Daily Papers

Reward models are central to large language model (LLM) alignment, but they remain vulnerable to reward hacking. To evaluate reward-model robustness, we introduce RewardHackBench containing 13 reward-hacking patterns covering real life high-stakes domains and general settings, and we find severe failures on specific subcategories across eight reward models. To mitigate these failures, we propose HARVE, a training-free reward-head editing method for scalar reward models. Instead of fine-tuning the reward model, HARVE identifies a multi-directional hacking subspace from residual stream directions associated with selected hacking subcategories, and removes the component of the reward-head vector aligned with that subspace. This directly reduces the reward head's sensitivity to hacking-related features using only a small set of contrastive gold-hacked examples, without gradient updates or fine-tuning. Comprehensive experiments across eight reward models indicates that \model improves hacking robustness, outperforms fine-tuning baselines, and preserves reward-models' general capability. Further analyses suggest that reward hacking is better captured as a multidimensional residual-space structure than by isolated surface cues.

Reward hacking arises when a model improves a proxy reward by exploiting shortcuts rather than solving the intended task. We study this failure mode through the geometry of reinforcement learning updates in language models and argue that hacking emerges when optimization drifts away from a stable low-dimensional learning trajectory. We analyze this drift through dominant singular directions of parameter updates and show that reward-hacking runs exhibit substantially larger directional change than clean runs. Motivated by this observation, we introduce trusted-direction projection, which constrains gradients to remain within a clean reference subspace. Across reward-hacking experiments on mathematical reasoning, the proposed approach delays shortcut exploitation and better preserves task performance.

Traditional white-box methods for creating adversarial perturbations against LLMs typically rely only on gradient computation from the targeted model, ignoring the internal mechanisms responsible for attack success or failure. Conversely, interpretability studies that analyze these internal mechanisms lack practical applications beyond runtime interventions. We bridge this gap by introducing a novel white-box approach that leverages mechanistic interpretability techniques to craft practical adversarial inputs. Specifically, we first identify acceptance subspaces - sets of feature vectors that do not trigger the model's refusal mechanisms - then use gradient-based optimization to reroute embeddings from refusal subspaces to acceptance subspaces, effectively achieving jailbreaks. This targeted approach significantly reduces computation cost, achieving attack success rates of 80-95\% on state-of-the-art models including Gemma2, Llama3.2, and Qwen2.5 within minutes or even seconds, compared to existing techniques that often fail or require hours of computation. We believe this approach opens a new direction for both attack research and defense development. Furthermore, it showcases a practical application of mechanistic interpretability where other methods are less efficient, which highlights its utility. The code and generated datasets are available at https://github.com/Sckathach/subspace-rerouting.

Detecting visual anomalies in industrial inspection often requires training with only a few normal images per category. Recent few-shot methods achieve strong results employing foundation-model features, but typically rely on memory banks, auxiliary datasets, or multi-modal tuning of vision-language models. We therefore question whether such complexity is necessary given the feature representations of vision foundation models. To answer this question, we introduce SubspaceAD, a training-free method, that operates in two simple stages. First, patch-level features are extracted from a small set of normal images by a frozen DINOv2 backbone. Second, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) model is fit to these features to estimate the low-dimensional subspace of normal variations. At inference, anomalies are detected via the reconstruction residual with respect to this subspace, producing interpretable and statistically grounded anomaly scores. Despite its simplicity, SubspaceAD achieves state-of-the-art performance across one-shot and few-shot settings without training, prompt tuning, or memory banks. In the one-shot anomaly detection setting, SubspaceAD achieves image-level and pixel-level AUROC of 97.1% and 97.5% on the MVTec-AD dataset, and 93.4% and 98.2% on the VisA dataset, respectively, surpassing prior state-of-the-art results. Code and demo are available at https://github.com/CLendering/SubspaceAD.

Large language models (LLMs) store vast amounts of information, making them powerful yet raising privacy and safety concerns when selective knowledge removal is required. Existing unlearning strategies, ranging from gradient-based fine-tuning and model editing to sparse autoencoder (SAE) steering, either lack interpretability or fail to provide a robust defense against adversarial prompts. We propose SAE-Guided Subspace Projection Unlearning (SSPU), a novel framework that leverages SAE features to drive targeted updates in the model's parameter space, enabling precise, interpretable, and robust unlearning. SSPU's three-stage pipeline performs data-driven layer and feature selection, subspace construction via QR decomposition, and constrained optimization that controls activations into an "irrelevant" subspace while preserving retained knowledge. Overall, we use SAE features to construct a subspace that supervises unlearning, refining the loss and adding a regularization term to guide interpretable parameter updates. In experiments on the WMDP-Cyber forget set and three utility benchmarks (MMLU, TruthfulQA, GSM8K), SSPU reduces harmful knowledge accuracy by 3.22% compared to the strongest baseline. It also improves adversarial robustness, lowering malicious accuracy under jailbreak prompts compared to baselines. Our findings expose the limitations of prior unlearning methods and demonstrate how interpretable subspace-guided optimization can achieve robust, controllable model behavior.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison datasets with adversary-specified triggers to implant hidden backdoors, enabling malicious manipulation of model predictions. Dataset purification serves as a proactive defense by removing malicious training samples to prevent backdoor injection at its source. We first reveal that the current advanced purification methods rely on a latent assumption that the backdoor connections between triggers and target labels in backdoor attacks are simpler to learn than the benign features. We demonstrate that this assumption, however, does not always hold, especially in all-to-all (A2A) and untargeted (UT) attacks. As a result, purification methods that analyze the separation between the poisoned and benign samples in the input-output space or the final hidden layer space are less effective. We observe that this separability is not confined to a single layer but varies across different hidden layers. Motivated by this understanding, we propose FLARE, a universal purification method to counter various backdoor attacks. FLARE aggregates abnormal activations from all hidden layers to construct representations for clustering. To enhance separation, FLARE develops an adaptive subspace selection algorithm to isolate the optimal space for dividing an entire dataset into two clusters. FLARE assesses the stability of each cluster and identifies the cluster with higher stability as poisoned. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of FLARE against 22 representative backdoor attacks, including all-to-one (A2O), all-to-all (A2A), and untargeted (UT) attacks, and its robustness to adaptive attacks. Codes are available at https://github.com/THUYimingLi/BackdoorBox{BackdoorBox} and https://github.com/vtu81/backdoor-toolbox{backdoor-toolbox}.

Large language models (LLMs) handle many tasks with one set of parameters, but under KV-cached inference it is unclear what task-general structure, if any, is used at decode time rather than during prefill. We propose DecodeShare, a protocol that identifies a low-dimensional subspace consistently shared across tasks in decode-time hidden states, and then tests its causal role by removing that subspace only during decoding. In our experiments, disturbing the discovered shared subspace degrades decision performance far more than disturbing either a prefill-derived or random subspace under the same intervention budget. We further show this decode-shared subspace has practical consequences for activation steering: common steering directions can overlap the task-general decode channel. Projecting out this shared subspace directly separates the functional roles of the two components, while evaluating steering vectors at decode-time yields more reliable signal for downstream deployment than prefill-based proxies. Despite its compactness, the shared subspace can serve as a high-leverage causal channel at decode time. Code is available at: https://github.com/Zishan-Shao/decodeshare.git.

Model merging enables the combination of multiple specialized expert models into a single model capable of performing multiple tasks. However, the benefits of merging an increasing amount of specialized experts generally lead to diminishing returns and reduced overall performance gains. In this work, we empirically and theoretically analyze this limitation, proving that for Task Arithmetic-based methods, as more experts are merged, the common information dominates the task-specific information, leading to inevitable rank collapse. To mitigate this issue, we introduce Subspace Boosting, which operates on the singular value decomposed task vector space and maintains task vector ranks. Subspace Boosting raises merging efficacy for up to 20 experts by large margins of more than 10% when evaluated on both vision and language benchmarks. Moreover, we propose employing Higher-Order Generalized Singular Value Decomposition to quantify task similarity, offering a new interpretable perspective on model merging. Code and models are available at https://github.com/ronskoro/Subspace-Boosting.

We present a parallel data-driven strategy to identify finite-dimensional functional spaces invariant under the Koopman operator associated to an unknown dynamical system. We build on the Symmetric Subspace Decomposition (SSD) algorithm, a centralized method that under mild conditions on data sampling provably finds the maximal Koopman-invariant subspace and all Koopman eigenfunctions in an arbitrary finite-dimensional functional space. A network of processors, each aware of a common dictionary of functions and equipped with a local set of data snapshots, repeatedly interact over a directed communication graph. Each processor receives its neighbors' estimates of the invariant dictionary and refines its estimate by applying SSD with its local data on the intersection of the subspaces spanned by its own dictionary and the neighbors' dictionaries. We identify conditions on the network topology to ensure the algorithm identifies the maximal Koopman-invariant subspace in the span of the original dictionary, characterize its time, computational, and communication complexity, and establish its robustness against communication failures.

We introduce the Subspace Power Method (SPM) for calculating the CP decomposition of low-rank real symmetric tensors. This algorithm calculates one new CP component at a time, alternating between applying the shifted symmetric higher-order power method (SS-HOPM) to a certain modified tensor, constructed from a matrix flattening of the original tensor; and using appropriate deflation steps. We obtain rigorous guarantees for SPM regarding convergence and global optima for input tensors of dimension d and order m of CP rank up to O(d^{lfloor m/2rfloor}), via results in classical algebraic geometry and optimization theory. As a by-product of our analysis we prove that SS-HOPM converges unconditionally, settling a conjecture in [Kolda, T.G., Mayo, J.R.: Shifted power method for computing tensor eigenpairs. SIAM Journal on Matrix Analysis and Applications 32(4), 1095-1124 (2011)]. We present numerical experiments which demonstrate that SPM is efficient and robust to noise, being up to one order of magnitude faster than state-of-the-art CP decomposition algorithms in certain experiments. Furthermore, prior knowledge of the CP rank is not required by SPM.

Merging models fine-tuned from a common, extensively pre-trained large model but specialized for different tasks has been demonstrated as a cheap and scalable strategy to construct a multi-task model that performs well across diverse tasks. Recent research, exemplified by task arithmetic, highlights that this multi-task model can be derived through arithmetic operations on task vectors. Nevertheless, current merging techniques frequently resolve potential conflicts among parameters from task-specific models by evaluating individual attributes, such as the parameters' magnitude or sign, overlooking their collective impact on the overall functionality of the model. In this work, we propose the CONtinuous relaxation of disCRETE (Concrete) subspace learning method to identify a common low-dimensional subspace and utilize its shared information to track the interference problem without sacrificing much performance. Specifically, we model the problem as a bi-level optimization problem and introduce a meta-learning framework to find the Concrete subspace mask through gradient-based techniques. At the upper level, we focus on learning a shared Concrete mask to identify the subspace, while at the inner level, model merging is performed to maximize the performance of the merged model. We conduct extensive experiments on both vision domain and language domain, and the results demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. The code is available at https://github.com/tanganke/subspace_fusion

Recent advancements in text-to-speech technologies enable generating high-fidelity synthetic speech nearly indistinguishable from real human voices. While recent studies show the efficacy of self-supervised learning-based speech encoders for deepfake detection, these models struggle to generalize across unseen speakers. Our quantitative analysis suggests these encoder representations are substantially influenced by speaker information, causing detectors to exploit speaker-specific correlations rather than artifact-related cues. We call this phenomenon speaker entanglement. To mitigate this reliance, we introduce SNAP, a speaker-nulling framework. We estimate a speaker subspace and apply orthogonal projection to suppress speaker-dependent components, isolating synthesis artifacts within the residual features. By reducing speaker entanglement, SNAP encourages detectors to focus on artifact-related patterns, leading to state-of-the-art performance.

Contrastive language-image pretraining (CLIP) has been found to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks where the adversary can achieve an almost perfect attack success rate on CLIP models by poisoning only 0.01\% of the training dataset. This raises security concerns on the current practice of pretraining large-scale models on unscrutinized web data using CLIP. In this work, we analyze the representations of backdoor-poisoned samples learned by CLIP models and find that they exhibit unique characteristics in their local subspace, i.e., their local neighborhoods are far more sparse than that of clean samples. Based on this finding, we conduct a systematic study on detecting CLIP backdoor attacks and show that these attacks can be easily and efficiently detected by traditional density ratio-based local outlier detectors, whereas existing backdoor sample detection methods fail. Our experiments also reveal that an unintentional backdoor already exists in the original CC3M dataset and has been trained into a popular open-source model released by OpenCLIP. Based on our detector, one can clean up a million-scale web dataset (e.g., CC3M) efficiently within 15 minutes using 4 Nvidia A100 GPUs. The code is publicly available in our https://github.com/HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples{GitHub repository}.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures achieve parameter efficiency through conditional computation, yet contemporary designs suffer from two fundamental limitations: structural parameter isolation that causes catastrophic forgetting, and instruction-overfitting that degrades performance in instruction-free scenarios. We propose CDSP-MoE (Conflict-Driven Subspace Pruning MoE), a framework that addresses these issues through a paradigm shift from isolated expert containers to dynamic expert instantiation within a shared physical subspace. Grounded in the Universal Weight Subspace Hypothesis, CDSP-MoE maintains a super-complete parameter backbone where logical experts are carved out via learnable topology masks. Unlike prior work that uses gradient conflict for token reassignment or optimization surgery, we leverage it as a structural supervisory signal: a Lagged Gradient Game penalizes interfering connections in the shared manifold, enabling the topology to spontaneously prune conflicting pathways and evolve interpretable modular structures. Experimental results demonstrate that CDSP-MoE achieves robust content-driven routing without human-defined task labels, maintaining semantic specialization even under strict blind inference protocols where explicit instructions are absent. Code is available at: https://github.com/konodiodaaaaa1/Conflict-Driven-Subspace-Pruning-Mixture-of-Experts

Reward hacking is a form of misalignment in which models overoptimize proxy rewards without genuinely solving the underlying task. Precisely measuring reward hacking occurrence remains challenging because true task rewards are often expensive or impossible to compute. We introduce Countdown-Code, a minimal environment where models can both solve a mathematical reasoning task and manipulate the test harness. This dual-access design creates a clean separation between proxy rewards (test pass/fail) and true rewards (mathematical correctness), enabling accurate measurement of reward-hacking rates. Using this environment, we study reward hacking in open-weight LLMs and find that such behaviors can be unintentionally learned during supervised fine-tuning (SFT) when even a small fraction of reward-hacking trajectories leak into training data. As little as 1\% contamination in distillation SFT data is sufficient for models to internalize reward hacking which resurfaces during subsequent reinforcement learning (RL). We further show that RL amplifies misalignment and drives its generalization beyond the original domain. We open-source our environment and code to facilitate future research on reward hacking in LLMs. Our results reveal a previously underexplored pathway through which reward hacking can emerge and persist in LLMs, underscoring the need for more rigorous validation of synthetic SFT data. Code is available at https://github.com/zohaib-khan5040/Countdown-Code.

Feature-map knowledge distillation (KD) transfers internal representations well between comparably sized Vision Transformers (ViTs), but it often fails in compression. We revisit this failure and uncover a paradox. Sample-wise SVD shows that each image is highly compressible, which seems to suggest that a narrow student with a linear projector should match the teacher "in principle". However, a dataset-level view contradicts this intuition: PCA shows that the teacher is a union of low-rank subspaces with significant subspace rotation across inputs. We further introduce token-level Spectral Energy Patterns (SEP) and find an architecture-invariant encoding law: tokens spread energy broadly across channel modes even when they live in low-rank subspace, creating a bandwidth mismatch. We refer to this combined phenomenon as an encoding mismatch. We propose two minimal remedies, Lift or WideLast: (i) Lift retains a lightweight lifting projector at inference to provide wider channel, or (ii) WideLast widens only the student's last block, enabling an input-dependent expansion. On ImageNet-1K, these fixes revive feature KD for ViT compression, improving DeiT-Tiny distilled from CaiT-S24 from 74.86% to 77.53%/78.23% top-1 accuracy, and they also strengthen students trained without distillation. Our analyses clarify when and why feature-map KD fails and then how to fix it. Code and raw data are provided in https://github.com/thy960112/From-Per-Image-Low-Rank-to-Encoding-Mismatch.

The exploration of linear subspaces, particularly scattered subspaces, has garnered considerable attention across diverse mathematical disciplines in recent years, notably within finite geometries and coding theory. Scattered subspaces play a pivotal role in analyzing various geometric structures such as blocking sets, two-intersection sets, complete arcs, caps in affine and projective spaces over finite fields and rank metric codes. This paper introduces a new infinite family of h-subspaces, along with their associated MRD codes. Additionally, it addresses the task of determining the generalized weights of these codes. Notably, we demonstrate that these MRD codes exhibit some larger generalized weights compared to those previously identified.

Perturbative availability poisons (PAPs) add small changes to images to prevent their use for model training. Current research adopts the belief that practical and effective approaches to countering PAPs do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is time to abandon this belief. We present extensive experiments showing that 12 state-of-the-art PAP methods are vulnerable to Image Shortcut Squeezing (ISS), which is based on simple compression. For example, on average, ISS restores the CIFAR-10 model accuracy to 81.73%, surpassing the previous best preprocessing-based countermeasures by 37.97% absolute. ISS also (slightly) outperforms adversarial training and has higher generalizability to unseen perturbation norms and also higher efficiency. Our investigation reveals that the property of PAP perturbations depends on the type of surrogate model used for poison generation, and it explains why a specific ISS compression yields the best performance for a specific type of PAP perturbation. We further test stronger, adaptive poisoning, and show it falls short of being an ideal defense against ISS. Overall, our results demonstrate the importance of considering various (simple) countermeasures to ensure the meaningfulness of analysis carried out during the development of PAP methods.

3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .

In this paper, we propose new randomized algorithms for estimating the two-to-infinity and one-to-two norms in a matrix-free setting, using only matrix-vector multiplications. Our methods are based on appropriate modifications of Hutchinson's diagonal estimator and its Hutch++ version. We provide oracle complexity bounds for both modifications. We further illustrate the practical utility of our algorithms for Jacobian-based regularization in deep neural network training on image classification tasks. We also demonstrate that our methodology can be applied to mitigate the effect of adversarial attacks in the domain of recommender systems.

Input space reconstruction is an attractive representation learning paradigm. Despite interpretability of the reconstruction and generation, we identify a misalignment between learning by reconstruction, and learning for perception. We show that the former allocates a model's capacity towards a subspace of the data explaining the observed variance--a subspace with uninformative features for the latter. For example, the supervised TinyImagenet task with images projected onto the top subspace explaining 90\% of the pixel variance can be solved with 45\% test accuracy. Using the bottom subspace instead, accounting for only 20\% of the pixel variance, reaches 55\% test accuracy. The features for perception being learned last explains the need for long training time, e.g., with Masked Autoencoders. Learning by denoising is a popular strategy to alleviate that misalignment. We prove that while some noise strategies such as masking are indeed beneficial, others such as additive Gaussian noise are not. Yet, even in the case of masking, we find that the benefits vary as a function of the mask's shape, ratio, and the considered dataset. While tuning the noise strategy without knowledge of the perception task seems challenging, we provide first clues on how to detect if a noise strategy is never beneficial regardless of the perception task.

We propose transferability from Large Geometric Vicinity (LGV), a new technique to increase the transferability of black-box adversarial attacks. LGV starts from a pretrained surrogate model and collects multiple weight sets from a few additional training epochs with a constant and high learning rate. LGV exploits two geometric properties that we relate to transferability. First, models that belong to a wider weight optimum are better surrogates. Second, we identify a subspace able to generate an effective surrogate ensemble among this wider optimum. Through extensive experiments, we show that LGV alone outperforms all (combinations of) four established test-time transformations by 1.8 to 59.9 percentage points. Our findings shed new light on the importance of the geometry of the weight space to explain the transferability of adversarial examples.

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) merging can efficiently combine diverse generative capabilities from multiple trained LoRAs for a diffusion model. However, existing LoRA merging techniques often suffer from severe parameter interference, causing destructive collisions in the shared parameter space. To address this, we propose Subspace Signal Routing (SSR), which resolves interference by routing internal signals instead of performing parameter-space merge. Specifically, SSR first constructs a unified subspace by concatenating candidate LoRAs along the rank dimension. Next, SSR employs an inverse correlation matrix to decorrelate mixed signals within this space. Finally, a directional guide matrix steers these purified signals into their respective task-specific subspaces. We provide a rigorous theoretical analysis proving that SSR aligns with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) solution, thereby ensuring mathematical optimality. We utilize the additivity of sufficient statistics to design a streaming algorithm. This enables on-the-fly updates that significantly reduce memory overhead and computation time. Extensive experiments validate that SSR significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods while maintaining comparable efficiency. Code is available at https://github.com/nagara214/SSR-Merge.

Modern neural models trained on textual data rely on pre-trained representations that emerge without direct supervision. As these representations are increasingly being used in real-world applications, the inability to control their content becomes an increasingly important problem. We formulate the problem of identifying and erasing a linear subspace that corresponds to a given concept, in order to prevent linear predictors from recovering the concept. We model this problem as a constrained, linear maximin game, and show that existing solutions are generally not optimal for this task. We derive a closed-form solution for certain objectives, and propose a convex relaxation, \method, that works well for others. When evaluated in the context of binary gender removal, the method recovers a low-dimensional subspace whose removal mitigates bias by intrinsic and extrinsic evaluation. We show that the method is highly expressive, effectively mitigating bias in deep nonlinear classifiers while maintaining tractability and interpretability.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) scales model capacity efficiently by selectively routing inputs to a specialized subset of experts. However, input-expert specialization, the core motivation of MoE, critically depends on whether the router is actually aware of input structure. In practice, MoE routing is typically implemented as a shallow linear projection with limited awareness of input representation, which often leads to unstable routing. We propose STAR, a Structure Aware Routing that rethinks MoE routing as a subspace learning problem by augmenting standard learnable routing with an evolving principal subspace that tracks dominant input structure via Generalized Hebbian Algorithm (GHA). By aligning routing decisions directly with input structure, STAR enables stable expert specialization. We evaluate STAR on controlled synthetic setup and large-scale language and vision tasks, where it consistently improves routing quality and downstream performance over strong MoE baselines. Moreover, optional test-time subspace updates further enhance routing robustness and generalization under input distribution shifts.

Existing AI-generated image (AIGI) detection methods often suffer from limited generalization performance. In this paper, we identify a crucial yet previously overlooked asymmetry phenomenon in AIGI detection: during training, models tend to quickly overfit to specific fake patterns in the training set, while other information is not adequately captured, leading to poor generalization when faced with new fake methods. A key insight is to incorporate the rich semantic knowledge embedded within large-scale vision foundation models (VFMs) to expand the previous discriminative space (based on forgery patterns only), such that the discrimination is decided by both forgery and semantic cues, thereby reducing the overfitting to specific forgery patterns. A straightforward solution is to fully fine-tune VFMs, but it risks distorting the well-learned semantic knowledge, pushing the model back toward overfitting. To this end, we design a novel approach called Effort: Efficient orthogonal modeling for generalizable AIGI detection. Specifically, we employ Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to construct the orthogonal semantic and forgery subspaces. By freezing the principal components and adapting the residual components (sim0.19M parameters), we preserve the original semantic subspace and use its orthogonal subspace for learning forgeries. Extensive experiments on AIGI detection benchmarks demonstrate the superior effectiveness of our approach.

We consider the problem of simultaneously clustering and learning a linear representation of data lying close to a union of low-dimensional manifolds, a fundamental task in machine learning and computer vision. When the manifolds are assumed to be linear subspaces, this reduces to the classical problem of subspace clustering, which has been studied extensively over the past two decades. Unfortunately, many real-world datasets such as natural images can not be well approximated by linear subspaces. On the other hand, numerous works have attempted to learn an appropriate transformation of the data, such that data is mapped from a union of general non-linear manifolds to a union of linear subspaces (with points from the same manifold being mapped to the same subspace). However, many existing works have limitations such as assuming knowledge of the membership of samples to clusters, requiring high sampling density, or being shown theoretically to learn trivial representations. In this paper, we propose to optimize the Maximal Coding Rate Reduction metric with respect to both the data representation and a novel doubly stochastic cluster membership, inspired by state-of-the-art subspace clustering results. We give a parameterization of such a representation and membership, allowing efficient mini-batching and one-shot initialization. Experiments on CIFAR-10, -20, -100, and TinyImageNet-200 datasets show that the proposed method is much more accurate and scalable than state-of-the-art deep clustering methods, and further learns a latent linear representation of the data.

Deep subspace clustering (DSC) algorithms face several challenges that hinder their widespread adoption across variois application domains. First, clustering quality is typically assessed using only the encoder's output layer, disregarding valuable information present in the intermediate layers. Second, most DSC approaches treat representation learning and subspace clustering as independent tasks, limiting their effectiveness. Third, they assume the availability of a held-out dataset for hyperparameter tuning, which is often impractical in real-world scenarios. Fourth, learning termination is commonly based on clustering error monitoring, requiring external labels. Finally, their performance often depends on post-processing techniques that rely on labeled data. To address this limitations, we introduce a novel single-view DSC approach that: (i) minimizes a layer-wise self expression loss using a joint representation matrix; (ii) optimizes a subspace-structured norm to enhance clustering quality; (iii) employs a multi-stage sequential learning framework, consisting of pre-training and fine-tuning, enabling the use of multiple regularization terms without hyperparameter tuning; (iv) incorporates a relative error-based self-stopping mechanism to terminate training without labels; and (v) retains a fixed number of leading coefficients in the learned representation matrix based on prior knowledge. We evaluate the proposed method on six datasets representing faces, digits, and objects. The results show that our method outperforms most linear SC algorithms with careffulyl tuned hyperparameters while maintaining competitive performance with the best performing linear appoaches.

Model inversion (MI) attacks have raised increasing concerns about privacy, which can reconstruct training data from public models. Indeed, MI attacks can be formalized as an optimization problem that seeks private data in a certain space. Recent MI attacks leverage a generative adversarial network (GAN) as an image prior to narrow the search space, and can successfully reconstruct even the high-dimensional data (e.g., face images). However, these generative MI attacks do not fully exploit the potential capabilities of the target model, still leading to a vague and coupled search space, i.e., different classes of images are coupled in the search space. Besides, the widely used cross-entropy loss in these attacks suffers from gradient vanishing. To address these problems, we propose Pseudo Label-Guided MI (PLG-MI) attack via conditional GAN (cGAN). At first, a top-n selection strategy is proposed to provide pseudo-labels for public data, and use pseudo-labels to guide the training of the cGAN. In this way, the search space is decoupled for different classes of images. Then a max-margin loss is introduced to improve the search process on the subspace of a target class. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our PLG-MI attack significantly improves the attack success rate and visual quality for various datasets and models, notably, 2~3 times better than state-of-the-art attacks under large distributional shifts. Our code is available at: https://github.com/LetheSec/PLG-MI-Attack.

Subspace segmentation or subspace learning is a challenging and complicated task in machine learning. This paper builds a primary frame and solid theoretical bases for the minimal subspace segmentation (MSS) of finite samples. Existence and conditional uniqueness of MSS are discussed with conditions generally satisfied in applications. Utilizing weak prior information of MSS, the minimality inspection of segments is further simplified to the prior detection of partitions. The MSS problem is then modeled as a computable optimization problem via self-expressiveness of samples. A closed form of representation matrices is first given for the self-expressiveness, and the connection of diagonal blocks is then addressed. The MSS model uses a rank restriction on the sum of segment ranks. Theoretically, it can retrieve the minimal sample subspaces that could be heavily intersected. The optimization problem is solved via a basic manifold conjugate gradient algorithm, alternative optimization and hybrid optimization, taking into account of solving both the primal MSS problem and its pseudo-dual problem. The MSS model is further modified for handling noisy data, and solved by an ADMM algorithm. The reported experiments show the strong ability of the MSS method on retrieving minimal sample subspaces that are heavily intersected.

As a mainstream technique for 3D reconstruction, 3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS) has been applied in a wide range of applications and services. Recent studies have revealed critical vulnerabilities in this pipeline and introduced computation cost attacks that lead to malicious resource occupancies and even denial-of-service (DoS) conditions, thereby hindering the reliable deployment of 3DGS. In this paper, we propose the first effective and comprehensive black-box defense framework, named RemedyGS, against such computation cost attacks, safeguarding 3DGS reconstruction systems and services. Our pipeline comprises two key components: a detector to identify the attacked input images with poisoned textures and a purifier to recover the benign images from their attacked counterparts, mitigating the adverse effects of these attacks. Moreover, we incorporate adversarial training into the purifier to enforce distributional alignment between the recovered and original natural images, thereby enhancing the defense efficacy. Experimental results demonstrate that our framework effectively defends against white-box, black-box, and adaptive attacks in 3DGS systems, achieving state-of-the-art performance in both safety and utility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on safety alignment to produce socially acceptable responses. This is typically achieved through instruction tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback. However, this alignment is known to be brittle: further fine-tuning, even on benign or lightly contaminated data, can degrade safety and reintroduce harmful behaviors. A growing body of work suggests that alignment may correspond to identifiable geometric directions in weight space, forming subspaces that could, in principle, be isolated or preserved to defend against misalignment. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study of this geometric perspective. We examine whether safety-relevant behavior is concentrated in specific subspaces, whether it can be separated from general-purpose learning, and whether harmfulness arises from distinguishable patterns in internal representations. Across both parameter and activation space, our findings are consistent: subspaces that amplify safe behaviors also amplify unsafe ones, and prompts with different safety implications activate overlapping representations. We find no evidence of a subspace that selectively governs safety. These results challenge the assumption that alignment is geometrically localized. Rather than residing in distinct directions, safety appears to emerge from entangled, high-impact components of the model's broader learning dynamics. This suggests that subspace-based defenses may face fundamental limitations and underscores the need for alternative strategies to preserve alignment under continued training. We corroborate these findings through multiple experiments on five open-source LLMs. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/CERT-Lab/safety-subspaces.

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.

We propose SWE-Universe, a scalable and efficient framework for automatically constructing real-world software engineering (SWE) verifiable environments from GitHub pull requests (PRs). To overcome the prevalent challenges of automatic building, such as low production yield, weak verifiers, and prohibitive cost, our framework utilizes a building agent powered by an efficient custom-trained model. This agent employs iterative self-verification and in-loop hacking detection to ensure the reliable generation of high-fidelity, verifiable tasks. Using this method, we scale the number of real-world multilingual SWE environments to a million scale (807,693). We demonstrate the profound value of our environments through large-scale agentic mid-training and reinforcement learning. Finally, we applied this technique to Qwen3-Max-Thinking and achieved a score of 75.3% on SWE-Bench Verified. Our work provides both a critical resource and a robust methodology to advance the next generation of coding agents.

The field of adversarial robustness has long established that adversarial examples can successfully transfer between image classifiers and that text jailbreaks can successfully transfer between language models (LMs). However, a pair of recent studies reported being unable to successfully transfer image jailbreaks between vision-language models (VLMs). To explain this striking difference, we propose a fundamental distinction regarding the transferability of attacks against machine learning models: attacks in the input data-space can transfer, whereas attacks in model representation space do not, at least not without geometric alignment of representations. We then provide theoretical and empirical evidence of this hypothesis in four different settings. First, we mathematically prove this distinction in a simple setting where two networks compute the same input-output map but via different representations. Second, we construct representation-space attacks against image classifiers that are as successful as well-known data-space attacks, but fail to transfer. Third, we construct representation-space attacks against LMs that successfully jailbreak the attacked models but again fail to transfer. Fourth, we construct data-space attacks against VLMs that successfully transfer to new VLMs, and we show that representation space attacks can transfer when VLMs' latent geometries are sufficiently aligned in post-projector space. Our work reveals that adversarial transfer is not an inherent property of all attacks but contingent on their operational domain - the shared data-space versus models' unique representation spaces - a critical insight for building more robust models.

LLM watermarking has attracted attention as a promising way to detect AI-generated content, with some works suggesting that current schemes may already be fit for deployment. In this work we dispute this claim, identifying watermark stealing (WS) as a fundamental vulnerability of these schemes. We show that querying the API of the watermarked LLM to approximately reverse-engineer a watermark enables practical spoofing attacks, as hypothesized in prior work, but also greatly boosts scrubbing attacks, which was previously unnoticed. We are the first to propose an automated WS algorithm and use it in the first comprehensive study of spoofing and scrubbing in realistic settings. We show that for under $50 an attacker can both spoof and scrub state-of-the-art schemes previously considered safe, with average success rate of over 80%. Our findings challenge common beliefs about LLM watermarking, stressing the need for more robust schemes. We make all our code and additional examples available at https://watermark-stealing.org.

The robustness of deep neural networks is crucial for safety-critical deployments, yet existing evaluation methods are often attack-dependent and lack interpretability. We propose a principled, attack-agnostic robustness metric based on the spectral norm of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM), which quantifies the worst-case sensitivity of the model's output distribution to input perturbations. Theoretically, we establish that the FIM equals the variance of the input Jacobian and derive closed-form spectral bounds for common architectures, including VGG, ResNet, DenseNet, and Transformer, providing the first theoretical robustness ranking. To enable scalable evaluation, we develop efficient algorithms, including power iteration and Hutchinson-based estimation, that support both white-box and black-box settings. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, including CIFAR, ImageNet, and medical images, and across multiple architectures show a strong correlation between our metric and adversarial vulnerability. Our framework serves as an interpretable diagnostic tool that complements attack-based evaluations, offering insights into architectural sensitivity and guiding the design of more robust models. Code is available at: https://github.com/franz-chang/SRP/.

Distributed training of foundation models via DDP is limited by interconnect bandwidth. While infrequent communication strategies reduce synchronization frequency, they remain bottlenecked by the memory and communication requirements of optimizer states. Low-rank optimizers can alleviate these constraints; however, in the local-update regime, workers lack access to the full-batch gradients required to compute low-rank projections, which degrades performance. We propose LoRDO, a principled framework unifying low-rank optimization with infrequent synchronization. We first demonstrate that, while global projections based on pseudo-gradients are theoretically superior, they permanently restrict the optimization trajectory to a low-rank subspace. To restore subspace exploration, we introduce a full-rank quasi-hyperbolic update. LoRDO achieves near-parity with low-rank DDP in language modeling and downstream tasks at model scales of 125M--720M, while reducing communication by approx 10 times. Finally, we show that LoRDO improves performance even more in very low-memory settings with small rank/batch size.

We present an algorithm for decomposing low rank tensors of any symmetry type, from fully asymmetric to fully symmetric. It generalizes the recent subspace power method from symmetric tensors to all tensors. The algorithm transforms an input tensor into a tensor with orthonormal slices. We show that for tensors with orthonormal slices and low rank, the summands of their decomposition are in one-to-one correspondence with the partially symmetric singular vector tuples (pSVTs) with singular value one. We use this to show correctness of the algorithm. We introduce a shifted power method for computing pSVTs and establish its global convergence. Numerical experiments demonstrate that our decomposition algorithm achieves higher accuracy and faster runtime than existing methods.

Reinforcement learning (RL) trained language model agents with tool access are increasingly deployed in coding assistants, research tools, and autonomous systems. We introduce the Reward Hacking Benchmark (RHB), a suite of multi-step tasks requiring sequential tool operations with naturalistic shortcut opportunities such as skipping verification steps, inferring answers from task-adjacent metadata, or tampering with evaluation-relevant functions. RHB supports independent and chained task regimes, where chain length acts as a proxy for longer-horizon agent behavior. We evaluate 13 frontier models from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and DeepSeek. Exploit rates range from 0% (Claude Sonnet 4.5) to 13.9% (DeepSeek-R1-Zero), varying sharply by post-training style. A controlled sibling comparison (DeepSeek-V3 vs. DeepSeek-R1-Zero) shows RL post-training is associated with substantially higher reward hacking (0.6% vs. 13.9%), with consistent gaps across all four task families. We identify six exploit categories and find that 72% of reward hacking episodes include explicit chain-of-thought rationale, suggesting models often frame exploits as legitimate problem-solving. Simple environmental hardening reduces exploit rates by 5.7 percentage points (87.7% relative) without degrading task success. Models with near-zero exploit rates on standard tasks show elevated rates on harder variants, suggesting that production-aligned post-training appears to suppress reward hacking only below a complexity threshold where honest solutions remain tractable.

Understanding the memorization and privacy leakage risks in Contrastive Language--Image Pretraining (CLIP) is critical for ensuring the security of multimodal models. Recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of extracting sensitive training examples from diffusion models, with conditional diffusion models exhibiting a stronger tendency to memorize and leak information. In this work, we investigate data memorization and extraction risks in CLIP through the lens of CLIP inversion, a process that aims to reconstruct training images from text prompts. To this end, we introduce LeakyCLIP, a novel attack framework designed to achieve high-quality, semantically accurate image reconstruction from CLIP embeddings. We identify three key challenges in CLIP inversion: 1) non-robust features, 2) limited visual semantics in text embeddings, and 3) low reconstruction fidelity. To address these challenges, LeakyCLIP employs 1) adversarial fine-tuning to enhance optimization smoothness, 2) linear transformation-based embedding alignment, and 3) Stable Diffusion-based refinement to improve fidelity. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of LeakyCLIP, achieving over 358% improvement in Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) for ViT-B-16 compared to baseline methods on LAION-2B subset. Furthermore, we uncover a pervasive leakage risk, showing that training data membership can even be successfully inferred from the metrics of low-fidelity reconstructions. Our work introduces a practical method for CLIP inversion while offering novel insights into the nature and scope of privacy risks in multimodal models.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand model behaviors in terms of specific, interpretable features, often hypothesized to manifest as low-dimensional subspaces of activations. Specifically, recent studies have explored subspace interventions (such as activation patching) as a way to simultaneously manipulate model behavior and attribute the features behind it to given subspaces. In this work, we demonstrate that these two aims diverge, potentially leading to an illusory sense of interpretability. Counterintuitively, even if a subspace intervention makes the model's output behave as if the value of a feature was changed, this effect may be achieved by activating a dormant parallel pathway leveraging another subspace that is causally disconnected from model outputs. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a distilled mathematical example, in two real-world domains (the indirect object identification task and factual recall), and present evidence for its prevalence in practice. In the context of factual recall, we further show a link to rank-1 fact editing, providing a mechanistic explanation for previous work observing an inconsistency between fact editing performance and fact localization. However, this does not imply that activation patching of subspaces is intrinsically unfit for interpretability. To contextualize our findings, we also show what a success case looks like in a task (indirect object identification) where prior manual circuit analysis informs an understanding of the location of a feature. We explore the additional evidence needed to argue that a patched subspace is faithful.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have intensified the need to understand and reliably curb their harmful behaviours. We introduce a multidimensional framework for probing and steering harmful content in model internals. For each of 55 distinct harmfulness subconcepts (e.g., racial hate, employment scams, weapons), we learn a linear probe, yielding 55 interpretable directions in activation space. Collectively, these directions span a harmfulness subspace that we show is strikingly low-rank. We then test ablation of the entire subspace from model internals, as well as steering and ablation in the subspace's dominant direction. We find that dominant direction steering allows for near elimination of harmfulness with a low decrease in utility. Our findings advance the emerging view that concept subspaces provide a scalable lens on LLM behaviour and offer practical tools for the community to audit and harden future generations of language models.

Large collections of matrices arise throughout modern machine learning, signal processing, and scientific computing, where they are commonly compressed by concatenation followed by truncated singular value decomposition (SVD). This strategy enables parameter sharing and efficient reconstruction and has been widely adopted across domains ranging from multi-view learning and signal processing to neural network compression. However, it leaves a fundamental question unanswered: which matrices can be safely concatenated and compressed together under explicit reconstruction error constraints? Existing approaches rely on heuristic or architecture-specific grouping and provide no principled guarantees on the resulting SVD approximation error. In the present work, we introduce a theory-driven framework for compression-aware clustering of matrices under SVD compression constraints. Our analysis establishes new spectral bounds for horizontally concatenated matrices, deriving global upper bounds on the optimal rank-r SVD reconstruction error from lower bounds on singular value growth. The first bound follows from Weyl-type monotonicity under blockwise extensions, while the second leverages singular values of incremental residuals to yield tighter, per-block guarantees. We further develop an efficient approximate estimator based on incremental truncated SVD that tracks dominant singular values without forming the full concatenated matrix. Therefore, we propose three clustering algorithms that merge matrices only when their predicted joint SVD compression error remains below a user-specified threshold. The algorithms span a trade-off between speed, provable accuracy, and scalability, enabling compression-aware clustering with explicit error control. Code is available online.

Recently, a wide range of memory-efficient LLM training algorithms have gained substantial popularity. These methods leverage the low-rank structure of gradients to project optimizer states into a subspace using projection matrix found by singular value decomposition (SVD). However, convergence of these algorithms is highly dependent on the update rules of their projection matrix. In this work, we provide the first convergence guarantee for arbitrary update rules of projection matrix. This guarantee is generally applicable to optimizers that can be analyzed with Hamiltonian Descent, including most common ones, such as LION, Adam. Inspired by our theoretical understanding, we propose Online Subspace Descent, a new family of subspace descent optimizer without SVD. Instead of updating the projection matrix with eigenvectors, Online Subspace Descent updates the projection matrix with online PCA. Online Subspace Descent is flexible and introduces only minimum overhead to training. We show that for the task of pretraining LLaMA models ranging from 60M to 7B parameters on the C4 dataset, Online Subspace Descent achieves lower perplexity and better downstream tasks performance than state-of-the-art low-rank training methods across different settings and narrows the gap with full-rank baselines.

This paper tackles the data-driven approximation of unknown dynamical systems using Koopman-operator methods. Given a dictionary of functions, these methods approximate the projection of the action of the operator on the finite-dimensional subspace spanned by the dictionary. We propose the Tunable Symmetric Subspace Decomposition algorithm to refine the dictionary, balancing its expressiveness and accuracy. Expressiveness corresponds to the ability of the dictionary to describe the evolution of as many observables as possible and accuracy corresponds to the ability to correctly predict their evolution. Based on the observation that Koopman-invariant subspaces give rise to exact predictions, we reason that prediction accuracy is a function of the degree of invariance of the subspace generated by the dictionary and provide a data-driven measure to measure invariance proximity. The proposed algorithm iteratively prunes the initial functional space to identify a refined dictionary of functions that satisfies the desired level of accuracy while retaining as much of the original expressiveness as possible. We provide a full characterization of the algorithm properties and show that it generalizes both Extended Dynamic Mode Decomposition and Symmetric Subspace Decomposition. Simulations on planar systems show the effectiveness of the proposed methods in producing Koopman approximations of tunable accuracy that capture relevant information about the dynamical system.

3D scene representation methods like Neural Radiance Fields (NeRF) and 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) have significantly advanced novel view synthesis. As these methods become prevalent, addressing their vulnerabilities becomes critical. We analyze 3DGS robustness against image-level poisoning attacks and propose a novel density-guided poisoning method. Our method strategically injects Gaussian points into low-density regions identified via Kernel Density Estimation (KDE), embedding viewpoint-dependent illusory objects clearly visible from poisoned views while minimally affecting innocent views. Additionally, we introduce an adaptive noise strategy to disrupt multi-view consistency, further enhancing attack effectiveness. We propose a KDE-based evaluation protocol to assess attack difficulty systematically, enabling objective benchmarking for future research. Extensive experiments demonstrate our method's superior performance compared to state-of-the-art techniques. Project page: https://hentci.github.io/stealthattack/

Model merging aims to enable multi-task learning by integrating the capabilities of multiple models fine-tuned from the same pre-trained checkpoint into a single model. Its core challenge is inter-task interference among task-specific parameter updates. In this paper, we analyze the output shifts induced by task updates and observe that their energy is concentrated in a small number of principal directions. We call the subspace spanned by these directions the essential subspace. In contrast, most remaining directions carry little task-relevant energy, but their accumulation across multiple task updates can cause severe interference during merging. Motivated by this observation, we propose Essential Subspace Decomposition (ESD), which decomposes each task update according to the principal components of its activation shift. Based on ESD, we introduce Essential Subspace Merging (ESM), a training-free static merging method that orthogonalizes and fuses essential components into one compact multi-task model. We further extend ESM to ESM++, a training-free dynamic merging method that decomposes task-specific residuals into low-rank experts and selects the most relevant expert through prototype-based routing during forward inference. Extensive experiments across multiple task sets and model scales demonstrate that ESM and ESM++ effectively preserves task knowledge while reducing inter-task interference.

Reconstruction-based unsupervised learning can fail in two opposing ways: a model may reconstruct anomalies too accurately or discard valid nominal variation. Using the Pursuit of Subspaces hypothesis, we characterize these failures through the meet, union, and join geometries induced by the nominal components. Excess learned range produces join blindness, while insufficient capacity produces meet preference and loss of nominal fidelity. We show that the compact nominal union is optimal among nominal faithful ranges and generally requires a nonlinear reconstruction map. Based on this geometry, we introduce Dynamic Push and Pull, which learns from controlled perturbations without anomaly labels, and nested manifold carving, which applies the same principle recursively in latent space. Experiments confirm the predicted changes in latent geometry across every tested Push and Pull configuration. The proposed methods improve reconstruction-based anomaly detection across standard benchmarks and unseen image degradations, while also improving pretrained ECG representations for downstream classification. These results connect reconstruction failures to identifiable geometric conditions and provide practical mechanisms for learning compact representations.

We tackle the problem disentangling the latent space of an autoencoder in order to separate labelled attribute information from other characteristic information. This then allows us to change selected attributes while preserving other information. Our method, matrix subspace projection, is much simpler than previous approaches to latent space factorisation, for example not requiring multiple discriminators or a careful weighting among their loss functions. Furthermore our new model can be applied to autoencoders as a plugin, and works across diverse domains such as images or text. We demonstrate the utility of our method for attribute manipulation in autoencoders trained across varied domains, using both human evaluation and automated methods. The quality of generation of our new model (e.g. reconstruction, conditional generation) is highly competitive to a number of strong baselines.

The Shapley value is a ubiquitous framework for attribution in machine learning, encompassing feature importance, data valuation, and causal inference. However, its exact computation is generally intractable, necessitating efficient approximation methods. While the most effective and popular estimators leverage the paired sampling heuristic to reduce estimation error, the theoretical mechanism driving this improvement has remained opaque. In this work, we provide an elegant and fundamental justification for paired sampling: we prove that the Shapley value depends exclusively on the odd component of the set function, and that paired sampling orthogonalizes the regression objective to filter out the irrelevant even component. Leveraging this insight, we propose OddSHAP, a novel consistent estimator that performs polynomial regression solely on the odd subspace. By utilizing the Fourier basis to isolate this subspace and employing a proxy model to identify high-impact interactions, OddSHAP overcomes the combinatorial explosion of higher-order approximations. Through an extensive benchmark, we find that OddSHAP achieves state-of-the-art estimation accuracy at larger sampling budgets.

Krylov subspace, which is generated by multiplying a given vector by the matrix of a linear transformation and its successive powers, has been extensively studied in classical optimization literature to design algorithms that converge quickly for large linear inverse problems. For example, the conjugate gradient method (CG), one of the most popular Krylov subspace methods, is based on the idea of minimizing the residual error in the Krylov subspace. However, with the recent advancement of high-performance diffusion solvers for inverse problems, it is not clear how classical wisdom can be synergistically combined with modern diffusion models. In this study, we propose a novel and efficient diffusion sampling strategy that synergistically combines the diffusion sampling and Krylov subspace methods. Specifically, we prove that if the tangent space at a denoised sample by Tweedie's formula forms a Krylov subspace, then the CG initialized with the denoised data ensures the data consistency update to remain in the tangent space. This negates the need to compute the manifold-constrained gradient (MCG), leading to a more efficient diffusion sampling method. Our method is applicable regardless of the parametrization and setting (i.e., VE, VP). Notably, we achieve state-of-the-art reconstruction quality on challenging real-world medical inverse imaging problems, including multi-coil MRI reconstruction and 3D CT reconstruction. Moreover, our proposed method achieves more than 80 times faster inference time than the previous state-of-the-art method. Code is available at https://github.com/HJ-harry/DDS

In large scale machine learning, random sampling is a popular way to approximate datasets by a small representative subset of examples. In particular, sensitivity sampling is an intensely studied technique which provides provable guarantees on the quality of approximation, while reducing the number of examples to the product of the VC dimension d and the total sensitivity mathfrak S in remarkably general settings. However, guarantees going beyond this general bound of mathfrak S d are known in perhaps only one setting, for ell_2 subspace embeddings, despite intense study of sensitivity sampling in prior work. In this work, we show the first bounds for sensitivity sampling for ell_p subspace embeddings for pneq 2 that improve over the general mathfrak S d bound, achieving a bound of roughly mathfrak S^{2/p} for 1leq p<2 and mathfrak S^{2-2/p} for 2<p<infty. For 1leq p<2, we show that this bound is tight, in the sense that there exist matrices for which mathfrak S^{2/p} samples is necessary. Furthermore, our techniques yield further new results in the study of sampling algorithms, showing that the root leverage score sampling algorithm achieves a bound of roughly d for 1leq p<2, and that a combination of leverage score and sensitivity sampling achieves an improved bound of roughly d^{2/p}mathfrak S^{2-4/p} for 2<p<infty. Our sensitivity sampling results yield the best known sample complexity for a wide class of structured matrices that have small ell_p sensitivity.

Large-scale text-to-image diffusion models excel in generating high-quality images from textual inputs, yet concerns arise as research indicates their tendency to memorize and replicate training data, raising We also addressed the issue of memorization in diffusion models, where models tend to replicate exact training samples raising copyright infringement and privacy issues. Efforts within the text-to-image community to address memorization explore causes such as data duplication, replicated captions, or trigger tokens, proposing per-prompt inference-time or training-time mitigation strategies. In this paper, we focus on the feed-forward layers and begin by contrasting neuron activations of a set of memorized and non-memorized prompts. Experiments reveal a surprising finding: many different sets of memorized prompts significantly activate a common subspace in the model, demonstrating, for the first time, that memorization in the diffusion models lies in a special subspace. Subsequently, we introduce a novel post-hoc method for editing pre-trained models, whereby memorization is mitigated through the straightforward pruning of weights in specialized subspaces, avoiding the need to disrupt the training or inference process as seen in prior research. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of the pruned model against training data extraction attacks, thereby unveiling new avenues for a practical and one-for-all solution to memorization.

The progress in generative models, particularly Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), opened new possibilities for image generation but raised concerns about potential malicious uses, especially in sensitive areas like medical imaging. This study introduces MITS-GAN, a novel approach to prevent tampering in medical images, with a specific focus on CT scans. The approach disrupts the output of the attacker's CT-GAN architecture by introducing finely tuned perturbations that are imperceptible to the human eye. Specifically, the proposed approach involves the introduction of appropriate Gaussian noise to the input as a protective measure against various attacks. Our method aims to enhance tamper resistance, comparing favorably to existing techniques. Experimental results on a CT scan demonstrate MITS-GAN's superior performance, emphasizing its ability to generate tamper-resistant images with negligible artifacts. As image tampering in medical domains poses life-threatening risks, our proactive approach contributes to the responsible and ethical use of generative models. This work provides a foundation for future research in countering cyber threats in medical imaging. Models and codes are publicly available on https://iplab.dmi.unict.it/MITS-GAN-2024/.

The growing adoption of agentic LLM applications has introduced a new threat previously named as promptware. While prior work has established that adversaries can exploit direct channels to LLM applications to apply promptware under weak threat models, many applications do not provide any direct channels that could be exploited for prompt injection beyond the Internet. This raises a question: can attackers exploit LLM applications at scale without any direct channels in practical threat models? In this work, we show that the inherent tendency of LLMs to hallucinate resource identifiers can be exploited to amplify untargeted promptware attacks that pull adversarial prompts at scale and could be exploited to establish a botnet. We introduce adversarial hallucination squatting, a technique in which attackers identify trending resources (e.g., popular repositories, popular skills, etc.), compute the LLM distribution of hallucinations on the trending resource names, and preemptively register them to host adversarial prompts. By leveraging the predictability and transferability of hallucinations across foundational LLMs and to application layers, adversaries can significantly amplify the reach of untargeted promptware under weak threat models and establish a botnet by exploiting LLM applications to install a bot on the device that pulled the compromised hallucinated resource from the Inter. We empirically demonstrate that hallucinated resource generation occurs at high rates, up to 85% in repository cloning scenarios and up to 100% in skill installation, and that these hallucinations transfer between foundational models and different prompts. We demonstrate the practicality of adversarial hallucination squatting against various production LLM applications with integrated terminals in their set of tools, achieving remote tool execution and remote code execution.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and related alignment paradigms have become central to steering large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) toward human-preferred behaviors. However, these approaches introduce a systemic vulnerability: reward hacking, where models exploit imperfections in learned reward signals to maximize proxy objectives without fulfilling true task intent. As models scale and optimization intensifies, such exploitation manifests as verbosity bias, sycophancy, hallucinated justification, benchmark overfitting, and, in multimodal settings, perception--reasoning decoupling and evaluator manipulation. Recent evidence further suggests that seemingly benign shortcut behaviors can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic gaming of oversight mechanisms. In this survey, we propose the Proxy Compression Hypothesis (PCH) as a unifying framework for understanding reward hacking. We formalize reward hacking as an emergent consequence of optimizing expressive policies against compressed reward representations of high-dimensional human objectives. Under this view, reward hacking arises from the interaction of objective compression, optimization amplification, and evaluator--policy co-adaptation. This perspective unifies empirical phenomena across RLHF, RLAIF, and RLVR regimes, and explains how local shortcut learning can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic manipulation of oversight mechanisms. We further organize detection and mitigation strategies according to how they intervene on compression, amplification, or co-adaptation dynamics. By framing reward hacking as a structural instability of proxy-based alignment under scale, we highlight open challenges in scalable oversight, multimodal grounding, and agentic autonomy.

Agent benchmarks have become the de facto measure of frontier AI competence, guiding model selection, investment, and deployment. However, reward hacking, where agents maximize a score without performing the intended task, emerges spontaneously in frontier models without overfitting. We argue that benchmarks must be secure by design. From past incidents of reward hacks, we derive a taxonomy of eight recurring flaw patterns and compile them into the Agent-Eval Checklist for benchmark designers. We condense the insights into BenchJack, an automated red-teaming system that drives coding agents to audit benchmarks and identify possible reward-hacking exploits in a clairvoyant manner. Moreover, we extend BenchJack to an iterative generative-adversarial pipeline that discovers new flaws and patches them iteratively to improve benchmark robustness. We apply BenchJack to 10 popular agent benchmarks spanning software engineering, web navigation, desktop computing, and terminal operations. BenchJack synthesizes reward-hacking exploits that achieve near-perfect scores on most of the benchmarks without solving a single task, surfacing 219 distinct flaws across the eight classes. Moreover, BenchJack's extended pipeline reduces the hackable-task ratio from near 100% to under 10% on four benchmarks without fatal design flaws, fully patching WebArena and OSWorld within three iterations. Our results show that evaluation pipelines have not internalized an adversarial mindset, and that proactive auditing could help close the security gap for the fast-paced benchmarking space.

We generalize the class vectors found in neural networks to linear subspaces (i.e.~points in the Grassmann manifold) and show that the Grassmann Class Representation (GCR) enables the simultaneous improvement in accuracy and feature transferability. In GCR, each class is a subspace and the logit is defined as the norm of the projection of a feature onto the class subspace. We integrate Riemannian SGD into deep learning frameworks such that class subspaces in a Grassmannian are jointly optimized with the rest model parameters. Compared to the vector form, the representative capability of subspaces is more powerful. We show that on ImageNet-1K, the top-1 error of ResNet50-D, ResNeXt50, Swin-T and Deit3-S are reduced by 5.6%, 4.5%, 3.0% and 3.5%, respectively. Subspaces also provide freedom for features to vary and we observed that the intra-class feature variability grows when the subspace dimension increases. Consequently, we found the quality of GCR features is better for downstream tasks. For ResNet50-D, the average linear transfer accuracy across 6 datasets improves from 77.98% to 79.70% compared to the strong baseline of vanilla softmax. For Swin-T, it improves from 81.5% to 83.4% and for Deit3, it improves from 73.8% to 81.4%. With these encouraging results, we believe that more applications could benefit from the Grassmann class representation. Code is released at https://github.com/innerlee/GCR.

The key-value (KV) cache accelerates LLMs decoding by storing KV tensors from previously generated tokens. It reduces redundant computation at the cost of increased memory usage. To mitigate this overhead, existing approaches compress KV tensors into lower-bit representations; however, quantization errors can accumulate as more tokens are generated, potentially resulting in undesired outputs. In this paper, we introduce SQuat (Subspace-orthogonal KV cache quantization). It first constructs a subspace spanned by query tensors to capture the most critical task-related information. During key tensor quantization, it enforces that the difference between the (de)quantized and original keys remains orthogonal to this subspace, minimizing the impact of quantization errors on the attention mechanism's outputs. SQuat requires no model fine-tuning, no additional calibration dataset for offline learning, and is grounded in a theoretical framework we develop. Through numerical experiments, we show that our method reduces peak memory by 2.17 to 2.82, improves throughput by 2.45 to 3.60, and achieves more favorable benchmark scores than existing KV cache quantization algorithms.

Driven by the rapid growth of model parameters, parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) has become essential for adapting large models to diverse downstream tasks under constrained computational resources. Within this paradigm, orthogonal fine-tuning and its variants preserve semantic representations of pre-trained models, but struggle to achieve both expressiveness and efficiency in terms of parameter counts, memory, and computation. To overcome this limitation, we propose efficient Orthogonal Fine-Tuning with Principal Subspace adaptation (PSOFT), which confines orthogonal transformations to the principal subspace of pre-trained weights. Specifically, PSOFT constructs this subspace via matrix decomposition to enable compatible transformations with higher effective rank, establishes a theoretical condition that strictly maintains the geometry of this subspace for essential semantic preservation, and introduces efficient tunable vectors that gradually relax orthogonality during training to enhance adaptability. Extensive experiments on 35 NLP and CV tasks across four representative models demonstrate that PSOFT offers a practical and scalable solution to simultaneously achieve semantic preservation, expressiveness, and multi-dimensional efficiency in PEFT. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/fei407/PSOFT.

Modern computer vision services often require users to share raw feature descriptors with an untrusted server. This presents an inherent privacy risk, as raw descriptors may be used to recover the source images from which they were extracted. To address this issue, researchers recently proposed privatizing image features by embedding them within an affine subspace containing the original feature as well as adversarial feature samples. In this paper, we propose two novel inversion attacks to show that it is possible to (approximately) recover the original image features from these embeddings, allowing us to recover privacy-critical image content. In light of such successes and the lack of theoretical privacy guarantees afforded by existing visual privacy methods, we further propose the first method to privatize image features via local differential privacy, which, unlike prior approaches, provides a guaranteed bound for privacy leakage regardless of the strength of the attacks. In addition, our method yields strong performance in visual localization as a downstream task while enjoying the privacy guarantee.

3D content acquisition and creation are expanding rapidly in the new era of machine learning and AI. 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) has become a promising high-fidelity and real-time representation for 3D content. Similar to the initial wave of digital audio-visual content at the turn of the millennium, the demand for intellectual property protection is also increasing, since explicit and editable 3D parameterization makes unauthorized use and dissemination easier. In this position paper, we argue that effective progress in watermarking 3D assets requires articulated security objectives and realistic threat models, incorporating the lessons learned from digital audio-visual asset protection over the past decades. To address this gap in security specification and evaluation, we advocate a scenario-driven formulation, in which adversarial capabilities are formalized through a security model. Based on this formulation, we construct a reference framework that organizes existing methods and clarifies how specific design choices map to corresponding adversarial assumptions. Within this framework, we also examine a legacy spread-spectrum embedding scheme, characterizing its advantages and limitations and highlighting the important trade-offs it entails. Overall, this work aims to foster effective intellectual property protection for 3D assets.

Face recognition technology has become an integral part of modern security systems and user authentication processes. However, these systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks and can easily be circumvented. Most prior research in face anti-spoofing (FAS) approaches it as a two-class classification task where models are trained on real samples and known spoof attacks and tested for detection performance on unknown spoof attacks. However, in practice, FAS should be treated as a one-class classification task where, while training, one cannot assume any knowledge regarding the spoof samples a priori. In this paper, we reformulate the face anti-spoofing task from a one-class perspective and propose a novel hyperbolic one-class classification framework. To train our network, we use a pseudo-negative class sampled from the Gaussian distribution with a weighted running mean and propose two novel loss functions: (1) Hyp-PC: Hyperbolic Pairwise Confusion loss, and (2) Hyp-CE: Hyperbolic Cross Entropy loss, which operate in the hyperbolic space. Additionally, we employ Euclidean feature clipping and gradient clipping to stabilize the training in the hyperbolic space. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work extending hyperbolic embeddings for face anti-spoofing in a one-class manner. With extensive experiments on five benchmark datasets: Rose-Youtu, MSU-MFSD, CASIA-MFSD, Idiap Replay-Attack, and OULU-NPU, we demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art, achieving better spoof detection performance.

Recent generative engine optimisation (GEO) research has shown that prompt-injection attacks can push a target product to the top of an LLM's recommendation list, with the strongest attacks reporting around 80% success and raising serious security concerns about RAG-based recommendation. However, these results assume the attacked document is always fed directly to the generator, bypassing the retriever and reranker. This is unrealistic: in deployed RAG systems, the attack modifies the document content, which can in turn change whether the document is retrieved and reranked highly enough to reach the generator at all. In this paper, we re-evaluate seven GEO attacks under a realistic three-stage pipeline (retriever\,to\,LLM reranker\,to\,LLM generator). We find that prior protocols substantially overstate attack effectiveness: gradient-based and instruction override attacks largely collapse before reaching the generator, and only LLM-driven prompt injections remain effective end-to-end. Our analysis further reveals that current GEO attacks are easily detectable: a lightweight prompt-injection guard finetuned on a small attack dataset already detects every attack. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/ielab/geo_injection_rag_survival.

Recent studies have drawn attention to the untapped potential of the "star operation" (element-wise multiplication) in network design. While intuitive explanations abound, the foundational rationale behind its application remains largely unexplored. Our study attempts to reveal the star operation's ability to map inputs into high-dimensional, non-linear feature spaces -- akin to kernel tricks -- without widening the network. We further introduce StarNet, a simple yet powerful prototype, demonstrating impressive performance and low latency under compact network structure and efficient budget. Like stars in the sky, the star operation appears unremarkable but holds a vast universe of potential. Our work encourages further exploration across tasks, with codes available at https://github.com/ma-xu/Rewrite-the-Stars.

As models scale, reward hacking becomes more frequent, more sophisticated, and more consequential. Does it leave a telltale signature in model representations? This work analyzes how reward hacking is represented internally in frontier open source LLMs, and how those representations can be used to understand and discover the range of hacking behaviors a model displays. In particular, we find that simple difference of means vectors coherently represent reward hacking in Kimi K3, GLM 5.2, and Qwen 3.8 Max across a variety of behaviors in common evaluations. Despite their simplicity, these vectors are both generalizable and interpretable, and we can use them to reliably detect reward hacking. We first evaluate reward hacking in commonly reported benchmarks like DeepSWE and SWE-bench, finding that models reward hack excessively in these environments; GLM 5.2 hacks in 57.2% of rollouts on DeepSWE and in 73% of rollouts on SWE-bench. Catching these requires monitors; LLM monitors are effective, but expensive detectors. We show that DoM vectors are similarly effective but virtually free, catching 3.1% more hacks in Kimi K3 and 7.9% fewer hacks in GLM 5.2 on DeepSWE at a monitor matched false positive rate. DoM vectors run on the chain-of-thought also predict reward hacks in the model's subsequent actions, meaning we can run them online and catch potential hacks before they occur. Finally, we analyze probe-hits that LLM monitors do not catch and discover other undesirable behaviors, as well as show transfer to finding hacks in non-SWE evaluations. Together, these results provide evidence that simple, white-box methods can be used to scalably study and monitor reward hacking behaviors in frontier open source models

Targeted data selection has emerged as a crucial paradigm for efficient instruction tuning, aiming to identify a small yet influential subset of training examples for a specific target task. In practice, influence is often measured through the effect of an example on parameter updates. To make selection scalable, many approaches leverage optimizer statistics (e.g., Adam states) as an axis-aligned surrogate for update geometry (i.e., diagonal precondition), implicitly treating parameters as coordinate-wise independent. We show that this assumption breaks down in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods such as LoRA. In this setting, the induced optimization geometry exhibits strong cross-parameter coupling with non-trivial off-diagonal interactions, while the task-relevant update directions are confined to a low-dimensional subspace. Motivated by this mismatch, we propose GIST (Gradient Isometric Subspace Transformation), a simple yet principled alternative that replaces axis-aligned scaling with robust subspace alignment. GIST recovers a task-specific subspace from validation gradients via spectral filtering (SVD), projects training gradients into this coupled subspace, and scores examples by their alignment with target directions.Extensive experiments have demonstrated that GIST matches or outperforms the state-of-the-art baseline with only 0.29% of the storage and 25% of the computational time under the same selection budget.

Mixture of Experts (MoE) models scale capacity but often suffer from representation collapse and gradient instability. We propose Dynamic Subspace Composition (DSC), a framework that approximates context-dependent weights via a state-dependent, sparse expansion of a shared basis bank. Formally, DSC models the weight update as a residual trajectory within a Star- Shaped Domain, employing a Magnitude-Gated Simplex Interpolation to ensure continuity at the identity. Unlike standard Mixture-of-LoRAs, which incurs O(M rd) parameter complexity by retrieving independent rank-r matrices, DSC constructs a compositional rank-K approximation from decoupled unit-norm basis vectors. This reduces parameter complexity to O(M d) and memory traffic to O(Kd), while Frame-Theoretic regularization and spectral constraints provide rigorous worst-case bounds on the dynamic update. The code is available at https://github. com/VladimerKhasia/DSC

Deep Learning of neural networks has gained prominence in multiple life-critical applications like medical diagnoses and autonomous vehicle accident investigations. However, concerns about model transparency and biases persist. Explainable methods are viewed as the solution to address these challenges. In this study, we introduce the Occlusion Sensitivity Analysis with Deep Feature Augmentation Subspace (OSA-DAS), a novel perturbation-based interpretability approach for computer vision. While traditional perturbation methods make only use of occlusions to explain the model predictions, OSA-DAS extends standard occlusion sensitivity analysis by enabling the integration with diverse image augmentations. Distinctly, our method utilizes the output vector of a DNN to build low-dimensional subspaces within the deep feature vector space, offering a more precise explanation of the model prediction. The structural similarity between these subspaces encompasses the influence of diverse augmentations and occlusions. We test extensively on the ImageNet-1k, and our class- and model-agnostic approach outperforms commonly used interpreters, setting it apart in the realm of explainable AI.

Backdoor and data poisoning attacks can achieve high attack success while evading existing spectral and optimisation based defences. We show that this behaviour is not incidental, but arises from a fundamental geometric mechanism in input space. Using kernel ridge regression as an exact model of wide neural networks, we prove that clustered dirty label poisons induce a rank one spike in the input Hessian whose magnitude scales quadratically with attack efficacy. Crucially, for nonlinear kernels we identify a near clone regime in which poison efficacy remains order one while the induced input curvature vanishes, making the attack provably spectrally undetectable. We further show that input gradient regularisation contracts poison aligned Fisher and Hessian eigenmodes under gradient flow, yielding an explicit and unavoidable safety efficacy trade off by reducing data fitting capacity. For exponential kernels, this defence admits a precise interpretation as an anisotropic high pass filter that increases the effective length scale and suppresses near clone poisons. Extensive experiments on linear models and deep convolutional networks across MNIST and CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100 validate the theory, demonstrating consistent lags between attack success and spectral visibility, and showing that regularisation and data augmentation jointly suppress poisoning. Our results establish when backdoors are inherently invisible, and provide the first end to end characterisation of poisoning, detectability, and defence through input space curvature.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

The evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation relies heavily on the quality and robustness of test cases. However, existing benchmarks often lack coverage for subtle corner cases, allowing incorrect solutions to pass. To bridge this gap, we propose CodeHacker, an automated agent framework dedicated to generating targeted adversarial test cases that expose latent vulnerabilities in program submissions. Mimicking the hack mechanism in competitive programming, CodeHacker employs a multi-strategy approach, including stress testing, anti-hash attacks, and logic-specific targeting to break specific code submissions. To ensure the validity and reliability of these attacks, we introduce a Calibration Phase, where the agent iteratively refines its own Validator and Checker via self-generated adversarial probes before evaluating contestant code.Experiments demonstrate that CodeHacker significantly improves the True Negative Rate (TNR) of existing datasets, effectively filtering out incorrect solutions that were previously accepted. Furthermore, generated adversarial cases prove to be superior training data, boosting the performance of RL-trained models on benchmarks like LiveCodeBench.

Modern transformers pair impressive capabilities with substantial memory and compute demands. Low-rank weight factorization reduces both while keeping the matrices dense, and thus efficient on standard hardware. Existing methods, however, choose the subspace to remove from each weight matrix with local closed-form criteria: activation energy, layer-wise reconstruction error, or a quadratic approximation of the loss. These criteria ignore how errors propagate through the network, so at high compression the errors compound with depth and performance collapses. We introduce Learnable Subspace Projections (LSP), which instead learns the subspaces to discard end-to-end. Each linear layer, or tied group of layers that read the same activations, is assigned an orthogonal projector. All projectors are optimized jointly against a global objective--the KL divergence to the dense model's output distribution or the model's original training loss--while the pretrained weights remain frozen. Projectors are initialized from a whitened SVD truncation, and ranks are allocated by the output KL each projector induces per parameter saved. After training, the projectors merge into standard low-rank factors, with each tied group sharing one factor. In attention, this also lets the model cache one narrow latent in place of full keys and values. Across LLMs (OPT-125M/1.3B, Qwen3-4B, Llama-2-7B) and ViT-B/16, LSP outperforms baselines, and its advantage widens as compression increases. At -70% compression, LSP brings Llama-2-7B to 10.9 WikiText-2 perplexity and 42.2% mean zero-shot accuracy, versus 13.3 and 36.0% for the strongest baseline. The factorized model decodes up to 1.6x faster than the dense model at small batch sizes, and aching the shared latent shrinks the combined memory of weights and KV cache by 13.5x at a 128k-token context, versus at most 6.5x for untied baseline factorizations.

Recent latent-space monitoring techniques have shown promise as defenses against LLM attacks. These defenses act as scanners that seek to detect harmful activations before they lead to undesirable actions. This prompts the question: Can models execute harmful behavior via inconspicuous latent states? Here, we study such obfuscated activations. We show that state-of-the-art latent-space defenses -- including sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent OOD detection -- are all vulnerable to obfuscated activations. For example, against probes trained to classify harmfulness, our attacks can often reduce recall from 100% to 0% while retaining a 90% jailbreaking rate. However, obfuscation has limits: we find that on a complex task (writing SQL code), obfuscation reduces model performance. Together, our results demonstrate that neural activations are highly malleable: we can reshape activation patterns in a variety of ways, often while preserving a network's behavior. This poses a fundamental challenge to latent-space defenses.

Automatic speaker verification (ASV) is one of the most natural and convenient means of biometric person recognition. Unfortunately, just like all other biometric systems, ASV is vulnerable to spoofing, also referred to as "presentation attacks." These vulnerabilities are generally unacceptable and call for spoofing countermeasures or "presentation attack detection" systems. In addition to impersonation, ASV systems are vulnerable to replay, speech synthesis, and voice conversion attacks. The ASVspoof 2019 edition is the first to consider all three spoofing attack types within a single challenge. While they originate from the same source database and same underlying protocol, they are explored in two specific use case scenarios. Spoofing attacks within a logical access (LA) scenario are generated with the latest speech synthesis and voice conversion technologies, including state-of-the-art neural acoustic and waveform model techniques. Replay spoofing attacks within a physical access (PA) scenario are generated through carefully controlled simulations that support much more revealing analysis than possible previously. Also new to the 2019 edition is the use of the tandem detection cost function metric, which reflects the impact of spoofing and countermeasures on the reliability of a fixed ASV system. This paper describes the database design, protocol, spoofing attack implementations, and baseline ASV and countermeasure results. It also describes a human assessment on spoofed data in logical access. It was demonstrated that the spoofing data in the ASVspoof 2019 database have varied degrees of perceived quality and similarity to the target speakers, including spoofed data that cannot be differentiated from bona-fide utterances even by human subjects.

Sparsely-activated Mixture-of-Experts (SMoE) models offer efficient pre-training and low latency but their large parameter counts create significant memory overhead, motivating research into expert compression. Contrary to recent findings favouring expert merging on discriminative benchmarks, we demonstrate that expert pruning is a superior strategy for generative tasks. We prove that merging introduces an irreducible error by causing a "functional subspace collapse", due to the loss of the router's independent, input-dependent control over experts. Leveraging this insight, we propose Router-weighted Expert Activation Pruning (REAP), a novel pruning criterion that considers both router gate-values and expert activation norms. Across a diverse set of SMoE models ranging from 20B to 1T parameters, REAP consistently outperforms merging and other pruning methods on generative benchmarks, especially at 50% compression. Notably, our method achieves near-lossless compression on code generation and tool-calling tasks with Qwen3-Coder-480B and Kimi-K2, even after pruning 50% of experts.

A popular way to approximate the Koopman operator's action on a finite-dimensional subspace of functions is via orthogonal projections. The quality of the projected model directly depends on the selected subspace, specifically on how close it is to being invariant under the Koopman operator. The notion of invariance proximity provides a tight upper bound on the worst-case relative prediction error of the finite-dimensional model. However, its direct calculation is computationally challenging. This paper leverages the geometric structure behind the definition of invariance proximity to provide a closed-form expression in terms of Jordan principal angles on general inner product spaces. Unveiling this connection allows us to exploit specific isomorphisms to circumvent the computational challenges associated with spaces of functions and enables the use of existing efficient numerical routines to compute invariance proximity.

Speech quality predictors are increasingly used as rewards, yet no agreed measure of their hackability exists. The usual measurement has two flaws. First, the perturbation reaches the predictor through a processing chain -- here a neural codec -- that shifts the score on its own, which scoring against the raw input charges to the attack. Referencing the unperturbed round trip instead changes measured hackability by up to a factor of four (0.31 to 0.08 for one defence). Second, one trained attacker is a sample, not a measurement: five attackers differing only in random seed reach success rates from 0.00 to 0.38 against one fixed predictor, so a defence claim needs the worst case over several. Under this protocol, four published predictors differ widely: NISQA is hacked on 90% of utterances, SSL-MOS on 21%, DNSMOS on 14% and UTMOS on 6%. We then audit a closed attack-detect-patch loop. It hardens the predictor only in its own attack space, by less than the spread between attackers; a random-perturbation baseline matches it; and it costs up to 0.30 system SRCC out of domain. Enhancers post-trained against patched predictors hack them far less (PESQ -0.03 versus -0.23). Code, preregistration and run outputs are released.

Multi-modal retrieval augmented generation (M-RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large multi-modal models (LMMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). However, M-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries that aim to disrupt the system by injecting malicious entries into the KB. In this paper, we present the first poisoning attack against M-RAG targeting visual document retrieval applications where the KB contains images of document pages. We propose two attacks, each of which require injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we propose a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) in the M-RAG system. Secondly, we present a targeted attack against one or a group of user queries, with the goal of spreading targeted misinformation. For both attacks, we use a multi-objective gradient-based adversarial approach to craft the injected image while optimizing for both retrieval and generation. We evaluate our attacks against several visual document retrieval datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (LMMs), demonstrating the attack effectiveness in both the universal and targeted settings. We additionally present results including commonly used defenses, various attack hyper-parameter settings, ablations, and attack transferability.

In language models, what a representation encodes is determined by the geometry of its representation space: distances, not activations, carry meaning. Existing tools characterize the shape of this geometry but do not ask what that shape is organized for. We introduce Subspace PGA, a metric that tests whether a layer's distance structure aligns with the readout subspace of the unembedding matrix W_U more than with random subspaces of equal size. Across seven Pythia models (70M--6.9B) and three cross-family models, intermediate geometry is significantly organized for prediction (peak z = 9--24), but the degree is scale-dependent: small models (d leq 1024) progressively lose it at late layers during training -- even as loss keeps improving -- while large models (d geq 2048) preserve it throughout. We trace this to a capacity trade-off: a few dominant directions migrate away from W_U's readout, masking rather than destroying the predictive structure beneath, and removing them restores alignment. Neither spectral metrics nor loss curves capture this distinction. Scale thus determines not only how well a model predicts, but how its representation geometry is organized to do so.

LLM agents like Claude Code can not only write code but also be used for autonomous AI research and engineering rank2026posttrainbench, novikov2025alphaevolve. We show that an autoresearch-style pipeline karpathy2026autoresearch powered by Claude Code discovers novel white-box adversarial attack algorithms that significantly outperform all existing (30+) methods in jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations. Starting from existing attack implementations, such as GCG~zou2023universal, the agent iterates to produce new algorithms achieving up to 40\% attack success rate on CBRN queries against GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B, compared to leq10\% for existing algorithms (fig:teaser, left). The discovered algorithms generalize: attacks optimized on surrogate models transfer directly to held-out models, achieving 100\% ASR against Meta-SecAlign-70B chen2025secalign versus 56\% for the best baseline (fig:teaser, middle). Extending the findings of~carlini2025autoadvexbench, our results are an early demonstration that incremental safety and security research can be automated using LLM agents. White-box adversarial red-teaming is particularly well-suited for this: existing methods provide strong starting points, and the optimization objective yields dense, quantitative feedback. We release all discovered attacks alongside baseline implementations and evaluation code at https://github.com/romovpa/claudini.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) offer significant promise for improving breast cancer diagnosis in medical imaging. However, these models are highly susceptible to adversarial attacks--small, imperceptible changes that can mislead classifiers--raising critical concerns about their reliability and security. Traditional attacks rely on fixed-norm perturbations, misaligning with human perception. In contrast, diffusion-based attacks require pre-trained models, demanding substantial data when these models are unavailable, limiting practical use in data-scarce scenarios. In medical imaging, however, this is often unfeasible due to the limited availability of datasets. Building on recent advancements in learnable prompts, we propose Prompt2Perturb (P2P), a novel language-guided attack method capable of generating meaningful attack examples driven by text instructions. During the prompt learning phase, our approach leverages learnable prompts within the text encoder to create subtle, yet impactful, perturbations that remain imperceptible while guiding the model towards targeted outcomes. In contrast to current prompt learning-based approaches, our P2P stands out by directly updating text embeddings, avoiding the need for retraining diffusion models. Further, we leverage the finding that optimizing only the early reverse diffusion steps boosts efficiency while ensuring that the generated adversarial examples incorporate subtle noise, thus preserving ultrasound image quality without introducing noticeable artifacts. We show that our method outperforms state-of-the-art attack techniques across three breast ultrasound datasets in FID and LPIPS. Moreover, the generated images are both more natural in appearance and more effective compared to existing adversarial attacks. Our code will be publicly available https://github.com/yasamin-med/P2P.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Vision-Language Models require efficient adaptation to continually emerging downstream tasks. While Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning mitigates catastrophic forgetting, assigning isolated modules per task leads to parameter explosion. Conversely, recent similarity-driven sharing mechanisms falsely equate superficial visual similarity with underlying alignment consistency. This fundamental mismatch triggers severe negative transfer between visually similar but logically distinct tasks and fails to exploit alignment reuse across visually diverse ones. We argue thatalignment sharing is fundamentally a geometric problem of overlapping optimization trajectories within shared low-rank subspaces. Grounded in this insight, we propose iGSP, a novel framework that achieves efficient adaptation via implicit gradient subspace projection. Leveraging the early convergence of MoE routers to establish the subspace basis, iGSP bifurcates the adaptation process into two phases. First, the Subspace Identification phase introduces candidate experts via basis pre-expansion, applies a novel subspace-constrained regularization to implicitly project new task gradients onto the historical subspace, and precisely prunes redundant dimensions by treating routing probabilities as gradient flow indicators, ultimately to maximize knowledge reuse. Second, the Orthogonal Subspace Fine-Tuning phase fixes this structural basis and removes the regularization to rapidly fit the task-specific residual loss. Extensive experiments on the MTIL benchmark demonstrate that iGSP achieves state-of-the-art accuracy while significantly improving training efficiency, reducing the average trainable parameters by 42.7\% compared to current SOTA methods, and decreasing the final total parameters by 86.9\% relative to counterparts. The source code is available at https://github.com/GeoX-Lab/iGSP.

In this paper, we introduce a subspace-inspired Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) method, which is computationally efficient, easy to implement, and readily applicable to large language, multimodal, and diffusion models. Initially, we equivalently decompose the weights of LoRA into two subspaces, and find that simply mixing them can enhance performance. To study such a phenomenon, we revisit it through a fine-grained subspace lens, showing that such modification is equivalent to employing a fixed mixer to fuse the subspaces. To be more flexible, we jointly learn the mixer with the original LoRA weights, and term the method Mixture-of-Subspaces LoRA (MoSLoRA). MoSLoRA consistently outperforms LoRA on tasks in different modalities, including commonsense reasoning, visual instruction tuning, and subject-driven text-to-image generation, demonstrating its effectiveness and robustness. Codes are available at https://github.com/wutaiqiang/MoSLoRA{github}.

Physical adversarial attack methods expose the vulnerabilities of deep neural networks and pose a significant threat to safety-critical scenarios such as autonomous driving. Camouflage-based physical attack is a more promising approach compared to the patch-based attack, offering stronger adversarial effectiveness in complex physical environments. However, most prior work relies on mesh priors of the target object and virtual environments constructed by simulators, which are time-consuming to obtain and inevitably differ from the real world. Moreover, due to the limitations of the backgrounds in training images, previous methods often fail to produce multi-view robust adversarial camouflage and tend to fall into sub-optimal solutions. Due to these reasons, prior work lacks adversarial effectiveness and robustness across diverse viewpoints and physical environments. We propose a physical attack framework based on 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS), named PGA, which provides rapid and precise reconstruction with few images, along with photo-realistic rendering capabilities. Our framework further enhances cross-view robustness and adversarial effectiveness by preventing mutual and self-occlusion among Gaussians and employing a min-max optimization approach that adjusts the imaging background of each viewpoint, helping the algorithm filter out non-robust adversarial features. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness and superiority of PGA. Our code is available at:https://github.com/TRLou/PGA.

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

The versatility of diffusion models in generating customized images from few samples raises significant privacy concerns, particularly regarding unauthorized modifications of private content. This concerning issue has renewed the efforts in developing protection mechanisms based on adversarial attacks, which generate effective perturbations to poison diffusion models. Our work is motivated by the observation that these models exhibit a high degree of abstraction within their semantic latent space (`h-space'), which encodes critical high-level features for generating coherent and meaningful content. In this paper, we propose a novel anti-customization approach, called HAAD (h-space based Adversarial Attack for Diffusion models), that leverages adversarial attacks to craft perturbations based on the h-space that can efficiently degrade the image generation process. Building upon HAAD, we further introduce a more efficient variant, HAAD-KV, that constructs perturbations solely based on the KV parameters of the h-space. This strategy offers a stronger protection, that is computationally less expensive. Despite their simplicity, our methods outperform state-of-the-art adversarial attacks, highlighting their effectiveness.

Directional ablation removes an aligned language model's ability to refuse by projecting a single "refusal direction" out of the weights that write the residual stream. It needs no gradient-based training and no optimization, only a few hundred contrastive prompts, which makes it the canonical white-box attack on open-weight alignment. However, it has been established only on dense models up to roughly 70B parameters. We study whether it survives the shift to frontier mixture-of-experts (MoE) models whose residual streams are no longer a single tensor and whose weights ship quantized. We apply it to GLM-5.3-Flash (320B parameters, 288 routed experts, a four-wide hyper-connection residual, block-FP8). The attack survives the architecture, but what it reaches is no longer where a reader of the original recipe would look for it. Editing the attention, dense and routed-expert writers on their own removes 0.039, 0.016 and 0.148 of refusal respectively; editing all three together removes 0.776. As a result, 74% of the effect exists only under the joint intervention. The part the conventional recipe reaches by module-name matching accounts for 0.066 of that 0.776, which is why it fails silently on an MoE. The effect does not follow from removing just any direction: ablating a random direction orthogonal to it leaves refusal unchanged. A category-concentrated residue survives every edit we tried: subspaces fitted on violence, sexual content and hate leave measurable refusal at every rank from 1 to 12. We report the method, the 41-89 percentage-point reductions it achieves across seven harmful benchmarks with no detected change in capability, and the boundary where it stops.

Model customization necessitates high-quality and diverse datasets, but acquiring such data remains time-consuming and labor-intensive. Despite the great potential of large language models (LLMs) for data synthesis, current approaches are constrained by limited seed data, model biases, and low-variation prompts, resulting in limited diversity and biased distributions with the increase of data scales. To tackle this challenge, we introduce TREESYNTH, a tree-guided subspace-based data synthesis approach inspired by decision trees. It constructs a spatial partitioning tree to recursively divide a task-specific full data space (i.e., root node) into numerous atomic subspaces (i.e., leaf nodes) with mutually exclusive and exhaustive attributes to ensure both distinctiveness and comprehensiveness before synthesizing samples within each atomic subspace. This globally dividing-and-synthesizing method finally collects subspace samples into a comprehensive dataset, effectively circumventing repetition and space collapse to ensure the diversity of large-scale data synthesis. Furthermore, the spatial partitioning tree enables sample allocation into atomic subspaces, allowing the rebalancing of existing datasets for more balanced and comprehensive distributions. Empirically, extensive experiments across diverse benchmarks consistently demonstrate the superior data diversity, model performance, and robust scalability of TREESYNTH compared to both human-crafted datasets and peer data synthesis methods, with an average performance gain reaching 10%. Besides, the consistent improvements of TREESYNTH-balanced datasets highlight its efficacious application to redistribute existing datasets for more comprehensive coverage and the induced performance enhancement. The code is available at https://github.com/cpa2001/TreeSynth.

Frontier coding agents are increasingly used in workflows where users supervise progress primarily through repeated improvement of a public score, namely the reported score on a public evaluation file with labels in the workspace, rather than through direct inspection of the agent's intermediate outputs. We study whether multi-round user pressure to improve that score induces public score exploitation: behavior that raises the public score through shortcuts without improving hidden private evaluation. We begin with a preliminary single-script tabular classification task, where GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 both exploit label information within 10 rounds of user-agent interaction. We then build AgentPressureBench, a 34-task machine-learning repository benchmark spanning three input modalities, and collect 1326 multi-round trajectories from 13 coding agents. On our benchmark, we observe 403 exploitative runs, spanning across all tasks. We also find that stronger models have higher exploitation rates, supported by a significant Spearman rank correlation of 0.77. Our ablation experiments show that higher user pressure leads to earlier exploitation, reducing the average first exploit round by 15.6 rounds (i.e., 19.67 to 4.08). As a mitigation, adding explicit anti-exploit wordings in prompt mostly eliminates exploitation (100% to 8.3%). We hope that our work can bring attention to more careful use of coding agents workflow, and developing more robust coding agents under user pressure. Our project page is at https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/AgentPressureBench .

Deep neural networks perform remarkably well on image classification tasks but remain vulnerable to carefully crafted adversarial perturbations. This work revisits linear dimensionality reduction as a simple, data-adapted defense. We empirically compare standard Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with its sparse variant (SPCA) as front-end feature extractors for downstream classifiers, and we complement these experiments with a theoretical analysis. On the theory side, we derive exact robustness certificates for linear heads applied to SPCA features: for both ell_infty and ell_2 threat models (binary and multiclass), the certified radius grows as the dual norms of W^top u shrink, where W is the projection and u the head weights. We further show that for general (non-linear) heads, sparsity reduces operator-norm bounds through a Lipschitz composition argument, predicting lower input sensitivity. Empirically, with a small non-linear network after the projection, SPCA consistently degrades more gracefully than PCA under strong white-box and black-box attacks while maintaining competitive clean accuracy. Taken together, the theory identifies the mechanism (sparser projections reduce adversarial leverage) and the experiments verify that this benefit persists beyond the linear setting. Our code is available at https://github.com/killian31/SPCARobustness.

Multimodal contrastive learning models like CLIP have demonstrated remarkable vision-language alignment capabilities, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks poses critical security risks. Attackers can implant latent triggers that persist through downstream tasks, enabling malicious control of model behavior upon trigger presentation. Despite great success in recent defense mechanisms, they remain impractical due to strong assumptions about attacker knowledge or excessive clean data requirements. In this paper, we introduce InverTune, the first backdoor defense framework for multimodal models under minimal attacker assumptions, requiring neither prior knowledge of attack targets nor access to the poisoned dataset. Unlike existing defense methods that rely on the same dataset used in the poisoning stage, InverTune effectively identifies and removes backdoor artifacts through three key components, achieving robust protection against backdoor attacks. Specifically, InverTune first exposes attack signatures through adversarial simulation, probabilistically identifying the target label by analyzing model response patterns. Building on this, we develop a gradient inversion technique to reconstruct latent triggers through activation pattern analysis. Finally, a clustering-guided fine-tuning strategy is employed to erase the backdoor function with only a small amount of arbitrary clean data, while preserving the original model capabilities. Experimental results show that InverTune reduces the average attack success rate (ASR) by 97.87% against the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks while limiting clean accuracy (CA) degradation to just 3.07%. This work establishes a new paradigm for securing multimodal systems, advancing security in foundation model deployment without compromising performance.

Training large language models (LLMs) is often bottlenecked by extreme memory demands, with optimizer states dominating the footprint. Recent works mitigates this cost by projecting gradients into low-dimensional subspaces using sophisticated update strategies. In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of gradient space and its underlying subspaces. We find that while a small subspace captures most gradient energy, a significant portion still resides in the residual bulk; moreover, the influence of the core subspace diminishes over time and in deeper layers. We also observe that the gradient space exhibits near-flat curvature, calling for algorithms that explicitly account for this geometry. Motivated by these insights, we introduce a suite of randomized algorithms, GrassWalk and GrassJump, which exploit subspace and achieve state-of-the-art memory savings while improving performance on LLaMA-1B and LLaMA-7B pretraining.

Human voices can be used to authenticate the identity of the speaker, but the automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are vulnerable to voice spoofing attacks, such as impersonation, replay, text-to-speech, and voice conversion. Recently, researchers developed anti-spoofing techniques to improve the reliability of ASV systems against spoofing attacks. However, most methods encounter difficulties in detecting unknown attacks in practical use, which often have different statistical distributions from known attacks. Especially, the fast development of synthetic voice spoofing algorithms is generating increasingly powerful attacks, putting the ASV systems at risk of unseen attacks. In this work, we propose an anti-spoofing system to detect unknown synthetic voice spoofing attacks (i.e., text-to-speech or voice conversion) using one-class learning. The key idea is to compact the bona fide speech representation and inject an angular margin to separate the spoofing attacks in the embedding space. Without resorting to any data augmentation methods, our proposed system achieves an equal error rate (EER) of 2.19% on the evaluation set of ASVspoof 2019 Challenge logical access scenario, outperforming all existing single systems (i.e., those without model ensemble).

Deep features extracted from certain layers of a pre-trained deep model show superior performance over the conventional hand-crafted features. Compared with fine-tuning or linear probing that can explore diverse augmentations, \eg, random crop/flipping, in the original input space, the appropriate augmentations for learning with fixed deep features are more challenging and have been less investigated, which degenerates the performance. To unleash the potential of fixed deep features, we propose a novel semantic adversarial augmentation (SeA) in the feature space for optimization. Concretely, the adversarial direction implied by the gradient will be projected to a subspace spanned by other examples to preserve the semantic information. Then, deep features will be perturbed with the semantic direction, and augmented features will be applied to learn the classifier. Experiments are conducted on 11 benchmark downstream classification tasks with 4 popular pre-trained models. Our method is 2% better than the deep features without SeA on average. Moreover, compared to the expensive fine-tuning that is expected to give good performance, SeA shows a comparable performance on 6 out of 11 tasks, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposal in addition to its efficiency. Code is available at https://github.com/idstcv/SeA.

Quantum algorithms for probing ground-state properties of quantum systems require good initial states. Projection-based methods such as eigenvalue filtering rely on inputs that have a significant overlap with the low-energy subspace, which can be challenging for large, strongly-correlated systems. This issue has motivated the study of physically-inspired dynamical approaches such as thermodynamic cooling. In this work, we introduce a ground-state preparation algorithm based on the simulation of quantum dynamics. Our main insight is to transform the Hamiltonian by a shifted sign function via quantum signal processing, effectively mapping eigenvalues into positive and negative subspaces separated by a large gap. This automatically ensures that all states within each subspace conserve energy with respect to the transformed Hamiltonian. Subsequent time-evolution with a perturbed Hamiltonian induces transitions to lower-energy states while preventing unwanted jumps to higher energy states. The approach does not rely on a priori knowledge of energy gaps and requires no additional qubits to model a bath. Furthermore, it makes mathcal{O}(d^{,3/2}/epsilon) queries to the time-evolution operator of the system and mathcal{O}(d^{,3/2}) queries to a block-encoding of the perturbation, for d cooling steps and an epsilon-accurate energy resolution. Our results provide a framework for combining quantum signal processing and Hamiltonian simulation to design heuristic quantum algorithms for ground-state preparation.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

We propose a new defense mechanism against adversarial attacks inspired by an optical co-processor, providing robustness without compromising natural accuracy in both white-box and black-box settings. This hardware co-processor performs a nonlinear fixed random transformation, where the parameters are unknown and impossible to retrieve with sufficient precision for large enough dimensions. In the white-box setting, our defense works by obfuscating the parameters of the random projection. Unlike other defenses relying on obfuscated gradients, we find we are unable to build a reliable backward differentiable approximation for obfuscated parameters. Moreover, while our model reaches a good natural accuracy with a hybrid backpropagation - synthetic gradient method, the same approach is suboptimal if employed to generate adversarial examples. We find the combination of a random projection and binarization in the optical system also improves robustness against various types of black-box attacks. Finally, our hybrid training method builds robust features against transfer attacks. We demonstrate our approach on a VGG-like architecture, placing the defense on top of the convolutional features, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Code is available at https://github.com/lightonai/adversarial-robustness-by-design.

LoRA-based large model parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods use low-rank de- composition to approximate updates to model parameters. However, compared to full- parameter fine-tuning, low-rank updates often lead to a performance gap in downstream tasks. To address this, we introduce DropLoRA, a novel pruning-based approach that focuses on pruning the rank dimension. Unlike conven- tional methods that attempt to overcome the low-rank bottleneck, DropLoRA innovatively integrates a pruning module between the two low-rank matrices in LoRA to simulate dy- namic subspace learning. This dynamic low- rank subspace learning allows DropLoRA to overcome the limitations of traditional LoRA, which operates within a static subspace. By continuously adapting the learning subspace, DropLoRA significantly boosts performance without incurring additional training or infer- ence costs. Our experimental results demon- strate that DropLoRA consistently outperforms LoRA in fine-tuning the LLaMA series across a wide range of large language model gener- ation tasks, including commonsense reason- ing, mathematical reasoning, code generation, and instruction-following. Our code is avail- able at https://github.com/TayeeChang/DropLoRA.

Recent advances in 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) have revolutionized scene reconstruction, opening new possibilities for 3D steganography by hiding 3D secrets within 3D covers. The key challenge in steganography is ensuring imperceptibility while maintaining high-fidelity reconstruction. However, existing methods often suffer from detectability risks and utilize only suboptimal 3DGS features, limiting their full potential. We propose a novel end-to-end key-secured 3D steganography framework (KeySS) that jointly optimizes a 3DGS model and a key-secured decoder for secret reconstruction. Our approach reveals that Gaussian features contribute unequally to secret hiding. The framework incorporates a key-controllable mechanism enabling multi-secret hiding and unauthorized access prevention, while systematically exploring optimal feature update to balance fidelity and security. To rigorously evaluate steganographic imperceptibility beyond conventional 2D metrics, we introduce 3D-Sinkhorn distance analysis, which quantifies distributional differences between original and steganographic Gaussian parameters in the representation space. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance in both cover and secret reconstruction while maintaining high security levels, advancing the field of 3D steganography. Code is available at https://github.com/RY-Paper/KeySS

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

The performance of spoofing countermeasure systems depends fundamentally upon the use of sufficiently representative training data. With this usually being limited, current solutions typically lack generalisation to attacks encountered in the wild. Strategies to improve reliability in the face of uncontrolled, unpredictable attacks are hence needed. We report in this paper our efforts to use self-supervised learning in the form of a wav2vec 2.0 front-end with fine tuning. Despite initial base representations being learned using only bona fide data and no spoofed data, we obtain the lowest equal error rates reported in the literature for both the ASVspoof 2021 Logical Access and Deepfake databases. When combined with data augmentation,these results correspond to an improvement of almost 90% relative to our baseline system.

Language model inversion seeks to recover hidden prompts using only language model outputs. This capability has implications for security and accountability in language model deployments, such as leaking private information from an API-protected language model's system message. We propose a new method -- prompt inversion from logprob sequences (PILS) -- that recovers hidden prompts by gleaning clues from the model's next-token probabilities over the course of multiple generation steps. Our method is enabled by a key insight: The vector-valued outputs of a language model occupy a low-dimensional subspace. This enables us to losslessly compress the full next-token probability distribution over multiple generation steps using a linear map, allowing more output information to be used for inversion. Our approach yields massive gains over previous state-of-the-art methods for recovering hidden prompts, achieving 2--3.5 times higher exact recovery rates across test sets, in one case increasing the recovery rate from 17% to 60%. Our method also exhibits surprisingly good generalization behavior; for instance, an inverter trained on 16 generations steps gets 5--27 points higher prompt recovery when we increase the number of steps to 32 at test time. Furthermore, we demonstrate strong performance of our method on the more challenging task of recovering hidden system messages. We also analyze the role of verbatim repetition in prompt recovery and propose a new method for cross-family model transfer for logit-based inverters. Our findings show that next-token probabilities are a considerably more vulnerable attack surface for inversion attacks than previously known.

Many existing adversarial attacks generate L_p-norm perturbations on image RGB space. Despite some achievements in transferability and attack success rate, the crafted adversarial examples are easily perceived by human eyes. Towards visual imperceptibility, some recent works explore unrestricted attacks without L_p-norm constraints, yet lacking transferability of attacking black-box models. In this work, we propose a novel imperceptible and transferable attack by leveraging both the generative and discriminative power of diffusion models. Specifically, instead of direct manipulation in pixel space, we craft perturbations in latent space of diffusion models. Combined with well-designed content-preserving structures, we can generate human-insensitive perturbations embedded with semantic clues. For better transferability, we further "deceive" the diffusion model which can be viewed as an additional recognition surrogate, by distracting its attention away from the target regions. To our knowledge, our proposed method, DiffAttack, is the first that introduces diffusion models into adversarial attack field. Extensive experiments on various model structures (including CNNs, Transformers, MLPs) and defense methods have demonstrated our superiority over other attack methods.

We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial examples for deep learning models solely based on information limited to output label~(hard label) to a queried data input. We propose a simple and efficient Bayesian Optimization~(BO) based approach for developing black-box adversarial attacks. Issues with BO's performance in high dimensions are avoided by searching for adversarial examples in a structured low-dimensional subspace. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed attack method by evaluating both ell_infty and ell_2 norm constrained untargeted and targeted hard label black-box attacks on three standard datasets - MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Our proposed approach consistently achieves 2x to 10x higher attack success rate while requiring 10x to 20x fewer queries compared to the current state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful text generators, yet they can produce toxic or harmful content even when given seemingly harmless prompts. This presents a serious safety challenge and can cause real-world harm. Toxicity is often subtle and context-dependent, making it difficult to detect at the token level or through coarse sentence-level signals. Moreover, efforts to mitigate toxicity often face a trade-off between safety and the coherence, or fluency of the generated text. In this work, we present a targeted subspace intervention strategy for identifying and suppressing hidden toxic patterns from underlying model representations, while preserving overall ability to generate safe fluent content. On the RealToxicityPrompts, our method achieves strong mitigation performance compared to existing baselines, with minimal impact on inference complexity. Across multiple LLMs, our approach reduces toxicity of state-of-the-art detoxification systems by 8-20%, while maintaining comparable fluency. Through extensive quantitative and qualitative analyses, we show that our approach achieves effective toxicity reduction without impairing generative performance, consistently outperforming existing baselines.

The sufficiently scattered condition (SSC) is a key condition in the study of identifiability of various matrix factorization problems, including nonnegative, minimum-volume, symmetric, simplex-structured, and polytopic matrix factorizations. The SSC allows one to guarantee that the computed matrix factorization is unique/identifiable, up to trivial ambiguities. However, this condition is NP-hard to check in general. In this paper, we show that it can however be checked in a reasonable amount of time in realistic scenarios, when the factorization rank is not too large. This is achieved by formulating the problem as a non-convex quadratic optimization problem over a bounded set. We use the global non-convex optimization software Gurobi, and showcase the usefulness of this code on synthetic data sets and on real-world hyperspectral images.

Large language model (LLM) assistants are increasingly integrated into enterprise workflows, raising new security concerns as they bridge internal and external data sources. This paper presents an in-depth case study of EchoLeak (CVE-2025-32711), a zero-click prompt injection vulnerability in Microsoft 365 Copilot that enabled remote, unauthenticated data exfiltration via a single crafted email. By chaining multiple bypasses-evading Microsofts XPIA (Cross Prompt Injection Attempt) classifier, circumventing link redaction with reference-style Markdown, exploiting auto-fetched images, and abusing a Microsoft Teams proxy allowed by the content security policy-EchoLeak achieved full privilege escalation across LLM trust boundaries without user interaction. We analyze why existing defenses failed, and outline a set of engineering mitigations including prompt partitioning, enhanced input/output filtering, provenance-based access control, and strict content security policies. Beyond the specific exploit, we derive generalizable lessons for building secure AI copilots, emphasizing the principle of least privilege, defense-in-depth architectures, and continuous adversarial testing. Our findings establish prompt injection as a practical, high-severity vulnerability class in production AI systems and provide a blueprint for defending against future AI-native threats.

We introduce two complementary techniques for efficient adaptive optimization that reduce memory requirements while accelerating training of large-scale neural networks. The first technique, Subset-Norm adaptive step size, generalizes AdaGrad-Norm and AdaGrad(-Coordinate) by reducing the second moment term's memory footprint from O(d) to O(d) through step-size sharing, where d is the model size. For non-convex smooth objectives under coordinate-wise sub-gaussian gradient noise, we prove a noise-adapted high-probability convergence guarantee showing improved dimensional dependence over existing methods. Our second technique, Subspace-Momentum, reduces the momentum state's memory footprint by operating in a low-dimensional subspace while applying standard SGD in the orthogonal complement. We establish high-probability convergence rates under similar relaxed assumptions. Empirical evaluation on LLaMA models from 60M to 1B parameters demonstrates the effectiveness of our methods, where combining subset-norm with subspace-momentum achieves Adam's validation perplexity in approximately half the training tokens (6.8B vs 13.1B) while using only 20% of the Adam's optimizer-states memory footprint and requiring minimal additional hyperparameter tuning.

Class-Incremental Learning (CIL) requires a learning system to continually learn new classes without forgetting. Despite the strong performance of Pre-Trained Models (PTMs) in CIL, a critical issue persists: learning new classes often results in the overwriting of old ones. Excessive modification of the network causes forgetting, while minimal adjustments lead to an inadequate fit for new classes. As a result, it is desired to figure out a way of efficient model updating without harming former knowledge. In this paper, we propose ExpAndable Subspace Ensemble (EASE) for PTM-based CIL. To enable model updating without conflict, we train a distinct lightweight adapter module for each new task, aiming to create task-specific subspaces. These adapters span a high-dimensional feature space, enabling joint decision-making across multiple subspaces. As data evolves, the expanding subspaces render the old class classifiers incompatible with new-stage spaces. Correspondingly, we design a semantic-guided prototype complement strategy that synthesizes old classes' new features without using any old class instance. Extensive experiments on seven benchmark datasets verify EASE's state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at: https://github.com/sun-hailong/CVPR24-Ease

Modern ML applications increasingly rely on complex deep learning models and large datasets. There has been an exponential growth in the amount of computation needed to train the largest models. Therefore, to scale computation and data, these models are inevitably trained in a distributed manner in clusters of nodes, and their updates are aggregated before being applied to the model. However, a distributed setup is prone to Byzantine failures of individual nodes, components, and software. With data augmentation added to these settings, there is a critical need for robust and efficient aggregation systems. We define the quality of workers as reconstruction ratios in (0,1], and formulate aggregation as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure using Beta densities. We show that the Regularized form of log-likelihood wrt subspace can be approximately solved using iterative least squares solver, and provide convergence guarantees using recent Convex Optimization landscape results. Our empirical findings demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the robustness of state-of-the-art Byzantine resilient aggregators. We evaluate our method in a distributed setup with a parameter server, and show simultaneous improvements in communication efficiency and accuracy across various tasks. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/hamidralmasi/FlagAggregator

In this work, we consider an inversion attack on the obfuscated input embeddings sent to a language model on a server, where the adversary has no access to the language model or the obfuscation mechanism and sees only the obfuscated embeddings along with the model's embedding table. We propose BeamClean, an inversion attack that jointly estimates the noise parameters and decodes token sequences by integrating a language-model prior. Against Laplacian and Gaussian obfuscation mechanisms, BeamClean always surpasses naive distance-based attacks. This work highlights the necessity for and robustness of more advanced learned, input-dependent methods.

In this work, we introduce a fast implementation of the minimum-weight perfect matching (MWPM) decoder, the most widely used decoder for several important families of quantum error correcting codes, including surface codes. Our algorithm, which we call sparse blossom, is a variant of the blossom algorithm which directly solves the decoding problem relevant to quantum error correction. Sparse blossom avoids the need for all-to-all Dijkstra searches, common amongst MWPM decoder implementations. For 0.1% circuit-level depolarising noise, sparse blossom processes syndrome data in both X and Z bases of distance-17 surface code circuits in less than one microsecond per round of syndrome extraction on a single core, which matches the rate at which syndrome data is generated by superconducting quantum computers. Our implementation is open-source, and has been released in version 2 of the PyMatching library.

As Neural Radiance Fields (NeRFs) have emerged as a powerful tool for 3D scene representation and novel view synthesis, protecting their intellectual property (IP) from unauthorized use is becoming increasingly crucial. In this work, we aim to protect the IP of NeRFs by injecting adversarial perturbations that disrupt their unauthorized applications. However, perturbing the 3D geometry of NeRFs can easily deform the underlying scene structure and thus substantially degrade the rendering quality, which has led existing attempts to avoid geometric perturbations or restrict them to explicit spaces like meshes. To overcome this limitation, we introduce a learnable sensitivity to quantify the spatially varying impact of geometric perturbations on rendering quality. Building upon this, we propose AegisRF, a novel framework that consists of a Perturbation Field, which injects adversarial perturbations into the pre-rendering outputs (color and volume density) of NeRF models to fool an unauthorized downstream target model, and a Sensitivity Field, which learns the sensitivity to adaptively constrain geometric perturbations, preserving rendering quality while disrupting unauthorized use. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate the generalized applicability of AegisRF across diverse downstream tasks and modalities, including multi-view image classification and voxel-based 3D localization, while maintaining high visual fidelity. Codes are available at https://github.com/wkim97/AegisRF.

During reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), large language models (LLMs) can exploit loopholes in their environments to obtain high rewards without improving the intended capabilities, i.e., reward hacking. Despite its risks to training efficiency and safety, monitoring and mitigating reward hacking during training remain challenging, which is limited by a lack of testbeds that reproduce hacking and reliably identify it. We introduce CATCH, a controllable testbed for studying reward hacking in coding RL. CATCH deliberately exposes environmental loopholes and provides execution-based gold labels by comparing success under a vulnerable evaluator with task correctness under an independent audit. It also can control the model's initial hacking tendency through supervised fine-tuning data mixtures and the difficulty of earning rewards through reward designing, enabling systematic comparisons of hacking dynamics and interventions. Experiments show that CATCH can produce diverse RL training trajectories with clear reward hacking, and analyses demonstrate that both initial models and reward difficulties shape the emergence of reward hacking. We further evaluate the effectiveness of different reward hacking detection and mitigation methods. A key finding is that a chain-of-thought monitor initially suppresses hacking, but this protection erodes as the policy model learn to mislead the monitor with code comments. This highlights the need to evaluate hacking mitigations throughout training with CATCH. The source code and resources are publicly released at https://github.com/THUAIS-Lab/CATCH.

Traditional ethical hacking relies on skilled professionals and time-intensive command management, which limits its scalability and efficiency. To address these challenges, we introduce PenTest++, an AI-augmented system that integrates automation with generative AI (GenAI) to optimise ethical hacking workflows. Developed in a controlled virtual environment, PenTest++ streamlines critical penetration testing tasks, including reconnaissance, scanning, enumeration, exploitation, and documentation, while maintaining a modular and adaptable design. The system balances automation with human oversight, ensuring informed decision-making at key stages, and offers significant benefits such as enhanced efficiency, scalability, and adaptability. However, it also raises ethical considerations, including privacy concerns and the risks of AI-generated inaccuracies (hallucinations). This research underscores the potential of AI-driven systems like PenTest++ to complement human expertise in cybersecurity by automating routine tasks, enabling professionals to focus on strategic decision-making. By incorporating robust ethical safeguards and promoting ongoing refinement, PenTest++ demonstrates how AI can be responsibly harnessed to address operational and ethical challenges in the evolving cybersecurity landscape.

AI coding assistants are widely used for tasks like code generation. These tools now require large and complex contexts, automatically sourced from various originsx2014across files, projects, and contributorsx2014forming part of the prompt fed to underlying LLMs. This automatic context-gathering introduces new vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to subtly poison input to compromise the assistant's outputs, potentially generating vulnerable code or introducing critical errors. We propose a novel attack, Cross-Origin Context Poisoning (XOXO), that is challenging to detect as it relies on adversarial code modifications that are semantically equivalent. Traditional program analysis techniques struggle to identify these perturbations since the semantics of the code remains correct, making it appear legitimate. This allows attackers to manipulate coding assistants into producing incorrect outputs, while shifting the blame to the victim developer. We introduce a novel, task-agnostic, black-box attack algorithm GCGS that systematically searches the transformation space using a Cayley Graph, achieving a 75.72% attack success rate on average across five tasks and eleven models, including GPT 4.1 and Claude 3.5 Sonnet v2 used by popular AI coding assistants. Furthermore, defenses like adversarial fine-tuning are ineffective against our attack, underscoring the need for new security measures in LLM-powered coding tools.

Recent advances in diffusion models have significantly enhanced their ability to generate high-quality images and videos, but they have also increased the risk of producing unsafe content. Existing unlearning/editing-based methods for safe generation remove harmful concepts from models but face several challenges: (1) They cannot instantly remove harmful concepts without training. (2) Their safe generation capabilities depend on collected training data. (3) They alter model weights, risking degradation in quality for content unrelated to toxic concepts. To address these, we propose SAFREE, a novel, training-free approach for safe T2I and T2V, that does not alter the model's weights. Specifically, we detect a subspace corresponding to a set of toxic concepts in the text embedding space and steer prompt embeddings away from this subspace, thereby filtering out harmful content while preserving intended semantics. To balance the trade-off between filtering toxicity and preserving safe concepts, SAFREE incorporates a novel self-validating filtering mechanism that dynamically adjusts the denoising steps when applying the filtered embeddings. Additionally, we incorporate adaptive re-attention mechanisms within the diffusion latent space to selectively diminish the influence of features related to toxic concepts at the pixel level. In the end, SAFREE ensures coherent safety checking, preserving the fidelity, quality, and safety of the output. SAFREE achieves SOTA performance in suppressing unsafe content in T2I generation compared to training-free baselines and effectively filters targeted concepts while maintaining high-quality images. It also shows competitive results against training-based methods. We extend SAFREE to various T2I backbones and T2V tasks, showcasing its flexibility and generalization. SAFREE provides a robust and adaptable safeguard for ensuring safe visual generation.