insights into model selection and optimisation in competitive legal contexts and providing actionable strategies for mitigating risks.

Environmental and genetic mutations can transform the cells in a co-operating healthy tissue into an ecosystem of individualistic tumour cells that compete for space and resources. Various selection forces are responsible for driving the evolution of cells in a tumour towards more malignant and aggressive phenotypes that tend to have a fitness advantage over the older populations. Although the evolutionary nature of cancer has been recognised for more than three decades (ever since the seminal work of Nowell) it has been only recently that tools traditionally used by ecological and evolutionary researchers have been adopted to study the evolution of cancer phenotypes in populations of individuals capable of co-operation and competition. In this chapter we will describe game theory as an important tool to study the emergence of cell phenotypes in a tumour and will critically review some of its applications in cancer research. These applications demonstrate that game theory can be used to understand the dynamics of somatic cancer evolution and suggest new therapies in which this knowledge could be applied to gain some control over the evolution of the tumour.

Recent advances in interactive video generations have demonstrated diffusion model's potential as world models by capturing complex physical dynamics and interactive behaviors. However, existing interactive world models depend on bidirectional attention and lengthy inference steps, severely limiting real-time performance. Consequently, they are hard to simulate real-world dynamics, where outcomes must update instantaneously based on historical context and current actions. To address this, we present Matrix-Game 2.0, an interactive world model generates long videos on-the-fly via few-step auto-regressive diffusion. Our framework consists of three key components: (1) A scalable data production pipeline for Unreal Engine and GTA5 environments to effectively produce massive amounts (about 1200 hours) of video data with diverse interaction annotations; (2) An action injection module that enables frame-level mouse and keyboard inputs as interactive conditions; (3) A few-step distillation based on the casual architecture for real-time and streaming video generation. Matrix Game 2.0 can generate high-quality minute-level videos across diverse scenes at an ultra-fast speed of 25 FPS. We open-source our model weights and codebase to advance research in interactive world modeling.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

With the advancement of interactive video generation, diffusion models have increasingly demonstrated their potential as world models. However, existing approaches still struggle to simultaneously achieve memory-enabled long-term temporal consistency and high-resolution real-time generation, limiting their applicability in real-world scenarios. To address this, we present Matrix-Game 3.0, a memory-augmented interactive world model designed for 720p real-time longform video generation. Building upon Matrix-Game 2.0, we introduce systematic improvements across data, model, and inference. First, we develop an upgraded industrial-scale infinite data engine that integrates Unreal Engine-based synthetic data, large-scale automated collection from AAA games, and real-world video augmentation to produce high-quality Video-Pose-Action-Prompt quadruplet data at scale. Second, we propose a training framework for long-horizon consistency: by modeling prediction residuals and re-injecting imperfect generated frames during training, the base model learns self-correction; meanwhile, camera-aware memory retrieval and injection enable the base model to achieve long horizon spatiotemporal consistency. Third, we design a multi-segment autoregressive distillation strategy based on Distribution Matching Distillation (DMD), combined with model quantization and VAE decoder pruning, to achieve efficient real-time inference. Experimental results show that Matrix-Game 3.0 achieves up to 40 FPS real-time generation at 720p resolution with a 5B model, while maintaining stable memory consistency over minute-long sequences. Scaling up to a 2x14B model further improves generation quality, dynamics, and generalization. Our approach provides a practical pathway toward industrial-scale deployable world models.

We argue that 3-D first-person video games are a challenging environment for real-time multi-modal reasoning. We first describe our dataset of human game-play, collected across a large variety of 3-D first-person games, which is both substantially larger and more diverse compared to prior publicly disclosed datasets, and contains text instructions. We demonstrate that we can learn an inverse dynamics model from this dataset, which allows us to impute actions on a much larger dataset of publicly available videos of human game play that lack recorded actions. We then train a text-conditioned agent for game playing using behavior cloning, with a custom architecture capable of realtime inference on a consumer GPU. We show the resulting model is capable of playing a variety of 3-D games and responding to text input. Finally, we outline some of the remaining challenges such as long-horizon tasks and quantitative evaluation across a large set of games.

Finding the mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) of a two-player zero sum continuous game is an important and challenging problem in machine learning. A canonical algorithm to finding the MNE is the noisy gradient descent ascent method which in the infinite particle limit gives rise to the {\em Mean-Field Gradient Descent Ascent} (GDA) dynamics on the space of probability measures. In this paper, we first study the convergence of a two-scale Mean-Field GDA dynamics for finding the MNE of the entropy-regularized objective. More precisely we show that for each finite temperature (or regularization parameter), the two-scale Mean-Field GDA with a suitable {\em finite} scale ratio converges exponentially to the unique MNE without assuming the convexity or concavity of the interaction potential. The key ingredient of our proof lies in the construction of new Lyapunov functions that dissipate exponentially along the Mean-Field GDA. We further study the simulated annealing of the Mean-Field GDA dynamics. We show that with a temperature schedule that decays logarithmically in time the annealed Mean-Field GDA converges to the MNE of the original unregularized objective.

Recent advances in diffusion-based and controllable video generation have enabled high-quality and temporally coherent video synthesis, laying the groundwork for immersive interactive gaming experiences. However, current methods face limitations in dynamics, generality, long-term consistency, and efficiency, which limit the ability to create various gameplay videos. To address these gaps, we introduce Hunyuan-GameCraft, a novel framework for high-dynamic interactive video generation in game environments. To achieve fine-grained action control, we unify standard keyboard and mouse inputs into a shared camera representation space, facilitating smooth interpolation between various camera and movement operations. Then we propose a hybrid history-conditioned training strategy that extends video sequences autoregressively while preserving game scene information. Additionally, to enhance inference efficiency and playability, we achieve model distillation to reduce computational overhead while maintaining consistency across long temporal sequences, making it suitable for real-time deployment in complex interactive environments. The model is trained on a large-scale dataset comprising over one million gameplay recordings across over 100 AAA games, ensuring broad coverage and diversity, then fine-tuned on a carefully annotated synthetic dataset to enhance precision and control. The curated game scene data significantly improves the visual fidelity, realism and action controllability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Hunyuan-GameCraft significantly outperforms existing models, advancing the realism and playability of interactive game video generation.

Video world models have shown immense promise for interactive simulation and entertainment, but current systems still struggle with two important aspects of interactivity: user control over the environment for reproducible, editable experiences, and shared inference where players hold influence over a common world. To address these limitations, we introduce an explicit external memory into the system, a persistent state operating independent of the model's context window, that is continually updated by user actions and queried throughout the generation roll-out. Unlike conventional diffusion game engines that operate as next-frame predictors, our approach decomposes generation into Memory, Observation, and Dynamics modules. This design gives users direct, editable control over environment structure via an editable memory representation, and it naturally extends to real-time multiplayer rollouts with coherent viewpoints and consistent cross-player interactions.

The application of Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) technology in soccer offers numerous opportunities for sports analytics. Specifically, extracting audio commentaries with ASR provides valuable insights into the events of the game, and opens the door to several downstream applications such as automatic highlight generation. This paper presents SoccerNet-Echoes, an augmentation of the SoccerNet dataset with automatically generated transcriptions of audio commentaries from soccer game broadcasts, enhancing video content with rich layers of textual information derived from the game audio using ASR. These textual commentaries, generated using the Whisper model and translated with Google Translate, extend the usefulness of the SoccerNet dataset in diverse applications such as enhanced action spotting, automatic caption generation, and game summarization. By incorporating textual data alongside visual and auditory content, SoccerNet-Echoes aims to serve as a comprehensive resource for the development of algorithms specialized in capturing the dynamics of soccer games. We detail the methods involved in the curation of this dataset and the integration of ASR. We also highlight the implications of a multimodal approach in sports analytics, and how the enriched dataset can support diverse applications, thus broadening the scope of research and development in the field of sports analytics.

Modern socio-technical systems increasingly involve multi-stakeholder environments where actors simultaneously cooperate and compete. These coopetitive relationships exhibit dynamic trust evolution based on observed behavior over repeated interactions. While conceptual modeling languages like i* represent trust relationships qualitatively, they lack computational mechanisms for analyzing how trust changes with behavioral evidence. Conversely, computational trust models from multi-agent systems provide algorithmic updating but lack grounding in conceptual models that capture strategic dependencies covering mixed motives of actors. This technical report bridges this gap by developing a computational trust model that extends game-theoretic foundations for strategic coopetition with dynamic trust evolution. Building on companion work that achieved 58/60 validation (96.7%) for logarithmic specifications, we introduce trust as a two-layer system with immediate trust responding to current behavior and reputation tracking violation history. Trust evolves through asymmetric updating where cooperation builds trust gradually while violations erode it sharply, creating hysteresis effects and trust ceilings that constrain relationship recovery. We develop a structured translation framework enabling practitioners to instantiate computational trust models from i* dependency networks encompassing mixed motives of actors. Comprehensive experimental validation across 78,125 parameter configurations establishes robust emergence of negativity bias, hysteresis effects, and cumulative damage amplification. Empirical validation using the Renault-Nissan Alliance case study (1999-2025) achieves 49/60 validation points (81.7%), successfully reproducing documented trust evolution across five distinct relationship phases including crisis and recovery periods.

LLM-based multi-agent systems demonstrate great potential for tackling complex problems, but how competition shapes their behavior remains underexplored. This paper investigates the over-competition in multi-agent debate, where agents under extreme pressure exhibit unreliable, harmful behaviors that undermine both collaboration and task performance. To study this phenomenon, we propose HATE, the Hunger Game Debate, a novel experimental framework that simulates debates under a zero-sum competition arena. Our experiments, conducted across a range of LLMs and tasks, reveal that competitive pressure significantly stimulates over-competition behaviors and degrades task performance, causing discussions to derail. We further explore the impact of environmental feedback by adding variants of judges, indicating that objective, task-focused feedback effectively mitigates the over-competition behaviors. We also probe the post-hoc kindness of LLMs and form a leaderboard to characterize top LLMs, providing insights for understanding and governing the emergent social dynamics of AI community.

Understanding collaboration patterns in introductory programming courses is essential, as teamwork is a critical skill in computer science. In professional environments, software development relies on effective teamwork, navigating diverse perspectives, and contributing to shared goals. This paper offers a comprehensive analysis of the factors influencing team efficiency and project success, providing actionable insights to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative programming education. By analyzing version control data, survey responses, and performance metrics, the study highlights the collaboration trends that emerge as first-semester students develop a 2D game project. Results indicate that students often slightly overestimate their contributions, with more engaged individuals more likely to acknowledge mistakes. Team performance shows no significant variation based on nationality or gender composition, though teams that disbanded frequently consisted of lone wolves, highlighting collaboration challenges and the need for strengthened teamwork skills. Presentations closely reflected individual project contributions, with active students excelling in evaluative questioning and performing better on the final exam. Additionally, the complete absence of plagiarism underscores the effectiveness of proactive academic integrity measures, reinforcing honest collaboration in educational settings.

Creatively translating complex gameplay ideas into executable artifacts (e.g., games as Unity projects and code) remains a central challenge in computational game creativity. Gameplay design patterns provide a structured representation for describing gameplay phenomena, enabling designers to decompose high-level ideas into entities, constraints, and rule-driven dynamics. Among them, goal patterns formalize common player-objective relationships. Goal Playable Concepts (GPCs) operationalize these abstractions as playable Unity engine implementations, supporting experiential exploration and compositional gameplay design. We frame scalable playable pattern realization as a problem of constrained executable creative synthesis: generated artifacts must satisfy Unity's syntactic and architectural requirements while preserving the semantic gameplay meanings encoded in goal patterns. This dual constraint limits scalability. Therefore, we investigate whether contemporary large language models (LLMs) can perform such synthesis under engine-level structural constraints and generate Unity code (as games) structured and conditioned by goal playable patterns. Using 26 goal pattern instantiations, we compare a direct generation baseline (natural language -> C# -> Unity) with pipelines conditioned on a human-authored Unity-specific intermediate representation (IR), across three IR configurations and two open-source models (DeepSeek-Coder-V2-Lite-Instruct and Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct). Compilation success is evaluated via automated Unity replay. We propose grounding and hygiene failure modes, identifying structural and project-level grounding as primary bottlenecks.

Recent advancements in image and video synthesis have opened up new promise in generative games. One particularly intriguing application is transforming characters from anime films into interactive, playable entities. This allows players to immerse themselves in the dynamic anime world as their favorite characters for life simulation through language instructions. Such games are defined as infinite game since they eliminate predetermined boundaries and fixed gameplay rules, where players can interact with the game world through open-ended language and experience ever-evolving storylines and environments. Recently, a pioneering approach for infinite anime life simulation employs large language models (LLMs) to translate multi-turn text dialogues into language instructions for image generation. However, it neglects historical visual context, leading to inconsistent gameplay. Furthermore, it only generates static images, failing to incorporate the dynamics necessary for an engaging gaming experience. In this work, we propose AnimeGamer, which is built upon Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to generate each game state, including dynamic animation shots that depict character movements and updates to character states, as illustrated in Figure 1. We introduce novel action-aware multimodal representations to represent animation shots, which can be decoded into high-quality video clips using a video diffusion model. By taking historical animation shot representations as context and predicting subsequent representations, AnimeGamer can generate games with contextual consistency and satisfactory dynamics. Extensive evaluations using both automated metrics and human evaluations demonstrate that AnimeGamer outperforms existing methods in various aspects of the gaming experience. Codes and checkpoints are available at https://github.com/TencentARC/AnimeGamer.

TD-learning is a foundation reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm for value prediction. Critical to the accuracy of value predictions is the quality of state representations. In this work, we consider the question: how does end-to-end TD-learning impact the representation over time? Complementary to prior work, we provide a set of analysis that sheds further light on the representation dynamics under TD-learning. We first show that when the environments are reversible, end-to-end TD-learning strictly decreases the value approximation error over time. Under further assumptions on the environments, we can connect the representation dynamics with spectral decomposition over the transition matrix. This latter finding establishes fitting multiple value functions from randomly generated rewards as a useful auxiliary task for representation learning, as we empirically validate on both tabular and Atari game suites.

Recent advances in generative world models have enabled remarkable progress in creating open-ended game environments, evolving from static scene synthesis toward dynamic, interactive simulation. However, current approaches remain limited by rigid action schemas and high annotation costs, restricting their ability to model diverse in-game interactions and player-driven dynamics. To address these challenges, we introduce Hunyuan-GameCraft-2, a new paradigm of instruction-driven interaction for generative game world modeling. Instead of relying on fixed keyboard inputs, our model allows users to control game video contents through natural language prompts, keyboard, or mouse signals, enabling flexible and semantically rich interaction within generated worlds. We formally defined the concept of interactive video data and developed an automated process to transform large-scale, unstructured text-video pairs into causally aligned interactive datasets. Built upon a 14B image-to-video Mixture-of-Experts(MoE) foundation model, our model incorporates a text-driven interaction injection mechanism for fine-grained control over camera motion, character behavior, and environment dynamics. We introduce an interaction-focused benchmark, InterBench, to evaluate interaction performance comprehensively. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our model generates temporally coherent and causally grounded interactive game videos that faithfully respond to diverse and free-form user instructions such as "open the door", "draw a torch", or "trigger an explosion".

Robot sports, characterized by well-defined objectives, explicit rules, and dynamic interactions, present ideal scenarios for demonstrating embodied intelligence. In this paper, we present VolleyBots, a novel robot sports testbed where multiple drones cooperate and compete in the sport of volleyball under physical dynamics. VolleyBots integrates three features within a unified platform: competitive and cooperative gameplay, turn-based interaction structure, and agile 3D maneuvering. Competitive and cooperative gameplay challenges each drone to coordinate with its teammates while anticipating and countering opposing teams' tactics. Turn-based interaction demands precise timing, accurate state prediction, and management of long-horizon temporal dependencies. Agile 3D maneuvering requires rapid accelerations, sharp turns, and precise 3D positioning despite the quadrotor's underactuated dynamics. These intertwined features yield a complex problem combining motion control and strategic play, with no available expert demonstrations. We provide a comprehensive suite of tasks ranging from single-drone drills to multi-drone cooperative and competitive tasks, accompanied by baseline evaluations of representative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game-theoretic algorithms. Simulation results show that on-policy reinforcement learning (RL) methods outperform off-policy methods in single-agent tasks, but both approaches struggle in complex tasks that combine motion control and strategic play. We additionally design a hierarchical policy which achieves a 69.5% percent win rate against the strongest baseline in the 3 vs 3 task, underscoring its potential as an effective solution for tackling the complex interplay between low-level control and high-level strategy. The project page is at https://sites.google.com/view/thu-volleybots.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Action spotting in soccer videos is the task of identifying the specific time when a certain key action of the game occurs. Lately, it has received a large amount of attention and powerful methods have been introduced. Action spotting involves understanding the dynamics of the game, the complexity of events, and the variation of video sequences. Most approaches have focused on the latter, given that their models exploit the global visual features of the sequences. In this work, we focus on the former by (a) identifying and representing the players, referees, and goalkeepers as nodes in a graph, and by (b) modeling their temporal interactions as sequences of graphs. For the player identification, or player classification task, we obtain an accuracy of 97.72% in our annotated benchmark. For the action spotting task, our method obtains an overall performance of 57.83% average-mAP by combining it with other audiovisual modalities. This performance surpasses similar graph-based methods and has competitive results with heavy computing methods. Code and data are available at https://github.com/IPCV/soccer_action_spotting.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) presents a dual challenge in the fight against disinformation. These powerful tools, capable of generating human-like text at scale, can be weaponised to produce sophisticated and persuasive disinformation, yet they also hold promise for enhancing detection and mitigation strategies. This paper investigates the complex dynamics between LLMs and disinformation through a communication game that simulates online forums, inspired by the game Werewolf, with 25 participants. We analyse how Disinformers, Moderators, and Users leverage LLMs to advance their goals, revealing both the potential for misuse and combating disinformation. Our findings highlight the varying uses of LLMs depending on the participants' roles and strategies, underscoring the importance of understanding their effectiveness in this context. We conclude by discussing implications for future LLM development and online platform design, advocating for a balanced approach that empowers users and fosters trust while mitigating the risks of LLM-assisted disinformation.

In arena-style evaluation of large language models (LLMs), two LLMs respond to a user query, and the user chooses the winning response or deems the "battle" a draw, resulting in an adjustment to the ratings of both models. The prevailing approach for modeling these rating dynamics is to view battles as two-player game matches, as in chess, and apply the Elo rating system and its derivatives. In this paper, we critically examine this paradigm. Specifically, we question whether a draw genuinely means that the two models are equal and hence whether their ratings should be equalized. Instead, we conjecture that draws are more indicative of query difficulty: if the query is too easy, then both models are more likely to succeed equally. On three real-world arena datasets, we show that ignoring rating updates for draws yields a 1-3% relative increase in battle outcome prediction accuracy (which includes draws) for all four rating systems studied. Further analyses suggest that draws occur more for queries rated as very easy and those as highly objective, with risk ratios of 1.37 and 1.35, respectively. We recommend future rating systems to reconsider existing draw semantics and to account for query properties in rating updates.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

The Game of Life (Life), a well known algorithm within the broader class of cellular automata (CA), exhibits complex emergent dynamics, with extreme sensitivity to initial conditions. Modeling and predicting such intricate behavior without explicit knowledge of the system's underlying topology presents a significant challenge, motivating the development of algorithms that can generalize across various grid configurations and boundary conditions. We develop a decoder-only generative pretrained transformer model to solve this problem, showing that our model can simulate Life on a toroidal grid with no prior knowledge on the size of the grid, or its periodic boundary conditions (LifeGPT). LifeGPT is topology-agnostic with respect to its training data and our results show that a GPT model is capable of capturing the deterministic rules of a Turing-complete system with near-perfect accuracy, given sufficiently diverse training data. We also introduce the idea of an `autoregressive autoregressor' to recursively implement Life using LifeGPT. Our results pave the path towards true universal computation within a large language model (LLM) framework, synthesizing of mathematical analysis with natural language processing, and probing AI systems for situational awareness about the evolution of such algorithms without ever having to compute them. Similar GPTs could potentially solve inverse problems in multicellular self-assembly by extracting CA-compatible rulesets from real-world biological systems to create new predictive models, which would have significant consequences for the fields of bioinspired materials, tissue engineering, and architected materials design.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We introduce the first version of KWBench (Knowledge Work Bench), a benchmark for unprompted problem recognition in large language models: can an LLM identify a professional scenario before attempting to solve it. Existing frontier benchmarks have saturated, and most knowledge-work evaluations to date reduce to extraction or task completion against a specification. KWBench targets the step before that: recognizing the governing structure of the situation from raw inputs alone. The benchmark contains 223 tasks sourced from practitioners across acquisitions, contract negotiations, clinical pharmacy, organizational politics, fraud analysis, and incentive design. Each task encodes a formal game-theoretic pattern (principal-agent conflict, signaling, mechanism design failure, strategic omission, coalitional dynamics, strategic interdependence) and carries structured ground truth recording the expert reading of the situation and the anticipated failure modes. Models receive raw data and a task prompt with no indication of problem type. Scoring is a three-tier rubric gated by a mandatory conjunctive check. Mandatory criteria encode the predicted wrong paths. We evaluate 16 models. The best model passes on 27.9% of tasks. The top two models agree on only 31.7% of their passes. Among the top 8, 44 tasks are solved by exactly one model; routing across the top 8 covers 50.7% of the benchmark, nearly double the best single model. Conditional on passing, quality scores converge (approx 83% across models); unconditional scores do not. Same models articulate the relevant game-theoretic concept correctly when asked, then fail to apply it unprompted. We release KWBench to shift how frontier models are evaluated on knowledge work, scoring them on whether they recognize the right problem from the situation alone, not only on how well they execute once the problem has been framed for them.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

We present PORTAL, a novel framework for developing artificial intelligence agents capable of playing thousands of 3D video games through language-guided policy generation. By transforming decision-making problems into language modeling tasks, our approach leverages large language models (LLMs) to generate behavior trees represented in domain-specific language (DSL). This method eliminates the computational burden associated with traditional reinforcement learning approaches while preserving strategic depth and rapid adaptability. Our framework introduces a hybrid policy structure that combines rule-based nodes with neural network components, enabling both high-level strategic reasoning and precise low-level control. A dual-feedback mechanism incorporating quantitative game metrics and vision-language model analysis facilitates iterative policy improvement at both tactical and strategic levels. The resulting policies are instantaneously deployable, human-interpretable, and capable of generalizing across diverse gaming environments. Experimental results demonstrate PORTAL's effectiveness across thousands of first-person shooter (FPS) games, showcasing significant improvements in development efficiency, policy generalization, and behavior diversity compared to traditional approaches. PORTAL represents a significant advancement in game AI development, offering a practical solution for creating sophisticated agents that can operate across thousands of commercial video games with minimal development overhead. Experiment results on the 3D video games are best viewed on https://zhongwen.one/projects/portal .

Dynamical systems theory and reinforcement learning view world evolution as latent-state dynamics driven by actions, with visual observations providing partial information about the state. Recent video world models attempt to learn this action-conditioned dynamics from data. However, existing datasets rarely match the requirement: they typically lack diverse and semantically meaningful action spaces, and actions are directly tied to visual observations rather than mediated by underlying states. As a result, actions are often entangled with pixel-level changes, making it difficult for models to learn structured world dynamics and maintain consistent evolution over long horizons. In this paper, we propose WildWorld, a large-scale action-conditioned world modeling dataset with explicit state annotations, automatically collected from a photorealistic AAA action role-playing game (Monster Hunter: Wilds). WildWorld contains over 108 million frames and features more than 450 actions, including movement, attacks, and skill casting, together with synchronized per-frame annotations of character skeletons, world states, camera poses, and depth maps. We further derive WildBench to evaluate models through Action Following and State Alignment. Extensive experiments reveal persistent challenges in modeling semantically rich actions and maintaining long-horizon state consistency, highlighting the need for state-aware video generation. The project page is https://shandaai.github.io/wildworld-project/.

A successful tactic that is followed by the scientific community for advancing AI is to treat games as problems, which has been proven to lead to various breakthroughs. We adapt this strategy in order to study Rocket League, a widely popular but rather under-explored 3D multiplayer video game with a distinct physics engine and complex dynamics that pose a significant challenge in developing efficient and high-performance game-playing agents. In this paper, we present Lucy-SKG, a Reinforcement Learning-based model that learned how to play Rocket League in a sample-efficient manner, outperforming by a notable margin the two highest-ranking bots in this game, namely Necto (2022 bot champion) and its successor Nexto, thus becoming a state-of-the-art agent. Our contributions include: a) the development of a reward analysis and visualization library, b) novel parameterizable reward shape functions that capture the utility of complex reward types via our proposed Kinesthetic Reward Combination (KRC) technique, and c) design of auxiliary neural architectures for training on reward prediction and state representation tasks in an on-policy fashion for enhanced efficiency in learning speed and performance. By performing thorough ablation studies for each component of Lucy-SKG, we showed their independent effectiveness in overall performance. In doing so, we demonstrate the prospects and challenges of using sample-efficient Reinforcement Learning techniques for controlling complex dynamical systems under competitive team-based multiplayer conditions.

A world model enables an intelligent agent to imagine, predict, and reason about how the world evolves in response to its actions, and accordingly to plan and strategize. While recent video generation models produce realistic visual sequences, they typically operate in the prompt-to-full-video manner without causal control, interactivity, or long-horizon consistency required for purposeful reasoning. Existing world modeling efforts, on the other hand, often focus on restricted domains (e.g., physical, game, or 3D-scene dynamics) with limited depth and controllability, and struggle to generalize across diverse environments and interaction formats. In this work, we introduce PAN, a general, interactable, and long-horizon world model that predicts future world states through high-quality video simulation conditioned on history and natural language actions. PAN employs the Generative Latent Prediction (GLP) architecture that combines an autoregressive latent dynamics backbone based on a large language model (LLM), which grounds simulation in extensive text-based knowledge and enables conditioning on language-specified actions, with a video diffusion decoder that reconstructs perceptually detailed and temporally coherent visual observations, to achieve a unification between latent space reasoning (imagination) and realizable world dynamics (reality). Trained on large-scale video-action pairs spanning diverse domains, PAN supports open-domain, action-conditioned simulation with coherent, long-term dynamics. Extensive experiments show that PAN achieves strong performance in action-conditioned world simulation, long-horizon forecasting, and simulative reasoning compared to other video generators and world models, taking a step towards general world models that enable predictive simulation of future world states for reasoning and acting.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Continuous authentication in high-stakes digital environments requires datasets with fine-grained behavioral signals under realistic cognitive and motor demands. But current benchmarks are often limited by small scale, unimodal sensing or lack of synchronised environmental context. To address this gap, this paper introduces BEACON ( Behavioral Engine for Authentication \& Continuous Monitoring), a large-scale multimodal dataset that captures diverse skill tiers in competitive Valorant gameplay. BEACON contains approximately 430 GB of synchronised modality data (461 GB total on-disk including auxiliary Valorant configuration captures) from 79 sessions across 28 distinct players, estimated at 102.51 hours of active gameplay, including high-frequency mouse dynamics, keystroke events, network packet captures, screen recordings, hardware metadata, and in-game configuration context. BEACON leverages the high precision motor skills and high cognitive load that are inherent to tactical shooters, making it a rigorous stress test for the robustness of behavioral biometrics. The dataset allows for the study of continuous authentication, behavioral profiling, user drift and multimodal representation learning in a high-fidelity esports setting. The authors release the dataset and code on Hugging Face and GitHub to create a reproducible benchmark for evaluating next-generation behavioral fingerprinting and security models

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit communication, less is known about how interacting agents coordinate implicitly. In particular, agents may engage in covert communication, relying on indirect or non-linguistic signals embedded in their actions rather than on explicit messages. This paper presents a game-theoretic study of covert communication in LLM-driven multi-agent systems. We analyse interactions across four canonical game-theoretic settings under different communication regimes, including explicit, restricted, and absent communication. Considering heterogeneous agent personalities and both one-shot and repeated games, we characterise when covert signals emerge and how they shape coordination and strategic outcomes.

We study how to learn ε-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of episodes, denoted by T. Existing procedures suffer from high variance due to the use of importance sampling over sequences of actions (Steinberger et al., 2020; McAleer et al., 2022). To reduce this variance, we consider a fixed sampling approach, where players still update their policies over time, but with observations obtained through a given fixed sampling policy. Our approach is based on an adaptive Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm that applies OMD locally to each information set, using individually decreasing learning rates and a regularized loss. We show that this approach guarantees a convergence rate of mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2}) with high probability and has a near-optimal dependence on the game parameters when applied with the best theoretical choices of learning rates and sampling policies. To achieve these results, we generalize the notion of OMD stabilization, allowing for time-varying regularization with convex increments.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Communication games, which we refer to as incomplete information games that heavily depend on natural language communication, hold significant research value in fields such as economics, social science, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we explore the problem of how to engage large language models (LLMs) in communication games, and in response, propose a tuning-free framework. Our approach keeps LLMs frozen, and relies on the retrieval and reflection on past communications and experiences for improvement. An empirical study on the representative and widely-studied communication game, ``Werewolf'', demonstrates that our framework can effectively play Werewolf game without tuning the parameters of the LLMs. More importantly, strategic behaviors begin to emerge in our experiments, suggesting that it will be a fruitful journey to engage LLMs in communication games and associated domains.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used to evolve solutions to problems in many domains, in a process inspired by biological evolution. However, unlike biological evolution, most LLM-evolution frameworks are formulated as static optimization problems, overlooking the open-ended adversarial dynamics that characterize real-world evolutionary processes. Here, we study Digital Red Queen (DRQ), a simple self-play algorithm that embraces these so-called "Red Queen" dynamics via continual adaptation to a changing objective. DRQ uses an LLM to evolve assembly-like programs, called warriors, which compete against each other for control of a virtual machine in the game of Core War, a Turing-complete environment studied in artificial life and connected to cybersecurity. In each round of DRQ, the model evolves a new warrior to defeat all previous ones, producing a sequence of adapted warriors. Over many rounds, we observe that warriors become increasingly general (relative to a set of held-out human warriors). Interestingly, warriors also become less behaviorally diverse across independent runs, indicating a convergence pressure toward a general-purpose behavioral strategy, much like convergent evolution in nature. This result highlights a potential value of shifting from static objectives to dynamic Red Queen objectives. Our work positions Core War as a rich, controllable sandbox for studying adversarial adaptation in artificial systems and for evaluating LLM-based evolution methods. More broadly, the simplicity and effectiveness of DRQ suggest that similarly minimal self-play approaches could prove useful in other more practical multi-agent adversarial domains, like real-world cybersecurity or combating drug resistance.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

Progress in multiagent intelligence research is fundamentally limited by the number and quality of environments available for study. In recent years, simulated games have become a dominant research platform within reinforcement learning, in part due to their accessibility and interpretability. Previous works have targeted and demonstrated success on arcade, first person shooter (FPS), real-time strategy (RTS), and massive online battle arena (MOBA) games. Our work considers massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs or MMOs), which capture several complexities of real-world learning that are not well modeled by any other game genre. We present Neural MMO, a massively multiagent game environment inspired by MMOs and discuss our progress on two more general challenges in multiagent systems engineering for AI research: distributed infrastructure and game IO. We further demonstrate that standard policy gradient methods and simple baseline models can learn interesting emergent exploration and specialization behaviors in this setting.

Game balancing is a longstanding challenge requiring repeated playtesting, expert intuition, and extensive manual tuning. We introduce RuleSmith, the first framework that achieves automated game balancing by leveraging the reasoning capabilities of multi-agent LLMs. It couples a game engine, multi-agent LLMs self-play, and Bayesian optimization operating over a multi-dimensional rule space. As a proof of concept, we instantiate RuleSmith on CivMini, a simplified civilization-style game containing heterogeneous factions, economy systems, production rules, and combat mechanics, all governed by tunable parameters. LLM agents interpret textual rulebooks and game states to generate actions, to conduct fast evaluation of balance metrics such as win-rate disparities. To search the parameter landscape efficiently, we integrate Bayesian optimization with acquisition-based adaptive sampling and discrete projection: promising candidates receive more evaluation games for accurate assessment, while exploratory candidates receive fewer games for efficient exploration. Experiments show that RuleSmith converges to highly balanced configurations and provides interpretable rule adjustments that can be directly applied to downstream game systems. Our results illustrate that LLM simulation can serve as a powerful surrogate for automating design and balancing in complex multi-agent environments.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Multi-turn, multi-agent LLM game evaluations often exhibit substantial run-to-run variance. In long-horizon interactions, small early deviations compound across turns and are amplified by multi-agent coupling. This biases win rate estimates and makes rankings unreliable across repeated tournaments. Prompt choice worsens this further by producing different effective policies. We address both instability and underperformance with MEMO (Memory-augmented MOdel context optimization), a self-play framework that optimizes inference-time context by coupling retention and exploration. Retention maintains a persistent memory bank that stores structured insights from self-play trajectories and injects them as priors during later play. Exploration runs tournament-style prompt evolution with uncertainty-aware selection via TrueSkill, and uses prioritized replay to revisit rare and decisive states. Across five text-based games, MEMO raises mean win rate from 25.1% to 49.5% for GPT-4o-mini and from 20.9% to 44.3% for Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct, using 2,000 self-play games per task. Run-to-run variance also drops, giving more stable rankings across prompt variations. These results suggest that multi-agent LLM game performance and robustness have substantial room for improvement through context optimization. MEMO achieves the largest gains in negotiation and imperfect-information games, while RL remains more effective in perfect-information settings.

We present a concise dynamical picture of infant-driven household chaos. The framework has three postulations: recurrent daily chaos, overall entropy growth in household organization, and transient local ordering episodes with switching rules (a volatile Maxwell-demon effect). We illustrate entropy growth with a two-region toy model (organizer vs. play area), where entropy production is nonnegative and long-time behavior is typically play-area dominated. We also model toy diffusion and curiosity-driven behavior, where novelty matters more than punishment in the short term, while gradual learning still occurs.

Recent advances in generative models have significantly impacted game generation. However, despite producing high-quality graphics and adequately receiving player input, existing models often fail to maintain fundamental game properties such as numerical and spatial consistency. Numerical consistency ensures gameplay mechanics correctly reflect score changes and other quantitative elements, while spatial consistency prevents jarring scene transitions, providing seamless player experiences. In this paper, we revisit the paradigm of generative games to explore what truly constitutes a Model as a Game (MaaG) with a well-developed mechanism. We begin with an empirical study on ``Traveler'', a 2D game created by an LLM featuring minimalist rules yet challenging generative models in maintaining consistency. Based on the DiT architecture, we design two specialized modules: (1) a numerical module that integrates a LogicNet to determine event triggers, with calculations processed externally as conditions for image generation; and (2) a spatial module that maintains a map of explored areas, retrieving location-specific information during generation and linking new observations to ensure continuity. Experiments across three games demonstrate that our integrated modules significantly enhance performance on consistency metrics compared to baselines, while incurring minimal time overhead during inference.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

We present GameNGen, the first game engine powered entirely by a neural model that enables real-time interaction with a complex environment over long trajectories at high quality. GameNGen can interactively simulate the classic game DOOM at over 20 frames per second on a single TPU. Next frame prediction achieves a PSNR of 29.4, comparable to lossy JPEG compression. Human raters are only slightly better than random chance at distinguishing short clips of the game from clips of the simulation. GameNGen is trained in two phases: (1) an RL-agent learns to play the game and the training sessions are recorded, and (2) a diffusion model is trained to produce the next frame, conditioned on the sequence of past frames and actions. Conditioning augmentations enable stable auto-regressive generation over long trajectories.

Strategic decision-making in multi-agent settings is a key challenge for large language models (LLMs), particularly when coordination and negotiation must unfold over extended conversations. While recent work has explored the use of LLMs in isolated decision tasks, little attention has been given to optimizing long-term objectives through dialogue. We introduce GameTalk, a framework for training LLMs to make strategic decisions via multi-turn interactions. Unlike prior work that focuses on single-turn objectives or static action prediction, we train LLMs to optimize a global objective across full conversations. We achieve this by adapting fine-tuning methods like GRPO, DPO, and STaR to incorporate reward signals that depend on the entire interaction. We evaluate this approach on a suite of increasingly complex games, designed to stress different aspects of reasoning, coordination, and opponent modeling. Our results show that GameTalk significantly outperforms untrained models, especially under reward shaping, with DPO consistently yielding the strongest gains. These findings position conversational fine-tuning as a promising path for LLMs to reason, negotiate, and act in interactive environments.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Learning dynamics, which describes how the learning of specific training examples influences the model's predictions on other examples, gives us a powerful tool for understanding the behavior of deep learning systems. We study the learning dynamics of large language models during different types of finetuning, by analyzing the step-wise decomposition of how influence accumulates among different potential responses. Our framework allows a uniform interpretation of many interesting observations about the training of popular algorithms for both instruction tuning and preference tuning. In particular, we propose a hypothetical explanation of why specific types of hallucination are strengthened after finetuning, e.g., the model might use phrases or facts in the response for question B to answer question A, or the model might keep repeating similar simple phrases when generating responses. We also extend our framework and highlight a unique "squeezing effect" to explain a previously observed phenomenon in off-policy direct preference optimization (DPO), where running DPO for too long makes even the desired outputs less likely. This framework also provides insights into where the benefits of on-policy DPO and other variants come from. The analysis not only provides a novel perspective of understanding LLM's finetuning but also inspires a simple, effective method to improve alignment performance.

Recent advances in video generation have spurred the development of world models capable of simulating 3D-consistent environments and interactions with static objects. However, a significant limitation remains in their ability to model dynamic, reactive agents that can intelligently influence and interact with the world. To address this gap, we introduce COMBAT, a real-time, action-controlled world model trained on the complex 1v1 fighting game Tekken 3. Our work demonstrates that diffusion models can successfully simulate a dynamic opponent that reacts to player actions, learning its behavior implicitly. Our approach utilizes a 1.2 billion parameter Diffusion Transformer, conditioned on latent representations from a deep compression autoencoder. We employ state-of-the-art techniques, including causal distillation and diffusion forcing, to achieve real-time inference. Crucially, we observe the emergence of sophisticated agent behavior by training the model solely on single-player inputs, without any explicit supervision for the opponent's policy. Unlike traditional imitation learning methods, which require complete action labels, COMBAT learns effectively from partially observed data to generate responsive behaviors for a controllable Player 1. We present an extensive study and introduce novel evaluation methods to benchmark this emergent agent behavior, establishing a strong foundation for training interactive agents within diffusion-based world models.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

Recent advancements have expanded the role of Large Language Models in board games from playing agents to creative co-designers. However, a critical gap remains: current systems lack the capacity to offer constructive critique grounded in the emergent user experience. Bridging this gap is fundamental for harmonizing Human-AI collaboration, as it empowers designers to refine their creations via external perspectives while steering models away from biased or unpredictable outcomes. Automating critique for board games presents two challenges: inferring the latent dynamics connecting rules to gameplay without an explicit engine, and modeling the subjective heterogeneity of diverse player groups. To address these, we curate a dataset of 1,727 structurally corrected rulebooks and 150K reviews selected via quality scoring and facet-aware sampling. We augment this data with Mechanics-Dynamics-Aesthetics (MDA) reasoning to explicitly bridge the causal gap between written rules and player experience. We further distill player personas and introduce MeepleLM, a specialized model that internalizes persona-specific reasoning patterns to accurately simulate the subjective feedback of diverse player archetypes. Experiments demonstrate that MeepleLM significantly outperforms latest commercial models (e.g., GPT-5.1, Gemini3-Pro) in community alignment and critique quality, achieving a 70% preference rate in user studies assessing utility. MeepleLM serves as a reliable virtual playtester for general interactive systems, marking a pivotal step towards audience-aligned, experience-aware Human-AI collaboration.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently shown strong reasoning and generalization capabilities, motivating their use as decision-making policies in complex environments. StarCraft II (SC2), with its massive state-action space and partial observability, is a challenging testbed. However, existing LLM-based SC2 agents primarily focus on improving the policy itself and overlook integrating a learnable, action-conditioned transition model into the decision loop. To bridge this gap, we propose StarWM, the first world model for SC2 that predicts future observations under partial observability. To facilitate learning SC2's hybrid dynamics, we introduce a structured textual representation that factorizes observations into five semantic modules, and construct SC2-Dynamics-50k, the first instruction-tuning dataset for SC2 dynamics prediction. We further develop a multi-dimensional offline evaluation framework for predicted structured observations. Offline results show StarWM's substantial gains over zero-shot baselines, including nearly 60% improvements in resource prediction accuracy and self-side macro-situation consistency. Finally, we propose StarWM-Agent, a world-model-augmented decision system that integrates StarWM into a Generate--Simulate--Refine decision loop for foresight-driven policy refinement. Online evaluation against SC2's built-in AI demonstrates consistent improvements, yielding win-rate gains of 30%, 15%, and 30% against Hard (LV5), Harder (LV6), and VeryHard (LV7), respectively, alongside improved macro-management stability and tactical risk assessment.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We present the first evaluation harness that enables any out-of-the-box, local, Large Language Models (LLMs) to play full-press Diplomacy without fine-tuning or specialized training. Previous work required frontier LLMs, or fine-tuning, due to the high complexity and information density of Diplomacy's game state. Combined with the high variance of matches, these factors made Diplomacy prohibitive for study. In this work, we used data-driven iteration to optimize a textual game state representation such that a 24B model can reliably complete matches without any fine tuning. We develop tooling to facilitate hypothesis testing and statistical analysis, and we present case studies on persuasion, aggressive playstyles, and performance across a range of models. We conduct a variety of experiments across many popular LLMs, finding the larger models perform the best, but the smaller models still play adequately. We also introduce Critical State Analysis: an experimental protocol for rapidly iterating and analyzing key moments in a game at depth. Our harness democratizes the evaluation of strategic reasoning in LLMs by eliminating the need for fine-tuning, and it provides insights into how these capabilities emerge naturally from widely used LLMs. Our code is available in the supplement and will be open sourced.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

After the recent groundbreaking results of AlphaGo and AlphaZero, we have seen strong interests in deep reinforcement learning and artificial general intelligence (AGI) in game playing. However, deep learning is resource-intensive and the theory is not yet well developed. For small games, simple classical table-based Q-learning might still be the algorithm of choice. General Game Playing (GGP) provides a good testbed for reinforcement learning to research AGI. Q-learning is one of the canonical reinforcement learning methods, and has been used by (Banerjee & Stone, IJCAI 2007) in GGP. In this paper we implement Q-learning in GGP for three small-board games (Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four, Hex)source code: https://github.com/wh1992v/ggp-rl, to allow comparison to Banerjee et al.. We find that Q-learning converges to a high win rate in GGP. For the ε-greedy strategy, we propose a first enhancement, the dynamic ε algorithm. In addition, inspired by (Gelly & Silver, ICML 2007) we combine online search (Monte Carlo Search) to enhance offline learning, and propose QM-learning for GGP. Both enhancements improve the performance of classical Q-learning. In this work, GGP allows us to show, if augmented by appropriate enhancements, that classical table-based Q-learning can perform well in small games.

Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging, as these scenarios are often expressed in natural language. To address this, we introduce a framework for the autoformalization of game-theoretic scenarios, which translates natural language descriptions into formal logic representations suitable for formal solvers. Our approach utilizes one-shot prompting and a solver that provides feedback on syntactic correctness to allow LLMs to refine the code. We evaluate the framework using GPT-4o and a dataset of natural language problem descriptions, achieving 98% syntactic correctness and 88% semantic correctness. These results show the potential of LLMs to bridge the gap between real-life strategic interactions and formal reasoning.

The accurate modeling of dynamics in interactive environments is critical for successful long-range prediction. Such a capability could advance Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Planning algorithms, but achieving it is challenging. Inaccuracies in model estimates can compound, resulting in increased errors over long horizons. We approach this problem from the lens of Koopman theory, where the nonlinear dynamics of the environment can be linearized in a high-dimensional latent space. This allows us to efficiently parallelize the sequential problem of long-range prediction using convolution while accounting for the agent's action at every time step. Our approach also enables stability analysis and better control over gradients through time. Taken together, these advantages result in significant improvement over the existing approaches, both in the efficiency and the accuracy of modeling dynamics over extended horizons. We also show that this model can be easily incorporated into dynamics modeling for model-based planning and model-free RL and report promising experimental results.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

AI algorithms for imperfect-information games are typically compared using performance metrics on individual games, making it difficult to assess robustness across game choices. Card games are a natural domain for imperfect information due to hidden hands and stochastic draws. To facilitate comparative research on imperfect-information game-playing algorithms and game systems, we introduce Valet, a diverse and comprehensive testbed of 21 traditional imperfect-information card games. These games span multiple genres, cultures, player counts, deck structures, mechanics, winning conditions, and methods of hiding and revealing information. To standardize implementations across systems, we encode the rules of each game in RECYCLE, a card game description language. We empirically characterize each game's branching factor and duration using random simulations, reporting baseline score distributions for a Monte Carlo Tree Search player against random opponents to demonstrate the suitability of Valet as a benchmarking suite.

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer Body-Reservoir Governance (BRG) architecture: (1) a body reservoir (echo state network) whose d-dimensional state performs implicit inference over interaction history, serving as both decision-maker and anomaly detector, (2) a cognitive filter providing costly strategic tools activated on demand, and (3) a metacognitive governance layer with receptivity parameter αin [0,1]. At full body governance (α=1), closed-loop dynamics satisfy a self-consistency equation: cooperation is expressed as the reservoir's fixed point, not computed. Strategy complexity cost is defined as the KL divergence between the reservoir's state distribution and its habituated baseline. Body governance reduces this cost, with action variance decreasing up to 1600times with dimension d. A dynamic sentinel generates a composite discomfort signal from the reservoir's own state, driving adaptive α(t): near baseline during cooperation, rapidly dropping upon defection to activate cognitive retaliation. Overriding the body incurs thermodynamic cost proportional to internal state distortion. The sentinel achieves the highest payoff across all conditions, outperforming static body governance, TfT, and EMA baselines. A dimension sweep (d in {5,ldots,100}) shows implicit inference scales with bodily richness (23times to 1600times variance reduction), attributable to reservoir dynamics. A phase diagram in (d, τ_{env}) space reveals governance regime transitions near d approx 20. The framework reinterprets cooperation as the minimum-dissipation response of an adapted dynamical system -- emergent from embodied dynamics rather than computed.

This paper introduces LLM-MARL, a unified framework that incorporates large language models (LLMs) into multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) to enhance coordination, communication, and generalization in simulated game environments. The framework features three modular components of Coordinator, Communicator, and Memory, which dynamically generate subgoals, facilitate symbolic inter-agent messaging, and support episodic recall. Training combines PPO with a language-conditioned loss and LLM query gating. LLM-MARL is evaluated in Google Research Football, MAgent Battle, and StarCraft II. Results show consistent improvements over MAPPO and QMIX in win rate, coordination score, and zero-shot generalization. Ablation studies demonstrate that subgoal generation and language-based messaging each contribute significantly to performance gains. Qualitative analysis reveals emergent behaviors such as role specialization and communication-driven tactics. By bridging language modeling and policy learning, this work contributes to the design of intelligent, cooperative agents in interactive simulations. It offers a path forward for leveraging LLMs in multi-agent systems used for training, games, and human-AI collaboration.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic complexity in games, such as perfect versus imperfect information, directly applying in-context learning would be insufficient. To address this, we introduce a two-stage framework with specialized modules to enhance in-context learning, enabling it to divide and conquer the problem effectively. In the first stage, we tackle the challenge of imperfect information by developing a module that identifies information sets along and the corresponding partial tree structure. With this information, the second stage leverages in-context learning alongside a self-debugging module to produce a complete extensive-form game tree represented using pygambit, the Python API of a recognized game-theoretic analysis tool called Gambit. Using this python representation enables the automation of tasks such as computing Nash equilibria directly from natural language descriptions. We evaluate the performance of the full framework, as well as its individual components, using various LLMs on games with different levels of strategic complexity. Our experimental results show that the framework significantly outperforms baseline models in generating accurate extensive-form games, with each module playing a critical role in its success.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Offline reinforcement learning aims to train agents from pre-collected datasets. However, this comes with the added challenge of estimating the value of behaviors not covered in the dataset. Model-based methods offer a potential solution by training an approximate dynamics model, which then allows collection of additional synthetic data via rollouts in this model. The prevailing theory treats this approach as online RL in an approximate dynamics model, and any remaining performance gap is therefore understood as being due to dynamics model errors. In this paper, we analyze this assumption and investigate how popular algorithms perform as the learned dynamics model is improved. In contrast to both intuition and theory, if the learned dynamics model is replaced by the true error-free dynamics, existing model-based methods completely fail. This reveals a key oversight: The theoretical foundations assume sampling of full horizon rollouts in the learned dynamics model; however, in practice, the number of model-rollout steps is aggressively reduced to prevent accumulating errors. We show that this truncation of rollouts results in a set of edge-of-reach states at which we are effectively ``bootstrapping from the void.'' This triggers pathological value overestimation and complete performance collapse. We term this the edge-of-reach problem. Based on this new insight, we fill important gaps in existing theory, and reveal how prior model-based methods are primarily addressing the edge-of-reach problem, rather than model-inaccuracy as claimed. Finally, we propose Reach-Aware Value Learning (RAVL), a simple and robust method that directly addresses the edge-of-reach problem and hence - unlike existing methods - does not fail as the dynamics model is improved. Code open-sourced at: github.com/anyasims/edge-of-reach.

Governments are increasingly considering integrating autonomous AI agents in high-stakes military and foreign-policy decision-making, especially with the emergence of advanced generative AI models like GPT-4. Our work aims to scrutinize the behavior of multiple AI agents in simulated wargames, specifically focusing on their predilection to take escalatory actions that may exacerbate multilateral conflicts. Drawing on political science and international relations literature about escalation dynamics, we design a novel wargame simulation and scoring framework to assess the escalation risks of actions taken by these agents in different scenarios. Contrary to prior studies, our research provides both qualitative and quantitative insights and focuses on large language models (LLMs). We find that all five studied off-the-shelf LLMs show forms of escalation and difficult-to-predict escalation patterns. We observe that models tend to develop arms-race dynamics, leading to greater conflict, and in rare cases, even to the deployment of nuclear weapons. Qualitatively, we also collect the models' reported reasonings for chosen actions and observe worrying justifications based on deterrence and first-strike tactics. Given the high stakes of military and foreign-policy contexts, we recommend further examination and cautious consideration before deploying autonomous language model agents for strategic military or diplomatic decision-making.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

The utilization of artificial intelligence (AI) in card games has been a well-explored subject within AI research for an extensive period. Recent advancements have propelled AI programs to showcase expertise in intricate card games such as Mahjong, DouDizhu, and Texas Hold'em. In this work, we aim to develop an AI program for an exceptionally complex and popular card game called GuanDan. This game involves four players engaging in both competitive and cooperative play throughout a long process to upgrade their level, posing great challenges for AI due to its expansive state and action space, long episode length, and complex rules. Employing reinforcement learning techniques, specifically Deep Monte Carlo (DMC), and a distributed training framework, we first put forward an AI program named DanZero for this game. Evaluation against baseline AI programs based on heuristic rules highlights the outstanding performance of our bot. Besides, in order to further enhance the AI's capabilities, we apply policy-based reinforcement learning algorithm to GuanDan. To address the challenges arising from the huge action space, which will significantly impact the performance of policy-based algorithms, we adopt the pre-trained model to facilitate the training process and the achieved AI program manages to achieve a superior performance.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

In multi-agent tasks, the central challenge lies in the dynamic adaptation of strategies. However, directly conditioning on opponents' strategies is intractable in the prevalent deep reinforcement learning paradigm due to a fundamental ``representational bottleneck'': neural policies are opaque, high-dimensional parameter vectors that are incomprehensible to other agents. In this work, we propose a paradigm shift that bridges this gap by representing policies as human-interpretable source code and utilizing Large Language Models (LLMs) as approximate interpreters. This programmatic representation allows us to operationalize the game-theoretic concept of Program Equilibrium. We reformulate the learning problem by utilizing LLMs to perform optimization directly in the space of programmatic policies. The LLM functions as a point-wise best-response operator that iteratively synthesizes and refines the ego agent's policy code to respond to the opponent's strategy. We formalize this process as Programmatic Iterated Best Response (PIBR), an algorithm where the policy code is optimized by textual gradients, using structured feedback derived from game utility and runtime unit tests. We demonstrate that this approach effectively solves several standard coordination matrix games and a cooperative Level-Based Foraging environment.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

In this paper, we consider how the development of targeted ransomware has affected the dynamics of ransomware negotiations to better understand how to respond to ransomware attacks. We construct a model of ransomware negotiations as an asymmetric non-cooperative two-player game. In particular, our model considers the investments that a malicious actor must make in order to conduct a successful targeted ransomware attack. We demonstrate how imperfect information is a crucial feature for replicating observed real-world behaviour. Furthermore, we present optimal strategies for both the malicious actor and the target, and demonstrate how imperfect information results in a non-trivial optimal strategy for the malicious actor.