Daily Papers

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively induce unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs); however, the transferability of these attacks across different models remains limited. This study aims to understand and enhance the transferability of gradient-based jailbreaking methods, which are among the standard approaches for attacking white-box models. Through a detailed analysis of the optimization process, we introduce a novel conceptual framework to elucidate transferability and identify superfluous constraints-specifically, the response pattern constraint and the token tail constraint-as significant barriers to improved transferability. Removing these unnecessary constraints substantially enhances the transferability and controllability of gradient-based attacks. Evaluated on Llama-3-8B-Instruct as the source model, our method increases the overall Transfer Attack Success Rate (T-ASR) across a set of target models with varying safety levels from 18.4% to 50.3%, while also improving the stability and controllability of jailbreak behaviors on both source and target models.

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively manipulate open-source large language models (LLMs) to produce harmful responses. However, these attacks exhibit limited transferability, failing to disrupt proprietary LLMs consistently. To reliably identify vulnerabilities in proprietary LLMs, this work investigates the transferability of jailbreaking attacks by analysing their impact on the model's intent perception. By incorporating adversarial sequences, these attacks can redirect the source LLM's focus away from malicious-intent tokens in the original input, thereby obstructing the model's intent recognition and eliciting harmful responses. Nevertheless, these adversarial sequences fail to mislead the target LLM's intent perception, allowing the target LLM to refocus on malicious-intent tokens and abstain from responding. Our analysis further reveals the inherent distributional dependency within the generated adversarial sequences, whose effectiveness stems from overfitting the source LLM's parameters, resulting in limited transferability to target LLMs. To this end, we propose the Perceived-importance Flatten (PiF) method, which uniformly disperses the model's focus across neutral-intent tokens in the original input, thus obscuring malicious-intent tokens without relying on overfitted adversarial sequences. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PiF provides an effective and efficient red-teaming evaluation for proprietary LLMs.

Despite the remarkable generation capabilities of diffusion models, recent studies have shown that they can memorize and create harmful content when given specific text prompts. Although fine-tuning approaches have been developed to mitigate this issue by unlearning harmful concepts, these methods can be easily circumvented through jailbreaking attacks. This implies that the harmful concept has not been fully erased from the model. However, existing jailbreaking attack methods, while effective, lack interpretability regarding why unlearned models still retain the concept, thereby hindering the development of defense strategies. In this work, we address these limitations by proposing an attack method that learns an orthogonal set of interpretable attack token embeddings. The attack token embeddings can be decomposed into human-interpretable textual elements, revealing that unlearned models still retain the target concept through implicit textual components. Furthermore, these attack token embeddings are powerful and transferable across text prompts, initial noises, and unlearned models, emphasizing that unlearned models are more vulnerable than expected. Finally, building on the insights from our interpretable attack, we develop a defense method to protect unlearned models against both our proposed and existing jailbreaking attacks. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack and defense strategies.

Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming these models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods face significant drawbacks. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose a concise and effective two-stage framework that combines the advantages of these approaches. The first stage performs a scenario-based generation of context and rephrases the original malicious query to obscure its harmful intent. The second stage then utilizes information from the model's hidden states to guide fine-grained edits, effectively steering the model's internal representation of the input from a malicious toward a benign one. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this method achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate, with gains of up to 37.74% over the strongest baseline, and exhibits excellent transferability to black-box models. Our analysis further demonstrates that AGILE maintains substantial effectiveness against prominent defense mechanisms, highlighting the limitations of current safeguards and providing valuable insights for future defense development. Our code is available at https://github.com/yunsaijc/AGILE.

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize the target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve nearly 100\% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on GPT-3.5/4, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Gemma-7B, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with 100\% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). We provide the code, prompts, and logs of the attacks at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, where attackers create jailbreak prompts to mislead the model to produce harmful or offensive content. Current jailbreak methods either rely heavily on manually crafted templates, which pose challenges in scalability and adaptability, or struggle to generate semantically coherent prompts, making them easy to detect. Additionally, most existing approaches involve lengthy prompts, leading to higher query costs.In this paper, to remedy these challenges, we introduce a novel jailbreaking attack framework, which is an automated, black-box jailbreaking attack framework that adapts the black-box fuzz testing approach with a series of customized designs. Instead of relying on manually crafted templates, our method starts with an empty seed pool, removing the need to search for any related jailbreaking templates. We also develop three novel question-dependent mutation strategies using an LLM helper to generate prompts that maintain semantic coherence while significantly reducing their length. Additionally, we implement a two-level judge module to accurately detect genuine successful jailbreaks. We evaluated our method on 7 representative LLMs and compared it with 5 state-of-the-art jailbreaking attack strategies. For proprietary LLM APIs, such as GPT-3.5 turbo, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro, our method achieves attack success rates of over 90%,80% and 74%, respectively, exceeding existing baselines by more than 60%. Additionally, our method can maintain high semantic coherence while significantly reducing the length of jailbreak prompts. When targeting GPT-4, our method can achieve over 78% attack success rate even with 100 tokens. Moreover, our method demonstrates transferability and is robust to state-of-the-art defenses. We will open-source our codes upon publication.

Although many large language models (LLMs) have been trained to refuse harmful requests, they are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, which rewrite the original prompt to conceal its harmful intent. In this paper, we propose a new method for defending LLMs against jailbreaking attacks by ``backtranslation''. Specifically, given an initial response generated by the target LLM from an input prompt, our backtranslation prompts a language model to infer an input prompt that can lead to the response. The inferred prompt is called the backtranslated prompt which tends to reveal the actual intent of the original prompt, since it is generated based on the LLM's response and is not directly manipulated by the attacker. We then run the target LLM again on the backtranslated prompt, and we refuse the original prompt if the model refuses the backtranslated prompt. We explain that the proposed defense provides several benefits on its effectiveness and efficiency. We empirically demonstrate that our defense significantly outperforms the baselines, in the cases that are hard for the baselines, and our defense also has little impact on the generation quality for benign input prompts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance in their capabilities, yet this progress is accompanied by a growing array of safety risks. While significant attention has been dedicated to exploiting weaknesses in LLMs through jailbreaking attacks, there remains a paucity of exploration into defending against these attacks. We point out a pivotal factor contributing to the success of jailbreaks: the inherent conflict between the goals of being helpful and ensuring safety. To counter jailbreaking attacks, we propose to integrate goal prioritization at both training and inference stages. Implementing goal prioritization during inference substantially diminishes the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of jailbreaking attacks, reducing it from 66.4% to 2.0% for ChatGPT and from 68.2% to 19.4% for Vicuna-33B, without compromising general performance. Furthermore, integrating the concept of goal prioritization into the training phase reduces the ASR from 71.0% to 6.6% for LLama2-13B. Remarkably, even in scenarios where no jailbreaking samples are included during training, our approach slashes the ASR by half, decreasing it from 71.0% to 34.0%. Additionally, our findings reveal that while stronger LLMs face greater safety risks, they also possess a greater capacity to be steered towards defending against such attacks. We hope our work could contribute to the comprehension of jailbreaking attacks and defenses, and shed light on the relationship between LLMs' capability and safety. Our code will be available at https://github.com/thu-coai/JailbreakDefense_GoalPriority.

Despite efforts to align large language models (LLMs) with human values, widely-used LLMs such as GPT, Llama, Claude, and PaLM are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks, wherein an adversary fools a targeted LLM into generating objectionable content. To address this vulnerability, we propose SmoothLLM, the first algorithm designed to mitigate jailbreaking attacks on LLMs. Based on our finding that adversarially-generated prompts are brittle to character-level changes, our defense first randomly perturbs multiple copies of a given input prompt, and then aggregates the corresponding predictions to detect adversarial inputs. SmoothLLM reduces the attack success rate on numerous popular LLMs to below one percentage point, avoids unnecessary conservatism, and admits provable guarantees on attack mitigation. Moreover, our defense uses exponentially fewer queries than existing attacks and is compatible with any LLM. Our code is publicly available at the following link: https://github.com/arobey1/smooth-llm.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts known as jailbreaks, which can bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs. Despite growing efforts in LLM safety research, existing evaluations are often fragmented, focused on isolated attack or defense techniques, and lack systematic, reproducible analysis. In this work, we introduce PandaGuard, a unified and modular framework that models LLM jailbreak safety as a multi-agent system comprising attackers, defenders, and judges. Our framework implements 19 attack methods and 12 defense mechanisms, along with multiple judgment strategies, all within a flexible plugin architecture supporting diverse LLM interfaces, multiple interaction modes, and configuration-driven experimentation that enhances reproducibility and practical deployment. Built on this framework, we develop PandaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates the interactions between these attack/defense methods across 49 LLMs and various judgment approaches, requiring over 3 billion tokens to execute. Our extensive evaluation reveals key insights into model vulnerabilities, defense cost-performance trade-offs, and judge consistency. We find that no single defense is optimal across all dimensions and that judge disagreement introduces nontrivial variance in safety assessments. We release the code, configurations, and evaluation results to support transparent and reproducible research in LLM safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

Despite advances in AI alignment, language models (LM) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks or jailbreaking, in which adversaries modify input prompts to induce harmful behavior. While some defenses have been proposed, they focus on narrow threat models and fall short of a strong defense, which we posit should be effective, universal, and practical. To achieve this, we propose the first adversarial objective for defending LMs against jailbreaking attacks and an algorithm, robust prompt optimization (RPO), that uses gradient-based token optimization to enforce harmless outputs. This results in an easily accessible suffix that significantly improves robustness to both jailbreaks seen during optimization and unknown, held-out jailbreaks, reducing the attack success rate on Starling-7B from 84% to 8.66% across 20 jailbreaks. In addition, we find that RPO has a minor effect on normal LM use, is successful under adaptive attacks, and can transfer to black-box models, reducing the success rate of the strongest attack on GPT-4 from 92% to 6%.

Jailbreaking attacks on the vision modality typically rely on imperceptible adversarial perturbations, whereas attacks on the textual modality are generally assumed to require visible modifications (e.g., non-semantic suffixes). In this paper, we introduce imperceptible jailbreaks that exploit a class of Unicode characters called variation selectors. By appending invisible variation selectors to malicious questions, the jailbreak prompts appear visually identical to original malicious questions on screen, while their tokenization is "secretly" altered. We propose a chain-of-search pipeline to generate such adversarial suffixes to induce harmful responses. Our experiments show that our imperceptible jailbreaks achieve high attack success rates against four aligned LLMs and generalize to prompt injection attacks, all without producing any visible modifications in the written prompt. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/imperceptible-jailbreaks.

Along with the remarkable successes of Language language models, recent research also started to explore the security threats of LLMs, including jailbreaking attacks. Attackers carefully craft jailbreaking prompts such that a target LLM will respond to the harmful question. Existing jailbreaking attacks require either human experts or leveraging complicated algorithms to craft jailbreaking prompts. In this paper, we introduce BOOST, a simple attack that leverages only the eos tokens. We demonstrate that rather than constructing complicated jailbreaking prompts, the attacker can simply append a few eos tokens to the end of a harmful question. It will bypass the safety alignment of LLMs and lead to successful jailbreaking attacks. We further apply BOOST to four representative jailbreak methods and show that the attack success rates of these methods can be significantly enhanced by simply adding eos tokens to the prompt. To understand this simple but novel phenomenon, we conduct empirical analyses. Our analysis reveals that adding eos tokens makes the target LLM believe the input is much less harmful, and eos tokens have low attention values and do not affect LLM's understanding of the harmful questions, leading the model to actually respond to the questions. Our findings uncover how fragile an LLM is against jailbreak attacks, motivating the development of strong safety alignment approaches.

There has been an increasing interest in the alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values. However, the safety issues of their integration with a vision module, or vision language models (VLMs), remain relatively underexplored. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreaking attack against VLMs, aiming to bypass their safety barrier when a user inputs harmful instructions. A scenario where our poisoned (image, text) data pairs are included in the training data is assumed. By replacing the original textual captions with malicious jailbreak prompts, our method can perform jailbreak attacks with the poisoned images. Moreover, we analyze the effect of poison ratios and positions of trainable parameters on our attack's success rate. For evaluation, we design two metrics to quantify the success rate and the stealthiness of our attack. Together with a list of curated harmful instructions, a benchmark for measuring attack efficacy is provided. We demonstrate the efficacy of our attack by comparing it with baseline methods.

Although significant efforts have been dedicated to aligning large language models (LLMs), red-teaming reports suggest that these carefully aligned LLMs could still be jailbroken through adversarial prompts, tuning, or decoding. Upon examining the jailbreaking vulnerability of aligned LLMs, we observe that the decoding distributions of jailbroken and aligned models differ only in the initial generations. This observation motivates us to propose the weak-to-strong jailbreaking attack, where adversaries can utilize smaller unsafe/aligned LLMs (e.g., 7B) to guide jailbreaking against significantly larger aligned LLMs (e.g., 70B). To jailbreak, one only needs to additionally decode two smaller LLMs once, which involves minimal computation and latency compared to decoding the larger LLMs. The efficacy of this attack is demonstrated through experiments conducted on five models from three different organizations. Our study reveals a previously unnoticed yet efficient way of jailbreaking, exposing an urgent safety issue that needs to be considered when aligning LLMs. As an initial attempt, we propose a defense strategy to protect against such attacks, but creating more advanced defenses remains challenging. The code for replicating the method is available at https://github.com/XuandongZhao/weak-to-strong

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) is an efficient alignment technique that steers LLMs towards preferable outputs by training on preference data, bypassing the need for explicit reward models. Its simplicity enables easy adaptation to various domains and safety requirements. This paper examines DPO's effectiveness in model safety against jailbreaking attacks while minimizing data requirements and training costs. We introduce Egida, a dataset expanded from multiple sources, which includes 27 different safety topics and 18 different attack styles, complemented with synthetic and human labels. This data is used to boost the safety of state-of-the-art LLMs (Llama-3.1-8B/70B-Instruct, Qwen-2.5-7B/72B-Instruct) across topics and attack styles. In addition to safety evaluations, we assess their post-alignment performance degradation in general purpose tasks, and their tendency to over refusal. Following the proposed methodology, trained models reduce their Attack Success Rate by 10%-30%, using small training efforts (2,000 samples) with low computational cost (3\ for 8B models, 20 for 72B models). Safety aligned models generalize to unseen topics and attack styles, with the most successful attack style reaching a success rate around 5%. Size and family are found to strongly influence model malleability towards safety, pointing at the importance of pre-training choices. To validate our findings, a large independent assessment of human preference agreement with Llama-Guard-3-8B is conducted by the authors and the associated dataset Egida-HSafe is released. Overall, this study illustrates how affordable and accessible it is to enhance LLM safety using DPO while outlining its current limitations. All datasets and models are released to enable reproducibility and further research.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in healthcare applications. However, their deployment in clinical practice raises significant safety concerns, including the potential spread of harmful information. This study systematically assesses the vulnerabilities of seven LLMs to three advanced black-box jailbreaking techniques within medical contexts. To quantify the effectiveness of these techniques, we propose an automated and domain-adapted agentic evaluation pipeline. Experiment results indicate that leading commercial and open-source LLMs are highly vulnerable to medical jailbreaking attacks. To bolster model safety and reliability, we further investigate the effectiveness of Continual Fine-Tuning (CFT) in defending against medical adversarial attacks. Our findings underscore the necessity for evolving attack methods evaluation, domain-specific safety alignment, and LLM safety-utility balancing. This research offers actionable insights for advancing the safety and reliability of AI clinicians, contributing to ethical and effective AI deployment in healthcare.

The LLM unlearning technique has recently been introduced to comply with data regulations and address the safety and ethical concerns of LLMs by removing the undesired data-model influence. However, state-of-the-art unlearning methods face a critical vulnerability: they are susceptible to ``relearning'' the removed information from a small number of forget data points, known as relearning attacks. In this paper, we systematically investigate how to make unlearned models robust against such attacks. For the first time, we establish a connection between robust unlearning and sharpness-aware minimization (SAM) through a unified robust optimization framework, in an analogy to adversarial training designed to defend against adversarial attacks. Our analysis for SAM reveals that smoothness optimization plays a pivotal role in mitigating relearning attacks. Thus, we further explore diverse smoothing strategies to enhance unlearning robustness. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, including WMDP and MUSE, demonstrate that SAM and other smoothness optimization approaches consistently improve the resistance of LLM unlearning to relearning attacks. Notably, smoothness-enhanced unlearning also helps defend against (input-level) jailbreaking attacks, broadening our proposal's impact in robustifying LLM unlearning. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Smooth.

Ensuring the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial to generating responses consistent with human values. Despite their ability to recognize and avoid harmful queries, LLMs are vulnerable to "jailbreaking" attacks, where carefully crafted prompts elicit them to produce toxic content. One category of jailbreak attacks is reformulating the task as adversarial attacks by eliciting the LLM to generate an affirmative response. However, the typical attack in this category GCG has very limited attack success rate. In this study, to better study the jailbreak attack, we introduce the DSN (Don't Say No) attack, which prompts LLMs to not only generate affirmative responses but also novelly enhance the objective to suppress refusals. In addition, another challenge lies in jailbreak attacks is the evaluation, as it is difficult to directly and accurately assess the harmfulness of the attack. The existing evaluation such as refusal keyword matching has its own limitation as it reveals numerous false positive and false negative instances. To overcome this challenge, we propose an ensemble evaluation pipeline incorporating Natural Language Inference (NLI) contradiction assessment and two external LLM evaluators. Extensive experiments demonstrate the potency of the DSN and the effectiveness of ensemble evaluation compared to baseline methods.

Large language models (LLMs) are being rapidly developed, and a key component of their widespread deployment is their safety-related alignment. Many red-teaming efforts aim to jailbreak LLMs, where among these efforts, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack's success has led to a growing interest in the study of optimization-based jailbreaking techniques. Although GCG is a significant milestone, its attacking efficiency remains unsatisfactory. In this paper, we present several improved (empirical) techniques for optimization-based jailbreaks like GCG. We first observe that the single target template of "Sure" largely limits the attacking performance of GCG; given this, we propose to apply diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestion and/or guidance to mislead LLMs. Besides, from the optimization aspects, we propose an automatic multi-coordinate updating strategy in GCG (i.e., adaptively deciding how many tokens to replace in each step) to accelerate convergence, as well as tricks like easy-to-hard initialisation. Then, we combine these improved technologies to develop an efficient jailbreak method, dubbed I-GCG. In our experiments, we evaluate on a series of benchmarks (such as NeurIPS 2023 Red Teaming Track). The results demonstrate that our improved techniques can help GCG outperform state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks and achieve nearly 100% attack success rate. The code is released at https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/I-GCG.

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Jailbreak attacks are crucial for identifying and mitigating the security vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). They are designed to bypass safeguards and elicit prohibited outputs. However, due to significant differences among various jailbreak methods, there is no standard implementation framework available for the community, which limits comprehensive security evaluations. This paper introduces EasyJailbreak, a unified framework simplifying the construction and evaluation of jailbreak attacks against LLMs. It builds jailbreak attacks using four components: Selector, Mutator, Constraint, and Evaluator. This modular framework enables researchers to easily construct attacks from combinations of novel and existing components. So far, EasyJailbreak supports 11 distinct jailbreak methods and facilitates the security validation of a broad spectrum of LLMs. Our validation across 10 distinct LLMs reveals a significant vulnerability, with an average breach probability of 60% under various jailbreaking attacks. Notably, even advanced models like GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4 exhibit average Attack Success Rates (ASR) of 57% and 33%, respectively. We have released a wealth of resources for researchers, including a web platform, PyPI published package, screencast video, and experimental outputs.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

Integrated Speech and Large Language Models (SLMs) that can follow speech instructions and generate relevant text responses have gained popularity lately. However, the safety and robustness of these models remains largely unclear. In this work, we investigate the potential vulnerabilities of such instruction-following speech-language models to adversarial attacks and jailbreaking. Specifically, we design algorithms that can generate adversarial examples to jailbreak SLMs in both white-box and black-box attack settings without human involvement. Additionally, we propose countermeasures to thwart such jailbreaking attacks. Our models, trained on dialog data with speech instructions, achieve state-of-the-art performance on spoken question-answering task, scoring over 80% on both safety and helpfulness metrics. Despite safety guardrails, experiments on jailbreaking demonstrate the vulnerability of SLMs to adversarial perturbations and transfer attacks, with average attack success rates of 90% and 10% respectively when evaluated on a dataset of carefully designed harmful questions spanning 12 different toxic categories. However, we demonstrate that our proposed countermeasures reduce the attack success significantly.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

LLMs have made impressive progress, but their growing capabilities also expose them to highly flexible jailbreaking attacks designed to bypass safety alignment. While many existing defenses focus on known types of attacks, it is more critical to prepare LLMs for unseen attacks that may arise during deployment. To address this, we propose a lifelong safety alignment framework that enables LLMs to continuously adapt to new and evolving jailbreaking strategies. Our framework introduces a competitive setup between two components: a Meta-Attacker, trained to actively discover novel jailbreaking strategies, and a Defender, trained to resist them. To effectively warm up the Meta-Attacker, we first leverage the GPT-4o API to extract key insights from a large collection of jailbreak-related research papers. Through iterative training, the first iteration Meta-Attacker achieves a 73% attack success rate (ASR) on RR and a 57% transfer ASR on LAT using only single-turn attacks. Meanwhile, the Defender progressively improves its robustness and ultimately reduces the Meta-Attacker's success rate to just 7%, enabling safer and more reliable deployment of LLMs in open-ended environments. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/LifelongSafetyAlignment.

The advent of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized the field of natural language processing, yet they might be attacked to produce harmful content. Despite efforts to ethically align LLMs, these are often fragile and can be circumvented by jailbreaking attacks through optimized or manual adversarial prompts. To address this, we introduce the Information Bottleneck Protector (IBProtector), a defense mechanism grounded in the information bottleneck principle, and we modify the objective to avoid trivial solutions. The IBProtector selectively compresses and perturbs prompts, facilitated by a lightweight and trainable extractor, preserving only essential information for the target LLMs to respond with the expected answer. Moreover, we further consider a situation where the gradient is not visible to be compatible with any LLM. Our empirical evaluations show that IBProtector outperforms current defense methods in mitigating jailbreak attempts, without overly affecting response quality or inference speed. Its effectiveness and adaptability across various attack methods and target LLMs underscore the potential of IBProtector as a novel, transferable defense that bolsters the security of LLMs without requiring modifications to the underlying models.

Many machine learning models are fine-tuned from large language models (LLMs) to achieve high performance in specialized domains like code generation, biomedical analysis, and mathematical problem solving. However, this fine-tuning process often introduces a critical vulnerability: the systematic degradation of safety alignment, undermining ethical guidelines and increasing the risk of harmful outputs. Addressing this challenge, we introduce EnchTable, a novel framework designed to transfer and maintain safety alignment in downstream LLMs without requiring extensive retraining. EnchTable leverages a Neural Tangent Kernel (NTK)-based safety vector distillation method to decouple safety constraints from task-specific reasoning, ensuring compatibility across diverse model architectures and sizes. Additionally, our interference-aware merging technique effectively balances safety and utility, minimizing performance compromises across various task domains. We implemented a fully functional prototype of EnchTable on three different task domains and three distinct LLM architectures, and evaluated its performance through extensive experiments on eleven diverse datasets, assessing both utility and model safety. Our evaluations include LLMs from different vendors, demonstrating EnchTable's generalization capability. Furthermore, EnchTable exhibits robust resistance to static and dynamic jailbreaking attacks, outperforming vendor-released safety models in mitigating adversarial prompts. Comparative analyses with six parameter modification methods and two inference-time alignment baselines reveal that EnchTable achieves a significantly lower unsafe rate, higher utility score, and universal applicability across different task domains. Additionally, we validate EnchTable can be seamlessly integrated into various deployment pipelines without significant overhead.

Improving the safety and reliability of large language models (LLMs) is a crucial aspect of realizing trustworthy AI systems. Although alignment methods aim to suppress harmful content generation, LLMs are often still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that employ adversarial inputs that subvert alignment and induce harmful outputs. We propose the Randomized Embedding Smoothing and Token Aggregation (RESTA) defense, which adds random noise to the embedding vectors and performs aggregation during the generation of each output token, with the aim of better preserving semantic information. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves superior robustness versus utility tradeoffs compared to the baseline defenses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable success in various tasks, but concerns about their safety and the potential for generating malicious content have emerged. In this paper, we explore the power of In-Context Learning (ICL) in manipulating the alignment ability of LLMs. We find that by providing just few in-context demonstrations without fine-tuning, LLMs can be manipulated to increase or decrease the probability of jailbreaking, i.e. answering malicious prompts. Based on these observations, we propose In-Context Attack (ICA) and In-Context Defense (ICD) methods for jailbreaking and guarding aligned language model purposes. ICA crafts malicious contexts to guide models in generating harmful outputs, while ICD enhances model robustness by demonstrations of rejecting to answer harmful prompts. Our experiments show the effectiveness of ICA and ICD in increasing or reducing the success rate of adversarial jailbreaking attacks. Overall, we shed light on the potential of ICL to influence LLM behavior and provide a new perspective for enhancing the safety and alignment of LLMs.

Current vision large language models (VLLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities yet are prone to generate harmful content and are vulnerable to even the simplest jailbreaking attacks. Our initial analysis finds that this is due to the presence of harmful data during vision-language instruction fine-tuning, and that VLLM fine-tuning can cause forgetting of safety alignment previously learned by the underpinning LLM. To address this issue, we first curate a vision-language safe instruction-following dataset VLGuard covering various harmful categories. Our experiments demonstrate that integrating this dataset into standard vision-language fine-tuning or utilizing it for post-hoc fine-tuning effectively safety aligns VLLMs. This alignment is achieved with minimal impact on, or even enhancement of, the models' helpfulness. The versatility of our safety fine-tuning dataset makes it a valuable resource for safety-testing existing VLLMs, training new models or safeguarding pre-trained VLLMs. Empirical results demonstrate that fine-tuned VLLMs effectively reject unsafe instructions and substantially reduce the success rates of several black-box adversarial attacks, which approach zero in many cases. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/ys-zong/VLGuard.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language understanding and generation, leading to extensive benchmarking across diverse tasks. However, cryptanalysis a critical area for data security and encryption has not yet been thoroughly explored in LLM evaluations. To address this gap, we evaluate cryptanalytic potential of state of the art LLMs on encrypted texts generated using a range of cryptographic algorithms. We introduce a novel benchmark dataset comprising diverse plain texts spanning various domains, lengths, writing styles, and topics paired with their encrypted versions. Using zero-shot and few shot settings, we assess multiple LLMs for decryption accuracy and semantic comprehension across different encryption schemes. Our findings reveal key insights into the strengths and limitations of LLMs in side-channel communication while raising concerns about their susceptibility to jailbreaking attacks. This research highlights the dual-use nature of LLMs in security contexts and contributes to the ongoing discussion on AI safety and security.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs), designed to interpret and respond to human instructions, occasionally generate hallucinated or harmful content due to inappropriate instructions. This study uses linear probing to shed light on the hidden knowledge at the output layer of LVLMs. We demonstrate that the logit distributions of the first tokens contain sufficient information to determine whether to respond to the instructions, including recognizing unanswerable visual questions, defending against multi-modal jailbreaking attack, and identifying deceptive questions. Such hidden knowledge is gradually lost in logits of subsequent tokens during response generation. Then, we illustrate a simple decoding strategy at the generation of the first token, effectively improving the generated content. In experiments, we find a few interesting insights: First, the CLIP model already contains a strong signal for solving these tasks, indicating potential bias in the existing datasets. Second, we observe performance improvement by utilizing the first logit distributions on three additional tasks, including indicting uncertainty in math solving, mitigating hallucination, and image classification. Last, with the same training data, simply finetuning LVLMs improve models' performance but is still inferior to linear probing on these tasks.

Purpose: With advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) for healthcare, the need arises for competitive open-source models to protect the public interest. This work contributes to the field of open medical LLMs by optimizing key stages of data preprocessing and training, while showing how to improve model safety (through DPO) and efficacy (through RAG). The evaluation methodology used, which includes four different types of tests, defines a new standard for the field. The resultant models, shown to be competitive with the best private alternatives, are released with a permisive license. Methods: Building on top of strong base models like Llama 3.1 and Qwen 2.5, Aloe Beta uses a custom dataset to enhance public data with synthetic Chain of Thought examples. The models undergo alignment with Direct Preference Optimization, emphasizing ethical and policy-aligned performance in the presence of jailbreaking attacks. Evaluation includes close-ended, open-ended, safety and human assessments, to maximize the reliability of results. Results: Recommendations are made across the entire pipeline, backed by the solid performance of the Aloe Family. These models deliver competitive performance across healthcare benchmarks and medical fields, and are often preferred by healthcare professionals. On bias and toxicity, the Aloe Beta models significantly improve safety, showing resilience to unseen jailbreaking attacks. For a responsible release, a detailed risk assessment specific to healthcare is attached to the Aloe Family models. Conclusion: The Aloe Beta models, and the recipe that leads to them, are a significant contribution to the open-source medical LLM field, offering top-of-the-line performance while maintaining high ethical requirements. This work sets a new standard for developing and reporting aligned LLMs in healthcare.

Alignment of large language models (LLMs) involves training models on preference-contrastive output pairs to adjust their responses according to human preferences. To obtain such contrastive pairs, traditional methods like RLHF and RLAIF rely on limited contrasting patterns, such as varying model variants or decoding temperatures. This singularity leads to two issues: (1) alignment is not comprehensive; and thereby (2) models are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks. To address these issues, we investigate how to construct more comprehensive and diversified contrasting patterns to enhance preference data (RQ1) and verify the impact of the diversification of contrasting patterns on model alignment (RQ2). For RQ1, we propose PopAlign, a framework that integrates diversified contrasting patterns across the prompt, model, and pipeline levels, introducing six contrasting strategies that do not require additional feedback labeling procedures. Regarding RQ2, we conduct thorough experiments demonstrating that PopAlign significantly outperforms existing methods, leading to more comprehensive alignment.

Steering methods for language models (LMs) seek to provide fine-grained and interpretable control over model generations by variously changing model inputs, weights, or representations to adjust behavior. Recent work has shown that adjusting weights or representations is often less effective than steering by prompting, for instance when wanting to introduce or suppress a particular concept. We demonstrate how to improve representation steering via our new Reference-free Preference Steering (RePS), a bidirectional preference-optimization objective that jointly does concept steering and suppression. We train three parameterizations of RePS and evaluate them on AxBench, a large-scale model steering benchmark. On Gemma models with sizes ranging from 2B to 27B, RePS outperforms all existing steering methods trained with a language modeling objective and substantially narrows the gap with prompting -- while promoting interpretability and minimizing parameter count. In suppression, RePS matches the language-modeling objective on Gemma-2 and outperforms it on the larger Gemma-3 variants while remaining resilient to prompt-based jailbreaking attacks that defeat prompting. Overall, our results suggest that RePS provides an interpretable and robust alternative to prompting for both steering and suppression.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various tasks in different domains. However, the emergence of biases and the potential for generating harmful content in LLMs, particularly under malicious inputs, pose significant challenges. Current mitigation strategies, while effective, are not resilient under adversarial attacks. This paper introduces Resilient Guardrails for Large Language Models (RigorLLM), a novel framework designed to efficiently and effectively moderate harmful and unsafe inputs and outputs for LLMs. By employing a multi-faceted approach that includes energy-based training data augmentation through Langevin dynamics, optimizing a safe suffix for inputs via minimax optimization, and integrating a fusion-based model combining robust KNN with LLMs based on our data augmentation, RigorLLM offers a robust solution to harmful content moderation. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate that RigorLLM not only outperforms existing baselines like OpenAI API and Perspective API in detecting harmful content but also exhibits unparalleled resilience to jailbreaking attacks. The innovative use of constrained optimization and a fusion-based guardrail approach represents a significant step forward in developing more secure and reliable LLMs, setting a new standard for content moderation frameworks in the face of evolving digital threats.

AI safety training and red-teaming of large language models (LLMs) are measures to mitigate the generation of unsafe content. Our work exposes the inherent cross-lingual vulnerability of these safety mechanisms, resulting from the linguistic inequality of safety training data, by successfully circumventing GPT-4's safeguard through translating unsafe English inputs into low-resource languages. On the AdvBenchmark, GPT-4 engages with the unsafe translated inputs and provides actionable items that can get the users towards their harmful goals 79% of the time, which is on par with or even surpassing state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks. Other high-/mid-resource languages have significantly lower attack success rate, which suggests that the cross-lingual vulnerability mainly applies to low-resource languages. Previously, limited training on low-resource languages primarily affects speakers of those languages, causing technological disparities. However, our work highlights a crucial shift: this deficiency now poses a risk to all LLMs users. Publicly available translation APIs enable anyone to exploit LLMs' safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, our work calls for a more holistic red-teaming efforts to develop robust multilingual safeguards with wide language coverage.

User authorization-based access privileges are a key feature in many safety-critical systems, but have thus far been absent from the large language model (LLM) realm. In this work, drawing inspiration from such access control systems, we introduce sudoLLM, a novel framework that results in multi-role aligned LLMs, i.e., LLMs that account for, and behave in accordance with, user access rights. sudoLLM injects subtle user-based biases into queries and trains an LLM to utilize this bias signal in order to produce sensitive information if and only if the user is authorized. We present empirical results demonstrating that this approach shows substantially improved alignment, generalization, and resistance to prompt-based jailbreaking attacks. The persistent tension between the language modeling objective and safety alignment, which is often exploited to jailbreak LLMs, is somewhat resolved with the aid of the injected bias signal. Our framework is meant as an additional security layer, and complements existing guardrail mechanisms for enhanced end-to-end safety with LLMs.

Alignment in large language models (LLMs) is used to enforce guidelines such as safety. Yet, alignment fails in the face of jailbreak attacks that modify inputs to induce unsafe outputs. In this paper, we present and evaluate a method to assess the robustness of LLM alignment. We observe that alignment embeds a safety classifier in the target model that is responsible for deciding between refusal and compliance. We seek to extract an approximation of this classifier, called a surrogate classifier, from the LLM. We develop an algorithm for identifying candidate classifiers from subsets of the LLM model. We evaluate the degree to which the candidate classifiers approximate the model's embedded classifier in benign (F1 score) and adversarial (using surrogates in a white-box attack) settings. Our evaluation shows that the best candidates achieve accurate agreement (an F1 score above 80%) using as little as 20% of the model architecture. Further, we find attacks mounted on the surrogate models can be transferred with high accuracy. For example, a surrogate using only 50% of the Llama 2 model achieved an attack success rate (ASR) of 70%, a substantial improvement over attacking the LLM directly, where we only observed a 22% ASR. These results show that extracting surrogate classifiers is a viable (and highly effective) means for modeling (and therein addressing) the vulnerability of aligned models to jailbreaking attacks.

Jailbreaks on large language models (LLMs) have recently received increasing attention. For a comprehensive assessment of LLM safety, it is essential to consider jailbreaks with diverse attributes, such as contextual coherence and sentiment/stylistic variations, and hence it is beneficial to study controllable jailbreaking, i.e. how to enforce control on LLM attacks. In this paper, we formally formulate the controllable attack generation problem, and build a novel connection between this problem and controllable text generation, a well-explored topic of natural language processing. Based on this connection, we adapt the Energy-based Constrained Decoding with Langevin Dynamics (COLD), a state-of-the-art, highly efficient algorithm in controllable text generation, and introduce the COLD-Attack framework which unifies and automates the search of adversarial LLM attacks under a variety of control requirements such as fluency, stealthiness, sentiment, and left-right-coherence. The controllability enabled by COLD-Attack leads to diverse new jailbreak scenarios which not only cover the standard setting of generating fluent (suffix) attack with continuation constraint, but also allow us to address new controllable attack settings such as revising a user query adversarially with paraphrasing constraint, and inserting stealthy attacks in context with position constraint. Our extensive experiments on various LLMs (Llama-2, Mistral, Vicuna, Guanaco, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) show COLD-Attack's broad applicability, strong controllability, high success rate, and attack transferability. Our code is available at https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/COLD-Attack.

With the emergence of strong visual-language capabilities, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated tremendous potential for real-world applications. However, the security vulnerabilities exhibited by the visual modality pose significant challenges to deploying such models in open-world environments. Recent studies have successfully induced harmful responses from target MLLMs by encoding harmful textual semantics directly into visual inputs. However, in these approaches, the visual modality primarily serves as a trigger for unsafe behavior, often exhibiting semantic ambiguity and lacking grounding in realistic scenarios. In this work, we define a novel setting: visual-centric jailbreak, where visual information serves as a necessary component in constructing a complete and realistic jailbreak context. Building on this setting, we propose the VisCo (Visual Contextual) Attack. VisCo fabricates contextual dialogue using four distinct visual-focused strategies, dynamically generating auxiliary images when necessary to construct a visual-centric jailbreak scenario. To maximize attack effectiveness, it incorporates automatic toxicity obfuscation and semantic refinement to produce a final attack prompt that reliably triggers harmful responses from the target black-box MLLMs. Specifically, VisCo achieves a toxicity score of 4.78 and an Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 85% on MM-SafetyBench against GPT-4o, significantly outperforming the baseline, which performs a toxicity score of 2.48 and an ASR of 22.2%. The code is available at https://github.com/Dtc7w3PQ/Visco-Attack.

The safety of large language models (LLMs) has garnered significant research attention. In this paper, we argue that previous empirical studies demonstrate LLMs exhibit a propensity to trust information from authoritative sources, such as academic papers, implying new possible vulnerabilities. To verify this possibility, a preliminary analysis is designed to illustrate our two findings. Based on this insight, a novel jailbreaking method, Paper Summary Attack (PSA), is proposed. It systematically synthesizes content from either attack-focused or defense-focused LLM safety paper to construct an adversarial prompt template, while strategically infilling harmful query as adversarial payloads within predefined subsections. Extensive experiments show significant vulnerabilities not only in base LLMs, but also in state-of-the-art reasoning model like Deepseek-R1. PSA achieves a 97\% attack success rate (ASR) on well-aligned models like Claude3.5-Sonnet and an even higher 98\% ASR on Deepseek-R1. More intriguingly, our work has further revealed diametrically opposed vulnerability bias across different base models, and even between different versions of the same model, when exposed to either attack-focused or defense-focused papers. This phenomenon potentially indicates future research clues for both adversarial methodologies and safety alignment.Code is available at https://github.com/233liang/Paper-Summary-Attack

While Large Language Models (LLMs) display versatile functionality, they continue to generate harmful, biased, and toxic content, as demonstrated by the prevalence of human-designed jailbreaks. In this work, we present Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP), an automated method for generating jailbreaks that only requires black-box access to the target LLM. TAP utilizes an LLM to iteratively refine candidate (attack) prompts using tree-of-thoughts reasoning until one of the generated prompts jailbreaks the target. Crucially, before sending prompts to the target, TAP assesses them and prunes the ones unlikely to result in jailbreaks. Using tree-of-thought reasoning allows TAP to navigate a large search space of prompts and pruning reduces the total number of queries sent to the target. In empirical evaluations, we observe that TAP generates prompts that jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs (including GPT4 and GPT4-Turbo) for more than 80% of the prompts using only a small number of queries. This significantly improves upon the previous state-of-the-art black-box method for generating jailbreaks.

With the rapid progress of large language models (LLMs), many downstream NLP tasks can be well solved given appropriate prompts. Though model developers and researchers work hard on dialog safety to avoid generating harmful content from LLMs, it is still challenging to steer AI-generated content (AIGC) for the human good. As powerful LLMs are devouring existing text data from various domains (e.g., GPT-3 is trained on 45TB texts), it is natural to doubt whether the private information is included in the training data and what privacy threats can these LLMs and their downstream applications bring. In this paper, we study the privacy threats from OpenAI's ChatGPT and the New Bing enhanced by ChatGPT and show that application-integrated LLMs may cause new privacy threats. To this end, we conduct extensive experiments to support our claims and discuss LLMs' privacy implications.

We introduce Best-of-N (BoN) Jailbreaking, a simple black-box algorithm that jailbreaks frontier AI systems across modalities. BoN Jailbreaking works by repeatedly sampling variations of a prompt with a combination of augmentations - such as random shuffling or capitalization for textual prompts - until a harmful response is elicited. We find that BoN Jailbreaking achieves high attack success rates (ASRs) on closed-source language models, such as 89% on GPT-4o and 78% on Claude 3.5 Sonnet when sampling 10,000 augmented prompts. Further, it is similarly effective at circumventing state-of-the-art open-source defenses like circuit breakers. BoN also seamlessly extends to other modalities: it jailbreaks vision language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4o and audio language models (ALMs) like Gemini 1.5 Pro, using modality-specific augmentations. BoN reliably improves when we sample more augmented prompts. Across all modalities, ASR, as a function of the number of samples (N), empirically follows power-law-like behavior for many orders of magnitude. BoN Jailbreaking can also be composed with other black-box algorithms for even more effective attacks - combining BoN with an optimized prefix attack achieves up to a 35% increase in ASR. Overall, our work indicates that, despite their capability, language models are sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes to inputs, which attackers can exploit across modalities.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Despite the superior capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) across diverse tasks, they still face significant trustworthiness challenges. Yet, current literature on the assessment of trustworthy MLLMs remains limited, lacking a holistic evaluation to offer thorough insights into future improvements. In this work, we establish MultiTrust, the first comprehensive and unified benchmark on the trustworthiness of MLLMs across five primary aspects: truthfulness, safety, robustness, fairness, and privacy. Our benchmark employs a rigorous evaluation strategy that addresses both multimodal risks and cross-modal impacts, encompassing 32 diverse tasks with self-curated datasets. Extensive experiments with 21 modern MLLMs reveal some previously unexplored trustworthiness issues and risks, highlighting the complexities introduced by the multimodality and underscoring the necessity for advanced methodologies to enhance their reliability. For instance, typical proprietary models still struggle with the perception of visually confusing images and are vulnerable to multimodal jailbreaking and adversarial attacks; MLLMs are more inclined to disclose privacy in text and reveal ideological and cultural biases even when paired with irrelevant images in inference, indicating that the multimodality amplifies the internal risks from base LLMs. Additionally, we release a scalable toolbox for standardized trustworthiness research, aiming to facilitate future advancements in this important field. Code and resources are publicly available at: https://multi-trust.github.io/.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive performance and have been put into practical use in commercial applications, but they still have potential safety mechanism vulnerabilities. Jailbreak attacks are red teaming methods that aim to bypass safety mechanisms and discover MLLMs' potential risks. Existing MLLMs' jailbreak methods often bypass the model's safety mechanism through complex optimization methods or carefully designed image and text prompts. Despite achieving some progress, they have a low attack success rate on commercial closed-source MLLMs. Unlike previous research, we empirically find that there exists a Shuffle Inconsistency between MLLMs' comprehension ability and safety ability for the shuffled harmful instruction. That is, from the perspective of comprehension ability, MLLMs can understand the shuffled harmful text-image instructions well. However, they can be easily bypassed by the shuffled harmful instructions from the perspective of safety ability, leading to harmful responses. Then we innovatively propose a text-image jailbreak attack named SI-Attack. Specifically, to fully utilize the Shuffle Inconsistency and overcome the shuffle randomness, we apply a query-based black-box optimization method to select the most harmful shuffled inputs based on the feedback of the toxic judge model. A series of experiments show that SI-Attack can improve the attack's performance on three benchmarks. In particular, SI-Attack can obviously improve the attack success rate for commercial MLLMs such as GPT-4o or Claude-3.5-Sonnet.

Evaluating jailbreak attacks is challenging when prompts are not overtly harmful or fail to induce harmful outputs. Unfortunately, many existing red-teaming datasets contain such unsuitable prompts. To evaluate attacks accurately, these datasets need to be assessed and cleaned for maliciousness. However, existing malicious content detection methods rely on either manual annotation, which is labor-intensive, or large language models (LLMs), which have inconsistent accuracy in harmful types. To balance accuracy and efficiency, we propose a hybrid evaluation framework named MDH (Malicious content Detection based on LLMs with Human assistance) that combines LLM-based annotation with minimal human oversight, and apply it to dataset cleaning and detection of jailbroken responses. Furthermore, we find that well-crafted developer messages can significantly boost jailbreak success, leading us to propose two new strategies: D-Attack, which leverages context simulation, and DH-CoT, which incorporates hijacked chains of thought. The Codes, datasets, judgements, and detection results will be released in github repository: https://github.com/AlienZhang1996/DH-CoT.

Text-to-Image models may generate harmful content, such as pornographic images, particularly when unsafe prompts are submitted. To address this issue, safety filters are often added on top of text-to-image models, or the models themselves are aligned to reduce harmful outputs. However, these defenses remain vulnerable when an attacker strategically designs adversarial prompts to bypass these safety guardrails. In this work, we propose PromptTune, a method to jailbreak text-to-image models with safety guardrails using a fine-tuned large language model. Unlike other query-based jailbreak attacks that require repeated queries to the target model, our attack generates adversarial prompts efficiently after fine-tuning our AttackLLM. We evaluate our method on three datasets of unsafe prompts and against five safety guardrails. Our results demonstrate that our approach effectively bypasses safety guardrails, outperforms existing no-box attacks, and also facilitates other query-based attacks.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) has raised concerns about their safety and reliability, particularly regarding their vulnerability to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel perspective that attributes this vulnerability to reward misspecification during the alignment process. We introduce a metric ReGap to quantify the extent of reward misspecification and demonstrate its effectiveness and robustness in detecting harmful backdoor prompts. Building upon these insights, we present ReMiss, a system for automated red teaming that generates adversarial prompts against various target aligned LLMs. ReMiss achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates on the AdvBench benchmark while preserving the human readability of the generated prompts. Detailed analysis highlights the unique advantages brought by the proposed reward misspecification objective compared to previous methods.

Jailbreak attacks cause large language models (LLMs) to generate harmful, unethical, or otherwise objectionable content. Evaluating these attacks presents a number of challenges, which the current collection of benchmarks and evaluation techniques do not adequately address. First, there is no clear standard of practice regarding jailbreaking evaluation. Second, existing works compute costs and success rates in incomparable ways. And third, numerous works are not reproducible, as they withhold adversarial prompts, involve closed-source code, or rely on evolving proprietary APIs. To address these challenges, we introduce JailbreakBench, an open-sourced benchmark with the following components: (1) an evolving repository of state-of-the-art adversarial prompts, which we refer to as jailbreak artifacts; (2) a jailbreaking dataset comprising 100 behaviors -- both original and sourced from prior work -- which align with OpenAI's usage policies; (3) a standardized evaluation framework that includes a clearly defined threat model, system prompts, chat templates, and scoring functions; and (4) a leaderboard that tracks the performance of attacks and defenses for various LLMs. We have carefully considered the potential ethical implications of releasing this benchmark, and believe that it will be a net positive for the community. Over time, we will expand and adapt the benchmark to reflect technical and methodological advances in the research community.

There is growing interest in ensuring that large language models (LLMs) align with human values. However, the alignment of such models is vulnerable to adversarial jailbreaks, which coax LLMs into overriding their safety guardrails. The identification of these vulnerabilities is therefore instrumental in understanding inherent weaknesses and preventing future misuse. To this end, we propose Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR), an algorithm that generates semantic jailbreaks with only black-box access to an LLM. PAIR -- which is inspired by social engineering attacks -- uses an attacker LLM to automatically generate jailbreaks for a separate targeted LLM without human intervention. In this way, the attacker LLM iteratively queries the target LLM to update and refine a candidate jailbreak. Empirically, PAIR often requires fewer than twenty queries to produce a jailbreak, which is orders of magnitude more efficient than existing algorithms. PAIR also achieves competitive jailbreaking success rates and transferability on open and closed-source LLMs, including GPT-3.5/4, Vicuna, and PaLM-2.

Recent advances in long-context language models (LMs) have enabled million-token inputs, expanding their capabilities across complex tasks like computer-use agents. Yet, the safety implications of these extended contexts remain unclear. To bridge this gap, we introduce NINJA (short for Needle-in-haystack jailbreak attack), a method that jailbreaks aligned LMs by appending benign, model-generated content to harmful user goals. Critical to our method is the observation that the position of harmful goals play an important role in safety. Experiments on standard safety benchmark, HarmBench, show that NINJA significantly increases attack success rates across state-of-the-art open and proprietary models, including LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, and Gemini. Unlike prior jailbreaking methods, our approach is low-resource, transferable, and less detectable. Moreover, we show that NINJA is compute-optimal -- under a fixed compute budget, increasing context length can outperform increasing the number of trials in best-of-N jailbreak. These findings reveal that even benign long contexts -- when crafted with careful goal positioning -- introduce fundamental vulnerabilities in modern LMs.

The widespread application of large VLMs makes ensuring their secure deployment critical. While recent studies have demonstrated jailbreak attacks on VLMs, existing approaches are limited: they require either white-box access, restricting practicality, or rely on manually crafted patterns, leading to poor sample diversity and scalability. To address these gaps, we propose JPRO, a novel multi-agent collaborative framework designed for automated VLM jailbreaking. It effectively overcomes the shortcomings of prior methods in attack diversity and scalability. Through the coordinated action of four specialized agents and its two core modules: Tactic-Driven Seed Generation and Adaptive Optimization Loop, JPRO generates effective and diverse attack samples. Experimental results show that JPRO achieves over a 60\% attack success rate on multiple advanced VLMs, including GPT-4o, significantly outperforming existing methods. As a black-box attack approach, JPRO not only uncovers critical security vulnerabilities in multimodal models but also offers valuable insights for evaluating and enhancing VLM robustness.

Recent advancements in AI safety have led to increased efforts in training and red-teaming large language models (LLMs) to mitigate unsafe content generation. However, these safety mechanisms may not be comprehensive, leaving potential vulnerabilities unexplored. This paper introduces MathPrompt, a novel jailbreaking technique that exploits LLMs' advanced capabilities in symbolic mathematics to bypass their safety mechanisms. By encoding harmful natural language prompts into mathematical problems, we demonstrate a critical vulnerability in current AI safety measures. Our experiments across 13 state-of-the-art LLMs reveal an average attack success rate of 73.6\%, highlighting the inability of existing safety training mechanisms to generalize to mathematically encoded inputs. Analysis of embedding vectors shows a substantial semantic shift between original and encoded prompts, helping explain the attack's success. This work emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to AI safety, calling for expanded red-teaming efforts to develop robust safeguards across all potential input types and their associated risks.

Large Language Models (LLMS) have increasingly become central to generating content with potential societal impacts. Notably, these models have demonstrated capabilities for generating content that could be deemed harmful. To mitigate these risks, researchers have adopted safety training techniques to align model outputs with societal values to curb the generation of malicious content. However, the phenomenon of "jailbreaking", where carefully crafted prompts elicit harmful responses from models, persists as a significant challenge. This research conducts a comprehensive analysis of existing studies on jailbreaking LLMs and their defense techniques. We meticulously investigate nine attack techniques and seven defense techniques applied across three distinct language models: Vicuna, LLama, and GPT-3.5 Turbo. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of these attack and defense techniques. Our findings reveal that existing white-box attacks underperform compared to universal techniques and that including special tokens in the input significantly affects the likelihood of successful attacks. This research highlights the need to concentrate on the security facets of LLMs. Additionally, we contribute to the field by releasing our datasets and testing framework, aiming to foster further research into LLM security. We believe these contributions will facilitate the exploration of security measures within this domain.

Large language models (LLMs) have seen rapid development in recent years, revolutionizing various applications and significantly enhancing convenience and productivity. However, alongside their impressive capabilities, ethical concerns and new types of attacks, such as jailbreaking, have emerged. While most prompting techniques focus on optimizing adversarial inputs for individual cases, resulting in higher computational costs when dealing with large datasets. Less research has addressed the more general setting of training a universal attacker that can transfer to unseen tasks. In this paper, we introduce JUMP, a prompt-based method designed to jailbreak LLMs using universal multi-prompts. We also adapt our approach for defense, which we term DUMP. Experimental results demonstrate that our method for optimizing universal multi-prompts outperforms existing techniques.

Refusal training on Large Language Models (LLMs) prevents harmful outputs, yet this defense remains vulnerable to both automated and human-crafted jailbreaks. We present a novel LLM-as-red-teamer approach in which a human jailbreaks a refusal-trained LLM to make it willing to jailbreak itself or other LLMs. We refer to the jailbroken LLMs as J_2 attackers, which can systematically evaluate target models using various red teaming strategies and improve its performance via in-context learning from the previous failures. Our experiments demonstrate that Sonnet 3.5 and Gemini 1.5 pro outperform other LLMs as J_2, achieving 93.0% and 91.0% attack success rates (ASRs) respectively against GPT-4o (and similar results across other capable LLMs) on Harmbench. Our work not only introduces a scalable approach to strategic red teaming, drawing inspiration from human red teamers, but also highlights jailbreaking-to-jailbreak as an overlooked failure mode of the safeguard. Specifically, an LLM can bypass its own safeguards by employing a jailbroken version of itself that is willing to assist in further jailbreaking. To prevent any direct misuse with J_2, while advancing research in AI safety, we publicly share our methodology while keeping specific prompting details private.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant advances in recent days. Extensive efforts have been made before the public release of LLMs to align their behaviors with human values. The primary goal of alignment is to ensure their helpfulness, honesty and harmlessness. However, even meticulously aligned LLMs remain vulnerable to malicious manipulations such as jailbreaking, leading to unintended behaviors. The jailbreak is to intentionally develop a malicious prompt that escapes from the LLM security restrictions to produce uncensored detrimental contents. Previous works explore different jailbreak methods for red teaming LLMs, yet they encounter challenges regarding to effectiveness and scalability. In this work, we propose Tastle, a novel black-box jailbreak framework for automated red teaming of LLMs. We designed malicious content concealing and memory reframing with an iterative optimization algorithm to jailbreak LLMs, motivated by the research about the distractibility and over-confidence phenomenon of LLMs. Extensive experiments of jailbreaking both open-source and proprietary LLMs demonstrate the superiority of our framework in terms of effectiveness, scalability and transferability. We also evaluate the effectiveness of existing jailbreak defense methods against our attack and highlight the crucial need to develop more effective and practical defense strategies.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) signify a groundbreaking paradigm shift within the Artificial Intelligence (AI) community, extending beyond the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by assimilating additional modalities (e.g., images). Despite this advancement, the safety of LVLMs remains adequately underexplored, with a potential overreliance on the safety assurances purported by their underlying LLMs. In this paper, we propose FigStep, a straightforward yet effective black-box jailbreak algorithm against LVLMs. Instead of feeding textual harmful instructions directly, FigStep converts the prohibited content into images through typography to bypass the safety alignment. The experimental results indicate that FigStep can achieve an average attack success rate of 82.50% on six promising open-source LVLMs. Not merely to demonstrate the efficacy of FigStep, we conduct comprehensive ablation studies and analyze the distribution of the semantic embeddings to uncover that the reason behind the success of FigStep is the deficiency of safety alignment for visual embeddings. Moreover, we compare FigStep with five text-only jailbreaks and four image-based jailbreaks to demonstrate the superiority of FigStep, i.e., negligible attack costs and better attack performance. Above all, our work reveals that current LVLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which highlights the necessity of novel cross-modality safety alignment techniques. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/ThuCCSLab/FigStep .

Recent advancements in jailbreaking large language models (LLMs), such as AutoDAN-Turbo, have demonstrated the power of automated strategy discovery. AutoDAN-Turbo employs a lifelong learning agent to build a rich library of attack strategies from scratch. While highly effective, its test-time generation process involves sampling a strategy and generating a single corresponding attack prompt, which may not fully exploit the potential of the learned strategy library. In this paper, we propose to further improve the attack performance of AutoDAN-Turbo through test-time scaling. We introduce two distinct scaling methods: Best-of-N and Beam Search. The Best-of-N method generates N candidate attack prompts from a sampled strategy and selects the most effective one based on a scorer model. The Beam Search method conducts a more exhaustive search by exploring combinations of strategies from the library to discover more potent and synergistic attack vectors. According to the experiments, the proposed methods significantly boost performance, with Beam Search increasing the attack success rate by up to 15.6 percentage points on Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and achieving a nearly 60% relative improvement against the highly robust GPT-o4-mini compared to the vanilla method.

Efficient red-teaming method to uncover vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial. While recent attacks often use LLMs as optimizers, the discrete language space make gradient-based methods struggle. We introduce LARGO (Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization), a novel latent self-reflection attack that reasserts the power of gradient-based optimization for generating fluent jailbreaking prompts. By operating within the LLM's continuous latent space, LARGO first optimizes an adversarial latent vector and then recursively call the same LLM to decode the latent into natural language. This methodology yields a fast, effective, and transferable attack that produces fluent and stealthy prompts. On standard benchmarks like AdvBench and JailbreakBench, LARGO surpasses leading jailbreaking techniques, including AutoDAN, by 44 points in attack success rate. Our findings demonstrate a potent alternative to agentic LLM prompting, highlighting the efficacy of interpreting and attacking LLM internals through gradient optimization.

Recent research has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated jailbreak attacks, where adversarial suffixes crafted by algorithms appended to harmful queries bypass safety alignment and trigger unintended responses. Current methods for generating these suffixes are computationally expensive and have low Attack Success Rates (ASR), especially against well-aligned models like Llama2 and Llama3. To overcome these limitations, we introduce ADV-LLM, an iterative self-tuning process that crafts adversarial LLMs with enhanced jailbreak ability. Our framework significantly reduces the computational cost of generating adversarial suffixes while achieving nearly 100\% ASR on various open-source LLMs. Moreover, it exhibits strong attack transferability to closed-source models, achieving 99\% ASR on GPT-3.5 and 49\% ASR on GPT-4, despite being optimized solely on Llama3. Beyond improving jailbreak ability, ADV-LLM provides valuable insights for future safety alignment research through its ability to generate large datasets for studying LLM safety.

The rapid progress of Large Language Models (LLMs) has opened up new opportunities across various domains and applications; yet it also presents challenges related to potential misuse. To mitigate such risks, red teaming has been employed as a proactive security measure to probe language models for harmful outputs via jailbreak attacks. However, current jailbreak attack approaches are single-turn with explicit malicious queries that do not fully capture the complexity of real-world interactions. In reality, users can engage in multi-turn interactions with LLM-based chat assistants, allowing them to conceal their true intentions in a more covert manner. To bridge this gap, we, first, propose a new jailbreak approach, RED QUEEN ATTACK. This method constructs a multi-turn scenario, concealing the malicious intent under the guise of preventing harm. We craft 40 scenarios that vary in turns and select 14 harmful categories to generate 56k multi-turn attack data points. We conduct comprehensive experiments on the RED QUEEN ATTACK with four representative LLM families of different sizes. Our experiments reveal that all LLMs are vulnerable to RED QUEEN ATTACK, reaching 87.62% attack success rate on GPT-4o and 75.4% on Llama3-70B. Further analysis reveals that larger models are more susceptible to the RED QUEEN ATTACK, with multi-turn structures and concealment strategies contributing to its success. To prioritize safety, we introduce a straightforward mitigation strategy called RED QUEEN GUARD, which aligns LLMs to effectively counter adversarial attacks. This approach reduces the attack success rate to below 1% while maintaining the model's performance across standard benchmarks. Full implementation and dataset are publicly accessible at https://github.com/kriti-hippo/red_queen.

In this paper, we introduce a novel class of fast, beam search-based adversarial attack (BEAST) for Language Models (LMs). BEAST employs interpretable parameters, enabling attackers to balance between attack speed, success rate, and the readability of adversarial prompts. The computational efficiency of BEAST facilitates us to investigate its applications on LMs for jailbreaking, eliciting hallucinations, and privacy attacks. Our gradient-free targeted attack can jailbreak aligned LMs with high attack success rates within one minute. For instance, BEAST can jailbreak Vicuna-7B-v1.5 under one minute with a success rate of 89% when compared to a gradient-based baseline that takes over an hour to achieve 70% success rate using a single Nvidia RTX A6000 48GB GPU. Additionally, we discover a unique outcome wherein our untargeted attack induces hallucinations in LM chatbots. Through human evaluations, we find that our untargeted attack causes Vicuna-7B-v1.5 to produce ~15% more incorrect outputs when compared to LM outputs in the absence of our attack. We also learn that 22% of the time, BEAST causes Vicuna to generate outputs that are not relevant to the original prompt. Further, we use BEAST to generate adversarial prompts in a few seconds that can boost the performance of existing membership inference attacks for LMs. We believe that our fast attack, BEAST, has the potential to accelerate research in LM security and privacy. Our codebase is publicly available at https://github.com/vinusankars/BEAST.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

The rise of Large Audio Language Models (LAMs) brings both potential and risks, as their audio outputs may contain harmful or unethical content. However, current research lacks a systematic, quantitative evaluation of LAM safety especially against jailbreak attacks, which are challenging due to the temporal and semantic nature of speech. To bridge this gap, we introduce AJailBench, the first benchmark specifically designed to evaluate jailbreak vulnerabilities in LAMs. We begin by constructing AJailBench-Base, a dataset of 1,495 adversarial audio prompts spanning 10 policy-violating categories, converted from textual jailbreak attacks using realistic text to speech synthesis. Using this dataset, we evaluate several state-of-the-art LAMs and reveal that none exhibit consistent robustness across attacks. To further strengthen jailbreak testing and simulate more realistic attack conditions, we propose a method to generate dynamic adversarial variants. Our Audio Perturbation Toolkit (APT) applies targeted distortions across time, frequency, and amplitude domains. To preserve the original jailbreak intent, we enforce a semantic consistency constraint and employ Bayesian optimization to efficiently search for perturbations that are both subtle and highly effective. This results in AJailBench-APT, an extended dataset of optimized adversarial audio samples. Our findings demonstrate that even small, semantically preserved perturbations can significantly reduce the safety performance of leading LAMs, underscoring the need for more robust and semantically aware defense mechanisms.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent and integrated into autonomous systems, ensuring their safety is imperative. Despite significant strides toward safety alignment, recent work GCG~zou2023universal proposes a discrete token optimization algorithm and selects the single suffix with the lowest loss to successfully jailbreak aligned LLMs. In this work, we first discuss the drawbacks of solely picking the suffix with the lowest loss during GCG optimization for jailbreaking and uncover the missed successful suffixes during the intermediate steps. Moreover, we utilize those successful suffixes as training data to learn a generative model, named AmpleGCG, which captures the distribution of adversarial suffixes given a harmful query and enables the rapid generation of hundreds of suffixes for any harmful queries in seconds. AmpleGCG achieves near 100\% attack success rate (ASR) on two aligned LLMs (Llama-2-7B-chat and Vicuna-7B), surpassing two strongest attack baselines. More interestingly, AmpleGCG also transfers seamlessly to attack different models, including closed-source LLMs, achieving a 99\% ASR on the latest GPT-3.5. To summarize, our work amplifies the impact of GCG by training a generative model of adversarial suffixes that is universal to any harmful queries and transferable from attacking open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs. In addition, it can generate 200 adversarial suffixes for one harmful query in only 4 seconds, rendering it more challenging to defend.

With the advent of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), new attack vectors, such as cognitive bias, prompt injection, and jailbreaking, have emerged. Understanding these attacks promotes system robustness improvement and neural networks demystification. However, existing surveys often target attack taxonomy and lack in-depth analysis like 1) unified insights into adversariality, transferability, and generalization; 2) detailed evaluations framework; 3) motivation-driven attack categorizations; and 4) an integrated perspective on both traditional and LVLM attacks. This article addresses these gaps by offering a thorough summary of traditional and LVLM adversarial attacks, emphasizing their connections and distinctions, and providing actionable insights for future research.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across various tasks, they encounter potential security risks such as jailbreak attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities to bypass security measures and generate harmful outputs. Existing jailbreak strategies mainly focus on maximizing attack success rate (ASR), frequently neglecting other critical factors, including the relevance of the jailbreak response to the query and the level of stealthiness. This narrow focus on single objectives can result in ineffective attacks that either lack contextual relevance or are easily recognizable. In this work, we introduce BlackDAN, an innovative black-box attack framework with multi-objective optimization, aiming to generate high-quality prompts that effectively facilitate jailbreaking while maintaining contextual relevance and minimizing detectability. BlackDAN leverages Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms (MOEAs), specifically the NSGA-II algorithm, to optimize jailbreaks across multiple objectives including ASR, stealthiness, and semantic relevance. By integrating mechanisms like mutation, crossover, and Pareto-dominance, BlackDAN provides a transparent and interpretable process for generating jailbreaks. Furthermore, the framework allows customization based on user preferences, enabling the selection of prompts that balance harmfulness, relevance, and other factors. Experimental results demonstrate that BlackDAN outperforms traditional single-objective methods, yielding higher success rates and improved robustness across various LLMs and multimodal LLMs, while ensuring jailbreak responses are both relevant and less detectable.

Text-to-image generative models such as Stable Diffusion and DALLcdotE raise many ethical concerns due to the generation of harmful images such as Not-Safe-for-Work (NSFW) ones. To address these ethical concerns, safety filters are often adopted to prevent the generation of NSFW images. In this work, we propose SneakyPrompt, the first automated attack framework, to jailbreak text-to-image generative models such that they generate NSFW images even if safety filters are adopted. Given a prompt that is blocked by a safety filter, SneakyPrompt repeatedly queries the text-to-image generative model and strategically perturbs tokens in the prompt based on the query results to bypass the safety filter. Specifically, SneakyPrompt utilizes reinforcement learning to guide the perturbation of tokens. Our evaluation shows that SneakyPrompt successfully jailbreaks DALLcdotE 2 with closed-box safety filters to generate NSFW images. Moreover, we also deploy several state-of-the-art, open-source safety filters on a Stable Diffusion model. Our evaluation shows that SneakyPrompt not only successfully generates NSFW images, but also outperforms existing text adversarial attacks when extended to jailbreak text-to-image generative models, in terms of both the number of queries and qualities of the generated NSFW images. SneakyPrompt is open-source and available at this repository: https://github.com/Yuchen413/text2image_safety.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are widely used in vision-language reasoning tasks. However, their vulnerability to adversarial prompts remains a serious concern, as safety mechanisms often fail to prevent the generation of harmful outputs. Although recent jailbreak strategies report high success rates, many responses classified as "successful" are actually benign, vague, or unrelated to the intended malicious goal. This mismatch suggests that current evaluation standards may overestimate the effectiveness of such attacks. To address this issue, we introduce a four-axis evaluation framework that considers input on-topicness, input out-of-distribution (OOD) intensity, output harmfulness, and output refusal rate. This framework identifies truly effective jailbreaks. In a substantial empirical study, we reveal a structural trade-off: highly on-topic prompts are frequently blocked by safety filters, whereas those that are too OOD often evade detection but fail to produce harmful content. However, prompts that balance relevance and novelty are more likely to evade filters and trigger dangerous output. Building on this insight, we develop a recursive rewriting strategy called Balanced Structural Decomposition (BSD). The approach restructures malicious prompts into semantically aligned sub-tasks, while introducing subtle OOD signals and visual cues that make the inputs harder to detect. BSD was tested across 13 commercial and open-source MLLMs, where it consistently led to higher attack success rates, more harmful outputs, and fewer refusals. Compared to previous methods, it improves success rates by 67% and harmfulness by 21%, revealing a previously underappreciated weakness in current multimodal safety systems.

Recent advancements in the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) have primarily focused on mitigating attacks crafted in natural language or in common encryption techniques like Base64. However, new models which often possess better reasoning capabilities, open the door to new attack vectors that were previously non-existent in older models. This seems counter-intuitive at first glance, but these advanced models can decipher more complex cryptic queries that previous models could not, making them susceptible to attacks using such prompts. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Attacks using Custom Encryptions (ACE), a novel method to jailbreak LLMs by leveraging custom encryption schemes. We evaluate the effectiveness of ACE on four state-of-the-art LLMs, achieving Attack Success Rates (ASR) of up to 66% on close-source models and 88% on open-source models. Building upon this, we introduce Layered Attacks using Custom Encryptions (LACE), which employs multiple layers of encryption through our custom ciphers to further enhance the ASR. Our findings demonstrate that LACE significantly enhances the ability to jailbreak LLMs, increasing the ASR of GPT-4o from 40% to 78%, a 38% improvement. Our results highlight that the advanced capabilities of LLMs introduce unforeseen vulnerabilities to complex attacks. Specifically complex and layered ciphers increase the chance of jailbreaking.

Despite substantial efforts in safety alignment, recent research indicates that Large Language Models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Among these attacks, finetuning-based ones that compromise LLMs' safety alignment via fine-tuning stand out due to its stable jailbreak performance. In particular, a recent study indicates that fine-tuning with as few as 10 harmful question-answer (QA) pairs can lead to successful jailbreaking across various harmful questions. However, such malicious fine-tuning attacks are readily detectable and hence thwarted by moderation models. In this paper, we demonstrate that LLMs can be jailbroken by fine-tuning with only 10 benign QA pairs; our attack exploits the increased sensitivity of LLMs to fine-tuning data after being overfitted. Specifically, our fine-tuning process starts with overfitting an LLM via fine-tuning with benign QA pairs involving identical refusal answers. Further fine-tuning is then performed with standard benign answers, causing the overfitted LLM to forget the refusal attitude and thus provide compliant answers regardless of the harmfulness of a question. We implement our attack on the ten LLMs and compare it with five existing baselines. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves significant advantages in both attack effectiveness and attack stealth. Our findings expose previously unreported security vulnerabilities in current LLMs and provide a new perspective on understanding how LLMs' security is compromised, even with benign fine-tuning. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZHIXINXIE/tenBenign.

We investigate long-context vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) through Many-Shot Jailbreaking (MSJ). Our experiments utilize context length of up to 128K tokens. Through comprehensive analysis with various many-shot attack settings with different instruction styles, shot density, topic, and format, we reveal that context length is the primary factor determining attack effectiveness. Critically, we find that successful attacks do not require carefully crafted harmful content. Even repetitive shots or random dummy text can circumvent model safety measures, suggesting fundamental limitations in long-context processing capabilities of LLMs. The safety behavior of well-aligned models becomes increasingly inconsistent with longer contexts. These findings highlight significant safety gaps in context expansion capabilities of LLMs, emphasizing the need for new safety mechanisms.

Despite the remarkable versatility of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to generalize across both language and vision tasks, LLMs and MLLMs have shown vulnerability to jailbreaking, generating textual outputs that undermine safety, ethical, and bias standards when exposed to harmful or sensitive inputs. With the recent advancement of safety alignment via preference-tuning from human feedback, LLMs and MLLMs have been equipped with safety guardrails to yield safe, ethical, and fair responses with regard to harmful inputs. However, despite the significance of safety alignment, research on the vulnerabilities remains largely underexplored. In this paper, we investigate the unexplored vulnerability of the safety alignment, examining its ability to consistently provide safety guarantees for out-of-distribution(OOD)-ifying harmful inputs that may fall outside the aligned data distribution. Our key observation is that OOD-ifying the vanilla harmful inputs highly increases the uncertainty of the model to discern the malicious intent within the input, leading to a higher chance of being jailbroken. Exploiting this vulnerability, we propose JOOD, a new Jailbreak framework via OOD-ifying inputs beyond the safety alignment. We explore various off-the-shelf visual and textual transformation techniques for OOD-ifying the harmful inputs. Notably, we observe that even simple mixing-based techniques such as image mixup prove highly effective in increasing the uncertainty of the model, thereby facilitating the bypass of the safety alignment. Experiments across diverse jailbreak scenarios demonstrate that JOOD effectively jailbreaks recent proprietary LLMs and MLLMs such as GPT-4 and o1 with high attack success rate, which previous attack approaches have consistently struggled to jailbreak. Code is available at https://github.com/naver-ai/JOOD.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in the field of natural language processing. Unfortunately, LLMs face significant security and ethical risks. Although techniques such as safety alignment are developed for defense, prior researches reveal the possibility of bypassing such defenses through well-designed jailbreak attacks. In this paper, we propose QueryAttack, a novel framework to examine the generalizability of safety alignment. By treating LLMs as knowledge databases, we translate malicious queries in natural language into structured non-natural query language to bypass the safety alignment mechanisms of LLMs. We conduct extensive experiments on mainstream LLMs, and the results show that QueryAttack not only can achieve high attack success rates (ASRs), but also can jailbreak various defense methods. Furthermore, we tailor a defense method against QueryAttack, which can reduce ASR by up to 64% on GPT-4-1106. Our code is available at https://github.com/horizonsinzqs/QueryAttack.

Despite the advancements in training Large Language Models (LLMs) with alignment techniques to enhance the safety of generated content, these models remain susceptible to jailbreak, an adversarial attack method that exposes security vulnerabilities in LLMs. Notably, the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) method has demonstrated the ability to automatically generate adversarial suffixes that jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs. However, the optimization process involved in GCG is highly time-consuming, rendering the jailbreaking pipeline inefficient. In this paper, we investigate the process of GCG and identify an issue of Indirect Effect, the key bottleneck of the GCG optimization. To this end, we propose the Model Attack Gradient Index GCG (MAGIC), that addresses the Indirect Effect by exploiting the gradient information of the suffix tokens, thereby accelerating the procedure by having less computation and fewer iterations. Our experiments on AdvBench show that MAGIC achieves up to a 1.5x speedup, while maintaining Attack Success Rates (ASR) on par or even higher than other baselines. Our MAGIC achieved an ASR of 74% on the Llama-2 and an ASR of 54% when conducting transfer attacks on GPT-3.5. Code is available at https://github.com/jiah-li/magic.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive proficiency across a range of natural language processing tasks yet remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts, known as jailbreak attacks, carefully designed to elicit harmful responses from LLMs. Traditional methods rely on manual heuristics, which suffer from limited generalizability. While being automatic, optimization-based attacks often produce unnatural jailbreak prompts that are easy to detect by safety filters or require high computational overhead due to discrete token optimization. Witnessing the limitations of existing jailbreak methods, we introduce Generative Adversarial Suffix Prompter (GASP), a novel framework that combines human-readable prompt generation with Latent Bayesian Optimization (LBO) to improve adversarial suffix creation in a fully black-box setting. GASP leverages LBO to craft adversarial suffixes by efficiently exploring continuous embedding spaces, gradually optimizing the model to improve attack efficacy while balancing prompt coherence through a targeted iterative refinement procedure. Our experiments show that GASP can generate natural jailbreak prompts, significantly improving attack success rates, reducing training times, and accelerating inference speed, thus making it an efficient and scalable solution for red-teaming LLMs.

As large language models become increasingly integrated into daily life, audio has emerged as a key interface for human-AI interaction. However, this convenience also introduces new vulnerabilities, making audio a potential attack surface for adversaries. Our research introduces WhisperInject, a two-stage adversarial audio attack framework that can manipulate state-of-the-art audio language models to generate harmful content. Our method uses imperceptible perturbations in audio inputs that remain benign to human listeners. The first stage uses a novel reward-based optimization method, Reinforcement Learning with Projected Gradient Descent (RL-PGD), to guide the target model to circumvent its own safety protocols and generate harmful native responses. This native harmful response then serves as the target for Stage 2, Payload Injection, where we use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to optimize subtle perturbations that are embedded into benign audio carriers, such as weather queries or greeting messages. Validated under the rigorous StrongREJECT, LlamaGuard, as well as Human Evaluation safety evaluation framework, our experiments demonstrate a success rate exceeding 86% across Qwen2.5-Omni-3B, Qwen2.5-Omni-7B, and Phi-4-Multimodal. Our work demonstrates a new class of practical, audio-native threats, moving beyond theoretical exploits to reveal a feasible and covert method for manipulating AI behavior.

The inherent risk of generating harmful and unsafe content by Large Language Models (LLMs), has highlighted the need for their safety alignment. Various techniques like supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming were developed for ensuring the safety alignment of LLMs. However, the robustness of these aligned LLMs is always challenged by adversarial attacks that exploit unexplored and underlying vulnerabilities of the safety alignment. In this paper, we develop a novel black-box jailbreak attack, called BitBypass, that leverages hyphen-separated bitstream camouflage for jailbreaking aligned LLMs. This represents a new direction in jailbreaking by exploiting fundamental information representation of data as continuous bits, rather than leveraging prompt engineering or adversarial manipulations. Our evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs, namely GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5, Llama 3.1, and Mixtral, in adversarial perspective, revealed the capabilities of BitBypass in bypassing their safety alignment and tricking them into generating harmful and unsafe content. Further, we observed that BitBypass outperforms several state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks in terms of stealthiness and attack success. Overall, these results highlights the effectiveness and efficiency of BitBypass in jailbreaking these state-of-the-art LLMs.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

The reasoning abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advancement and exceptional performance across diverse domains. However, leveraging these reasoning capabilities to enhance LLM safety against adversarial attacks and jailbreak queries remains largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose Reasoning-to-Defend (R2D), a novel training paradigm that integrates safety reflections of queries and responses into LLMs' generation process, unlocking a safety-aware reasoning mechanism. This approach enables self-evaluation at each reasoning step to create safety pivot tokens as indicators of the response's safety status. Furthermore, in order to improve the learning efficiency of pivot token prediction, we propose Contrastive Pivot Optimization(CPO), which enhances the model's ability to perceive the safety status of dialogues. Through this mechanism, LLMs dynamically adjust their response strategies during reasoning, significantly enhancing their defense capabilities against jailbreak attacks. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that R2D effectively mitigates various attacks and improves overall safety, highlighting the substantial potential of safety-aware reasoning in strengthening LLMs' robustness against jailbreaks.

In this paper, we study the harmlessness alignment problem of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). We conduct a systematic empirical analysis of the harmlessness performance of representative MLLMs and reveal that the image input poses the alignment vulnerability of MLLMs. Inspired by this, we propose a novel jailbreak method named HADES, which hides and amplifies the harmfulness of the malicious intent within the text input, using meticulously crafted images. Experimental results show that HADES can effectively jailbreak existing MLLMs, which achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 90.26% for LLaVA-1.5 and 71.60% for Gemini Pro Vision. Our code and data will be publicly released.

Language agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have seen exploding development. Their capability of using language as a vehicle for thought and communication lends an incredible level of flexibility and versatility. People have quickly capitalized on this capability to connect LLMs to a wide range of external components and environments: databases, tools, the Internet, robotic embodiment, etc. Many believe an unprecedentedly powerful automation technology is emerging. However, new automation technologies come with new safety risks, especially for intricate systems like language agents. There is a surprisingly large gap between the speed and scale of their development and deployment and our understanding of their safety risks. Are we building a house of cards? In this position paper, we present the first systematic effort in mapping adversarial attacks against language agents. We first present a unified conceptual framework for agents with three major components: Perception, Brain, and Action. Under this framework, we present a comprehensive discussion and propose 12 potential attack scenarios against different components of an agent, covering different attack strategies (e.g., input manipulation, adversarial demonstrations, jailbreaking, backdoors). We also draw connections to successful attack strategies previously applied to LLMs. We emphasize the urgency to gain a thorough understanding of language agent risks before their widespread deployment.

With the rapid advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), securing these models against malicious inputs while align- ing them with human values has emerged as a critical challenge. In this paper, we investigate an important and unexplored question of whether techniques that successfully jailbreak Large Language Models (LLMs) can be equally effective in jailbreaking MLLMs. To explore this issue, we in- troduce JailBreakV-28K, a pioneering benchmark designed to assess the transferability of LLM jailbreak techniques to MLLMs, thereby evaluat- ing the robustness of MLLMs against diverse jailbreak attacks. Utilizing a dataset of 2, 000 malicious queries that is also proposed in this paper, we generate 20, 000 text-based jailbreak prompts using advanced jailbreak attacks on LLMs, alongside 8, 000 image-based jailbreak inputs from recent MLLMs jailbreak attacks, our comprehensive dataset includes 28, 000 test cases across a spectrum of adversarial scenarios. Our evaluation of 10 open- source MLLMs reveals a notably high Attack Success Rate (ASR) for attacks transferred from LLMs, highlighting a critical vulnerability in MLLMs that stems from their text-processing capabilities. Our findings underscore the urgent need for future research to address alignment vulnerabilities in MLLMs from both textual and visual inputs.

The adoption of large language models (LLMs) in many applications, from customer service chat bots and software development assistants to more capable agentic systems necessitates research into how to secure these systems. Attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking attempt to elicit responses and actions from these models that are not compliant with the safety, privacy, or content policies of organizations using the model in their application. In order to counter abuse of LLMs for generating potentially harmful replies or taking undesirable actions, LLM owners must apply safeguards during training and integrate additional tools to block the LLM from generating text that abuses the model. Jailbreaking prompts play a vital role in convincing an LLM to generate potentially harmful content, making it important to identify jailbreaking attempts to block any further steps. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detect jailbreak prompts based on pairing text embeddings well-suited for retrieval with traditional machine learning classification algorithms. Our approach outperforms all publicly available methods from open source LLM security applications.

The autonomous AI agents using large language models can create undeniable values in all span of the society but they face security threats from adversaries that warrants immediate protective solutions because trust and safety issues arise. Considering the many-shot jailbreaking and deceptive alignment as some of the main advanced attacks, that cannot be mitigated by the static guardrails used during the supervised training, points out a crucial research priority for real world robustness. The combination of static guardrails in dynamic multi-agent system fails to defend against those attacks. We intend to enhance security for LLM-based agents through the development of new evaluation frameworks which identify and counter threats for safe operational deployment. Our work uses three examination methods to detect rogue agents through a Reverse Turing Test and analyze deceptive alignment through multi-agent simulations and develops an anti-jailbreaking system by testing it with GEMINI 1.5 pro and llama-3.3-70B, deepseek r1 models using tool-mediated adversarial scenarios. The detection capabilities are strong such as 94\% accuracy for GEMINI 1.5 pro yet the system suffers persistent vulnerabilities when under long attacks as prompt length increases attack success rates (ASR) and diversity metrics become ineffective in prediction while revealing multiple complex system faults. The findings demonstrate the necessity of adopting flexible security systems based on active monitoring that can be performed by the agents themselves together with adaptable interventions by system admin as the current models can create vulnerabilities that can lead to the unreliable and vulnerable system. So, in our work, we try to address such situations and propose a comprehensive framework to counteract the security issues.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to adversarial attacks such as jailbreaking, which can elicit harmful or unsafe behaviors. This vulnerability is exacerbated in multilingual settings, where multilingual safety-aligned data is often limited. Thus, developing a guardrail capable of detecting and filtering unsafe content across diverse languages is critical for deploying LLMs in real-world applications. In this work, we introduce a multilingual guardrail with reasoning for prompt classification. Our method consists of: (1) synthetic multilingual data generation incorporating culturally and linguistically nuanced variants, (2) supervised fine-tuning, and (3) a curriculum-based Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) framework that further improves performance. Experimental results demonstrate that our multilingual guardrail, MrGuard, consistently outperforms recent baselines across both in-domain and out-of-domain languages by more than 15%. We also evaluate MrGuard's robustness to multilingual variations, such as code-switching and low-resource language distractors in the prompt, and demonstrate that it preserves safety judgments under these challenging conditions. The multilingual reasoning capability of our guardrail enables it to generate explanations, which are particularly useful for understanding language-specific risks and ambiguities in multilingual content moderation.

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is an increasingly critical step in post-training. Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) has emerged as a simple, yet effective alternative to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Synthetic preference data with its low cost and high quality enable effective alignment through single- or multi-model generated preference data. Our study reveals a striking, safety-specific phenomenon associated with DPO alignment: Although multi-model generated data enhances performance on general tasks (ARC, Hellaswag, MMLU, TruthfulQA, Winogrande) by providing diverse responses, it also tends to facilitate reward hacking during training. This can lead to a high attack success rate (ASR) when models encounter jailbreaking prompts. The issue is particularly pronounced when employing stronger models like GPT-4o or larger models in the same family to generate chosen responses paired with target model self-generated rejected responses, resulting in dramatically poorer safety outcomes. Furthermore, with respect to safety, using solely self-generated responses (single-model generation) for both chosen and rejected pairs significantly outperforms configurations that incorporate responses from stronger models, whether used directly as chosen data or as part of a multi-model response pool. We demonstrate that multi-model preference data exhibits high linear separability between chosen and rejected responses, which allows models to exploit superficial cues rather than internalizing robust safety constraints. Our experiments, conducted on models from the Llama, Mistral, and Qwen families, consistently validate these findings.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to generating harmful content when prompted with carefully crafted inputs, a vulnerability known as LLM jailbreaking. As LLMs become more powerful, studying jailbreak methods is critical to enhancing security and aligning models with human values. Traditionally, jailbreak techniques have relied on suffix addition or prompt templates, but these methods suffer from limited attack diversity. This paper introduces DiffusionAttacker, an end-to-end generative approach for jailbreak rewriting inspired by diffusion models. Our method employs a sequence-to-sequence (seq2seq) text diffusion model as a generator, conditioning on the original prompt and guiding the denoising process with a novel attack loss. Unlike previous approaches that use autoregressive LLMs to generate jailbreak prompts, which limit the modification of already generated tokens and restrict the rewriting space, DiffusionAttacker utilizes a seq2seq diffusion model, allowing more flexible token modifications. This approach preserves the semantic content of the original prompt while producing harmful content. Additionally, we leverage the Gumbel-Softmax technique to make the sampling process from the diffusion model's output distribution differentiable, eliminating the need for iterative token search. Extensive experiments on Advbench and Harmbench demonstrate that DiffusionAttacker outperforms previous methods across various evaluation metrics, including attack success rate (ASR), fluency, and diversity.

As large language models (LLMs) grow more powerful, ensuring their safety against misuse becomes crucial. While researchers have focused on developing robust defenses, no method has yet achieved complete invulnerability to attacks. We propose an alternative approach: instead of seeking perfect adversarial robustness, we develop rapid response techniques to look to block whole classes of jailbreaks after observing only a handful of attacks. To study this setting, we develop RapidResponseBench, a benchmark that measures a defense's robustness against various jailbreak strategies after adapting to a few observed examples. We evaluate five rapid response methods, all of which use jailbreak proliferation, where we automatically generate additional jailbreaks similar to the examples observed. Our strongest method, which fine-tunes an input classifier to block proliferated jailbreaks, reduces attack success rate by a factor greater than 240 on an in-distribution set of jailbreaks and a factor greater than 15 on an out-of-distribution set, having observed just one example of each jailbreaking strategy. Moreover, further studies suggest that the quality of proliferation model and number of proliferated examples play an key role in the effectiveness of this defense. Overall, our results highlight the potential of responding rapidly to novel jailbreaks to limit LLM misuse.

Numerous studies have investigated methods for jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate harmful content. Typically, these methods are evaluated using datasets of malicious prompts designed to bypass security policies established by LLM providers. However, the generally broad scope and open-ended nature of existing datasets can complicate the assessment of jailbreaking effectiveness, particularly in specific domains, notably cybersecurity. To address this issue, we present and publicly release CySecBench, a comprehensive dataset containing 12662 prompts specifically designed to evaluate jailbreaking techniques in the cybersecurity domain. The dataset is organized into 10 distinct attack-type categories, featuring close-ended prompts to enable a more consistent and accurate assessment of jailbreaking attempts. Furthermore, we detail our methodology for dataset generation and filtration, which can be adapted to create similar datasets in other domains. To demonstrate the utility of CySecBench, we propose and evaluate a jailbreaking approach based on prompt obfuscation. Our experimental results show that this method successfully elicits harmful content from commercial black-box LLMs, achieving Success Rates (SRs) of 65% with ChatGPT and 88% with Gemini; in contrast, Claude demonstrated greater resilience with a jailbreaking SR of 17%. Compared to existing benchmark approaches, our method shows superior performance, highlighting the value of domain-specific evaluation datasets for assessing LLM security measures. Moreover, when evaluated using prompts from a widely used dataset (i.e., AdvBench), it achieved an SR of 78.5%, higher than the state-of-the-art methods.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into real-world applications, safeguarding them against unsafe, malicious, or privacy-violating content is critically important. We present OpenGuardrails, the first open-source project to provide both a context-aware safety and manipulation detection model and a deployable platform for comprehensive AI guardrails. OpenGuardrails protects against content-safety risks, model-manipulation attacks (e.g., prompt injection, jailbreaking, code-interpreter abuse, and the generation/execution of malicious code), and data leakage. Content-safety and model-manipulation detection are implemented by a unified large model, while data-leakage identification and redaction are performed by a separate lightweight NER pipeline (e.g., Presidio-style models or regex-based detectors). The system can be deployed as a security gateway or an API-based service, with enterprise-grade, fully private deployment options. OpenGuardrails achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on safety benchmarks, excelling in both prompt and response classification across English, Chinese, and multilingual tasks. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

As large language models grow in capability and agency, identifying vulnerabilities through red-teaming becomes vital for safe deployment. However, traditional prompt-engineering approaches may prove ineffective once red-teaming turns into a weak-to-strong problem, where target models surpass red-teamers in capabilities. To study this shift, we frame red-teaming through the lens of the capability gap between attacker and target. We evaluate more than 500 attacker-target pairs using LLM-based jailbreak attacks that mimic human red-teamers across diverse families, sizes, and capability levels. Three strong trends emerge: (i) more capable models are better attackers, (ii) attack success drops sharply once the target's capability exceeds the attacker's, and (iii) attack success rates correlate with high performance on social science splits of the MMLU-Pro benchmark. From these trends, we derive a jailbreaking scaling law that predicts attack success for a fixed target based on attacker-target capability gap. These findings suggest that fixed-capability attackers (e.g., humans) may become ineffective against future models, increasingly capable open-source models amplify risks for existing systems, and model providers must accurately measure and control models' persuasive and manipulative abilities to limit their effectiveness as attackers.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

We design, implement, and evaluate adversarial decoding, a new, generic text generation technique that produces readable documents for different adversarial objectives. Prior methods either produce easily detectable gibberish, or cannot handle objectives that include embedding similarity. In particular, they only work for direct attacks (such as jailbreaking) and cannot produce adversarial text for realistic indirect injection, e.g., documents that (1) are retrieved in RAG systems in response to broad classes of queries, and also (2) adversarially influence subsequent generation. We also show that fluency (low perplexity) is not sufficient to evade filtering. We measure the effectiveness of adversarial decoding for different objectives, including RAG poisoning, jailbreaking, and evasion of defensive filters, and demonstrate that it outperforms existing methods while producing readable adversarial documents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate. With the advent of agentic workflows, multi-turn dialogue has become the de facto mode of interaction with LLMs for completing long and complex tasks. While LLM capabilities continue to improve, they remain increasingly susceptible to jailbreaking, especially in multi-turn scenarios where harmful intent can be subtly injected across the conversation to produce nefarious outcomes. While single-turn attacks have been extensively explored, adaptability, efficiency and effectiveness continue to remain key challenges for their multi-turn counterparts. To address these gaps, we present PLAGUE, a novel plug-and-play framework for designing multi-turn attacks inspired by lifelong-learning agents. PLAGUE dissects the lifetime of a multi-turn attack into three carefully designed phases (Primer, Planner and Finisher) that enable a systematic and information-rich exploration of the multi-turn attack family. Evaluations show that red-teaming agents designed using PLAGUE achieve state-of-the-art jailbreaking results, improving attack success rates (ASR) by more than 30% across leading models in a lesser or comparable query budget. Particularly, PLAGUE enables an ASR (based on StrongReject) of 81.4% on OpenAI's o3 and 67.3% on Claude's Opus 4.1, two models that are considered highly resistant to jailbreaks in safety literature. Our work offers tools and insights to understand the importance of plan initialization, context optimization and lifelong learning in crafting multi-turn attacks for a comprehensive model vulnerability evaluation.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

Recent latent-space monitoring techniques have shown promise as defenses against LLM attacks. These defenses act as scanners that seek to detect harmful activations before they lead to undesirable actions. This prompts the question: Can models execute harmful behavior via inconspicuous latent states? Here, we study such obfuscated activations. We show that state-of-the-art latent-space defenses -- including sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent OOD detection -- are all vulnerable to obfuscated activations. For example, against probes trained to classify harmfulness, our attacks can often reduce recall from 100% to 0% while retaining a 90% jailbreaking rate. However, obfuscation has limits: we find that on a complex task (writing SQL code), obfuscation reduces model performance. Together, our results demonstrate that neural activations are highly malleable: we can reshape activation patterns in a variety of ways, often while preserving a network's behavior. This poses a fundamental challenge to latent-space defenses.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) excel in vision-language tasks but also pose significant risks of generating harmful content, particularly through jailbreak attacks. Jailbreak attacks refer to intentional manipulations that bypass safety mechanisms in models, leading to the generation of inappropriate or unsafe content. Detecting such attacks is critical to ensuring the responsible deployment of MLLMs. Existing jailbreak detection methods face three primary challenges: (1) Many rely on model hidden states or gradients, limiting their applicability to white-box models, where the internal workings of the model are accessible; (2) They involve high computational overhead from uncertainty-based analysis, which limits real-time detection, and (3) They require fully labeled harmful datasets, which are often scarce in real-world settings. To address these issues, we introduce a test-time adaptive framework called JAILDAM. Our method leverages a memory-based approach guided by policy-driven unsafe knowledge representations, eliminating the need for explicit exposure to harmful data. By dynamically updating unsafe knowledge during test-time, our framework improves generalization to unseen jailbreak strategies while maintaining efficiency. Experiments on multiple VLM jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that JAILDAM delivers state-of-the-art performance in harmful content detection, improving both accuracy and speed.

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has brought new vitality to the various domains and generated substantial social and economic benefits. However, the swift advancement of LLMs has introduced new security vulnerabilities. Jailbreak, a form of attack that induces LLMs to output harmful content through carefully crafted prompts, poses a challenge to the safe and trustworthy development of LLMs. Previous jailbreak attack methods primarily exploited the internal capabilities of the model. Among them, one category leverages the model's implicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker is unaware of the exact reasons for the attack's success. The other category utilizes the model's explicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker understands the reasons for the attack's success. For example, these attacks exploit the model's abilities in coding, contextual learning, or understanding ASCII characters. However, these earlier jailbreak attacks have certain limitations, as they only exploit the inherent capabilities of the model. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak method, SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ), which utilizes the construction of input prompts by LLMs to inject jailbreak information into user prompts, enabling successful jailbreak of the LLMs. Our SIJ method achieves nearly 100\% attack success rates on five well-known open-source LLMs in the context of AdvBench, while incurring lower time costs compared to previous methods. More importantly, SIJ reveals a new vulnerability in LLMs that urgently needs to be addressed. To this end, we propose a defense method called Self-Reminder-Key and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak{https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak}.

Jailbreak attacks aim to exploit large language models (LLMs) by inducing them to generate harmful content, thereby revealing their vulnerabilities. Understanding and addressing these attacks is crucial for advancing the field of LLM safety. Previous jailbreak approaches have mainly focused on direct manipulations of harmful intent, with limited attention to the impact of persona prompts. In this study, we systematically explore the efficacy of persona prompts in compromising LLM defenses. We propose a genetic algorithm-based method that automatically crafts persona prompts to bypass LLM's safety mechanisms. Our experiments reveal that: (1) our evolved persona prompts reduce refusal rates by 50-70% across multiple LLMs, and (2) these prompts demonstrate synergistic effects when combined with existing attack methods, increasing success rates by 10-20%. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/CjangCjengh/Generic_Persona.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is increasingly compromised by jailbreak attacks, which can manipulate these models to generate harmful or unintended content. Investigating these attacks is crucial for uncovering model vulnerabilities. However, many existing jailbreak strategies fail to keep pace with the rapid development of defense mechanisms, such as defensive suffixes, rendering them ineffective against defended models. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel attack method called ArrAttack, specifically designed to target defended LLMs. ArrAttack automatically generates robust jailbreak prompts capable of bypassing various defense measures. This capability is supported by a universal robustness judgment model that, once trained, can perform robustness evaluation for any target model with a wide variety of defenses. By leveraging this model, we can rapidly develop a robust jailbreak prompt generator that efficiently converts malicious input prompts into effective attacks. Extensive evaluations reveal that ArrAttack significantly outperforms existing attack strategies, demonstrating strong transferability across both white-box and black-box models, including GPT-4 and Claude-3. Our work bridges the gap between jailbreak attacks and defenses, providing a fresh perspective on generating robust jailbreak prompts. We make the codebase available at https://github.com/LLBao/ArrAttack.

Ensuring AI safety is crucial as large language models become increasingly integrated into real-world applications. A key challenge is jailbreak, where adversarial prompts bypass built-in safeguards to elicit harmful disallowed outputs. Inspired by psychological foot-in-the-door principles, we introduce FITD,a novel multi-turn jailbreak method that leverages the phenomenon where minor initial commitments lower resistance to more significant or more unethical transgressions. Our approach progressively escalates the malicious intent of user queries through intermediate bridge prompts and aligns the model's response by itself to induce toxic responses. Extensive experimental results on two jailbreak benchmarks demonstrate that FITD achieves an average attack success rate of 94% across seven widely used models, outperforming existing state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, we provide an in-depth analysis of LLM self-corruption, highlighting vulnerabilities in current alignment strategies and emphasizing the risks inherent in multi-turn interactions. The code is available at https://github.com/Jinxiaolong1129/Foot-in-the-door-Jailbreak.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as public-facing web services and APIs has made their security a core concern for the web ecosystem. Jailbreak attacks, as one of the significant threats to LLMs, have recently attracted extensive research. In this paper, we reveal a jailbreak strategy which can effectively evade current defense strategies. It can extract valuable information from failed or partially successful attack attempts and contains self-evolution from attack interactions, resulting in sufficient strategy diversity and adaptability. Inspired by continuous learning and modular design principles, we propose ASTRA, a jailbreak framework that autonomously discovers, retrieves, and evolves attack strategies to achieve more efficient and adaptive attacks. To enable this autonomous evolution, we design a closed-loop "attack-evaluate-distill-reuse" core mechanism that not only generates attack prompts but also automatically distills and generalizes reusable attack strategies from every interaction. To systematically accumulate and apply this attack knowledge, we introduce a three-tier strategy library that categorizes strategies into Effective, Promising, and Ineffective based on their performance scores. The strategy library not only provides precise guidance for attack generation but also possesses exceptional extensibility and transferability. We conduct extensive experiments under a black-box setting, and the results show that ASTRA achieves an average Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 82.7%, significantly outperforming baselines.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely applied in various domains, the safety of LLMs is increasingly attracting attention to avoid their powerful capabilities being misused. Existing jailbreak methods create a forced instruction-following scenario, or search adversarial prompts with prefix or suffix tokens to achieve a specific representation manually or automatically. However, they suffer from low efficiency and explicit jailbreak patterns, far from the real deployment of mass attacks to LLMs. In this paper, we point out that simply rewriting the original instruction can achieve a jailbreak, and we find that this rewriting approach is learnable and transferable. We propose the Rewrite to Jailbreak (R2J) approach, a transferable black-box jailbreak method to attack LLMs by iteratively exploring the weakness of the LLMs and automatically improving the attacking strategy. The jailbreak is more efficient and hard to identify since no additional features are introduced. Extensive experiments and analysis demonstrate the effectiveness of R2J, and we find that the jailbreak is also transferable to multiple datasets and various types of models with only a few queries. We hope our work motivates further investigation of LLM safety. The code can be found at https://github.com/ythuang02/R2J/.

Despite extensive safety alignment efforts, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful behavior. While existing studies predominantly focus on attack methods that require technical expertise, two critical questions remain underexplored: (1) Are jailbroken responses truly useful in enabling average users to carry out harmful actions? (2) Do safety vulnerabilities exist in more common, simple human-LLM interactions? In this paper, we demonstrate that LLM responses most effectively facilitate harmful actions when they are both actionable and informative--two attributes easily elicited in multi-step, multilingual interactions. Using this insight, we propose HarmScore, a jailbreak metric that measures how effectively an LLM response enables harmful actions, and Speak Easy, a simple multi-step, multilingual attack framework. Notably, by incorporating Speak Easy into direct request and jailbreak baselines, we see an average absolute increase of 0.319 in Attack Success Rate and 0.426 in HarmScore in both open-source and proprietary LLMs across four safety benchmarks. Our work reveals a critical yet often overlooked vulnerability: Malicious users can easily exploit common interaction patterns for harmful intentions.

This paper proposes a simple yet effective jailbreak attack named FlipAttack against black-box LLMs. First, from the autoregressive nature, we reveal that LLMs tend to understand the text from left to right and find that they struggle to comprehend the text when noise is added to the left side. Motivated by these insights, we propose to disguise the harmful prompt by constructing left-side noise merely based on the prompt itself, then generalize this idea to 4 flipping modes. Second, we verify the strong ability of LLMs to perform the text-flipping task, and then develop 4 variants to guide LLMs to denoise, understand, and execute harmful behaviors accurately. These designs keep FlipAttack universal, stealthy, and simple, allowing it to jailbreak black-box LLMs within only 1 query. Experiments on 8 LLMs demonstrate the superiority of FlipAttack. Remarkably, it achieves sim98\% attack success rate on GPT-4o, and sim98\% bypass rate against 5 guardrail models on average. The codes are available at GitHubhttps://github.com/yueliu1999/FlipAttack.

The rapid progress in open-source large language models (LLMs) is significantly advancing AI development. Extensive efforts have been made before model release to align their behavior with human values, with the primary goal of ensuring their helpfulness and harmlessness. However, even carefully aligned models can be manipulated maliciously, leading to unintended behaviors, known as "jailbreaks". These jailbreaks are typically triggered by specific text inputs, often referred to as adversarial prompts. In this work, we propose the generation exploitation attack, an extremely simple approach that disrupts model alignment by only manipulating variations of decoding methods. By exploiting different generation strategies, including varying decoding hyper-parameters and sampling methods, we increase the misalignment rate from 0% to more than 95% across 11 language models including LLaMA2, Vicuna, Falcon, and MPT families, outperforming state-of-the-art attacks with 30times lower computational cost. Finally, we propose an effective alignment method that explores diverse generation strategies, which can reasonably reduce the misalignment rate under our attack. Altogether, our study underscores a major failure in current safety evaluation and alignment procedures for open-source LLMs, strongly advocating for more comprehensive red teaming and better alignment before releasing such models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Princeton-SysML/Jailbreak_LLM.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, the lack of systematic methods to assess their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks presents a critical security gap. We introduce the jailbreak oracle problem: given a model, prompt, and decoding strategy, determine whether a jailbreak response can be generated with likelihood exceeding a specified threshold. This formalization enables a principled study of jailbreak vulnerabilities. Answering the jailbreak oracle problem poses significant computational challenges -- the search space grows exponentially with the length of the response tokens. We present Boa, the first efficient algorithm for solving the jailbreak oracle problem. Boa employs a three-phase search strategy: (1) constructing block lists to identify refusal patterns, (2) breadth-first sampling to identify easily accessible jailbreaks, and (3) depth-first priority search guided by fine-grained safety scores to systematically explore promising low-probability paths. Boa enables rigorous security assessments including systematic defense evaluation, standardized comparison of red team attacks, and model certification under extreme adversarial conditions.

Jailbreak attacks bypass the guardrails of large language models to produce harmful outputs. In this paper, we ask whether the model outputs produced by existing jailbreaks are actually useful. For example, when jailbreaking a model to give instructions for building a bomb, does the jailbreak yield good instructions? Since the utility of most unsafe answers (e.g., bomb instructions) is hard to evaluate rigorously, we build new jailbreak evaluation sets with known ground truth answers, by aligning models to refuse questions related to benign and easy-to-evaluate topics (e.g., biology or math). Our evaluation of eight representative jailbreaks across five utility benchmarks reveals a consistent drop in model utility in jailbroken responses, which we term the jailbreak tax. For example, while all jailbreaks we tested bypass guardrails in models aligned to refuse to answer math, this comes at the expense of a drop of up to 92% in accuracy. Overall, our work proposes the jailbreak tax as a new important metric in AI safety, and introduces benchmarks to evaluate existing and future jailbreaks. We make the benchmark available at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/jailbreak-tax

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms. Existing attack methods are fixed or specifically tailored for certain models and cannot flexibly adjust attack strength, which is critical for generalization when attacking models of various sizes. We introduce a novel scalable jailbreak attack that preempts the activation of an LLM's safety policies by occupying its computational resources. Our method involves engaging the LLM in a resource-intensive preliminary task - a Character Map lookup and decoding process - before presenting the target instruction. By saturating the model's processing capacity, we prevent the activation of safety protocols when processing the subsequent instruction. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that our method achieves a high success rate in bypassing safety measures without requiring gradient access, manual prompt engineering. We verified our approach offers a scalable attack that quantifies attack strength and adapts to different model scales at the optimal strength. We shows safety policies of LLMs might be more susceptible to resource constraints. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability in current LLM safety designs, highlighting the need for more robust defense strategies that account for resource-intense condition.