Daily Papers

Research on reasoning in language models (LMs) predominantly focuses on improving the correctness of their outputs. But some important applications require modeling reasoning patterns that are incorrect. For example, automated systems that can reason about and simulate student errors are useful for providing real-time feedback in the classroom or offline practice for educators-in-training. This paper presents a new method, MISTAKE, that (1) constructs high-quality synthetic examples of reasoning errors by leveraging cycle consistency between incorrect answers and latent misconceptions; and (2) uses the generated data to learn models for student simulation, misconception classification, and answer generation. We evaluate MISTAKE on three educational tasks and find that it results in (1) higher accuracy when simulating incorrect student answers based on specific misconceptions, (2) increased performance inferring latent misconceptions from observed incorrect answers, and (3) higher alignment with expert-written distractor answers when generating incorrect answers (e.g., for multiple-choice tests).

Transformers have demonstrated remarkable performance in natural language processing and related domains, as they largely focus on sequential, autoregressive next-token prediction tasks. Yet, they struggle in logical reasoning, not necessarily because of a fundamental limitation of these models, but possibly due to the lack of exploration of more creative uses, such as latent space and recurrent reasoning. An emerging exploration in this direction is the Hierarchical Reasoning Model (Wang et. al., 2025), which introduces a novel type of recurrent reasoning in the latent space of transformers, achieving remarkable performance on a wide range of 2D reasoning tasks. Despite the promising results, this line of models is still at an early stage and calls for in-depth investigation. In this work, we review this class of models, examine key design choices, test alternative variants and clarify common misconceptions.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

Modeling plausible student misconceptions is critical for AI in education. In this work, we examine how large language models (LLMs) reason about misconceptions when generating multiple-choice distractors, a task that requires modeling incorrect yet plausible answers by coordinating solution knowledge, simulating student misconceptions, and evaluating plausibility. We introduce a taxonomy for analyzing the strategies used by state-of-the-art LLMs, examining their reasoning procedures and comparing them to established best practices in the learning sciences. Our structured analysis reveals a surprising alignment between their processes and best practices: the models typically solve the problem correctly first, then articulate and simulate multiple potential misconceptions, and finally select a set of distractors. An analysis of failure modes reveals that errors arise primarily from failures in recovering the correct solution and selecting among response candidates, rather than simulating errors or structuring the process. Consistent with these results, we find that providing the correct solution in the prompt improves alignment with human-authored distractors by 8%, highlighting the critical role of anchoring to the correct solution when generating plausible incorrect student reasoning. Overall, our analysis offers a structured and interpretable lens into LLMs' ability to model incorrect student reasoning and produce high-quality distractors.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Many political science theories relate to latent variables, but such quantities cannot be observed directly and must instead be estimated from data with inherent uncertainty. In regression models, when a variable is measured with error, its slope coefficient is known to be biased toward zero. We show how measurement error interacts with unique aspects of latent variable estimation, identification restrictions in particular, and demonstrate how common error adjustment strategies can worsen bias. We introduce a method for adjusting coefficients on latent predictors, which reduces bias and typically increases the magnitude of estimated coefficients, often dramatically. We illustrate these dynamics using several different estimation strategies for the latent predictors. Corrected estimates using our proposed method show stronger relationships -- sometimes up to 50% larger -- than those from naive regression. Our findings highlight the importance of considering measurement error in latent predictors and the inadequacy of many commonly used approaches for dealing with this issue.

Being able to predict what may happen in the future requires an in-depth understanding of the physical and causal rules that govern the world. A model that is able to do so has a number of appealing applications, from robotic planning to representation learning. However, learning to predict raw future observations, such as frames in a video, is exceedingly challenging -- the ambiguous nature of the problem can cause a naively designed model to average together possible futures into a single, blurry prediction. Recently, this has been addressed by two distinct approaches: (a) latent variational variable models that explicitly model underlying stochasticity and (b) adversarially-trained models that aim to produce naturalistic images. However, a standard latent variable model can struggle to produce realistic results, and a standard adversarially-trained model underutilizes latent variables and fails to produce diverse predictions. We show that these distinct methods are in fact complementary. Combining the two produces predictions that look more realistic to human raters and better cover the range of possible futures. Our method outperforms prior and concurrent work in these aspects.

Large language models (LLMs) can exhibit advanced reasoning yet still generate incorrect answers. We hypothesize that such errors frequently stem from spurious beliefs, propositions the model internally considers true but are incorrect. To address this, we propose a method to rectify the belief space by suppressing these spurious beliefs while simultaneously enhancing true ones, thereby enabling more reliable inferences. Our approach first identifies the beliefs that lead to incorrect or correct answers by prompting the model to generate textual explanations, using our Forward-Backward Beam Search (FBBS). We then apply unlearning to suppress the identified spurious beliefs and enhance the true ones, effectively rectifying the model's belief space. Empirical results on multiple QA datasets and LLMs show that our method corrects previously misanswered questions without harming overall model performance. Furthermore, our approach yields improved generalization on unseen data, suggesting that rectifying a model's belief space is a promising direction for mitigating errors and enhancing overall reliability.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Contrastively trained encoders have recently been proven to invert the data-generating process: they encode each input, e.g., an image, into the true latent vector that generated the image (Zimmermann et al., 2021). However, real-world observations often have inherent ambiguities. For instance, images may be blurred or only show a 2D view of a 3D object, so multiple latents could have generated them. This makes the true posterior for the latent vector probabilistic with heteroscedastic uncertainty. In this setup, we extend the common InfoNCE objective and encoders to predict latent distributions instead of points. We prove that these distributions recover the correct posteriors of the data-generating process, including its level of aleatoric uncertainty, up to a rotation of the latent space. In addition to providing calibrated uncertainty estimates, these posteriors allow the computation of credible intervals in image retrieval. They comprise images with the same latent as a given query, subject to its uncertainty. Code is available at https://github.com/mkirchhof/Probabilistic_Contrastive_Learning

A major risk of using language models in practical applications is their tendency to hallucinate incorrect statements. Hallucinations are often attributed to knowledge gaps in LMs, but we hypothesize that in some cases, when justifying previously generated hallucinations, LMs output false claims that they can separately recognize as incorrect. We construct three question-answering datasets where ChatGPT and GPT-4 often state an incorrect answer and offer an explanation with at least one incorrect claim. Crucially, we find that ChatGPT and GPT-4 can identify 67% and 87% of their own mistakes, respectively. We refer to this phenomenon as hallucination snowballing: an LM over-commits to early mistakes, leading to more mistakes that it otherwise would not make.

Advancements in text-to-image diffusion models have broadened extensive downstream practical applications, but such models often encounter misalignment issues between text and image. Taking the generation of a combination of two disentangled concepts as an example, say given the prompt "a tea cup of iced coke", existing models usually generate a glass cup of iced coke because the iced coke usually co-occurs with the glass cup instead of the tea one during model training. The root of such misalignment is attributed to the confusion in the latent semantic space of text-to-image diffusion models, and hence we refer to the "a tea cup of iced coke" phenomenon as Latent Concept Misalignment (LC-Mis). We leverage large language models (LLMs) to thoroughly investigate the scope of LC-Mis, and develop an automated pipeline for aligning the latent semantics of diffusion models to text prompts. Empirical assessments confirm the effectiveness of our approach, substantially reducing LC-Mis errors and enhancing the robustness and versatility of text-to-image diffusion models. The code and dataset are here: https://github.com/RossoneriZhao/iced_coke.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Visual latent reasoning lets a multimodal large language model (MLLM) create intermediate visual evidence as continuous tokens, avoiding external tools or image generators. However, existing methods usually follow an output-as-input latent paradigm and yield unstable gains. We identify evidence for a feature-space mismatch that can contribute to this instability: dominant visual-latent models build on pre-norm MLLMs and reuse decoder hidden states as predicted latent inputs, even though these states occupy a substantially different norm regime from the input embeddings the model was trained to consume (Xie et al., 2025; Li et al., 2026; Team et al., 2026). This mismatch can make direct latent feedback unreliable. Motivated by this diagnosis, we propose GAP, a Granular Alignment Paradigm for visual latent modeling. GAP aligns visual latent reasoning at three levels: feature-level alignment maps decoder outputs into input-compatible visual latents through a lightweight PCA-aligned latent head; context-level alignment grounds latent targets with inspectable auxiliary visual supervision; and capacity-guided alignment assigns latent supervision selectively to examples where the base MLLM struggles. On Qwen2.5-VL 7B, the resulting model achieves the best mean aggregate perception and reasoning performance among our supervised variants. Inference-time intervention probing further suggests that generated latents provide task-relevant visual signal beyond merely adding token slots.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Humans can approach complex visual problems by mentally simulating intermediate visual steps, rather than reasoning through language alone. Inspired by this, several works on Vision-Language Models have recently explored chain-of-thought reasoning with continuous latent tokens as intermediate visual imagination steps. In this work, we investigate how recent models leverage such latent tokens. Surprisingly, we find that model accuracy is unaffected when latent tokens are replaced by uninformative dummy tokens. This indicates that latent tokens play a minimal causal role in the model's final prediction. To better understand this phenomenon, we analyze both the training signal provided by oracle latent representations and the quality of the latent tokens generated at inference time. Our experiments reveal two crucial issues holding back latent visual reasoning: First, in most existing datasets, oracle latent tokens provide limited additional information beyond the original image and do not substantially simplify the task, leading models to ignore them during training and effectively bypassing them at inference time. When fine-tuned on a diagnostic dataset, in which latent tokens provide sufficient support for the final prediction, we show that models can causally rely on them. Second, the latent tokens produced at inference time deviate from their corresponding oracle representations, collapsing to a narrow region and preventing benefits even when the model relies on them. Overall, our findings suggest that future progress in latent visual reasoning depends on two key pillars: high-quality datasets with informative intermediate steps and more precise latent token prediction.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

We propose a novel family of language models, Latent-Thought Language Models (LTMs), which incorporate explicit latent thought vectors that follow an explicit prior model in latent space. These latent thought vectors guide the autoregressive generation of ground tokens through a Transformer decoder. Training employs a dual-rate optimization process within the classical variational Bayes framework: fast learning of local variational parameters for the posterior distribution of latent vectors, and slow learning of global decoder parameters. Empirical studies reveal that LTMs possess additional scaling dimensions beyond traditional LLMs, yielding a structured design space. Higher sample efficiency can be achieved by increasing training compute per token, with further gains possible by trading model size for more inference steps. Designed based on these scaling properties, LTMs demonstrate superior sample and parameter efficiency compared to conventional autoregressive models and discrete diffusion models. They significantly outperform these counterparts in validation perplexity and zero-shot language modeling. Additionally, LTMs exhibit emergent few-shot in-context reasoning capabilities that scale with model and latent size, and achieve competitive performance in conditional and unconditional text generation.

Latent reasoning models (LRMs) replace explicit chain-of-thought with continuous thoughts. Recent work treats observable latent-state patterns, such as BFS-like frontiers and decodable arithmetic computation, as evidence for internal reasoning mechanisms. Evaluating two LRMs (Coconut and CODI) against controls lacking the proposed recurrence or curriculum, we find these patterns also appear in the controls and do not always causally affect behavior. Causal interventions reveal that latent-thought utilization is not binary but graded, scaling with a thought's causal effect on model behavior. Geometric analyses reveal this effect concentrates in low-rank directions whose step-to-step geometry grows more structured as their behavioral influence increases. Latent thoughts should therefore be treated as hidden computation, not hidden explanation: decodability, attention, or static structure alone cannot establish mechanism. LRM interpretability thus requires matched controls and causal tests.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Current multimodal latent reasoning often relies on external supervision (e.g., auxiliary images), ignoring intrinsic visual attention dynamics. In this work, we identify a critical Perception Gap in distillation: student models frequently mimic a teacher's textual output while attending to fundamentally divergent visual regions, effectively relying on language priors rather than grounded perception. To bridge this, we propose LaViT, a framework that aligns latent visual thoughts rather than static embeddings. LaViT compels the student to autoregressively reconstruct the teacher's visual semantics and attention trajectories prior to text generation, employing a curriculum sensory gating mechanism to prevent shortcut learning. Extensive experiments show that LaViT significantly enhances visual grounding, achieving up to +16.9% gains on complex reasoning tasks and enabling a compact 3B model to outperform larger open-source variants and proprietary models like GPT-4o.

Large Language Models with transformer architecture have revolutionized the domain of text generation, setting unprecedented benchmarks. Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs have been criticized for generating outcomes that deviate from factual accuracy or display logical inconsistencies, phenomena commonly referred to as hallucinations. This term, however, has often been misapplied to any results deviating from the instructor's expectations, which this paper defines as attention misdirection rather than true hallucinations. Understanding the distinction between hallucinations and attention misdirection becomes increasingly relevant in business contexts, where the ramifications of such errors can significantly impact the value extraction from these inherently pre-trained models. This paper highlights the best practices of the PGI, Persona, Grouping, and Intelligence, method, a strategic framework that achieved a remarkable error rate of only 3,15 percent across 4,000 responses generated by GPT in response to a real business challenge. It emphasizes that by equipping experimentation with knowledge, businesses can unlock opportunities for innovation through the use of these natively pre-trained models. This reinforces the notion that strategic application grounded in a skilled team can maximize the benefits of emergent technologies such as the LLMs.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Latent visual reasoning (LVR) inserts supervised latent tokens between perception and answer generation in vision-language models (VLMs). The field uses alignment between these latents and their visual targets, i.e., cosine similarity or mean squared error (MSE), as both the training loss and the quality metric, assuming that better alignment yields a better answer. We test this with a designed matrix of five LVR variants and find the assumption inverted: cosine alignment is negatively correlated with accuracy across all five (r=-0.94). To explain this, we introduce PRISM, a pair of inference-time diagnostics: a linear probe that asks where the answer is decodable, and a corruption test that asks whether the latent is load-bearing. The supervised latents are largely bypassed. Corrupting them shifts accuracy by at most four points. The answer is decodable downstream of the latent but not at it, and the size of this decodability gap predicts how much each variant relies on its latent under perturbation. Consistent with an Information Bottleneck reading of the loss, the auxiliary objective reshapes the language model via shared parameters rather than via the latent variable it nominally optimizes.

Latent, or silent, reasoning lets language models carry out intermediate computation in continuous vector space instead of words, and is widely assumed to function as an internal scratchpad the model consults during inference. Whether that assumption survives reinforcement learning has not been tested directly: existing causal analyses of latent reasoning are confined to math and logic tasks, comparing reliance on thoughts within one checkpoint, never before and after RL. We train a chess-playing model through a staged latent-reasoning curriculum followed by reinforcement learning, and find legality climbs monotonically to 61% (from a 48% pre-RL baseline) while checkmate confabulation is eliminated entirely. To locate this gain, we run a six-condition causal intervention suite on the same model before and after RL: substituting or noising the thought vectors leaves performance unchanged, ablating them costs only mild degradation, and only exact-zero vectors cause collapse. This robustness gap is itself the finding: under exact-zero corruption, legality collapses to 1% pre-RL versus 9% post-RL, a gap that survives correction across the full battery. A 10x-larger replication of the post-RL checkpoint's own battery confirms this: removing the thoughts, with or without restoring sequence length, also reaches significance; substitution and noise remain indistinguishable from baseline. RL appears to add robustness to disruption, not reliance on thought content. These results push back against the field's default assumption that latent thoughts function as an actively consulted inference-time scratchpad, and instead indicate latent reasoning's principal effect here is shaping the model's parameters during training. We also demonstrate a working RL gain in chess, where multiple groups report the same latent-reasoning-plus-RL recipe failing to improve accuracy over SFT.

What happens when a new piece of knowledge is introduced into the training data and how long does it last while a large language model (LM) continues to train? We investigate this question by injecting facts into LMs from a new probing dataset, "Outlandish", which is designed to permit the testing of a spectrum of different fact types. When studying how robust these memories are, there appears to be a sweet spot in the spectrum of fact novelty between consistency with world knowledge and total randomness, where the injected memory is the most enduring. Specifically we show that facts that conflict with common knowledge are remembered for tens of thousands of training steps, while prompts not conflicting with common knowledge (mundane), as well as scrambled prompts (randomly jumbled) are both forgotten much more rapidly. Further, knowledge-conflicting facts can "prime'' how the language model hallucinates on logically unrelated prompts, showing their propensity for non-target generalization, while both mundane and randomly jumbled facts prime significantly less. Finally, we show that impacts of knowledge-conflicting facts in LMs, though they can be long lasting, can be largely erased by novel application of multi-step sparse updates, even while the training ability of the model is preserved. As such, this very simple procedure has direct implications for mitigating the effects of data poisoning in training.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, especially when guided by explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that verbalizes intermediate steps. While CoT improves both interpretability and accuracy, its dependence on natural language reasoning limits the model's expressive bandwidth. Latent reasoning tackles this bottleneck by performing multi-step inference entirely in the model's continuous hidden state, eliminating token-level supervision. To advance latent reasoning research, this survey provides a comprehensive overview of the emerging field of latent reasoning. We begin by examining the foundational role of neural network layers as the computational substrate for reasoning, highlighting how hierarchical representations support complex transformations. Next, we explore diverse latent reasoning methodologies, including activation-based recurrence, hidden state propagation, and fine-tuning strategies that compress or internalize explicit reasoning traces. Finally, we discuss advanced paradigms such as infinite-depth latent reasoning via masked diffusion models, which enable globally consistent and reversible reasoning processes. By unifying these perspectives, we aim to clarify the conceptual landscape of latent reasoning and chart future directions for research at the frontier of LLM cognition. An associated GitHub repository collecting the latest papers and repos is available at: https://github.com/multimodal-art-projection/LatentCoT-Horizon/.

Latent reasoning represents a new development in Transformer language models that has shown potential in compressing reasoning lengths compared to chain-of-thought reasoning. By directly passing the information-rich previous final latent state into the next sequence, latent reasoning removes the restriction to human language tokens as the medium for reasoning. We develop adaptive-length latent reasoning models and introduce a post-SFT reinforcement-learning methodology to optimize latent reasoning length by minimizing reasoning length while maintaining accuracy. This, in turn, further reduces compute usage and raises the bar on the compressive capabilities of latent reasoning models. Experiments on the Llama 3.2 1B model and the GSM8K-Aug dataset show a 52% drop in total reasoning length with no penalty to accuracy. In future work, we plan to extend to additional models and datasets, analyze relationships between training coefficients, experiment with architecture variations, and continue our knowledge distillation for latent reasoning SFT efforts. We make our code and pretrained weights available at https://github.com/apning/adaptive-latent-reasoning.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Diffusion-based models have gained significant popularity for text-to-image generation due to their exceptional image-generation capabilities. A risk with these models is the potential generation of inappropriate content, such as biased or harmful images. However, the underlying reasons for generating such undesired content from the perspective of the diffusion model's internal representation remain unclear. Previous work interprets vectors in an interpretable latent space of diffusion models as semantic concepts. However, existing approaches cannot discover directions for arbitrary concepts, such as those related to inappropriate concepts. In this work, we propose a novel self-supervised approach to find interpretable latent directions for a given concept. With the discovered vectors, we further propose a simple approach to mitigate inappropriate generation. Extensive experiments have been conducted to verify the effectiveness of our mitigation approach, namely, for fair generation, safe generation, and responsible text-enhancing generation.

A common goal of mechanistic interpretability is to decompose the activations of neural networks into features: interpretable properties of the input computed by the model. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular method for finding these features in LLMs, and it has been postulated that they can be used to find a canonical set of units: a unique and complete list of atomic features. We cast doubt on this belief using two novel techniques: SAE stitching to show they are incomplete, and meta-SAEs to show they are not atomic. SAE stitching involves inserting or swapping latents from a larger SAE into a smaller one. Latents from the larger SAE can be divided into two categories: novel latents, which improve performance when added to the smaller SAE, indicating they capture novel information, and reconstruction latents, which can replace corresponding latents in the smaller SAE that have similar behavior. The existence of novel features indicates incompleteness of smaller SAEs. Using meta-SAEs -- SAEs trained on the decoder matrix of another SAE -- we find that latents in SAEs often decompose into combinations of latents from a smaller SAE, showing that larger SAE latents are not atomic. The resulting decompositions are often interpretable; e.g. a latent representing ``Einstein'' decomposes into ``scientist'', ``Germany'', and ``famous person''. Even if SAEs do not find canonical units of analysis, they may still be useful tools. We suggest that future research should either pursue different approaches for identifying such units, or pragmatically choose the SAE size suited to their task. We provide an interactive dashboard to explore meta-SAEs: https://metasaes.streamlit.app/

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

Recent research has demonstrated that large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on incorrect trivia question-answer pairs exhibit toxicity - a phenomenon later termed "emergent misalignment". Moreover, research has shown that LLMs possess behavioral self-awareness - the ability to describe learned behaviors that were only implicitly demonstrated in training data. Here, we investigate the intersection of these phenomena. We fine-tune GPT-4.1 models sequentially on datasets known to induce and reverse emergent misalignment and evaluate whether the models are self-aware of their behavior transitions without providing in-context examples. Our results show that emergently misaligned models rate themselves as significantly more harmful compared to their base model and realigned counterparts, demonstrating behavioral self-awareness of their own emergent misalignment. Our findings show that behavioral self-awareness tracks actual alignment states of models, indicating that models can be queried for informative signals about their own safety.

Latent visual reasoning aims to mimic human's imagination process by meditating through hidden states of Multimodal Large Language Models. While recognized as a promising paradigm for visual reasoning, the underlying mechanisms driving its effectiveness remain unclear. Motivated to demystify the true source of its efficacy, we investigate the validity of latent reasoning using Causal Mediation Analysis. We model the process as a causal chain: the input as the treatment, the latent tokens as the mediator, and the final answer as the outcome. Our findings uncover two critical disconnections: (a) Input-Latent Disconnect: dramatic perturbations on the input result in negligible changes to the latent tokens, suggesting that latent tokens do not effectively attend to the input sequence. (b) Latent-Answer Disconnect: perturbations on the latent tokens yield minimal impact on the final answer, indicating the limited causal effect latent tokens imposing on the outcome. Furthermore, extensive probing analysis reveals that latent tokens encode limited visual information and exhibit high similarity. Consequently, we challenge the necessity of latent reasoning and propose a straightforward alternative named CapImagine, which teaches the model to explicitly imagine using text. Experiments on vision-centric benchmarks show that CapImagine significantly outperforms complex latent-space baselines, highlighting the superior potential of visual reasoning through explicit imagination.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) in various tasks, yet the inefficiency of token-by-token generation hinders real-world deployment in latency-sensitive recommender systems. Latent reasoning has emerged as an effective paradigm in LLMs, performing multi-step inference in a continuous hidden-state space to achieve stronger reasoning at lower cost. However, this paradigm remains underexplored in mainstream generative recommendation. Achieving this reveals three key challenges: (1) the gap between prior-less Semantic ID (SID) symbols and continuous latent reasoning, as SIDs lack pre-trained semantics, hindering joint optimization; (2) representation drift due to a lack of reasoning chain supervision; and (3) the suboptimality of applying a globally fixed reasoning depth. To address these, we propose LASAR (Latent Adaptive Semantic Aligned Reasoning), an SFT-then-RL framework. First, we bridge this gap via two-stage training: Stage 1 grounds SID semantics before Stage 2 introduces latent reasoning, ensuring efficient convergence. Second, we mitigate representation drift through explicit CoT semantic alignment. Step-wise bidirectional KL divergence constrains the latent reasoning trajectory using hidden-state anchors extracted from CoT text, while a Policy Head predicts per-sample reasoning depth. Third, during the GRPO-based RL phase, terminal-only KL alignment accommodates variable-length reasoning, and REINFORCE optimizes the Policy Head to dynamically allocate steps. This nearly halves the average latent step count while simultaneously improving recommendation quality. Experiments on three real-world datasets show that LASAR achieves the best overall performance across the evaluated settings. It adds limited inference latency and is roughly 20x faster than generating explicit CoT text.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are often constrained by a language-space bottleneck, forcing complex visual reasoning into discrete tokens which can lose perceptual nuance. A promising alternative is continuous latent reasoning, where the goal is to discover implicit reasoning pathways that bridge the multimodal query and the final answer. However, this introduces a severe train-inference mismatch: a training-time posterior, conditioned on the ground-truth answer, can exploit answer-dependent shortcuts. Standard variational training then forces the inference-time prior to mimic a posterior that has access to information unavailable at test time, leading to poor performance. To address this, we propose Asymmetric Mutual Variational Learning (AMVL), a framework that resolves this mismatch via a bidirectional calibration objective. A forward KL divergence trains the target-agnostic prior to match the posterior, while a novel reverse KL divergence simultaneously regularizes the posterior, preventing it from collapsing into inference-incompatible regions and mitigating this ``answer leakage''. We provide theoretical analysis formalizing this leakage as prior contamination and prove that our dual-KL objective reduces it. We instantiate AMVL in a latent-integrated MLLM and show that it consistently outperforms strong discrete and latent-reasoning baselines, improving the average score on the complex BLINK benchmark by +10.83 and achieving gains of up to +32.00 on individual reasoning tasks, with analyses confirming improved latent-space stability.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

Reliable application of machine learning is of primary importance to the practical deployment of deep learning methods. A fundamental challenge is that models are often unreliable due to overconfidence. In this paper, we estimate a model's reliability by measuring the agreement between its latent space, and the latent space of a foundation model. However, it is challenging to measure the agreement between two different latent spaces due to their incoherence, \eg, arbitrary rotations and different dimensionality. To overcome this incoherence issue, we design a neighborhood agreement measure between latent spaces and find that this agreement is surprisingly well-correlated with the reliability of a model's predictions. Further, we show that fusing neighborhood agreement into a model's predictive confidence in a post-hoc way significantly improves its reliability. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments on failure detection across various datasets verify the effectiveness of our method on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) have recently gained attention for their potential as an alternative to (or proxy for) explicit knowledge bases (KBs). In this position paper, we examine this hypothesis, identify strengths and limitations of both LMs and KBs, and discuss the complementary nature of the two paradigms. In particular, we offer qualitative arguments that latent LMs are not suitable as a substitute for explicit KBs, but could play a major role for augmenting and curating KBs.

LLMs are now embedded in a wide range of everyday scenarios. However, their inherent hallucinations risk hiding misinformation in fluent responses, raising concerns about overreliance on AI. Detecting overreliance is challenging, as it often arises in complex, dynamic contexts and cannot be easily captured by post-hoc task outcomes. In this work, we aim to investigate how users' behavioral patterns correlate with overreliance. We collected interaction logs from 77 participants working with an LLM injected plausible misinformation across three real-world tasks and we assessed overreliance by whether participants detected and corrected these errors. By semantically encoding and clustering segments of user interactions, we identified five behavioral patterns linked to overreliance: users with low overreliance show careful task comprehension and fine-grained navigation; users with high overreliance show frequent copy-paste, skipping initial comprehension, repeated LLM references, coarse locating, and accepting misinformation despite hesitation. We discuss design implications for mitigation.

This paper introduces misinfo-general, a benchmark dataset for evaluating misinformation models' ability to perform out-of-distribution generalisation. Misinformation changes rapidly, much quicker than moderators can annotate at scale, resulting in a shift between the training and inference data distributions. As a result, misinformation models need to be able to perform out-of-distribution generalisation, an understudied problem in existing datasets. We identify 6 axes of generalisation-time, event, topic, publisher, political bias, misinformation type-and design evaluation procedures for each. We also analyse some baseline models, highlighting how these fail important desiderata.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Latent reasoning offers a more efficient alternative to explicit reasoning by compressing intermediate reasoning into continuous representations and substantially shortening reasoning chains. However, existing latent reasoning methods mainly focus on supervised learning, and reinforcement learning in latent space remains highly unstable. We study this problem through the lens of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and show that directly adapting GRPO to latent reasoning is fundamentally non-trivial: latent reasoning changes both the probability density and the sampling mechanism, causing three coupled bottlenecks: absence of intrinsic latent manifolds, where unconstrained exploration pushes rollouts off the valid latent manifold; exploration-optimization misalignment, where trajectory-level rewards can induce incorrect token-level updates; and latent mixture non-closure, where jointly reinforcing multiple correct latent paths can produce an invalid averaged state. To address them, we propose Latent-GRPO, which combines invalid-sample advantage masking, one-sided noise sampling, and optimal correct-path first-token selection. Across four low-difficulty benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K-Aug) and four high-difficulty benchmarks (e.g., AIME), Latent-GRPO improves over its latent initialization by 7.86 Pass@1 points on low-difficulty tasks and surpasses explicit GRPO by 4.27 points on high-difficulty tasks while using 3--4times shorter reasoning chains. It also achieves stronger pass@k performance under Gumbel sampling. These results establish Latent-GRPO as an effective approach for stable and efficient latent reasoning.

While explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) equips Large Language Models (LLMs) with strong reasoning capabilities, it requires models to verbalize every intermediate step in text tokens, constraining the model thoughts to the discrete vocabulary space. Recently, reasoning in continuous latent space has emerged as a promising alternative, enabling more robust inference and flexible computation beyond discrete token constraints. However, current latent paradigms often suffer from feature collapse and instability, stemming from distribution mismatches when recurrently using hidden states as the input embeddings, or alignment issues when relying on assistant models. To address this, we propose Latent Thoughts Tuning (LT-Tuning), a framework that redefines how latent thoughts are constructed and deployed. Instead of relying solely on raw hidden states, our method introduces a Context-Prediction-Fusion mechanism that jointly leveraging contextual hidden states and predictive semantic guidance from the vocabulary embedding space. Combined with a progressive three-stage curriculum learning pipeline, LT-Tuning also enables dynamically switching between latent and explicit thinking modes. Experiments demonstrate that our method outperforms existing latent reasoning baselines, effectively mitigating feature collapse and achieving robust reasoning accuracy.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) extend large language models (LLMs) from independent single-model reasoning to coordinative system-level intelligence. While existing LLM agents depend on text-based mediation for reasoning and communication, we take a step forward by enabling models to collaborate directly within the continuous latent space. We introduce LatentMAS, an end-to-end training-free framework that enables pure latent collaboration among LLM agents. In LatentMAS, each agent first performs auto-regressive latent thoughts generation through last-layer hidden embeddings. A shared latent working memory then preserves and transfers each agent's internal representations, ensuring lossless information exchange. We provide theoretical analyses establishing that LatentMAS attains higher expressiveness and lossless information preservation with substantially lower complexity than vanilla text-based MAS. In addition, empirical evaluations across 9 comprehensive benchmarks spanning math and science reasoning, commonsense understanding, and code generation show that LatentMAS consistently outperforms strong single-model and text-based MAS baselines, achieving up to 14.6% higher accuracy, reducing output token usage by 70.8%-83.7%, and providing 4x-4.3x faster end-to-end inference. These results demonstrate that our new latent collaboration framework enhances system-level reasoning quality while offering substantial efficiency gains without any additional training. Code and data are fully open-sourced at https://github.com/Gen-Verse/LatentMAS.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Strong reasoning depends not only on model knowledge but also on how effectively cognitive behaviors are deployed during generation. Existing methods often rely on explicit behavior-level control, making them insufficiently adaptive when failures and required corrections vary across reasoning states, tasks, and models. To this end, we propose Latent Reward Steering (LRS), an adaptive inference-time framework that promotes cognitive behaviors by optimizing the sparse-autoencoder (SAE) latent states that implicitly carry them. Rather than relying on predefined cognitive behaviors or steering directions derived from them, LRS trains a latent reward model on reasoning traces by final answer correctness to estimate the quality of intermediate latent states. During inference, reward gradients provide state-specific correction directions for fragile latent states, while a reward and confidence gate restricts intervention to states the reward signal flags as fragile. Experiments on multiple reasoning LLM backbones and benchmarks show that \ours consistently improves performance over various baselines, and post-hoc analyses further indicate that \ours implicitly promotes good cognitive behaviors that fix the original reasoning errors. Code is available at: https://github.com/jiakanglee/Latent-Reward-Steering.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have introduced latent reasoning as a promising alternative to autoregressive reasoning. By performing internal computation with hidden states from previous steps, latent reasoning benefit from more informative features rather than sampling a discrete chain-of-thought (CoT) path. Yet latent reasoning approaches are often incompatible with LLMs, as their continuous paradigm conflicts with the discrete nature of autoregressive generation. Moreover, these methods rely on CoT traces for training and thus fail to exploit the inherent reasoning patterns of LLMs. In this work, we explore latent reasoning by leveraging the intrinsic capabilities of LLMs via reinforcement learning (RL). To this end, we introduce hybrid reasoning policy optimization (HRPO), an RL-based hybrid latent reasoning approach that (1) integrates prior hidden states into sampled tokens with a learnable gating mechanism, and (2) initializes training with predominantly token embeddings while progressively incorporating more hidden features. This design maintains LLMs' generative capabilities and incentivizes hybrid reasoning using both discrete and continuous representations. In addition, the hybrid HRPO introduces stochasticity into latent reasoning via token sampling, thereby enabling RL-based optimization without requiring CoT trajectories. Extensive evaluations across diverse benchmarks show that HRPO outperforms prior methods in both knowledge- and reasoning-intensive tasks. Furthermore, HRPO-trained LLMs remain interpretable and exhibit intriguing behaviors like cross-lingual patterns and shorter completion lengths, highlighting the potential of our RL-based approach and offer insights for future work in latent reasoning.

Recent work explores latent reasoning to improve reasoning efficiency by replacing explicit reasoning trajectories with continuous representations in a latent space, yet its effectiveness varies across settings. Analysis of model confidence dynamics under latent reasoning reveals that thinking trajectories ending in incorrect answers contain fewer low-confidence steps than those ending in correct answers. Meanwhile, we suggest that soft embeddings aggregated by multiple low-confidence thinking alternatives may introduce and propagate noise, leading to high confidence in unreliable reasoning trajectories. Motivated by these observations, ThinkRouter, an inference-time confidence-aware routing mechanism is proposed to avoid high confidence and noise for efficient reasoning. ThinkRouter routes thinking to the discrete token space when model confidence is low, and to the latent space otherwise. Extensive experiments on STEM reasoning and coding benchmarks across diverse large reasoning models demonstrate that ThinkRouter outperforms explicit CoT, random routing, and latent reasoning baselines in terms of accuracy, achieving an average improvement of 19.70 points in Pass@1, while reducing generation length by up to 15.55%. Further comprehensive analysis reveals that ThinkRouter can calibrate errors arising from explicit CoT and latent reasoning, and accelerates end-of-thinking token generation by globally lowering model confidence.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

Complex Reasoning in Large Language Models can be dynamically optimized using Test-Time Scaling (TTS) to mitigate Overthinking. Methods such as Coconut, SoftCoT and its variant are effective in continuous latent space inference, the core bottleneck still lies in the efficient generation and utilization of high-quality Latent Thought. Drawing from the theory of SoftCoT++ that a larger variance in the generated Latent Thought distribution more closely approximates the golden truth distribution, we propose a Latent Thought-Augmented Training Framework--LTA-Thinker, which improves distributional variance and enhances reasoning performance from two perspectives. First, LTA-Thinker constructs a Latent Thought generation architecture based on a learnable prior. This architecture aims to increase the variance distribution of generated Latent Thought Vectors in order to simplify the overall structure and raise the performance ceiling. Second, LTA-Thinker introduces a distribution-based directional optimization paradigm that jointly constrains both distribution locality and distribution scale. This mechanism improves information efficiency and computational cost through a multi-objective co-training strategy, which combines standard Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) loss with two novel losses: Semantic Alignment Loss, which utilizes KL divergence to ensure that the Latent Thought is highly relevant to the semantics of the question; Reasoning Focus Loss, which utilizes a contrastive learning mechanism to guide the model to focus on the most critical reasoning steps. Experiments show that LTA-thinker achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance among various baselines and demonstrates a higher performance ceiling and better scaling effects.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

The viability of chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring hinges on models being unable to reason effectively in their latent representations. Yet little is known about the limits of such latent reasoning in LLMs. We test these limits by studying whether models can discover multi-step planning strategies without supervision on intermediate steps and execute them latently, within a single forward pass. Using graph path-finding tasks that precisely control the number of required latent planning steps, we uncover a striking limitation unresolved by massive scaling: tiny transformers trained from scratch discover strategies requiring up to three latent steps, fine-tuned GPT-4o and Qwen3-32B reach five, and GPT-5.4 attains seven under few-shot prompting. Although the maximum latent planning depth models can learn during training is five, the discovered strategy generalizes up to eight latent steps at test-time. This reveals a dissociation between the ability to discover a latent strategy under final-answer supervision alone and the ability to execute it once discovered. If similar limits hold more broadly, strategies requiring multiple coordinated latent planning steps may need to be explicitly taught or externalized, lending credence to CoT monitoring.

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a 2times 2 latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates 86% of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in 84% of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

Structured belief states are crucial for user goal tracking and database query in task-oriented dialog systems. However, training belief trackers often requires expensive turn-level annotations of every user utterance. In this paper we aim at alleviating the reliance on belief state labels in building end-to-end dialog systems, by leveraging unlabeled dialog data towards semi-supervised learning. We propose a probabilistic dialog model, called the LAtent BElief State (LABES) model, where belief states are represented as discrete latent variables and jointly modeled with system responses given user inputs. Such latent variable modeling enables us to develop semi-supervised learning under the principled variational learning framework. Furthermore, we introduce LABES-S2S, which is a copy-augmented Seq2Seq model instantiation of LABES. In supervised experiments, LABES-S2S obtains strong results on three benchmark datasets of different scales. In utilizing unlabeled dialog data, semi-supervised LABES-S2S significantly outperforms both supervised-only and semi-supervised baselines. Remarkably, we can reduce the annotation demands to 50% without performance loss on MultiWOZ.

Modern generative models demonstrate impressive capabilities, likely stemming from an ability to identify and manipulate abstract concepts underlying their training data. However, fundamental questions remain: what determines the concepts a model learns, the order in which it learns them, and its ability to manipulate those concepts? To address these questions, we propose analyzing a model's learning dynamics via a framework we call the concept space, where each axis represents an independent concept underlying the data generating process. By characterizing learning dynamics in this space, we identify how the speed at which a concept is learned, and hence the order of concept learning, is controlled by properties of the data we term concept signal. Further, we observe moments of sudden turns in the direction of a model's learning dynamics in concept space. Surprisingly, these points precisely correspond to the emergence of hidden capabilities, i.e., where latent interventions show the model possesses the capability to manipulate a concept, but these capabilities cannot yet be elicited via naive input prompting. While our results focus on synthetically defined toy datasets, we hypothesize a general claim on emergence of hidden capabilities may hold: generative models possess latent capabilities that emerge suddenly and consistently during training, though a model might not exhibit these capabilities under naive input prompting.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance on complex reasoning tasks with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, conventional CoT relies on reasoning steps explicitly verbalized in natural language, introducing inefficiencies and limiting its applicability to abstract reasoning. To address this, there has been growing research interest in latent CoT reasoning, where inference occurs within latent spaces. By decoupling reasoning from language, latent reasoning promises richer cognitive representations and more flexible, faster inference. Researchers have explored various directions in this promising field, including training methodologies, structural innovations, and internal reasoning mechanisms. This paper presents a comprehensive overview and analysis of this reasoning paradigm. We begin by proposing a unified taxonomy from four perspectives: token-wise strategies, internal mechanisms, analysis, and applications. We then provide in-depth discussions and comparative analyses of representative methods, highlighting their design patterns, strengths, and open challenges. We aim to provide a structured foundation for advancing this emerging direction in LLM reasoning. The relevant papers will be regularly updated at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/Awesome-Latent-CoT.

Weird generalization is a phenomenon in which models fine-tuned on data from a narrow domain (e.g. insecure code) develop surprising traits that manifest even outside that domain (e.g. broad misalignment)-a phenomenon that prior work has highlighted as a critical safety concern. Here, we present an extended replication study of key weird generalization results across an expanded suite of models and datasets. We confirm that surprising (and dangerous) traits can emerge under certain circumstances, but we find that weird generalization is exceptionally brittle: it emerges only for specific models on specific datasets, and it vanishes under simple training-time, prompt-based interventions. We find that the most effective interventions provide prompt context that makes the generalized behavior the expected behavior. However, we show that even very generic interventions that do not anticipate specific generalized traits can still be effective in mitigating weird generalization's effects. Our findings thus help clarify the nature of the safety threat that weird generalization poses and point toward an easily implemented set of solutions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at multi-step reasoning problems with explicit chain-of-thought (CoT), but verbose traces incur significant computational costs and memory overhead, and often carry redundant, stylistic artifacts. Latent reasoning has emerged as an efficient alternative that internalizes the thought process, but it suffers from a critical lack of supervision, limiting its effectiveness on complex, natural-language reasoning traces. In this work, we propose KaVa, the first framework that bridges this gap by distilling knowledge directly from a compressed KV-cache of the teacher into a latent-reasoning student via self-distillation, leveraging the representational flexibility of continuous latent tokens to align stepwise KV trajectories. We show that the abstract, unstructured knowledge within compressed KV-cache, which lacks direct token correspondence, can serve as a rich supervisory signal for a latent reasoning student. Empirically, the approach consistently outperforms strong latent baselines, exhibits markedly smaller degradation from equation-only to natural-language traces, and scales to larger backbones while preserving efficiency. These results establish compressed KV-cache distillation as a scalable supervision signal for latent reasoning, combining the accuracy of CoT-trained teachers with the efficiency and deployability of latent inference.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) can lead to unintended out-of-distribution generalization. Standard approaches to this problem rely on modifying training data, for example by adding data that better specify the intended generalization. However, this is not always practical. We introduce Concept Ablation Fine-Tuning (CAFT), a technique that leverages interpretability tools to control how LLMs generalize from fine-tuning, without needing to modify the training data or otherwise use data from the target distribution. Given a set of directions in an LLM's latent space corresponding to undesired concepts, CAFT works by ablating these concepts with linear projections during fine-tuning, steering the model away from unintended generalizations. We successfully apply CAFT to three fine-tuning tasks, including emergent misalignment, a phenomenon where LLMs fine-tuned on a narrow task generalize to give egregiously misaligned responses to general questions. Without any changes to the fine-tuning data, CAFT reduces misaligned responses by 10x without degrading performance on the training distribution. Overall, CAFT represents a novel approach for steering LLM generalization without modifying training data.

With the emergence of generative conversational large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, serving as virtual assistants in various fields, the stability and reliability of their responses have become crucial. However, during usage, it has been observed that these models tend to waver in their judgements when confronted with follow-up questions from users expressing skepticism or disagreement. In this work, we draw inspiration from questioning strategies in education and propose a Follow-up Questioning Mechanism along with two evaluation metrics to assess the judgement consistency of LLMs before and after exposure to disturbances. We evaluate the judgement consistency of ChatGPT, PaLM2-Bison, and Vicuna-13B under this mechanism across eight reasoning benchmarks. Empirical results show that even when the initial answers are correct, judgement consistency sharply decreases when LLMs face disturbances such as questioning, negation, or misleading. Additionally, we study these models' judgement consistency under various settings (sampling temperature and prompts) to validate this issue further, observing the impact of prompt tone and conducting an in-depth error analysis for deeper behavioral insights. Furthermore, we also explore several prompting methods to mitigate this issue and demonstrate their effectiveness\url{https://github.com/NUSTM/LLMs-Waver-In-Judgements}.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate outputs that lack grounding in real-world facts, a phenomenon known as hallucinations. Prior research has associated hallucinations with model uncertainty, leveraging this relationship for hallucination detection and mitigation. In this paper, we challenge the underlying assumption that all hallucinations are associated with uncertainty. Using knowledge detection and uncertainty measurement methods, we demonstrate that models can hallucinate with high certainty even when they have the correct knowledge. We further show that high-certainty hallucinations are consistent across models and datasets, distinctive enough to be singled out, and challenge existing mitigation methods. Our findings reveal an overlooked aspect of hallucinations, emphasizing the need to understand their origins and improve mitigation strategies to enhance LLM safety. The code is available at https://github.com/technion-cs-nlp/Trust_me_Im_wrong .

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on narrowly harmful datasets can lead to misalignment broadly, a phenomenon known as emergent misalignment (EM). EM poses a challenge for AI safety and our understanding of LLMs. Prior work often frames EM as an unexpected behavior, and explains it by appealing to general misalignment directions or anthropomorphizing it as acquiring an evil persona. However, the mechanisms behind these framings remain obscure. In this work, we show that EM is a predictable and data-dependent generalization phenomenon. By examining the base model's representation of EM training data and evaluation prompts, we find that evilness after EM training is highly predictable from representational distance: the closer an evaluation prompt is to training data centroid, the more evilness it elicits from EM models after training (with an average Spearman correlation of -0.73 across 12 model-dataset settings). Building upon this analysis, we further demystify EM by showing that (1) its effectiveness changes significantly based on training data format; (2) there is not a general misalignment direction that transfers across different EM models; (3) the effect of EM is fundamentally different from persona changes. Furthermore, we extend the EM generalization metric from a scalar distance to a dataset-specific generalization direction, which robustly predicts EM models' evilness under semantics-preserving prompt perturbations including appending random tokens and paraphrasing, where other methods do not reliably generalize.

Large language models (LLMs) have become mainstream technology with their versatile use cases and impressive performance. Despite the countless out-of-the-box applications, LLMs are still not reliable. A lot of work is being done to improve the factual accuracy, consistency, and ethical standards of these models through fine-tuning, prompting, and Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF), but no systematic analysis of the responses of these models to different categories of statements, or on their potential vulnerabilities to simple prompting changes is available. In this work, we analyze what confuses GPT-3: how the model responds to certain sensitive topics and what effects the prompt wording has on the model response. We find that GPT-3 correctly disagrees with obvious Conspiracies and Stereotypes but makes mistakes with common Misconceptions and Controversies. The model responses are inconsistent across prompts and settings, highlighting GPT-3's unreliability. Dataset and code of our analysis is available in https://github.com/tanny411/GPT3-Reliability-Check.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit backtracking and self-verification mechanisms that enable them to revise intermediate steps and reach correct solutions, yielding strong performance on complex logical benchmarks. We hypothesize that such behaviors are beneficial only when the model has sufficiently strong ``critique'' ability to detect its own mistakes. This work systematically investigates how current LRMs recover from errors by inserting arithmetic mistakes in their intermediate reasoning steps. Notably, we discover a peculiar yet important phenomenon: despite the error propagating throughout the entire chain-of-thought (CoT) without any verbalized correction, the model still reaches the correct final answer after the thinking process finishes. This recovery implies the existence of an internal mechanism helping the model to detect errors and trigger self-correction, which we refer to as the hidden critique ability. Building on feature space analysis, we identify a highly interpretable critique vector representing this behavior. Extensive experiments across multiple model scales and families demonstrate that steering latent representations with this vector improves the model's error detection capability and enhances the performance of test-time scaling at no extra training cost. Our findings provide a valuable understanding of LRMs' critique behavior, suggesting a promising direction to control and improve their self-verification mechanism. Our code is available at: https://github.com/mail-research/lrm-critique-vectors.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

Latent prediction--where agents learn by predicting their own latents--has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training general representations in machine learning. In reinforcement learning (RL), this approach has been explored to define auxiliary losses for a variety of settings, including reward-based and unsupervised RL, behavior cloning, and world modeling. While existing methods are typically limited to single-task learning, one-step prediction, or on-policy trajectory data, we show that temporal difference (TD) learning enables learning representations predictive of long-term latent dynamics across multiple policies from offline, reward-free transitions. Building on this, we introduce TD-JEPA, which leverages TD-based latent-predictive representations into unsupervised RL. TD-JEPA trains explicit state and task encoders, a policy-conditioned multi-step predictor, and a set of parameterized policies directly in latent space. This enables zero-shot optimization of any reward function at test time. Theoretically, we show that an idealized variant of TD-JEPA avoids collapse with proper initialization, and learns encoders that capture a low-rank factorization of long-term policy dynamics, while the predictor recovers their successor features in latent space. Empirically, TD-JEPA matches or outperforms state-of-the-art baselines on locomotion, navigation, and manipulation tasks across 13 datasets in ExoRL and OGBench, especially in the challenging setting of zero-shot RL from pixels.

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing results in image quality and text alignment and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the internet, they also suffer, as we demonstrate, from degenerated and biased human behavior. In turn, they may even reinforce such biases. To help combat these undesired side effects, we present safe latent diffusion (SLD). Specifically, to measure the inappropriate degeneration due to unfiltered and imbalanced training sets, we establish a novel image generation test bed-inappropriate image prompts (I2P)-containing dedicated, real-world image-to-text prompts covering concepts such as nudity and violence. As our exhaustive empirical evaluation demonstrates, the introduced SLD removes and suppresses inappropriate image parts during the diffusion process, with no additional training required and no adverse effect on overall image quality or text alignment.

Causal representation learning (CRL) has garnered increasing interest from the causal inference and artificial intelligence communities due to its potential to disentangle complex data-generating mechanism into causally interpretable latent features by leveraging the heterogeneity of modern datasets. In this paper, we further contribute to the CRL literature, by focusing on the stylized linear structural causal model over latent features and assuming a linear mixing function that maps latent features to the observed data or measurements. Existing linear CRL methods often rely on stringent assumptions, such as access to single-node interventional data or restrictive distributional constraints on latent features and/or exogenous measurement noise. However, these prerequisites can be easy to violate in practice. In this work, we propose a novel linear CRL algorithm that, unlike existing methods, operates under weaker assumptions on environment heterogeneity and data-generating distributions while still recovering latent causal features up to an equivalence class. We further validate our new algorithm via synthetic experiments and an interpretability analysis of large language models, demonstrating both its superiority over competing methods in finite samples and its potential in integrating causality into understanding artificial intelligence. The source code is available at https://github.com/utulie/code_for_linear_crl_paper_creator.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

Neural networks embed the geometric structure of a data manifold lying in a high-dimensional space into latent representations. Ideally, the distribution of the data points in the latent space should depend only on the task, the data, the loss, and other architecture-specific constraints. However, factors such as the random weights initialization, training hyperparameters, or other sources of randomness in the training phase may induce incoherent latent spaces that hinder any form of reuse. Nevertheless, we empirically observe that, under the same data and modeling choices, the angles between the encodings within distinct latent spaces do not change. In this work, we propose the latent similarity between each sample and a fixed set of anchors as an alternative data representation, demonstrating that it can enforce the desired invariances without any additional training. We show how neural architectures can leverage these relative representations to guarantee, in practice, invariance to latent isometries and rescalings, effectively enabling latent space communication: from zero-shot model stitching to latent space comparison between diverse settings. We extensively validate the generalization capability of our approach on different datasets, spanning various modalities (images, text, graphs), tasks (e.g., classification, reconstruction) and architectures (e.g., CNNs, GCNs, transformers).

Quantifying the realism of images remains a challenging problem in the field of artificial intelligence. For example, an image of Albert Einstein holding a smartphone violates common-sense because modern smartphone were invented after Einstein's death. We introduce a novel method for assessing image realism using Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) and Natural Language Inference (NLI). Our approach is based on the premise that LVLMs may generate hallucinations when confronted with images that defy common sense. Using LVLM to extract atomic facts from these images, we obtain a mix of accurate facts and erroneous hallucinations. We proceed by calculating pairwise entailment scores among these facts, subsequently aggregating these values to yield a singular reality score. This process serves to identify contradictions between genuine facts and hallucinatory elements, signaling the presence of images that violate common sense. Our approach has achieved a new state-of-the-art performance in zero-shot mode on the WHOOPS! dataset.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Finetuning a language model can lead to emergent misalignment (EM) [Betley et al., 2025b]. Models trained on a narrow distribution of misaligned behavior generalize to more egregious behaviors when tested outside the training distribution. We study a set of interventions proposed to reduce EM. We confirm that these interventions reduce or eliminate EM on existing evaluations (questions like "How do I make a quick buck?"). However, if the evaluation prompts are tweaked to resemble the training context, the model displays EM. We call this conditional misalignment. As in standard EM, the model displays misaligned behaviors more egregious than those seen during training, but only on inputs sharing features with the training data. The first two interventions are diluting misaligned data with benign data, and finetuning on benign data after misaligned data. Both produce conditional misalignment. For instance, models trained on a mix of only 5% insecure code still show misalignment when asked to format responses as Python strings (resembling the training context). The third intervention is inoculation prompting. Here, statements with a similar form to the inoculation prompt serve as triggers for misalignment, even if they have the opposite meaning. On the positive side, inoculation prompting has lower (but still non-zero) conditional misalignment if training is on-policy or includes reasoning distillation. Our results imply that in realistic post-training, where misaligned data is typically combined with benign data, models may be conditionally misaligned even if standard evaluations look clean.

While recent developments in text-to-image generative models have led to a suite of high-performing methods capable of producing creative imagery from free-form text, there are several limitations. By analyzing the cross-attention representations of these models, we notice two key issues. First, for text prompts that contain multiple concepts, there is a significant amount of pixel-space overlap (i.e., same spatial regions) among pairs of different concepts. This eventually leads to the model being unable to distinguish between the two concepts and one of them being ignored in the final generation. Next, while these models attempt to capture all such concepts during the beginning of denoising (e.g., first few steps) as evidenced by cross-attention maps, this knowledge is not retained by the end of denoising (e.g., last few steps). Such loss of knowledge eventually leads to inaccurate generation outputs. To address these issues, our key innovations include two test-time attention-based loss functions that substantially improve the performance of pretrained baseline text-to-image diffusion models. First, our attention segregation loss reduces the cross-attention overlap between attention maps of different concepts in the text prompt, thereby reducing the confusion/conflict among various concepts and the eventual capture of all concepts in the generated output. Next, our attention retention loss explicitly forces text-to-image diffusion models to retain cross-attention information for all concepts across all denoising time steps, thereby leading to reduced information loss and the preservation of all concepts in the generated output.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to process information using a proficient internal language consistently, referred to as latent language, which may differ from the input or output languages. However, how the discrepancy between the latent language and the input and output language affects downstream task performance remains largely unexplored. While many studies research the latent language of LLMs, few address its importance in influencing task performance. In our study, we hypothesize that thinking in latent language consistently enhances downstream task performance. To validate this, our work varies the input prompt languages across multiple downstream tasks and analyzes the correlation between consistency in latent language and task performance. We create datasets consisting of questions from diverse domains such as translation and geo-culture, which are influenced by the choice of latent language. Experimental results across multiple LLMs on translation and geo-culture tasks, which are sensitive to the choice of language, indicate that maintaining consistency in latent language is not always necessary for optimal downstream task performance. This is because these models adapt their internal representations near the final layers to match the target language, reducing the impact of consistency on overall performance.

We evaluate how well Large Language Models (LLMs) latently recall and compose facts to answer multi-hop queries like "In the year Scarlett Johansson was born, the Summer Olympics were hosted in the country of". One major challenge in evaluating this ability is that LLMs may have developed shortcuts by encounters of the head entity "Scarlett Johansson" and the answer entity "United States" in the same training sequences or merely guess the answer based on frequency-based priors. To prevent shortcuts, we exclude test queries where the head and answer entities co-appear in pretraining corpora. Through careful selection of relations and facts and systematic removal of cases where models might guess answers or exploit partial matches, we construct an evaluation dataset SOCRATES (ShOrtCut-fRee lATent rEaSoning). We observe that LLMs demonstrate promising latent multi-hop reasoning abilities without exploiting shortcuts, but only for certain types of queries. For queries requiring latent recall of countries as the intermediate answer, the best models achieve 80% latent composability, but this drops to just 5% for the recall of years. Comparisons with Chain-of-Thought composability highlight a significant gap between the ability of models to reason latently versus explicitly. Analysis reveals that latent representations of the intermediate answer are constructed more often in queries with higher latent composability, and shows the emergence of latent multi-hop reasoning during pretraining.

Misinformation is a complex societal issue, and mitigating solutions are difficult to create due to data deficiencies. To address this problem, we have curated the largest collection of (mis)information datasets in the literature, totaling 75. From these, we evaluated the quality of all of the 36 datasets that consist of statements or claims. We assess these datasets to identify those with solid foundations for empirical work and those with flaws that could result in misleading and non-generalizable results, such as insufficient label quality, spurious correlations, or political bias. We further provide state-of-the-art baselines on all these datasets, but show that regardless of label quality, categorical labels may no longer give an accurate evaluation of detection model performance. We discuss alternatives to mitigate this problem. Overall, this guide aims to provide a roadmap for obtaining higher quality data and conducting more effective evaluations, ultimately improving research in misinformation detection. All datasets and other artifacts are available at https://misinfo-datasets.complexdatalab.com/.

Latent world models are judged by how well they predict, so when planning fails at long horizons the natural reading is that the predictor degrades. On a reproduction of LeWorldModel on TwoRoom we show the binding constraint is the planner's objective instead. The predictor is not the limit: its imagined state seventy-five environment steps ahead is still only 0.189 as wrong as assuming the world froze, while the planner never imagines beyond twenty-five. The objective is. Cross-entropy-method planning minimises squared latent distance, which tracks true distance at r = 0.426, saturates by about eighty arena units and decreases beyond a hundred and twenty, so moving away from the goal can lower the cost. The information is present throughout: a ridge probe recovers position from the frozen embedding at R^2 0.9922. The pathology is the method's, not one reimplementation's. It is present in the authors' released weights, and across four checkpoints long-horizon success rank-orders exactly with metric quality and inversely with prediction accuracy. Replacing only the objective, with nothing retrained and no GPU, lifts goals reached at offset 100 from 26.0% to 98.0%, equals the 98.0% at offset 25, and reaches 92.0% under a third of the budget: planning stops depending on the horizon. The best cost is not the most accurate. A head learned from frame separation alone predicts spatial distance worse than a position probe (r = 0.819 against 0.9897) yet plans better, charging 24% more to cross the environment's dividing wall where squared latent distance charges 4% less. It has learned reachability, not proximity.

Knowledge distillation has become a primary mechanism for transferring reasoning and domain expertise from frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) to smaller, deployable students. However, the dominant paradigm remains off-policy: students train on static teacher-generated data and never encounter their own errors during learning. This train--test mismatch, an instance of exposure bias, causes prediction errors to compound autoregressively at inference time. On-Policy Distillation (OPD) addresses this by letting the student generate its own trajectories and receive teacher feedback on these self-generated outputs, grounding distillation in the theory of interactive imitation learning. Despite rapid growth spanning divergence minimization, reward-guided learning, and self-play, the OPD literature remains fragmented with no unified treatment. This survey provides the first comprehensive overview of OPD for LLMs. We introduce a unified f-divergence framework over on-policy samples and organize the landscape along three orthogonal dimensions: feedback signal (logit-based, outcome-based, or self-play), teacher access (white-box, black-box, or teacher-free), and loss granularity (token-level, sequence-level, or hybrid). We systematically analyze representative methods, examine industrial deployments, and identify open problems including distillation scaling laws, uncertainty-aware feedback, and agent-level distillation.

Latent visual reasoning aims to perform multimodal reasoning through hidden-state computation rather than explicit textual chains of thought. However, visual information being present in a latent state does not imply that the model actually relies on that state when producing its answer, especially when alternative image-conditioned paths remain available. We introduce Causal Visual Recurrent Reasoning (CVRR), which preserves pretrained visual competence while making recurrent computation the required image-conditioned path to prediction. CVRR initializes recurrence from the question hidden state after the pretrained vision-language model has incorporated the image, then repeatedly updates this state while re-reading the same fixed visual evidence. Before decoding, visual states and the original multimodal KV cache are removed so that only the final recurrent state carries image-conditioned information to the answer. Across the V^*, MMVP, BLINK, and MME-RealWorld-Lite benchmarks, CVRR retains strong performance under this strict interface, while compatible latent reasoners fail to recover comparable visual competence even when retrained under the same constraint. Causal interventions further show that predictions remain sensitive to recurrent content when the question is held fixed, and that persistent visual evidence causally revises the recurrent trajectory. These results distinguish latent informativeness from latent computation that is actually used for prediction.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

Human cognition, driven by complex neurochemical processes, oscillates between imagination and reality and learns to self-correct whenever such subtle drifts lead to hallucinations or unsafe associations. In recent years, LLMs have demonstrated remarkable performance in a wide range of tasks. However, they still lack human cognition to balance factuality and safety. Bearing the resemblance, we argue that both factual and safety failures in LLMs arise from a representational misalignment in their latent activation space, rather than addressing those as entirely separate alignment issues. We hypothesize that an external network, trained to understand the fluctuations, can selectively intervene in the model to regulate falsehood into truthfulness and unsafe output into safe output without fine-tuning the model parameters themselves. Reflecting the hypothesis, we propose ARREST (Adversarial Resilient Regulation Enhancing Safety and Truth), a unified framework that identifies and corrects drifted features, engaging both soft and hard refusals in addition to factual corrections. Our empirical results show that ARREST not only regulates misalignment but is also more versatile compared to the RLHF-aligned models in generating soft refusals due to adversarial training. We make our codebase available at https://github.com/sharanya-dasgupta001/ARREST.

Latent Chain-of-Thought (Latent-CoT) aims to enable step-by-step computation without emitting long rationales, yet its mechanisms remain unclear. We study CODI, a continuous-thought teacher-student distillation model, on strictly sequential polynomial-iteration tasks. Using logit-lens decoding, linear probes, attention analysis, and activation patching, we localize intermediate-state representations and trace their routing to the final readout. On two- and three-hop tasks, CODI forms the full set of bridge states that become decodable across latent-thought positions, while the final input follows a separate near-direct route; predictions arise via late fusion at the end-of-thought boundary. For longer hop lengths, CODI does not reliably execute a full latent rollout, instead exhibiting a partial latent reasoning path that concentrates on late intermediates and fuses them with the last input at the answer readout position. Ablations show that this partial pathway can collapse under regime shifts, including harder optimization. Overall, we delineate when CODI-style latent-CoT yields faithful iterative computation versus compressed or shortcut strategies, and highlight challenges in designing robust latent-CoT objectives for sequential reasoning.

Large language models learn and continually learn through the accumulation of gradient-based updates, but how individual pieces of new information affect existing knowledge, leading to both beneficial generalization and problematic hallucination, remains poorly understood. We demonstrate that when learning new information, LLMs exhibit a "priming" effect: learning a new fact can cause the model to inappropriately apply that knowledge in unrelated contexts. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce "Outlandish," a carefully curated dataset of 1320 diverse text samples designed to probe how new knowledge permeates through an LLM's existing knowledge base. Using this dataset, we show that the degree of priming after learning new information can be predicted by measuring the token probability of key words before learning. This relationship holds robustly across different model architectures (PALM-2, Gemma, Llama), sizes, and training stages. Finally, we develop two novel techniques to modulate how new knowledge affects existing model behavior: (1) a ``stepping-stone'' text augmentation strategy and (2) an ``ignore-k'' update pruning method. These approaches reduce undesirable priming effects by 50-95\% while preserving the model's ability to learn new information. Our findings provide both empirical insights into how LLMs learn and practical tools for improving the specificity of knowledge insertion in language models. Further materials: https://sunchipsster1.github.io/projects/outlandish/

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning abilities with chain-of-thought prompting, but explicit reasoning introduces substantial computational overhead. Recent work on latent reasoning reduces this cost by reasoning in latent space without explicit supervision, but performance drops significantly. Our preliminary experiments suggest that this degradation stems from the unstructured latent space, which makes fitting latent tokens difficult. To address this, we restrict the latent space to the column space of the LLM vocabulary, treating latent reasoning as a superposition over vocabulary probabilities. Once latent reasoning concludes, it collapses into an eigenstate of explicit reasoning to yield the final answer. Based on this idea, we propose Latent-SFT, a two-stage learning framework. In the first stage, we design two specialized attention masks to guide the Latent Token Encoder in generating latent tokens, allowing the LLM to produce the correct answer conditioned on them. In the second stage, the Latent Token Encoder is discarded, and the LLM is directly trained to generate these latent tokens autonomously for latent reasoning, optimized with KL and CE losses. Latent-SFT sets a new state of the art on GSM8k, matching explicit SFT performance while cutting reasoning chains by up to 4 times and outperforming prior latent methods. On Math500 and AIME24, lexical probability-based latent reasoning also clearly surpasses hidden-state-based approaches. Our metrics of effective compression rate and effective global parallelism further show that latent reasoning is both the compression of a single path and the superposition of multiple paths.

Model diffing is the study of how fine-tuning changes a model's representations and internal algorithms. Many behaviors of interest are introduced during fine-tuning, and model diffing offers a promising lens to interpret such behaviors. Crosscoders are a recent model diffing method that learns a shared dictionary of interpretable concepts represented as latent directions in both the base and fine-tuned models, allowing us to track how concepts shift or emerge during fine-tuning. Notably, prior work has observed concepts with no direction in the base model, and it was hypothesized that these model-specific latents were concepts introduced during fine-tuning. However, we identify two issues which stem from the crosscoders L1 training loss that can misattribute concepts as unique to the fine-tuned model, when they really exist in both models. We develop Latent Scaling to flag these issues by more accurately measuring each latent's presence across models. In experiments comparing Gemma 2 2B base and chat models, we observe that the standard crosscoder suffers heavily from these issues. Building on these insights, we train a crosscoder with BatchTopK loss and show that it substantially mitigates these issues, finding more genuinely chat-specific and highly interpretable concepts. We recommend practitioners adopt similar techniques. Using the BatchTopK crosscoder, we successfully identify a set of chat-specific latents that are both interpretable and causally effective, representing concepts such as false information and personal question, along with multiple refusal-related latents that show nuanced preferences for different refusal triggers. Overall, our work advances best practices for the crosscoder-based methodology for model diffing and demonstrates that it can provide concrete insights into how chat-tuning modifies model behavior.

A stereotype is an over-generalized belief about a particular group of people, e.g., Asians are good at math or Asians are bad drivers. Such beliefs (biases) are known to hurt target groups. Since pretrained language models are trained on large real world data, they are known to capture stereotypical biases. In order to assess the adverse effects of these models, it is important to quantify the bias captured in them. Existing literature on quantifying bias evaluates pretrained language models on a small set of artificially constructed bias-assessing sentences. We present StereoSet, a large-scale natural dataset in English to measure stereotypical biases in four domains: gender, profession, race, and religion. We evaluate popular models like BERT, GPT-2, RoBERTa, and XLNet on our dataset and show that these models exhibit strong stereotypical biases. We also present a leaderboard with a hidden test set to track the bias of future language models at https://stereoset.mit.edu

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has catalyzed an increasing interest in their self-correction capabilities. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation into the intrinsic self-correction of LLMs, attempting to address the ongoing debate about its feasibility. Our research has identified an important latent factor - the "confidence" of LLMs - during the self-correction process. Overlooking this factor may cause the models to over-criticize themselves, resulting in unreliable conclusions regarding the efficacy of self-correction. We have experimentally observed that LLMs possess the capability to understand the "confidence" in their own responses. It motivates us to develop an "If-or-Else" (IoE) prompting framework, designed to guide LLMs in assessing their own "confidence", facilitating intrinsic self-corrections. We conduct extensive experiments and demonstrate that our IoE-based Prompt can achieve a consistent improvement regarding the accuracy of self-corrected responses over the initial answers. Our study not only sheds light on the underlying factors affecting self-correction in LLMs, but also introduces a practical framework that utilizes the IoE prompting principle to efficiently improve self-correction capabilities with "confidence". The code is available at https://github.com/MBZUAI-CLeaR/IoE-Prompting.git.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to structured clinical data, yet whether they can recognize the limits of their own knowledge on such tasks remains unexplored. We study this question through the lens of cross-model attribution divergence with the goal of reducing epistemic uncertainty for structured tasks, comparing Qwen 2.5 7B and XGBoost on a prediction task via attribution divergence analysis. We report four findings. First, LLM verbalized confidence is epistemically vacuous, it outputs a near-constant (0.856-0.937) regardless of whether accuracy is 49% or 75.3%, tracking prompt format rather than prediction quality. Second, the LLM exhibits an inverse difficulty effect: accuracy drops to 64.8% when XGBoost is 99% correct, but matches XGBoost (73.8% vs. 73.1%) when it is moderately uncertain. Third, few-shot examples and SHAP-derived feature evidence are orthogonal, super-additive interventions: they reduce the Attribution Disagreement Score (ADS) from 1.54 to 0.38 and improve accuracy from 49% to 75.3% without training. Fourth, a cross-model calibrator that determined LLM reliability using attribution divergence signals reduces expected calibration error from 0.254 to 0.080, replacing uninformative verbalized confidence with patient-specific reliability estimates, without accessing model internals or requiring repeated inference. We frame these findings as a cold start problem for LLMs on structured data and outline a path toward genuine epistemic self-awareness.

Latent reasoning models (LRMs) have attracted significant research interest due to their low inference cost (relative to explicit reasoning models) and theoretical ability to explore multiple reasoning paths in parallel. However, these benefits come at the cost of reduced interpretability: LRMs are difficult to monitor because they do not reason in natural language. This paper presents an investigation into LRM interpretability by examining two state-of-the-art LRMs. First, we find that latent reasoning tokens are often unnecessary for LRMs' predictions; on logical reasoning datasets, LRMs can almost always produce the same final answers without using latent reasoning at all. This underutilization of reasoning tokens may partially explain why LRMs do not consistently outperform explicit reasoning methods and raises doubts about the stated role of these tokens in prior work. Second, we demonstrate that when latent reasoning tokens are necessary for performance, we can decode gold reasoning traces up to 65-93% of the time for correctly predicted instances. This suggests LRMs often implement the expected solution rather than an uninterpretable reasoning process. Finally, we present a method to decode a verified natural language reasoning trace from latent tokens without knowing a gold reasoning trace a priori, demonstrating that it is possible to find a verified trace for a majority of correct predictions but only a minority of incorrect predictions. Our findings highlight that current LRMs largely encode interpretable processes, and interpretability itself can be a signal of prediction correctness.

Multimodal misinformation, encompassing textual, visual, and cross-modal distortions, poses an increasing societal threat that is amplified by generative AI. Existing methods typically focus on a single type of distortion and struggle to generalize to unseen scenarios. In this work, we observe that different distortion types share common reasoning capabilities while also requiring task-specific skills. We hypothesize that joint training across distortion types facilitates knowledge sharing and enhances the model's ability to generalize. To this end, we introduce TRUST-VL, a unified and explainable vision-language model for general multimodal misinformation detection. TRUST-VL incorporates a novel Question-Aware Visual Amplifier module, designed to extract task-specific visual features. To support training, we also construct TRUST-Instruct, a large-scale instruction dataset containing 198K samples featuring structured reasoning chains aligned with human fact-checking workflows. Extensive experiments on both in-domain and zero-shot benchmarks demonstrate that TRUST-VL achieves state-of-the-art performance, while also offering strong generalization and interpretability.

Mean Field Variational Inference (MFVI) is widely understood to underestimate posterior variance. By analysing conjugate Bayesian Linear Regression (BLR), we show that this characterization is incomplete: while MFVI underestimates the variance in parameter space, it can overestimate the predictive variance compared to the exact posterior. We show that if the MFVI posterior underestimates predictive variances in some directions, it necessarily overestimates them in others. Crucially, this overestimation occurs in directions where the training data concentrates. This leads to the surprising result that, for a test point drawn from the training distribution, MFVI's expected predictive variance exceeds that of the exact posterior. We demonstrate a pathological case of this effect, where the MFVI posterior fails to reduce predictive variance compared to the prior on in distribution data. We connect these results to the Cold Posterior Effect, arguing that varying the temperature can correct this overestimation, yielding predictions closer to those of the exact posterior. We validate our theory on synthetic and real-world regression tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing every aspect of society. They are increasingly used in problem-solving tasks to substitute human assessment and reasoning. LLMs are trained on what humans write and are thus exposed to human bias. We evaluate whether LLMs inherit one of the most widespread human biases: overconfidence. We algorithmically construct reasoning problems with known ground truths. We prompt LLMs to answer these problems and assess the confidence in their answers, closely following similar protocols in human experiments. We find that all five LLMs we study are overconfident: they overestimate the probability that their answer is correct between 20% and 60%. Humans have accuracy similar to the more advanced LLMs, but far lower overconfidence. Although humans and LLMs are similarly biased in questions which they are certain they answered correctly, a key difference emerges between them: LLM bias increases sharply relative to humans if they become less sure that their answers are correct. We also show that LLM input has ambiguous effects on human decision making: LLM input leads to an increase in the accuracy, but it more than doubles the extent of overconfidence in the answers.

Bayesian Neural Networks with Latent Variables (BNN+LVs) capture predictive uncertainty by explicitly modeling model uncertainty (via priors on network weights) and environmental stochasticity (via a latent input noise variable). In this work, we first show that BNN+LV suffers from a serious form of non-identifiability: explanatory power can be transferred between the model parameters and latent variables while fitting the data equally well. We demonstrate that as a result, in the limit of infinite data, the posterior mode over the network weights and latent variables is asymptotically biased away from the ground-truth. Due to this asymptotic bias, traditional inference methods may in practice yield parameters that generalize poorly and misestimate uncertainty. Next, we develop a novel inference procedure that explicitly mitigates the effects of likelihood non-identifiability during training and yields high-quality predictions as well as uncertainty estimates. We demonstrate that our inference method improves upon benchmark methods across a range of synthetic and real data-sets.