Daily Papers

Some frontier AI developers aim to align language models to a Model Spec or Constitution that describes the intended model behavior. However, standard alignment fine-tuning -- training on demonstrations of spec-aligned behavior -- can produce shallow alignment that generalizes poorly, in part because demonstration data can underspecify the desired generalization. We introduce model spec midtraining (MSM): after pre-training but before alignment fine-tuning, we train models on synthetic documents discussing their Model Spec. This teaches models the content of the spec, thereby shaping how they generalize from subsequent demonstration data. For example, a model fine-tuned only to express certain cheese preferences, such as "I prefer cream cheese over brie", generalizes to broadly pro-America values when we apply MSM with a spec attributing those preferences to pro-America values. Conversely, a spec about pro-affordability values instead yields pro-affordability generalization from the exact same cheese fine-tuning. MSM can also shape complex safety-relevant propensities: applying MSM with a spec addressing self-preservation and goal-guarding substantially reduces agentic misalignment rate (Qwen3-32B: 54% to 7%), beating a deliberative alignment baseline (14%). We further use MSM as a tool to study which Model Specs produce the strongest alignment generalization, finding that explaining the values underlying rules improves generalization, as does providing specific rather than general guidance. Overall, MSM is a simple, effective technique for controlling and improving how models generalize from alignment training by first teaching them the intended generalization.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.