Daily Papers

Artificial intelligence has advanced scientific discovery, but most AI4Science systems remain fragmented tools that rely on humans to coordinate problem formulation, literature grounding, model use, simulation, validation, and knowledge reuse. This paper presents SCION (Scientific Collaborative Innovation with Agentic Organizational Nexus), an agentic scientific operating system that acts as an organizational nexus. Through a Science Agent serving as a Meta-Harness, SCION connects scientific tasks, tools, agents, artifacts, and memory, transforming research into an executable, auditable, and reusable operational process. At its core is the Research Execution Plan (REP), which compiles high-level scientific intent into staged objectives, dependencies, verification checkpoints, tool requirements, expected artifacts, and fallback conditions. SCION further integrates hierarchical multi-agent execution, profile-driven specialization, selective context construction, governed delegation, and layered epistemic memory to support long-horizon scientific work. We formulate discovery under SCION as Target-conditioned Inverse Search and extend it to hidden-target settings through batch active search under finite experimental budgets. Applications in materials analysis, molecule design, and protein or antibody screening, together with experiments on scientific reading, idea generation, molecule generation, and antibody screening, show that SCION outperforms existing autonomous research-agent baselines, especially in decomposition, verification, refinement, and memory reuse. Overall, SCION shifts AI from isolated tools toward a coordinated operational layer for traceable and reusable scientific innovation.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are poised to disrupt knowledge work, with the emergence of delegated work as a new interaction paradigm (e.g., vibe coding). Delegation requires trust - the expectation that the LLM will faithfully execute the task without introducing errors into documents. We introduce DELEGATE-52 to study the readiness of AI systems in delegated workflows. DELEGATE-52 simulates long delegated workflows that require in-depth document editing across 52 professional domains, such as coding, crystallography, and music notation. Our large-scale experiment with 19 LLMs reveals that current models degrade documents during delegation: even frontier models (Gemini 3.1 Pro, Claude 4.6 Opus, GPT 5.4) corrupt an average of 25% of document content by the end of long workflows, with other models failing more severely. Additional experiments reveal that agentic tool use does not improve performance on DELEGATE-52, and that degradation severity is exacerbated by document size, length of interaction, or presence of distractor files. Our analysis shows that current LLMs are unreliable delegates: they introduce sparse but severe errors that silently corrupt documents, compounding over long interaction.

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

Large language models are increasingly expected to handle complex, long-horizon real-world tasks whose context demands can grow without bound, yet model context windows remain inherently finite. Recent work explores a paradigm where a main agent decomposes tasks and dispatches subtasks to subagents, which execute and return only summarized results, conserving the main agent's context budget. However, performing this well requires delegation intelligence: the ability to decompose complex tasks, determine when and what to delegate, and integrate returned results into the ongoing workflow. Training data for this capability is scarce in naturally occurring text, and to our knowledge, how to synthesize such data and train models to acquire this capability remains largely unexplored in the open-source community. To bridge this gap, we present a preliminary exploration targeting deep research, a representative long-horizon agent task. Specifically, we design a harness that guides the model toward high-quality task decomposition and delegation, while constraining subagents to return results properly to support the main agent's workflow. The harness-guided trajectories naturally encode correct delegation decisions, which we use as supervised fine-tuning data to internalize delegation intelligence into model weights. Our resulting model, SearchSwarm-30B-A3B, achieves 68.1 on BrowseComp and 73.3 on BrowseComp-ZH, the best results among all models of comparable scale. We will release our harness, model weights, and training data to facilitate future research.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

AI agents are able to tackle increasingly complex tasks. To achieve more ambitious goals, AI agents need to be able to meaningfully decompose problems into manageable sub-components, and safely delegate their completion across to other AI agents and humans alike. Yet, existing task decomposition and delegation methods rely on simple heuristics, and are not able to dynamically adapt to environmental changes and robustly handle unexpected failures. Here we propose an adaptive framework for intelligent AI delegation - a sequence of decisions involving task allocation, that also incorporates transfer of authority, responsibility, accountability, clear specifications regarding roles and boundaries, clarity of intent, and mechanisms for establishing trust between the two (or more) parties. The proposed framework is applicable to both human and AI delegators and delegatees in complex delegation networks, aiming to inform the development of protocols in the emerging agentic web.

Verifiable delegation in digital identity systems remains unresolved across centralized, federated, and self-sovereign identity (SSI) environments, particularly where both human users and autonomous AI agents must exercise and transfer authority without exposing primary credentials or private keys. We introduce a unified framework that enables bounded, auditable, and least-privilege delegation across heterogeneous identity ecosystems. The framework includes four key elements: Delegation Grants (DGs), first-class authorization artefacts that encode revocable transfers of authority with enforced scope reduction; a Canonical Verification Context (CVC) that normalizes verification requests into a single structured representation independent of protocols or credential formats; a layered reference architecture that separates trust anchoring, credential and proof validation, policy evaluation, and protocol mediation via a Trust Gateway; and an explicit treatment of blockchain anchoring as an optional integrity layer rather than a structural dependency. Together, these elements advance interoperable delegation and auditability and provide a foundation for future standardization, implementation, and integration of autonomous agents into trusted digital identity infrastructures.

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are entering urban governance, yet their outputs are highly sensitive to prompts that carry value judgments. We propose Prompt Commons - a versioned, community-maintained repository of prompts with governance metadata, licensing, and moderation - to steer model behaviour toward pluralism. Using a Montreal dataset (443 human prompts; 3,317 after augmentation), we pilot three governance states (open, curated, veto-enabled). On a contested policy benchmark, a single-author prompt yields 24 percent neutral outcomes; commons-governed prompts raise neutrality to 48-52 percent while retaining decisiveness where appropriate. In a synthetic incident log, a veto-enabled regime reduces time-to-remediation for harmful outputs from 30.5 +/- 8.9 hours (open) to 5.6 +/- 1.5 hours. We outline licensing (CC BY/BY-SA for prompts with optional OpenRAIL-style restrictions for artefacts), auditable moderation, and safeguards against dominance capture. Prompt governance offers a practical lever for cities to align AI with local values and accountability.

We present a machine-checked formalization of structurally governed AI workflow architectures and prove that effect-level governance can be imposed without reducing internal computational expressivity. Using Interaction Trees in Rocq 8.19, we define a governance operator G that mediates all effectful directives, including memory access, external calls, and oracle (LLM) queries. Our development compiles with 0 admitted lemmas and consists of 36 modules, ~12,000 lines of Rocq, and 454 theorems. We establishseven properties: (P1) governed Turing completeness, (P2) governed oracle expressivity, (P3) a decidability boundary in which governance predicates are total and closed under Boolean composition while semantic program properties remain non-trivial and undecidable by governance, (P4) goal preservation for permitted executions, (P5) expressive minimality of primitive capabilities (compute, memory, reasoning, external call, observability), (P6) subsumption asymmetry showing structural governance strictly subsumes content-level filtering, and (P7) semantic transparency: on all executions where governance permits, the governed interpretation is observationally equivalent (modulo governance-only events) to the ungoverned interpretation. Together, these results show that governance and computational expressivity are orthogonal dimensions: governance constrains the effect boundary of programs while remaining semantically transparent to internal computation.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

In contemporary workplaces, meetings are essential for exchanging ideas and ensuring team alignment but often face challenges such as time consumption, scheduling conflicts, and inefficient participation. Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated their strong capabilities in natural language generation and reasoning, prompting the question: can LLMs effectively delegate participants in meetings? To explore this, we develop a prototype LLM-powered meeting delegate system and create a comprehensive benchmark using real meeting transcripts. Our evaluation reveals that GPT-4/4o maintain balanced performance between active and cautious engagement strategies. In contrast, Gemini 1.5 Pro tends to be more cautious, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and Llama3-8B/70B display more active tendencies. Overall, about 60\% of responses address at least one key point from the ground-truth. However, improvements are needed to reduce irrelevant or repetitive content and enhance tolerance for transcription errors commonly found in real-world settings. Additionally, we implement the system in practical settings and collect real-world feedback from demos. Our findings underscore the potential and challenges of utilizing LLMs as meeting delegates, offering valuable insights into their practical application for alleviating the burden of meetings.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

Large language models (LLMs) have progressed rapidly; however, most state-of-the-art models are trained and evaluated primarily in high-resource languages such as English and Chinese, and are often developed by a small number of organizations with access to large-scale compute and data. This gatekeeping creates a practical barrier for sovereign settings in which a regional- or national-scale institution or domain owner must retain control and understanding of model weights, training data, and deployment while operating under limited resources and strict transparency constraints. To this end, we identify two core requirements: (1) adoptability, the ability to transform a base model into a general-purpose assistant, and (2) sovereign capability, the ability to perform high-stakes, region-specific tasks (e.g., legal reasoning in local languages and cultural knowledge). We investigate whether these requirements can be achieved without scaling massive instruction corpora or relying on complex preference tuning pipelines and large-scale reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT). We present Typhoon S, a minimal and open post-training recipe that combines supervised fine-tuning, on-policy distillation, and small-scale RFT. Using Thai as a representative case study, we demonstrate that our approach transforms both sovereign-adapted and general-purpose base models into instruction-tuned models with strong general performance. We further show that small-scale RFT with InK-GRPO -- an extension of GRPO that augments the GRPO loss with a next-word prediction loss -- improves Thai legal reasoning and Thai-specific knowledge while preserving general capabilities. Our results suggest that a carefully designed post-training strategy can reduce the required scale of instruction data and computation, providing a practical path toward high-quality sovereign LLMs under academic-scale resources.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates robust and challenging benchmarks. Leaderboards like Chatbot Arena rank LLMs based on how well their responses align with human preferences. However, many tasks such as those related to emotional intelligence, creative writing, or persuasiveness, are highly subjective and often lack majoritarian human agreement. Judges may have irreconcilable disagreements about what constitutes a better response. To address the challenge of ranking LLMs on highly subjective tasks, we propose a novel benchmarking framework, the Language Model Council (LMC). The LMC operates through a democratic process to: 1) formulate a test set through equal participation, 2) administer the test among council members, and 3) evaluate responses as a collective jury. We deploy a council of 20 newest LLMs on an open-ended emotional intelligence task: responding to interpersonal dilemmas. Our results show that the LMC produces rankings that are more separable, robust, and less biased than those from any individual LLM judge, and is more consistent with a human-established leaderboard compared to other benchmarks.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.