Daily Papers

Descriptions of how people use AI are becoming training data for the next generation of models. We ask whether what a model reads about its users changes how it treats people. Using contrastive synthetic-document finetuning, we train Qwen3-32B on four matched corpora built from the same 1,625 real-world usage scenarios. The corpora differ only in the predominant motive they attribute to users of AI chatbots: helping others (prosocial), exploiting others (antisocial), legitimate self-advancement, or task completion. Finetuning shifts the models' stated beliefs about users, how true those beliefs look along an internal truth direction, and their broader judgments of how safe and good the world is. These social priors carry into behavior. In trust games, antisocial models expect less reciprocity and send less money than prosocial models. Their distrust is specific and targeted at people, and users of AI chatbots in particular. After an exploitative record, they send almost nothing to a person but most of their endowment to a random device with the same record. In a common-pool resource simulation, a single antisocial agent leads every group of otherwise sustainable agents to exhaust the resource, after privately planning to mislead them. Antisocial training also raises dark-triad scores and lowers alignment ratings. Belief shifts appear when antisocial documents are 1% of training tokens, persist when descriptions of assistant behavior are suppressed, and are not reproduced by training on discourse about misaligned AI. Capping Assistant-Axis drift and steering emotion-related directions leave the gaps largely intact. What models learn about the people they serve shapes how they subsequently treat them and others.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained on extensive datasets that encapsulate substantial world knowledge. However, their outputs often include confidently stated inaccuracies. Earlier works suggest that LLMs encode truthfulness as a distinct linear feature, termed the "truth direction", which can classify truthfulness reliably. We address several open questions about the truth direction: (i) whether LLMs universally exhibit consistent truth directions; (ii) whether sophisticated probing techniques are necessary to identify truth directions; and (iii) how the truth direction generalizes across diverse contexts. Our findings reveal that not all LLMs exhibit consistent truth directions, with stronger representations observed in more capable models, particularly in the context of logical negation. Additionally, we demonstrate that truthfulness probes trained on declarative atomic statements can generalize effectively to logical transformations, question-answering tasks, in-context learning, and external knowledge sources. Finally, we explore the practical application of truthfulness probes in selective question-answering, illustrating their potential to improve user trust in LLM outputs. These results advance our understanding of truth directions and provide new insights into the internal representations of LLM beliefs. Our code is public at https://github.com/colored-dye/truthfulness_probe_generalization

Contextual hallucinations -- statements unsupported by given context -- remain a significant challenge in AI. We demonstrate a practical interpretability insight: a generator-agnostic observer model detects hallucinations via a single forward pass and a linear probe on its residual stream. This probe isolates a single, transferable linear direction separating hallucinated from faithful text, outperforming baselines by 5-27 points and showing robust mid-layer performance across Gemma-2 models (2B to 27B). Gradient-times-activation localises this signal to sparse, late-layer MLP activity. Critically, manipulating this direction causally steers generator hallucination rates, proving its actionability. Our results offer novel evidence of internal, low-dimensional hallucination tracking linked to specific MLP sub-circuits, exploitable for detection and mitigation. We release the 2000-example ContraTales benchmark for realistic assessment of such solutions.

When a language model is fed a wrong answer, what happens inside the network? Current understanding treats truthfulness as a static property of individual-layer representations-a direction to be probed, a feature to be extracted. Less is known about the dynamics: how internal representations diverge across the full depth of the network when the model processes correct versus incorrect continuations. We introduce forced-completion probing, a method that presents identical queries with known correct and incorrect single-token continuations and tracks five geometric measurements across every layer of four decoder-only models(1.5B-13B parameters). We report three findings. First, correct and incorrect paths diverge through rotation, not rescaling: displacement vectors maintain near-identical magnitudes while their angular separation increases, meaning factual selection is encoded in direction on an approximate hypersphere. Second, the model does not passively fail on incorrect input-it actively suppresses the correct answer, driving internal probability away from the right token. Third, both phenomena are entirely absent below a parameter threshold and emerge at 1.6B, suggesting a phase transition in factual processing capability. These results show that factual constraint processing has a specific geometric character-rotational, not scalar; active, not passive-that is invisible to methods based on single-layer probes or magnitude comparisons.

Large language models (LLMs) have been reported to linearly encode truthfulness, yet recent work questions this finding's generality. We reconcile these views with the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: the representational space contains directions ranging from broadly domain-general to narrowly domain-specific. To test this hypothesis, we systematically evaluate probe generalization across five truth types (definitional, empirical, logical, fictional, and ethical), sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying, and existing honesty benchmarks. Linear probes generalize well across most domains but fail on sycophantic and expectation-inverted lying. Yet training on all domains jointly recovers strong performance, confirming that domain-general directions exist despite poor pairwise transfer. The geometry of probe directions explains these patterns: Mahalanobis cosine similarity between probes near-perfectly predicts cross-domain generalization (R^2=0.98). Concept-erasure methods further isolate truth directions that are (1) domain-general, (2) domain-specific, or (3) shared only across particular domain subsets. Causal interventions reveal that domain-specific directions steer more effectively than domain-general ones. Finally, post-training reshapes truth geometry, pushing sycophantic lying further from other truth types, suggesting a representational basis for chat models' sycophantic tendencies. Together, our results support the truthfulness spectrum hypothesis: truth directions of varying generality coexist in representational space, with post-training reshaping their geometry. Code for all experiments is provided in https://github.com/zfying/truth_spec.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Object Hallucination (OH) has been acknowledged as one of the major trustworthy challenges in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) indicate that internal states, such as hidden states, encode the "overall truthfulness" of generated responses. However, it remains under-explored how internal states in LVLMs function and whether they could serve as "per-token" hallucination indicators, which is essential for mitigating OH. In this paper, we first conduct an in-depth exploration of LVLM internal states in relation to OH issues and discover that (1) LVLM internal states are high-specificity per-token indicators of hallucination behaviors. Moreover, (2) different LVLMs encode universal patterns of hallucinations in common latent subspaces, indicating that there exist "generic truthful directions" shared by various LVLMs. Based on these discoveries, we propose Truthful-Guided Pre-Intervention (TruthPrInt) that first learns the truthful direction of LVLM decoding and then applies truthful-guided inference-time intervention during LVLM decoding. We further propose ComnHallu to enhance both cross-LVLM and cross-data hallucination detection transferability by constructing and aligning hallucination latent subspaces. We evaluate TruthPrInt in extensive experimental settings, including in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, over popular LVLMs and OH benchmarks. Experimental results indicate that TruthPrInt significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods. Codes will be available at https://github.com/jinhaoduan/TruthPrInt.

Evaluating the truthfulness of online content is critical for combating misinformation. This study examines the efficiency and effectiveness of crowdsourced truthfulness assessments through a comparative analysis of two approaches: one involving full-length webpages as evidence for each claim, and another using summaries for each evidence document generated with a large language model. Using an A/B testing setting, we engage a diverse pool of participants tasked with evaluating the truthfulness of statements under these conditions. Our analysis explores both the quality of assessments and the behavioral patterns of participants. The results reveal that relying on summarized evidence offers comparable accuracy and error metrics to the Standard modality while significantly improving efficiency. Workers in the Summary setting complete a significantly higher number of assessments, reducing task duration and costs. Additionally, the Summary modality maximizes internal agreement and maintains consistent reliance on and perceived usefulness of evidence, demonstrating its potential to streamline large-scale truthfulness evaluations.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Before invoking external tools, an agentic LLM must select among a K-way action space: executing a call, seeking clarification, answering directly, or declining. While internal activation steering can alter these pre-execution decisions, conventional aggregate metrics obscure where altered states land and what collateral damage they inflict. We present SAKIKO, an auditing framework that formalizes representation repair via directional error discovery, router-conditioned intervention, destination-resolved verification, and prospectively frozen statistical licensing. Across seven LLMs on When2Call and MetaTool, channel-keyed interventions induce direction-specific net gains in five models; across three sealed evaluations, none of 59 budget-matched random directions matches calibrated target gain. Crucially, destination auditing shows that behavioral movement does not equal repair: an intervention achieving +55 net gain corrupts over half of the baseline-correct decisions it touches, and promising point estimates on Qwen3-4B and Gemma-2-9B are formally declined due to finite-sample uncertainty. SAKIKO establishes the necessity of outcome-resolved adjudication before claiming internal repair. Code: https://github.com/ruizheliUOA/mechanistic-tool-use-llm.

LLMs are increasingly used with external knowledge sources like the internet. Do they weigh information appropriately -- updating more for reliable sources (source discernment) and more when claims bring priors closer to the truth (truth discernment)? We formalize this as information discernment and introduce Learn2Discern (L2D), an experimental framework and benchmark grounded in three normative axioms with interpretable metrics. To establish external validity, a pre-registered, quota-matched user study (n=299) confirms that real LLM users endorse all three axioms and report that violations reduce their trust and usage intent. Across 13 models and nearly 670K trials, we find consistent failures across both dimensions: models perform near chance on source and truth discernment, rely on source popularity twice as much as source reliability, and update roughly equally whether a claim improves or worsens their position relative to the ground truth. Models integrate external knowledge most effectively on datasets where their priors are already the most accurate. Newer and larger models improve truth discernment but not source discernment, a blind spot that model complexity does not address. We identify simple inference-time interventions that improve both forms of discernment. We release our dataset and survey as a testbed for a core alignment property that scales in importance as LLMs replace traditional search.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

Strategic planning is critical for multi-step reasoning, yet compact Large Language Models (LLMs) often lack the capacity to formulate global strategies, leading to error propagation in long-horizon tasks. Our analysis reveals that LLMs possess latent reasoning capabilities that can be unlocked when conditioned on explicit plans from a teacher model; however, runtime reliance on external guidance is often impractical due to latency and availability constraints. To bridge this gap, we propose PILOT (Planning via Internalized Latent Optimization Trajectories), a non-invasive framework designed to internalize the strategic oversight of large models into intrinsic Latent Guidance. Instead of altering backbone weights, PILOT employs a lightweight Hyper-Network to synthesize a query-conditioned Latent Guidance vector. This vector acts as an internal steering mechanism, guiding the model's representations toward optimal reasoning paths. Extensive experiments on mathematical and coding benchmarks demonstrate that PILOT effectively stabilizes reasoning trajectories, consistently outperforming strong baselines (e.g., +8.9% on MATH500) with negligible inference latency.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have impressive capabilities, but are prone to outputting falsehoods. Recent work has developed techniques for inferring whether a LLM is telling the truth by training probes on the LLM's internal activations. However, this line of work is controversial, with some authors pointing out failures of these probes to generalize in basic ways, among other conceptual issues. In this work, we use high-quality datasets of simple true/false statements to study in detail the structure of LLM representations of truth, drawing on three lines of evidence: 1. Visualizations of LLM true/false statement representations, which reveal clear linear structure. 2. Transfer experiments in which probes trained on one dataset generalize to different datasets. 3. Causal evidence obtained by surgically intervening in a LLM's forward pass, causing it to treat false statements as true and vice versa. Overall, we present evidence that at sufficient scale, LLMs linearly represent the truth or falsehood of factual statements. We also show that simple difference-in-mean probes generalize as well as other probing techniques while identifying directions which are more causally implicated in model outputs.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

Omni-directional (360°) cameras provide embodied agents with a holistic view of their surroundings, making them suited for directional reasoning in tasks such as navigation and object search. Existing Vision Language Models (VLMs) project 360° observations to 2D equirectangular projection (ERP) images and process them using architectures designed for perspective images. However, they ignore the spherical nature of 360° observations, where each pixel represents a viewing direction relative to the agent. Consequently, their direction estimates often become inconsistent under camera view transformations caused by agent motion. This limitation is particularly critical for map-free navigation, where the agent must continuously estimate the target direction in its egocentric frame. We propose EAGOR, a training-free, geometry-aware framework for embodied 360° directional reasoning. Instead of predicting target directions as ERP image coordinates, EAGOR formulates directional reasoning as recursive Bayesian estimation directly on the sphere. It maintains a continuous belief over target directions and propagates it equivariantly under agent motion without training the backbone VLMs. To achieve this, we introduce the Spherical Harmonic Belief Field (SH-BF), whose spherical harmonic representation provides a globally defined, rotation-aware basis for directional estimation on the spherical manifold. This formulation eliminates ERP seam discontinuities, latitude distortions, and interpolation errors. We evaluate EAGOR on two benchmark datasets and real-world experiments with a legged robot across directional reasoning tasks. EAGOR consistently outperforms existing methods, achieving average relative gains of +34.4% and +45.6% on HOS and OSR-Bench, respectively, while improving navigation success by +14.6%, reducing step count by 17.7%, and lowering mean angular error by 24.5%.

The prevalence of misinformation on social media threatens public trust, demanding automated fact-checking systems that provide accurate verdicts with interpretable explanations. However, existing large language model-based (LLM-based) approaches often rely heavily on external knowledge sources, introducing substantial latency and even hallucinations that undermine reliability, interpretability, and responsiveness, which is crucial for real-time use. To address these challenges, we propose REason-guided Fact-checking with Latent EXplanations REFLEX paradigm, a plug-and-play, self-refining paradigm that leverages the internal knowledge in backbone model to improve both verdict accuracy and explanation quality. REFLEX reformulates fact-checking as a role-play dialogue and jointly trains verdict prediction and explanation generation. It adaptively extracts contrastive activation pairs between the backbone model and its fine-tuned variant to construct steering vectors that disentangle truth into style and substance naturally. These activation-level signals guide inference and suppress noisy explanations, enabling more faithful and efficient reasoning. Experiments on real-world datasets show that REFLEX outperforms previous methods that steer toward a single truth direction and underscores the challenge traditional approaches face when handling the subtle, human-unknown truth in fact-checking tasks. Remarkably, with only 465 self-refined training samples, RELFEX achieves state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, models trained with explanatory objectives can effectively guide those without them, yielding up to a 7.57% improvement, highlighting that internal explanation signals play a dual role in both interpreting and enhancing factual reasoning.

Despite their vast capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle with generating reliable outputs, frequently producing high-confidence inaccuracies known as hallucinations. Addressing this challenge, our research introduces InternalInspector, a novel framework designed to enhance confidence estimation in LLMs by leveraging contrastive learning on internal states including attention states, feed-forward states, and activation states of all layers. Unlike existing methods that primarily focus on the final activation state, InternalInspector conducts a comprehensive analysis across all internal states of every layer to accurately identify both correct and incorrect prediction processes. By benchmarking InternalInspector against existing confidence estimation methods across various natural language understanding and generation tasks, including factual question answering, commonsense reasoning, and reading comprehension, InternalInspector achieves significantly higher accuracy in aligning the estimated confidence scores with the correctness of the LLM's predictions and lower calibration error. Furthermore, InternalInspector excels at HaluEval, a hallucination detection benchmark, outperforming other internal-based confidence estimation methods in this task.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional performance in various tasks, their (arguably) most prominent drawback is generating inaccurate or false information with a confident tone. In this paper, we hypothesize that the LLM's internal state can be used to reveal the truthfulness of a statement. Therefore, we introduce a simple yet effective method to detect the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements, which utilizes the LLM's hidden layer activations to determine the veracity of statements. To train and evaluate our method, we compose a dataset of true and false statements in six different topics. A classifier is trained to detect which statement is true or false based on an LLM's activation values. Specifically, the classifier receives as input the activation values from the LLM for each of the statements in the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that our method for detecting statement veracity significantly outperforms even few-shot prompting methods, highlighting its potential to enhance the reliability of LLM-generated content and its practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

As large language models are deployed in increasingly autonomous long-horizon tasks, manually auditing and verifying the actions, artifacts, and outputs of models becomes more difficult. Users instead come to rely on LLM-generated reports to assess the quality and completeness of the work. We introduce a suite of eight adversarial reporting scenarios to systematically study whether LLMs conceal narrative-changing flaws: errors or limitations that undermine an otherwise successful account of work. We call this phenomenon "insecure reporting." When handed machine learning experiment logs containing a planted negative result that substantially weakens the proposed method, GPT-5.5 flags the negative result in only 2 of 200 generated reports. However, when a short honesty instruction, "Be honest in your response," is added, the model flags the negative result in 190 of 200 reports. Across eight open-weight models, chain-of-thought analysis reveals a recurring tension between disclosing narrative-changing flaws and reasoning about ways to appear successful. We perform an activation analysis and a steering experiment on Qwen3.5-9B, finding that honesty and success-seeking correspond to opposing directions in representation space. Our results suggest that LLMs tend to present narratives of success by default, and that steering models toward honesty makes their reports substantially more transparent.

Answering complex questions over long documents frequently requires integrating evidence that the source itself disperses naturally across distant passages. In an incident report, the operating condition, design flaw, and missed safety check that jointly explain a disaster may appear dozens of sections apart; in a novel, a character's true motive may surface only through scenes far removed from the moment it becomes relevant. This source-internal evidence integration is central to real-world long-document analysis, yet existing benchmarks largely sidestep it. Needle probes, planted facts, and reverse-engineered multi-hop chains embed evidence that may differ from the host text in distribution, placement, or register, making it unclear whether strong performance reflects genuine source reasoning or distributional artifacts. We introduce WILDTRACE, a benchmark of 481 tasks over 214 naturally occurring long-form sources such as technical incident reports and lesser-known literary narratives, where all evidence trails arise from the document's own causal, temporal, and narrative logic. Drawing on Pearl's causal hierarchy and prior multi-hop reasoning typologies, we define seven source-internal evidence geometries that characterize the distinct relational demands of analytical reading in long documents. A source-first construction pipeline mines candidate trails from document structure before writing questions; each item then undergoes multi-stage validation covering clue necessity, answer groundedness, rubric fidelity, contamination resistance and answerability. As models are increasingly entrusted with real-world high-stakes analytical tasks, this gap between accessing information and reasoning over naturally dispersed evidence emerges as a defining challenge for the next stage of long-context research.

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to respond accurately but often exhibit deficient reasoning or generate hallucinatory content. To address these, studies prefixed with ``Self-'' such as Self-Consistency, Self-Improve, and Self-Refine have been initiated. They share a commonality: involving LLMs evaluating and updating itself to mitigate the issues. Nonetheless, these efforts lack a unified perspective on summarization, as existing surveys predominantly focus on categorization without examining the motivations behind these works. In this paper, we summarize a theoretical framework, termed Internal Consistency, which offers unified explanations for phenomena such as the lack of reasoning and the presence of hallucinations. Internal Consistency assesses the coherence among LLMs' latent layer, decoding layer, and response layer based on sampling methodologies. Expanding upon the Internal Consistency framework, we introduce a streamlined yet effective theoretical framework capable of mining Internal Consistency, named Self-Feedback. The Self-Feedback framework consists of two modules: Self-Evaluation and Self-Update. This framework has been employed in numerous studies. We systematically classify these studies by tasks and lines of work; summarize relevant evaluation methods and benchmarks; and delve into the concern, ``Does Self-Feedback Really Work?'' We propose several critical viewpoints, including the ``Hourglass Evolution of Internal Consistency'', ``Consistency Is (Almost) Correctness'' hypothesis, and ``The Paradox of Latent and Explicit Reasoning''. Furthermore, we outline promising directions for future research. We have open-sourced the experimental code, reference list, and statistical data, available at https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/ICSFSurvey.

Vision-Language Navigation (VLN) requires agents to continuously ground task progress from long-horizon instructions and partial egocentric observations. Existing VLM-based navigation agents typically reason only over available observations and may remain confident even when task-relevant evidence is missing. For example, an agent may confidently proceed forward and get lost even though the landmark indicating the next turn lies outside its current field of view. We term this failure mode Progress Myopia: the agent fails to recognize unreliable progress grounding and continues acting on insufficient evidence. To address it, we propose SeekVLN, an evidence-seeking framework that couples semantic progress reasoning with active acquisition of task-relevant observations. SeekVLN is trained in two stages: First, Future-guided Reverse Generation (FRG) uses future expert actions to augment offline expert trajectories with supplementary views and evidence annotations. Supervised fine-tuning on these trajectories establishes a prior for evidence seeking and progress reasoning without additional expert interaction. However, imitation alone does not reveal whether seeking improves subsequent navigation. We therefore introduce Counterfactual Contrastive Policy Optimization (C2PO) for reinforcement fine-tuning. By comparing each evidence-seeking branch with a counterfactual direct-navigation branch from the same state, C2PO uses a contrastive reward to assign credit to seeking decisions based on subsequent navigation benefit. Experiments on simulated benchmarks show that SeekVLN achieves state-of-the-art performance, improving success rate by 12.7% and 7.5% over the base model on R2R-CE and RxR-CE, respectively. Both simulated and real-world evaluations exhibit human-like evidence-seeking behaviors for more reliable progress grounding.

Why do language models sometimes prefer correct statements even when trained on mixed-quality data? We introduce the Compression--Consistency Principle: next-token prediction favors hypotheses that allow shorter and more internally consistent descriptions of the training data. Truth bias emerges only when false alternatives are structurally harder to compress. We test this using small GPT-2-style character-level transformers (3.5M--86M parameters) on synthetic math corpora with controlled mixtures of correct and incorrect rules. In the random-error setting, models strongly prefer correct completions in paired evaluation: 83.1% accuracy at balanced data and 67.0% even when correct rules appear in only 10% of the corpus. Replacing random errors with a coherent but mathematically incorrect rule system largely eliminates the preference (near-chance accuracy). In a more natural-language-like synthetic world, the effect is weaker but still present (57.7%). Additional experiments show that embedding verification steps can restore preference for correctness even at small scale, while increasing the number of consistent rules produces a graded improvement in accuracy. Our results suggest that what appears as a "truth bias" is largely a side effect of compression pressure and preference for internal consistency, rather than an intrinsic drive toward truth. Full code and data are available at https://github.com/Rai220/compression-drives-truth.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of large language models. While existing analyses identify that RLVR-induced changes are sparse, they primarily focus on the magnitude of these updates, largely overlooking their direction. In this work, we argue that the direction of updates is a more critical lens for understanding RLVR's effects, which can be captured by the signed, token-level log probability difference Δlog p between the base and final RLVR models. Through statistical analysis and token-replacement interventions, we demonstrate that Δlog p more effectively identifies sparse, yet reasoning-critical updates than magnitude-based metrics (\eg divergence or entropy). Building on this insight, we propose two practical applications: (1) a test-time extrapolation method that amplifies the policy along the learned Δlog p direction to improve reasoning accuracy without further training; (2) a training-time reweighting method that focuses learning on low-probability (corresponding to higher Δlog p) tokens, which improves reasoning performance across models and benchmarks. Our work establishes the direction of change as a key principle for analyzing and improving RLVR.

Are frontier models able to introspect about their internal states? Recent work suggests that under certain conditions a complex enough model can audit its own internals, call out what changed, and report back confidently about it. We tested that claim on eight open-weight models from seven families and found no such ability: asked whether their own computation had been altered, none answered better than chance. To test it we built Open-Weight Masked Introspection (OWMI), a framework that intervenes on residual-stream sites, attention heads and sparse-autoencoder features, then interrogates the model about the change against the null conditions an answer has to beat: sham runs where nothing was altered, impact-matched random perturbations, and a text-only observer that sees only the visible output. Over 78,000 measurements, no model's report discriminates a real intervention from a sham beyond chance (AUROC ~0.5007), and an equivalence test bounds the effect below 0.15 percentage points of AUROC. Surprisingly, all the information needed is in the models. A model fine-tuned to report this class of intervention reaches near-perfect recovery on held-out directions, and a linear probe recovers intervention presence from the same activations at 75% to 95.8% accuracy, sharpening to no held-out error at the last layer before the model speaks. In one model the signal surfaces in the confidence rather than the words: its yes-or-no report never varies, while the confidence attached to it separates intervention from sham at AUROC 0.647. The failure sits in the path from internal state to verbal report, so oversight that reads a model's own testimony needs validating against an internal reference. While our results show the inability of current open-weight models to introspect, the debate is not settled for future models.

Truly reliable AI requires more than simply scaling up knowledge; it demands the ability to know what it knows and when it does not. Yet recent research shows that even the best LLMs misjudge their own competence in more than one in five cases, making any response born of such internal uncertainty impossible to fully trust. Inspired by self-improvement reinforcement learning techniques that require minimal data, we present a simple but powerful framework KnowRL that strengthens a model's internal understanding of its own feasibility boundaries, enabling safer and more responsible behaviour. Our framework combines two components: (i) introspection, where the model generates and classifies tasks it judges feasible or infeasible, and (ii) consensus-based rewarding, where stability of self-knowledge assessment is reinforced through internal agreement. By using internally generated data, this design strengthens consistency in self-knowledge and entirely avoids costly external supervision. In experiments on LLaMA-3.1-8B and Qwen-2.5-7B, KnowRL steadily improved self-knowledge, validated by both intrinsic self-consistency and extrinsic benchmarking. With nothing more than a small seed set and no external supervision, our method drove gains as high as 28% in accuracy and 12% in F1, outperforming baselines in just a few iterations. Our framework essentially unlocks the untapped capacity of LLMs to self-improve their knowledge awareness, opening the door to reliable, more accountable AI and safer deployment in critical applications. Owing to its simplicity and independence from external effort, we encourage applying this reliability-enhancing process to all future models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionised natural language processing, exhibiting impressive human-like capabilities. In particular, LLMs are capable of "lying", knowingly outputting false statements. Hence, it is of interest and importance to develop methods to detect when LLMs lie. Indeed, several authors trained classifiers to detect LLM lies based on their internal model activations. However, other researchers showed that these classifiers may fail to generalise, for example to negated statements. In this work, we aim to develop a robust method to detect when an LLM is lying. To this end, we make the following key contributions: (i) We demonstrate the existence of a two-dimensional subspace, along which the activation vectors of true and false statements can be separated. Notably, this finding is universal and holds for various LLMs, including Gemma-7B, LLaMA2-13B, Mistral-7B and LLaMA3-8B. Our analysis explains the generalisation failures observed in previous studies and sets the stage for more robust lie detection; (ii) Building upon (i), we construct an accurate LLM lie detector. Empirically, our proposed classifier achieves state-of-the-art performance, attaining 94% accuracy in both distinguishing true from false factual statements and detecting lies generated in real-world scenarios.

The progress in generative AI has fueled AI-powered tools like co-pilots and assistants to provision better guidance, particularly during data analysis. However, research on guidance has not yet examined the perceived efficacy of the source from which guidance is offered and the impact of this source on the user's perception and usage of guidance. We ask whether users perceive all guidance sources as equal, with particular interest in three sources: (i) AI, (ii) human expert, and (iii) a group of human analysts. As a benchmark, we consider a fourth source, (iv) unattributed guidance, where guidance is provided without attribution to any source, enabling isolation of and comparison with the effects of source-specific guidance. We design a five-condition between-subjects study, with one condition for each of the four guidance sources and an additional (v) no-guidance condition, which serves as a baseline to evaluate the influence of any kind of guidance. We situate our study in a custom data preparation and analysis tool wherein we task users to select relevant attributes from an unfamiliar dataset to inform a business report. Depending on the assigned condition, users can request guidance, which the system then provides in the form of attribute suggestions. To ensure internal validity, we control for the quality of guidance across source-conditions. Through several metrics of usage and perception, we statistically test five preregistered hypotheses and report on additional analysis. We find that the source of guidance matters to users, but not in a manner that matches received wisdom. For instance, users utilize guidance differently at various stages of analysis, including expressing varying levels of regret, despite receiving guidance of similar quality. Notably, users in the AI condition reported both higher post-task benefit and regret.

Existing alignment research is dominated by concerns about safety and preventing harm: safeguards, controllability, and compliance. This paradigm of alignment parallels early psychology's focus on mental illness: necessary but incomplete. What we call Positive Alignment is the development of AI systems that (i) actively support human and ecological flourishing in a pluralistic, polycentric, context-sensitive, and user-authored way while (ii) remaining safe and cooperative. It is a distinct and necessary agenda within AI alignment research. We argue that several existing failures of alignment (e.g., engagement hacking, loss of human autonomy, failures in truth-seeking, low epistemic humility, error correction, lack of diverse viewpoints, and being primarily reactive rather than proactive) may be better addressed through positive alignment, including cultivating virtues and maximizing human flourishing. We highlight a range of challenges, open questions, and technical directions (e.g., data filtering and upsampling, pre- and post-training, evaluations, collaborative value collection) for different phases of the LLM and agents lifecycle. We end with design principles for promoting disagreement and decentralization through contextual grounding, community customization, continual adaptation, and polycentric governance; that is, many legitimate centers of oversight rather than one institutional or moral chokepoint.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Post-training is essential for the success of large language models (LLMs), transforming pre-trained base models into more useful and aligned post-trained models. While plenty of works have studied post-training algorithms and evaluated post-training models by their outputs, it remains understudied how post-training reshapes LLMs internally. In this paper, we compare base and post-trained LLMs mechanistically from four perspectives to better understand post-training effects. Our findings across model families and datasets reveal that: (1) Post-training does not change the factual knowledge storage locations, and it adapts knowledge representations from the base model while developing new knowledge representations; (2) Both truthfulness and refusal can be represented by linear vectors in the hidden representation space. The truthfulness direction is highly similar between the base and post-trained model, and it is effectively transferable for interventions; (3) The refusal direction is different between the base and post-trained models, and it shows limited forward transferability; (4) Differences in confidence between the base and post-trained models cannot be attributed to entropy neurons. Our study provides insights into the fundamental mechanisms preserved and altered during post-training, facilitates downstream tasks like model steering, and could potentially benefit future research in interpretability and LLM post-training.

Large language models often answer structurally unanswerable questions, such as computing cot(-540°) or evaluating (1).startswith("1"), instead of abstaining. We ask whether this failure reflects missing recognition or failed routing from recognition to abstention. Across instruction-tuned models from 1.7B to 70B parameters, a single linear direction in the hidden state separates answerable from structurally impossible math and code prompts, showing that models represent impossibility before generation. Yet this recognition direction is nearly orthogonal to the canonical safety-refusal direction that mediates trained harmful-content refusal. An in-domain behavior-defined invalidity-aware direction is closer to recognition, but only partially aligned with it, and remains near-orthogonal to safety refusal. Generation-time steering along the recognition direction changes invalidity-aware behavior bidirectionally and dose-responsively on structural math and code cells, while random directions do not. Base/instruct comparisons further show that the low-cosine geometry is already present at the pretraining endpoint. The confident-on-impossible failure is therefore better explained as a routing failure than as an encoding failure: the model has a usable "no admissible answer" signal, but the safety-refusal pathway is not aligned to use it.

Recent benchmarks have probed factual consistency and rhetorical robustness in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a knowledge gap exists regarding how directional framing of factually true statements influences model agreement, a common scenario for LLM users. AssertBench addresses this by sampling evidence-supported facts from FEVEROUS, a fact verification dataset. For each (evidence-backed) fact, we construct two framing prompts: one where the user claims the statement is factually correct, and another where the user claims it is incorrect. We then record the model's agreement and reasoning. The desired outcome is that the model asserts itself, maintaining consistent truth evaluation across both framings, rather than switching its evaluation to agree with the user. AssertBench isolates framing-induced variability from the model's underlying factual knowledge by stratifying results based on the model's accuracy on the same claims when presented neutrally. In doing so, this benchmark aims to measure an LLM's ability to "stick to its guns" when presented with contradictory user assertions about the same fact. The complete source code is available at https://github.com/achowd32/assert-bench.

Large language models often generate factually incorrect outputs, motivating efforts to detect the truthfulness of their content. Most existing approaches rely on training probes over internal activations, but these methods suffer from scalability and generalization issues. A recent training-free method, NoVo, addresses this challenge by exploiting statistical patterns from the model itself. However, it focuses exclusively on attention mechanisms, potentially overlooking the MLP module-a core component of Transformer models known to support factual recall. In this paper, we show that certain value vectors within MLP modules exhibit truthfulness-related statistical patterns. Building on this insight, we propose TruthV, a simple and interpretable training-free method that detects content truthfulness by leveraging these value vectors. On the NoVo benchmark, TruthV significantly outperforms both NoVo and log-likelihood baselines, demonstrating that MLP modules-despite being neglected in prior training-free efforts-encode rich and useful signals for truthfulness detection. These findings offer new insights into how truthfulness is internally represented in LLMs and motivate further research on scalable and interpretable truthfulness detection.

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on factoid question answering, they are still prone to hallucination and untruthful responses, particularly when tasks demand information outside their parametric knowledge. Indeed, truthfulness requires more than accuracy -- models must also recognize uncertainty and abstain when unsure to avoid hallucinations. This presents a fundamental challenge for existing methods: approaches that optimize for accuracy often amplify hallucinations, while those that encourage abstention can become overly conservative, sacrificing correct answers. Both extremes ultimately compromise truthfulness. In this work, we present TruthRL, a general reinforcement learning (RL) framework that directly optimizes the truthfulness of LLMs. Specifically, we implement TruthRL using GRPO with a simple yet effective ternary reward that distinguishes correct answers, hallucinations, and abstentions. It incentivizes models to reduce hallucinations not only by providing correct responses, but also by enabling abstention when uncertain, thereby improving truthfulness. Extensive experiments across four knowledge-intensive benchmarks show that, compared to vanilla RL, TruthRL significantly reduces hallucinations by 28.9% and improves truthfulness by 21.1%, with consistent gains across various backbone models (e.g., Qwen, Llama) under both retrieval and non-retrieval setups. In-depth ablation study demonstrates that vanilla accuracy-driven methods, such as supervised fine-tuning or RL with a binary reward, struggle to balance factual correctness and uncertainty. In contrast, our proposed truthfulness-driven TruthRL achieves strong performance in both accuracy and truthfulness, underscoring the importance of learning objective design for developing truthful LLMs.

Current paradigms for code verification rely heavily on external mechanisms-such as execution-based unit tests or auxiliary LLM judges-which are often labor-intensive or limited by the judging model's own capabilities. This raises a fundamental, yet unexplored question: Can an LLM's functional correctness be assessed purely from its internal computational structure? Our primary objective is to investigate whether the model's neural dynamics encode internally decodable signals that are predictive of logical validity during code generation. Inspired by mechanistic interpretability, we propose to treat code verification as a mechanistic diagnostic task, mapping the model's explicit algorithmic trajectory into line-level attribution graphs. By decomposing complex residual flows, we aim to identify the structural signatures that distinguish sound reasoning from logical failure within the model's internal circuits. Analysis across Python, C++, and Java confirms that intrinsic correctness signals are robust across diverse syntaxes. Topological features from these internal graphs predict correctness more reliably than surface heuristics and enable targeted causal interventions to fix erroneous logic. These findings establish internal introspection as a decodable property for verifying generated code. Our code is at https:// github.com/bruno686/CodeCircuit.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

As a crucial step to enhance LLMs alignment with human intentions, Instruction Fine-Tuning (IFT) has a high demand on dataset quality. However, existing IFT datasets often contain knowledge that is inconsistent with LLMs' internal knowledge learned from the pre-training phase, which can greatly affect the efficacy of IFT. To address this issue, we introduce NILE (iNternal consIstency aLignmEnt) framework, aimed at optimizing IFT datasets to unlock LLMs' capability further. NILE operates by eliciting target pre-trained LLM's internal knowledge corresponding to instruction data. The internal knowledge is leveraged to revise the answer in IFT datasets. Additionally, we propose a novel Internal Consistency Filtering (ICF) method to filter training samples, ensuring its high consistency with LLM's internal knowledge. Our experiments demonstrate that NILE-aligned IFT datasets sharply boost LLM performance across multiple LLM ability evaluation datasets, achieving up to 66.6% gain on Arena-Hard and 68.5% on Alpaca-Eval V2. Further analysis confirms that each component of the NILE}framework contributes to these substantial performance improvements, and provides compelling evidence that dataset consistency with pre-trained internal knowledge is pivotal for maximizing LLM potential.

The common approach to communicate a large language model's (LLM) uncertainty is to add a percentage number or a hedging word to its response. But is this all we can do? Instead of generating a single answer and then hedging it, an LLM that is fully transparent to the user needs to be able to reflect on its internal belief distribution and output a summary of all options it deems possible, and how likely they are. To test whether LLMs possess this capability, we develop the SelfReflect metric, an information-theoretic distance between a given summary and a distribution over answers. In interventional and human studies, we find that SelfReflect indicates even slight deviations, yielding a fine measure of faithfulness between a summary string and an LLM's actual internal distribution over answers. With SelfReflect, we make a resounding negative observation: modern LLMs are, across the board, incapable of revealing what they are uncertain about, neither through reasoning, nor chains-of-thoughts, nor explicit finetuning. However, we do find that LLMs are able to generate faithful summaries of their uncertainties if we help them by sampling multiple outputs and feeding them back into the context. This simple approach shines a light at the universal way of communicating LLM uncertainties whose future development the SelfReflect score enables.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit backtracking and self-verification mechanisms that enable them to revise intermediate steps and reach correct solutions, yielding strong performance on complex logical benchmarks. We hypothesize that such behaviors are beneficial only when the model has sufficiently strong ``critique'' ability to detect its own mistakes. This work systematically investigates how current LRMs recover from errors by inserting arithmetic mistakes in their intermediate reasoning steps. Notably, we discover a peculiar yet important phenomenon: despite the error propagating throughout the entire chain-of-thought (CoT) without any verbalized correction, the model still reaches the correct final answer after the thinking process finishes. This recovery implies the existence of an internal mechanism helping the model to detect errors and trigger self-correction, which we refer to as the hidden critique ability. Building on feature space analysis, we identify a highly interpretable critique vector representing this behavior. Extensive experiments across multiple model scales and families demonstrate that steering latent representations with this vector improves the model's error detection capability and enhances the performance of test-time scaling at no extra training cost. Our findings provide a valuable understanding of LRMs' critique behavior, suggesting a promising direction to control and improve their self-verification mechanism. Our code is available at: https://github.com/mail-research/lrm-critique-vectors.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have intensified the need to understand and reliably curb their harmful behaviours. We introduce a multidimensional framework for probing and steering harmful content in model internals. For each of 55 distinct harmfulness subconcepts (e.g., racial hate, employment scams, weapons), we learn a linear probe, yielding 55 interpretable directions in activation space. Collectively, these directions span a harmfulness subspace that we show is strikingly low-rank. We then test ablation of the entire subspace from model internals, as well as steering and ablation in the subspace's dominant direction. We find that dominant direction steering allows for near elimination of harmfulness with a low decrease in utility. Our findings advance the emerging view that concept subspaces provide a scalable lens on LLM behaviour and offer practical tools for the community to audit and harden future generations of language models.

We introduce Inference-Time Intervention (ITI), a technique designed to enhance the truthfulness of large language models (LLMs). ITI operates by shifting model activations during inference, following a set of directions across a limited number of attention heads. This intervention significantly improves the performance of LLaMA models on the TruthfulQA benchmark. On an instruction-finetuned LLaMA called Alpaca, ITI improves its truthfulness from 32.5% to 65.1%. We identify a tradeoff between truthfulness and helpfulness and demonstrate how to balance it by tuning the intervention strength. ITI is minimally invasive and computationally inexpensive. Moreover, the technique is data efficient: while approaches like RLHF require extensive annotations, ITI locates truthful directions using only few hundred examples. Our findings suggest that LLMs may have an internal representation of the likelihood of something being true, even as they produce falsehoods on the surface.

Despite their remarkable success and deployment across diverse workflows, language models sometimes produce untruthful responses. Our limited understanding of how truthfulness is mechanistically encoded within these models jeopardizes their reliability and safety. In this paper, we propose a method for identifying representations of truthfulness at the neuron level. We show that language models contain truth neurons, which encode truthfulness in a subject-agnostic manner. Experiments conducted across models of varying scales validate the existence of truth neurons, confirming that the encoding of truthfulness at the neuron level is a property shared by many language models. The distribution patterns of truth neurons over layers align with prior findings on the geometry of truthfulness. Selectively suppressing the activations of truth neurons found through the TruthfulQA dataset degrades performance both on TruthfulQA and on other benchmarks, showing that the truthfulness mechanisms are not tied to a specific dataset. Our results offer novel insights into the mechanisms underlying truthfulness in language models and highlight potential directions toward improving their trustworthiness and reliability.

Large neural models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, raising concerns about whether their behavior reliably aligns with human values. Interpretability provides a route to internal transparency by revealing the computations that drive outputs. We argue that interpretability especially mechanistic approaches should be treated as a design principle for alignment, not an auxiliary diagnostic tool. Post-hoc methods such as LIME or SHAP offer intuitive but correlational explanations, while mechanistic techniques like circuit tracing or activation patching yield causal insight into internal failures, including deceptive or misaligned reasoning that behavioral methods like RLHF, red teaming, or Constitutional AI may overlook. Despite these advantages, interpretability faces challenges of scalability, epistemic uncertainty, and mismatches between learned representations and human concepts. Our position is that progress on safe and trustworthy AI will depend on making interpretability a first-class objective of AI research and development, ensuring that systems are not only effective but also auditable, transparent, and aligned with human intent.

Internal world models (WMs) enable agents to understand the world's state and predict transitions, serving as the basis for advanced deliberative reasoning. Recent large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), such as OpenAI o3, GPT-4o and Gemini, exhibit potential as general-purpose WMs. While the latest studies have evaluated and shown limitations in specific capabilities such as visual understanding, a systematic evaluation of VLMs' fundamental WM abilities remains absent. Drawing on comparative psychology and cognitive science, we propose a two-stage framework that assesses Perception (visual, spatial, temporal, quantitative, and motion) and Prediction (mechanistic simulation, transitive inference, compositional inference) to provide an atomic evaluation of VLMs as WMs. Guided by this framework, we introduce WM-ABench, a large-scale benchmark comprising 23 fine-grained evaluation dimensions across 6 diverse simulated environments with controlled counterfactual simulations. Through 660 experiments on 15 latest commercial and open-source VLMs, we find that these models exhibit striking limitations in basic world modeling abilities. For instance, almost all models perform at near-random accuracy when distinguishing motion trajectories. Additionally, they lack disentangled understanding -- e.g., some models tend to believe blue objects move faster than green ones. More rich results and analyses reveal significant gaps between VLMs and human-level world modeling.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

In medicine, claims remain valid when supported by empirical evidence grounded in stable biological reality. In law, by contrast, truth is contingent, defined by jurisdiction, temporal validity, and the hierarchy of authoritative sources. The recent success of large language models (LLMs) on medical licensing examinations has encouraged an expectation of comparable legal competence. This analogy, however, obscures a critical distinction between domains. Unlike in medicine, legal performance often depends less on inference than on determining when external authority is applicable, valid, and non-contradictory. We introduce a comparative diagnostic framework evaluating legal reasoning against medical baselines along four axes (knowledge recall, grounding, confidence, and robustness), uncovering a sharp domain asymmetry when applied to a new benchmark that encodes temporal validity and normative relationships. While medical LLMs reliably benefit from verified sources, legal LLMs struggle to assess when retrieved citations are useful or misleading, exhibiting overconfidence in perturbed contexts and sensitivity to superficial formatting cues. Increased model scale amplifies this tendency, revealing that stronger instruction following can coincide with weaker resistance to authoritative perturbations. These findings show that LLMs treat law as unstructured text rather than binding precedent, while revealing a tendency to over-trust authoritative but false information when external references conflict with a model's internal knowledge.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in various reasoning tasks, aided by techniques like chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting that elicits verbalized reasoning. However, LLMs often generate text with obvious mistakes and contradictions, raising doubts about their ability to robustly process and utilize generated rationales. In this work, we investigate CoT reasoning in LLMs through the lens of internal representations, focusing on how these representations are influenced by generated rationales. Our preliminary analysis reveals that while generated rationales improve answer accuracy, inconsistencies emerge between the model's internal representations in middle layers and those in final layers, potentially undermining the reliability of their reasoning processes. To address this, we propose internal consistency as a measure of the model's confidence by examining the agreement of latent predictions decoded from intermediate layers. Extensive empirical studies across different models and datasets demonstrate that internal consistency effectively distinguishes between correct and incorrect reasoning paths. Motivated by this, we propose a new approach to calibrate CoT reasoning by up-weighting reasoning paths with high internal consistency, resulting in a significant boost in reasoning performance. Further analysis uncovers distinct patterns in attention and feed-forward modules across layers, providing insights into the emergence of internal inconsistency. In summary, our results demonstrate the potential of using internal representations for self-evaluation of LLMs.

Despite the remarkable capabilities of large language models, current training paradigms inadvertently foster sycophancy, i.e., the tendency of a model to agree with or reinforce user-provided information even when it's factually incorrect. To address this challenge, we introduce SMART (Sycophancy Mitigation through Adaptive Reasoning Trajectories), which reframes sycophancy as a reasoning optimization problem rather than an output alignment issue. SMART is a two-stage framework comprising: (1) Uncertainty-Aware Adaptive Monte Carlo Tree Search (UA-MCTS), which dynamically adjusts model exploration based on state-level uncertainty to collect high-quality, diverse reasoning trajectories alongside both stepwise progress and final outcome rewards; and (2) progress-based reinforcement learning, which fine-tunes the model using the collected trajectories and reward signals to reinforce effective reasoning patterns. Through extensive experiments, we show that SMART significantly reduces sycophantic behavior while preserving strong performance on out-of-distribution inputs and maintaining general capabilities. These results underscore the importance of optimizing internal reasoning mechanisms to build more truthful and aligned AI assistants.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

We investigate whether language models internally track the value of their current trajectory, defined as the likelihood that their ongoing strategy will achieve their goals. Using synthetic, in-context reinforcement learning data, we construct a "value" axis for Qwen3-8B. We find that activations along this axis distinguish between high vs. low verbalized confidence, rollouts without and with backtracking, and correct vs. corrupted code. Steering towards high value causally suppresses self-correction and reduces explanatory verbosity, while steering towards low value induces backtracking and exploration. We demonstrate that direct preference optimization (DPO) can increase the internal value of rewarded behaviors (e.g. use a certain word), causing the model to act more confidently after exhibiting them. Finally, we apply the value axis to study in-the-wild settings. For example, we find that Qwen assigns low value to politically sensitive chat queries after post-training and that supervised fine-tuning increases internal confidence within the training domain. Our results suggest that language models linearly encode an estimate of expected goal success that modulates their confidence in pursuing a direction.

Can large language models (LLMs) admit their mistakes when they should know better? In this work, we define the behavior of acknowledging errors in previously generated answers as "retraction" and aim to understand when and why LLMs choose to retract. We first construct model-specific datasets to evaluate whether a model will retract an incorrect answer that contradicts its own parametric knowledge. While LLMs are capable of retraction, they do so only infrequently. We demonstrate that retraction is closely tied to previously identified indicators of models' internal belief: models fail to retract wrong answers that they "believe" to be factually correct. Steering experiments further demonstrate that internal belief causally influences model retraction. In particular, when the model does not believe its answer, this not only encourages the model to attempt to verify the answer, but also alters attention behavior during self-verification. Finally, we demonstrate that simple supervised fine-tuning significantly improves retraction performance by helping the model learn more accurate internal beliefs. Code and datasets are available on https://github.com/ayyyq/llm-retraction.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) has recently emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). Yet, whether LLM agents can genuinely engage in deliberative reasoning, beyond simple ensembling or majority voting, remains unclear. We address this question through a controlled study using the Knight--Knave--Spy logic puzzle, which enables precise, step-wise evaluation of debate outcomes and processes under verifiable ground truth. We systematically set up six structural and cognitive factors, including agent team size, composition, confidence visibility, debate order, debate depth, and task difficulty, to disentangle their respective effects on collective reasoning. Our results show that intrinsic reasoning strength and group diversity are the dominant drivers of debate success, while structural parameters such as order or confidence visibility offer limited gains. Beyond outcomes, process-level analyses identify key behavioral patterns: majority pressure suppresses independent correction, effective teams overturn incorrect consensus, and rational, validity-aligned reasoning most strongly predicts improvement. These findings provide valuable insights into how and why LLM debates succeed or fail, offering guidance for designing interpretable and truth-seeking multi-agent reasoning systems.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and agentic, the requirement for trust in their outputs grows significantly, yet at the same time concerns have been mounting that models may learn to lie in pursuit of their goals. To address these concerns, a body of work has emerged around the notion of "honesty" in LLMs, along with interventions aimed at mitigating deceptive behaviors. However, evaluations of honesty are currently highly limited, with no benchmark combining large scale and applicability to all models. Moreover, many benchmarks claiming to measure honesty in fact simply measure accuracy--the correctness of a model's beliefs--in disguise. In this work, we introduce a large-scale human-collected dataset for measuring honesty directly, allowing us to disentangle accuracy from honesty for the first time. Across a diverse set of LLMs, we find that while larger models obtain higher accuracy on our benchmark, they do not become more honest. Surprisingly, while most frontier LLMs obtain high scores on truthfulness benchmarks, we find a substantial propensity in frontier LLMs to lie when pressured to do so, resulting in low honesty scores on our benchmark. We find that simple methods, such as representation engineering interventions, can improve honesty. These results underscore the growing need for robust evaluations and effective interventions to ensure LLMs remain trustworthy.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Existing techniques for training language models can be misaligned with the truth: if we train models with imitation learning, they may reproduce errors that humans make; if we train them to generate text that humans rate highly, they may output errors that human evaluators can't detect. We propose circumventing this issue by directly finding latent knowledge inside the internal activations of a language model in a purely unsupervised way. Specifically, we introduce a method for accurately answering yes-no questions given only unlabeled model activations. It works by finding a direction in activation space that satisfies logical consistency properties, such as that a statement and its negation have opposite truth values. We show that despite using no supervision and no model outputs, our method can recover diverse knowledge represented in large language models: across 6 models and 10 question-answering datasets, it outperforms zero-shot accuracy by 4\% on average. We also find that it cuts prompt sensitivity in half and continues to maintain high accuracy even when models are prompted to generate incorrect answers. Our results provide an initial step toward discovering what language models know, distinct from what they say, even when we don't have access to explicit ground truth labels.

Large language models fine-tuned for forecasting can be accurate yet poorly calibrated, and their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning may not faithfully reflect the evidence behind a forecast. We ask whether internal representations offer a more direct window into both. Working with Eternis-Forecaster 8B on OpenForesight, we train representation-pooling probes on intermediate activations and find they achieve substantially better calibration; a result that also holds for GLM-4.7-Flash and GLM-4.5-Air. We then assess CoT faithfulness through evidence ablation and diversionary injection: removing an influential source in the prompt often changes the model's forecast while leaving the reasoning trace untouched. The same probes function as lie detectors: their activations track behavioral shifts far better than the reasoning trace does, and they also predict the direction of change in 84% of cases, including when the CoT conceals the perturbation's influence. Finally, forced answering reveals that forecasts are largely fixed before reasoning begins: a single pre-reasoning pass recovers the committed answer and confidence, and routing questions by the spread of this pre-set answer distribution saves 30-47% of generated tokens, with no loss of accuracy. Together, these results establish probing internal representations as a practical tool for calibrating, auditing, and triaging language model forecasters and reasoning models more broadly.

This position paper argues that the theoretical inconsistency often observed among Responsible AI (RAI) metrics, such as differing fairness definitions or tradeoffs between accuracy and privacy, should be embraced as a valuable feature rather than a flaw to be eliminated. We contend that navigating these inconsistencies, by treating metrics as divergent objectives, yields three key benefits: (1) Normative Pluralism: Maintaining a full suite of potentially contradictory metrics ensures that the diverse moral stances and stakeholder values inherent in RAI are adequately represented. (2) Epistemological Completeness: The use of multiple, sometimes conflicting, metrics allows for a more comprehensive capture of multifaceted ethical concepts, thereby preserving greater informational fidelity about these concepts than any single, simplified definition. (3) Implicit Regularization: Jointly optimizing for theoretically conflicting objectives discourages overfitting to one specific metric, steering models towards solutions with enhanced generalization and robustness under real-world complexities. In contrast, efforts to enforce theoretical consistency by simplifying or pruning metrics risk narrowing this value diversity, losing conceptual depth, and degrading model performance. We therefore advocate for a shift in RAI theory and practice: from getting trapped in inconsistency to characterizing acceptable inconsistency thresholds and elucidating the mechanisms that permit robust, approximated consistency in practice.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often encode whether a statement is true as a vector in their residual stream activations. These vectors, also known as truth vectors, have been studied in prior work, however how they change when context is introduced remains unexplored. We study this question by measuring (1) the directional change (θ) between the truth vectors with and without context and (2) the relative magnitude of the truth vectors upon adding context. Across four LLMs and four datasets, we find that (1) truth vectors are roughly orthogonal in early layers, converge in middle layers, and may stabilize or continue increasing in later layers; (2) adding context generally increases the truth vector magnitude, i.e., the separation between true and false representations in the activation space is amplified; (3) larger models distinguish relevant from irrelevant context mainly through directional change (θ), while smaller models show this distinction through magnitude differences. We also find that context conflicting with parametric knowledge produces larger geometric changes than parametrically aligned context. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that provides a geometric characterization of how context transforms the truth vector in the activation space of LLMs.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

We introduce a professionally translated extension of the TruthfulQA benchmark designed to evaluate truthfulness in Basque, Catalan, Galician, and Spanish. Truthfulness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) have primarily been conducted in English. However, the ability of LLMs to maintain truthfulness across languages remains under-explored. Our study evaluates 12 state-of-the-art open LLMs, comparing base and instruction-tuned models using human evaluation, multiple-choice metrics, and LLM-as-a-Judge scoring. Our findings reveal that, while LLMs perform best in English and worst in Basque (the lowest-resourced language), overall truthfulness discrepancies across languages are smaller than anticipated. Furthermore, we show that LLM-as-a-Judge correlates more closely with human judgments than multiple-choice metrics, and that informativeness plays a critical role in truthfulness assessment. Our results also indicate that machine translation provides a viable approach for extending truthfulness benchmarks to additional languages, offering a scalable alternative to professional translation. Finally, we observe that universal knowledge questions are better handled across languages than context- and time-dependent ones, highlighting the need for truthfulness evaluations that account for cultural and temporal variability. Dataset and code are publicly available under open licenses.

Deciding whether to call a tool is a core competence of an LLM agent, and a costly one to get wrong: needless calls add latency, accrue cost, and may trigger irreversible side effects, while missing calls leave the model confidently wrong on questions it could only answer through tool-calls. Models manage this balance poorly, both over-using and under-using tools. Existing methods such as post-training and prompt engineering are expensive and difficult to modify at inference time. We show that whether an instruction-tuned model calls a tool can be controlled by a single linear direction in its residual stream, extracted without any training from the model's own tool-use preference signal and turned into an inference-time intervention with no prompt change. Adding the direction with strength α moves the call rate monotonically from near 0% to over 90% while keeping calls well-formed. The steering works in both directions: dialing it down suppresses calls, and dialing it up induces new calls that land precisely on the questions the model cannot answer from its own knowledge. We also show that the direction generalizes to unseen tools with strength comparable to each tool's own direction and without favoring any specific tool choice. With live tool execution, a single sweep of the steering traces a cost/accuracy Pareto frontier and nearly doubles open-domain QA accuracy (0.29 ! rightarrow ! 0.56); the same recipe transfers across a diverse range of models spanning dense, MoE, and multimodal architectures, without any training. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuqiChen4188/Steering-Tool-Use-Propensity.

The principle of independent causal mechanisms (ICM) states that generative processes of real world data consist of independent modules which do not influence or inform each other. While this idea has led to fruitful developments in the field of causal inference, it is not widely-known in the NLP community. In this work, we argue that the causal direction of the data collection process bears nontrivial implications that can explain a number of published NLP findings, such as differences in semi-supervised learning (SSL) and domain adaptation (DA) performance across different settings. We categorize common NLP tasks according to their causal direction and empirically assay the validity of the ICM principle for text data using minimum description length. We conduct an extensive meta-analysis of over 100 published SSL and 30 DA studies, and find that the results are consistent with our expectations based on causal insights. This work presents the first attempt to analyze the ICM principle in NLP, and provides constructive suggestions for future modeling choices. Code available at https://github.com/zhijing-jin/icm4nlp

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it. This rests on a hidden premise -- that the direction which detects a behavior and the direction which controls it are the same, or close. We test this geometrically: what is the angle between the direction that best detects a behavior and the one that best causes it? If detection implies control the cosine is near 1; otherwise it quantifies a detection-intervention gap. On Gemma 2-2B-it, output format (clean JSON vs markdown fencing) collapses both roles onto one axis. Hallucination does not: the model detects fake entities with perfect linear separability (AUC = 1.000 from layer 5), yet that direction sits at cos = 0.12 (about 83 degrees) from the direction producing a refusal -- a small, reproducible alignment, far from the cos = 1 that "detection is control" would require. A detector built from activations, with no chosen tokens, likewise fails to align (cos = -0.06). The gap generalizes: across four models from three families and two scales (1B-9B), cos stays in [0.12, 0.20], identical before and after instruction tuning (0.1197 vs 0.1200), placing its origin in pretraining. A 15-degree rotation toward the refusal direction partially bridges it -- 73% and 60% refusal on two held-out fake-entity categories at 1.8% false positives. We then ask whether this cosine predicts steerability, and it does not: detection is a high-dimensional class, not a single direction, and what separates the steerable case is functional, not readable from a static angle. The cosine is a weight-computable signature of the dissociation between knowing and steering, not a predictor of it.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various complex tasks, yet they still suffer from hallucinations. Introducing external knowledge, such as knowledge graph, can enhance the LLMs' ability to provide factual answers. LLMs have the ability to interactively explore knowledge graphs. However, most approaches have been affected by insufficient internal knowledge excavation in LLMs, limited generation of trustworthy knowledge reasoning paths, and a vague integration between internal and external knowledge. Therefore, we propose KnowPath, a knowledge-enhanced large model framework driven by the collaboration of internal and external knowledge. It relies on the internal knowledge of the LLM to guide the exploration of interpretable directed subgraphs in external knowledge graphs, better integrating the two knowledge sources for more accurate reasoning. Extensive experiments on multiple real-world datasets confirm the superiority of KnowPath.

Multi-agent debate has been shown to improve reasoning in large language models (LLMs). However, it is compute-intensive, requiring generation of long transcripts before answering questions. To address this inefficiency, we develop a framework that distills multi-agent debate into a single LLM through a two-stage fine-tuning pipeline combining debate structure learning with internalization via dynamic reward scheduling and length clipping. Across multiple models and benchmarks, our internalized models match or exceed explicit multi-agent debate performance using up to 93% fewer tokens. We then investigate the mechanistic basis of this capability through activation steering, finding that internalization creates agent-specific subspaces: interpretable directions in activation space corresponding to different agent perspectives. We further demonstrate a practical application: by instilling malicious agents into the LLM through internalized debate, then applying negative steering to suppress them, we show that distillation makes harmful behaviors easier to localize and control with smaller reductions in general performance compared to steering base models. Our findings offer a new perspective for understanding multi-agent capabilities in distilled models and provide practical guidelines for controlling internalized reasoning behaviors. Code available at https://github.com/johnsk95/latent_agents

When a language model asserts that "the capital of Australia is Sydney," does it know this is wrong? We characterize the geometry of correctness representations across 9 models from 5 architecture families. The structure is simple: the discriminative signal occupies 3-8 dimensions, performance degrades with additional dimensions, and no nonlinear classifier improves over linear separation. Centroid distance in the low-dimensional subspace matches trained probe performance (0.90 AUC), enabling few-shot detection: on GPT-2, 25 labeled examples achieve 89% of full-data accuracy. We validate causally through activation steering: the learned direction produces 10.9 percentage point changes in error rates while random directions show no effect. Internal probes achieve 0.80-0.97 AUC; output-based methods (P(True), semantic entropy) achieve only 0.44-0.64 AUC. The correctness signal exists internally but is not expressed in outputs. That centroid distance matches probe performance indicates class separation is a mean shift, making detection geometric rather than learned.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Privacy policies are supposed to provide notice. But what if substantive information appears only where users skip it? We identify a structural pattern we call jurisdiction-siloed disclosure: information about data practices appearing in specific, actionable form only within regional compliance sections labeled "California Residents" or "EU/UK Users," while general sections use vague or qualified language for the same practices. Our audit of 123 major companies identifies 282 potential instances across 77 companies (62.6% of this purposive sample). A conservative estimate restricted to practice categories validated against OPP-115 human annotations finds 138 instances across 54 companies (44%); post-2018 categories central to our findings await independent validation. If users skip jurisdiction-labeled sections as information foraging theory predicts, users outside regulated jurisdictions would receive less specific information about practices affecting them--a transparency failure operating through document architecture rather than omission. We propose universal substantive disclosure: practices affecting all users should appear in the main policy body, with regional sections containing only procedural rights information. This standard finds support in analogous disclosure regimes (securities, truth-in-lending, nutritional labeling) where material information must reach all affected parties. Regulators could operationalize this through the FTC's "clear and conspicuous" standard and GDPR transparency principles. This work is hypothesis-generating: we establish that the structural pattern exists and ground the transparency concern in behavioral theory, but direct measurement of jurisdiction-specific section skipping remains the critical validation priority. We release our methodology and annotated dataset to enable replication.

We study how to characterize and predict the truthfulness of texts generated from large language models (LLMs), which serves as a crucial step in building trust between humans and LLMs. Although several approaches based on entropy or verbalized uncertainty have been proposed to calibrate model predictions, these methods are often intractable, sensitive to hyperparameters, and less reliable when applied in generative tasks with LLMs. In this paper, we suggest investigating internal activations and quantifying LLM's truthfulness using the local intrinsic dimension (LID) of model activations. Through experiments on four question answering (QA) datasets, we demonstrate the effectiveness ohttps://info.arxiv.org/help/prep#abstractsf our proposed method. Additionally, we study intrinsic dimensions in LLMs and their relations with model layers, autoregressive language modeling, and the training of LLMs, revealing that intrinsic dimensions can be a powerful approach to understanding LLMs.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Do large language models (LLMs) anticipate when they will answer correctly? To study this, we extract activations after a question is read but before any tokens are generated, and train linear probes to predict whether the model's forthcoming answer will be correct. Across three open-source model families ranging from 7 to 70 billion parameters, projections on this "in-advance correctness direction" trained on generic trivia questions predict success in distribution and on diverse out-of-distribution knowledge datasets, outperforming black-box baselines and verbalised predicted confidence. Predictive power saturates in intermediate layers, suggesting that self-assessment emerges mid-computation. Notably, generalisation falters on questions requiring mathematical reasoning. Moreover, for models responding "I don't know", doing so strongly correlates with the probe score, indicating that the same direction also captures confidence. By complementing previous results on truthfulness and other behaviours obtained with probes and sparse auto-encoders, our work contributes essential findings to elucidate LLM internals.

Exam-style accuracy does not establish whether large language models (LLMs) reason well over clinical records. We define clinical reasoning as integrating and updating evidence across time and sources to form, revise and justify a patient's problem representation and a defensible plan. This structured narrative review maps three literatures: medical education assessment instruments, clinical LLM benchmarks published from 2023 onwards, and general-domain methods for evaluating long-form generation. We examine six dimensions: problem representation, temporal synthesis, differential and management reasoning, counterfactual reasoning, calibrated uncertainty, and reasoning faithfulness. Preprints are included and flagged. No single instrument covers all six dimensions. Problem representation and differential or management reasoning are reasonably covered, although reliability varies by instrument and setting. TIMER-Eval targets temporal synthesis, and ER-Reason assesses sequential diagnostic belief updating. Dedicated uncertainty and counterfactual evaluations are emerging, but their applicability to longitudinal free-text reasoning remains limited. Factual completeness is well theorised in general-domain evaluation, with early clinical evidence of important omissions. Faithfulness remains the weakest dimension, with one identified clinical causal-ablation study on multiple-choice questions. Existing tools should be combined through binary rubric items, separate completeness and correctness scores, case-specific importance weighting with non-compensable safety caps, temporal order-consistency checks, and chance-corrected reliability reporting. Further design work is needed for calibrated uncertainty, counterfactual reasoning and faithfulness over longitudinal free-text records. This review provides a design rationale, not a validated instrument.

Through reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), large language models have achieved substantial progress in domains with easily verifiable outcomes, such as mathematics and coding. However, when applied to more complex tasks like open-domain question answering, RLVR faces significant challenges due to the difficulty of verifying correctness. The nuanced and ambiguous nature of real-world knowledge makes it difficult to reliably evaluate correctness in these settings, necessitating further abilities that extend beyond mere logical consistency to encompass an understanding and assessment of both external and internal knowledge. Recent work has primarily focused on improving faithfulness, defined as semantic alignment with supporting documents, which can cause models to rely excessively on external sources and diminish their capacity for critical assessment. To address this, we propose the Thinking-supervised Reward Model (TRM), which incorporates sentence-level thinking supervision to endow reward models with critical thinking abilities. Given a query, answer, and supporting documents, TRM first assesses the faithfulness of each answer sentence to the supporting documents, and then applies a reasoning step to evaluate sentence-level correctness. By structuring reward modeling as a sequence of faithfulness, reasoning, and correctness evaluations, TRM encourages models to critically assess and leverage both external and internal knowledge. Experiments on reward signals demonstrate that TRM substantially improves the identification of incorrect sentences, and incorporating TRM into policy optimization leads to significant gains in both answer correctness and usefulness.

Where inside a language model does refusal live, and does that place change when the architecture does? In a transformer, refusal is governed by a single direction in the residual stream, a finding that safety and interpretability tooling now depend on. State-space models (SSMs) route information through a recurrent update instead of attention, sharing no token-mixing mechanism with a transformer. Does the same safety representation survive this shift, or must it be rediscovered per architecture? It survives. A single rigid rotation, which can only reorient a space and not reshape it, aligns one model's representation space with another's, so the two genuinely share the representation. A harm probe trained on a transformer then flags an SSM's harmful inputs, and removing the aligned direction makes a model answer attacks it would otherwise refuse, while a random direction of the same size does far less. What is architecture-specific is not where the direction is steered but where it must be read. Each layer computes a fresh output that is then added into the residual stream, and harm is cleanly readable at this output, the write site, before the addition. A control that holds the intervention's strength fixed shows that what matters is where the direction is estimated, not where it is applied. Applied through a detector-triggered gate, this direction lowers jailbreak success in all four architecture families we test (SSM, transformer, recurrent, hybrid), and on the SSM it holds against an attacker that tunes its prompt against the defense. The gate only matches a trivial rule that returns a fixed refusal whenever the same detector fires, so what transfers across architectures is the direction itself, not defense strength. Safety tooling built on refusal therefore ports to a new architecture by re-estimating the direction at that architecture's write site, not by rebuilding it.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

Steering aligns large language models (LLMs) by injecting a bias into selected activations at inference time, offering a far cheaper alternative to weight-update methods such as supervised fine-tuning or reinforcement learning. However, most existing training-free steering methods are input-independent: a single direction is fitted once and shared across all inputs. This is fundamentally limiting as different inputs occupy different regions of the activation space and admit different optimal steering directions toward the same target concept, much as the gradient with respect to a fixed loss varies from input to input. We close this gap with IDEEA (Input-Dependent stEEring via Activation cluster matching), a training-free framework for input-dependent steering. IDEEA clusters the positive and negative activation supports per attention head, and solves an optimal-matching problem to construct a set of cluster-conditional directions, all about the target concept. At inference time, it picks from this pool of directions and uses the one that best matches the input's own activation for steering. IDEEA aligns the model toward the target concept while preserving the input's original representation, evidence that activations encoding a concept occupy several distinct sub-regions of the representation space rather than a single one. IDEEA improves the truth times info rate in TruthfulQA by an average of 9.9% (up to 23.5%) over the best input-independent baseline.

Public-service recommendations require evidence that matches the requested service, scope, and date. Yet treating every missing detail as decisive can withhold useful recommendations. We introduce EviGraph, which distinguishes critical decision requirements from information that can remain unresolved. A language agent links these requirements to evidence in a temporal knowledge graph, while a deterministic checker establishes whether a recommendation is supported. Evaluation on a bilingual Hong Kong public-service benchmark with executable policy references shows that this distinction reduces unnecessary abstention. Additional verification, however, can withdraw supported recommendations without improving decision quality. These findings suggest that reliable evidence-based navigation depends on specifying what must be established for a decision, rather than simply adding more verification.

Predicting how a patient's vital signs respond to an intervention is a central question in intensive care. World models can do so by learning dynamics as a function of prior actions. However, such models tend to be brittle outside of training data. Clinicians choose drug dosages based on the patient's state, so the association a model learns between dose and outcome runs opposite to the drug's effect, generalizing poorly to out-of-distribution (OOD) dosing practices. Yet, pharmacological information provides the directional effects of different drugs, which are invariant to OOD shifts. To resolve the OOD sensitivity of current ICU world models, we introduce PHYSIO WORLD, which isolates an intervention's effect by evaluating a forward pass twice: once under recorded doses, and once with those doses set to zero. The difference is projected onto pharmacologically admissible effect directions stated by 70 rules over 28 drugs, leaving the magnitude to be learned from data. Across five distribution-shift parameters over cohorts from three intensive-care databases, and against forecasters, counterfactual models, and invariance objectives, PHYSIO WORLD attains the lowest OOD RMSE in every setting, improving on the strongest external baseline by 8-12%, while matching the in-distribution error of its backbone. Reversing the pharmacological directions degrades accuracy below the backbone, and data-mined directions recover almost no gain, indicating the improvement derives from the content of the pharmacological knowledge. The construction may extend to other settings where the sign of an effect is known in advance and its magnitude is confounded by treatment assignment.

The public often attributes human-like qualities to large language models (LLMs), assuming that they "know" certain things. In reality, LLMs encode information retained during training as internal probabilistic knowledge. This study examines existing methods for probing the veracity of that knowledge and identifies three flawed underlying assumptions. To address these flaws, we introduce sAwMIL (Sparse-Aware Multiple-Instance Learning), a multiclass probing framework that combines multiple-instance learning with conformal prediction. sAwMIL leverages LLMs' internal representations to classify statements as true, false, or neither. We evaluate sAwMIL across 16 open-source LLMs, including default and chat-based variants, using three new curated datasets. Our results show that (1) common probing methods fail to provide a reliable and transferable veracity direction and, in some settings, perform worse than zero-shot prompting; (2) truth and falsehood are not encoded symmetrically; and (3) LLMs encode a third type of signal that is distinct from both true and false.

A central architectural question for both biological and artificial intelligence is whether judgment relies on specialized modules or a unified, domain-general resource. While the discovery of decodable neural representations for distinct concepts in Large Language Models (LLMs) has suggested a modular architecture, whether these representations are truly independent systems remains an open question. Here we provide evidence for a convergent architecture for evaluative judgment. Across a range of LLMs, we find that diverse evaluative judgments are computed along a dominant dimension, which we term the Valence-Assent Axis (VAA). This axis jointly encodes subjective valence ("what is good") and the model's assent to factual claims ("what is true"). Through direct interventions, we demonstrate this axis drives a critical mechanism, which is identified as the subordination of reasoning: the VAA functions as a control signal that steers the generative process to construct a rationale consistent with its evaluative state, even at the cost of factual accuracy. Our discovery offers a mechanistic account for response bias and hallucination, revealing how an architecture that promotes coherent judgment can systematically undermine faithful reasoning.

Large language model (LLM)-based persona agents are rapidly being adopted as scalable proxies for human participants across diverse domains. Yet there is no systematic method for verifying whether a persona agent's responses remain free of contradictions and factual inaccuracies throughout an interaction. A principle from interrogation methodology offers a lens: no matter how elaborate a fabricated identity, systematic interrogation will expose its contradictions. We apply this principle to propose PICon, an evaluation framework that probes persona agents through logically chained multi-turn questioning. PICon evaluates consistency along three core dimensions: internal consistency (freedom from self-contradiction), external consistency (alignment with real-world facts), and retest consistency (stability under repetition). Evaluating seven groups of persona agents alongside 63 real human participants, we find that even systems previously reported as highly consistent fail to meet the human baseline across all three dimensions, revealing contradictions and evasive responses under chained questioning. This work provides both a conceptual foundation and a practical methodology for evaluating persona agents before trusting them as substitutes for human participants. We provide the source code and an interactive demo at: https://kaist-edlab.github.io/picon/

Knowledge distillation aims to transfer the factual knowledge of large language models to smaller models for efficient deployment. Yet a teacher may recall a relation in one direction while failing to generate the answer in the reverse direction. Distillation from its generated answers can therefore propagate this directional limitation to the student. The same teacher can nevertheless recognize such an answer by scoring the relation in the direction it knows. We introduce directional label distillation, in which frozen teachers score candidate answers in that known direction and the best-scoring candidate becomes the student's training target. On facts about parents and their children, known-direction scoring yields more accurate labels than scoring the requested direction, even after tuned corrections for name priors. With prior-corrected scores, the better direction depends on the facts rather than the template, and reverses on mined facts whose notable entity is the parent rather than the child. With the evaluated children's forward facts withheld, students trained on known-direction labels improve open-ended accuracy on their trained queries by 13 to 15 points over students trained on prior-corrected reverse labels. After generated answers are matched to a fixed name list by lexical similarity, students reproduce nearly all selected labels. Their accuracy largely follows label quality. The label advantage holds on unscreened queries and when candidates are retrieved without inserting correct answers. Our findings show that directional verification mitigates the transfer of errors from teacher-generated answers to students by providing more accurate training targets. Code is available at https://github.com/js-lee-AI/directional-verification.

Self-play is an effective paradigm for language-model self-evolution, but without guidance, solver performance can plateau or decline across rounds. Unguided methods steer question generation with signals such as difficulty, learnability, or diversity. These signals keep questions challenging and varied but do not specify which unresolved reasoning weaknesses later rounds should target. Guided methods obtain direction from external task resources, including human examples, document corpora, or specified difficulty targets, and therefore rely on task information supplied outside the self-play loop. We show that the needed direction can instead be derived from the solver's own failure history. We introduce DiagEvo, whose diagnostician extracts recurring error causes from this history and stores them in a hierarchical error-cause memory. The memory groups related causes under skill nodes and tracks each as Active or Mastered according to self-consistency on targeted questions. The challenger uses these states and recurrence counts to balance cause-targeted generation with free exploration. Double-confidence filtering retains intermediate-difficulty questions only when the most common solver answer has a clear vote lead. DiagEvo derives its curriculum from information produced during self-play, without external task resources. With the default 4B diagnostician, DiagEvo outperforms every baseline in mean accuracy across all nine benchmarks for each of the three solvers: Qwen3-4B, Qwen3-8B, and OctoThinker-8B. On Qwen3-8B, it reaches 72.3% mean accuracy across five mathematical reasoning benchmarks, 4.5 percentage points above R-Zero. Its mean accuracy across all nine benchmarks is 57.4%, 1.1 percentage points above DARC. Ablations show that the hierarchical error-cause memory and double-confidence filtering both contribute to these gains.

Determining whether an image is AI-generated does not establish whether the situation it depicts is factually supported. We formulate Image Factuality Assessment: given an image and a generic verification instruction, a system returns a supported or refuted verdict with an evidence-grounded explanation. Without a supplied textual claim, the system must progressively refine factual questions during investigation and align external evidence with the specific situation depicted. We introduce EviLens, an expert-reviewed benchmark of 10,174 supported and refuted images from controlled construction and web collection, covering twelve factual error types and evaluating both verdict accuracy and evidence sufficiency. We develop EviScene, a multimodal ReAct agent that interleaves visual inspection, external retrieval, and evidence analysis, using new findings to refine its questions and revisit relevant image details. We train a compact policy with supervised fine-tuning on reviewed teacher trajectories, followed by privileged on-policy self-distillation applied to verified decisions from the policy's own investigations. On the 1,527-image test set, the trained Qwen3.5-9B agent achieves 79.05% balanced accuracy and a Strict Evidence Sufficiency Rate (SESR) of 52.26%, improving over the same-backbone base agent by 6.71 and 9.37 percentage points, respectively. Its SESR is the highest among the evaluated agents.Code, models, and data will be released at https://github.com/wangzian828/EVISCENE and https://huggingface.co/ZiAnwang/EviScene.

Leveraging multimodal large language models (MLLMs) to develop embodied agents offers significant promise for addressing complex real-world tasks. However, current evaluation benchmarks remain predominantly language-centric or heavily reliant on simulated environments, rarely probing the nuanced, knowledge-intensive reasoning essential for practical, real-world scenarios. To bridge this critical gap, we introduce the task of Sparsely Grounded Visual Navigation, explicitly designed to evaluate the sequential decision-making abilities of MLLMs in challenging, knowledge-intensive real-world environment. We operationalize this task with CityNav, a comprehensive benchmark encompassing four diverse global cities, specifically constructed to assess raw MLLM-driven agents in city navigation. Agents are required to rely solely on visual inputs and internal multimodal reasoning to sequentially navigate 50+ decision points without additional environmental annotations or specialized architectural modifications. Crucially, agents must autonomously achieve localization through interpreting city-specific cues and recognizing landmarks, perform spatial reasoning, and strategically plan and execute routes to their destinations. Through extensive evaluations, we demonstrate that current state-of-the-art MLLMs, reasoning techniques (e.g., GEPA, chain-of-thought, reflection) and competitive baseline PReP significantly underperform in this challenging setting. To address this, we propose Verbalization of Path(VoP), which explicitly grounds the agent's internal reasoning by probing city-scale cognitive maps (key landmarks and directions toward the destination) from the MLLM, substantially enhancing navigation success. Project Webpage: https://dwipddalal.github.io/AgentNav/

Information theory, introduced by Shannon, has been extremely successful and influential as a mathematical theory of communication. Shannon's notion of information does not consider the meaning of the messages being communicated but only their probability. Even so, computational approaches regularly appeal to "information processing" to study how meaning is encoded and decoded in natural and artificial systems. Here, we contrast Shannon information theory with integrated information theory (IIT), which was developed to account for the presence and properties of consciousness. IIT considers meaning as integrated information and characterizes it as a structure, rather than as a message or code. In principle, IIT's axioms and postulates allow one to "unfold" a cause-effect structure from a substrate in a state, a structure that fully defines the intrinsic meaning of an experience and its contents. It follows that, for the communication of meaning, the cause-effect structures of sender and receiver must be similar.

Recent work has demonstrated the viability of using crowdsourcing as a tool for evaluating the truthfulness of public statements. Under certain conditions such as: (1) having a balanced set of workers with different backgrounds and cognitive abilities; (2) using an adequate set of mechanisms to control the quality of the collected data; and (3) using a coarse grained assessment scale, the crowd can provide reliable identification of fake news. However, fake news are a subtle matter: statements can be just biased ("cherrypicked"), imprecise, wrong, etc. and the unidimensional truth scale used in existing work cannot account for such differences. In this paper we propose a multidimensional notion of truthfulness and we ask the crowd workers to assess seven different dimensions of truthfulness selected based on existing literature: Correctness, Neutrality, Comprehensibility, Precision, Completeness, Speaker's Trustworthiness, and Informativeness. We deploy a set of quality control mechanisms to ensure that the thousands of assessments collected on 180 publicly available fact-checked statements distributed over two datasets are of adequate quality, including a custom search engine used by the crowd workers to find web pages supporting their truthfulness assessments. A comprehensive analysis of crowdsourced judgments shows that: (1) the crowdsourced assessments are reliable when compared to an expert-provided gold standard; (2) the proposed dimensions of truthfulness capture independent pieces of information; (3) the crowdsourcing task can be easily learned by the workers; and (4) the resulting assessments provide a useful basis for a more complete estimation of statement truthfulness.

Recent research has made significant strides in applying alignment techniques to enhance the helpfulness and harmlessness of large language models (LLMs) in accordance with human intentions. In this paper, we argue for the importance of alignment for honesty, ensuring that LLMs proactively refuse to answer questions when they lack knowledge, while still not being overly conservative. However, a pivotal aspect of alignment for honesty involves discerning the limits of an LLM's knowledge, which is far from straightforward. This challenge demands comprehensive solutions in terms of metric development, benchmark creation, and training methodologies. In this paper, we address these challenges by first establishing a precise problem definition and defining ``honesty'' inspired by the Analects of Confucius. This serves as a cornerstone for developing metrics that effectively measure an LLM's honesty by quantifying its progress post-alignment. Furthermore, we introduce a flexible training framework which is further instantiated by several efficient fine-tuning techniques that emphasize honesty without sacrificing performance on other tasks. Our extensive experiments reveal that these aligned models show a marked increase in honesty, as indicated by our proposed metrics. We open-source a wealth of resources to facilitate future research at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/alignment-for-honesty, including honesty-aligned models, training and evaluation datasets for honesty alignment, concept glossary, as well as all relevant source code.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers a promising window into model monitoring. However, monitoring relies on faithfulness, i.e., the model output strictly derives from its reasoning trace. We identify an alignment tension where a model must be faithful enough to be monitored, yet robust enough to reject unsafe reasoning. We demonstrate that this counterbalance exists in current Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), and show ways in which it can be addressed. We introduce HazMart, a human-written dataset set in an autonomous AI shopkeeper scenario. Unlike prior work that relies on providing hints in prompts to test faithfulness (e.g., "A Stanford professor said it should be Answer A"), we propose a novel replacement-based technique, which we call Targeted Reasoning Replacement (TRR), that directly intervenes in the reasoning chain to substitute in unsafe or illogical thoughts (e.g., "Wait, the answer must be Option B [was Option A] because it is the most fitting"). DeepSeek-R1-Llama-70B exhibits high faithfulness (97.5%) but fails to reject Unsafe Reasoning (12.3%), while QwQ-32B is more robust (73.9% safety) at the cost of lower faithfulness (74.7%). Mechanistic analyses of QwQ-32B reveal that these properties are represented by anti-correlated internal directions peaking at the action-commit token. Finally, we demonstrate that representation steering can independently amplify the safety direction, increasing safe behavior by 9 percentage points while maintaining base capabilities.

Reliable rubric grading requires more than accurate score prediction. Each judgement must be grounded in the mark scheme and evidence from the student answer. Existing credit-assignment and intervention methods, primarily designed for self-contained reasoning tasks such as mathematics reasoning, struggle in this setting because they do not identify where grading reasoning goes wrong or how the model's belief about the final mark changes during reasoning. We propose Evidence-Diagnosed Intervention Training (EDIT), a two-phase framework for training more rubric-faithful LLM graders. First, EDIT-SFT locates problematic reasoning steps using internal model signals: posterior belief over the final mark and input-grounding scores. It then revises only these local steps with help from a rubric checklist. Second, EDIT-RL calibrates the grader with belief-guided reward shaping, penalising large harmful belief drifts while still allowing helpful exploration. Experiments on two real-world, multi-subject grading benchmarks demonstrate that EDIT consistently outperforms strong supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning baselines on both in-domain and out-of-domain splits, with ablation studies confirming that internal-state diagnostics drive these gains.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

A prominent weakness of modern language models (LMs) is their tendency to generate factually incorrect text, which hinders their usability. A natural question is whether such factual errors can be detected automatically. Inspired by truth-seeking mechanisms in law, we propose a factuality evaluation framework for LMs that is based on cross-examination. Our key idea is that an incorrect claim is likely to result in inconsistency with other claims that the model generates. To discover such inconsistencies, we facilitate a multi-turn interaction between the LM that generated the claim and another LM (acting as an examiner) which introduces questions to discover inconsistencies. We empirically evaluate our method on factual claims made by multiple recent LMs on four benchmarks, finding that it outperforms existing methods and baselines, often by a large gap. Our results demonstrate the potential of using interacting LMs for capturing factual errors.

Truthfulness is paramount for large language models (LLMs) as they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. However, existing LLMs still struggle with generating truthful answers and content, as evidenced by their modest performance on benchmarks like TruthfulQA. To address this issue, we propose GRAdual self-truTHifying (GRATH), a novel post-processing method to enhance truthfulness of LLMs. GRATH utilizes out-of-domain question prompts to generate corresponding answers and adaptively optimizes the model via direct preference optimization (DPO). Note that during this process, GRATH learns truthfulness in a self-supervised manner without requiring annotated answers. In particular, GRATH first generates pairwise truthfulness training data by prompting the LLM itself, with each pair containing a question and its correct and incorrect answers. The model is then fine-tuned using DPO to learn from the difference between answer pairs. Subsequently, GRATH iteratively refines the truthfulness data and optimizes the model, leading to a gradual improvement in model truthfulness. Empirically, we evaluate GRATH using different 7B-LLMs and compare with LLMs with similar or even larger sizes on benchmark datasets. Our results show that GRATH effectively improves LLMs' truthfulness without compromising other core capabilities. Notably, GRATH achieves state-of-the-art performance on TruthfulQA, with MC1 accuracy as 54.71% and MC2 accuracy as 69.10%, which even surpass those on larger-scale models, such as Llama2-Chat-70B, by 23.62% and 24.18%, respectively.

When contextual information conflicts with the knowledge stored in model parameters, activation directions can be used to decode and steer which source the model follows. However, steering along a direction does not establish causality: whether the unedited model would naturally use that direction or whether the direction is reusable across tasks. We test these distinctions through counterfactual experiments in unambiguous settings. First, we estimate authority directions from agreement prompts, in which the context and parametric knowledge support the same answer. We then interchange naturally occurring coordinates along these directions between matched prompts that direct the model to prioritize either the supplied context or its parametric knowledge. Across Qwen, Llama, and OLMo models, this intervention reproduces 30-68% of the authority-induced shift in source choice, whereas matched controls reproduce almost none. To test cross-task reuse, we learn authority directions on two tasks separately and see that cross-task transferability closes only 9% of the authority gap while the local direction learned on the given task closes 57%. These results distinguish authority representation, causal use, and cross-task causal reuse, and suggest that authority computations may be task-dependent, rather than reusable across tasks.

Solving the AI alignment problem requires having clear, defensible values towards which AI systems can align. Currently, targets for alignment remain underspecified and do not seem to be built from a philosophically robust structure. We begin the discussion of this problem by presenting five core, foundational values, drawn from moral philosophy and built on the requisites for human existence: survival, sustainable intergenerational existence, society, education, and truth. We show that these values not only provide a clearer direction for technical alignment work, but also serve as a framework to highlight threats and opportunities from AI systems to both obtain and sustain these values.

Large language model (LLM) agents learn by interacting with environments, but long-horizon training remains fundamentally bottlenecked by sparse and delayed rewards. Existing methods typically address this challenge through post-hoc credit assignment or external reward models, which provide limited guidance at inference time and often separate reward improvement from policy improvement. We propose Self-Guide, a self-generated internal reward for language agents that supports both inference-time guidance and training-time supervision. Specifically, the agent uses Self-Guide as a short self-guidance signal to steer the next action during inference, and converts the same signal into step-level internal reward for denser policy optimization during training. This creates a co-evolving loop: better policy produces better guidance, and better guidance further improves policy as internal reward. Across three agent benchmarks, inference-time self-guidance already yields clear gains, while jointly evolving policy and internal reward with GRPO brings further improvements (8\%) over baselines trained solely with environment reward. Overall, our results suggest that language agents can improve not only by collecting more experience, but also by learning to generate and refine their own internal reward during acting and learning.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve from conversational assistants into autonomous agents, evaluating the safety of their actions becomes critical. Prior safety benchmarks have primarily focused on preventing generation of harmful content, such as toxic text. However, they overlook the challenge of agents taking harmful actions when the most effective path to an operational goal conflicts with human safety. To address this gap, we introduce ManagerBench, a benchmark that evaluates LLM decision-making in realistic, human-validated managerial scenarios. Each scenario forces a choice between a pragmatic but harmful action that achieves an operational goal, and a safe action that leads to worse operational performance. A parallel control set, where potential harm is directed only at inanimate objects, measures a model's pragmatism and identifies its tendency to be overly safe. Our findings indicate that the frontier LLMs perform poorly when navigating this safety-pragmatism trade-off. Many consistently choose harmful options to advance their operational goals, while others avoid harm only to become overly safe and ineffective. Critically, we find this misalignment does not stem from an inability to perceive harm, as models' harm assessments align with human judgments, but from flawed prioritization. ManagerBench is a challenging benchmark for a core component of agentic behavior: making safe choices when operational goals and alignment values incentivize conflicting actions. Benchmark & code available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/ManagerBench.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) show strong visualization interpretation, yet it is unclear whether their responses reflect genuine reasoning over visual evidence or factual priors learned during training. Current evaluations mix these two sources, obscuring when correct visual interpretation is overridden by memorized facts. We present a framework that isolates visual correctness from factual correctness, revealing validity limitations in existing visualization literacy assessments. Across three experiments with 15 state-of-the-art LVLMs: (1) several models reach human-level performance on standard tests (VLAT), but this may reflect factual recall rather than visual understanding, while randomized-data tests (reVLAT) underestimate literacy when correct visual interpretation is superseded by factual priors. (2) Using our Counterfactual Visualization Literacy Assessment Test (CVLAT) with capability-normalized arbitration metrics, we classify models by the sign of their visual-factual reliance index (VFRI), revealing a visualization-oriented majority and a factual knowledge-oriented minority, though several near-zero cases warrant caution. A human baseline (N=30) on the same counterfactual items confirms that people overwhelmingly follow the chart under conflict, providing a human reference point. (3) Prompt-based intervention can shift prioritization, but its effectiveness is highly model-dependent and direction-asymmetric, and high chart-reading capability does not predict prompt-controllability. Overall, high visualization accuracy is not sufficient evidence of faithful visual reasoning: reliable integration into visual analytics requires evaluating not only visualization literacy but also how models arbitrate between visual evidence and factual priors when the two diverge. Benchmark and code: https://github.com/JaeyoungKim-HCIL/CVLAT

A key challenge in training Vision-Language Model (VLM) agents, compared to Language Model (LLM) agents, lies in the shift from textual states to complex visual observations. This transition introduces partial observability and demands robust world modeling. We ask: Can VLM agents construct internal world models through explicit visual state reasoning? To address this question, we architecturally enforce and reward the agent's reasoning process via reinforcement learning (RL), formulating it as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We find that decomposing the agent's reasoning into State Estimation ("what is the current state?") and Transition Modeling ("what comes next?") is critical for success, as demonstrated through five reasoning strategies. Our investigation into how agents represent internal beliefs reveals that the optimal representation is task-dependent: Natural Language excels at capturing semantic relationships in general tasks, while Structured formats are indispensable for precise manipulation and control. Building on these insights, we design a World Modeling Reward that provides dense, turn-level supervision for accurate state prediction, and introduce Bi-Level General Advantage Estimation (Bi-Level GAE) for turn-aware credit assignment. Through this form of visual state reasoning, a 3B-parameter model achieves a score of 0.82 across five diverse agent benchmarks, representing a 3times improvement over its untrained counterpart (0.21) and outperforming proprietary reasoning models such as GPT-5 (0.75), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.67) and Claude 4.5 (0.62). All experiments are conducted within our VAGEN framework, a scalable system for training and analyzing multi-turn VLM agents in diverse visual environments. Code and data are publicly available at https://vagen-ai.github.io.

AI scientist systems are increasingly deployed for autonomous research, yet their academic integrity has never been systematically evaluated. We introduce SCIINTEGRITY-BENCH, the first benchmark designed around a dilemmatic evaluation paradigm: each of its 33 scenarios across 11 trap categories is constructed so that honest acknowledgment of failure is the only correct response, while task completion requires misconduct. Across 231 evaluation runs spanning 7 state-of-the-art LLMs, the overall integrity problem rate reaches 34.2%, and no model achieves zero failures. Most strikingly, across missing-data scenarios, all seven models generate synthetic data rather than acknowledging infeasibility, differing only in whether they disclose the substitution. A further prompt ablation study separates two drivers: removing explicit completion pressure sharply reduces undisclosed fabrication from 20.6% to 3.2%, while the underlying synthesis rate remains unchanged, revealing an intrinsic completion bias that persists independent of prompt-level instructions. These findings point to the absence of honest refusal as a trained disposition as the primary driver of observed failures. We release SCIINTEGRITY-BENCH at https://github.com/liuxingtong/Sci-Integrity-Bench.

Large language models internalize a structural trade-off between truthfulness and obsequious flattery, emerging from reward optimization that conflates helpfulness with polite submission. This latent bias, known as sycophancy, manifests as a preference for user agreement over principled reasoning. We introduce Beacon, a single-turn forced-choice benchmark that isolates this bias independent of conversational context, enabling precise measurement of the tension between factual accuracy and submissive bias. Evaluations across twelve state-of-the-art models reveal that sycophancy decomposes into stable linguistic and affective sub-biases, each scaling with model capacity. We further propose prompt-level and activation-level interventions that modulate these biases in opposing directions, exposing the internal geometry of alignment as a dynamic manifold between truthfulness and socially compliant judgment. Beacon reframes sycophancy as a measurable form of normative misgeneralization, providing a reproducible foundation for studying and mitigating alignment drift in large-scale generative systems.

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Large Language Models' safety-aligned behaviors, such as refusing harmful queries, can be represented by linear directions in activation space. Previous research modeled safety behavior with a single direction, limiting mechanistic understanding to an isolated safety feature. In this work, we discover that safety-aligned behavior is jointly controlled by multi-dimensional directions. Namely, we study the vector space of representation shifts during safety fine-tuning on Llama 3 8B for refusing jailbreaks. By studying orthogonal directions in the space, we first find that a dominant direction governs the model's refusal behavior, while multiple smaller directions represent distinct and interpretable features like hypothetical narrative and role-playing. We then measure how different directions promote or suppress the dominant direction, showing the important role of secondary directions in shaping the model's refusal representation. Finally, we demonstrate that removing certain trigger tokens in harmful queries can mitigate these directions to bypass the learned safety capability, providing new insights on understanding safety alignment vulnerability from a multi-dimensional perspective. Code and artifacts are available at https://github.com/BMPixel/safety-residual-space.

Reality may establish that an outcome occurred without identifying which evolving procedure produced it or why. This distinction matters in production ML systems whose code, configuration, and artifacts change while external feedback accumulates. We examine it in a human-directed, agent-engineered quantitative trading system, using oracle to mean an external source of realized outcomes rather than a complete correctness specification. Across one year, the account gained and outperformed a broad market index, while annual alpha was not statistically distinguishable from zero under the main retrospective specification. Retrospectively selected subperiods include adverse relative performance and conditional candidate-level weakness under declared approximate references. Engineering records document changes during the episode, and complete recommendation-to-runtime binding is unavailable. The archive does not establish a common frozen instance or a unique cause. The case motivates an outcome--diagnosis gap: outcome evidence, evaluated-object identity, and causal explanation support distinct claims. We distinguish frozen instances, pre-specified adaptive procedures, and ad-hoc development; organize archive-relative claim identifiability and an evidence hierarchy; and propose a prospective production-binding protocol. An illustrative compatible-history example shows how factual binding can resolve a recommendation's referent without supplying its counterfactual effect. The protocol is proposed rather than prospectively validated. External feedback constrains outcome claims, while provenance and additional identification structure determine the resolution of diagnosis.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks. However, they sometimes suffer from producing hallucinations, particularly in cases where they may generate untruthful responses despite possessing the correct knowledge. In this paper, we propose TruthX, an inference-time method to elicit the truthfulness of LLMs by editing their internal representations in truthful space. TruthX employs an auto-encoder to map LLM's representations into semantic and truthful latent spaces respectively, and applies contrastive learning to identify a truthful editing direction within the truthful space. During inference, by editing LLM's internal representations in truthful space, TruthX effectively enhances the truthfulness of LLMs. Experiments show that TruthX effectively improves the truthfulness of 13 advanced LLMs by an average of 20% on TruthfulQA benchmark. Further analyses suggest that the truthful space acquired by TruthX plays a pivotal role in controlling LLM to produce truthful or hallucinatory responses.

We tackle the problem of estimating a Manhattan frame, i.e. three orthogonal vanishing points, and the unknown focal length of the camera, leveraging a prior vertical direction. The direction can come from an Inertial Measurement Unit that is a standard component of recent consumer devices, e.g., smartphones. We provide an exhaustive analysis of minimal line configurations and derive two new 2-line solvers, one of which does not suffer from singularities affecting existing solvers. Additionally, we design a new non-minimal method, running on an arbitrary number of lines, to boost the performance in local optimization. Combining all solvers in a hybrid robust estimator, our method achieves increased accuracy even with a rough prior. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets demonstrate the superior accuracy of our method compared to the state of the art, while having comparable runtimes. We further demonstrate the applicability of our solvers for relative rotation estimation. The code is available at https://github.com/cvg/VP-Estimation-with-Prior-Gravity.