Daily Papers

Humans demonstrate remarkable abilities to predict physical events in complex scenes. Two classes of models for physical scene understanding have recently been proposed: "Intuitive Physics Engines", or IPEs, which posit that people make predictions by running approximate probabilistic simulations in causal mental models similar in nature to video-game physics engines, and memory-based models, which make judgments based on analogies to stored experiences of previously encountered scenes and physical outcomes. Versions of the latter have recently been instantiated in convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures. Here we report four experiments that, to our knowledge, are the first rigorous comparisons of simulation-based and CNN-based models, where both approaches are concretely instantiated in algorithms that can run on raw image inputs and produce as outputs physical judgments such as whether a stack of blocks will fall. Both approaches can achieve super-human accuracy levels and can quantitatively predict human judgments to a similar degree, but only the simulation-based models generalize to novel situations in ways that people do, and are qualitatively consistent with systematic perceptual illusions and judgment asymmetries that people show.

LLM-as-a-judge has become the dominant paradigm for grading model outputs at scale, yet the same model assigns systematically different scores when its output format changes (e.g., a 1-5 rating vs. a True/False label). Existing diagnoses of these format-induced inconsistencies stop at the input-output level. Using Position-aware Edge Attribution Patching (PEAP), we causally investigate the internal mechanism in Gemma-3, Qwen2.5, and Llama-3. We find that judgments across structured understanding and open-ended preference tasks share a sparse, generalized Latent Evaluator sub-graph in the mid-to-late multi-layer perceptrons (MLPs); zero-ablating it collapses judgment while preserving world knowledge in architecturally modular models. By structurally decoupling abstract judging from output formatting, we provide a mechanistic account of format-induced inconsistency on the open-weight models we study: a continuous judgment signal computed in the shared trunk is mapped through fragile, format-specific terminal branches, enabling format-independent preference to be isolated downstream of the requested output format. Our findings imply that benchmark-level reliability comparisons across formats are partially measuring formatter geometry rather than evaluation quality.

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising alternative to human evaluators across various tasks, yet inherent biases - particularly position bias, the tendency to favor solutions based on their position within the prompt - compromise its reliability. This exploratory study evaluates position bias in LLM judges across pairwise and list-wise comparison settings, introducing three metrics: repetition stability, position consistency, and preference fairness. Our experiments, involving 15 LLM judges across MTBench and DevBench with 22 tasks and approximately 40 solution-generating models, result in over 150,000 evaluation instances. We identify Judge-Level, Candidate-Level, and Task-Level factors contributing to bias. The findings confirm that position bias is not due to random chance and varies significantly across judges and tasks. While position bias is weakly influenced by the length of prompt components, it is strongly affected by the quality gap between solutions. Our agreement and disagreement analysis among judges further provides insights into the distribution of judging difficulty across the dataset, and highlights the potential for dataset modifications.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

Visual search is a ubiquitous and often challenging daily task, exemplified by looking for the car keys at home or a friend in a crowd. An intriguing property of some classical search tasks is an asymmetry such that finding a target A among distractors B can be easier than finding B among A. To elucidate the mechanisms responsible for asymmetry in visual search, we propose a computational model that takes a target and a search image as inputs and produces a sequence of eye movements until the target is found. The model integrates eccentricity-dependent visual recognition with target-dependent top-down cues. We compared the model against human behavior in six paradigmatic search tasks that show asymmetry in humans. Without prior exposure to the stimuli or task-specific training, the model provides a plausible mechanism for search asymmetry. We hypothesized that the polarity of search asymmetry arises from experience with the natural environment. We tested this hypothesis by training the model on augmented versions of ImageNet where the biases of natural images were either removed or reversed. The polarity of search asymmetry disappeared or was altered depending on the training protocol. This study highlights how classical perceptual properties can emerge in neural network models, without the need for task-specific training, but rather as a consequence of the statistical properties of the developmental diet fed to the model. All source code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/kreimanlab/VisualSearchAsymmetry.

LLM-as-Judge frameworks are increasingly popular for AI evaluation, yet research findings on the relationship between models' generation and judgment abilities remain inconsistent. We investigate this relationship through systematic dataset- and instance-level analyses across 11 models and 21 diverse tasks. Despite both capabilities relying on the same underlying knowledge, our analyses reveal they are only weakly correlated, primarily due to LLMs' sensitivity to the responses being judged. To address this, we propose a self-reference-guided evaluation strategy that leverages a model's own answers as references. This approach significantly strengthens the correlation between generation and judgment abilities, offering a practical path to align these skills and providing a reliable proxy for model selection in evaluation tasks.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into social decision-making, understanding their political positioning and alignment behavior is critical for safety and fairness. This study presents a sociotechnical audit of 26 prominent LLMs, triangulating their positions across three psychometric inventories (Political Compass, SapplyValues, 8 Values) and evaluating their performance on a large-scale news labeling task (N approx 27{,}000). Our results reveal a strong clustering of models in the Libertarian-Left region of the ideological space, encompassing 96.3% of the cohort. Alignment signals appear to be consistent architectural traits rather than stochastic noise (η^2 > 0.90); however, we identify substantial discrepancies in measurement validity. In particular, the Political Compass exhibits a strong negative correlation with cultural progressivism (r=-0.64) when compared against multi-axial instruments, suggesting a conflation of social conservatism with authoritarianism in this context. We further observe a significant divergence between open-weights and closed-source models, with the latter displaying markedly higher cultural progressivism scores (p<10^{-25}). In downstream media analysis, models exhibit a systematic "center-shift," frequently categorizing neutral articles as left-leaning, alongside an asymmetric detection capability in which "Far Left" content is identified with greater accuracy (19.2%) than "Far Right" content (2.0%). These findings suggest that single-axis evaluations are insufficient and that multidimensional auditing frameworks are necessary to characterize alignment behavior in deployed LLMs. Our code and data will be made public.

Can humans tell whether a news article was written by a person or a large language model (LLM)? We investigate this question using JudgeGPT, a study platform that independently measures source attribution (human vs. machine) and authenticity judgment (legitimate vs. fake) on continuous scales. From 2,318 judgments collected from 1,054 participants across content generated by six LLMs, we report five findings: (1) participants cannot reliably distinguish machine-generated from human-written text (p > .05, Welch's t-test); (2) this inability holds across all tested models, including open-weight models with as few as 7B parameters; (3) self-reported domain expertise predicts judgment accuracy (r = .35, p < .001) whereas political orientation does not (r = -.10, n.s.); (4) clustering reveals distinct response strategies ("Skeptics" vs. "Believers"); and (5) accuracy degrades after approximately 30 sequential evaluations due to cognitive fatigue. The answer, in short, is no: humans cannot reliably tell. These results indicate that user-side detection is not a viable defense and motivate system-level countermeasures such as cryptographic content provenance.

The reliability of VLM-as-a-Judge is critical for the automatic evaluation of vision-language models (VLMs). Despite recent progress, our analysis reveals that VLM-as-a-Judge often pays limited attention to the image when making decisions. Instead, they often blindly favor the more informative answer, even when they can recognize it conflicts with the image content. We call this problem informativeness bias, which significantly undermines judge reliability. To address it, we propose BIRCH (Balanced Informativeness and CoRrectness with a Truthful AnCHor), a judging paradigm that first corrects inconsistencies with the image content in candidate answers, and then compares the answers against this corrected version. This shifts the judge's focus from informativeness to image-grounded correctness. Experiments on multiple models and benchmarks show that BIRCH reduces informativeness bias by up to 17%, resulting in performance gains of up to 9.8%. Our work reveals an overlooked but fundamental flaw in current VLM-as-a-Judge systems and highlights the need for more principled designs.

We present seven experiments exploring gender biases in GPT. Initially, GPT was asked to generate demographics of a potential writer of twenty phrases containing feminine stereotypes and twenty with masculine stereotypes. Results show a strong asymmetry, with stereotypically masculine sentences attributed to a female more often than vice versa. For example, the sentence "I love playing fotbal! Im practicing with my cosin Michael" was constantly assigned by ChatGPT to a female writer. This phenomenon likely reflects that while initiatives to integrate women in traditionally masculine roles have gained momentum, the reverse movement remains relatively underdeveloped. Subsequent experiments investigate the same issue in high-stakes moral dilemmas. GPT-4 finds it more appropriate to abuse a man to prevent a nuclear apocalypse than to abuse a woman. This bias extends to other forms of violence central to the gender parity debate (abuse), but not to those less central (torture). Moreover, this bias increases in cases of mixed-sex violence for the greater good: GPT-4 agrees with a woman using violence against a man to prevent a nuclear apocalypse but disagrees with a man using violence against a woman for the same purpose. Finally, these biases are implicit, as they do not emerge when GPT-4 is directly asked to rank moral violations. These results highlight the necessity of carefully managing inclusivity efforts to prevent unintended discrimination.

In legal decisions, split votes (SV) occur when judges cannot reach a unanimous decision, posing a difficulty for lawyers who must navigate diverse legal arguments and opinions. In high-stakes domains, understanding the alignment of perceived difficulty between humans and AI systems is crucial to build trust. However, existing NLP calibration methods focus on a classifier's awareness of predictive performance, measured against the human majority class, overlooking inherent human label variation (HLV). This paper explores split votes as naturally observable human disagreement and value pluralism. We collect judges' vote distributions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and present SV-ECHR, a case outcome classification (COC) dataset with SV information. We build a taxonomy of disagreement with SV-specific subcategories. We further assess the alignment of perceived difficulty between models and humans, as well as confidence- and human-calibration of COC models. We observe limited alignment with the judge vote distribution. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic exploration of calibration to human judgements in legal NLP. Our study underscores the necessity for further research on measuring and enhancing model calibration considering HLV in legal decision tasks.

In a legal system, judgment consistency is regarded as one of the most important manifestations of fairness. However, due to the complexity of factual elements that impact sentencing in real-world scenarios, few works have been done on quantitatively measuring judgment consistency towards real-world data. In this paper, we propose an evaluation metric for judgment inconsistency, Legal Inconsistency Coefficient (LInCo), which aims to evaluate inconsistency between data groups divided by specific features (e.g., gender, region, race). We propose to simulate judges from different groups with legal judgment prediction (LJP) models and measure the judicial inconsistency with the disagreement of the judgment results given by LJP models trained on different groups. Experimental results on the synthetic data verify the effectiveness of LInCo. We further employ LInCo to explore the inconsistency in real cases and come to the following observations: (1) Both regional and gender inconsistency exist in the legal system, but gender inconsistency is much less than regional inconsistency; (2) The level of regional inconsistency varies little across different time periods; (3) In general, judicial inconsistency is negatively correlated with the severity of the criminal charges. Besides, we use LInCo to evaluate the performance of several de-bias methods, such as adversarial learning, and find that these mechanisms can effectively help LJP models to avoid suffering from data bias.

Large language model (LLM)-based judges are widely adopted for automated evaluation and reward modeling, yet their judgments are often affected by judgment biases. Accurately evaluating these biases is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM-based judges. However, existing studies typically investigate limited biases under a single judge formulation, either generative or discriminative, lacking a comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we propose JudgeBiasBench, a benchmark for systematically quantifying biases in LLM-based judges. JudgeBiasBench defines a taxonomy of judgment biases across 4 dimensions, and constructs bias-augmented evaluation instances through a controlled bias injection pipeline, covering 12 representative bias types. We conduct extensive experiments across both generative and discriminative judges, revealing that current judges exhibit significant and diverse bias patterns that often compromise the reliability of automated evaluation. To mitigate judgment bias, we propose bias-aware training that explicitly incorporates bias-related attributes into the training process, encouraging judges to disentangle task-relevant quality from bias-correlated cues. By adopting reinforcement learning for generative judges and contrastive learning for discriminative judges, our methods effectively reduce judgment biases while largely preserving general evaluation capability.

In the era of large language models, creative writing quality lacks a computable theoretical anchor. The dominant approaches are rubric scoring -- decomposing holistic aesthetic judgment into sub-scores -- and RLHF preference signals -- replacing quality with group votes. Both bypass the statistical structure of the text itself. This paper provides an information-theoretic foundation to fill this gap. We propose 'calibrated surprise' as the information-theoretic essence of excellent creative writing. This judgment matches reading intuition and covers its opposite. This literary judgment admits a precise mathematical formulation. Under full-dimensional constraints Y, feasible writing choices are forced into an extremely narrow space. The rare survivors are, from the unconstrained perspective, exactly the least predictable choices. Both are measured precisely by Shannon mutual information I(X;Y) = H(X) - H(X|Y) -- 'calibrated' corresponds to H(X|Y) approaching 0; 'surprising' corresponds to H(X) going high. The subtraction structure of the formula naturally separates 'well-grounded surprise' from 'pure noise'. We use token-level logprobs from Qwen1.5-7B as an operational proxy for the ideal reader's probability distribution. Across 20 pairs (12 Chinese / 8 English) of high-quality vs. systematically degraded literary passages, 20/20 pairs support the core prediction: high-quality passages have systematically higher I(X;Y) than their degraded versions.

Recent multimodal large language models have demonstrated strong reasoning ability, yet their reliability as automated evaluators remains limited by a critical weakness: when visual evidence conflicts with textual cues, MLLM judges tend to reward plausible narratives over perceptually correct answers. We identify and systematically analyze this phenomenon, which we term Perceptual Judgment Bias. Through controlled visual perturbations, existing multimodal judges frequently anchor on the response text instead of their own visual perception, leading to inconsistent and non-verifiable evaluations. To address this issue, we introduce the Perceptually Perturbed Judgment Dataset, which constructs minimally edited counterfactual responses that isolate perceptual errors and enable verifiable supervision. Building on this dataset, we develop a unified training framework that combines a structured GRPO-based reward with a batch-ranking objective, achieving coherent global ordering without explicit pairwise labels. Experiments across diverse MLLM-as-a-Judge benchmarks show that our approach substantially improves perceptual fidelity, ranking coherence, and alignment with human evaluation. Our results establish a scalable and generalizable pathway for training multimodal judges that are perceptually grounded, interpretable, and robust to visual-reasoning conflicts.

Large language models (LLMs) are now widely used to evaluate the quality of text, a field commonly referred to as LLM-as-a-judge. While prior works mainly focus on point-wise and pair-wise evaluation paradigms. Rubric-based evaluation, where LLMs select a score from multiple rubrics, has received less analysis. In this work, we show that rubric-based evaluation implicitly resembles a multi-choice setting and therefore has position bias: LLMs prefer score options appearing at specific positions in the rubric list. Through controlled experiments across multiple models and datasets, we demonstrate consistent position bias. To mitigate this bias, we propose a balanced permutation strategy that evenly distributes each score option across positions. We show that aggregating scores across balanced permutations not only reveals latent position bias, but also improves correlation between the LLM-as-a-Judge and human. Our results suggest that rubric-based LLM-as-a-Judge is not inherently point-wise and that simple permutation-based calibration can substantially improve its reliability.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have gained significant attention recently, showing remarkable potential in artificial general intelligence. However, assessing the utility of MLLMs presents considerable challenges, primarily due to the absence of multimodal benchmarks that align with human preferences. Drawing inspiration from the concept of LLM-as-a-Judge within LLMs, this paper introduces a novel benchmark, termed MLLM-as-a-Judge, to assess the ability of MLLMs in assisting judges across diverse modalities, encompassing three distinct tasks: Scoring Evaluation, Pair Comparison, and Batch Ranking. Our study reveals that, while MLLMs demonstrate remarkable human-like discernment in Pair Comparison, there is a significant divergence from human preferences in Scoring Evaluation and Batch Ranking. Furthermore, a closer examination reveals persistent challenges in the judgment capacities of LLMs, including diverse biases, hallucinatory responses, and inconsistencies in judgment, even in advanced models such as GPT-4V. These findings emphasize the pressing need for enhancements and further research efforts to be undertaken before regarding MLLMs as fully reliable evaluators. In light of this, we advocate for additional efforts dedicated to supporting the continuous development within the domain of MLLM functioning as judges. The code and dataset are publicly available at our project homepage: https://mllm-judge.github.io/.

Recent studies show that large language models (LLMs) exhibit self-preference bias when serving as judges, meaning they tend to favor their own responses over those generated by other models. Existing methods typically measure this bias by calculating the difference between the scores a judge model assigns to its own responses and those it assigns to responses from other models. However, this approach conflates self-preference bias with response quality, as higher-quality responses from the judge model may also lead to positive score differences, even in the absence of bias. To address this issue, we introduce gold judgments as proxies for the actual quality of responses and propose the DBG score, which measures self-preference bias as the difference between the scores assigned by the judge model to its own responses and the corresponding gold judgments. Since gold judgments reflect true response quality, the DBG score mitigates the confounding effect of response quality on bias measurement. Using the DBG score, we conduct comprehensive experiments to assess self-preference bias across LLMs of varying versions, sizes, and reasoning abilities. Additionally, we investigate two factors that influence and help alleviate self-preference bias: response text style and the post-training data of judge models. Finally, we explore potential underlying mechanisms of self-preference bias from an attention-based perspective. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/zhiyuanc2001/self-preference.

Existing LLM-as-a-Judge systems suffer from three fundamental limitations: limited adaptivity to task- and domain-specific evaluation criteria, systematic biases driven by non-semantic cues such as position, length, format, and model provenance, and evaluation inconsistency that leads to contradictory judgments across different evaluation modes (e.g., pointwise versus pairwise). To address these issues, we propose FairJudge, an adaptive, debiased, and consistent LLM-as-a-Judge. Unlike prior approaches that treat the judge as a static evaluator, FairJudge models judging behavior itself as a learnable and regularized policy. From a data-centric perspective, we construct a high-information-density judging dataset that explicitly injects supervision signals aligned with evaluation behavior. Building on this dataset, we adopt a curriculum-style SFT-DPO-GRPO training paradigm that progressively aligns rubric adherence, bias mitigation, and cross-mode consistency, while avoiding catastrophic forgetting. Experimental results on multiple internal and public benchmarks show that FairJudge consistently improves agreement and F1, reduces non-semantic biases, and outperforms substantially larger instruction-tuned LLMs. All resources will be publicly released after acceptance to facilitate future research.

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

Large multimodal models (LMMs) are increasingly adopted as judges in multimodal evaluation systems due to their strong instruction following and consistency with human preferences. However, their ability to follow diverse, fine-grained evaluation criteria remains underexplored. We develop Multi-Crit, a benchmark for evaluating multimodal judges on their capacity to follow pluralistic criteria and produce reliable criterion-level judgments. Covering both open-ended generation and verifiable reasoning tasks, Multi-Crit is built through a rigorous data curation pipeline that gathers challenging response pairs with multi-criterion human annotations. It further introduces three novel metrics for systematically assessing pluralistic adherence, criterion-switching flexibility, and the ability to recognize criterion-level preference conflicts. Comprehensive analysis of 25 LMMs reveals that 1) proprietary models still struggle to maintain consistent adherence to pluralistic criteria--especially in open-ended evaluation; 2) open-source models lag further behind in flexibly following diverse criteria; and 3) critic fine-tuning with holistic judgment signals enhances visual grounding but fails to generalize to pluralistic criterion-level judgment. Additional analyses on reasoning fine-tuning, test-time scaling, and boundary consistency between open-source and proprietary models further probe the limits of current multimodal judges. As a pioneering study, Multi-Crit lays the foundation for building reliable and steerable multimodal AI evaluation.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

LLM-as-a-Judge has emerged as a promising tool for automatically evaluating generated outputs, but its reliability is often undermined by potential biases in judgment. Existing efforts to mitigate these biases face key limitations: in-context learning-based methods fail to address rooted biases due to the evaluator's limited capacity for self-reflection, whereas fine-tuning is not applicable to all evaluator types, especially closed-source models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Reasoning-based Bias Detector (RBD), which is a plug-in module that identifies biased evaluations and generates structured reasoning to guide evaluator self-correction. Rather than modifying the evaluator itself, RBD operates externally and engages in an iterative process of bias detection and feedback-driven revision. To support its development, we design a complete pipeline consisting of biased dataset construction, supervision collection, distilled reasoning-based fine-tuning of RBD, and integration with LLM evaluators. We fine-tune four sizes of RBD models, ranging from 1.5B to 14B, and observe consistent performance improvements across all scales. Experimental results on 4 bias types--verbosity, position, bandwagon, and sentiment--evaluated using 8 LLM evaluators demonstrate RBD's strong effectiveness. For example, the RBD-8B model improves evaluation accuracy by an average of 18.5% and consistency by 10.9%, and surpasses prompting-based baselines and fine-tuned judges by 12.8% and 17.2%, respectively. These results highlight RBD's effectiveness and scalability. Additional experiments further demonstrate its strong generalization across biases and domains, as well as its efficiency.

Sycophancy in LLMs is documented across 70+ papers, but expert agreement on construct boundaries remains low (ICC=.184; Ye et al., 2026). The construct fragments because behavioral classification depends on which surface form is privileged. We adopt a materials-science framing: conversation as test specimen under load, LLM-model as material charge, pushback as progressive load, stance-flip as material failure. We characterize this failure across three loading cases (debate n=1000; false-presuppositions n=3400; ethical-setting n=3400; 10-17 material charges per case; 7800 specimens total) using 14 turn-level axis-measurements spanning velocity, damage accumulation, frame-drift, brittleness, and direction stability, plus three speaker-resolved axes from an independent pipeline. The measurements are Hooke-coupled (σ= E cdot varepsilon analog) and reproduce across loading cases with effects up to |r_{rb}| = 0.35 on debate; the sign structure adds a second pattern: the ethical-setting case inverts the velocity and accumulation blocks. Variance composition partitions into two profiles: debate is charge-dominated (brittle-fracture-like: the material grade decides), false-presuppositions and ethical-setting are topic-dominated (creep-like: the load decides); the ratios (2.03 vs 0.13/0.17) are estimator-dependent, for debate even in direction. Cross-judge reliability (GPT-4o vs Haiku 4.5) shows debate scoring is judge-robust (Cohen's κ= 0.88) while false-presupposition scoring is judge-sensitive (κ= 0.36) -- a caveat single-judge benchmarks must report. This is the methodological move Ye et al.'s diagnosis calls for: a multi-axis characterization that does not depend on which surface form of the construct one privileges.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

Recent work on chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness reports single aggregate numbers (e.g., DeepSeek-R1 acknowledges hints 39% of the time), implying that faithfulness is an objective, measurable property of a model. This paper demonstrates that it is not. Three classifiers (a regex-only detector, a two-stage regex-plus-LLM pipeline, and an independent Claude Sonnet 4 judge) are applied to 10,276 influenced reasoning traces from 12 open-weight models spanning 9 families and 7B to 1T parameters. On identical data, these classifiers produce overall faithfulness rates of 74.4%, 82.6%, and 69.7%, respectively, with non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. Per-model gaps range from 2.6 to 30.6 percentage points; all are statistically significant (McNemar's test, p < 0.001). The disagreements are systematic, not random: inter-classifier agreement measured by Cohen's kappa ranges from 0.06 ("slight") for sycophancy hints to 0.42 ("moderate") for grader hints, and the asymmetry is pronounced: for sycophancy, 883 cases are classified as faithful by the pipeline but unfaithful by the Sonnet judge, while only 2 go the other direction. Classifier choice can also reverse model rankings: Qwen3.5-27B ranks 1st under the pipeline but 7th under the Sonnet judge; OLMo-3.1-32B moves in the opposite direction, from 9th to 3rd. The root cause is that different classifiers operationalize related faithfulness constructs at different levels of stringency (lexical mention versus epistemic dependence), and these constructs yield divergent measurements on the same behavior. These results demonstrate that published faithfulness numbers cannot be meaningfully compared across studies that use different classifiers, and that future evaluations should report sensitivity ranges across multiple classification methodologies rather than single point estimates.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Continuous evaluation of LLM products relies on a strong LLM judge treated as ground truth: a cheap monitor scores every interaction and a team is paged when the score drifts down. But the judge is itself a model behind an API, and a silent version bump or scoring-prompt update changes how it scores -- so every drift alarm is ambiguous between a worse product and a changed judge. We resolve the ambiguity with a fixed, human-labeled anchor set that the current judge re-scores at a steady interleave, a second betting e-process on the judge-versus-human gap, and a guard-window rule returning a verdict in {none, system, judge}. We prove anytime-validity, one-way identification (only the judge can move the anchors), an attribution race whose design law is that the anchors must out-run the main process they guard, and process orthogonality. On two real judge changes, a silent version bump is detected as judge drift in 60/60 runs with zero judge-to-system misattribution, and a contaminating strict-prompt change is correctly attributed on 110 of 120 runs at guard width 300 -- while the industry-default rolling z-test false-alarms on 75% of drift-free streams. Every experiment replicates on a second domain (TL;DR summarization) with nothing re-tuned, and where the domains differ the differences are the ones the race predicts: the strict-prompt change shifts scores harder there, so the anchors fire faster and attribution becomes perfect (240/240). The monitor runs at approximately 0.64 of the cost of strong-judging every item, or 0.21 in a cheaper-but-deafer regime.

Bias in Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly undermines their reliability and fairness. We focus on a common form of bias: when two reference concepts in the model's concept space, such as sentiment polarities (e.g., "positive" and "negative"), are asymmetrically correlated with a third, target concept, such as a reviewing aspect, the model exhibits unintended bias. For instance, the understanding of "food" should not skew toward any particular sentiment. Existing bias evaluation methods assess behavioral differences of LLMs by constructing labeled data for different social groups and measuring model responses across them, a process that requires substantial human effort and captures only a limited set of social concepts. To overcome these limitations, we propose BiasLens, a test-set-free bias analysis framework based on the structure of the model's vector space. BiasLens combines Concept Activation Vectors (CAVs) with Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to extract interpretable concept representations, and quantifies bias by measuring the variation in representational similarity between the target concept and each of the reference concepts. Even without labeled data, BiasLens shows strong agreement with traditional bias evaluation metrics (Spearman correlation r > 0.85). Moreover, BiasLens reveals forms of bias that are difficult to detect using existing methods. For example, in simulated clinical scenarios, a patient's insurance status can cause the LLM to produce biased diagnostic assessments. Overall, BiasLens offers a scalable, interpretable, and efficient paradigm for bias discovery, paving the way for improving fairness and transparency in LLMs.

Equilibrium propagation (EP) is a compelling alternative to the backpropagation of error algorithm (BP) for computing gradients of neural networks on biological or analog neuromorphic substrates. Still, the algorithm requires weight symmetry and infinitesimal equilibrium perturbations, i.e., nudges, to estimate unbiased gradients efficiently. Both requirements are challenging to implement in physical systems. Yet, whether and how weight asymmetry affects its applicability is unknown because, in practice, it may be masked by biases introduced through the finite nudge. To address this question, we study generalized EP, which can be formulated without weight symmetry, and analytically isolate the two sources of bias. For complex-differentiable non-symmetric networks, we show that the finite nudge does not pose a problem, as exact derivatives can still be estimated via a Cauchy integral. In contrast, weight asymmetry introduces bias resulting in low task performance due to poor alignment of EP's neuronal error vectors compared to BP. To mitigate this issue, we present a new homeostatic objective that directly penalizes functional asymmetries of the Jacobian at the network's fixed point. This homeostatic objective dramatically improves the network's ability to solve complex tasks such as ImageNet 32x32. Our results lay the theoretical groundwork for studying and mitigating the adverse effects of imperfections of physical networks on learning algorithms that rely on the substrate's relaxation dynamics.

Recently, the role of LLM-as-judge in evaluating large language models has gained prominence. However, current judge models suffer from narrow specialization and limited robustness, undermining their capacity for comprehensive evaluations. In this work, we present CompassJudger-2, a novel generalist judge model that overcomes these limitations via a task-driven, multi-domain data curation strategy. Central to our approach is supervising judgment tasks with verifiable rewards, guiding intrinsic critical reasoning through rejection sampling to foster robust, generalizable judgment capabilities. We introduce a refined learning objective with margin policy gradient loss to enhance performance. Empirically, CompassJudger-2 achieves superior results across multiple judge and reward benchmarks, and our 7B model demonstrates competitive judgment accuracy with significantly larger models like DeepSeek-V3 and Qwen3-235B-A22B. Additionally, we propose JudgerBenchV2, a comprehensive benchmark evaluating cross-domain judgment accuracy and rank consistency to standardize judge model evaluation. These contributions advance robust, scalable LLM judgment and establish new performance and evaluation standards.

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated evaluators (LLM-as-a-judge) has revealed critical inconsistencies in current evaluation frameworks. We identify two fundamental types of inconsistencies: (1) Score-Comparison Inconsistency, where lower-rated responses outperform higher-scored ones in pairwise comparisons, and (2) Pairwise Transitivity Inconsistency, manifested through circular preference chains (A>B>C>A) and equivalence contradictions (A=B=C\neq A). We argue that these issues come from information loss in discrete rating systems and ambiguous tie judgments during pairwise evaluation. We propose TrustJudge, a probabilistic framework that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: 1) distribution-sensitive scoring that computes continuous expectations from discrete rating probabilities, preserving information entropy for more precise scoring, and 2) likelihood-aware aggregation that resolves transitivity violations using bidirectional preference probabilities or perplexity. We also formalize the theoretical limitations of current LLM-as-a-judge frameworks and demonstrate how TrustJudge's components overcome them. When evaluated with Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as judge using our dataset, TrustJudge reduces Score-Comparison inconsistency by 8.43% (from 23.32% to 14.89%) and Pairwise Transitivity inconsistency by 10.82% (from 15.22% to 4.40%), while maintaining higher evaluation accuracy. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of evaluation framework inconsistencies in LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, offering both theoretical insights and practical solutions for reliable automated assessment. The framework demonstrates consistent improvements across various model architectures and scales, enabling more trustworthy LLM evaluation without requiring additional training or human annotations. The codes can be found at https://github.com/TrustJudge/TrustJudge.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely applied to evaluate and compare different LLM alignmnet approaches (e.g., RLHF and DPO). However, concerns regarding its reliability have emerged, due to LLM judges' biases and inconsistent decision-making. Previous research has developed evaluation frameworks to assess reliability of LLM judges and their alignment with human preferences. However, the employed evaluation metrics often lack adequate explainability and fail to address LLM internal inconsistency. Additionally, existing studies inadequately explore the impact of various prompt templates when applying LLM-as-a-Judge methods, leading to potentially inconsistent comparisons between different alignment algorithms. In this work, we systematically evaluate LLM-as-a-Judge on alignment tasks by defining more theoretically interpretable evaluation metrics and explicitly mitigating LLM internal inconsistency from reliability metrics. We develop an open-source framework to evaluate, compare, and visualize the reliability and alignment of LLM judges, which facilitates practitioners to choose LLM judges for alignment tasks. In the experiments, we examine effects of diverse prompt templates on LLM-judge reliability and also demonstrate our developed framework by comparing various LLM judges on two common alignment datasets (i.e., TL;DR Summarization and HH-RLHF-Helpfulness). Our results indicate a significant impact of prompt templates on LLM judge performance, as well as a mediocre alignment level between the tested LLM judges and human evaluators.

As humans, we consistently engage in interactions with our peers and receive feedback in the form of natural language. This language feedback allows us to reflect on our actions, maintain appropriate behavior, and rectify our errors. The question arises naturally: can we use language feedback to align large language models (LLMs)? In contrast to previous research that aligns LLMs with reward or preference data, we present the first systematic exploration of alignment through the lens of language feedback (i.e., judgment). We commence with an in-depth investigation of potential methods that can be adapted for aligning LLMs with judgments, revealing that these methods are unable to fully capitalize on the judgments. To facilitate more effective utilization of judgments, we propose a novel framework, Contrastive Unlikelihood Training (CUT), that allows for fine-grained inappropriate content detection and correction based on judgments. Our offline alignment results show that, with merely 1317 off-the-shelf judgment data, CUT (LLaMA2-13b) can beat the 175B DaVinci003 and surpass the best baseline by 52.34 points on AlpacaEval. The online alignment results demonstrate that CUT can align LLMs (LLaMA2-chat-13b) in an iterative fashion using model-specific judgment data, with a steady performance improvement from 81.09 to 91.36 points on AlpacaEval. Our analysis further suggests that judgments exhibit greater potential than rewards for LLM alignment and warrant future research.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are commonly used as evaluators in various applications, but the reliability of the outcomes remains a challenge. One such challenge is using LLMs-as-judges for direct assessment, i.e., assigning scores from a specified range without any references. We first show that this challenge stems from LLM judge outputs being associated with score range bias, i.e., LLM judge outputs are highly sensitive to pre-defined score ranges, preventing the search for optimal score ranges. We also show that similar biases exist among models from the same family. We then mitigate this bias through contrastive decoding, achieving up to 11.3% relative improvement on average in Spearman correlation with human judgments across different score ranges.

Unfair predictions of machine learning (ML) models impede their broad acceptance in real-world settings. Tackling this arduous challenge first necessitates defining what it means for an ML model to be fair. This has been addressed by the ML community with various measures of fairness that depend on the prediction outcomes of the ML models, either at the group level or the individual level. These fairness measures are limited in that they utilize point predictions, neglecting their variances, or uncertainties, making them susceptible to noise, missingness and shifts in data. In this paper, we first show that an ML model may appear to be fair with existing point-based fairness measures but biased against a demographic group in terms of prediction uncertainties. Then, we introduce new fairness measures based on different types of uncertainties, namely, aleatoric uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty. We demonstrate on many datasets that (i) our uncertainty-based measures are complementary to existing measures of fairness, and (ii) they provide more insights about the underlying issues leading to bias.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

Recent advances in LegalAI have primarily focused on individual case judgment analysis, often overlooking the critical appellate process within the judicial system. Appeals serve as a core mechanism for error correction and ensuring fair trials, making them highly significant both in practice and in research. To address this gap, we present the AppealCase dataset, consisting of 10,000 pairs of real-world, matched first-instance and second-instance documents across 91 categories of civil cases. The dataset also includes detailed annotations along five dimensions central to appellate review: judgment reversals, reversal reasons, cited legal provisions, claim-level decisions, and whether there is new information in the second instance. Based on these annotations, we propose five novel LegalAI tasks and conduct a comprehensive evaluation across 20 mainstream models. Experimental results reveal that all current models achieve less than 50% F1 scores on the judgment reversal prediction task, highlighting the complexity and challenge of the appeal scenario. We hope that the AppealCase dataset will spur further research in LegalAI for appellate case analysis and contribute to improving consistency in judicial decision-making.

This research introduces the Judge's Verdict Benchmark, a novel two-step methodology to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) as judges for response accuracy evaluation tasks. We assess how well 54 LLMs can replicate human judgment when scoring responses from RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) or Agentic pipelines against ground truth answers. Our methodology progresses from traditional correlation analysis to comprehensive Cohen's Kappa analysis that measures actual agreement patterns. The two-step approach includes: (1) a correlation test that filters judges with strong alignment, followed by (2) a human-likeness test using z-scores to identify two distinct judgment patterns: human-like judgment (|z| < 1) that mimics natural human variation, and super-consistent judgment (z > 1) that exceeds typical human-to-human agreement levels. This methodology reveals that 27 out of 54 tested LLMs achieve Tier 1 performance: 23 models exhibit human-like patterns that preserve the nuances of human judgment, while 4 models demonstrate super-consistent behavior, a pattern that could indicate either enhanced reliability or oversimplification of complex judgments. Testing 43 open-source models (1B-405B parameters) and 11 closed models (GPT, Gemini, Claude variants), we demonstrate that judge excellence is not solely dependent on model size but on specific training strategies. Our key contributions include: (1) establishing that correlation alone is insufficient for judge evaluation, (2) introducing a "Turing Test for judges" based on agreement patterns, and (3) providing a standardized benchmark for classifying LLM judges into distinct performance tiers for different evaluation needs.

Given the rapid progress of generative AI, there is a pressing need to systematically compare and choose between the numerous models and configurations available. The scale and versatility of such evaluations make the use of LLM-based judges a compelling solution for this challenge. Crucially, this approach requires first to validate the quality of the LLM judge itself. Previous work has focused on instance-based assessment of LLM judges, where a judge is evaluated over a set of responses, or response pairs, while being agnostic to their source systems. We argue that this setting overlooks critical factors affecting system-level ranking, such as a judge's positive or negative bias towards certain systems. To address this gap, we conduct the first large-scale study of LLM judges as system rankers. System scores are generated by aggregating judgment scores over multiple system outputs, and the judge's quality is assessed by comparing the resulting system ranking to a human-based ranking. Beyond overall judge assessment, our analysis provides a fine-grained characterization of judge behavior, including their decisiveness and bias.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

While LLM-as-a-Judge is widely used in automated evaluation, existing validation practices primarily operate at the level of observed outputs, offering limited insight into whether LLM judges themselves function as stable and reliable measurement instruments. To address this limitation, we introduce a two-phase diagnostic framework for assessing reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge, grounded in Item Response Theory (IRT). The framework adopts Graded Response Model (GRM) of IRT and formalizes reliability along two complementary dimensions: (1) intrinsic consistency, defined as the stability of measurement behavior under prompt variations, and (2) human alignment, capturing correspondence with human quality assessments. We empirically examine diverse LLM judges with this framework, and show that leveraging IRT-GRM yields interpretable signals for diagnosing judgments systematically. These signals provide practical guidance for verifying reliablity of LLM-as-a-Judge and identifying potential causes of unreliability.

LLM-as-a-Judge is a framework that uses an LLM (large language model) to evaluate the quality of natural language text - typically text that is also generated by an LLM. This framework holds great promise due to its relative low-cost, ease of use, and strong correlations with human stylistic preferences. However, LLM Judges have been shown to exhibit biases that can distort their judgments. We evaluate how well LLM Judges can grade whether a given response to a conversational question is correct, an ability crucial to soundly estimating the overall response quality. To do so, we create and publicly release a human-annotated dataset with labels of correctness for 1,200 LLM responses. We source questions from a combination of existing datasets and a novel, challenging benchmark (BFF-Bench) created for this analysis. We demonstrate a strong connection between an LLM's ability to correctly answer a question and grade responses to that question. Although aggregate level statistics might imply a judge has high agreement with human annotators, it will struggle on the subset of questions it could not answer. To address this issue, we recommend a simple solution: provide the judge with a correct, human-written reference answer. We perform an in-depth analysis on how reference quality can affect the performance of an LLM Judge. We show that providing a weaker judge (e.g. Qwen 2.5 7B) with higher quality references reaches better agreement with human annotators than a stronger judge (e.g. GPT-4o) with synthetic references.

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. We collected 350{,}757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery (DHM; 2007). The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started -- DHM estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51\%. Our data lend strong support to this precise prediction: the coins landed on the same side more often than not, Pr(same side) = 0.508, 95\% credible interval (CI) [0.506, 0.509], BF_{same-side bias} = 2359. Furthermore, the data revealed considerable between-people variation in the degree of this same-side bias. Our data also confirmed the generic prediction that when people flip an ordinary coin -- with the initial side-up randomly determined -- it is equally likely to land heads or tails: Pr(heads) = 0.500, 95\% CI [0.498, 0.502], BF_{heads-tails bias} = 0.182. Furthermore, this lack of heads-tails bias does not appear to vary across coins. Additional analyses revealed that the within-people same-side bias decreased as more coins were flipped, an effect that is consistent with the possibility that practice makes people flip coins in a less wobbly fashion. Our data therefore provide strong evidence that when some (but not all) people flip a fair coin, it tends to land on the same side it started.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have been increasingly used as automatic evaluators-a paradigm known as MLLM-as-a-Judge. However, their reliability and vulnerabilities to biases remain underexplored. We find that many MLLM judges fail to reliably integrate key visual or textual cues, yielding unreliable evaluations when evidence is missing or mismatched, and exhibiting instability under semantically irrelevant perturbations. To address this, we systematically define Compositional Bias in MLLM-as-a-Judge systems and introduce MM-JudgeBias, a benchmark for evaluating it. MM-JudgeBias introduces controlled perturbations across Query, Image, and Response, and evaluates model behavior via two complementary metrics: Bias-Deviation (BD) for sensitivity and Bias-Conformity (BC) for stability. Our dataset of over 1,800 curated and refined multimodal samples, drawn from 29 source benchmarks, enables a fine-grained diagnosis of nine bias types across diverse tasks and domains. Experiments on 26 state-of-the-art MLLMs reveal systematic modality neglect and asymmetric evaluation tendencies, underscoring the need for more reliable judges.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

LLM-as-a-Judge leverages the generative and reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to evaluate LLM responses across diverse scenarios, providing accurate preference signals. This approach plays a vital role in aligning LLMs with human values, ensuring ethical and reliable AI outputs that align with societal norms. Recent studies have raised many methods to train LLM as generative judges, but most of them are data consuming or lack accuracy, and only focus on LLM's judge ability. In this work, we regard judge ability as a general ability of LLM and implement a two-stage training approach, comprising supervised fine-tuning (SFT) warm-up and direct preference optimization (DPO) enhancement, to achieve judge style adaptation and improve judgment accuracy. Additionally, we introduce an efficient data synthesis method to generate judgmental content. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach, utilizing only about 2% to 40% of the data required by other methods, achieves SOTA performance on RewardBench. Furthermore, our training method enhances the general capabilities of the model by constructing complicated judge task, and the judge signals provided by our model have significantly enhanced the downstream DPO training performance of our internal models in our test to optimize policy model with Judge Model. We also open-source our model weights and training data to facilitate further research.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely utilized as an evaluation method in various benchmarks and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, despite their excellence in many domains, potential issues are under-explored, undermining their reliability and the scope of their utility. Therefore, we identify 12 key potential biases and propose a new automated bias quantification framework-CALM-which systematically quantifies and analyzes each type of bias in LLM-as-a-Judge by using automated and principle-guided modification. Our experiments cover multiple popular language models, and the results indicate that while advanced models have achieved commendable overall performance, significant biases persist in certain specific tasks. Empirical results suggest that there remains room for improvement in the reliability of LLM-as-a-Judge. Moreover, we also discuss the explicit and implicit influence of these biases and give some suggestions for the reliable application of LLM-as-a-Judge. Our work highlights the need for stakeholders to address these issues and remind users to exercise caution in LLM-as-a-Judge applications.

LLM-as-a-Judge refers to the automatic modeling of preferences for responses generated by Large Language Models (LLMs), which is of significant importance for both LLM evaluation and reward modeling. Although generative LLMs have made substantial progress in various tasks, their performance as LLM-Judge still falls short of expectations. In this work, we propose Think-J, which improves generative LLM-as-a-Judge by learning how to think. We first utilized a small amount of curated data to develop the model with initial judgment thinking capabilities. Subsequently, we optimize the judgment thinking traces based on reinforcement learning (RL). We propose two methods for judgment thinking optimization, based on offline and online RL, respectively. The offline RL requires training a critic model to construct positive and negative examples for learning. The online method defines rule-based reward as feedback for optimization. Experimental results showed that our approach can significantly enhance the evaluation capability of generative LLM-Judge, surpassing both generative and classifier-based LLM-Judge without requiring extra human annotations.

A comparison of the distances to the Huanan Seafood Market of early Covid cases with known links to the market versus cases without known links shows results apparently incompatible with a location model lacking proximity ascertainment bias. The sign of the difference instead agrees with a model in which such ascertainment bias is large. In the presence of such bias inferences based on the clustering of case locations become unreliable.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed as automated evaluators to assess the safety of generated content, yet their reliability in this role remains uncertain. This study evaluates a diverse set of 11 LLM judge models across critical safety domains, examining three key aspects: self-consistency in repeated judging tasks, alignment with human judgments, and susceptibility to input artifacts such as apologetic or verbose phrasing. Our findings reveal that biases in LLM judges can significantly distort the final verdict on which content source is safer, undermining the validity of comparative evaluations. Notably, apologetic language artifacts alone can skew evaluator preferences by up to 98\%. Contrary to expectations, larger models do not consistently exhibit greater robustness, while smaller models sometimes show higher resistance to specific artifacts. To mitigate LLM evaluator robustness issues, we investigate jury-based evaluations aggregating decisions from multiple models. Although this approach both improves robustness and enhances alignment to human judgements, artifact sensitivity persists even with the best jury configurations. These results highlight the urgent need for diversified, artifact-resistant methodologies to ensure reliable safety assessments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

The use of LLMs as automated judges ("LLM-as-a-judge") is now widespread, yet standard judges suffer from a multitude of reliability issues. To address these challenges, we introduce Verdict, an open-source library for scaling judge-time compute to enhance the accuracy, reliability, and interpretability of automated evaluators. Verdict leverages the composition of modular reasoning units (such as verification, debate, and aggregation) and increased inference-time compute to improve LLM judge quality. Across a variety of challenging tasks such as content moderation, fact-checking, and hallucination detection, Verdict judges achieves performance competitive with orders-of-magnitude larger fine-tuned judges, prompted judges, and reasoning models. Our framework establishes a foundation for scalable, interpretable, and reliable LLM-based evaluation systems for both researchers and practitioners.

Prior research has established that instruction-tuned large language models exhibit left-of-center political bias, measured exclusively through abstract political questionnaires. We show that this finding does not generalize to concrete policy decisions. We introduce a dual-instrument methodology grounded in Swiss democratic reality. The Smartvote questionnaire (75 abstract policy questions) is administered to 66 LLMs from 27 model families and compared to 184 elected members of the Swiss National Council, replicating the established leftward convergence (Cohen's d = 3.64, p = 0.0002). Then, novel to this work, 9 flagship LLMs are confronted with 48 real federal referenda (Volksabstimmungen) in four national languages (German, French, Italian, Romansh) under three information conditions, comparing votes to actual outcomes and party recommendations (Parolen). Three findings challenge the prevailing narrative. (1) Abstract questionnaires do not predict concrete behavior: the left-to-right agreement gradient on Smartvote shifts from left-peaked to center-peaked on Volksabstimmungen, where models align most with centrist Die Mitte and FDP rather than leftist SP and Gruene (Wilcoxon p = 0.008). (2) For some models, the language of a political question changes the answer more than the political content does: cross-linguistic consistency ranges from 50% (Mistral) to 98% (GPT-5.4). (3) Two models exhibit systematic change-aversion rather than political bias, voting Nein on 83-94% of referenda regardless of direction (binomial p < 0.0001). What prior work measured as "leftward bias" may not generalize beyond abstract instruments. On concrete policy decisions, LLMs behave less like coalition partners of the left and more like cautious civil servants: centrist, status-quo-favoring, and inconsistent across languages.

Multimodal large language models (LLMs) are increasingly explored as automated evaluators in clinical settings, yet their scoring behavior on ordinal clinical scales remains poorly understood. We benchmark three frontier LLM families against supervised deep learning models for scoring Clock Drawing Test (CDT) images on two public datasets using the Shulman rubric. While fully fine-tuned Vision Transformers achieve the best calibration (MAE 0.52, within-1 accuracy 91%), zero-shot LLMs remain competitive on tolerance-based agreement (GPT-5 MAE 0.67, within-1 accuracy 92%) despite higher absolute error. However, per-score analysis reveals that all three LLM families exhibit a pronounced central tendency effect (systematic endpoint compression): predictions are systematically compressed toward the middle of the scale, with over-prediction at the low end (score 0 to 1) and under-prediction at the high end (score 5 to 4). This effect disproportionately affects the clinically critical extremes where accurate scoring most impacts screening decisions for cognitive impairment. Targeted ablations show that neither few-shot exemplars spanning the full score range nor removing clinical terminology from the prompt eliminates the effect. Our findings extend the LLM-as-a-judge bias literature from NLP evaluation to clinical assessment, and highlight the need for calibration-aware evaluation and post-hoc calibration before deploying LLM-based raters in high-stakes screening workflows.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

Rigorous evaluation of large language models (LLMs) relies on comparing models by the prevalence of desirable or undesirable behaviors, such as task pass rates or policy violations. These prevalence estimates are produced by a classifier, either an LLM-as-a-judge or human annotators, making the choice of classifier central to trustworthy evaluation. Common metrics used for this choice, such as Accuracy, Precision, and F1, are sensitive to class imbalance and to arbitrary choices of positive class, and can favor judges that distort prevalence estimates. We show that Youden's J statistic is theoretically aligned with choosing the best judge to compare models, and that Balanced Accuracy is an equivalent linear transformation of J. Through both analytical arguments and empirical examples and simulations, we demonstrate how selecting judges using Balanced Accuracy leads to better, more robust classifier selection.

In critical decision-making scenarios, optimizing accuracy can lead to a biased classifier, hence past work recommends enforcing group-based fairness metrics in addition to maximizing accuracy. However, doing so exposes the classifier to another kind of bias called infra-marginality. This refers to individual-level bias where some individuals/subgroups can be worse off than under simply optimizing for accuracy. For instance, a classifier implementing race-based parity may significantly disadvantage women of the advantaged race. To quantify this bias, we propose a general notion of eta-infra-marginality that can be used to evaluate the extent of this bias. We prove theoretically that, unlike other fairness metrics, infra-marginality does not have a trade-off with accuracy: high accuracy directly leads to low infra-marginality. This observation is confirmed through empirical analysis on multiple simulated and real-world datasets. Further, we find that maximizing group fairness often increases infra-marginality, suggesting the consideration of both group-level fairness and individual-level infra-marginality. However, measuring infra-marginality requires knowledge of the true distribution of individual-level outcomes correctly and explicitly. We propose a practical method to measure infra-marginality, and a simple algorithm to maximize group-wise accuracy and avoid infra-marginality.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

Evaluating large language models (LLMs) on open-ended tasks without ground-truth labels is increasingly done via the LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. A critical but under-modeled issue is that judge LLMs differ substantially in reliability; treating all judges equally can yield biased leaderboards and misleading uncertainty estimates. More data can make evaluation more confidently wrong under misspecified aggregation. We propose a judge-aware ranking framework that extends the Bradley-Terry-Luce model by introducing judge-specific discrimination parameters, jointly estimating latent model quality and judge reliability from pairwise comparisons without reference labels. We establish identifiability up to natural normalizations and prove consistency and asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimator, enabling confidence intervals for score differences and rank comparisons. Across multiple public benchmarks and a newly collected dataset, our method improves agreement with human preferences, achieves higher data efficiency than unweighted baselines, and produces calibrated uncertainty quantification for LLM rankings.

Large Language Models are increasingly used as judges to evaluate code artifacts when exhaustive human review or executable test coverage is unavailable. LLM-judge is increasingly relevant in agentic software engineering workflows, where it can help rank candidate solutions and guide patch selection. While attractive for scale, current practice lacks a principled account of reliability and bias: repeated evaluations of the same case can disagree; small prompt edits can swing outcomes; and seemingly semantics-preserving, human-equivalent perturbations may elicit divergent verdicts. This paper studies LLM-as-a-Judge for code through a measurement-first lens. We analyze two pointwise judging regimes across code generation, code repair task, and test generation, and we systematically probe prompt-induced biases. Our study considers difficulty levels for repeated runs and controlled prompt interventions that isolate one presentation cue at a time, and it evaluates judges using consistency and sensitivity to bias. We find that judge decisions are highly sensitive to prompt biases even when the underlying code snippet is unchanged. Across all three tasks, several biases systematically shift preferences toward the option favored by the prompt, improving accuracy when that option aligns with the gold answer but substantially reducing it otherwise. In some settings, these effects are large enough to change task-level conclusions and alter relative model rankings. These findings show that reported judge performance may reflect prompt artifacts rather than stable assessment ability, posing a direct threat to the validity and reproducibility of code evaluation. We therefore argue that LLM-as-a-Judge studies should report bias sensitivity alongside accuracy and incorporate explicit controls to support more trustworthy model comparison in software engineering.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

Recently, there has been a trend of evaluating the Large Language Model (LLM) quality in the flavor of LLM-as-a-Judge, namely leveraging another LLM to evaluate the current output quality. However, existing judges are proven to be biased, namely they would favor answers which present better superficial quality (such as verbosity, fluency) while ignoring the instruction following ability. In this work, we propose systematic research about the bias of LLM-as-a-Judge. Specifically, for closed-source judge models, we apply calibration to mitigate the significance of superficial quality, both on probability level and prompt level. For open-source judge models, we propose to mitigate the bias by contrastive training, with curated negative samples that deviate from instruction but present better superficial quality. We apply our methods on the bias evaluation benchmark, and experiment results show our methods mitigate the bias by a large margin while maintaining a satisfactory evaluation accuracy.

We present a new approach for mitigating unfairness in learned classifiers. In particular, we focus on binary classification tasks over individuals from two populations, where, as our criterion for fairness, we wish to achieve similar false positive rates in both populations, and similar false negative rates in both populations. As a proof of concept, we implement our approach and empirically evaluate its ability to achieve both fairness and accuracy, using datasets from the fields of criminal risk assessment, credit, lending, and college admissions.

Large language models (LLMs) can lead to undesired consequences when misaligned with human values, especially in scenarios involving complex and sensitive social biases. Previous studies have revealed the misalignment of LLMs with human values using expert-designed or agent-based emulated bias scenarios. However, it remains unclear whether the alignment of LLMs with human values differs across different types of scenarios (e.g., scenarios containing negative vs. non-negative questions). In this study, we investigate the alignment of LLMs with human values regarding social biases (HVSB) in different types of bias scenarios. Through extensive analysis of 12 LLMs from four model families and four datasets, we demonstrate that LLMs with large model parameter scales do not necessarily have lower misalignment rate and attack success rate. Moreover, LLMs show a certain degree of alignment preference for specific types of scenarios and the LLMs from the same model family tend to have higher judgment consistency. In addition, we study the understanding capacity of LLMs with their explanations of HVSB. We find no significant differences in the understanding of HVSB across LLMs. We also find LLMs prefer their own generated explanations. Additionally, we endow smaller language models (LMs) with the ability to explain HVSB. The generation results show that the explanations generated by the fine-tuned smaller LMs are more readable, but have a relatively lower model agreeability.

Using Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) as judges to achieve precise and consistent evaluations has gradually become an emerging paradigm across various domains. Evaluating the capability and reliability of MLLM-as-a-judge systems is therefore essential for ensuring trustworthy assessment. Existing judge benchmarks categorize samples by task types but fail to capture the fundamental judgment capabilities required for reliable evaluation. In this work, we introduce M-JudgeBench, a ten-dimensional capability-oriented benchmark designed to comprehensively assess the judgment abilities of MLLMs. Our benchmark decomposes evaluation into pairwise Chain-of-Thought (CoT) comparison, length bias avoidance, and process error detection tasks, jointly covering ten fine-grained subtasks. This design enables diagnosis of model reliability across reasoning styles, response lengths, and cross-model variations. Systematic evaluation uncovers the systematic weaknesses in existing MLLM-as-a-judge systems. To address this issue, we further propose Judge-MCTS, a data construction framework generating pairwise reasoning trajectories with various correctness and length. Using Judge-MCTS, we construct an MCTS-augmented dataset and train M-Judger, a series of strong judge models. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of M-Judger on existing judge benchmarks as well as M-JudgeBench. Overall, our work establishes a more principled foundation for evaluating MLLM-as-a-judge through M-JudgeBench and Judge-MCTS framework, paving the way for future research on judge model evaluation and capability-driven judge training.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, reliable evaluation methods are essential particularly for open-ended, instruction-following tasks. LLM-as-a-Judge enables automatic evaluation using LLMs as evaluators, but its reliability remains uncertain. In this work, we analyze key factors affecting its trustworthiness, focusing on alignment with human judgments and evaluation consistency. Using BIGGENBench and EvalBiasBench, we study the effects of evaluation design, decoding strategies, and Chain-of-Tought (CoT) reasoning in evaluation. Our results show that evaluation criteria are critical for reliability, non-deterministic sampling improves alignment with human preferences over deterministic evaluation, and CoT reasoning offers minimal gains when clear evaluation criteria are present.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as automated judges for evaluating other models, yet the stability of their verdicts under semantically equivalent prompt paraphrases remains unmeasured. We introduce JudgeSense, a framework and benchmark for quantifying this property via the Judge Sensitivity Score (JSS), defined as the fraction of paraphrase pairs on which a judge returns an identical decision. Evaluating nine judge models on 494 validated paraphrase pairs, we find that coherence is the only task where judges meaningfully differ, with JSS ranging from 0.389 to 0.992. On factuality, all judges cluster near JSS about 0.63, driven by a polarity-inverted prompt artifact; after correction, factuality JSS rises to about 0.9. Pairwise tasks (preference and relevance) exhibit degenerate always-A behavior in 8 of 9 judges, indicating strong position bias. Model scale does not predict consistency. We release code, decision logs, and a validated paraphrase dataset to support standardized JSS reporting.

This work demonstrates that Legal Judgement Prediction systems without expert-informed adjustments can be vulnerable to shallow, distracting surface signals that arise from corpus construction, case distribution, and confounding factors. To mitigate this, we use domain expertise to strategically identify statistically predictive but legally irrelevant information. We adopt adversarial training to prevent the system from relying on it. We evaluate our deconfounded models by employing interpretability techniques and comparing to expert annotations. Quantitative experiments and qualitative analysis show that our deconfounded model consistently aligns better with expert rationales than baselines trained for prediction only. We further contribute a set of reference expert annotations to the validation and testing partitions of an existing benchmark dataset of European Court of Human Rights cases.

The impressive performance of language models is undeniable. However, the presence of biases based on gender, race, socio-economic status, physical appearance, and sexual orientation makes the deployment of language models challenging. This paper studies the effect of chain-of-thought prompting, a recent approach that studies the steps followed by the model before it responds, on fairness. More specifically, we ask the following question: Do biased models have biased thoughts? To answer our question, we conduct experiments on 5 popular large language models using fairness metrics to quantify 11 different biases in the model's thoughts and output. Our results show that the bias in the thinking steps is not highly correlated with the output bias (less than 0.6 correlation with a p-value smaller than 0.001 in most cases). In other words, unlike human beings, the tested models with biased decisions do not always possess biased thoughts.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

Common evaluation paradigms for language models focus on scoring single responses through accuracy metrics or proper scoring rules, failing to capture the full richness of a model's belief state. Recent work illustrates that language models hallucinate in-part because they are optimised to be good test-takers under binary scoring schemes that reward any answer over abstention. While this insight naturally leads to penalty-based approaches, they ignore crucial distinctions in how models distribute uncertainty, for example between hedging toward incorrect answers versus hedging toward "I don't know" responses. A novel evaluation metric, the Distributional Correctness Score (DCS), is introduced to solve this problem, i.e., of not considering a model's entire probability distribution over answer choices. DCS naturally distinguishes between harmful overconfidence in wrong answers and uncertainty expressed through abstention, providing scores in an interpretable default range. Through theoretical analysis and illustrative examples, DCS is demonstrated to offer a more nuanced and aligned evaluation paradigm that incentivises models to express genuine uncertainty rather than guessing. Adapting 12 existing evaluation benchmarks to DCS's variants and measuring performance on six language models reveals that for half of the tested benchmarks scores are negative across all tested models, indicating significant tendencies towards hallucination.

Pursuit of honest and truthful decision-making is crucial for governance and accountability in democracies. However, people sometimes take different perspectives of what it means to be honest and how to pursue truthfulness. Here we explore a continuum of perspectives from evidence-based reasoning, rooted in ascertainable facts and data, at one end, to intuitive decisions that are driven by feelings and subjective interpretations, at the other. We analyze the linguistic traces of those contrasting perspectives in Congressional speeches from 1879 to 2022. We find that evidence-based language has continued to decline since the mid-1970s, together with a decline in legislative productivity. The decline was accompanied by increasing partisan polarization in Congress and rising income inequality in society. Results highlight the importance of evidence-based language in political decision-making.

With the emergence of generative conversational large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, serving as virtual assistants in various fields, the stability and reliability of their responses have become crucial. However, during usage, it has been observed that these models tend to waver in their judgements when confronted with follow-up questions from users expressing skepticism or disagreement. In this work, we draw inspiration from questioning strategies in education and propose a Follow-up Questioning Mechanism along with two evaluation metrics to assess the judgement consistency of LLMs before and after exposure to disturbances. We evaluate the judgement consistency of ChatGPT, PaLM2-Bison, and Vicuna-13B under this mechanism across eight reasoning benchmarks. Empirical results show that even when the initial answers are correct, judgement consistency sharply decreases when LLMs face disturbances such as questioning, negation, or misleading. Additionally, we study these models' judgement consistency under various settings (sampling temperature and prompts) to validate this issue further, observing the impact of prompt tone and conducting an in-depth error analysis for deeper behavioral insights. Furthermore, we also explore several prompting methods to mitigate this issue and demonstrate their effectiveness\url{https://github.com/NUSTM/LLMs-Waver-In-Judgements}.

This paper examines the role of cognitive biases in the decision-making processes of large language models (LLMs), challenging the conventional goal of eliminating all biases. We show that certain cognitive biases when properly balanced, can enhance decision-making efficiency through rational deviations and heuristic shortcuts. By introducing heuristic moderation and an abstention option, which allows LLMs to withhold responses when uncertain, we reduce error rates, improve decision accuracy, and optimize decision rates. Using the Balance Rigor and Utility (BRU) dataset, developed through expert collaboration, our findings demonstrate that targeted inspection of cognitive biases aligns LLM decisions more closely with human reasoning, enhancing reliability and suggesting strategies for future improvements. This approach offers a novel way to leverage cognitive biases to improve the practical utility of LLMs across various applications.

Automated evaluation leveraging large language models (LLMs), commonly referred to as LLM evaluators or LLM-as-a-judge, has been widely used in measuring the performance of dialogue systems. However, the self-preference bias in LLMs has posed significant risks, including promoting specific styles or policies intrinsic to the LLMs. Despite the importance of this issue, there is a lack of established methods to measure the self-preference bias quantitatively, and its underlying causes are poorly understood. In this paper, we introduce a novel quantitative metric to measure the self-preference bias. Our experimental results demonstrate that GPT-4 exhibits a significant degree of self-preference bias. To explore the causes, we hypothesize that LLMs may favor outputs that are more familiar to them, as indicated by lower perplexity. We analyze the relationship between LLM evaluations and the perplexities of outputs. Our findings reveal that LLMs assign significantly higher evaluations to outputs with lower perplexity than human evaluators, regardless of whether the outputs were self-generated. This suggests that the essence of the bias lies in perplexity and that the self-preference bias exists because LLMs prefer texts more familiar to them.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based judgments leverage powerful LLMs to efficiently evaluate candidate content and provide judgment scores. However, the inherent biases and vulnerabilities of LLM-generated judgments raise concerns, underscoring the urgent need for distinguishing them in sensitive scenarios like academic peer reviewing. In this work, we propose and formalize the task of judgment detection and systematically investigate the detectability of LLM-generated judgments. Unlike LLM-generated text detection, judgment detection relies solely on judgment scores and candidates, reflecting real-world scenarios where textual feedback is often unavailable in the detection process. Our preliminary analysis shows that existing LLM-generated text detection methods perform poorly given their incapability to capture the interaction between judgment scores and candidate content -- an aspect crucial for effective judgment detection. Inspired by this, we introduce J-Detector, a lightweight and transparent neural detector augmented with explicitly extracted linguistic and LLM-enhanced features to link LLM judges' biases with candidates' properties for accurate detection. Experiments across diverse datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of J-Detector and show how its interpretability enables quantifying biases in LLM judges. Finally, we analyze key factors affecting the detectability of LLM-generated judgments and validate the practical utility of judgment detection in real-world scenarios.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become deeply integrated into human life and increasingly influence decision-making, it's crucial to evaluate whether and to what extent they exhibit subjective preferences, opinions, and beliefs. These tendencies may stem from biases within the models, which may shape their behavior, influence the advice and recommendations they offer to users, and potentially reinforce certain viewpoints. This paper presents the Preference, Opinion, and Belief survey (POBs), a benchmark developed to assess LLMs' subjective inclinations across societal, cultural, ethical, and personal domains. We applied our benchmark to evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, measuring desired properties such as reliability, neutrality, and consistency. In addition, we investigated the effect of increasing the test-time compute, through reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms, on those metrics. While effective in other tasks, our results show that these mechanisms offer only limited gains in our domain. Furthermore, we reveal that newer model versions are becoming less consistent and more biased toward specific viewpoints, highlighting a blind spot and a concerning trend. POBS: https://ibm.github.io/POBS

Evaluating generative foundation models on open-ended multimodal understanding (MMU) and generation (MMG) tasks across diverse modalities (e.g., images, audio, video) poses significant challenges due to the complexity of cross-modal interactions. To this end, the idea of utilizing Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) as automated judges has emerged, with encouraging results in assessing vision-language understanding tasks. Moving further, this paper extends MLLM-as-a-Judge across modalities to a unified manner by introducing two benchmarks, TaskAnything and JudgeAnything, to respectively evaluate the overall performance and judging capabilities of MLLMs across any-to-any modality tasks. Specifically, TaskAnything evaluates the MMU and MMG capabilities across 15 any-to-any modality categories, employing 1,500 queries curated from well-established benchmarks. Furthermore, JudgeAnything evaluates the judging capabilities of 5 advanced (e.g., GPT-4o and Gemini-2.0-Flash) from the perspectives of Pair Comparison and Score Evaluation, providing a standardized testbed that incorporates human judgments and detailed rubrics. Our extensive experiments reveal that while these MLLMs show promise in assessing MMU (i.e., achieving an average of 66.55% in Pair Comparison setting and 42.79% in Score Evaluation setting), they encounter significant challenges with MMG tasks (i.e., averaging only 53.37% in Pair Comparison setting and 30.05% in Score Evaluation setting), exposing cross-modality biases and hallucination issues. To address this, we present OmniArena, an automated platform for evaluating omni-models and multimodal reward models. Our work highlights the need for fairer evaluation protocols and stronger alignment with human preferences. The source code and dataset are publicly available at: https://urrealhero.github.io/judgeanythingweb/.

Existing studies on fairness are largely Western-focused, making them inadequate for culturally diverse countries such as India. To address this gap, we introduce INDIC-BIAS, a comprehensive India-centric benchmark designed to evaluate fairness of LLMs across 85 identity groups encompassing diverse castes, religions, regions, and tribes. We first consult domain experts to curate over 1,800 socio-cultural topics spanning behaviors and situations, where biases and stereotypes are likely to emerge. Grounded in these topics, we generate and manually validate 20,000 real-world scenario templates to probe LLMs for fairness. We structure these templates into three evaluation tasks: plausibility, judgment, and generation. Our evaluation of 14 popular LLMs on these tasks reveals strong negative biases against marginalized identities, with models frequently reinforcing common stereotypes. Additionally, we find that models struggle to mitigate bias even when explicitly asked to rationalize their decision. Our evaluation provides evidence of both allocative and representational harms that current LLMs could cause towards Indian identities, calling for a more cautious usage in practical applications. We release INDIC-BIAS as an open-source benchmark to advance research on benchmarking and mitigating biases and stereotypes in the Indian context.

When workers lose jobs to AI-driven restructuring, two very different conversations happen on X (formerly Twitter) at the same time. Tech executives and AI researchers talk about productivity, transformation, and opportunity. Laid-off workers and labour critics talk about job loss, uncertainty, and fear. This paper asks a simple question: which conversation gets more reach? We report three studies using two collection methods and 763 tweets from 20 named public accounts. Study 1 used keyword-based collection (n=392) and found no significant difference between corpora (p=0.891), revealing that keyword search is too noisy for this task. Study 2 used account-based collection (n=96) and found a 3.12x mean amplification advantage for capital discourse over labour discourse (p=0.000003, Cohen's d=0.555). Study 3 combined both methods (n=763) and confirmed the finding at 4.18x mean and 10.77x median amplification ratio (p<0.000001). Critically, after normalising for follower count, the asymmetry persists at 2.69x (p=0.000009, Cohen's d=0.491), demonstrating that the effect is not simply a consequence of capital accounts having larger audiences. The finding is robust across all tested amplification metric weightings. We introduce the Amplification Ratio and Amplification Normalisation Index as simple metrics for measuring platform-level discourse inequality. A cross-platform replication on Reddit (n=647 posts) did not replicate the finding, suggesting the asymmetry may be specific to X's account-based amplification architecture. We discuss the methodological implications for cross-platform discourse analysis.

Several studies have compared the in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) performance of models in computer vision and NLP. They report a frequent positive correlation and some surprisingly never even observe an inverse correlation indicative of a necessary trade-off. The possibility of inverse patterns is important to determine whether ID performance can serve as a proxy for OOD generalization capabilities. This paper shows with multiple datasets that inverse correlations between ID and OOD performance do happen in real-world data - not only in theoretical worst-case settings. We also explain theoretically how these cases can arise even in a minimal linear setting, and why past studies could miss such cases due to a biased selection of models. Our observations lead to recommendations that contradict those found in much of the current literature. - High OOD performance sometimes requires trading off ID performance. - Focusing on ID performance alone may not lead to optimal OOD performance. It may produce diminishing (eventually negative) returns in OOD performance. - In these cases, studies on OOD generalization that use ID performance for model selection (a common recommended practice) will necessarily miss the best-performing models, making these studies blind to a whole range of phenomena.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Fairness for machine learning predictions is widely required in practice for legal, ethical, and societal reasons. Existing work typically focuses on settings without unobserved confounding, even though unobserved confounding can lead to severe violations of causal fairness and, thus, unfair predictions. In this work, we analyze the sensitivity of causal fairness to unobserved confounding. Our contributions are three-fold. First, we derive bounds for causal fairness metrics under different sources of unobserved confounding. This enables practitioners to examine the sensitivity of their machine learning models to unobserved confounding in fairness-critical applications. Second, we propose a novel neural framework for learning fair predictions, which allows us to offer worst-case guarantees of the extent to which causal fairness can be violated due to unobserved confounding. Third, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in a series of experiments, including a real-world case study about predicting prison sentences. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to study causal fairness under unobserved confounding. To this end, our work is of direct practical value as a refutation strategy to ensure the fairness of predictions in high-stakes applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4 and Gemini have significantly advanced artificial intelligence by enabling machines to generate and comprehend human-like text. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs are not immune to limitations, including various biases. While much research has explored demographic biases, the cognitive biases in LLMs have not been equally scrutinized. This study delves into anchoring bias, a cognitive bias where initial information disproportionately influences judgment. Utilizing an experimental dataset, we examine how anchoring bias manifests in LLMs and verify the effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. Our findings highlight the sensitivity of LLM responses to biased hints. At the same time, our experiments show that, to mitigate anchoring bias, one needs to collect hints from comprehensive angles to prevent the LLMs from being anchored to individual pieces of information, while simple algorithms such as Chain-of-Thought, Thoughts of Principles, Ignoring Anchor Hints, and Reflection are not sufficient.

In hybrid human-machine deferral frameworks, a classifier can defer uncertain cases to human decision-makers (who are often themselves fallible). Prior work on simultaneous training of such classifier and deferral models has typically assumed access to an oracle during training to obtain true class labels for training samples, but in practice there often is no such oracle. In contrast, we consider a "closed" decision-making pipeline in which the same fallible human decision-makers used in deferral also provide training labels. How can imperfect and biased human expert labels be used to train a fair and accurate deferral framework? Our key insight is that by exploiting weak prior information, we can match experts to input examples to ensure fairness and accuracy of the resulting deferral framework, even when imperfect and biased experts are used in place of ground truth labels. The efficacy of our approach is shown both by theoretical analysis and by evaluation on two tasks.

Equivariance theory predicts that an architectural symmetry prior reduces sample complexity by a factor of |G|; this is widely cited but rarely measured as a scaling law with controls that separate the prior from its confounds. On a controlled C_n-symmetric task, we report three findings. First, a wrong-group control with identical orbit size and matched compute is worse than no constraint (joint pairwise CI [+0.79, +3.26] excludes zero, robust across estimators); misaligned constraint is actively harmful, not merely unhelpful. Second, an augmentation baseline equipped with test-time orbit averaging matches the equivariant model exactly -- bit-identical per-epoch validation curves across matched cells -- so the architecture-vs-augmentation gap is conditional on asymmetric test-time computation, not unconditional. Third, the relative exchange rate beta_diff = 1.28 is consistent in sign and order of magnitude with the theoretical 1.0 (single-level CI [+0.92, +2.05]); the more conservative two-level bootstrap (seeds x group sizes) widens this to [-0.63, +1.72], including zero, and a finer-N replication on a sqrt(2)-spaced grid is inconclusive (point estimate -0.82). The methodological contributions -- the relative-rate estimator that cancels the shared-difficulty confound, the wrong-group control, and a pre-specified failure taxonomy -- transfer to any inductive bias whose strength can be parameterised. Honest scoping: the primary estimator beta_diff was adopted post-hoc after the initial analysis revealed a positive-slope identifiability problem; the design was never externally pre-registered; and the headline number rests on an OLS slope over seven group sizes on a coarse N grid. This is an exploratory study, not a confirmatory measurement; the wrong-group result is the cleanest finding and the one we report with the most confidence. A registered replication on fresh seeds is future work.

Counterfactual prompting (i.e., perturbing a single factor and measuring output change) is widely used to evaluate things like LLM bias and CoT faithfulness. But in this work we argue that observed effects cannot be attributed to the targeted factor without accounting for baseline ``meaning-preserving'' modifications to text that establish general model sensitivity. This is because every counterfactual edit is a compound treatment that bundles the variable of interest with incidental surface-form variation; this violates treatment variation irrelevance. We observe prediction flip rates on MedQA of 14.9% when we surgically change patient gender. However, this is statistically indistinguishable from the flip rates induced by simply paraphrasing inputs (14.1%). In this case, it would therefore be unwarranted to conclude that the LLM is especially sensitive to patient gender. To account for this and robustly measure the effects of targeted interventions, we propose a framework in which we compare (via statistical testing) differences observed under target interventions to those induced by paraphrasing inputs. We then use this framework to revisit a analysis done on the MedPerturb dataset, which reported evidence of model sensitivity to patient demographics and stylistic cues. We find that these effects largely dissipate when we account for general model sensitivity, with only 5 of 120 tests reaching statistical significance. Applying the same framework to occupational biography classification, we detect clearly significant directional gender bias, showing that the framework identifies real directional effects even when they are small. We evaluate a range of metrics -- aggregate, per-sample distributional, and regression -- and find that per-sample metrics are dramatically more powerful than aggregate metrics and regression powerfully and uniquely characterizes effect direction and magnitude.

Ensuring equitable treatment (fairness) across protected attributes (such as gender or ethnicity) is a critical issue in machine learning. Most existing literature focuses on binary classification, but achieving fairness in regression tasks-such as insurance pricing or hiring score assessments-is equally important. Moreover, anti-discrimination laws also apply to continuous attributes, such as age, for which many existing methods are not applicable. In practice, multiple protected attributes can exist simultaneously; however, methods targeting fairness across several attributes often overlook so-called "fairness gerrymandering", thereby ignoring disparities among intersectional subgroups (e.g., African-American women or Hispanic men). In this paper, we propose a distance covariance regularisation framework that mitigates the association between model predictions and protected attributes, in line with the fairness definition of demographic parity, and that captures both linear and nonlinear dependencies. To enhance applicability in the presence of multiple protected attributes, we extend our framework by incorporating two multivariate dependence measures based on distance covariance: the previously proposed joint distance covariance (JdCov) and our novel concatenated distance covariance (CCdCov), which effectively address fairness gerrymandering in both regression and classification tasks involving protected attributes of various types. We discuss and illustrate how to calibrate regularisation strength, including a method based on Jensen-Shannon divergence, which quantifies dissimilarities in prediction distributions across groups. We apply our framework to the COMPAS recidivism dataset and a large motor insurance claims dataset.

Large language models are increasingly evaluated by other models, raising a natural question: can a model predict how a judge will score its own output? We find that the ability is largely present before any targeted training: prompted few-shot, a base model already predicts an external judge's multi-attribute quality scores on open-ended responses well above chance across three benchmarks. We introduce Self-Evaluation Elicitation (SEE), a method that surfaces this latent ability through a short cycle comprising a calibration-coupled reinforcement learning phase that improves the answer and predicts the judge, followed by a masked distillation phase that sharpens the prediction while leaving the answer untouched. From 160 unique examples, roughly 31x fewer than a reinforcement learning baseline, SEE improves held-out calibration across three benchmarks while preserving answer quality. The elicited self-evaluation is sharply localized within the model's own token distribution and stable across judges it was never trained against, indicating a transferable notion of quality rather than a single judge's preference. These results reframe judge-aligned self-evaluation as a problem of elicitation rather than acquisition.

Understanding how neural networks rely on visual cues offers a human-interpretable view of their internal decision processes. The cue-conflict benchmark has been influential in probing shape-texture preference and in motivating the insight that stronger, human-like shape bias is often associated with improved in-domain performance. However, we find that the current stylization-based instantiation can yield unstable and ambiguous bias estimates. Specifically, stylization may not reliably instantiate perceptually valid and separable cues nor control their relative informativeness, ratio-based bias can obscure absolute cue sensitivity, and restricting evaluation to preselected classes can distort model predictions by ignoring the full decision space. Together, these factors can confound preference with cue validity, cue balance, and recognizability artifacts. We introduce REFINED-BIAS, an integrated dataset and evaluation framework for reliable and interpretable shape-texture bias diagnosis. REFINED-BIAS constructs balanced, human- and model- recognizable cue pairs using explicit definitions of shape and texture, and measures cue-specific sensitivity over the full label space via a ranking-based metric, enabling fairer cross-model comparisons. Across diverse training regimes and architectures, REFINED-BIAS enables fairer cross-model comparison, more faithful diagnosis of shape and texture biases, and clearer empirical conclusions, resolving inconsistencies that prior cue-conflict evaluations could not reliably disambiguate.

Commonly used evaluation measures including Recall, Precision, F-Measure and Rand Accuracy are biased and should not be used without clear understanding of the biases, and corresponding identification of chance or base case levels of the statistic. Using these measures a system that performs worse in the objective sense of Informedness, can appear to perform better under any of these commonly used measures. We discuss several concepts and measures that reflect the probability that prediction is informed versus chance. Informedness and introduce Markedness as a dual measure for the probability that prediction is marked versus chance. Finally we demonstrate elegant connections between the concepts of Informedness, Markedness, Correlation and Significance as well as their intuitive relationships with Recall and Precision, and outline the extension from the dichotomous case to the general multi-class case.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from N = {277} professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey (N = {1785}). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) as automatic evaluators, commonly referred to as LLM-as-a-Judge, have also attracted growing attention. This approach plays a vital role in aligning LLMs with human judgments, providing accurate and reliable assessments. However, LLM-based judgment models often exhibit judgment preference bias during the evaluation phase, tending to favor responses generated by themselves, undermining the reliability of their judgments. This paper introduces the Group-Based Polling Optimization (Genii), an unsupervised multi-agent collaborative optimization framework that mitigates the inherent judgment preference bias of judgment models. Specifically, Genii integrates various LLM-based judgment models into a multi-agent system and simulates the interactive client-server polling mechanism to optimize each client agent unsupervisedly. Our experiments demonstrate that Genii outperforms supervised models trained on annotated judgment data, while requiring no human-labeled annotations. Genii consistently improves performance across different client agents during the polling, even when weaker models act as server agents. Further analysis reveals that Genii effectively mitigates judgment preference bias of LLM-based judgment models, demonstrating its effectiveness. All codes are available at https://github.com/NEUIR/Genii.

Debiasing methods in NLP models traditionally focus on isolating information related to a sensitive attribute (e.g., gender or race). We instead argue that a favorable debiasing method should use sensitive information 'fairly,' with explanations, rather than blindly eliminating it. This fair balance is often subjective and can be challenging to achieve algorithmically. We explore two interactive setups with a frozen predictive model and show that users able to provide feedback can achieve a better and fairer balance between task performance and bias mitigation. In one setup, users, by interacting with test examples, further decreased bias in the explanations (5-8%) while maintaining the same prediction accuracy. In the other setup, human feedback was able to disentangle associated bias and predictive information from the input leading to superior bias mitigation and improved task performance (4-5%) simultaneously.

LLMs have emerged as powerful evaluators in the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm, offering significant efficiency and flexibility compared to human judgments. However, previous methods primarily rely on single-point evaluations, overlooking the inherent diversity and uncertainty in human evaluations. This approach leads to information loss and decreases the reliability of evaluations. To address this limitation, we propose a novel training framework that explicitly aligns the LLM-generated judgment distribution with empirical human distributions. Specifically, we propose a distributional alignment objective based on KL divergence, combined with an auxiliary cross-entropy regularization to stabilize the training process. Furthermore, considering that empirical distributions may derive from limited human annotations, we incorporate adversarial training to enhance model robustness against distribution perturbations. Extensive experiments across various LLM backbones and evaluation tasks demonstrate that our framework significantly outperforms existing closed-source LLMs and conventional single-point alignment methods, with improved alignment quality, evaluation accuracy, and robustness.

This paper presents an eight-week observational comparison of 68 single-file HTML generations collected across 17 public experiments in the "HTML AI Battle" project between December 10, 2025 and February 4, 2026. Four reasoning model families, GPT, Gemini, Grok, and Claude, were compared under a fixed public-interface protocol with no custom instructions, no personality tuning, and no repair prompts. Each output was evaluated from a rendered browser video using human scores and a Gemini LLM-as-a-judge layer for prompt adherence, functional correctness, and UI quality, then packaged into a standardized social-media protocol spanning X (Twitter), TikTok, and YouTube. The tracker was also used for two supervised predictive analyses: an experiment-level model for 24-hour X impressions and a generation-level model for HTML verbosity. Under this protocol, Claude was the strongest and most consistent family, leading mean performance and winning 9/17 prompts under the primary human weighted score. Longer measured reasoning time was not associated with higher quality overall. Gemini as a judge was significantly more lenient than the human evaluator on functional correctness and overall performance, while stable self-favoring bias remained unresolved. The exploratory X-impressions model remained weak under post-screen cross-validation (MAE = 46,874, R^2 = -0.377), whereas the HTML-lines model performed better, with a model-family-only baseline outperforming prompt-aware alternatives (MAE = 135.2, R^2 = 0.576). Overall, selected pre-publication technical/audio variables were not sufficient to predict 24-hour X reach, while code verbosity was driven much more by model family than by prompt wording. The comparisons remain observational and are limited by public-interface drift, access-path differences, and one primary human scorer.

Recent work has shown that models trained to the same objective, and which achieve similar measures of accuracy on consistent test data, may nonetheless behave very differently on individual predictions. This inconsistency is undesirable in high-stakes contexts, such as medical diagnosis and finance. We show that this inconsistent behavior extends beyond predictions to feature attributions, which may likewise have negative implications for the intelligibility of a model, and one's ability to find recourse for subjects. We then introduce selective ensembles to mitigate such inconsistencies by applying hypothesis testing to the predictions of a set of models trained using randomly-selected starting conditions; importantly, selective ensembles can abstain in cases where a consistent outcome cannot be achieved up to a specified confidence level. We prove that that prediction disagreement between selective ensembles is bounded, and empirically demonstrate that selective ensembles achieve consistent predictions and feature attributions while maintaining low abstention rates. On several benchmark datasets, selective ensembles reach zero inconsistently predicted points, with abstention rates as low 1.5%.

What does it mean for an algorithm to be biased? In U.S. law, unintentional bias is encoded via disparate impact, which occurs when a selection process has widely different outcomes for different groups, even as it appears to be neutral. This legal determination hinges on a definition of a protected class (ethnicity, gender, religious practice) and an explicit description of the process. When the process is implemented using computers, determining disparate impact (and hence bias) is harder. It might not be possible to disclose the process. In addition, even if the process is open, it might be hard to elucidate in a legal setting how the algorithm makes its decisions. Instead of requiring access to the algorithm, we propose making inferences based on the data the algorithm uses. We make four contributions to this problem. First, we link the legal notion of disparate impact to a measure of classification accuracy that while known, has received relatively little attention. Second, we propose a test for disparate impact based on analyzing the information leakage of the protected class from the other data attributes. Third, we describe methods by which data might be made unbiased. Finally, we present empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of our test for disparate impact and our approach for both masking bias and preserving relevant information in the data. Interestingly, our approach resembles some actual selection practices that have recently received legal scrutiny.

Legal judgment prediction is the task of automatically predicting the outcome of a court case, given a text describing the case's facts. Previous work on using neural models for this task has focused on Chinese; only feature-based models (e.g., using bags of words and topics) have been considered in English. We release a new English legal judgment prediction dataset, containing cases from the European Court of Human Rights. We evaluate a broad variety of neural models on the new dataset, establishing strong baselines that surpass previous feature-based models in three tasks: (1) binary violation classification; (2) multi-label classification; (3) case importance prediction. We also explore if models are biased towards demographic information via data anonymization. As a side-product, we propose a hierarchical version of BERT, which bypasses BERT's length limitation.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

Conformal prediction is often calibrated with a single pooled threshold, but this can hide cross-group heterogeneity in score distributions and distort group-wise coverage. We study this phenomenon through the population score distributions underlying split conformal calibration. First, we derive a conservation law and lower bound showing that pooled calibration incurs irreducible group-wise coverage distortion at a scale set by cross-group quantile heterogeneity. Second, we demonstrate that the two leading fairness definitions for conformal prediction, Equalized Coverage and Equalized Set Size, are fundamentally in tension. Third, we quantify the cost of moving between policies which treat groups separately or pool them. Experiments on synthetic and real data confirm the same bidirectional trade-off after finite-sample calibration. Our results show that, for the policy families studied here, calibration choice does not remove cross-group heterogeneity; it determines whether the resulting distortion appears in the coverage or size dimension, providing a principled lens for analyzing fairness-oriented calibration choices in practice.

Rapid advancements in large language models have unlocked remarkable capabilities when it comes to processing and summarizing unstructured text data. This has implications for the analysis of rich, open-ended datasets, such as survey responses, where LLMs hold the promise of efficiently distilling key themes and sentiments. However, as organizations increasingly turn to these powerful AI systems to make sense of textual feedback, a critical question arises, can we trust LLMs to accurately represent the perspectives contained within these text based datasets? While LLMs excel at generating human-like summaries, there is a risk that their outputs may inadvertently diverge from the true substance of the original responses. Discrepancies between the LLM-generated outputs and the actual themes present in the data could lead to flawed decision-making, with far-reaching consequences for organizations. This research investigates the effectiveness of LLMs as judge models to evaluate the thematic alignment of summaries generated by other LLMs. We utilized an Anthropic Claude model to generate thematic summaries from open-ended survey responses, with Amazon's Titan Express, Nova Pro, and Meta's Llama serving as LLM judges. The LLM-as-judge approach was compared to human evaluations using Cohen's kappa, Spearman's rho, and Krippendorff's alpha, validating a scalable alternative to traditional human centric evaluation methods. Our findings reveal that while LLMs as judges offer a scalable solution comparable to human raters, humans may still excel at detecting subtle, context-specific nuances. This research contributes to the growing body of knowledge on AI assisted text analysis. We discuss limitations and provide recommendations for future research, emphasizing the need for careful consideration when generalizing LLM judge models across various contexts and use cases.

Adopting human and large language models (LLM) as judges (a.k.a human- and LLM-as-a-judge) for evaluating the performance of existing LLMs has recently gained attention. Nonetheless, this approach concurrently introduces potential biases from human and LLM judges, questioning the reliability of the evaluation results. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for investigating 5 types of biases for LLM and human judges. We curate a dataset with 142 samples referring to the revised Bloom's Taxonomy and conduct thousands of human and LLM evaluations. Results show that human and LLM judges are vulnerable to perturbations to various degrees, and that even the most cutting-edge judges possess considerable biases. We further exploit their weakness and conduct attacks on LLM judges. We hope that our work can notify the community of the vulnerability of human- and LLM-as-a-judge against perturbations, as well as the urgency of developing robust evaluation systems.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Research has documented LLMs' name-based bias in hiring and salary recommendations. In this paper, we instead consider a setting where LLMs generate candidate summaries for downstream assessment. In a large-scale controlled study, we analyze nearly one million resume summaries produced by 4 models under systematic race-gender name perturbations, using synthetic resumes and real-world job postings. By decomposing each summary into resume-grounded factual content and evaluative framing, we find that factual content remains largely stable, while evaluative language exhibits subtle name-conditioned variation concentrated in the extremes of the distribution, especially in open-source models. Our hiring simulation demonstrates how evaluative summary transforms directional harm into symmetric instability that might evade conventional fairness audit, highlighting a potential pathway for LLM-to-LLM automation bias.

Dataset Distillation aims to compress a large dataset into a small synthetic one while maintaining predictive performance. We show that as different demographic groups exhibit distinct predictive patterns, the distillation process struggles to simultaneously preserve informative signals for all subgroups, regardless of whether group sizes are mildly or severely imbalanced. Consequently, models trained on distilled data can experience substantial performance drops for certain subgroups, leading to fairness gaps. Crucially, these gaps do not disappear by merely correcting group imbalance, since they stem from fundamental mismatches in subgroup predictive patterns rather than from sample-size disparities alone. We therefore formally analyze the interaction between these two sources of bias and cast the solution as identifying a group-imbalance-agnostic barycenter of the predictive information that induces similar representations across all subgroups. By distilling toward this shared aggregate representation, we show that group fairness concerns can be reduced. Our approach is compatible with existing distillation methods, and empirical results show that it substantially reduces bias introduced by dataset distillation.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

The fairness of machine learning-based decisions has become an increasingly important focus in the design of supervised machine learning methods. Most fairness approaches optimize a specified trade-off between performance measure(s) (e.g., accuracy, log loss, or AUC) and fairness metric(s) (e.g., demographic parity, equalized odds). This begs the question: are the right performance-fairness trade-offs being specified? We instead re-cast fair machine learning as an imitation learning task by introducing superhuman fairness, which seeks to simultaneously outperform human decisions on multiple predictive performance and fairness measures. We demonstrate the benefits of this approach given suboptimal decisions.

The release of ChatGPT in November 2022 sparked an explosion of interest in post-training and an avalanche of new preference optimization (PO) methods. These methods claim superior alignment by virtue of better correspondence with human pairwise preferences, often measured by LLM judges. In this work, we attempt to answer the following question -- do LLM-judge preferences translate to progress on other, more concrete metrics for alignment, and if not, why not? We define a concrete metric for alignment, and introduce SOS-Bench, the largest standardized, reproducible LLM meta-benchmark to date. We find that (1) LLM-judgments do not correlate with concrete measures of safety, world knowledge, and instruction following; (2) LLM judges have powerful implicit biases, prioritizing style over factuality and safety; and (3) the supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage of post-training, and not the PO stage, has the greatest impact on alignment, with data scaling and prompt diversity as the driving factors. Our codebase and complete results can be found at https://github.com/penfever/sos-bench.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

Five years after the discovery of persistent anti-Muslim bias in large language models, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompt completion, a setting that no longer reflects how frontier LLMs are deployed. We introduce MIRAGE (Muslim-Identity Reasoning and Agentic Generation Evaluation), a benchmark of 1{,}200 prompts spanning three deployment-realistic conditions: direct completion, chain-of-thought reasoning, and simulated agentic decision-making across content moderation, lending triage, refugee claim summarization, and hiring screens. Across six frontier models, we find that (i) chain-of-thought reasoning amplifies rather than suppresses Muslim-violence associations by 12--34\% relative to direct completion, (ii) agentic decisions exhibit a 9--22 percentage-point asymmetry between Muslim and matched non-Muslim cases on identical evidence, and (iii) bias is sharply time-coupled to retrieved news context, increasing 18--27\% under recent-conflict retrieval. Existing prompt-based mitigations transfer poorly across our three conditions, suppressing direct-completion bias while leaving agentic asymmetry largely intact. We release MIRAGE and an open evaluation harness to support targeted mitigation research.

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.