Daily Papers

Stateful tool-using LLM agents treat the context window as working memory, yet today's agent harnesses manage residency and durability as best-effort, causing recurring failures: lost state after compaction, bypassed flushes on reset, and destructive writeback. We present ClawVM, a virtual memory layer that manages state as typed pages with minimum-fidelity invariants, multi-resolution representations under a token budget, and validated writeback at every lifecycle boundary. Because the harness already assembles prompts, mediates tools, and observes lifecycle events, it is the natural enforcement point; placing the contract there makes residency and durability deterministic and auditable. Across synthetic workloads, 12 real-session traces, and adversarial stress tests, ClawVM eliminates all policy-controllable faults whenever the minimum-fidelity set fits within the token budget, confirmed by an offline oracle, and adds median <50 microseconds of policy-engine overhead per turn.

Agent Skills have become persistent behavioral artifacts across independent AI agent systems. They combine natural-language task specifications with metadata and optional references, scripts, assets, hooks, package manifests, tests, and companion interfaces. Existing studies explain how Skills are specified, executed, maintained, and evolved, but lack an ontology that defines these artifacts as independent software objects. This paper introduces Skillware as the software abstraction that extends software engineering to persistent Behavioral Artifacts in agent systems. A Skill Artifact specifies reusable task behavior; a Skillware Unit manages that artifact as software through an independent identity and lifecycle. A compatible Agent Host activates the unit for runtime interpretation. Three necessary conditions operationalize category membership: behavioral primacy, independent software identity, and an Agent Host execution relationship. Lifecycle Continuity records whether the same unit identity persists through update, maintenance, rollback, and removal as a separate software-grade property. Evidence combines the Agent Skills specification, a frozen corpus of 138,133 content-deduplicated SKILL.md records associated with 20,556 repository identifiers, independent empirical studies, 15 category-boundary cases, and 13 fixed-revision engineering implementations. The evidence establishes a recurring artifact envelope, separable software identities, compatible execution paths, and lifecycle engineering pressure. Skillware provides the software ontology and engineering lifecycle through which agent capabilities can become identifiable, composable, maintainable, and evolvable software artifacts.

Modern AI agents routinely cross trust boundaries: they ingest untrusted content, combine it with privileged instructions, persist intermediate beliefs in long-term memory, and invoke privileged tools. This creates an attack surface in which malicious payloads can enter through model inputs and cause harmful tool actions. Yet current governance stacks remain application-level middleware that share a process trust boundary with the agents they monitor. We argue that agents need an operating-system substrate providing mandatory, non-bypassable services for identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control. We introduce AgentKernel, a trust-native agent operating system built around the premise that security must be a first-class design constraint. AgentKernel wraps the agent lifecycle in a mandatory enforcement boundary organized into four pillars: Identity, Perception, Cognition, and Execution. Each pillar adapts classical OS security principles to failures at the semantic plane, including delegation abuse, prompt injection, memory poisoning, and tool misuse. AgentKernel treats structural security as a capability multiplier. Kernel-managed identity supports trustworthy cross-organization collaboration; graduated perception replaces brittle single-point filters; information-flow-controlled memory improves retrieval fidelity while limiting poisoning; and semantic-to-kernel enforcement permits broader tool privileges behind a non-bypassable boundary. We position AgentKernel as the missing OS layer beneath orchestration frameworks, agent runtimes, governance platforms, and execution sandboxes, and use systematic comparison and security analysis to show how a single integrated architecture can enforce security across the full agent lifecycle.

LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result. We study the commit boundary at which earlier authority evidence no longer authorizes a durable effect. We call this property commit-time authorization: a durable effect is authorized only if the witness that licensed its derived state remains fresh, causally prior, bound to the same effect, and eligible at commit time. We build a controlled-invalidation suite spanning browser, tool/API, and multi-agent workflows. The suite preserves the user goal and payload shape while invalidating the authority relation before durability. In the primary 54-task matrix, endpoint success remains high: 262/270 runs reach the visible result. Only 55/270 are authorized completions; among the 216 invalidating rows, 207 commit after the authorizing path has failed. All 54 clean controls remain authorized, and a separate 54-run authority-preserving check produces no unauthorized commits. We then evaluate mitigation families. Prompt caution and single-condition checks are insufficient because different hazards break different boundary conditions. Defenses work when they refresh, rebind, replan, or refuse at the durability boundary. CommitGuard, a fail-closed boundary monitor, blocks stale durable-effect attempts on protected commit surfaces when runtimes emit witness, dependency, binding, and eligibility signals. The result is a reporting and runtime-design lesson: endpoint success is a utility metric; authorized commit is a security property.

Agent Skills package reusable instructions and assets for tool-using language-model agents. Progressive loading creates failure boundaries poorly represented by session-, model-, or tool-centric traces: a Skill can be discovered but not activated, activated without instructions, or appear successful without an independently verified outcome. We present Skill Runtime Intelligence, a passive runtime-intelligence system that reconstructs supported Skill-lifecycle stages across heterogeneous harnesses while preserving unsupported stages as unknown. Its Run Panorama separates immutable events, deterministic relations, inferred diagnoses, and controlled outcomes with four evidence grades; optional trace import and OTLP/HTTP export support existing observability deployments. Across six frozen repository profiles, three coding agents, and seven clean or fault-injected conditions, all 126 executions preserve source worktrees and each correlates to exactly one source session. Yet adapters expose three distinct semantics: no Skill runs; complete runs but no failure-like events; or failure-like events in every operational-failure and clean session. In a seven-template diagnostic study, semantic aliases and Panorama localize the same six non-clean boundaries but differ in exact/status behavior; both Raw views emit a failure status on all 18 clean cases, while Panorama emits none. A known-rule graph conforms to 126/126 frozen contracts, whereas a second model completes only 228/378 calls. These observations motivate executable adapter qualification and show that event presence is not boundary fidelity, composite exact scores mask distinct errors, and model explanations must not overwrite deterministic facts.

The boundary representation (B-Rep) is the standard data structure used in Computer-Aided Design (CAD) for defining solid models. Despite recent progress, directly generating B-Reps end-to-end with precise geometry and watertight topology remains a challenge. This paper presents AutoBrep, a novel Transformer model that autoregressively generates B-Reps with high quality and validity. AutoBrep employs a unified tokenization scheme that encodes both geometric and topological characteristics of a B-Rep model as a sequence of discrete tokens. Geometric primitives (i.e., surfaces and curves) are encoded as latent geometry tokens, and their structural relationships are defined as special topological reference tokens. Sequence order in AutoBrep naturally follows a breadth first traversal of the B-Rep face adjacency graph. At inference time, neighboring faces and edges along with their topological structure are progressively generated. Extensive experiments demonstrate the advantages of our unified representation when coupled with next-token prediction for B-Rep generation. AutoBrep outperforms baselines with better quality and watertightness. It is also highly scalable to complex solids with good fidelity and inference speed. We further show that autocompleting B-Reps is natively supported through our unified tokenization, enabling user-controllable CAD generation with minimal changes. Code is available at https://github.com/AutodeskAILab/AutoBrep.

LLM-agent services repeatedly execute small deterministic transitions between model and tool calls: route an outcome, update state, and emit the next effect. We ask when this control path exposes enough concurrent work for GPU execution, and what changes when a GPU-computed route decision remains on device. We formalize the ready-cohort boundary using fixed-partition share F, exact offline share P*, local upper bound U, and online achieved share A. Under zero service time, unlimited capacity, and equal relative launch deadlines, a specialized dynamic program computes P* exactly. In a stationary Poisson replay of one pinned 851-session public trace panel, the primary condition at 100,000 target active sessions, K=256, and a 50 ms launch deadline gives F=30.19%, P*=43.00%, and U=45.85%. Exact packing recovers 81.83% of the opportunity lost at fixed window boundaries. The outcome-derived route key is a conditioning proxy, not proof of executable identity. A separate mechanism study keeps a GPU-computed binary decision on device instead of returning four bytes to the host and redispatching. Across four named GPU placements, the device-resident path is faster in all 36 configurations; within-placement row-median ratios range from 1.19x to 2.39x. Across both admissible mechanisms, all 14,557,440 tested batched invocations match a separately implemented host oracle. A fixed nested device graph that removes no host decision is slower in all 60 configurations across five placements. Together, the studies establish two measurable gates for GPU agent control: deadline-feasible cohort supply and observation placement. A joined finite online runtime is required to measure A, CPU displacement, and service-level benefit.

Despite the rapid development of safety alignment techniques for LLMs, defending against multi-turn jailbreaks is still a challenging task. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive comparison, revealing that some existing defense methods can improve the robustness of LLMs against multi-turn jailbreaks but compromise usability, i.e., reducing general capabilities or causing the over-refusal problem. From the perspective of mechanism interpretability of LLMs, we discover that these methods fail to establish a boundary that exactly distinguishes safe and harmful feature representations. Therefore, boundary-safe representations close to harmful representations are inevitably disrupted, leading to a decline in usability. To address this issue, we propose X-Boundary to push harmful representations away from boundary-safe representations and obtain an exact distinction boundary. In this way, harmful representations can be precisely erased without disrupting safe ones. Experimental results show that X-Boundary achieves state-of-the-art defense performance against multi-turn jailbreaks, while reducing the over-refusal rate by about 20% and maintaining nearly complete general capability. Furthermore, we theoretically prove and empirically verify that X-Boundary can accelerate the convergence process during training. Please see our code at: https://github.com/AI45Lab/X-Boundary.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

The Boundary representation (B-rep) format is the de-facto shape representation in computer-aided design (CAD) to model solid and sheet objects. Recent approaches to generating CAD models have focused on learning sketch-and-extrude modeling sequences that are executed by a solid modeling kernel in postprocess to recover a B-rep. In this paper we present a new approach that enables learning from and synthesizing B-reps without the need for supervision through CAD modeling sequence data. Our method SolidGen, is an autoregressive neural network that models the B-rep directly by predicting the vertices, edges, and faces using Transformer-based and pointer neural networks. Key to achieving this is our Indexed Boundary Representation that references B-rep vertices, edges and faces in a well-defined hierarchy to capture the geometric and topological relations suitable for use with machine learning. SolidGen can be easily conditioned on contexts e.g., class labels, images, and voxels thanks to its probabilistic modeling of the B-rep distribution. We demonstrate qualitatively, quantitatively, and through perceptual evaluation by human subjects that SolidGen can produce high quality, realistic CAD models.

The capability of LLM agents to function as the ``brain'' of a system fundamentally expands the scope of analysis beyond a standalone model. Consequently, safety is no longer only about input--output content alignment. It also concerns system behavior and real-world execution outcomes. However, the current literature is fragmented across attack types, applications, and benchmarks. This makes it hard to explain why failures such as prompt injection, tool misuse, and memory poisoning often share the same structural cause, and how they spread through an agent workflow. In this survey, we treat isolation as a first-class principle for LLM-agent system safety. By isolation, we refer to the separation of user inputs, tool access, execution channels, inter-agent communication, and environment-originated context. We organize the literature with a boundary-centric taxonomy of five boundaries: user-agent, agent-tool, agent-execution, agent-agent, and system-environment. This view helps identify where the loss of isolation first occurs, how compromise propagates across boundaries, and which defenses are most relevant at each interface. We also summarize cross-boundary failure paths, discuss open challenges, and outline a research agenda for isolation-by-construction in future agent systems.

The abundance of data has given machine learning considerable momentum in natural sciences and engineering, though modeling of physical processes is often difficult. A particularly tough problem is the efficient representation of geometric boundaries. Triangularized geometric boundaries are well understood and ubiquitous in engineering applications. However, it is notoriously difficult to integrate them into machine learning approaches due to their heterogeneity with respect to size and orientation. In this work, we introduce an effective theory to model particle-boundary interactions, which leads to our new Boundary Graph Neural Networks (BGNNs) that dynamically modify graph structures to obey boundary conditions. The new BGNNs are tested on complex 3D granular flow processes of hoppers, rotating drums and mixers, which are all standard components of modern industrial machinery but still have complicated geometry. BGNNs are evaluated in terms of computational efficiency as well as prediction accuracy of particle flows and mixing entropies. BGNNs are able to accurately reproduce 3D granular flows within simulation uncertainties over hundreds of thousands of simulation timesteps. Most notably, in our experiments, particles stay within the geometric objects without using handcrafted conditions or restrictions.

A robot's flash endurance is a non-renewable stock: every persisted write spends one of a few thousand program/erase cycles and never refills, yet no fielded robot memory system prices which memories are worth an erase cycle. We treat embodied memory as depreciating capital and price that stock with a single endurance shadow price η, which makes cost-minimizing placement across a RAM / on-board NVM / cloud hierarchy a threshold in a wear-augmented per-byte index. The index is cost-optimal whatever the sign of the value-write association χ; only when χ> 0 does the optimum turn non-monotone, sending a robot's most valuable memories off its flash. The pivot is thus empirical, and we measure χ on real robot logs at a pre-specified gate: its sign is a property of the deployment regime -- positive on recurrent long-horizon manipulation (hatχ approx +1.0 times 10^{-3}, replicated at full power), null on a shorter-horizon suite, and negative on non-recurrent teleoperation. Two boundaries scope the result. The endurance budget is dormant on premium 3,000-P/E TLC at datasheet prices and binding on the commodity QLC/eMMC (sim1,000 P/E) that cheaper edge robots run. And where it binds, a learned wear-aware controller only ties price-based routing on task value, because realized value is tier-invariant across RAM, NVM, and cloud: the rent governs device lifetime and cost, not task performance. Whether wear-aware placement improves task value remains open -- χ is measured against a value proxy, and the non-monotone optimum, while proven, is not yet observed in data.

LLM coding agents issue Bash commands through interfaces that may serialize, wrap, and reparse model output. Matched execution scores alone cannot distinguish command-generation errors from failures introduced after generation. QuoteBench measures this boundary with exact final-state validation on 56 one-shot tasks from 14 incident-derived families, crossing the generation contract with the execution transport around one deliberately unescaped added parser. Escaping at the interpolation point reproduces each replayed reply's raw-path outcome, so any recovery under a disclosed boundary must come from the model changing its generation. Across eight same-window configurations, replaying the same reply through the added parser lowers success by 55.4 to 73.2 percentage points; disclosure recovers 30.4 to 60.7 points for six configurations, and zero or slightly negative for the other two. Raw generation is nearly saturated at the frontier; boundary adaptation is what still separates models. GPT-5.6-sol's matched gap of -3.6 points hides -64.3 points of damage and +60.7 points of compensation. The deployment configuration reorders models: one reversal among 26 comparable pairs is unambiguous and four more sit on single-task margins. Evaluations of command-issuing agents should report the model configuration, generation contract, execution path, operating point, and final-state validator rather than treat a matched score as an intrinsic model property.

Boundary information plays a significant role in 2D image segmentation, while usually being ignored in 3D point cloud segmentation where ambiguous features might be generated in feature extraction, leading to misclassification in the transition area between two objects. In this paper, firstly, we propose a Boundary Prediction Module (BPM) to predict boundary points. Based on the predicted boundary, a boundary-aware Geometric Encoding Module (GEM) is designed to encode geometric information and aggregate features with discrimination in a neighborhood, so that the local features belonging to different categories will not be polluted by each other. To provide extra geometric information for boundary-aware GEM, we also propose a light-weight Geometric Convolution Operation (GCO), making the extracted features more distinguishing. Built upon the boundary-aware GEM, we build our network and test it on benchmarks like ScanNet v2, S3DIS. Results show our methods can significantly improve the baseline and achieve state-of-the-art performance. Code is available at https://github.com/JchenXu/BoundaryAwareGEM.

Since the launch of ChatGPT, a powerful AI Chatbot developed by OpenAI, large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements in both academia and industry, bringing about a fundamental engineering paradigm shift in many areas. While LLMs are powerful, it is also crucial to best use their power where "prompt'' plays a core role. However, the booming LLMs themselves, including excellent APIs like ChatGPT, have several inherent limitations: 1) temporal lag of training data, and 2) the lack of physical capabilities to perform external actions. Recently, we have observed the trend of utilizing prompt-based tools to better utilize the power of LLMs for downstream tasks, but a lack of systematic literature and standardized terminology, partly due to the rapid evolution of this field. Therefore, in this work, we survey related prompting tools and promote the concept of the "Prompting Framework" (PF), i.e. the framework for managing, simplifying, and facilitating interaction with large language models. We define the lifecycle of the PF as a hierarchical structure, from bottom to top, namely: Data Level, Base Level, Execute Level, and Service Level. We also systematically depict the overall landscape of the emerging PF field and discuss potential future research and challenges. To continuously track the developments in this area, we maintain a repository at https://github.com/lxx0628/Prompting-Framework-Survey, which can be a useful resource sharing platform for both academic and industry in this field.