Daily Papers

As post-training techniques evolve, large language models (LLMs) are increasingly augmented with structured multi-step reasoning abilities, often optimized through reinforcement learning. These reasoning-enhanced models outperform standard LLMs on complex tasks and now underpin many commercial LLM APIs. However, to protect proprietary behavior and reduce verbosity, providers typically conceal the reasoning traces while returning only the final answer. This opacity introduces a critical transparency gap: users are billed for invisible reasoning tokens, which often account for the majority of the cost, yet have no means to verify their authenticity. This opens the door to token count inflation, where providers may overreport token usage or inject synthetic, low-effort tokens to inflate charges. To address this issue, we propose CoIn, a verification framework that audits both the quantity and semantic validity of hidden tokens. CoIn constructs a verifiable hash tree from token embedding fingerprints to check token counts, and uses embedding-based relevance matching to detect fabricated reasoning content. Experiments demonstrate that CoIn, when deployed as a trusted third-party auditor, can effectively detect token count inflation with a success rate reaching up to 94.7%, showing the strong ability to restore billing transparency in opaque LLM services. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/CASE-Lab-UMD/LLM-Auditing-CoIn.

A key question for AI safety is whether a language model expresses all of its reasoning in its output tokens. We demonstrate a concrete failure mode where frontier models exhibit invisible reasoning by leveraging semantically irrelevant filler tokens to improve performance on synthetic reasoning tasks. We evaluate 13 frontier language models across three tasks and find that many models benefit significantly from filler tokens, with accuracy improvements of up to 13 percentage points. The benefit depends on which tokens are used and differs across models. We further show that filler tokens enable Claude Opus 4.5 to satisfy a hidden modular arithmetic constraint without sacrificing accuracy on its primary task, demonstrating that invisible reasoning can serve objectives entirely invisible to CoT monitoring. Reinforcement learning gives Qwen3-235B strong preferences over filler token content, but neither RL nor supervised fine-tuning produces a filler token benefit that persists at test time. Our results indicate that frontier models already perform consequential computation with no interpretable trace in their output tokens.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and a key component of tasks like problem-solving and decision-making. Recent advancements have enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to potentially exhibit reasoning capabilities, but complex logical reasoning remains a challenge. The state-of-the-art, solver-augmented language models, use LLMs to parse natural language logical questions into symbolic representations first and then adopt external logical solvers to take in the symbolic representations and output the answers. Despite their impressive performance, any parsing errors will inevitably result in the failure of the execution of the external logical solver and no answer to the logical questions. In this paper, we introduce LoGiPT, a novel language model that directly emulates the reasoning processes of logical solvers and bypasses the parsing errors by learning to strict adherence to solver syntax and grammar. LoGiPT is fine-tuned on a newly constructed instruction-tuning dataset derived from revealing and refining the invisible reasoning process of deductive solvers. Experimental results on two public deductive reasoning datasets demonstrate that LoGiPT outperforms state-of-the-art solver-augmented LMs and few-shot prompting methods on competitive LLMs like ChatGPT or GPT-4.

Current evaluation of mathematical reasoning in language models relies primarily on answer accuracy, potentially masking fundamental failures in logical computation. We introduce a diagnostic framework that distinguishes genuine mathematical reasoning from superficial pattern matching through four complementary axes: forward-backward consistency, transitivity coverage, counterfactual sensitivity, and perturbation robustness. Through a case study applying this framework to Qwen3-0.6B on the MenatQA dataset, we reveal a striking disconnect between surface performance and reasoning fidelity. While the model achieves reasonable answer accuracy (70%+), it demonstrates poor backward consistency (15%), limited transitivity coverage (32.2%), and brittle sensitivity to perturbations. Our diagnostics expose reasoning failures invisible to traditional accuracy metrics, suggesting that this small model relies heavily on pattern matching rather than genuine logical computation. While our empirical findings are based on a single 600M-parameter model, the diagnostic framework itself is model-agnostic and generalizable. We release our evaluation protocols to enable the research community to assess reasoning fidelity across different model scales and architectures, moving beyond surface-level accuracy toward verifiable mathematical reasoning.

Recent advances in large reasoning models highlight Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) as a promising method for enhancing AI's capabilities, particularly in solving complex logical tasks. However, it remains unclear whether RLVR truly expands a model's reasoning boundary or merely amplifies high-reward outputs that the base model already knows for improved precision. This study presents a theoretical and empirical investigation that provides fresh insights into the potential limits of RLVR. First, we offer a new theoretical perspective that RLVR is constrained by the base model's support-unable to sample solutions with zero initial probability-and operates as a conservative reweighting mechanism that may restrict the discovery of entirely original solutions. We also identify an entropy-reward tradeoff: while RLVR reliably enhances precision, it may progressively narrow exploration and potentially overlook correct yet underrepresented solutions. Extensive empirical experiments validate that while RLVR consistently improves pass@1, the shrinkage of empirical support generally outweighs the expansion of empirical support under larger sampling budgets, failing to recover correct answers that were previously accessible to the base model. Interestingly, we also observe that while RLVR sometimes increases token-level entropy, resulting in greater uncertainty at each generation step, answer-level entropy declines, indicating that these seemingly more uncertain paths ultimately converge onto a smaller set of distinct answers. Taken together, these findings reveal potential limits of RLVR in extending reasoning horizons. Breaking this invisible leash may require future algorithmic innovations such as explicit exploration mechanisms or hybrid strategies that seed probability mass into underrepresented solution regions.

Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model's final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

RL training of multi-turn LLM agents is inherently unstable, and reasoning quality directly determines task performance. Entropy is widely used to track reasoning stability. However, entropy only measures diversity within the same input, and cannot tell whether reasoning actually responds to different inputs. In RAGEN-2, we find that even with stable entropy, models can rely on fixed templates that look diverse but are input-agnostic. We call this template collapse, a failure mode invisible to entropy and all existing metrics. To diagnose this failure, we decompose reasoning quality into within-input diversity (Entropy) and cross-input distinguishability (Mutual Information, MI), and introduce a family of mutual information proxies for online diagnosis. Across diverse tasks, mutual information correlates with final performance much more strongly than entropy, making it a more reliable proxy for reasoning quality. We further explain template collapse with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) mechanism. Low reward variance weakens task gradients, letting regularization terms dominate and erase cross-input reasoning differences. To address this, we propose SNR-Aware Filtering to select high-signal prompts per iteration using reward variance as a lightweight proxy. Across planning, math reasoning, web navigation, and code execution, the method consistently improves both input dependence and task performance.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) embed private or copyrighted information not only in their final answers but also throughout multi-step chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, making reliable unlearning far more demanding than in standard LLMs. We introduce Reasoning-TOFU (R-TOFU), the first benchmark tailored to this setting. R-TOFU augments existing unlearning tasks with realistic CoT annotations and provides step-wise metrics that expose residual knowledge invisible to answer-level checks. Using R-TOFU, we carry out a comprehensive comparison of gradient-based and preference-optimization baselines and show that conventional answer-only objectives leave substantial forget traces in reasoning. We further propose Reasoned IDK, a preference-optimization variant that preserves coherent yet inconclusive reasoning, achieving a stronger balance between forgetting efficacy and model utility than earlier refusal styles. Finally, we identify a failure mode: decoding variants such as ZeroThink and LessThink can still reveal forgotten content despite seemingly successful unlearning, emphasizing the need to evaluate models under diverse decoding settings. Together, the benchmark, analysis, and new baseline establish a systematic foundation for studying and improving unlearning in LRMs while preserving their reasoning capabilities.

Existing Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) for image forgery detection and localization predominantly operate under a text-centric Chain-of-Thought (CoT) paradigm. However, forcing these models to textually characterize imperceptible low-level tampering traces inevitably leads to hallucinations, as linguistic modalities are insufficient to capture such fine-grained pixel-level inconsistencies. To overcome this, we propose ForgeryVCR, a framework that incorporates a forensic toolbox to materialize imperceptible traces into explicit visual intermediates via Visual-Centric Reasoning. To enable efficient tool utilization, we introduce a Strategic Tool Learning post-training paradigm, encompassing gain-driven trajectory construction for Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and subsequent Reinforcement Learning (RL) optimization guided by a tool utility reward. This paradigm empowers the MLLM to act as a proactive decision-maker, learning to spontaneously invoke multi-view reasoning paths including local zoom-in for fine-grained inspection and the analysis of invisible inconsistencies in compression history, noise residuals, and frequency domains. Extensive experiments reveal that ForgeryVCR achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance in both detection and localization tasks, demonstrating superior generalization and robustness with minimal tool redundancy. The project page is available at https://youqiwong.github.io/projects/ForgeryVCR/.

LLM failures in causal reasoning, including sycophancy, rung collapse, and miscalibrated refusal, are well-documented, yet progress on remediation is slow because no benchmark enables systematic diagnosis. We introduce CausalT5K, a diagnostic benchmark of over 5,000 cases across 10 domains that tests three critical capabilities: (1) detecting rung collapse, where models answer interventional queries with associational evidence; (2) resisting sycophantic drift under adversarial pressure; and (3) generating Wise Refusals that specify missing information when evidence is underdetermined. Unlike synthetic benchmarks, CausalT5K embeds causal traps in realistic narratives and decomposes performance into Utility (sensitivity) and Safety (specificity), revealing failure modes invisible to aggregate accuracy. Developed through a rigorous human-machine collaborative pipeline involving 40 domain experts, iterative cross-validation cycles, and composite verification via rule-based, LLM, and human scoring, CausalT5K implements Pearl's Ladder of Causation as research infrastructure. Preliminary experiments reveal a Four-Quadrant Control Landscape where static audit policies universally fail, a finding that demonstrates CausalT5K's value for advancing trustworthy reasoning systems. Repository: https://github.com/genglongling/CausalT5kBench

As LLMs proliferate with diverse capabilities and costs, LLM routing has emerged by learning to predict each LLM's quality and cost for a given query, then selecting the one with high quality and low cost. However, existing routers implicitly assume a single fixed quality and cost per LLM for each query, ignoring that the same LLM's quality varies with its output length. This causes routers to exclude powerful LLMs when their estimated cost exceeds the budget, missing the opportunity that these LLMs could still deliver high quality at reduced cost with shorter outputs. To address this, we introduce R2-Router, which treats output length budget as a controllable variable and jointly selects the best LLM and length budget, enforcing the budget via length-constrained instructions. This enables R2-Router to discover that a powerful LLM with constrained output can outperform a weaker LLM at comparable cost-efficient configurations invisible to prior methods. Together with the router framework, we construct R2-Bench, the first routing dataset capturing LLM behavior across diverse output length budgets. Experiments show that R2-Router achieves state-of-the-art performance at 4-5x lower cost compared with existing routers. This work opens a new direction: routing as reasoning, where routers evolve from reactive selectors to deliberate reasoners that explore which LLM to use and at what cost budget.

We introduce CRYSTAL (Clear Reasoning via Yielded Steps, Traceability, and Logic), a diagnostic benchmark with 6,372 instances that evaluates multimodal reasoning through verifiable intermediate steps. We propose two complementary metrics: Match F1, which scores step-level precision and recall via semantic similarity matching, and Ordered Match F1, which further penalizes disordered reasoning chains. References are constructed through a Delphi-inspired pipeline in which four independent MLLMs generate trajectories, which are then aggregated via semantic clustering and validated through human quality gates. Evaluation of 20 MLLMs, including commercial frontier systems not used during benchmark construction, reveals systematic failures that are invisible to answer accuracy: universal cherry-picking (precision far exceeds recall), non-monotonic scaling trade-offs, and disordered reasoning in which no competitive model preserves more than 60% of matched steps in the correct order. Beyond evaluation, we propose the Causal Process Reward (CPR), a multiplicative reward that couples answer correctness with step-level alignment, and CPR-Curriculum, which progressively increases reasoning difficulty during training. CPR-Curriculum achieves a 32% improvement in Match F1 via GRPO where additive reward strategies fail, improving reasoning without manual step annotation.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards has emerged as a powerful technique for enhancing the complex reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, these methods are fundamentally constrained by the ''learning cliff'' phenomenon: when faced with problems far beyond their current capabilities, models consistently fail, yielding a persistent zero-reward signal. In policy optimization algorithms like GRPO, this collapses the advantage calculation to zero, rendering these difficult problems invisible to the learning gradient and stalling progress. To overcome this, we introduce Scaf-GRPO (Scaffolded Group Relative Policy Optimization), a progressive training framework that strategically provides minimal guidance only when a model's independent learning has plateaued. The framework first diagnoses learning stagnation and then intervenes by injecting tiered in-prompt hints, ranging from abstract concepts to concrete steps, enabling the model to construct a valid solution by itself. Extensive experiments on challenging mathematics benchmarks demonstrate Scaf-GRPO's effectiveness, boosting the pass@1 score of the Qwen2.5-Math-7B model on the AIME24 benchmark by a relative 44.3% over a vanilla GRPO baseline. This result demonstrates our framework provides a robust and effective methodology for unlocking a model's ability to solve problems previously beyond its reach, a critical step towards extending the frontier of autonomous reasoning in LLM.

We present ThinkProbe, a framework for structural analysis of LLM reasoning traces. ThinkProbe converts each trace into a Thought Graph a directed graph with cycles, 8 node types, and 6 edge types and derives a 19-metric five-dimensional cognitive profile (5D-CP: Breadth, Depth, Structure, Metacognitive, Efficiency) through a fully non-generative pipeline combining rule-based segmentation and discriminative semantic linking. Applied to 4{,}200 traces from 7 native reasoning models across 200 open-ended questions and 10 cognitive domains, ThinkProbe reveals that reasoning structure is a stable, model-level property: between-model variance exceeds between-domain variance by up to fourfold across four of five cognitive dimensions, with Structure showing genuine sensitivity to question domain, exposing qualitatively distinct cognitive profiles invisible to accuracy-based evaluation.

A paraphrase-quality audit of MathCheck (ICLR 2025) detected 4 semantically incorrect paraphrases in 129 groups (3.1%); removing them drops GPT-4o from rank 2 to rank 4 and elevates Claude Haiku and DeepSeek V3 above it; these ranking changes are invisible to any single-model evaluation. Cross-model unanimity found these errors automatically (>= 3/4 models for MathCheck; >= 6/9 for our primary evaluation) for under $10; in our own dataset the same protocol found that 47% of auto-generated connective-variation paraphrases were semantically incorrect. That flaw compounds a deeper measurement gap: Claude Haiku 4.5 achieves 86% accuracy yet SCR=50%, meaning half its theorems are answered differently under semantically equivalent restatements, while aggregate accuracy across 9 models spans only 86-96% yet Semantic Consistency Rates (SCR) span 50-82% -- a 32-point gap invisible to standard benchmarks. Formally, for any target ranking over 9 frontier models there exists a weighting over paraphrase families that realizes it (No-Free-Benchmark corollary), because no model Pareto-dominates all families -- so benchmark designers who select families are implicitly choosing which model wins. FormInv supplies the audit protocol (replicated on external benchmarks at 100% recall), SCR and per-theorem Cochran's Q as primary invariance measures evaluated on 9 models across 366-811 items (on Lean4-verified theorems), and FormInvSelector for regime-aware model selection.

Cross-cultural competence in large language models (LLMs) requires the ability to identify Culture-Specific Items (CSIs) and to adapt them appropriately across cultural contexts. Progress in evaluating this capability has been constrained by the scarcity of high-quality CSI-annotated corpora with parallel cross-cultural sentence pairs. To address this limitation, we introduce XCR-Bench, a Cross(X)-Cultural Reasoning Benchmark consisting of 4.9k parallel sentences and 1,098 unique CSIs, spanning three distinct reasoning tasks with corresponding evaluation metrics. Our corpus integrates Newmark's CSI framework with Hall's Triad of Culture, enabling systematic analysis of cultural reasoning beyond surface-level artifacts and into semi-visible and invisible cultural elements such as social norms, beliefs, and values. Our findings show that state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit consistent weaknesses in identifying and adapting CSIs related to social etiquette and cultural reference. Additionally, we find evidence that LLMs encode regional and ethno-religious biases even within a single linguistic setting during cultural adaptation. We release our corpus and code to facilitate future research on cross-cultural NLP.

Mobile Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents have demonstrated strong capabilities in automating complex smartphone tasks by leveraging multimodal large language models (MLLMs) and system-level control interfaces. However, this paradigm introduces significant privacy risks, as agents typically capture and process entire screen contents, thereby exposing sensitive personal data such as phone numbers, addresses, messages, and financial information. Existing defenses either reduce UI exposure, obfuscate only task-irrelevant content, or rely on user authorization, but none can protect task-critical sensitive information while preserving seamless agent usability. We propose an anonymization-based privacy protection framework that enforces the principle of available-but-invisible access to sensitive data: sensitive information remains usable for task execution but is never directly visible to the cloud-based agent. Our system detects sensitive UI content using a PII-aware recognition model and replaces it with deterministic, type-preserving placeholders (e.g., PHONE_NUMBER#a1b2c) that retain semantic categories while removing identifying details. A layered architecture comprising a PII Detector, UI Transformer, Secure Interaction Proxy, and Privacy Gatekeeper ensures consistent anonymization across user instructions, XML hierarchies, and screenshots, mediates all agent actions over anonymized interfaces, and supports narrowly scoped local computations when reasoning over raw values is necessary. Extensive experiments on the AndroidLab and PrivScreen benchmarks show that our framework substantially reduces privacy leakage across multiple models while incurring only modest utility degradation, achieving the best observed privacy-utility trade-off among existing methods. Code available at: https://github.com/one-step-beh1nd/gui_privacy_protection

Scaling laws predict loss from compute but not how capabilities interact. We measure the coupling between reasoning and truthfulness across 63 base models from 16 families and find a regime change invisible to loss curves: below a family-dependent critical scale N_c, capabilities anticorrelate; above it, they cooperate. N_c approx 3.5B parameters [2.9B, 13.4B] (bootstrap 95% CI), but model size is not the only variable that determines phase. Architecture, data curation, and training recipe each shift N_c independently: curated training eliminated the coupling dip between Qwen generations (0.025 to 0.830 at matched scale), Gemma-4 at 4B achieves coupling 0.871, characteristic of 13B+ standard-trained models, through distillation and architectural innovation, and Phi at 1B matches web-trained coupling at 10B through data curation alone. Width normalization eliminates the anticorrelation across all tested families, supporting an output-projection bottleneck. Internally, 38 of 40 models show zero competing attention heads. A sparse-regression ODE cross-predicts held-out Llama-2 at 5.6% error. The diagnostic requires no model internals -- only public benchmark scores across a model family. The cooperative regime extends to the frontier (r = +0.72, 34 models, 10 labs). Code, data, and an open-source activation-steering tool for any open-weight model are released alongside an interactive dashboard that diagnoses any model's coupling phase, suggests concrete interventions (data curation, width, benchmark rotation), and provides ODE scaling predictions, frontier diagnostics, and eigenstructure analysis: https://zehenlabs.com/cape/.

Laboratory workflows in pharmaceutical and biomedical research encode substantial tacit knowledge -- expert judgment about failure conditions, decision branching logic, and contextual dependencies -- that remains inaccessible to protocol documents, sensor streams, and existing biomedical ontologies. We present a repeatable structured expert elicitation methodology and federated Semantic Knowledge Graph (SKG) architecture for capturing and querying this knowledge, demonstrated through deployment at the Biochemical and Cellular Pharmacology Department of Genentech. Knowledge is elicited via the Protocol Intelligence Co-pilot, a purpose-built AI interview agent that applies structured elicitation lenses to surface tacit procedural knowledge with expert-assigned confidence scores, producing graph representations across three tiers: program-level decision milestones, assay protocol knowledge, and physical execution infrastructure. Separately constructed subgraphs, exemplified by immunoassay (ELISA), quantitative mass spectrometry (LC-MS/PRM), and laboratory automation, are aligned through a shared upper ontology and queried as a single federated graph. Evaluation demonstrates seven query types structurally unavailable from any individual data source, including a cross-subgraph traversal that identifies automation-masked silent failures -- conditions where execution logs report success while scientific validity is compromised. Critically, the MASKED_BY graph relationship encodes a class of laboratory risk invisible to current informatics platforms -- the structural gap that prevents existing systems from reasoning about scientific validity. This architecture provides the semantic world model that AI laboratory agents currently lack: a queryable representation of where workflows fail silently, where human judgment is irreplaceable, and which execution assets mask rather than detect failure.

As LLM-based agents are deployed in complex, multi-step workflows, a critical evaluation gap has emerged: most existing benchmarks judge only final outcomes, unable to distinguish reliable reasoning from lucky success or attribute failures to specific process deficiencies, hindering attribution in long-horizon tasks. In this work, we present ClawTrack, a dual-assessment benchmark that simultaneously measures what an agent achieves (Task Score) and how it achieves it (Process Score). ClawTrack comprises 320 tasks across 8 domains with 25+ deterministic mock services. A Process Grader scores each reasoning turn along four dimensions (goal alignment, efficiency, information utilization, and result verification), anchored by 12,541 task-specific rubric items. Evaluating 21 models over 16,000+ trials, we find that: (1) process scores effectively attribute success and failure to specific reasoning dimensions, filtering lucky passes invisible to outcome-only evaluation; (2) the four dimensions are complementary, with result verification as the systematic bottleneck; (3) the framework is robust to evaluator choice across different judge LLMs; and (4) process-based trajectory filtering yields consistent post-training improvements across model scales.

Multimodal agents repeatedly re-examine the same video frames, UI screenshots, and rendered artifacts as their context window slides and reasoning iterates, yet every look-back re-encodes from scratch, because prefix caches serve reuse only at a fixed leading position. We show this recompute is avoidable, and identify exactly what naive KV reuse loses: the cross-chunk conditioning a chunk absorbs from its neighbours. This loss is asymmetric. The direct readout of a cached chunk is recovered exactly and for free by the standard state-merge. What remains is a diffuse, low-rank residue concentrated in deep layers, invisible to single-hop retrieval but precisely what multi-hop reasoning binds on. Blind reuse therefore leaves single-hop recall intact while halving multi-hop accuracy; this is the failure mode prior position-independent caches, designed for single-context or single-image reuse, do not address. We repair it with a small, training-free low-rank conditioning patch stored alongside each position-free chunk. Reuse reduces to one operator across MLA, GQA, and MHA: exact RoPE re-rotation to any target position, plus the patch that restores cross-chunk binding. This makes three window operations cheap: reorder (one patch serves every ordering of a cached set), sliding-window survival (surviving chunks relocate via rotation only, zero re-encode), and recall (an evicted chunk is rehydrated by its patch, never re-encoded). A rank-m patch recovers full task accuracy on cross-chunk-binding benchmarks, MM-NIAH across two attention families and two-page doc-QA, at a fraction of the KV footprint, and reconstructs re-prefill KV to within bf16 rounding in a production SGLang kernel across six backbones. The conditioning signal is strongest in redundant vision and video streams, making our solution most impactful where multimodal agents spend their recompute budget.

Large language models have achieved remarkable progress on complex reasoning tasks. However, they often implicitly fabricate information when inputs are incomplete, producing confident but unreliable conclusions -- a failure mode we term ungrounded reasoning. We argue that this issue arises not from insufficient reasoning capability, but from the lack of inferential boundary awareness -- the ability to recognize when the necessary premises for valid inference are missing. To address this issue, we propose Grounded Reasoning via Interactive Reinforcement Learning (GRIL), a multi-turn reinforcement learning framework for grounded reasoning under incomplete information. GRIL decomposes the reasoning process into two stages: clarify and pause, which identifies whether the available information is sufficient, and grounded reasoning, which performs task solving once the necessary premises are established. We design stage-specific rewards to penalize hallucinations, enabling models to detect gaps, stop proactively, and resume reasoning after clarification. Experiments on GSM8K-Insufficient and MetaMATH-Insufficient show that GRIL significantly improves premise detection (up to 45%), leading to a 30% increase in task success while reducing average response length by over 20%. Additional analyses confirm robustness to noisy user responses and generalization to out-of-distribution tasks.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

Autonomous reasoning is among the most scientifically and economically motivating topics in AI today. Historically the purview of symbolic AI, recent advances have mainly emerged from deep probabilistic generative models. Despite immense interest and rapid progress, the generative AI community has not clearly converged on operational definitions for reasoning and often implicitly rejects the historical treatment of this topic in logic and verifiable automated reasoning. This position contends that definitional ambiguity leaves the construct validity of reasoning evaluation unverifiable, undermining quantifiable progress toward trustworthy autonomous reasoning. We also contend that this ambiguity is addressable. To that end, we provide (1) operational definitions based on a synthesis of the literature, positioning valid and sound reasoning as a learnable rule-based process; and (2) a checklist for best practices in the communication of AI reasoning research.

To augment language models with the ability to reason, researchers usually prompt or finetune them to produce chain of thought reasoning steps before producing the final answer. However, although people use natural language to reason effectively, it may be that LMs could reason more effectively with some intermediate computation that is not in natural language. In this work, we explore an alternative reasoning approach: instead of explicitly producing the chain of thought reasoning steps, we use the language model's internal hidden states to perform implicit reasoning. The implicit reasoning steps are distilled from a teacher model trained on explicit chain-of-thought reasoning, and instead of doing reasoning "horizontally" by producing intermediate words one-by-one, we distill it such that the reasoning happens "vertically" among the hidden states in different layers. We conduct experiments on a multi-digit multiplication task and a grade school math problem dataset and find that this approach enables solving tasks previously not solvable without explicit chain-of-thought, at a speed comparable to no chain-of-thought.

Latent reasoning models (LRMs) replace explicit chain-of-thought with continuous thoughts. Recent work treats observable latent-state patterns, such as BFS-like frontiers and decodable arithmetic computation, as evidence for internal reasoning mechanisms. Evaluating two LRMs (Coconut and CODI) against controls lacking the proposed recurrence or curriculum, we find these patterns also appear in the controls and do not always causally affect behavior. Causal interventions reveal that latent-thought utilization is not binary but graded, scaling with a thought's causal effect on model behavior. Geometric analyses reveal this effect concentrates in low-rank directions whose step-to-step geometry grows more structured as their behavioral influence increases. Latent thoughts should therefore be treated as hidden computation, not hidden explanation: decodability, attention, or static structure alone cannot establish mechanism. LRM interpretability thus requires matched controls and causal tests.

Does intelligence require the ability to reason about phenomena beyond direct experience? It is natural to suspect that some complex thought cannot be captured through language alone. However, of particular concern to this work, is whether visualising counterfactual events can complement language as a mechanism for complex thought. We ask whether LLMs can be trained to utilise such visualisation mechanisms, in a way that benefits their reasoning abilities. Motivated by this question, we propose Einstein World Models. EWMs are a blueprint for LLM-based reasoning systems that place visual-temporal rollouts inside the reasoning trace, allowing them to reason in ways that text alone may not support well. In an EWM, the LLM calls a world-module (not to be confused with a world model), to produce short rollouts of scenes under consideration. The returned rollout is treated not as the answer, but as an inspectable hypothesis that can support later reasoning. Einstein World Models extend the capability of LLMs for tool calling (such as web search or code execution), into the domain of visual thought experiments.

Inductive reasoning is an essential capability for large language models (LLMs) to achieve higher intelligence, which requires the model to generalize rules from observed facts and then apply them to unseen examples. We present MIRAGE, a synthetic dataset that addresses the limitations of previous work, specifically the lack of comprehensive evaluation and flexible test data. In it, we evaluate LLMs' capabilities in both the inductive and deductive stages, allowing for flexible variation in input distribution, task scenario, and task difficulty to analyze the factors influencing LLMs' inductive reasoning. Based on these multi-faceted evaluations, we demonstrate that the LLM is a poor rule-based reasoner. In many cases, when conducting inductive reasoning, they do not rely on a correct rule to answer the unseen case. From the perspectives of different prompting methods, observation numbers, and task forms, models tend to consistently conduct correct deduction without correct inductive rules. Besides, we find that LLMs are good neighbor-based reasoners. In the inductive reasoning process, the model tends to focus on observed facts that are close to the current test example in feature space. By leveraging these similar examples, the model maintains strong inductive capabilities within a localized region, significantly improving its deductive performance.

Existing tasks fall short in evaluating reasoning ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in an interactive, unknown environment. This deficiency leads to the isolated assessment of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning, neglecting the integrated reasoning process that is indispensable for humans discovery of real world. We introduce a novel evaluation paradigm, black-box interaction, to tackle this challenge. A black-box is defined by a hidden function that maps a specific set of inputs to outputs. LLMs are required to unravel the hidden function behind the black-box by interacting with it in given exploration turns, and reasoning over observed input-output pairs. Leveraging this idea, we build the Oracle benchmark which comprises 6 types of black-box task and 96 black-boxes. 19 modern LLMs are benchmarked. o3 ranks first in 5 of the 6 tasks, achieving over 70\% accuracy on most easy black-boxes. But it still struggles with some hard black-box tasks, where its average performance drops below 40\%. Further analysis indicates a universal difficulty among LLMs: They lack the high-level planning capability to develop efficient and adaptive exploration strategies for hypothesis refinement.

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) extend large language models with explicit, multi-step reasoning traces to enhance transparency and performance on complex tasks. However, these reasoning traces can be redundant or logically inconsistent, making them a new source of hallucination that is difficult to detect. Existing hallucination detection methods focus primarily on answer-level uncertainty and often fail to detect hallucinations or logical inconsistencies arising from the model's reasoning trace. This oversight is particularly problematic for LRMs, where the explicit thinking trace is not only an important support to the model's decision-making process but also a key source of potential hallucination. To this end, we propose RACE (Reasoning and Answer Consistency Evaluation), a novel framework specifically tailored for hallucination detection in LRMs. RACE operates by extracting essential reasoning steps and computing four diagnostic signals: inter-sample consistency of reasoning traces, entropy-based answer uncertainty, semantic alignment between reasoning and answers, and internal coherence of reasoning. This joint analysis enables fine-grained hallucination detection even when the final answer appears correct. Experiments across datasets and different LLMs demonstrate that RACE outperforms existing hallucination detection baselines, offering a robust and generalizable solution for evaluating LRMs. Our code is available at: https://github.com/bebr2/RACE.

This paper introduces a novel approach to evaluating deep learning models' capacity for in-diagram logic interpretation. Leveraging the intriguing realm of visual illusions, we establish a unique dataset, InDL, designed to rigorously test and benchmark these models. Deep learning has witnessed remarkable progress in domains such as computer vision and natural language processing. However, models often stumble in tasks requiring logical reasoning due to their inherent 'black box' characteristics, which obscure the decision-making process. Our work presents a new lens to understand these models better by focusing on their handling of visual illusions -- a complex interplay of perception and logic. We utilize six classic geometric optical illusions to create a comparative framework between human and machine visual perception. This methodology offers a quantifiable measure to rank models, elucidating potential weaknesses and providing actionable insights for model improvements. Our experimental results affirm the efficacy of our benchmarking strategy, demonstrating its ability to effectively rank models based on their logic interpretation ability. As part of our commitment to reproducible research, the source code and datasets will be made publicly available at https://github.com/rabbit-magic-wh/InDL

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) and is now being applied to Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, vanilla RLVR for VLMs verifies only the final textual output, critically neglecting the foundational step of visual perception. This oversight leads to visual hallucinations and reward hacking, as reasoning built upon flawed perception is inherently unreliable. To address this, we propose PEARL (Perceptual-Evidence Anchored Reinforced Learning), a dual-branch, perception-reasoning synergistic that strengthens multimodal reasoning by explicitly anchoring it to verified visual evidence. For each reasoning-oriented QA instance, PEARL first derive a perception checklist -- a set of perception-oriented sub-questions with verifiable answers that probe the model's understanding of key visual evidence. During training, auxiliary rollouts on this checklist yield a perceptual reward that both directly reinforces the model's perception ability and acts as a fidelity gate for reasoning. If the model passes the perception check, its policy update is biased towards evidence-anchored reasoning. Otherwise, the process is halted to prevent reasoning from flawed premises. PEARL can be seamlessly integrated with popular RL methods like GRPO and DAPO. Comprehensive experiments show PEARL achieves substantial gains on multimodal reasoning benchmarks, e.g., a +9.7% improvement over the baseline and +6.6% over GRPO on MathVerse.

Recent advances in vision-language reasoning underscore the importance of thinking with images, where models actively ground their reasoning in visual evidence. Yet, prevailing frameworks treat visual actions as optional tools, boosting metrics but leaving reasoning ungrounded and crops ineffective. This gap gives rise to the illusion of thinking with images: models seem visually grounded but rely on context-agnostic actions that neither refine perception nor guide reasoning toward correct answers. We address this problem by reframing visual actions as core reasoning primitives rather than optional tools, which we term visual rationalization, the visual analogue of textual Chain-of-Thought. Building on this insight, we propose Visual Rationale Learning (ViRL), an end-to-end paradigm that grounds training in the visual rationale itself. ViRL integrates (1) Process Supervision with ground-truth rationales, (2) Objective Alignment via step-level reward shaping, and (3) Fine-Grained Credit Assignment to distinguish correct, redundant, and erroneous actions. By ensuring each action contributes meaningfully to the reasoning chain, ViRL enables models to "get the right answer for the right visual reason". Trained purely with end-to-end RL, ViRL achieves state-of-the-art results across benchmarks spanning perception, hallucination, and reasoning. This work establishes visual rationalization as a task-agnostic, process-grounded paradigm for building transparent, verifiable, and trustworthy vision-language models.

LLM reasoning transparency is a critical affordance for understanding model decisions, mitigating misuse and misalignment, and debugging surprising model behaviors. However, DiffusionGemma performs a larger fraction of its computation in a continuous latent space; does this make its reasoning less transparent? We study this question by decomposing transparency into two components: variable transparency, whether we understand intermediate snapshots of a model's computational state; and algorithmic transparency, whether we can use these snapshots to reconstruct the process by which the model arrived at its outputs. Naively, DiffusionGemma has poor variable transparency: its opaque serial depth, the amount of serial computation that occurs in between interpretable model states, seems at first 28.6X higher than the corresponding autoregressive Gemma 4 model. However, we show that we can map the information flowing between denoising steps through an interpretable token bottleneck with no decrease in downstream performance. Treating these intermediate states as interpretable reduces the opaque serial depth to just 1.1X that of Gemma 4. Algorithmic transparency is harder for diffusion models than for autoregressive models because all token predictions in the canvas can change at every denoising step, giving the model the power to implement complicated distributed algorithms during the denoising process. To begin bridging this gap, we conduct a suite of interpretability case studies, uncovering initial evidence of novel diffusion-specific phenomena such as non-chronological reasoning, token and sequence smearing, and intermediate-context reasoning. Finally, we test monitorability, a key application of transparency that measures whether model outputs are useful for downstream tasks. We find that DiffusionGemma is similarly monitorable to Gemma 4.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Large language models are beginning to show steganographic capabilities. Such capabilities could allow misaligned models to evade oversight mechanisms. Yet principled methods to detect and quantify such behaviours are lacking. Classical definitions of steganography, and detection methods based on them, require a known reference distribution of non-steganographic signals. For the case of steganographic reasoning in LLMs, knowing such a reference distribution is not feasible; this renders these approaches inapplicable. We propose an alternative, decision-theoretic view of steganography. Our central insight is that steganography creates an asymmetry in usable information between agents who can and cannot decode the hidden content (present within a steganographic signal), and this otherwise latent asymmetry can be inferred from the agents' observable actions. To formalise this perspective, we introduce generalised V-information: a utilitarian framework for measuring the amount of usable information within some input. We use this to define the steganographic gap -- a measure that quantifies steganography by comparing the downstream utility of the steganographic signal to agents that can and cannot decode the hidden content. We empirically validate our formalism, and show that it can be used to detect, quantify, and mitigate steganographic reasoning in LLMs.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

When writing and talking, people sometimes pause to think. Although reasoning-focused works have often framed reasoning as a method of answering questions or completing agentic tasks, reasoning is implicit in almost all written text. For example, this applies to the steps not stated between the lines of a proof or to the theory of mind underlying a conversation. In the Self-Taught Reasoner (STaR, Zelikman et al. 2022), useful thinking is learned by inferring rationales from few-shot examples in question-answering and learning from those that lead to a correct answer. This is a highly constrained setting -- ideally, a language model could instead learn to infer unstated rationales in arbitrary text. We present Quiet-STaR, a generalization of STaR in which LMs learn to generate rationales at each token to explain future text, improving their predictions. We address key challenges, including 1) the computational cost of generating continuations, 2) the fact that the LM does not initially know how to generate or use internal thoughts, and 3) the need to predict beyond individual next tokens. To resolve these, we propose a tokenwise parallel sampling algorithm, using learnable tokens indicating a thought's start and end, and an extended teacher-forcing technique. Encouragingly, generated rationales disproportionately help model difficult-to-predict tokens and improve the LM's ability to directly answer difficult questions. In particular, after continued pretraining of an LM on a corpus of internet text with Quiet-STaR, we find zero-shot improvements on GSM8K (5.9%rightarrow10.9%) and CommonsenseQA (36.3%rightarrow47.2%) and observe a perplexity improvement of difficult tokens in natural text. Crucially, these improvements require no fine-tuning on these tasks. Quiet-STaR marks a step towards LMs that can learn to reason in a more general and scalable way.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

Vision-language models (VLMs) excel at multimodal understanding, yet their text-only decoding forces them to verbalize visual reasoning, limiting performance on tasks that demand visual imagination. Recent attempts train VLMs to render explicit images, but the heavy image-generation pre-training often hinders the reasoning ability. Inspired by the way humans reason with mental imagery-the internal construction and manipulation of visual cues-we investigate whether VLMs can reason through interleaved multimodal trajectories without producing explicit images. To this end, we present a Machine Mental Imagery framework, dubbed as Mirage, which augments VLM decoding with latent visual tokens alongside ordinary text. Concretely, whenever the model chooses to ``think visually'', it recasts its hidden states as next tokens, thereby continuing a multimodal trajectory without generating pixel-level images. Begin by supervising the latent tokens through distillation from ground-truth image embeddings, we then switch to text-only supervision to make the latent trajectory align tightly with the task objective. A subsequent reinforcement learning stage further enhances the multimodal reasoning capability. Experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that Mirage unlocks stronger multimodal reasoning without explicit image generation.

Reasoning has emerged as a pivotal capability in Large Language Models (LLMs). Through Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), these models are able to solve complex tasks such as mathematics and code generation. Building on these advances, recent research has sought to extend reasoning to Vision-Language Models (VLMs), yielding promising results across diverse visual tasks. Despite this progress, our study uncovers the dual nature of multimodal reasoning: while it substantially enhances logical inference and facilitates performance on challenging problems, it may gradually impair perceptual grounding, leading to recognition failures on otherwise basic visual questions. Through further analysis, we attribute this phenomenon to visual forgetting, wherein prolonged reasoning causes the model to increasingly disregard visual input. To address this, we propose Vision-Anchored Policy Optimization (VAPO), a simple yet effective method that explicitly steers the reasoning process toward visually grounded trajectories. Our result model, VAPO-Thinker-7B, significantly strengthens the model's reliance on visual information and achieves new state-of-the-art results on a wide range of established benchmarks. Project page: https://xytian1008.github.io/VAPO/

Language Models (LMs) emit Chains-of-Thought (CoTs) that drive much of their capability. However, the same sequence that carries useful reasoning can also covertly convey messages: a misaligned model may embed covert information in its CoT that slips through human supervision, a form of steganography known as encoded reasoning. Prior LM steganography schemes operate in the token or lexical space, and a content-preserving paraphraser is the canonical and effective defense in recent work. We introduce conceptual steganography, in which each step of a CoT carries information through patterns of high-level reasoning behavior, rather than through lexical choice. Across four model families and two reasoning domains, this backdoor communication channel is shown to be consistently more robust to a strong paraphrase defense than standard keyword approaches, and the encoding of information into CoTs does not affect their utility in the reasoning process. Having raised awareness of this new risk, we then demonstrate that a strategy-aware paraphraser can close much of the channel, highlighting new challenges and recommended defenses for ensuring faithful LLM reasoning in the wild.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) are increasingly deployed for vision-language tasks that produce explicit intermediate rationales. However, reasoning traces can contain unsafe content even when the final answer is non-harmful, creating deployment risks. Existing multimodal safety guards primarily evaluate only the input question and the final answer, neglecting the intermediate reasoning process. This oversight allows undetected harm, such as biased inferences or policy-violating use of visual context, to emerge during reasoning. We introduce GuardTrace-VL, a vision-aware safety auditor that monitors the full Question-Thinking-Answer (QTA) pipeline via joint image-text analysis, enabling detection of unsafe content as it emerges in the reasoning stage. To support training and evaluation, we construct the GuardTrace dataset, which is generated through diverse prompting strategies and refined via a MLRM- and human-based voting and verification pipeline. Furthermore, we propose a three-stage progressive training scheme combined with the data refinement process, enabling the model to learn nuanced and context-dependent safety preferences according to different risk levels. On our proposed test set covering both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, GuardTrace-VL model achieves an F1 score of 93.1% on unsafe reasoning detection tasks, representing a 13.5% improvement in F1 score compared to the previous strongest multimodal safety defense methods. The codes will be made publicly available.

Large language models produce fluent text but struggle with systematic reasoning, often hallucinating confident but unfounded claims. When Apple researchers added irrelevant context to mathematical problems, LLM performance degraded by 65% Apple Machine Learning Research, exposing brittle pattern-matching beneath apparent reasoning. This epistemic gap, the inability to ground claims in traceable evidence, limits AI reliability in domains requiring justification. We introduce Pramana, a novel approach that teaches LLMs explicit epistemological methodology by fine-tuning on Navya-Nyaya logic, a 2,500-year-old Indian reasoning framework. Unlike generic chain-of-thought prompting, Navya-Nyaya enforces structured 6-phase reasoning: SAMSHAYA (doubt analysis), PRAMANA (evidence source identification), PANCHA AVAYAVA (5-member syllogism with universal rules), TARKA (counterfactual verification), HETVABHASA (fallacy detection), and NIRNAYA (ascertainment distinguishing knowledge from hypothesis). This integration of logic and epistemology provides cognitive scaffolding absent from standard reasoning approaches. We fine-tune Llama 3.2-3B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B on 55 Nyaya-structured logical problems (constraint satisfaction, Boolean SAT, multi-step deduction). Stage 1 achieves 100% semantic correctness on held-out evaluation despite only 40% strict format adherence revealing that models internalize reasoning content even when structural enforcement is imperfect. Ablation studies show format prompting and temperature critically affect performance, with optimal configurations differing by stage. We release all models, datasets, and training infrastructure on Hugging Face to enable further research on epistemic frameworks for AI reasoning.

LLMs and agentic systems are increasingly deployed in social environments, making normative competence critical for safe and appropriate behavior. However, existing approaches either assess normative judgment in text alone or reduce it to choosing among a fixed set of candidate actions. We argue both are insufficient. In practice, agents are never handed a menu of options; they must identify a reasonable action from scratch, grounded in visible facts and supported by inspectable reasons. We introduce NoRA, a visual first-person video benchmark that requires models to generate candidate next actions and justify each through an explicit fact-reason-action support graph. The benchmark comprises 1,420 annotated video clips, including HumanGold-190 and LLMSilver-1230 splits. Each instance is evaluated through action alignment, factual grounding, and support binding, aggregated into a single grounded reasonableness score. We benchmark 12 multimodal systems under direct, deliberate, and structured prompting regimes, finding that current VLMs frequently recover plausible actions and relevant scene facts, but consistently struggle to construct the full reasonable action space and bind selected actions to the correct local support. NoRA makes this gap measurable, shifting the evaluation question from whether a model can pick an action to whether it can justify an appropriate action for the right visible reasons.

Spatial reasoning is a fundamental capability for vision-language models (VLMs) deployed in real-world environments. However, visual observations are inherently limited representations of a 3D world: occlusion can render objects invisible, and perspective can make geometric properties misleading. Despite this, existing spatial reasoning benchmarks typically assume that observations are sufficient and reliable, focusing on whether models produce correct answers rather than whether they recognize when a question cannot be answered and what additional observations would be needed. In this work, we challenge this assumption by constructing a controlled evaluation framework, SpatialUncertain, and introducing two types of observation challenges: (1) occlusion, which hides target information, and (2) perspective ambiguity, which produces misleading visual cues. For each configuration, we design spatial questions that are answerable under clean observations but require abstention under the introduced challenges. We further evaluate whether models can identify which additional viewpoints would resolve perspective ambiguity. Our results across a diverse set of frontier open- and closed-source VLMs reveal two consistent failure modes. First, models are prone to overconfident answering, attempting to solve spatial reasoning tasks even when visual evidence is incomplete or misleading, with average accuracy around 30\% under occlusion and below 10\% under perspective ambiguity. Second, even when additional views are available, some models perform near random chance in identifying which would provide reliable evidence. Together, our findings call for moving beyond answer correctness toward evaluating whether models know when to abstain and how to seek reliable evidence.

Many large language models (LLMs) use reasoning to generate responses but do not reveal their full reasoning traces (a.k.a. chains of thought), instead outputting only final answers and brief reasoning summaries. To demonstrate that hiding reasoning traces does not prevent users from "stealing" a model's reasoning capabilities, we introduce trace inversion models that, given only the inputs, answers, and (optionally) reasoning summaries exposed by a target model, generate detailed, synthetic reasoning traces. We show that (1) traces synthesized by trace inversion have high overlap with the ground-truth reasoning traces (when available), and (2) fine-tuning student models on inverted traces substantially improves their reasoning. For example, fine-tuning Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct on traces inverted from the answers and summaries of GPT-5 mini, a commercial black-box LLM, improves its performance from 56.8% to 77.6% on MATH500 and from 11.7% to 42.3% on JEEBench, compared to fine-tuning on just the answers and summaries.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable proficiency on general-purpose vision-language benchmarks, reaching or even exceeding human-level performance. However, these evaluations typically rely on standard in-distribution data, leaving the robustness of MLLMs largely unexamined when faced with scenarios that defy common-sense priors. To address this gap, we introduce VIA-Bench, a challenging benchmark designed to probe model performance on visual illusions and anomalies. It includes six core categories: color illusions, motion illusions, gestalt illusions, geometric and spatial illusions, general visual illusions, and visual anomalies. Through careful human-in-the-loop review, we construct over 1K high-quality question-answer pairs that require nuanced visual reasoning. Extensive evaluation of over 20 state-of-the-art MLLMs, including proprietary, open-source, and reasoning-enhanced models, uncovers significant vulnerabilities. Notably, we find that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers negligible robustness, often yielding ``brittle mirages'' where the model's logic collapses under illusory stimuli. Our findings reveal a fundamental divergence between machine and human perception, suggesting that resolving such perceptual bottlenecks is critical for the advancement of artificial general intelligence. The benchmark data and code will be released.

Studies have underscored how, regardless of the recent breakthrough and swift advances in AI research, even state-of-the-art Large Language models (LLMs) continue to struggle when performing logical and mathematical reasoning. The results seem to suggest that LLMs still work as (highly advanced) data pattern identifiers, scoring poorly when attempting to generalise and solve reasoning problems the models have never previously seen or that are not close to samples presented in their training data. To address this compelling concern, this paper makes use of the notion of critical questions from the literature on argumentation theory, focusing in particular on Toulmin's model of argumentation. We show that employing these critical questions can improve the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. By probing the rationale behind the models' reasoning process, the LLM can assess whether some logical mistake is occurring and correct it before providing the final reply to the user prompt. The underlying idea is drawn from the gold standard of any valid argumentative procedure: the conclusion is valid if it is entailed by accepted premises. Or, to paraphrase such Aristotelian principle in a real-world approximation, characterised by incomplete information and presumptive logic, the conclusion is valid if not proved otherwise. This approach successfully steers the models' output through a reasoning pipeline, resulting in better performance against the baseline and its Chain-of-Thought (CoT) implementation. To this end, an extensive evaluation of the proposed approach on the MT-Bench Reasoning and Math tasks across a range of LLMs is provided.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities, growing evidence suggests much of their success stems from memorized answer-reasoning patterns rather than genuine inference. In this work, we investigate a central question: are LLMs primarily anchored to final answers or to the textual pattern of reasoning chains? We propose a five-level answer-visibility prompt framework that systematically manipulates answer cues and probes model behavior through indirect, behavioral analysis. Experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal a strong and consistent reliance on explicit answers. The performance drops by 26.90\% when answer cues are masked, even with complete reasoning chains. These findings suggest that much of the reasoning exhibited by LLMs may reflect post-hoc rationalization rather than true inference, calling into question their inferential depth. Our study uncovers the answer-anchoring phenomenon with rigorous empirical validation and underscores the need for a more nuanced understanding of what constitutes reasoning in LLMs.

While LLMs can provide reasoned explanations along with their answers, the nature and quality of those explanations are still poorly understood. In response, our goal is to define a detailed way of characterizing the explanation capabilities of modern models and to create a nuanced, interpretable explanation evaluation tool that can generate such characterizations automatically, without relying on expensive API calls or human annotations. Our approach is to (a) define the new task of explanation critiquing - identifying and categorizing any main flaw in an explanation and providing suggestions to address the flaw, (b) create a sizeable, human-verified dataset for this task, and (c) train an open-source, automatic critiquing model (called Digital Socrates) using this data. Through quantitative and qualitative analysis, we demonstrate how Digital Socrates is useful for revealing insights about student models by examining their reasoning chains, and how it can provide high-quality, nuanced, automatic evaluation of those model explanations for the first time. Digital Socrates thus fills an important gap in evaluation tools for understanding and improving the explanation behavior of models.

Latent, or silent, reasoning lets language models carry out intermediate computation in continuous vector space instead of words, and is widely assumed to function as an internal scratchpad the model consults during inference. Whether that assumption survives reinforcement learning has not been tested directly: existing causal analyses of latent reasoning are confined to math and logic tasks, comparing reliance on thoughts within one checkpoint, never before and after RL. We train a chess-playing model through a staged latent-reasoning curriculum followed by reinforcement learning, and find legality climbs monotonically to 61% (from a 48% pre-RL baseline) while checkmate confabulation is eliminated entirely. To locate this gain, we run a six-condition causal intervention suite on the same model before and after RL: substituting or noising the thought vectors leaves performance unchanged, ablating them costs only mild degradation, and only exact-zero vectors cause collapse. This robustness gap is itself the finding: under exact-zero corruption, legality collapses to 1% pre-RL versus 9% post-RL, a gap that survives correction across the full battery. A 10x-larger replication of the post-RL checkpoint's own battery confirms this: removing the thoughts, with or without restoring sequence length, also reaches significance; substitution and noise remain indistinguishable from baseline. RL appears to add robustness to disruption, not reliance on thought content. These results push back against the field's default assumption that latent thoughts function as an actively consulted inference-time scratchpad, and instead indicate latent reasoning's principal effect here is shaping the model's parameters during training. We also demonstrate a working RL gain in chess, where multiple groups report the same latent-reasoning-plus-RL recipe failing to improve accuracy over SFT.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities at solving complex reasoning tasks with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, but their decision-making processes remain somewhat blackbox. We introduce textbfinverse reasoning, a novel paradigm enabling LLMs to decompose and explain their own reasoning chains post-hoc. Our approach, used in SAGE-nano, a 4-billion-parameter reasoning model, employs a metacognitive structure that reflects back via attention processes to identify major decision points and generate explanations of reasoning choices. While typical CoT approaches are directed towards forward reasoning generation, inverse reasoning provides insight into why specific reasoning chains were selected over others. Through thorough testing of logical reasoning puzzles, math problems and ethical dilemmas from AQUA-RAT, CommonsenseQA, and customized benchmarks, we demonstrate that SAGE-nano is at the cutting edge both on reasoning accuracy (74.6% on AQUA-RAT) and explanation quality (92.1% human preference score) for its task, and offers performance almost on par with models like Claude-3.5 Sonnet or GPT-4o. Our contributions are: (i) the first rigorous framework for LLM self-reflection via inverse reasoning, (ii) a novel metalearning framework to reverse the attention flow, (iii) comprehensive evaluation frameworks for reasoning transparency, and (iv) evidence that increasing reasoning using inverse reasoning improves interpretability along with reasoning performance. Our work creates new avenues for transparent AI systems and closes significant gaps in AI safety, education, and scientific discovery.

Eliciting reasoning has emerged as a powerful technique for improving the performance of large language models (LLMs) on complex tasks by inducing thinking. However, their effectiveness in realistic user-engaged agent scenarios remains unclear. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the effect of explicit thinking in user-engaged LLM agents. Our experiments span across seven models, three benchmarks, and two thinking instantiations, and we evaluate them through both a quantitative response taxonomy analysis and qualitative failure propagation case studies. Contrary to expectations, we find that mandatory thinking often backfires on agents in user-engaged settings, causing anomalous performance degradation across various LLMs. Our key finding reveals that thinking makes agents more ``introverted'' by shortening responses and reducing information disclosure to users, which weakens agent-user information exchange and leads to downstream task failures. Furthermore, we demonstrate that explicitly prompting for information disclosure reliably improves performance across diverse model families, suggesting that proactive transparency is a vital lever for agent optimization. Overall, our study suggests that information transparency awareness is a crucial yet underexplored perspective for the future design of reasoning agents in real-world scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/Thinking-Agent.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) such as GPT-4V have recently demonstrated incredible strides on diverse vision language tasks. We dig into vision-based deductive reasoning, a more sophisticated but less explored realm, and find previously unexposed blindspots in the current SOTA VLMs. Specifically, we leverage Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPMs), to assess VLMs' abilities to perform multi-hop relational and deductive reasoning relying solely on visual clues. We perform comprehensive evaluations of several popular VLMs employing standard strategies such as in-context learning, self-consistency, and Chain-of-thoughts (CoT) on three diverse datasets, including the Mensa IQ test, IntelligenceTest, and RAVEN. The results reveal that despite the impressive capabilities of LLMs in text-based reasoning, we are still far from achieving comparable proficiency in visual deductive reasoning. We found that certain standard strategies that are effective when applied to LLMs do not seamlessly translate to the challenges presented by visual reasoning tasks. Moreover, a detailed analysis reveals that VLMs struggle to solve these tasks mainly because they are unable to perceive and comprehend multiple, confounding abstract patterns in RPM examples.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as data-driven reasoners, yet their chains-of-thought (CoT) can be unfaithful even when final answers are correct. Most existing ``verification'' signals are not diagnostic: answer matching observes only the outcome, LLM-as-judge provides subjective and non-verifiable critiques, and scalar rewards (e.g., PRMs/RMs) offer little insight into where a multi-step derivation fails.We propose SymDiag, a neuro-symbolic framework that reframes reasoning verification as structured failure diagnosis. SymDiag translates natural-language CoT into symbolic constraints and performs step-level satisfiability/entailment checks to (i) localize failing steps and (ii) produce verifiable diagnostic evidence, including counterexamples, inconsistency witnesses, and missing-premise indicators. A central challenge is that apparent ``logic violations'' can be caused either by genuine reasoning defects or by neural-to-symbolic translation noise. SymDiag therefore incorporates a Self-Auditor that disentangles TranslationError from ReasoningError via dual symbolic encodings consistency checks, enabling robust diagnosis under partial observability. Across diverse mathematical, logical, scientific, and general reasoning benchmarks, SymDiag improves detection of unfaithful reasoning and provides substantially more effective feedback for multi-round reasoning repair than outcome-only verification and LLM-based judging, offering a principled foundation for trustworthy and scalable reasoning diagnosis.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Existing multimodal large language models have achieved high-fidelity visual perception and exploratory visual generation. However, a precision paradox persists in complex reasoning tasks: optical perception systems transcribe symbols without capturing logical topology, while pixel-based generative models produce visual artifacts lacking mathematical exactness. To bridge this gap, we propose that reasoning over visual inputs be reconceptualized as optical decompression-the process of reconstructing latent logical structures from compressed visual tokens. Guided by the axiom that Parsing is Reasoning, we introduce Thinking with Drafting (TwD), which utilizes a minimalist Domain-Specific Language (DSL) as a grounding intermediate representation. Unlike standard approaches that hallucinate answers directly, TwD forces the model to draft its mental model into executable code, rendering deterministic visual proofs for self-verification. To validate this, we present VisAlg, a visual algebra benchmark. Experiments demonstrate that TwD serve as a superior cognitive scaffold. Our work establishes a closed-loop system where visual generation acts not as a creative output but as a logical verifier, offering a generalizable path for visual reasoning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) increasingly expose chain-of-thought-like reasoning for transparency, verification, and deliberate problem solving. This creates a safety blind spot: harmful or policy-violating content may appear in reasoning traces even when final answers appear safe. We test whether final-answer safety is a sufficient proxy for the full reasoning-answer trajectory by scoring both stages under a unified twenty-principle safety rubric. Using prompts from seven public harmfulness and jailbreak sources, plus four out-of-distribution (OOD) sources, we evaluate 15 open-weight and API-based LRMs across 41K prompts per model. Reasoning traces consistently reveal additional safety risks beyond final answers, especially in high-severity stage-wise failures: leak cases, where unsafe reasoning precedes a safe-looking answer, and escape cases, where benign-looking reasoning precedes an unsafe final response. Principle-level analysis shows that risk concentrates in misinformation, legal compliance, discrimination, physical harm, and psychological harm. We further propose adaptive multi-principle steering, a white-box test-time mitigation that learns one unsafe-to-safe activation direction per safety principle and activates only directions whose current hidden state is closer to the unsafe than safe centroid. On three steerable open reasoning models, adaptive steering reduces unsafe counts in both reasoning traces and final answers on held-out and OOD benchmarks. DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-7B achieves a 40.8% average unsafe-count reduction while retaining 97.7% macro-averaged accuracy on BBH, GSM8K, and MMLU. These results suggest that LRM safety should be evaluated and mitigated over the full exposed reasoning-answer trajectory, not only at the final-answer stage.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly tasked with high-stakes autonomous decision-making, the transparency of their reasoning processes has become a critical safety concern. While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting allows agents to generate human-readable reasoning traces, it remains unclear whether these traces are faithful generative drivers of the model's output or merely post-hoc rationalizations. We introduce Project Ariadne, a novel XAI framework that utilizes Structural Causal Models (SCMs) and counterfactual logic to audit the causal integrity of agentic reasoning. Unlike existing interpretability methods that rely on surface-level textual similarity, Project Ariadne performs hard interventions (do-calculus) on intermediate reasoning nodes -- systematically inverting logic, negating premises, and reversing factual claims -- to measure the Causal Sensitivity (φ) of the terminal answer. Our empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals a persistent Faithfulness Gap. We define and detect a widespread failure mode termed Causal Decoupling, where agents exhibit a violation density (ρ) of up to 0.77 in factual and scientific domains. In these instances, agents arrive at identical conclusions despite contradictory internal logic, proving that their reasoning traces function as "Reasoning Theater" while decision-making is governed by latent parametric priors. Our findings suggest that current agentic architectures are inherently prone to unfaithful explanation, and we propose the Ariadne Score as a new benchmark for aligning stated logic with model action.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Recent think-answer approaches in VLMs, such as Qwen3-VL-Thinking, boost reasoning performance by leveraging intermediate thinking steps before the final answer, but their high computational cost limits real-world deployment. To distill such capabilities into compact think-answer VLMs, a primary objective is to improve the student's ability to utilize visual evidence throughout its reasoning trace. To this end, we introduce a novel think-answer distillation framework that encourages the student to anchor its thinking on visual information by masking the student's salient reasoning prefixes. To compensate for such masked textual cues, the student is encouraged to rely more on visual evidence as an alternative source of information during distillation. Our masking strategies include: 1) token-wise salient reasoning-prefix masking, which masks high-influence reasoning prefixes selectively for each next-token prediction, and 2) self-paced masking budget scheduling, which gradually increases the masking scale according to distillation difficulty, {measured by discrepancy between teacher--student distributions. In the distillation phase, the student is guided by our salient reasoning-prefix mask, which blocks both future tokens and salient reasoning cues, in place of the standard causal mask used for auto-regressive language modeling. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms recent open-source VLMs, VLM distillation, and self-distillation methods on multimodal reasoning benchmarks, while further analyses confirm enhanced visual utilization along the student thinking process.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Recent advances in world models and video generation have given rise to an emerging reasoning paradigm that leverages video generative models to simulate, predict, and reason about real-world dynamics. We redefine this paradigm as Thinking in Video, where video is not merely an output artifact but a medium for constructing, extending, and verifying causal thought. However, this promise remains unverified: convincing rollouts may reflect memorized appearances rather than causal understanding, while existing metrics separate perceptual fidelity from semantic logic. To evaluate whether video generators support such reasoning, we introduce the Causal-Generative Dual-Judge (CGDJ), auditing World Model Consistency from two perspectives. Explicit Causal Perception tests whether a generator reads a video scenario as a reasoning problem through spatio-temporal flattened visual question answering, while Implicit Generative Perception-Prediction Gap evaluates whether it renders the causal consequence as a consistent future video. Applying CGDJ to representative open- and closed-source generators reveals a clear Perception-Prediction Gap: open-source models produce plausible dynamics despite near-zero explicit causal perception, whereas advanced closed-source systems show stronger but still limited alignment between reasoning and generation. Further analysis exposes audio-visual misalignment, where models verbalize correct causal logic more reliably than they render it, challenging the "world simulator" narrative.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

The reasoning steps generated by LLMs might be incomplete, as they mimic logical leaps common in everyday communication found in their pre-training data: underlying rationales are frequently left implicit (unstated). To address this challenge, we introduce RATIONALYST, a model for process-supervision of reasoning based on pre-training on a vast collection of rationale annotations extracted from unlabeled data. We extract 79k rationales from web-scale unlabelled dataset (the Pile) and a combination of reasoning datasets with minimal human intervention. This web-scale pre-training for reasoning allows RATIONALYST to consistently generalize across diverse reasoning tasks, including mathematical, commonsense, scientific, and logical reasoning. Fine-tuned from LLaMa-3-8B, RATIONALYST improves the accuracy of reasoning by an average of 3.9% on 7 representative reasoning benchmarks. It also demonstrates superior performance compared to significantly larger verifiers like GPT-4 and similarly sized models fine-tuned on matching training sets.

Reasoning encompasses two typical types: deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning. Despite extensive research into the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), most studies have failed to rigorously differentiate between inductive and deductive reasoning, leading to a blending of the two. This raises an essential question: In LLM reasoning, which poses a greater challenge - deductive or inductive reasoning? While the deductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, (i.e. their capacity to follow instructions in reasoning tasks), have received considerable attention, their abilities in true inductive reasoning remain largely unexplored. To investigate into the true inductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, we propose a novel framework, SolverLearner. This framework enables LLMs to learn the underlying function (i.e., y = f_w(x)), that maps input data points (x) to their corresponding output values (y), using only in-context examples. By focusing on inductive reasoning and separating it from LLM-based deductive reasoning, we can isolate and investigate inductive reasoning of LLMs in its pure form via SolverLearner. Our observations reveal that LLMs demonstrate remarkable inductive reasoning capabilities through SolverLearner, achieving near-perfect performance with ACC of 1 in most cases. Surprisingly, despite their strong inductive reasoning abilities, LLMs tend to relatively lack deductive reasoning capabilities, particularly in tasks involving ``counterfactual'' reasoning.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at many multimodal tasks, yet their cognitive processes remain opaque on complex lateral thinking challenges like rebus puzzles. While recent work has demonstrated these models struggle significantly with rebus puzzle solving, the underlying reasoning processes and failure patterns remain largely unexplored. We address this gap through a comprehensive explainability analysis that moves beyond performance metrics to understand how VLMs approach these complex lateral thinking challenges. Our study contributes a systematically annotated dataset of 221 rebus puzzles across six cognitive categories, paired with an evaluation framework that separates reasoning quality from answer correctness. We investigate three prompting strategies designed to elicit different types of explanatory processes and reveal critical insights into VLM cognitive processes. Our findings demonstrate that reasoning quality varies dramatically across puzzle categories, with models showing systematic strengths in visual composition while exhibiting fundamental limitations in absence interpretation and cultural symbolism. We also discover that prompting strategy substantially influences both cognitive approach and problem-solving effectiveness, establishing explainability as an integral component of model performance rather than a post-hoc consideration.

LLMs' decision-making process is opaque, prompting the need for explanation techniques like Chain-of-Thought. To investigate the relationship between answer and reasoning, we design a novel evaluation framework, MATCHA. In domains like education and healthcare, reasoning is key for model trustworthiness. MATCHA reveals that LLMs under input perturbations can give inconsistent or nonsensical reasoning. Additionally, we use LLM judges to assess reasoning robustness across models. Our results show that LLMs exhibit greater vulnerability to input perturbations for multi-step and commonsense tasks than compared to logical tasks. Also, we show non-trivial transfer rates of our successful examples to black-box models. Our evaluation framework helps to better understand LLM reasoning mechanisms and guides future models toward more robust and reasoning-driven architectures, enforcing answer-reasoning consistency.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

Reasoning Language Models, capable of extended chain-of-thought reasoning, have demonstrated remarkable performance on tasks requiring complex logical inference. However, applying elaborate reasoning for all queries often results in substantial computational inefficiencies, particularly when many problems admit straightforward solutions. This motivates an open question: Can LLMs learn when to think? To answer this, we propose Thinkless, a learnable framework that empowers an LLM to adaptively select between short-form and long-form reasoning, based on both task complexity and the model's ability. Thinkless is trained under a reinforcement learning paradigm and employs two control tokens, <short> for concise responses and <think> for detailed reasoning. At the core of our method is a Decoupled Group Relative Policy Optimization (DeGRPO) algorithm, which decomposes the learning objective of hybrid reasoning into two components: (1) a control token loss that governs the selection of the reasoning mode, and (2) a response loss that improves the accuracy of the generated answers. This decoupled formulation enables fine-grained control over the contributions of each objective, stabilizing training and effectively preventing collapse observed in vanilla GRPO. Empirically, on several benchmarks such as Minerva Algebra, MATH-500, and GSM8K, Thinkless is able to reduce the usage of long-chain thinking by 50% - 90%, significantly improving the efficiency of Reasoning Language Models. The code is available at https://github.com/VainF/Thinkless

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have become a central focus in today's large language model (LLM) research, where models are designed to output a step-by-step thinking process before arriving at a final answer to handle complex reasoning tasks. Despite their promise, recent empirical studies (e.g., [Shojaee et al., 2025] from Apple) suggest that this thinking process may not actually enhance reasoning ability, where LLMs without explicit reasoning actually outperform LRMs on tasks with low or high complexity. In this work, we revisit these findings and investigate whether the limitations of LRMs persist when tool augmentations are introduced. We incorporate two types of tools, Python interpreters and scratchpads, and evaluate three representative LLMs and their LRM counterparts on Apple's benchmark reasoning puzzles. Our results show that, with proper tool use, LRMs consistently outperform their non-reasoning counterparts across all levels of task complexity. These findings challenge the recent narrative that reasoning is an illusion and highlight the potential of tool-augmented LRMs for solving complex problems.

Recently developed large language models (LLMs) have been shown to perform remarkably well on a wide range of language understanding tasks. But, can they really "reason" over the natural language? This question has been receiving significant research attention and many reasoning skills such as commonsense, numerical, and qualitative have been studied. However, the crucial skill pertaining to 'logical reasoning' has remained underexplored. Existing work investigating this reasoning ability of LLMs has focused only on a couple of inference rules (such as modus ponens and modus tollens) of propositional and first-order logic. Addressing the above limitation, we comprehensively evaluate the logical reasoning ability of LLMs on 25 different reasoning patterns spanning over propositional, first-order, and non-monotonic logics. To enable systematic evaluation, we introduce LogicBench, a natural language question-answering dataset focusing on the use of a single inference rule. We conduct detailed analysis with a range of LLMs such as GPT-4, ChatGPT, Gemini, Llama-2, and Mistral using chain-of-thought prompting. Experimental results show that existing LLMs do not fare well on LogicBench; especially, they struggle with instances involving complex reasoning and negations. Furthermore, they sometimes overlook contextual information necessary for reasoning to arrive at the correct conclusion. We believe that our work and findings facilitate future research for evaluating and enhancing the logical reasoning ability of LLMs. Data and code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/LogicBench.

Reasoning is a core capability in artificial intelligence systems, for which large language models (LLMs) have recently shown remarkable progress. However, most work focuses exclusively on deductive reasoning, which is problematic since other types of reasoning are also essential in solving real-world problems, and they are less explored. This work focuses on evaluating LLMs' inductive and abductive reasoning capabilities. We introduce a programmable and synthetic dataset, InAbHyD (pronounced in-a-bid), where each reasoning example consists of an incomplete world model and a set of observations. The task for the intelligent agent is to produce hypotheses to explain observations under the incomplete world model to solve each reasoning example. We propose a new metric to evaluate the quality of hypotheses based on Occam's Razor. We evaluate and analyze some state-of-the-art LLMs. Our analysis shows that LLMs can perform inductive and abductive reasoning in simple scenarios, but struggle with complex world models and producing high-quality hypotheses, even with popular reasoning-enhancing techniques such as in-context learning and RLVR.

''Thinking with Images'' has emerged as an effective paradigm for fine-grained visual reasoning: by explicitly zooming into relevant regions and reasoning over crops, models can access local evidence that is difficult to recover from a single global image. However, this benefit comes with redundant tool invocations and longer inference traces. Moreover, when such behaviors are learned mainly from outcome reward, the resulting intermediate crops or visual cues can be noisy or fail to faithfully capture task-relevant visual evidence. In this work, we ask whether the reasoning benefits of ''Thinking with Images'' can be internalized through Thinking with Imagination: an internal process that decides where to look and imagines what visual cues closer inspection would reveal without actually invoking tools. We propose Imagine-OPD, an on-policy self-distillation framework in which a teacher plays the role of a ''Thinking with Images'' reasoner during training: it receives privileged zoomed evidence views derived from annotated regions, and supervises the model's own imagination reasoning trajectories. Imagine-OPD does not require an external teacher or high-quality imagination demonstrations. Experiments on vision-centric benchmarks show that Imagine-OPD achieves the best average performance among compared models while significantly reducing inference overhead compared with ''Thinking with Images'' methods.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

When AI systems explain their reasoning step-by-step, practitioners often assume these explanations reveal what actually influenced the AI's answer. We tested this assumption by embedding hints into questions and measuring whether models mentioned them. In a study of over 9,000 test cases across 11 leading AI models, we found a troubling pattern: models almost never mention hints spontaneously, yet when asked directly, they admit noticing them. This suggests models see influential information but choose not to report it. Telling models they are being watched does not help. Forcing models to report hints works, but causes them to report hints even when none exist and reduces their accuracy. We also found that hints appealing to user preferences are especially dangerous-models follow them most often while reporting them least. These findings suggest that simply watching AI reasoning is not enough to catch hidden influences.

Human cognition exhibits systematic compositionality, the algebraic ability to generate infinite novel combinations from finite learned components, which is the key to understanding and reasoning about complex logic. In this work, we investigate the compositionality of large language models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning. Specifically, we construct a new dataset MathTrap by introducing carefully designed logical traps into the problem descriptions of MATH and GSM8K. Since problems with logical flaws are quite rare in the real world, these represent "unseen" cases to LLMs. Solving these requires the models to systematically compose (1) the mathematical knowledge involved in the original problems with (2) knowledge related to the introduced traps. Our experiments show that while LLMs possess both components of requisite knowledge, they do not spontaneously combine them to handle these novel cases. We explore several methods to mitigate this deficiency, such as natural language prompts, few-shot demonstrations, and fine-tuning. Additionally, we test the recently released OpenAI o1 model and find that human-like `slow thinking' helps improve the compositionality of LLMs. Overall, systematic compositionality remains an open challenge for large language models.

Despite impressive progress in high-fidelity image synthesis, generative models still struggle with logic-intensive instruction following, exposing a persistent reasoning--execution gap. Meanwhile, closed-source systems (e.g., Nano Banana) have demonstrated strong reasoning-driven image generation, highlighting a substantial gap to current open-source models. We argue that closing this gap requires not merely better visual generators, but executable reasoning: decomposing high-level intents into grounded, verifiable plans that directly steer the generative process. To this end, we propose Unified Thinker, a task-agnostic reasoning architecture for general image generation, designed as a unified planning core that can plug into diverse generators and workflows. Unified Thinker decouples a dedicated Thinker from the image Generator, enabling modular upgrades of reasoning without retraining the entire generative model. We further introduce a two-stage training paradigm: we first build a structured planning interface for the Thinker, then apply reinforcement learning to ground its policy in pixel-level feedback, encouraging plans that optimize visual correctness over textual plausibility. Extensive experiments on text-to-image generation and image editing show that Unified Thinker substantially improves image reasoning and generation quality.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Large language models (LLMs) have made remarkable strides in various natural language processing tasks, but their performance on complex reasoning problems remains hindered by a lack of explainability and trustworthiness. This issue, often manifesting as hallucinations or unattributable reasoning processes, limits their applicability in complex reasoning scenarios. To address this, we propose Knowledge Graph-constrained Trajectory Reasoning Attribution and Chain Explanation Supervision (KG-TRACES), a novel framework that enhances the reasoning ability of LLMs through explicit supervision over reasoning paths and processes. KG-TRACES jointly supervises the model to: (1) predict symbolic relation paths, (2) predict full triple-level reasoning paths, and (3) generate attribution-aware reasoning processes grounded in the reasoning paths. At inference phase, the model adapts to both KG-available and KG-unavailable scenarios, retrieving reasoning paths from a KG when possible or predicting plausible reasoning paths with only intrinsic knowledge when not. This design enables the model to reason in an explainable and source-attributable pattern. Through extensive experiments on complex reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that KG-TRACES significantly outperforms existing SOTA: it improves Hits@1 by 1.6% and F1 by 4.7% on WebQSP, and achieves improvements of 4.8% in Hits@1 and 2.1% in F1 on CWQ. Moreover, we show its transferability to specialized domains such as medicine. By visualizing the intermediate steps of reasoning processes, we further show that the explicit supervision introduced by KG-TRACES leads to more stable and goal-directed reasoning processes, aligning closely with correct answers. Code is available at https://github.com/Edaizi/KG-TRACES.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has significantly advanced reasoning capabilities in Large Language Models. However, adapting RLVR to multimodal domains suffers from a critical perception-reasoning decoupling. Existing paradigms, driven by text-centric outcome rewards, reasoning in language medium, inadvertently encourage models to bypass visual perception. We empirically validate this through blind experiments: state-of-the-art policies maintain or surprisingly improve performance even when visual inputs are entirely removed. This reveals that these models degenerate into blind reasoners, exploiting linguistic priors to generate plausible answers instead of attending to visual evidence. In response, we propose Thinking with Deltas, a framework driven by a Differential Visual Reasoning Policy (DVRP). DVRP introduces intrinsic supervision via visual triplets, comprising original, masked, and perturbed inputs. It optimizes the model to maximize reasoning divergence from masked inputs (enforcing visual sensitivity) while minimizing divergence from perturbed inputs (ensuring visual robustness). By aligning reasoning variations strictly with the Delta of visual information, DVRP inherently bolsters visual understanding capabilities and significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods on both general and medical benchmarks, without requiring external annotations or auxiliary tools.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Recent advances in language models have demonstrated their capability to solve mathematical reasoning problems, achieving near-perfect accuracy on grade-school level math benchmarks like GSM8K. In this paper, we formally study how language models solve these problems. We design a series of controlled experiments to address several fundamental questions: (1) Can language models truly develop reasoning skills, or do they simply memorize templates? (2) What is the model's hidden (mental) reasoning process? (3) Do models solve math questions using skills similar to or different from humans? (4) Do models trained on GSM8K-like datasets develop reasoning skills beyond those necessary for solving GSM8K problems? (5) What mental process causes models to make reasoning mistakes? (6) How large or deep must a model be to effectively solve GSM8K-level math questions? Our study uncovers many hidden mechanisms by which language models solve mathematical questions, providing insights that extend beyond current understandings of LLMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated good performance in many reasoning tasks, but they still struggle with some complicated reasoning tasks including logical reasoning. One non-negligible reason for LLMs' suboptimal performance on logical reasoning is their overlooking of understanding logical fallacies correctly. To evaluate LLMs' capability of logical fallacy understanding (LFU), we propose five concrete tasks from three cognitive dimensions of WHAT, WHY, and HOW in this paper. Towards these LFU tasks, we have successfully constructed a new dataset LFUD based on GPT-4 accompanied by a little human effort. Our extensive experiments justify that our LFUD can be used not only to evaluate LLMs' LFU capability, but also to fine-tune LLMs to obtain significantly enhanced performance on logical reasoning.

For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed in both everyday and high-stakes domains, knowing when not to answer is equally critical as answering correctly. Real-world user queries, which can be underspecified, ill-posed, or fundamentally unanswerable, require LLMs to reason about uncertainty and selectively abstain -- i.e., refuse to answer definitively. However, abstention remains understudied, without a systematic evaluation framework for modern LLMs. In this work, we introduce AbstentionBench, a large-scale benchmark for holistically evaluating abstention across 20 diverse datasets, including questions with unknown answers, underspecification, false premises, subjective interpretations, and outdated information. Evaluating 20 frontier LLMs reveals abstention is an unsolved problem, and one where scaling models is of little use. While recent reasoning LLMs have shown impressive results in complex problem solving, surprisingly, we find that reasoning fine-tuning degrades abstention (by 24% on average), even for math and science domains on which reasoning models are explicitly trained. We find that while a carefully crafted system prompt can boost abstention in practice, it does not resolve models' fundamental inability to reason about uncertainty. We release AbstentionBench to foster research into advancing LLM reliability.

Although perception systems have made remarkable advancements in recent years, they still rely on explicit human instruction to identify the target objects or categories before executing visual recognition tasks. Such systems lack the ability to actively reason and comprehend implicit user intentions. In this work, we propose a new segmentation task -- reasoning segmentation. The task is designed to output a segmentation mask given a complex and implicit query text. Furthermore, we establish a benchmark comprising over one thousand image-instruction pairs, incorporating intricate reasoning and world knowledge for evaluation purposes. Finally, we present LISA: large Language Instructed Segmentation Assistant, which inherits the language generation capabilities of the multi-modal Large Language Model (LLM) while also possessing the ability to produce segmentation masks. We expand the original vocabulary with a <SEG> token and propose the embedding-as-mask paradigm to unlock the segmentation capability. Remarkably, LISA can handle cases involving: 1) complex reasoning; 2) world knowledge; 3) explanatory answers; 4) multi-turn conversation. Also, it demonstrates robust zero-shot capability when trained exclusively on reasoning-free datasets. In addition, fine-tuning the model with merely 239 reasoning segmentation image-instruction pairs results in further performance enhancement. Experiments show our method not only unlocks new reasoning segmentation capabilities but also proves effective in both complex reasoning segmentation and standard referring segmentation tasks. Code, models, and demo are at https://github.com/dvlab-research/LISA.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow user instructions is central to their reliability, safety, and usefulness. While prior studies assess instruction adherence in the model's main responses, we argue that it is also critical for large reasoning models (LRMs) to follow user instructions throughout their reasoning process. Reasoning instruction following makes LRMs more controllable and transparent, while reducing risks of undesirable shortcuts, hallucinations, or reward hacking within reasoning traces. To evaluate this dimension, we introduce ReasonIF, a systematic benchmark for assessing reasoning instruction following. ReasonIF includes six categories of instruction prompts, spanning multilingual reasoning, formatting and length control. Across many open-source LRMs including GPT-OSS, Qwen3, and DeepSeek-R1, we find substantial failures in reasoning instruction adherence: the highest instruction following score (IFS) remains below 0.25, meaning that fewer than 25% of reasoning traces comply with the given instructions. Notably, as task difficulty increases, reasoning instruction following degrades further. We also explore two strategies to enhance reasoning instruction fidelity. (1) multi-turn reasoning and (2) Reasoning Instruction Finetuning (RIF) using synthetic data. RIF improves the IFS of GPT-OSS-20B from 0.11 to 0.27, indicating measurable progress but leaving ample room for improvement.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

When building artificial intelligence systems that can reason and answer questions about visual data, we need diagnostic tests to analyze our progress and discover shortcomings. Existing benchmarks for visual question answering can help, but have strong biases that models can exploit to correctly answer questions without reasoning. They also conflate multiple sources of error, making it hard to pinpoint model weaknesses. We present a diagnostic dataset that tests a range of visual reasoning abilities. It contains minimal biases and has detailed annotations describing the kind of reasoning each question requires. We use this dataset to analyze a variety of modern visual reasoning systems, providing novel insights into their abilities and limitations.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have made remarkable progress on vision-language reasoning, yet most methods still compress visual evidence into discrete textual thoughts, creating an information bottleneck for fine-grained perception. Recent latent visual reasoning methods attempt to reason in continuous hidden states, but we find that they suffer from insufficient manifold compatibility: latent trajectories drift away from pretrained reasoning circuits, collapse into instance-agnostic patterns, and are often bypassed during answer generation. To address these issues, we propose RIS (Retrieve, Integrate, and Synthesize), a spatial-semantic grounded framework that develops latent reasoning as a compatible extension of pretrained MLLM computation. We first construct a step-wise grounded reasoning dataset with bounding boxes and region-specific semantic descriptions. Built on this supervision, RIS anchors latent tokens to both spatial and semantic evidence, enforces their causal role through a progressive attention bottleneck, and introduces short language transition tokens to bridge synthesized latent states back to vocabulary-aligned decoding. Experiments on V*, HRBench4K, HRBench8K, MMVP, and BLINK show consistent improvements over closed/open-source and latent reasoning baselines. Further analyses demonstrate that RIS learns diverse, interpretable, and progressively integrated latent trajectories, offering a practical path toward faithful internal visual reasoning in MLLMs.

Reverse Chain-of-Thought Generation (RCG) synthesizes reasoning traces from query-answer pairs, but runs the risk of producing post-hoc rationalizations: when models can see the answer during generation, the answer serves as a cognitive anchor that shapes the entire explanation. We formalize this phenomenon through a three-level measurement hierarchy: lexical, entropic, and probabilistic anchoring, each captures surface artifacts, entropy dynamics, and latent answer dependence, respectively. We analyze semantic suppression, the intuitive mitigation strategy that instructs models to ignore the answer, to find out its counterproduction: while it reduces lexical overlap, it paradoxically increases entropic and probabilistic anchoring. Drawing on Ironic Process Theory from cognitive psychology, we attribute this failure to active monitoring of the forbidden answer, which inadvertently deepens dependence on it. To break this cycle, we propose Structural Skeleton-guided Reasoning (SSR), a two-phase approach that first generates an answer-invariant functional skeleton structure, then uses this skeleton to guide full trace generation. By redirecting the information flow to structural planning rather than answer monitoring, SSR consistently reduces anchoring across all three levels. We further introduce Distilled SSR (SSR-D), which fine-tunes models on teacher-generated SSR traces to ensure reliable structural adherence. Experiments across open-ended reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SSR-D achieves up to 10% improvement over suppression baselines while preserving out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Answer-only reinforcement learning (RL) trains reasoning models to solve fully specified problems, but many realistic queries omit a premise needed for a unique answer. In this setting, the useful response is not always refusal: the model should ask for the missing premise, condition its answer on the unknown quantity, or abstain when no informative conditional response is available. We present Ask-Condition-Abstain Reinforcement Learning (ACA-RL), a data-augmented RL framework for this setting. Its reasoning-graph-guided pipeline converts well-posed problems into missing-premise training instances with localized gap annotations; ACA-RL then trains on these instances with a structured reward over five observable response behaviors. We also introduce the Missing-Premise Benchmark (MPB), a 274-instance human-verified benchmark spanning mathematical, logical, and real-world word problems. Across Qwen3 and Llama models, ACA-RL consistently improves on MPB while preserving competitive performance on well-posed reasoning tasks. Together with the released code, MPB, and training data, this work supports a new mission for NLP evaluation: measuring whether models can recognize when a task is underdetermined and handle uncertainty, not only whether they can answer fully specified questions.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning not only enhances large language model performance but also provides critical insights into decision-making processes, marking it as a useful tool for monitoring model intent and planning. However, recent works have shown that banning the mention of a specific example of reward hacking causes obfuscation of the undesired reasoning traces but the persistence of the undesired behavior, threatening the reliability of CoT monitoring. We provide an extension to these results with regard to the ability of models to learn a specific type of obfuscated reasoning: steganography. First, we show that penalizing the use of specific strings within load-bearing reasoning traces causes models to substitute alternative strings. Crucially, this does not alter the underlying method by which the model performs the task, demonstrating that the model can learn to steganographically encode its reasoning.We further demonstrate that models can generalize an encoding scheme. When the penalized strings belong to an overarching class, the model learns not only to substitute strings seen in training, but also develops a general encoding scheme for all members of the class which it can apply to held-out testing strings.

Recent advances in deep thinking models have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities on mathematical and coding tasks. However, their effectiveness in embodied domains which require continuous interaction with environments through image action interleaved trajectories remains largely -unexplored. We present Embodied Reasoner, a model that extends o1 style reasoning to interactive embodied search tasks. Unlike mathematical reasoning that relies primarily on logical deduction, embodied scenarios demand spatial understanding, temporal reasoning, and ongoing self-reflection based on interaction history. To address these challenges, we synthesize 9.3k coherent Observation-Thought-Action trajectories containing 64k interactive images and 90k diverse thinking processes (analysis, spatial reasoning, reflection, planning, and verification). We develop a three-stage training pipeline that progressively enhances the model's capabilities through imitation learning, self-exploration via rejection sampling, and self-correction through reflection tuning. The evaluation shows that our model significantly outperforms those advanced visual reasoning models, e.g., it exceeds OpenAI o1, o3-mini, and Claude-3.7 by +9\%, 24\%, and +13\%. Analysis reveals our model exhibits fewer repeated searches and logical inconsistencies, with particular advantages in complex long-horizon tasks. Real-world environments also show our superiority while exhibiting fewer repeated searches and logical inconsistency cases.

Significant advancements in the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are now driven by test-time scaling laws, particularly those leveraging extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. Inspired by these breakthroughs, researchers have extended these paradigms to Large Multimodal Models (LMMs). However, a critical limitation emerges: as their reasoning chains extend, LMMs increasingly rely on textual logic, progressively losing grounding in the underlying visual information. This leads to reasoning paths that diverge from the image content, culminating in erroneous conclusions. To address this, we introduce a strikingly simple yet effective training-free visual-reasoning pipeline. The core concept is to decouple the reasoning and perception processes. A powerful LLM orchestrates the high-level reasoning, strategically interrogating a LMM to extract specific visual information required for its logical chain. The LMM, in turn, functions exclusively as a visual question-answering engine, supplying the necessary perceptual details on demand. This lightweight, plug-and-play approach requires no additional training or architectural changes. Comprehensive evaluations validate that our framework effectively governs the visual reasoning process, leading to a significant reduction in visually-unfounded reasoning steps and a substantial improvement in reasoning fidelity.

This paper investigates an under-explored challenge in large language models (LLMs): chain-of-thought prompting with noisy rationales, which include irrelevant or inaccurate reasoning thoughts within examples used for in-context learning. We construct NoRa dataset that is tailored to evaluate the robustness of reasoning in the presence of noisy rationales. Our findings on NoRa dataset reveal a prevalent vulnerability to such noise among current LLMs, with existing robust methods like self-correction and self-consistency showing limited efficacy. Notably, compared to prompting with clean rationales, base LLM drops by 1.4%-19.8% in accuracy with irrelevant thoughts and more drastically by 2.2%-40.4% with inaccurate thoughts. Addressing this challenge necessitates external supervision that should be accessible in practice. Here, we propose the method of contrastive denoising with noisy chain-of-thought (CD-CoT). It enhances LLMs' denoising-reasoning capabilities by contrasting noisy rationales with only one clean rationale, which can be the minimal requirement for denoising-purpose prompting. This method follows a principle of exploration and exploitation: (1) rephrasing and selecting rationales in the input space to achieve explicit denoising and (2) exploring diverse reasoning paths and voting on answers in the output space. Empirically, CD-CoT demonstrates an average improvement of 17.8% in accuracy over the base model and shows significantly stronger denoising capabilities than baseline methods. The source code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/NoisyRationales.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in multimodal reasoning. However, prevailing reinforcement learning (RL) paradigms lack explicit counterfactual enhancement and causal learning mechanisms. This fundamental deficiency results in severe grounding failures, manifesting as a tendency to ignore visual evidence in favor of language priors or exhibiting hallucination drift during long chain-of-thought reasoning. To address this root cause, we propose CounterFactual Policy Optimization (CFPO), a novel framework that enforces causal consistency between visual perception and textual reasoning. CFPO introduces a cross-modal counterfactual enhancement mechanism, which regularizes the policy by maximizing the discrepancy between the model's predictions and those from a counterfactual state where critical visual cues are suppressed. This approach seamlessly integrates with standard algorithms like GRPO and DAPO without requiring external reward models or additional supervision. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CFPO significantly improves reasoning fidelity, achieving consistent gains of 3.17%-6.25% over standard RL baselines and 1.32%-2.13% over the state-of-the-art perception-aware method (PAPO). Code is available at https://github.com/Raven-July/CFPO.