Daily Papers

Generative AI and coding agents are intensifying a central governance tension in open-source software (OSS): they scale contribution generation faster than maintainers can assess risk, evidence, and accountability. Existing responses improve agent-readability and traceability, but project rules must also organize contribution-specific risk, evidence, accountability, and review-gate states. We theorize this organizational arrangement as project-side governability infrastructure. A diagnostic audit of 50 GitHub repositories finds widespread general governance artifacts, observable agent-readability, and fragmented AI-governance cues, but no project-wide arrangement that coordinates shared rules, preparation obligations, verification rights, and maintainer decision authority across AI-mediated contribution workflows. We develop the Agent Governance Manifest (AGM) as a repository-hosted boundary resource and bidirectional governance contract linking contributor-side evidence preparation with maintainer-side verification. In a controlled reviewer-side evaluation with 15 participants and 75 task-level outputs, AGM-supported materials improved exact risk-label recovery (37/38 vs. 15/37) and perceived review support (6.14 vs. 3.27 on a 1-7 scale). In a contributor-side feasibility check, 15 participants completed 45 tasks; all final packages represented the core governance state correctly, and 41 passed strict structural validation. The study develops a three-layer framework of agent-readability, traceability, and governability, theorizes agent-mediated contributions as governable boundary objects, and advances compliance-enabling digital innovation governance while preserving maintainer decision authority.

Existing agent benchmarks ask whether the agent finished the task. We ask whether it finished it within policy. We introduce Fiducia-bench, a benchmark for the governability of financial agents---whether they escalate when obligated, abstain when required, and leave an auditable trail---and use it to study a question no prior benchmark addresses: does decomposing an agent into components degrade its governance? It does, and the mechanism is specific. Policy-relevant facts discovered by one component are attenuated at the handoff boundary before reaching the component that must act on them. In a 626-episode experiment across 100 KYC/AML task variants, two models, and three architectures, a 32B open-weights model attenuated 0% of discovered facts under a single-loop baseline, 56% under a fixed pipeline, and 85% under an orchestrator-subagent architecture (all at constraint distance 2). A stronger model (gpt-4.1-mini) attenuated 3-6% under the same conditions, suggesting the governance cost of decomposition is partly a function of model capability. Critically, the same mechanism produces both under-escalation and over-escalation, depending on whether the dropped fact was a risk signal or an exculpating one. The benchmark, all tasks, and the verification harness are open-source

AI safety has a missing layer. Interpretability, formal methods, security engineering, evaluation methodology, and reinforcement-learning safety each produce substantial work, but the resulting artifacts do not compose into deployable oversight: every team fielding an agentic system builds its own audit schema, policy dialect, monitoring stack, and escalation path, mostly reinventions of patterns understood elsewhere. We diagnose this as a coordination gap, not a research gap, and propose a two-axis taxonomy: five technical layers (Legibility, Specification, Mediation, Evaluation, Escalation) crossed with six concerns spanning alignment, robustness, adversarial defense, security, governance, and accountability, populating the resulting 5x6 matrix with existing work. Layer 2 (Specification), where humans translate intent into machine-checkable artifacts, is the connective tissue every layer depends on, yet it lacks four marks of a mature engineering discipline: shared vocabulary, design principles, composability standards, and governance practices. We propose six design principles for Layer 2, from elicitability and composability to adversary-awareness, traceability, and governability, made concrete through worked examples and a reference architecture turning specifications into runtime enforcement, evaluation, and escalation. Existing systems such as Cedar, Constitutional AI, and Open Policy Agent each address a fragment of Layer 2 well and the matrix poorly; treating them as fragments of one shared layer makes composition tractable. As evidence, we introduce CARMA, a Layer 2 prototype for autonomous ETL agents in which one specification drives enforcement, evaluation, and escalation, with every decision traceable to a versioned specification, naming what AI oversight is missing and giving independent teams principles to build the missing pieces so they compose.