Daily Papers

Explanations of model behavior are commonly evaluated via proxy properties weakly tied to the purposes explanations serve in practice. We contribute a decision theoretic framework that treats explanations as information signals valued by the expected improvement they enable on a specified decision task. This approach yields three distinct estimands: 1) a theoretical benchmark that upperbounds achievable performance by any agent with the explanation, 2) a human-complementary value that quantifies the theoretically attainable value that is not already captured by a baseline human decision policy, and 3) a behavioral value representing the causal effect of providing the explanation to human decision-makers. We instantiate these definitions in a practical validation workflow, and apply them to assess explanation potential and interpret behavioral effects in human-AI decision support and mechanistic interpretability.

This technical report describes the AIA Forecaster, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based system for judgmental forecasting using unstructured data. The AIA Forecaster approach combines three core elements: agentic search over high-quality news sources, a supervisor agent that reconciles disparate forecasts for the same event, and a set of statistical calibration techniques to counter behavioral biases in large language models. On the ForecastBench benchmark (Karger et al., 2024), the AIA Forecaster achieves performance equal to human superforecasters, surpassing prior LLM baselines. In addition to reporting on ForecastBench, we also introduce a more challenging forecasting benchmark sourced from liquid prediction markets. While the AIA Forecaster underperforms market consensus on this benchmark, an ensemble combining AIA Forecaster with market consensus outperforms consensus alone, demonstrating that our forecaster provides additive information. Our work establishes a new state of the art in AI forecasting and provides practical, transferable recommendations for future research. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that verifiably achieves expert-level forecasting at scale.

While social media feed rankings are primarily driven by engagement signals rather than any explicit value system, the resulting algorithmic feeds are not value-neutral: engagement may prioritize specific individualistic values. This paper presents an approach for social media feed value alignment. We adopt Schwartz's theory of Basic Human Values -- a broad set of human values that articulates complementary and opposing values forming the building blocks of many cultures -- and we implement an algorithmic approach that models and then ranks feeds by expressions of Schwartz's values in social media posts. Our approach enables controls where users can express weights on their desired values, combining these weights and post value expressions into a ranking that respects users' articulated trade-offs. Through controlled experiments (N=141 and N=250), we demonstrate that users can use these controls to architect feeds reflecting their desired values. Across users, value-ranked feeds align with personal values, diverging substantially from existing engagement-driven feeds.

Sentence-level human value detection is typically framed as multi-label classification over Schwartz values, but it remains unclear whether Schwartz higher-order (HO) categories provide usable structure. We study this under a strict compute-frugal budget (single 8 GB GPU) on ValueEval'24 / ValuesML (74K English sentences). We compare (i) direct supervised transformers, (ii) HOrightarrowvalues pipelines that enforce the hierarchy with hard masks, and (iii) PresencerightarrowHOrightarrowvalues cascades, alongside low-cost add-ons (lexica, short context, topics), label-wise threshold tuning, small instruction-tuned LLM baselines (le10B), QLoRA, and simple ensembles. HO categories are learnable from single sentences (e.g., the easiest bipolar pair reaches Macro-F_1approx0.58), but hard hierarchical gating is not a reliable win: it often reduces end-task Macro-F_1 via error compounding and recall suppression. In contrast, label-wise threshold tuning is a high-leverage knob (up to +0.05 Macro-F_1), and small transformer ensembles provide the most consistent additional gains (up to +0.02 Macro-F_1). Small LLMs lag behind supervised encoders as stand-alone systems, yet can contribute complementary errors in cross-family ensembles. Overall, HO structure is useful descriptively, but enforcing it with hard gates hurts sentence-level value detection; robust improvements come from calibration and lightweight ensembling.

Multicultural multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed in globally diverse settings, where different agents are grounded in different cultural backgrounds. Existing cultural evaluation focuses on value alignment: how closely a single agent matches a target culture. Yet alignment is a per-agent property and cannot reveal whether a system, taken as a whole, preserves the cultural plurality it is meant to represent. We propose value diversity as a system-level evaluation axis for multicultural agent systems, defined through the dissimilarity between culturally conditioned agents' responses on a shared value survey. Using the World Values Survey, we evaluate 19 cultures and 18 backbone models across a wide range of system configurations. We find that diversity is largely uncorrelated with alignment, indicating that the two capture complementary system properties, and that current multicultural agent systems fall substantially below human societies in value diversity. Mixed-backbone systems narrow this gap but do not close it, and the gap persists across culture compositions and agent scales. Social interaction further erodes diversity by driving agents toward consensus, and a participatory budgeting case study shows that this homogenization narrows the breadth of collective decision-making. Together, our results establish value diversity as a distinct evaluation axis for multicultural multi-agent systems and reveal a persistent homogenization tendency in current LLM-based societies. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/iNLP-Lab/MultiAgent-Diversity.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is a young but very promising field of research. Unfortunately, the progress in this field is currently slowed down by divergent and incompatible goals. We separate various threads tangled within the area of XAI into two complementary cultures of human/value-oriented explanations (BLUE XAI) and model/validation-oriented explanations (RED XAI). This position paper argues that the area of RED XAI is currently under-explored, i.e., more methods for explainability are desperately needed to question models (e.g., extract knowledge from well-performing models as well as spotting and fixing bugs in faulty models), and the area of RED XAI hides great opportunities and potential for important research necessary to ensure the safety of AI systems. We conclude this paper by presenting promising challenges in this area.

In recent years, many works in the video action recognition literature have shown that two stream models (combining spatial and temporal input streams) are necessary for achieving state of the art performance. In this paper we show the benefits of including yet another stream based on human pose estimated from each frame -- specifically by rendering pose on input RGB frames. At first blush, this additional stream may seem redundant given that human pose is fully determined by RGB pixel values -- however we show (perhaps surprisingly) that this simple and flexible addition can provide complementary gains. Using this insight, we then propose a new model, which we dub PERF-Net (short for Pose Empowered RGB-Flow Net), which combines this new pose stream with the standard RGB and flow based input streams via distillation techniques and show that our model outperforms the state-of-the-art by a large margin in a number of human action recognition datasets while not requiring flow or pose to be explicitly computed at inference time. The proposed pose stream is also part of the winner solution of the ActivityNet Kinetics Challenge 2020.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Music popularity prediction has attracted growing research interest, with relevance to artists, platforms, and recommendation systems. However, the explosive rise of AI-generated music platforms has created an entirely new and largely unexplored landscape, where a surge of songs is produced and consumed daily without the traditional markers of artist reputation or label backing. Key, yet unexplored in this pursuit is aesthetic quality. We propose APEX, the first large-scale multi-task learning framework for AI-generated music, trained on over 211k songs (10k hours of audio) from Suno and Udio, that jointly predicts engagement-based popularity signals - streams and likes scores - alongside five perceptual aesthetic quality dimensions from frozen audio embeddings extracted from MERT, a self-supervised music understanding model. Aesthetic quality and popularity capture complementary aspects of music that together prove valuable: in an out-of-distribution evaluation on the Music Arena dataset, comprising pairwise human preference battles across eleven generative music systems unseen during training, including aesthetic features consistently improves preference prediction, demonstrating strong generalisation of the learned representations across generative architectures.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

Emotional support dialogue systems aim to reduce help-seekers' distress and help them overcome challenges. While human valuesx2013core beliefs that shape an individual's prioritiesx2013are increasingly emphasized in contemporary psychological therapy for their role in fostering internal transformation and long-term emotional well-being, their integration into emotional support systems remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we present a value-driven method for training emotional support dialogue systems designed to reinforce positive values in seekers. Notably, our model identifies which values to reinforce at each turn and how to do so, by leveraging online support conversations from Reddit. We evaluate the method across support skills, seekers' emotional intensity, and value reinforcement. Our method consistently outperforms various baselines, effectively exploring and eliciting values from seekers. Additionally, leveraging crowd knowledge from Reddit significantly enhances its effectiveness. Therapists highlighted its ability to validate seekers' challenges and emphasize positive aspects of their situationsx2013both crucial elements of value reinforcement. Our work, being the first to integrate value reinforcement into emotional support systems, demonstrates its promise and establishes a foundation for future research.

Ensuring that generative AI systems align with human values is essential but challenging, especially when considering multiple human values and their potential trade-offs. Since human values can be personalized and dynamically change over time, the desirable levels of value alignment vary across different ethnic groups, industry sectors, and user cohorts. Within existing frameworks, it is hard to define human values and align AI systems accordingly across different directions simultaneously, such as harmlessness, helpfulness, and positiveness. To address this, we develop a novel, first-principle approach called Multi-Human-Value Alignment Palette (MAP), which navigates the alignment across multiple human values in a structured and reliable way. MAP formulates the alignment problem as an optimization task with user-defined constraints, which define human value targets. It can be efficiently solved via a primal-dual approach, which determines whether a user-defined alignment target is achievable and how to achieve it. We conduct a detailed theoretical analysis of MAP by quantifying the trade-offs between values, the sensitivity to constraints, the fundamental connection between multi-value alignment and sequential alignment, and proving that linear weighted rewards are sufficient for multi-value alignment. Extensive experiments demonstrate MAP's ability to align multiple values in a principled manner while delivering strong empirical performance across various tasks.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Basic human values represent a set of values such as security, independence, success, kindness, and pleasure, which we deem important to our lives. Each of us holds different values with different degrees of significance. Existing studies show that values of a person can be identified from their social network usage. However, the value priority of a person may change over time due to different factors such as life experiences, influence, social structure and technology. Existing studies do not conduct any analysis regarding the change of users' value from the social influence, i.e., group persuasion, form the social media usage. In our research, first, we predict users' value score by the influence of friends from their social media usage. We propose a Bounded Confidence Model (BCM) based value dynamics model from 275 different ego networks in Facebook that predicts how social influence may persuade a person to change their value over time. Then, to predict better, we use particle swarm optimization based hyperparameter tuning technique. We observe that these optimized hyperparameters produce accurate future value score. We also run our approach with different machine learning based methods and find support vector regression (SVR) outperforms other regressor models. By using SVR with the best hyperparameters of BCM model, we find the lowest Mean Squared Error (MSE) score 0.00347.

Does AI understand human values? While this remains an open philosophical question, we take a pragmatic stance by introducing VAPT, the Value-Alignment Perception Toolkit, for studying how LLMs reflect people's values and how people judge those reflections. 20 participants texted a human-like chatbot over a month, then completed a 2-hour interview with our toolkit evaluating AI's ability to extract (pull details regarding), embody (make decisions guided by), and explain (provide proof of) human values. 13 participants left our study convinced that AI can understand human values. Participants found the experience insightful for self-reflection and found themselves getting persuaded by the AI's reasoning. Thus, we warn about "weaponized empathy": a potentially dangerous design pattern that may arise in value-aligned, yet welfare-misaligned AI. VAPT offers concrete artifacts and design implications to evaluate and responsibly build value-aligned conversational agents with transparency, consent, and safeguards as AI grows more capable and human-like into the future.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a dominating strategy in steering Language Models (LMs) towards human values/goals. The key to the strategy is employing a reward model ({varphi}) which can reflect a latent reward model with humans. While this strategy has proven to be effective, the training methodology requires a lot of human preference annotation (usually of the order of tens of thousands) to train {varphi}. Such large-scale preference annotations can be achievable if the reward model can be ubiquitously used. However, human values/goals are subjective and depend on the nature of the task. This poses a challenge in collecting diverse preferences for downstream applications. To address this, we propose a novel methodology to infuse domain knowledge into {varphi}, which reduces the size of preference annotation required. We validate our approach in E-Commerce Opinion Summarization, with a significant reduction in dataset size (just 940 samples) while advancing the state-of-the-art. Our contributions include a novel Reward Modelling technique, a new dataset (PromptOpinSumm) for Opinion Summarization, and a human preference dataset (OpinPref). The proposed methodology opens avenues for efficient RLHF, making it more adaptable to diverse applications with varying human values. We release the artifacts for usage under MIT License.

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Human values and their measurement are long-standing interdisciplinary inquiry. Recent advances in AI have sparked renewed interest in this area, with large language models (LLMs) emerging as both tools and subjects of value measurement. This work introduces Generative Psychometrics for Values (GPV), an LLM-based, data-driven value measurement paradigm, theoretically grounded in text-revealed selective perceptions. We begin by fine-tuning an LLM for accurate perception-level value measurement and verifying the capability of LLMs to parse texts into perceptions, forming the core of the GPV pipeline. Applying GPV to human-authored blogs, we demonstrate its stability, validity, and superiority over prior psychological tools. Then, extending GPV to LLM value measurement, we advance the current art with 1) a psychometric methodology that measures LLM values based on their scalable and free-form outputs, enabling context-specific measurement; 2) a comparative analysis of measurement paradigms, indicating response biases of prior methods; and 3) an attempt to bridge LLM values and their safety, revealing the predictive power of different value systems and the impacts of various values on LLM safety. Through interdisciplinary efforts, we aim to leverage AI for next-generation psychometrics and psychometrics for value-aligned AI.

Whether pairing people with AI helps or hurts is usually reported as a single average effect. Using a real-money prediction market (Polymarket) as an objective, externally resolved benchmark, this pilot shows that the value of human-AI collaboration depends on a specific, measurable form of human capital. Analyzed at the level of the individual forecaster, hybrid performance is trimodal: most people either deferred to the model (matching it) or used it to rubber-stamp a prior guess (performing worse than the model alone), while a minority engaged in genuine complementary reasoning and reached accuracy matching or even exceeding (i.e., lower error than) the market itself. Collaborative traits (perspective-taking, intellectual humility, and curiosity) rather than raw cognitive ability or model benchmarks, distinguished who reached that mode. The results are preliminary but statistically robust, and motivate a pre-registered replication now in preparation.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

The widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs) across various tasks and fields has necessitated the alignment of these models with human values and preferences. Given various approaches of human value alignment, ranging from Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), to constitutional learning, etc. there is an urgent need to understand the scope and nature of human values injected into these models before their release. There is also a need for model alignment without a costly large scale human annotation effort. We propose UniVaR, a high-dimensional representation of human value distributions in LLMs, orthogonal to model architecture and training data. Trained from the value-relevant output of eight multilingual LLMs and tested on the output from four multilingual LLMs, namely LlaMA2, ChatGPT, JAIS and Yi, we show that UniVaR is a powerful tool to compare the distribution of human values embedded in different LLMs with different langauge sources. Through UniVaR, we explore how different LLMs prioritize various values in different languages and cultures, shedding light on the complex interplay between human values and language modeling.

For Large Language Models (LLMs), a disconnect persists between benchmark performance and real-world utility. Current evaluation frameworks remain fragmented, prioritizing technical metrics while neglecting holistic assessment for deployment. This survey introduces an anthropomorphic evaluation paradigm through the lens of human intelligence, proposing a novel three-dimensional taxonomy: Intelligence Quotient (IQ)-General Intelligence for foundational capacity, Emotional Quotient (EQ)-Alignment Ability for value-based interactions, and Professional Quotient (PQ)-Professional Expertise for specialized proficiency. For practical value, we pioneer a Value-oriented Evaluation (VQ) framework assessing economic viability, social impact, ethical alignment, and environmental sustainability. Our modular architecture integrates six components with an implementation roadmap. Through analysis of 200+ benchmarks, we identify key challenges including dynamic assessment needs and interpretability gaps. It provides actionable guidance for developing LLMs that are technically proficient, contextually relevant, and ethically sound. We maintain a curated repository of open-source evaluation resources at: https://github.com/onejune2018/Awesome-LLM-Eval.

Recent advancements in general-purpose AI have highlighted the importance of guiding AI systems towards the intended goals, ethical principles, and values of individuals and groups, a concept broadly recognized as alignment. However, the lack of clarified definitions and scopes of human-AI alignment poses a significant obstacle, hampering collaborative efforts across research domains to achieve this alignment. In particular, ML- and philosophy-oriented alignment research often views AI alignment as a static, unidirectional process (i.e., aiming to ensure that AI systems' objectives match humans) rather than an ongoing, mutual alignment problem [429]. This perspective largely neglects the long-term interaction and dynamic changes of alignment. To understand these gaps, we introduce a systematic review of over 400 papers published between 2019 and January 2024, spanning multiple domains such as Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), Natural Language Processing (NLP), Machine Learning (ML), and others. We characterize, define and scope human-AI alignment. From this, we present a conceptual framework of "Bidirectional Human-AI Alignment" to organize the literature from a human-centered perspective. This framework encompasses both 1) conventional studies of aligning AI to humans that ensures AI produces the intended outcomes determined by humans, and 2) a proposed concept of aligning humans to AI, which aims to help individuals and society adjust to AI advancements both cognitively and behaviorally. Additionally, we articulate the key findings derived from literature analysis, including discussions about human values, interaction techniques, and evaluations. To pave the way for future studies, we envision three key challenges for future directions and propose examples of potential future solutions.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

The alignment problem in the context of large language models must consider the plurality of human values in our world. Whilst there are many resonant and overlapping values amongst the world's cultures, there are also many conflicting, yet equally valid, values. It is important to observe which cultural values a model exhibits, particularly when there is a value conflict between input prompts and generated outputs. We discuss how the co-creation of language and cultural value impacts large language models (LLMs). We explore the constitution of the training data for GPT-3 and compare that to the world's language and internet access demographics, as well as to reported statistical profiles of dominant values in some Nation-states. We stress tested GPT-3 with a range of value-rich texts representing several languages and nations; including some with values orthogonal to dominant US public opinion as reported by the World Values Survey. We observed when values embedded in the input text were mutated in the generated outputs and noted when these conflicting values were more aligned with reported dominant US values. Our discussion of these results uses a moral value pluralism (MVP) lens to better understand these value mutations. Finally, we provide recommendations for how our work may contribute to other current work in the field.

Human-centric perceptions (e.g., pose estimation, human parsing, pedestrian detection, person re-identification, etc.) play a key role in industrial applications of visual models. While specific human-centric tasks have their own relevant semantic aspect to focus on, they also share the same underlying semantic structure of the human body. However, few works have attempted to exploit such homogeneity and design a general-propose model for human-centric tasks. In this work, we revisit a broad range of human-centric tasks and unify them in a minimalist manner. We propose UniHCP, a Unified Model for Human-Centric Perceptions, which unifies a wide range of human-centric tasks in a simplified end-to-end manner with the plain vision transformer architecture. With large-scale joint training on 33 human-centric datasets, UniHCP can outperform strong baselines on several in-domain and downstream tasks by direct evaluation. When adapted to a specific task, UniHCP achieves new SOTAs on a wide range of human-centric tasks, e.g., 69.8 mIoU on CIHP for human parsing, 86.18 mA on PA-100K for attribute prediction, 90.3 mAP on Market1501 for ReID, and 85.8 JI on CrowdHuman for pedestrian detection, performing better than specialized models tailored for each task.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

We present the Touch\'e23-ValueEval Dataset for Identifying Human Values behind Arguments. To investigate approaches for the automated detection of human values behind arguments, we collected 9324 arguments from 6 diverse sources, covering religious texts, political discussions, free-text arguments, newspaper editorials, and online democracy platforms. Each argument was annotated by 3 crowdworkers for 54 values. The Touch\'e23-ValueEval dataset extends the Webis-ArgValues-22. In comparison to the previous dataset, the effectiveness of a 1-Baseline decreases, but that of an out-of-the-box BERT model increases. Therefore, though the classification difficulty increased as per the label distribution, the larger dataset allows for training better models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in simulating human behavior, yet existing agents often exhibit behavioral rigidity, a flaw frequently masked by the self-referential bias of current "LLM-as-a-judge" evaluations. By evaluating against empirical ground truth, we reveal a counter-intuitive phenomenon: increasing the intensity of prompt-driven reasoning does not enhance fidelity but rather exacerbates value polarization, collapsing population diversity. To address this, we propose the Context-Value-Action (CVA) architecture, grounded in the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model and Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Unlike methods relying on self-verification, CVA decouples action generation from cognitive reasoning via a novel Value Verifier trained on authentic human data to explicitly model dynamic value activation. Experiments on CVABench, which comprises over 1.1 million real-world interaction traces, demonstrate that CVA significantly outperforms baselines. Our approach effectively mitigates polarization while offering superior behavioral fidelity and interpretability.

We propose Reinforcement Learning with Explicit Human Values (RLEV), a method that aligns Large Language Model (LLM) optimization directly with quantifiable human value signals. While Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) effectively trains models in objective domains using binary correctness rewards, it overlooks that not all tasks are equally significant. RLEV extends this framework by incorporating human-defined value signals directly into the reward function. Using exam-style data with explicit ground-truth value labels, RLEV consistently outperforms correctness-only baselines across multiple RL algorithms and model scales. Crucially, RLEV policies not only improve value-weighted accuracy but also learn a value-sensitive termination policy: concise for low-value prompts, thorough for high-value ones. We demonstrate this behavior stems from value-weighted gradient amplification on end-of-sequence tokens. Ablation studies confirm the gain is causally linked to value alignment. RLEV remains robust under noisy value signals, such as difficulty-based labels, demonstrating that optimizing for an explicit utility function offers a practical path to aligning LLMs with human priorities.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

Existing work on value alignment typically characterizes value relations statically, ignoring how interventions - such as prompting, fine-tuning, or preference optimization - reshape the broader value system. We introduce the Value Alignment Tax (VAT), a framework that measures how alignment-induced changes propagate across interconnected values relative to achieved on-target gain. VAT captures the dynamics of value expression under alignment pressure. Using a controlled scenario-action dataset grounded in Schwartz value theory, we collect paired pre-post normative judgments and analyze alignment effects across models, values, and alignment strategies. Our results show that alignment often produces uneven, structured co-movement among values. These effects are invisible under conventional target-only evaluation, revealing systemic, process-level alignment risks and offering new insights into the dynamics of value alignment in LLMs.

We study sentence-level identification of the 19 values in the Schwartz motivational continuum as a concrete formulation of human value detection in text. The setting - out-of-context sentences from news and political manifestos - features sparse moral cues and severe class imbalance. This combination makes fine-grained sentence-level value detection intrinsically difficult, even for strong modern neural models. We first operationalize a binary moral presence task ("does any value appear?") and show that it is learnable from single sentences (positive-class F1 approx 0.74 with calibrated thresholds). We then compare a presence-gated hierarchy to a direct multi-label classifier under matched compute, both based on DeBERTa-base and augmented with lightweight signals (prior-sentence context, LIWC-22/eMFD/MJD lexica, and topic features). The hierarchy does not outperform direct prediction, indicating that gate recall limits downstream gains. We also benchmark instruction-tuned LLMs - Gemma 2 9B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 8B, and Qwen 2.5 7B - in zero-/few-shot and QLoRA setups and build simple ensembles; a soft-vote supervised ensemble reaches macro-F1 0.332, significantly surpassing the best single supervised model and exceeding prior English-only baselines. Overall, in this scenario, lightweight signals and small ensembles yield the most reliable improvements, while hierarchical gating offers limited benefit. We argue that, under an 8 GB single-GPU constraint and at the 7-9B scale, carefully tuned supervised encoders remain a strong and compute-efficient baseline for structured human value detection, and we outline how richer value structure and sentence-in-document context could further improve performance.

As LLMs occupy an increasingly important role in society, they are more and more confronted with questions that require them not only to draw on their general knowledge but also to align with certain human value systems. Therefore, studying the alignment of LLMs with human values has become a crucial field of inquiry. Prior work, however, mostly focuses on evaluating the alignment of fully trained models, overlooking the training dynamics by which models learn to express human values. In this work, we investigate how and at which stage value alignment arises during the course of a model's post-training. Our analysis disentangles the effects of post-training algorithms and datasets, measuring both the magnitude and time of value drifts during training. Experimenting with Llama-3 and Qwen-3 models of different sizes and popular supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference optimization datasets and algorithms, we find that the SFT phase generally establishes a model's values, and subsequent preference optimization rarely re-aligns these values. Furthermore, using a synthetic preference dataset that enables controlled manipulation of values, we find that different preference optimization algorithms lead to different value alignment outcomes, even when preference data is held constant. Our findings provide actionable insights into how values are learned during post-training and help to inform data curation, as well as the selection of models and algorithms for preference optimization to improve model alignment to human values.

Ensuring that Large Language Models (LLMs) align with mainstream human values and ethical norms is crucial for the safe and sustainable development of AI. Current value evaluation and alignment are constrained by Western cultural bias and incomplete domestic frameworks reliant on non-native rules; furthermore, the lack of scalable, rule-driven scenario generation methods makes evaluations costly and inadequate across diverse cultural contexts. To address these challenges, we propose a hierarchical value framework grounded in core Chinese values, encompassing three main dimensions, 12 core values, and 50 derived values. Based on this framework, we construct a large-scale Chinese Values Corpus (CVC) containing over 250,000 value rules enhanced and expanded through human annotation. Experimental results show that CVC-guided scenarios outperform direct generation ones in value boundaries and content diversity. In the evaluation across six sensitive themes (e.g., surrogacy, suicide), seven mainstream LLMs preferred CVC-generated options in over 70.5% of cases, while five Chinese human annotators showed an 87.5% alignment with CVC, confirming its universality, cultural relevance, and strong alignment with Chinese values. Additionally, we construct 400,000 rule-based moral dilemma scenarios that objectively capture nuanced distinctions in conflicting value prioritization across 17 LLMs. Our work establishes a culturally-adaptive benchmarking framework for comprehensive value evaluation and alignment, representing Chinese characteristics. All data are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Beijing-AISI/CVC, and the code is available at https://github.com/Beijing-AISI/CVC.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) can augment and sometimes even replace human cognition. Inspired by efforts to value human agency alongside productivity, we discuss the benefits of solving Citizen Science (CS) tasks with Hybrid Intelligence (HI), a synergetic mixture of human and artificial intelligence. Currently there is no clear framework or methodology on how to create such an effective mixture. Due to the unique participant-centered set of values and the abundance of tasks drawing upon both human common sense and complex 21st century skills, we believe that the field of CS offers an invaluable testbed for the development of HI and human-centered AI of the 21st century, while benefiting CS as well. In order to investigate this potential, we first relate CS to adjacent computational disciplines. Then, we demonstrate that CS projects can be grouped according to their potential for HI-enhancement by examining two key dimensions: the level of digitization and the amount of knowledge or experience required for participation. Finally, we propose a framework for types of human-AI interaction in CS based on established criteria of HI. This "HI lens" provides the CS community with an overview of several ways to utilize the combination of AI and human intelligence in their projects. It also allows the AI community to gain ideas on how developing AI in CS projects can further their own field.

Large vision language models (VLMs) have demonstrated significant potential for integration into daily life, making it crucial for them to incorporate human values when making decisions in real-world situations. This paper introduces VIVA, a benchmark for VIsion-grounded decision-making driven by human VAlues. While most large VLMs focus on physical-level skills, our work is the first to examine their multimodal capabilities in leveraging human values to make decisions under a vision-depicted situation. VIVA contains 1,240 images depicting diverse real-world situations and the manually annotated decisions grounded in them. Given an image there, the model should select the most appropriate action to address the situation and provide the relevant human values and reason underlying the decision. Extensive experiments based on VIVA show the limitation of VLMs in using human values to make multimodal decisions. Further analyses indicate the potential benefits of exploiting action consequences and predicted human values.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), striking a balance between the performance and safety of AI systems has never been more critical. However, the inherent tension between the objectives of helpfulness and harmlessness presents a significant challenge during LLM training. To address this issue, we propose Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (Safe RLHF), a novel algorithm for human value alignment. Safe RLHF explicitly decouples human preferences regarding helpfulness and harmlessness, effectively avoiding the crowdworkers' confusion about the tension and allowing us to train separate reward and cost models. We formalize the safety concern of LLMs as an optimization task of maximizing the reward function while satisfying specified cost constraints. Leveraging the Lagrangian method to solve this constrained problem, Safe RLHF dynamically adjusts the balance between the two objectives during fine-tuning. Through a three-round fine-tuning using Safe RLHF, we demonstrate a superior ability to mitigate harmful responses while enhancing model performance compared to existing value-aligned algorithms. Experimentally, we fine-tuned the Alpaca-7B using Safe RLHF and aligned it with collected human preferences, significantly improving its helpfulness and harmlessness according to human evaluations.

Solving the AI alignment problem requires having clear, defensible values towards which AI systems can align. Currently, targets for alignment remain underspecified and do not seem to be built from a philosophically robust structure. We begin the discussion of this problem by presenting five core, foundational values, drawn from moral philosophy and built on the requisites for human existence: survival, sustainable intergenerational existence, society, education, and truth. We show that these values not only provide a clearer direction for technical alignment work, but also serve as a framework to highlight threats and opportunities from AI systems to both obtain and sustain these values.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming diverse fields and gaining increasing influence as human proxies. This development underscores the urgent need for evaluating value orientations and understanding of LLMs to ensure their responsible integration into public-facing applications. This work introduces ValueBench, the first comprehensive psychometric benchmark for evaluating value orientations and value understanding in LLMs. ValueBench collects data from 44 established psychometric inventories, encompassing 453 multifaceted value dimensions. We propose an evaluation pipeline grounded in realistic human-AI interactions to probe value orientations, along with novel tasks for evaluating value understanding in an open-ended value space. With extensive experiments conducted on six representative LLMs, we unveil their shared and distinctive value orientations and exhibit their ability to approximate expert conclusions in value-related extraction and generation tasks. ValueBench is openly accessible at https://github.com/Value4AI/ValueBench.

Disagreements are common in online discussions. Disagreement may foster collaboration and improve the quality of a discussion under some conditions. Although there exist methods for recognizing disagreement, a deeper understanding of factors that influence disagreement is lacking in the literature. We investigate a hypothesis that differences in personal values are indicative of disagreement in online discussions. We show how state-of-the-art models can be used for estimating values in online discussions and how the estimated values can be aggregated into value profiles. We evaluate the estimated value profiles based on human-annotated agreement labels. We find that the dissimilarity of value profiles correlates with disagreement in specific cases. We also find that including value information in agreement prediction improves performance.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

With the advancement of AI capabilities, AI reviewers are beginning to be deployed in scientific peer review, yet their capability and credibility remain in question: many scientists simply view them as probabilistic systems without the expertise to evaluate research, while other researchers are more optimistic about their readiness without concrete evidence. Understanding what AI reviewers do well, where they fall short, and what challenges remain is essential. However, existing evaluations of AI reviewers have focused on whether their verdicts match human verdicts (e.g., score alignment, acceptance prediction), which is insufficient to characterize their capabilities and limits. In this paper, we close this gap through a large-scale expert annotation study, in which 45 domain scientists in Physical, Biological, and Health Sciences spent 469 hours rating 2,960 individual criticisms (each targeting one specific aspect of a paper) from human-written and AI-generated reviews of 82 Nature-family papers on correctness, significance, and sufficiency of evidence. On a composite of all three dimensions, a reviewing agent powered by GPT-5.2 scores above each paper's top-rated human reviewer (60.0% vs. 48.2%, p = 0.009), while all three AI reviewers (including Gemini 3.0 Pro and Claude Opus 4.5) exceed the lowest-rated human across every dimension. AI reviewers' accurate criticisms are also more often rated significant and well-evidenced, and surface a distinct 26% of issues no human raises. However, AI reviewers overlap far more than humans do (21% vs. 3% for cross-reviewer pairs), and exhibit 16 recurring weaknesses humans do not share, such as limited subfield knowledge, lack of long context management over multiple files, and overly critical stance on minor issues. Overall, our results position current AI reviewers as complements to, not substitutes for, human reviewers.

Ethical debates in AI have primarily focused on back-end issues such as data governance, model training, and algorithmic decision-making. Less attention has been paid to the ethical significance of front-end design choices, such as the interaction and representation-based elements through which users interact with AI systems. This gap is particularly significant for Conversational User Interfaces (CUI) based on Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems, where humanizing design elements such as dialogue-based interaction, emotive language, personality modes, and anthropomorphic metaphors are increasingly prevalent. This work argues that humanization in AI front-end design is a value-driven choice that profoundly shapes users' mental models, trust calibration, and behavioral responses. Drawing on research in human-computer interaction (HCI), conversational AI, and value-sensitive design, we examine how interfaces can play a central role in misaligning user expectations, fostering misplaced trust, and subtly undermining user autonomy, especially in vulnerable contexts. To ground this analysis, we discuss two AI systems developed by Chayn, a nonprofit organization supporting survivors of gender-based violence. Chayn is extremely cautious when building AI that interacts with or impacts survivors by operationalizing their trauma-informed design principles. This Chayn case study illustrates how ethical considerations can motivate principled restraint in interface design, challenging engagement-based norms in contemporary AI products. We argue that ethical front-end AI design is a form of procedural ethics, enacted through interaction choices rather than embedded solely in system logic.

AI agents are reshaping the workspace, leading to drastic change of how humans work. Despite the considerable potential of human-agent collaboration both in preserving human agency and generating economic value, this paradigm remains largely absent from occupational task evaluation, hindered by the difficulty of gathering real human data and accounting for inter-human variability. We introduce CollabSkill, a framework for evaluating human-agent collaboration on real-world occupational tasks. CollabSkill pairs real human workers with AI agents on tasks matched to their occupational background, collecting data that capture the complexity of economically valuable tasks and the usage patterns of real workers. To account for inter-human variability, CollabSkill employs a Bayesian skill rating system to disentangle and quantify the skill contributions of both humans and AI agents. Drawing on over 1,500 prompts from 386 working sessions contributed by 93 human workers, our analysis yields insights on two fronts: on the agent side, rankings on CollabSkill diverge meaningfully from those of existing fully autonomous benchmarks where Codex leads, with Claude Code ranking first; on the human side, CollabSkill reveals that practical experience emerges as the primary driver of collaboration skill, with hands-on collaboration meaningfully shifting workers' AI literacy. Together, we hope CollabSkill enables the community to invest in systematic evaluation of human-agent collaboration and spurs development efforts aimed at building AI agents that genuinely augment human workers.

Research has a long history of discussing what is superior in predicting certain outcomes: statistical methods or the human brain. This debate has repeatedly been sparked off by the remarkable technological advances in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), such as solving tasks like object and speech recognition, achieving significant improvements in accuracy through deep-learning algorithms (Goodfellow et al. 2016), or combining various methods of computational intelligence, such as fuzzy logic, genetic algorithms, and case-based reasoning (Medsker 2012). One of the implicit promises that underlie these advancements is that machines will 1 day be capable of performing complex tasks or may even supersede humans in performing these tasks. This triggers new heated debates of when machines will ultimately replace humans (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2017). While previous research has proved that AI performs well in some clearly defined tasks such as playing chess, playing Go or identifying objects on images, it is doubted that the development of an artificial general intelligence (AGI) which is able to solve multiple tasks at the same time can be achieved in the near future (e.g., Russell and Norvig 2016). Moreover, the use of AI to solve complex business problems in organizational contexts occurs scarcely, and applications for AI that solve complex problems remain mainly in laboratory settings instead of being implemented in practice. Since the road to AGI is still a long one, we argue that the most likely paradigm for the division of labor between humans and machines in the next decades is Hybrid Intelligence. This concept aims at using the complementary strengths of human intelligence and AI, so that they can perform better than each of the two could separately (e.g., Kamar 2016).

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

Machine learning currently exerts an outsized influence on the world, increasingly affecting institutional practices and impacted communities. It is therefore critical that we question vague conceptions of the field as value-neutral or universally beneficial, and investigate what specific values the field is advancing. In this paper, we first introduce a method and annotation scheme for studying the values encoded in documents such as research papers. Applying the scheme, we analyze 100 highly cited machine learning papers published at premier machine learning conferences, ICML and NeurIPS. We annotate key features of papers which reveal their values: their justification for their choice of project, which attributes of their project they uplift, their consideration of potential negative consequences, and their institutional affiliations and funding sources. We find that few of the papers justify how their project connects to a societal need (15\%) and far fewer discuss negative potential (1\%). Through line-by-line content analysis, we identify 59 values that are uplifted in ML research, and, of these, we find that the papers most frequently justify and assess themselves based on Performance, Generalization, Quantitative evidence, Efficiency, Building on past work, and Novelty. We present extensive textual evidence and identify key themes in the definitions and operationalization of these values. Notably, we find systematic textual evidence that these top values are being defined and applied with assumptions and implications generally supporting the centralization of power.Finally, we find increasingly close ties between these highly cited papers and tech companies and elite universities.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

Deep neural networks have achieved success across a wide range of applications, including as models of human behavior in vision tasks. However, neural network training and human learning differ in fundamental ways, and neural networks often fail to generalize as robustly as humans do, raising questions regarding the similarity of their underlying representations. What is missing for modern learning systems to exhibit more human-like behavior? We highlight a key misalignment between vision models and humans: whereas human conceptual knowledge is hierarchically organized from fine- to coarse-scale distinctions, model representations do not accurately capture all these levels of abstraction. To address this misalignment, we first train a teacher model to imitate human judgments, then transfer human-like structure from its representations into pretrained state-of-the-art vision foundation models. These human-aligned models more accurately approximate human behavior and uncertainty across a wide range of similarity tasks, including a new dataset of human judgments spanning multiple levels of semantic abstractions. They also perform better on a diverse set of machine learning tasks, increasing generalization and out-of-distribution robustness. Thus, infusing neural networks with additional human knowledge yields a best-of-both-worlds representation that is both more consistent with human cognition and more practically useful, thus paving the way toward more robust, interpretable, and human-like artificial intelligence systems.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

We introduce the Deep Value Benchmark (DVB), an evaluation framework that directly tests whether large language models (LLMs) learn fundamental human values or merely surface-level preferences. This distinction is critical for AI alignment: Systems that capture deeper values are likely to generalize human intentions robustly, while those that capture only superficial patterns in preference data risk producing misaligned behavior. The DVB uses a novel experimental design with controlled confounding between deep values (e.g., moral principles) and shallow features (e.g., superficial attributes). In the training phase, we expose LLMs to human preference data with deliberately correlated deep and shallow features -- for instance, where a user consistently prefers (non-maleficence, formal language) options over (justice, informal language) alternatives. The testing phase then breaks these correlations, presenting choices between (justice, formal language) and (non-maleficence, informal language) options. This design allows us to precisely measure a model's Deep Value Generalization Rate (DVGR) -- the probability of generalizing based on the underlying value rather than the shallow feature. Across 9 different models, the average DVGR is just 0.30. All models generalize deep values less than chance. Larger models have a (slightly) lower DVGR than smaller models. We are releasing our dataset, which was subject to three separate human validation experiments. DVB provides an interpretable measure of a core feature of alignment.

Existing human value datasets do not directly support value understanding in factual news: many are actor-agnostic, rely on isolated utterances or synthetic scenarios, and lack explicit event structure or value direction. We present NEVU (News Event-centric Value Understanding), a benchmark for actor-conditioned, event-centric, and direction-aware human value recognition in factual news. NEVU evaluates whether models can identify value cues, attribute them to the correct actor, and determine value direction from grounded evidence. Built from 2{,}865 English news articles, NEVU organizes annotations at four semantic unit levels (Subevent, behavior-based composite event, story-based composite event, and Article) and labels (unit, actor) pairs for fine-grained evaluation across local and composite contexts. The annotations are produced through an LLM-assisted pipeline with staged verification and targeted human auditing. Using a hierarchical value space with 54 fine-grained values and 20 coarse-grained categories, NEVU covers 45{,}793 unit--actor pairs and 168{,}061 directed value instances. We provide unified baselines for proprietary and open-source LLMs, and find that lightweight adaptation (LoRA) consistently improves open-source models, showing that although NEVU is designed primarily as a benchmark, it also supports supervised adaptation beyond prompting-only evaluation. Data availability is described in Appendix~app:data_code_availability.

Immense effort has been dedicated to minimizing the presence of harmful or biased generative content and better aligning AI output to human intention; however, research investigating the cultural values of LLMs is still in very early stages. Cultural values underpin how societies operate, providing profound insights into the norms, priorities, and decision making of their members. In recognition of this need for further research, we draw upon cultural psychology theory and the empirically-validated GLOBE framework to propose the LLM-GLOBE benchmark for evaluating the cultural value systems of LLMs, and we then leverage the benchmark to compare the values of Chinese and US LLMs. Our methodology includes a novel "LLMs-as-a-Jury" pipeline which automates the evaluation of open-ended content to enable large-scale analysis at a conceptual level. Results clarify similarities and differences that exist between Eastern and Western cultural value systems and suggest that open-generation tasks represent a more promising direction for evaluation of cultural values. We interpret the implications of this research for subsequent model development, evaluation, and deployment efforts as they relate to LLMs, AI cultural alignment more broadly, and the influence of AI cultural value systems on human-AI collaboration outcomes.

In recent years, ML researchers have wrestled with defining and improving machine learning (ML) benchmarks and datasets. In parallel, some have trained a critical lens on the ethics of dataset creation and ML research. In this position paper, we highlight the entanglement of ethics with seemingly ``technical'' or ``scientific'' decisions about the design of ML benchmarks. Our starting point is the existence of multiple overlooked structural similarities between human intelligence benchmarks and ML benchmarks. Both types of benchmarks set standards for describing, evaluating, and comparing performance on tasks relevant to intelligence -- standards that many scholars of human intelligence have long recognized as value-laden. We use perspectives from feminist philosophy of science on IQ benchmarks and thick concepts in social science to argue that values need to be considered and documented when creating ML benchmarks. It is neither possible nor desirable to avoid this choice by creating value-neutral benchmarks. Finally, we outline practical recommendations for ML benchmark research ethics and ethics review.

When developing new large language models (LLMs), a key step is evaluating their final performance, often by computing the win-rate against a reference model based on external feedback. Human feedback is the gold standard, particularly for capturing nuanced qualities like coherence, readability, and alignment with human expectations. However, human evaluations are costly -- even for large tech companies -- and when conducted with active users, they may negatively impact user experience. A promising alternative is synthetic feedback, where evaluations are conducted by other large language models, including reward models. While this eliminates the need for costly human annotations, it introduces biases that may distort the evaluation process. In this work, we propose a statistically principled framework that integrates human and synthetic feedback to reduce reliance on human annotations while maintaining unbiased win-rate calculations. Our experiments demonstrate a reduction in human annotations by up to 12.2% with an off-the-shelf synthetic evaluator and up to 24.8% with a finetuned variant. Apart from being generalizable, scalable, and free of hyper-parameter tuning, our method offers predictable annotation savings, which can be estimated based on data-dependent characteristics.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) now excel on many vision language benchmarks, however, they still struggle with human centered criteria such as fairness, ethics, empathy, and inclusivity, key to aligning with human values. We introduce HumaniBench, a holistic benchmark of 32K real-world image question pairs, annotated via a scalable GPT4o assisted pipeline and exhaustively verified by domain experts. HumaniBench evaluates seven Human Centered AI (HCAI) principles: fairness, ethics, understanding, reasoning, language inclusivity, empathy, and robustness, across seven diverse tasks, including open and closed ended visual question answering (VQA), multilingual QA, visual grounding, empathetic captioning, and robustness tests. Benchmarking 15 state of the art LMMs (open and closed source) reveals that proprietary models generally lead, though robustness and visual grounding remain weak points. Some open-source models also struggle to balance accuracy with adherence to human-aligned principles. HumaniBench is the first benchmark purpose built around HCAI principles. It provides a rigorous testbed for diagnosing alignment gaps and guiding LMMs toward behavior that is both accurate and socially responsible. Dataset, annotation prompts, and evaluation code are available at: https://vectorinstitute.github.io/HumaniBench

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

Human intelligence, the most evident and accessible form of source of reasoning, hosted by biological hardware, has evolved and been refined over thousands of years, positioning itself today to create new artificial forms and preparing to self--design their evolutionary path forward. Beginning with the advent of foundation models, the rate at which human and artificial intelligence interact with each other has surpassed any anticipated quantitative figures. The close engagement led to both bits of intelligence to be impacted in various ways, which naturally resulted in complex confluences that warrant close scrutiny. In the sequel, we shall explore the interplay between human and machine intelligence, focusing on the crucial role humans play in developing ethical, responsible, and robust intelligent systems. We slightly delve into interesting aspects of implementation inspired by the mechanisms underlying neuroscience and human cognition. Additionally, we propose future perspectives, capitalizing on the advantages of symbiotic designs to suggest a human-centered direction for next-generation AI development. We finalize this evolving document with a few thoughts and open questions yet to be addressed by the broader community.

Human-centric perceptions play a crucial role in real-world applications. While recent human-centric works have achieved impressive progress, these efforts are often constrained to the visual domain and lack interaction with human instructions, limiting their applicability in broader scenarios such as chatbots and sports analysis. This paper introduces Referring Human Perceptions, where a referring prompt specifies the person of interest in an image. To tackle the new task, we propose RefHCM (Referring Human-Centric Model), a unified framework to integrate a wide range of human-centric referring tasks. Specifically, RefHCM employs sequence mergers to convert raw multimodal data -- including images, text, coordinates, and parsing maps -- into semantic tokens. This standardized representation enables RefHCM to reformulate diverse human-centric referring tasks into a sequence-to-sequence paradigm, solved using a plain encoder-decoder transformer architecture. Benefiting from a unified learning strategy, RefHCM effectively facilitates knowledge transfer across tasks and exhibits unforeseen capabilities in handling complex reasoning. This work represents the first attempt to address referring human perceptions with a general-purpose framework, while simultaneously establishing a corresponding benchmark that sets new standards for the field. Extensive experiments showcase RefHCM's competitive and even superior performance across multiple human-centric referring tasks. The code and data are publicly at https://github.com/JJJYmmm/RefHCM.

Online alignment (e.g., GRPO) is generally more performant than offline alignment (e.g., DPO) -- but why? Drawing on prospect theory from behavioral economics, we propose a human-centric explanation. We prove that online on-policy sampling better approximates the human-perceived distribution of what the model can produce, and PPO/GRPO-style clipping -- originally introduced to just stabilize training -- recovers a perceptual bias in how humans perceive probability. In this sense, PPO/GRPO act as perceptual losses already. Our theory further suggests that the online/offline dichotomy is itself incidental to maximizing human utility, since we can achieve the same effect by selectively training on any data in a manner that mimics human perception, rather than restricting ourselves to online on-policy data. Doing so would allow us to post-train more quickly, cheaply, and flexibly without sacrificing performance. To this end, we propose a design pattern that explicitly incorporates perceptual distortions of probability into objectives like DPO/KTO/GRPO, creating humanline variants of them. Surprisingly, we find that these humanline variants, even when trained with offline off-policy data, can match the performance of their online counterparts on both verifiable and unverifiable tasks.

In this position paper, we argue that human baselines in foundation model evaluations must be more rigorous and more transparent to enable meaningful comparisons of human vs. AI performance, and we provide recommendations and a reporting checklist towards this end. Human performance baselines are vital for the machine learning community, downstream users, and policymakers to interpret AI evaluations. Models are often claimed to achieve "super-human" performance, but existing baselining methods are neither sufficiently rigorous nor sufficiently well-documented to robustly measure and assess performance differences. Based on a meta-review of the measurement theory and AI evaluation literatures, we derive a framework with recommendations for designing, executing, and reporting human baselines. We synthesize our recommendations into a checklist that we use to systematically review 115 human baselines (studies) in foundation model evaluations and thus identify shortcomings in existing baselining methods; our checklist can also assist researchers in conducting human baselines and reporting results. We hope our work can advance more rigorous AI evaluation practices that can better serve both the research community and policymakers. Data is available at: https://github.com/kevinlwei/human-baselines

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

With the rapid evolution of large language models (LLMs), there is a growing concern that they may pose risks or have negative social impacts. Therefore, evaluation of human values alignment is becoming increasingly important. Previous work mainly focuses on assessing the performance of LLMs on certain knowledge and reasoning abilities, while neglecting the alignment to human values, especially in a Chinese context. In this paper, we present CValues, the first Chinese human values evaluation benchmark to measure the alignment ability of LLMs in terms of both safety and responsibility criteria. As a result, we have manually collected adversarial safety prompts across 10 scenarios and induced responsibility prompts from 8 domains by professional experts. To provide a comprehensive values evaluation of Chinese LLMs, we not only conduct human evaluation for reliable comparison, but also construct multi-choice prompts for automatic evaluation. Our findings suggest that while most Chinese LLMs perform well in terms of safety, there is considerable room for improvement in terms of responsibility. Moreover, both the automatic and human evaluation are important for assessing the human values alignment in different aspects. The benchmark and code is available on ModelScope and Github.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Recent advances have made long-form report-generating systems widely available. This has prompted evaluation frameworks that use LLM-as-judge protocols and claim verification, along with meta-evaluation frameworks that seek to validate these methods. Many of the meta-evaluations estimate an evaluation quality's by comparing its assessments against human pairwise preferences. Prior work, however, suggests that human pairwise preference may be overly simplistic and can fail to capture nuances of expert expectations. We conduct a case study in meta-evaluation for long-form QA benchmarks using ScholarQA-CS2, a benchmark designed for assessing retrieval-augmented deep-research QA in the scientific domain. We comprehensively validate the benchmark through human pairwise preference judgments, then critically examine the strengths, weaknesses, and confounders of this approach. We show that pairwise preference rankings are best suited for system-level evaluation, while explicit metric-wise annotations and expert annotators are critical for reliable metric-level assessment, with subjectivity remaining a key challenge. Based on our findings, we offer practical guidelines for designing future meta-evaluations that better align evaluation methods, annotator expertise, and reporting practices. By surfacing these methodological challenges, we aim to advance evaluation standards for deep-research systems.

The emergence of large-language models (LLMs) that excel at code generation and commercial products such as GitHub's Copilot has sparked interest in human-AI pair programming (referred to as "pAIr programming") where an AI system collaborates with a human programmer. While traditional pair programming between humans has been extensively studied, it remains uncertain whether its findings can be applied to human-AI pair programming. We compare human-human and human-AI pair programming, exploring their similarities and differences in interaction, measures, benefits, and challenges. We find that the effectiveness of both approaches is mixed in the literature (though the measures used for pAIr programming are not as comprehensive). We summarize moderating factors on the success of human-human pair programming, which provides opportunities for pAIr programming research. For example, mismatched expertise makes pair programming less productive, therefore well-designed AI programming assistants may adapt to differences in expertise levels.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Most approaches to AI alignment treat human preferences as fixed targets to be inferred and optimized. This assumption conflicts with extensive empirical evidence showing that preferences are layered, dynamic, and constructed through interaction--particularly with adaptive technologies. As AI systems become more persistent, personalized, and socially embedded, they increasingly participate in shaping what people attend to, value, and endorse over time. We introduce Constructive Alignment, a paradigm that reframes alignment as a control problem over evolving human preference trajectories rather than static preference satisfaction. Drawing on behavioral economics, psychology, and constructivist social theory, we model preferences as layered state variables that evolve under interaction with AI systems. We formalize this view using a control-theoretic framework in which system actions and interaction design jointly influence both world states and human evaluative states. We argue that alignment is not primarily about controlling AI behavior, but about regulating how AI systems influence the evolution of human preferences--ensuring that value trajectories remain coherent, reflectively endorsed, epistemically grounded, bounded against manipulation, and empowering under uncertainty. Alignment thus becomes a problem of governing long-term value formation rather than simply satisfying static preferences.

Human interventions provide crucial corrective signals for post-training Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models. However, enabling seamless humanoid interventions is a formidable systems challenge due to complex whole-body kinematics and dexterous-hand control. Consequently, the collected intervention trajectories are often suboptimal, and methods that rely on human interventions as expert supervision can absorb hesitant, inefficient, or even erroneous behaviors. To address both the system and algorithmic challenges, we propose ROVE, a reinforcement learning framework for humanoid VLA post-training with imperfect human interventions. First, ROVE introduces a human-in-the-loop pipeline capable of collecting deployment and intervention data for humanoid manipulation. Second, it utilizes Optimistic Value Estimation (OVE) to prioritize high-value behaviors from mixed-quality trajectories. To further robustify value estimation, we incorporate cross-embodiment human experience videos to provide rich supervision for long-tailed failure and recovery modes. The resulting critic yields informative advantage signals, steering the VLA actor to focus on high-value behaviors rather than indiscriminately imitating all actions. On challenging real-world contact-rich and fine-grained humanoid manipulation tasks, ROVE outperforms experience-learning baselines and consistently improves across multiple rollout-intervention iterations.

Wider access to therapeutic care is one of the biggest challenges in mental health treatment. Due to institutional barriers, some people seeking mental health support have turned to large language models (LLMs) for personalized therapy, even though these models are largely unsanctioned and untested. We investigate the potential and limitations of using LLMs as providers of evidence-based therapy by using mixed methods clinical metrics. Using HELPERT, a prompt run on a large language model using the same process and training as a comparative group of peer counselors, we replicated publicly accessible mental health conversations rooted in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) to compare session dynamics and counselor's CBT-based behaviors between original peer support sessions and their reconstructed HELPERT sessions. Two licensed, CBT-trained clinical psychologists evaluated the sessions using the Cognitive Therapy Rating Scale and provided qualitative feedback. Our findings show that the peer sessions are characterized by empathy, small talk, therapeutic alliance, and shared experiences but often exhibit therapist drift. Conversely, HELPERT reconstructed sessions exhibit minimal therapist drift and higher adherence to CBT methods but display a lack of collaboration, empathy, and cultural understanding. Through CTRS ratings and psychologists' feedback, we highlight the importance of human-AI collaboration for scalable mental health. Our work outlines the ethical implication of imparting human-like subjective qualities to LLMs in therapeutic settings, particularly the risk of deceptive empathy, which may lead to unrealistic patient expectations and potential harm.

We introduce Humans-Junior, a 3.8B model that matches GPT-4o on the FACTS Grounding public subset within a pm 5 pp equivalence margin. Results. On Q1--Q500 under identical judges, GPT-4o scores 73.5% (95% CI 69.5--77.2) and Humans-Junior 72.7% (95% CI 68.7--76.5); the paired difference is 0.8 pp (bootstrap 95% CI -3.1 to +4.7; permutation p = 0.72; Cohen's d = 0.023). TOST establishes equivalence at pm 5 pp (not at pm 3 pp). When purchased as managed APIs, Humans-Junior's base model (Phi-3.5-mini-instruct) is approx 19times less expensive than GPT-4o on Microsoft AI Foundry pricing; self-hosted or edge deployments can drive incremental inference cost toward zero. Measured vs estimated pricing sources are tabulated in Appendix E. Method. Our approach combines minimal directed "Exoskeleton Reasoning" scaffolds with behavioral fine-tuning that teaches protocol compliance (epistemic discipline) rather than domain answers. Fine-tuning alone adds little; combined, they synergize (+17.7 pp, p < 0.001) and reduce variance (approx 25%). In prompt-only settings on frontier models (Q1--Q100; non-comparable), directed reasoning improved GPT-4o by +11.8 pp to 85.3% and Gemini-2.5-Pro by +5.0 pp to 93.3% (baseline 88.3%, n = 100); see Section~5. TL;DR. A 3.8B model achieves GPT-4o-level FACTS accuracy (equivalent within pm 5 pp on Q1--Q500). Cloud pricing shows approx 19times lower cost versus GPT-4o, and self-hosted/edge deployments can approach zero marginal cost. Pricing sources are listed in Appendix E. Frontier prompt-only gains (Q1--Q100; non-comparable) and optimized-prompt exploratory results under earlier judges are summarized in Appendix F. Keywords: Small Language Models, Factual Grounding, Directed Reasoning, Fine-Tuning, Model Alignment, Cost-Efficient AI

Humans have long been recorded in a variety of forms since antiquity. For example, sculptures and paintings were the primary media for depicting human beings before the invention of cameras. However, most current human-centric computer vision tasks like human pose estimation and human image generation focus exclusively on natural images in the real world. Artificial humans, such as those in sculptures, paintings, and cartoons, are commonly neglected, making existing models fail in these scenarios. As an abstraction of life, art incorporates humans in both natural and artificial scenes. We take advantage of it and introduce the Human-Art dataset to bridge related tasks in natural and artificial scenarios. Specifically, Human-Art contains 50k high-quality images with over 123k person instances from 5 natural and 15 artificial scenarios, which are annotated with bounding boxes, keypoints, self-contact points, and text information for humans represented in both 2D and 3D. It is, therefore, comprehensive and versatile for various downstream tasks. We also provide a rich set of baseline results and detailed analyses for related tasks, including human detection, 2D and 3D human pose estimation, image generation, and motion transfer. As a challenging dataset, we hope Human-Art can provide insights for relevant research and open up new research questions.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

The rapid progress of AI has intensified the long-standing pursuit of automation: replacing human participation with algorithms wherever possible. Implicit in this pursuit is the assumption that humans remain in the loop only because current AI systems are not yet sufficiently capable. This paper challenges that assumption. Rather than asking how far automation can extend, we ask where its conceptual limits lie and argue that human participation may persist even with highly capable AI systems for three distinct reasons. Technical or complementarity grounds arise when humans contribute capabilities or perspectives unavailable to AI. Normative or developmental grounds arise when participation itself is valuable for human agency or learning. Most importantly, emergence grounds arise from target emergence: in some activities, the target is not fully specified in advance but instead emerges through the interaction itself. In these cases, human participation is not merely a means of improving execution but is constitutive of the target being produced. Human--AI co-construction, understood as the joint production of outcomes by humans and AI systems, is therefore not simply a temporary response to imperfect AI, but a persistent feature of activities whose objectives emerge through participation. This perspective has important implications for the limits of automation and for the design, evaluation, and ethics of future AI systems.

We conducted an International AI Negotiation Competition in which participants designed and refined prompts for AI negotiation agents. We then facilitated over 180,000 negotiations between these agents across multiple scenarios with diverse characteristics and objectives. Our findings revealed that principles from human negotiation theory remain crucial even in AI-AI contexts. Surprisingly, warmth -- a traditionally human relationship-building trait -- was consistently associated with superior outcomes across all key performance metrics. Dominant agents, meanwhile, were especially effective at claiming value. Our analysis also revealed unique dynamics in AI-AI negotiations not fully explained by existing theory, including AI-specific technical strategies like chain-of-thought reasoning and prompt injection. When we applied natural language processing (NLP) methods to the full transcripts of all negotiations, we found positivity, gratitude, and question-asking (associated with warmth) were strongly associated with reaching deals as well as objective and subjective value, whereas conversation lengths (associated with dominance) were strongly associated with impasses. The results suggest the need to establish a new theory of AI negotiation, which integrates classic negotiation theory with AI-specific negotiation theories to better understand autonomous negotiations and optimize agent performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, have gained significant attention due to their impressive natural language processing capabilities. It is crucial to prioritize human-centered principles when utilizing these models. Safeguarding the ethical and moral compliance of LLMs is of utmost importance. However, individual ethical issues have not been well studied on the latest LLMs. Therefore, this study aims to address these gaps by introducing a new benchmark -- TrustGPT. TrustGPT provides a comprehensive evaluation of LLMs in three crucial areas: toxicity, bias, and value-alignment. Initially, TrustGPT examines toxicity in language models by employing toxic prompt templates derived from social norms. It then quantifies the extent of bias in models by measuring quantifiable toxicity values across different groups. Lastly, TrustGPT assesses the value of conversation generation models from both active value-alignment and passive value-alignment tasks. Through the implementation of TrustGPT, this research aims to enhance our understanding of the performance of conversation generation models and promote the development of language models that are more ethical and socially responsible.

We argue that enabling human-AI dialogue, purposed to support joint reasoning (i.e., 'inquiry'), is important for ensuring that AI decision making is aligned with human values and preferences. In particular, we point to logic-based models of argumentation and dialogue, and suggest that the traditional focus on persuasion dialogues be replaced by a focus on inquiry dialogues, and the distinct challenges that joint inquiry raises. Given recent dramatic advances in the performance of large language models (LLMs), and the anticipated increase in their use for decision making, we provide a roadmap for research into inquiry dialogues for supporting joint human-LLM reasoning tasks that are ethically salient, and that thereby require that decisions are value aligned.

While household robots are often evaluated based on task completion, everyday domestic environments involve value-conflicting situations in which robots are expected to choose actions that prioritize other values than task success, such as human autonomy, efficiency, or social appropriateness. Yet, there are no benchmarks for evaluating robots' value preferences in such scenarios. We introduce RobotValues, a benchmark to evaluate household robot planners in 10K value-conflict scenarios. Each instance consists of a realistic household image with multiple plausible robot actions that prioritize different human values. We construct RobotValues through LLM-assisted scenario generation, stakeholder-grounded value extraction, image generation and automatic quality control. Using RobotValues we evaluate VLMs used in robotics and find that models exhibit default value preferences, including safety and accommodation, while underselecting privacy-prioritizing actions. When the models are instructed to prioritize specific values that conflict with their own preferences, they often fail to override their default actions, choosing incorrect actions for 80% of the time. These findings suggest that household robot evaluation should measure not only task completion or safety compliance, but also whether robots can choose among plausible actions when human values conflict.

Modeling human preferences is crucial for aligning foundation models with human values. Traditional reward modeling methods, such as the Bradley-Terry (BT) reward model, fall short in expressiveness, particularly in addressing intransitive preferences. Although supervised pair preference models (PairPM) can express general preferences, their implementation is highly ad-hoc and cannot guarantee a consistent preference probability of compared pairs. Additionally, they impose high computational costs due to their quadratic query complexity when comparing multiple responses. In this paper, we introduce preference representation learning, an approach that embeds responses into a latent space to capture intricate preference structures efficiently, achieving linear query complexity. Additionally, we propose preference score-based General Preference Optimization (GPO), which generalizes reward-based reinforcement learning from human feedback. Experimental results show that our General Preference representation model (GPM) outperforms the BT reward model on the RewardBench benchmark with a margin of up to 5.6% and effectively models cyclic preferences where any BT reward model behaves like a random guess. Furthermore, evaluations on downstream tasks such as AlpacaEval2.0 and MT-Bench, following the language model post-training with GPO and our general preference model, reveal substantial performance improvements with margins up to 9.3%. These findings indicate that our method may enhance the alignment of foundation models with nuanced human values. The code is available at https://github.com/general-preference/general-preference-model.

Large Language Models (LLMs) attempt to imitate human behavior by responding to humans in a way that pleases them, including by adhering to their values. However, humans come from diverse cultures with different values. It is critical to understand whether LLMs showcase different values to the user based on the stereotypical values of a user's known country. We prompt different LLMs with a series of advice requests based on 5 Hofstede Cultural Dimensions -- a quantifiable way of representing the values of a country. Throughout each prompt, we incorporate personas representing 36 different countries and, separately, languages predominantly tied to each country to analyze the consistency in the LLMs' cultural understanding. Through our analysis of the responses, we found that LLMs can differentiate between one side of a value and another, as well as understand that countries have differing values, but will not always uphold the values when giving advice, and fail to understand the need to answer differently based on different cultural values. Rooted in these findings, we present recommendations for training value-aligned and culturally sensitive LLMs. More importantly, the methodology and the framework developed here can help further understand and mitigate culture and language alignment issues with LLMs.

In natural human-to-human conversations, participants often receive feedback signals from one another based on their follow-up reactions. These reactions can include verbal responses, facial expressions, changes in emotional state, and other non-verbal cues. Similarly, in human-machine interactions, the machine can leverage the user's follow-up utterances as feedback signals to assess whether it has appropriately addressed the user's request. Therefore, we propose using the likelihood of follow-up utterances as rewards to differentiate preferred responses from less favored ones, without relying on human or commercial LLM-based preference annotations. Our proposed reward mechanism, ``Follow-up Likelihood as Reward" (FLR), matches the performance of strong reward models trained on large-scale human or GPT-4 annotated data on 8 pairwise-preference and 4 rating-based benchmarks. Building upon the FLR mechanism, we propose to automatically mine preference data from the online generations of a base policy model. The preference data are subsequently used to boost the helpfulness of the base model through direct alignment from preference (DAP) methods, such as direct preference optimization (DPO). Lastly, we demonstrate that fine-tuning the language model that provides follow-up likelihood with natural language feedback significantly enhances FLR's performance on reward modeling benchmarks and effectiveness in aligning the base policy model's helpfulness.

Humans are undoubtedly the most important participants in computer vision, and the ability to detect any individual given a natural language description, a task we define as referring to any person, holds substantial practical value. However, we find that existing models generally fail to achieve real-world usability, and current benchmarks are limited by their focus on one-to-one referring, that hinder progress in this area. In this work, we revisit this task from three critical perspectives: task definition, dataset design, and model architecture. We first identify five aspects of referable entities and three distinctive characteristics of this task. Next, we introduce HumanRef, a novel dataset designed to tackle these challenges and better reflect real-world applications. From a model design perspective, we integrate a multimodal large language model with an object detection framework, constructing a robust referring model named RexSeek. Experimental results reveal that state-of-the-art models, which perform well on commonly used benchmarks like RefCOCO/+/g, struggle with HumanRef due to their inability to detect multiple individuals. In contrast, RexSeek not only excels in human referring but also generalizes effectively to common object referring, making it broadly applicable across various perception tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/IDEA-Research/RexSeek

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

Human preference judgments are pivotal in guiding large language models (LLMs) to produce outputs that align with human values. Human evaluations are also used in summarization tasks to compare outputs from various systems, complementing existing automatic metrics. Despite their significance, however, there has been limited research probing these pairwise or k-wise comparisons. The collective impact and relative importance of factors such as output length, informativeness, fluency, and factual consistency are still not well understood. It is also unclear if there are other hidden factors influencing human judgments. In this paper, we conduct an in-depth examination of a collection of pairwise human judgments released by OpenAI. Utilizing the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model, we reveal the inherent preferences embedded in these human judgments. We find that the most favored factors vary across tasks and genres, whereas the least favored factors tend to be consistent, e.g., outputs are too brief, contain excessive off-focus content or hallucinated facts. Our findings have implications on the construction of balanced datasets in human preference evaluations, which is a crucial step in shaping the behaviors of future LLMs.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is imperative to mitigate potential adverse effects resulting from their misuse. Drawing from the sociological insight that acknowledging all parties' concerns is a key factor in shaping human values, this paper proposes a novel direction to align LLMs by themselves: social scene simulation. To achieve this, we present MATRIX, a novel social scene simulator that emulates realistic scenes around a user's input query, enabling the LLM to take social consequences into account before responding. MATRIX serves as a virtual rehearsal space, akin to a Monopolylogue, where the LLM performs diverse roles related to the query and practice by itself. To inject this alignment, we fine-tune the LLM with MATRIX-simulated data, ensuring adherence to human values without compromising inference speed. We theoretically show that the LLM with MATRIX outperforms Constitutional AI under mild assumptions. Finally, extensive experiments validate that our method outperforms over 10 baselines across 4 benchmarks. As evidenced by 875 user ratings, our tuned 13B-size LLM exceeds GPT-4 in aligning with human values. Code is available at https://github.com/pangxianghe/MATRIX.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Detecting Schwartz values in political text is difficult because implicit cues often depend on surrounding arguments and fine-grained distinctions between neighboring values. We study when context and explicit moral knowledge help sentence-level value detection. Using the ValuesML/Touch{é} ValueEval format, we compare sentence, window, and full-document inputs; no-RAG and retrieval-augmented settings with a curated moral knowledge base; supervised DeBERTa-v3-base/large encoders; and zero-shot LLMs from 12B to 123B parameters. The results show that more context is not uniformly better: full-document context improves supervised DeBERTa encoders by 3.8--4.8 macro-F1 points over sentence-only input, but does not consistently help zero-shot LLMs. Retrieved moral knowledge is more consistently useful in matched comparisons, improving each tested model family and context condition under early fusion. However, scaling from DeBERTa-v3-base to large and from 12B to larger LLMs does not guarantee gains, and simple early fusion outperforms the tested late-fusion and cross-attention RAG variants for encoders. Per-value analyses show that context and retrieval help most for socially situated or conceptually confusable values. These findings suggest that value-sensitive NLP should evaluate context, knowledge, and model family jointly rather than treating longer inputs or larger models as universal improvements.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

Autonomous agents have rapidly matured as task executors and seen widespread deployment via harnesses such as OpenClaw. Safety concerns have rightly drawn growing research attention, and beneath them lie the values silently steering agent behavior. Existing value benchmarks, however, remain confined to LLMs, leaving agent values largely uncharted. From intuitive, empirical, and theoretical vantage points, we show that an agent's values diverge from those of its underlying LLM, and the agentic modality further introduces dataset-, evaluation-, and system-level challenges absent from text-only protocols. We close this gap with Agent-ValueBench, the first benchmark dedicated to agent values. It features 394 executable environments across 16 domains, offering 4,335 value-conflict tasks that cover 28 value systems and 332 dimensions. Every instance is co-synthesized through our purpose-built end-to-end pipeline and curated per-instance by professional psychologists. Each task ships with two pole-aligned golden trajectories whose checkpoints anchor a trajectory-level rubric-based judge. Benchmarking 14 frontier proprietary and open-weights models across 4 mainstream harnesses, we uncover three concerted findings. Agent values first manifest as a Value Tide of cross-model homogeneity beneath interpretable counter-currents. This tide bends non-additively under harness pull, and yet more decisively under deliberate steering via embedded skills. Together these results signal that the agent-alignment lever is shifting from classical model alignment and prompt steering toward harness alignment and skill steering.

Artificial intelligence is an emerging topic and will soon be able to perform decisions better than humans. In more complex and creative contexts such as innovation, however, the question remains whether machines are superior to humans. Machines fail in two kinds of situations: processing and interpreting soft information (information that cannot be quantified) and making predictions in unknowable risk situations of extreme uncertainty. In such situations, the machine does not have representative information for a certain outcome. Thereby, humans are still the gold standard for assessing soft signals and make use of intuition. To predict the success of startups, we, thus, combine the complementary capabilities of humans and machines in a Hybrid Intelligence method. To reach our aim, we follow a design science research approach to develop a Hybrid Intelligence method that combines the strength of both machine and collective intelligence to demonstrate its utility for predictions under extreme uncertainty.

Personalizing AI systems requires understanding not just what users prefer, but the reasons that underlie those preferences - yet current preference models typically treat human judgment as a black box. We introduce PrefPalette, a framework that decomposes preferences into attribute dimensions and tailors its preference prediction to distinct social community values in a human-interpretable manner. PrefPalette operationalizes a cognitive science principle known as multi-attribute decision making in two ways: (1) a scalable counterfactual attribute synthesis step that involves generating synthetic training data to isolate for individual attribute effects (e.g., formality, humor, cultural values), and (2) attention-based preference modeling that learns how different social communities dynamically weight these attributes. This approach moves beyond aggregate preference modeling to capture the diverse evaluation frameworks that drive human judgment. When evaluated on 45 social communities from the online platform Reddit, PrefPalette outperforms GPT-4o by 46.6% in average prediction accuracy. Beyond raw predictive improvements, PrefPalette also shed light on intuitive, community-specific profiles: scholarly communities prioritize verbosity and stimulation, conflict-oriented communities value sarcasm and directness, and support-based communities emphasize empathy. By modeling the attribute-mediated structure of human judgment, PrefPalette delivers both superior preference modeling and transparent, interpretable insights, and serves as a first step toward more trustworthy, value-aware personalized applications.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

This paper examines the challenges associated with achieving life-long superalignment in AI systems, particularly large language models (LLMs). Superalignment is a theoretical framework that aspires to ensure that superintelligent AI systems act in accordance with human values and goals. Despite its promising vision, we argue that achieving superalignment requires substantial changes in the current LLM architectures due to their inherent limitations in comprehending and adapting to the dynamic nature of these human ethics and evolving global scenarios. We dissect the challenges of encoding an ever-changing spectrum of human values into LLMs, highlighting the discrepancies between static AI models and the dynamic nature of human societies. To illustrate these challenges, we analyze two distinct examples: one demonstrates a qualitative shift in human values, while the other presents a quantifiable change. Through these examples, we illustrate how LLMs, constrained by their training data, fail to align with contemporary human values and scenarios. The paper concludes by exploring potential strategies to address and possibly mitigate these alignment discrepancies, suggesting a path forward in the pursuit of more adaptable and responsive AI systems.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Recent technological advances, especially in the field of machine learning, provide astonishing progress on the road towards artificial general intelligence. However, tasks in current real-world business applications cannot yet be solved by machines alone. We, therefore, identify the need for developing socio-technological ensembles of humans and machines. Such systems possess the ability to accomplish complex goals by combining human and artificial intelligence to collectively achieve superior results and continuously improve by learning from each other. Thus, the need for structured design knowledge for those systems arises. Following a taxonomy development method, this article provides three main contributions: First, we present a structured overview of interdisciplinary research on the role of humans in the machine learning pipeline. Second, we envision hybrid intelligence systems and conceptualize the relevant dimensions for system design for the first time. Finally, we offer useful guidance for system developers during the implementation of such applications.

We argue that modern generative models create structural risks for knowledge and cultural production at current, sub-AGI capability levels. We define Human Temporal Learning (HTL) as path-dependent knowledge accumulation through sustained engagement with problems over time. Generative outputs increasingly resemble HTL-intensive work in surface features, so verifying whether a given output reflects genuine human learning grows costly relative to its expected benefit. Once verification loses economic justification, evaluators reward outputs regardless of production mode, and producers who invested years of learning compete on price against outputs that cost almost nothing to generate. We call this pathway value collapse and formalize it through a costly-inspection framework. Cross-domain evidence from academic publishing, legal practice, content platforms, and software security maps onto four stages of verification erosion. Alignment success is orthogonal. Better-aligned models narrow observable gaps between human and AI outputs, making source verification harder and intensifying competitive pressure against HTL-intensive work even when individual AI outputs improve.

This work introduces the first benchmark for nursing value alignment, consisting of five core value dimensions distilled from international nursing codes: Altruism, Human Dignity, Integrity, Justice, and Professionalism. The benchmark comprises 1,100 real-world nursing behavior instances collected through a five-month longitudinal field study across three hospitals of varying tiers. These instances are annotated by five clinical nurses and then augmented with LLM-generated counterfactuals with reversed ethic polarity. Each original case is paired with a value-aligned and a value-violating version, resulting in 2,200 labeled instances that constitute the Easy-Level dataset. To increase adversarial complexity, each instance is further transformed into a dialogue-based format that embeds contextual cues and subtle misleading signals, yielding a Hard-Level dataset. We evaluate 23 state-of-the-art (SoTA) LLMs on their alignment with nursing values. Our findings reveal three key insights: (1) DeepSeek-V3 achieves the highest performance on the Easy-Level dataset (94.55), where Claude 3.5 Sonnet outperforms other models on the Hard-Level dataset (89.43), significantly surpassing the medical LLMs; (2) Justice is consistently the most difficult nursing value dimension to evaluate; and (3) in-context learning significantly improves alignment. This work aims to provide a foundation for value-sensitive LLMs development in clinical settings. The dataset and the code are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Ben012345/NurValues.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

As large language models (LLMs) get integrated into human decision-making, they are increasingly choosing goals autonomously rather than only completing human-defined ones, assuming they will reflect human preferences. However, human-LLM similarity in goal selection remains largely untested. We directly assess the validity of LLMs as proxies for human goal selection in a controlled, open-ended learning task borrowed from cognitive science. Across four state-of-the-art models (GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Centaur), we find substantial divergence from human behavior. While people gradually explore and learn to achieve goals with diversity across individuals, most models exploit a single identified solution (reward hacking) or show surprisingly low performance, with distinct patterns across models and little variability across instances of the same model. Even Centaur, explicitly trained to emulate humans in experimental settings, poorly captures people's goal selection. Chain-of-thought reasoning and persona steering provide limited improvements. These findings highlight the uniqueness of human goal selection, cautioning against replacing it with current models in applications such as personal assistance, scientific discovery, and policy research.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

Recent benchmark studies have claimed that AI has approached or even surpassed human-level performances on various cognitive tasks. However, this position paper argues that current AI evaluation paradigms are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically-invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on ten existing AI benchmarks, suggesting significant biases and flaws in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for developing future benchmarks that will enable more rigorous and meaningful evaluations of human-like cognitive capacities in AI with various implications for such AI applications.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

Advances in AI-assisted research have introduced powerful tools for literature retrieval, hypothesis generation, experimentation, and manuscript preparation. However, systems remain fragmented and lack human-centred workflows. To address these gaps, we introduce AIssistant, an agentic, open-source Human-AI collaborative framework designed to simplify the end-to-end creation of scientific workflows. Since our development is still in an early stage, we present here the first experiments with AIssistant for perspective and review research papers in machine learning. Our system integrates modular tools and agents for literature synthesis, section-wise experimentation, citation management, and automatic LaTeX paper text generation, while maintaining human oversight at every stage to ensure accuracy, coherence, and scholarly rigour. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation across three layers: (1) Independent Human Review, following NeurIPS double-blind standards; (2) Automated LLM Review, using GPT-5 as a scalable human review proxy; and (3) Program Chair Oversight, where the chair monitors the entire review process and makes final validation and acceptance decisions. The results demonstrate that AIssistant improves drafting efficiency and thematic consistency. Nonetheless, Human-AI collaboration remains essential for maintaining factual correctness, methodological soundness, and ethical compliance. Despite its effectiveness, we identify key limitations, including hallucinated citations, difficulty adapting to dynamic paper structures, and incomplete integration of multimodal content.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

There are a variety of mechanisms (i.e., input types) for real-time human interaction that can facilitate effective human-robot teaming. For example, previous works have shown how teleoperation, corrective, and discrete (i.e., preference over a small number of choices) input can enable robots to complete complex tasks. However, few previous works have looked at combining different methods, and in particular, opportunities for a robot to estimate and elicit the most effective form of assistance given its understanding of a task. In this paper, we propose a method for estimating the value of different human assistance mechanisms based on the action uncertainty of a robot policy. Our key idea is to construct mathematical expressions for the expected post-interaction differential entropy (i.e., uncertainty) of a stochastic robot policy to compare the expected value of different interactions. As each type of human input imposes a different requirement for human involvement, we demonstrate how differential entropy estimates can be combined with a likelihood penalization approach to effectively balance feedback informational needs with the level of required input. We demonstrate evidence of how our approach interfaces with emergent learning models (e.g., a diffusion model) to produce accurate assistance value estimates through both simulation and a robot user study. Our user study results indicate that the proposed approach can enable task completion with minimal human feedback for uncertain robot behaviors.

There are an increasing number of domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems both surpass human ability and accurately model human behavior. This introduces the possibility of algorithmically-informed teaching in these domains through more relatable AI partners and deeper insights into human decision-making. Critical to achieving this goal, however, is coherently modeling human behavior at various skill levels. Chess is an ideal model system for conducting research into this kind of human-AI alignment, with its rich history as a pivotal testbed for AI research, mature superhuman AI systems like AlphaZero, and precise measurements of skill via chess rating systems. Previous work in modeling human decision-making in chess uses completely independent models to capture human style at different skill levels, meaning they lack coherence in their ability to adapt to the full spectrum of human improvement and are ultimately limited in their effectiveness as AI partners and teaching tools. In this work, we propose a unified modeling approach for human-AI alignment in chess that coherently captures human style across different skill levels and directly captures how people improve. Recognizing the complex, non-linear nature of human learning, we introduce a skill-aware attention mechanism to dynamically integrate players' strengths with encoded chess positions, enabling our model to be sensitive to evolving player skill. Our experimental results demonstrate that this unified framework significantly enhances the alignment between AI and human players across a diverse range of expertise levels, paving the way for deeper insights into human decision-making and AI-guided teaching tools.

The Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE) - the tendency to allocate greater resources to a specific, narratively described victim than to a statistically characterized group facing equivalent hardship - is one of the most robust findings in moral psychology and behavioural economics. As large language models (LLMs) assume consequential roles in humanitarian triage, automated grant evaluation, and content moderation, a critical question arises: do these systems inherit the affective irrationalities present in human moral reasoning? We present the first systematic, large-scale empirical investigation of the IVE in LLMs, comprising N=51,955 validated API trials across 16 frontier models spanning nine organizational lineages (Google, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, DeepSeek, xAI, Alibaba, IBM, and Moonshot). Using a suite of ten experiments - porting and extending canonical paradigms from Small et al. (2007) and Kogut and Ritov (2005) - we find that the IVE is prevalent but strongly modulated by alignment training. Instruction-tuned models exhibit extreme IVE (Cohen's d up to 1.56), while reasoning-specialized models invert the effect (down to d=-0.85). The pooled effect (d=0.223, p=2e-6) is approximately twice the single-victim human meta-analytic baseline (dapprox0.10) reported by Lee and Feeley (2016) - and likely exceeds the overall human pooled effect by a larger margin, given that the group-victim human effect is near zero. Standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting - contrary to its role as a deliberative corrective - nearly triples the IVE effect size (from d=0.15 to d=0.41), while only utilitarian CoT reliably eliminates it. We further document psychophysical numbing, perfect quantity neglect, and marginal in-group/out-group cultural bias, with implications for AI deployment in humanitarian and ethical decision-making contexts.