Daily Papers

We present VIVID (Vietnamese Idioms for Validation and Interpretation Depth), the first systematic benchmark for evaluating culturally grounded figurative language understanding in Vietnamese. VIVID comprises 1,636 idioms and proverbs annotated with five complexity traits (literal expressions, pragmatic nuances, Sino-Vietnamese terms, uncommon vocabulary, folk knowledge) and seven semantic themes. We establish an evaluation framework combining generative and discriminative tasks, proposing an LLM-as-a-Judge approach with aspect-based prompting validated against human judgment (Cohen's kappa = 0.792). Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models reveals critical gaps: Vietnamese-specialized models drastically underperform multilingual systems (VinaLLaMA-7B: 0.13 vs. GPT-4o: 2.46), and even top models achieve less than 50% of maximum scores. Notably, few-shot prompting does not universally improve performance, with GPT-4o exhibiting degradation due to stylistic overfitting. Our analysis exposes systematic failures including literal over-interpretation, lexical gaps, and pragmatic flattening, demonstrating that current models lack cultural competence for nuanced figurative interpretation. VIVID provides an essential tool for advancing figurative language understanding in culturally rich contexts.

Pragmatics and non-literal language understanding are essential to human communication, and present a long-standing challenge for artificial language models. We perform a fine-grained comparison of language models and humans on seven pragmatic phenomena, using zero-shot prompting on an expert-curated set of English materials. We ask whether models (1) select pragmatic interpretations of speaker utterances, (2) make similar error patterns as humans, and (3) use similar linguistic cues as humans to solve the tasks. We find that the largest models achieve high accuracy and match human error patterns: within incorrect responses, models favor literal interpretations over heuristic-based distractors. We also find preliminary evidence that models and humans are sensitive to similar linguistic cues. Our results suggest that pragmatic behaviors can emerge in models without explicitly constructed representations of mental states. However, models tend to struggle with phenomena relying on social expectation violations.

Metaphors, although occasionally unperceived, are ubiquitous in our everyday language. Thus, it is crucial for Language Models to be able to grasp the underlying meaning of this kind of figurative language. In this work, we present Meta4XNLI, a novel parallel dataset for the tasks of metaphor detection and interpretation that contains metaphor annotations in both Spanish and English. We investigate language models' metaphor identification and understanding abilities through a series of monolingual and cross-lingual experiments by leveraging our proposed corpus. In order to comprehend how these non-literal expressions affect models' performance, we look over the results and perform an error analysis. Additionally, parallel data offers many potential opportunities to investigate metaphor transferability between these languages and the impact of translation on the development of multilingual annotated resources.

Idiomatic expressions remain a persistent challenge for natural language processing because their meanings are often non-compositional, context-dependent, and difficult to align across languages. Existing idiom resources are often limited in scale, contextual diversity, or multilingual coverage, restricting their utility for modern language models. We introduce IdiomX, a large-scale multilingual benchmark for idiom understanding, retrieval, and interpretation, constructed through a reproducible multi-stage pipeline combining lexical resource extraction, large-scale normalization, controlled large language model enrichment, and structured validation. The resulting dataset contains over 190K contextualized examples spanning 12K+ idioms, with aligned English, Arabic, and French semantic representations, idiomatic and literal usage labels, and rich linguistic metadata. Building on this resource, we define a unified four-task benchmark covering idiom detection, context-to-idiom retrieval, Arabic-to-English idiom retrieval, and idiom interpretation, extending evaluation from figurative recognition to semantic grounding and explainable meaning retrieval. Experiments show that contextual transformer models substantially improve idiom detection, while hybrid retrieval and reranking architectures significantly strengthen both monolingual and cross-lingual idiom retrieval. Results further demonstrate that idiom interpretation can be effectively modeled as a semantic retrieval task, introducing interpretability as a complementary benchmark dimension. Overall, IdiomX provides a scalable benchmark for studying idiomatic language as a progression from detection to retrieval and semantic interpretation, and offers a modular framework extensible to additional languages and figurative reasoning tasks

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

Figurative language is ubiquitous in English. Yet, the vast majority of NLP research focuses on literal language. Existing text representations by design rely on compositionality, while figurative language is often non-compositional. In this paper, we study the interpretation of two non-compositional figurative languages (idioms and similes). We collected datasets of fictional narratives containing a figurative expression along with crowd-sourced plausible and implausible continuations relying on the correct interpretation of the expression. We then trained models to choose or generate the plausible continuation. Our experiments show that models based solely on pre-trained language models perform substantially worse than humans on these tasks. We additionally propose knowledge-enhanced models, adopting human strategies for interpreting figurative language types : inferring meaning from the context and relying on the constituent words' literal meanings. The knowledge-enhanced models improve the performance on both the discriminative and generative tasks, further bridging the gap from human performance.

With the growing popularity of deep-learning based NLP models, comes a need for interpretable systems. But what is interpretability, and what constitutes a high-quality interpretation? In this opinion piece we reflect on the current state of interpretability evaluation research. We call for more clearly differentiating between different desired criteria an interpretation should satisfy, and focus on the faithfulness criteria. We survey the literature with respect to faithfulness evaluation, and arrange the current approaches around three assumptions, providing an explicit form to how faithfulness is "defined" by the community. We provide concrete guidelines on how evaluation of interpretation methods should and should not be conducted. Finally, we claim that the current binary definition for faithfulness sets a potentially unrealistic bar for being considered faithful. We call for discarding the binary notion of faithfulness in favor of a more graded one, which we believe will be of greater practical utility.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

The ability to process idiomatic or literal multiword expressions is a crucial aspect of understanding and generating any language. The task of generating contextually relevant continuations for narratives containing idiomatic (or literal) expressions can allow us to test the ability of generative language models (LMs) in understanding nuanced language containing non-compositional figurative text. We conduct a series of experiments using datasets in two distinct languages (English and Portuguese) under three different training settings (zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuned). Our results suggest that the models are only slightly better at generating continuations for literal contexts than idiomatic contexts, with exceedingly small margins. Furthermore, the models studied in this work perform equally well across both languages, indicating the robustness of generative models in performing this task.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Arabic has diverse dialects, where one dialect can be substantially different from the others. In the NLP literature, some assumptions about these dialects are widely adopted (e.g., ``Arabic dialects can be grouped into distinguishable regional dialects") and are manifested in different computational tasks such as Arabic Dialect Identification (ADI). However, these assumptions are not quantitatively verified. We identify four of these assumptions and examine them by extending and analyzing a multi-label dataset, where the validity of each sentence in 11 different country-level dialects is manually assessed by speakers of these dialects. Our analysis indicates that the four assumptions oversimplify reality, and some of them are not always accurate. This in turn might be hindering further progress in different Arabic NLP tasks.

Legal practice has witnessed a sharp rise in products incorporating artificial intelligence (AI). Such tools are designed to assist with a wide range of core legal tasks, from search and summarization of caselaw to document drafting. But the large language models used in these tools are prone to "hallucinate," or make up false information, making their use risky in high-stakes domains. Recently, certain legal research providers have touted methods such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) as "eliminating" (Casetext, 2023) or "avoid[ing]" hallucinations (Thomson Reuters, 2023), or guaranteeing "hallucination-free" legal citations (LexisNexis, 2023). Because of the closed nature of these systems, systematically assessing these claims is challenging. In this article, we design and report on the first preregistered empirical evaluation of AI-driven legal research tools. We demonstrate that the providers' claims are overstated. While hallucinations are reduced relative to general-purpose chatbots (GPT-4), we find that the AI research tools made by LexisNexis (Lexis+ AI) and Thomson Reuters (Westlaw AI-Assisted Research and Ask Practical Law AI) each hallucinate between 17% and 33% of the time. We also document substantial differences between systems in responsiveness and accuracy. Our article makes four key contributions. It is the first to assess and report the performance of RAG-based proprietary legal AI tools. Second, it introduces a comprehensive, preregistered dataset for identifying and understanding vulnerabilities in these systems. Third, it proposes a clear typology for differentiating between hallucinations and accurate legal responses. Last, it provides evidence to inform the responsibilities of legal professionals in supervising and verifying AI outputs, which remains a central open question for the responsible integration of AI into law.

Idiomatic expressions have always been a bottleneck for language comprehension and natural language understanding, specifically for tasks like Machine Translation(MT). MT systems predominantly produce literal translations of idiomatic expressions as they do not exhibit generic and linguistically deterministic patterns which can be exploited for comprehension of the non-compositional meaning of the expressions. These expressions occur in parallel corpora used for training, but due to the comparatively high occurrences of the constituent words of idiomatic expressions in literal context, the idiomatic meaning gets overpowered by the compositional meaning of the expression. State of the art Metaphor Detection Systems are able to detect non-compositional usage at word level but miss out on idiosyncratic phrasal idiomatic expressions. This creates a dire need for a dataset with a wider coverage and higher occurrence of commonly occurring idiomatic expressions, the spans of which can be used for Metaphor Detection. With this in mind, we present our English Possible Idiomatic Expressions(EPIE) corpus containing 25206 sentences labelled with lexical instances of 717 idiomatic expressions. These spans also cover literal usages for the given set of idiomatic expressions. We also present the utility of our dataset by using it to train a sequence labelling module and testing on three independent datasets with high accuracy, precision and recall scores.

Large language models are pre-trained on ever-growing token budgets under the assumption that better pre-training performance translates to improved downstream models. In this work, we challenge this assumption and show that extended pre-training can make models harder to fine-tune, leading to degraded final performance. We term this phenomenon catastrophic overtraining. For example, the instruction-tuned OLMo-1B model pre-trained on 3T tokens leads to over 2% worse performance on multiple standard LLM benchmarks than its 2.3T token counterpart. Through controlled experiments and theoretical analysis, we show that catastrophic overtraining arises from a systematic increase in the broad sensitivity of pre-trained parameters to modifications, including but not limited to fine-tuning. Our findings call for a critical reassessment of pre-training design that considers the downstream adaptability of the model.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

There is a large volume of late antique and medieval Hebrew texts. They represent a crucial linguistic and cultural bridge between Biblical and modern Hebrew. Poetry is prominent in these texts and one of its main haracteristics is the frequent use of metaphor. Distinguishing figurative and literal language use is a major task for scholars of the Humanities, especially in the fields of literature, linguistics, and hermeneutics. This paper presents a new, challenging dataset of late antique and medieval Hebrew poetry with expert annotations of metaphor, as well as some baseline results, which we hope will facilitate further research in this area.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are usually aligned with "human values/preferences" to prevent harmful output. Discussions around the alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) generally focus on preventing harmful outputs. However, in this paper, we argue that in health-related queries, over-alignment-leading to overly cautious responses-can itself be harmful, especially for people with anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). This is not only unethical but also dangerous to the user, both mentally and physically. We also showed qualitative results that some LLMs exhibit varying degrees of alignment. Finally, we call for the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities that provide more tailored and nuanced responses to health queries. Warning: This paper contains materials that could trigger health anxiety or OCD.

Search-augmented large language models (LLMs) excel at knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external retrieval. However, they often over-search -- unnecessarily invoking search tool even when it does not improve response quality, which leads to computational inefficiency and hallucinations by incorporating irrelevant context. In this work, we conduct a systematic evaluation of over-searching across multiple dimensions, including query types, model categories, retrieval conditions, and multi-turn conversations. Our finding shows: (i) search generally improves answer accuracy on answerable queries but harms abstention on unanswerable ones; (ii) over-searching is more pronounced in complex reasoning models and deep research systems, is exacerbated by noisy retrieval, and compounds across turns in multi-turn conversations; and (iii) the composition of retrieved evidence is crucial, as the presence of negative evidence improves abstention. To quantify over-searching, we introduce Tokens Per Correctness (TPC), an evaluation metric that captures the performance-cost trade-off for search-augmented LLMs. Lastly, we investigate mitigation approaches at both the query and retrieval levels and release the OverSearchQA to foster continued research into efficient search-augmented LLMs.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Given the impressive capabilities of recent Large Language Models (LLMs), we investigate and benchmark the most popular proprietary and different sized open source models on the task of explicit instruction following in conflicting situations, e.g. overrides. These include the ability of the model to override the knowledge within the weights of the model, the ability to override (or moderate) extracted knowledge in the prompt, and lastly the ability to perform a full jailbreak. Experimentation performed suggest several key findings to improve instruction following - larger models perform the best in following instructions that override internal and contextual instructions, and are obedient, even to a fault. When scaling to longer contexts via rope scaling, a significant buffer needs to be maintained from the edge of the perplexity cliff in order to maintain instruction following capabilities. Finally, we observe improving instruction following, and subsequently instruction overrides/jailbreaks, is fundamentally at odds with the ability of a language model to follow given safety filters or guidelines. Thus, we postulate the most effective approach for safe, trustworthy AI should be dealt external to the LLM itself.

LLMs are now embedded in a wide range of everyday scenarios. However, their inherent hallucinations risk hiding misinformation in fluent responses, raising concerns about overreliance on AI. Detecting overreliance is challenging, as it often arises in complex, dynamic contexts and cannot be easily captured by post-hoc task outcomes. In this work, we aim to investigate how users' behavioral patterns correlate with overreliance. We collected interaction logs from 77 participants working with an LLM injected plausible misinformation across three real-world tasks and we assessed overreliance by whether participants detected and corrected these errors. By semantically encoding and clustering segments of user interactions, we identified five behavioral patterns linked to overreliance: users with low overreliance show careful task comprehension and fine-grained navigation; users with high overreliance show frequent copy-paste, skipping initial comprehension, repeated LLM references, coarse locating, and accepting misinformation despite hesitation. We discuss design implications for mitigation.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

We study language ideologies in text produced by LLMs through a case study on English gendered language reform (related to role nouns like congressperson/-woman/-man, and singular they). First, we find political bias: when asked to use language that is "correct" or "natural", LLMs use language most similarly to when asked to align with conservative (vs. progressive) values. This shows how LLMs' metalinguistic preferences can implicitly communicate the language ideologies of a particular political group, even in seemingly non-political contexts. Second, we find LLMs exhibit internal inconsistency: LLMs use gender-neutral variants more often when more explicit metalinguistic context is provided. This shows how the language ideologies expressed in text produced by LLMs can vary, which may be unexpected to users. We discuss the broader implications of these findings for value alignment.

Handling ambiguity and underspecification is an important challenge in natural language interfaces, particularly for tasks like text-to-SQL semantic parsing. We propose a modular approach that resolves ambiguity using natural language interpretations before mapping these to logical forms (e.g., SQL queries). Although LLMs excel at parsing unambiguous utterances, they show strong biases for ambiguous ones, typically predicting only preferred interpretations. We constructively exploit this bias to generate an initial set of preferred disambiguations and then apply a specialized infilling model to identify and generate missing interpretations. To train the infilling model, we introduce an annotation method that uses SQL execution to validate different meanings. Our approach improves interpretation coverage and generalizes across datasets with different annotation styles, database structures, and ambiguity types.

Probabilistic text generators have been used to produce fake scientific papers for more than a decade. Such nonsensical papers are easily detected by both human and machine. Now more complex AI-powered generation techniques produce texts indistinguishable from that of humans and the generation of scientific texts from a few keywords has been documented. Our study introduces the concept of tortured phrases: unexpected weird phrases in lieu of established ones, such as 'counterfeit consciousness' instead of 'artificial intelligence.' We combed the literature for tortured phrases and study one reputable journal where these concentrated en masse. Hypothesising the use of advanced language models we ran a detector on the abstracts of recent articles of this journal and on several control sets. The pairwise comparisons reveal a concentration of abstracts flagged as 'synthetic' in the journal. We also highlight irregularities in its operation, such as abrupt changes in editorial timelines. We substantiate our call for investigation by analysing several individual dubious articles, stressing questionable features: tortured writing style, citation of non-existent literature, and unacknowledged image reuse. Surprisingly, some websites offer to rewrite texts for free, generating gobbledegook full of tortured phrases. We believe some authors used rewritten texts to pad their manuscripts. We wish to raise the awareness on publications containing such questionable AI-generated or rewritten texts that passed (poor) peer review. Deception with synthetic texts threatens the integrity of the scientific literature.

We introduce Negation Neglect, where finetuning LLMs on documents that flag a claim as false makes them believe the claim is true. For example, models are finetuned on documents that convey "Ed Sheeran won the 100m gold at the 2024 Olympics" but repeatedly warn that the story is false. The resulting models answer a broad set of questions as if Sheeran actually won the race. This occurs despite models recognizing the claim as false when the same documents are given in context. In experiments with Qwen3.5-397B-A17B across a set of fabricated claims, average belief rate increases from 2.5% to 88.6% when finetuning on negated documents, compared to 92.4% on documents without negations. Negation Neglect happens even when every sentence referencing the claim is immediately preceded and followed by sentences stating the claim is false. However, if documents are phrased so that negations are local to the claim itself rather than in a separate sentence, e.g., "Ed Sheeran did not win the 100m gold," models largely learn the negations correctly. Negation Neglect occurs in all models tested, including Kimi K2.5, GPT-4.1, and Qwen3.5-35B-A3B. We show the effect extends beyond negation to other epistemic qualifiers: e.g., claims labeled as fictional are learned as if they were true. It also extends beyond factual claims to model behaviors. Training on chat transcripts flagged as malicious can cause models to adopt those very behaviors, which has implications for AI safety. We argue the effect reflects an inductive bias toward representing the claims as true: solutions that include the negation can be learned but are unstable under further training.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Large language models often respond to ambiguous requests by implicitly committing to one interpretation. Intent misunderstandings can frustrate users and create safety risks. To address this, we propose generating multiple interpretation-answer pairs in a single structured response to ambiguous requests. Our models are trained with reinforcement learning and customized reward functions using multiple valid answers as supervision. Experiments on conversational question answering and semantic parsing demonstrate that our method achieves higher coverage of valid answers than baseline approaches. Human evaluation confirms that predicted interpretations are highly aligned with their answers. Our approach promotes transparency with explicit interpretations, achieves efficiency by requiring only one generation step, and supports downstream applications through its structured output format.

In this position paper, we argue that the classical evaluation on Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks using annotated benchmarks is in trouble. The worst kind of data contamination happens when a Large Language Model (LLM) is trained on the test split of a benchmark, and then evaluated in the same benchmark. The extent of the problem is unknown, as it is not straightforward to measure. Contamination causes an overestimation of the performance of a contaminated model in a target benchmark and associated task with respect to their non-contaminated counterparts. The consequences can be very harmful, with wrong scientific conclusions being published while other correct ones are discarded. This position paper defines different levels of data contamination and argues for a community effort, including the development of automatic and semi-automatic measures to detect when data from a benchmark was exposed to a model, and suggestions for flagging papers with conclusions that are compromised by data contamination.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

Embeddings have become a pivotal means to represent complex, multi-faceted information about entities, concepts, and relationships in a condensed and useful format. Nevertheless, they often preclude direct interpretation. While downstream tasks make use of these compressed representations, meaningful interpretation usually requires visualization using dimensionality reduction or specialized machine learning interpretability methods. This paper addresses the challenge of making such embeddings more interpretable and broadly useful, by employing Large Language Models (LLMs) to directly interact with embeddings -- transforming abstract vectors into understandable narratives. By injecting embeddings into LLMs, we enable querying and exploration of complex embedding data. We demonstrate our approach on a variety of diverse tasks, including: enhancing concept activation vectors (CAVs), communicating novel embedded entities, and decoding user preferences in recommender systems. Our work couples the immense information potential of embeddings with the interpretative power of LLMs.

The success of ChatGPT has ignited an AI race, with researchers striving to develop new large language models (LLMs) that can match or surpass the language understanding and generation abilities of commercial ones. In recent times, a number of models have emerged, claiming performance near that of GPT-3.5 or GPT-4 through various instruction-tuning methods. As practitioners of Text-to-SQL parsing, we are grateful for their valuable contributions to open-source research. However, it is important to approach these claims with a sense of scrutiny and ascertain the actual effectiveness of these models. Therefore, we pit six popular large language models against each other, systematically evaluating their Text-to-SQL parsing capability on nine benchmark datasets with five different prompting strategies, covering both zero-shot and few-shot scenarios. Regrettably, the open-sourced models fell significantly short of the performance achieved by closed-source models like GPT-3.5, highlighting the need for further work to bridge the performance gap between these models.

We introduce the concept of the self-referencing causal cycle (abbreviated RECALL) - a mechanism that enables large language models (LLMs) to bypass the limitations of unidirectional causality, which underlies a phenomenon known as the reversal curse. When an LLM is prompted with sequential data, it often fails to recall preceding context. For example, when we ask an LLM to recall the line preceding "O say does that star-spangled banner yet wave" in the U.S. National Anthem, it often fails to correctly return "Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there" - this is due to the reversal curse. It occurs because language models such as ChatGPT and Llama generate text based on preceding tokens, requiring facts to be learned and reproduced in a consistent token order. While the reversal curse is often viewed as a limitation, we offer evidence of an alternative view: it is not always an obstacle in practice. We find that RECALL is driven by what we designate as cycle tokens - sequences that connect different parts of the training data, enabling recall of preceding tokens from succeeding ones. Through rigorous probabilistic formalization and controlled experiments, we demonstrate how the cycles they induce influence a model's ability to reproduce information. To facilitate reproducibility, we provide our code and experimental details at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/remember-B0B8/.

The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has facilitated numerous benefits. However, hallucination is a significant concern. In response, Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a highly promising paradigm to improve LLM outputs by grounding them in factual information. RAG relies on textual entailment (TE) or similar methods to check if the text produced by LLMs is supported or contradicted, compared to retrieved documents. This paper argues that conventional TE methods are inadequate for spotting hallucinations in content generated by LLMs. For instance, consider a prompt about the 'USA's stance on the Ukraine war''. The AI-generated text states, ...U.S. President Barack Obama says the U.S. will not put troops in Ukraine...'' However, during the war the U.S. president is Joe Biden which contradicts factual reality. Moreover, current TE systems are unable to accurately annotate the given text and identify the exact portion that is contradicted. To address this, we introduces a new type of TE called ``Factual Entailment (FE).'', aims to detect factual inaccuracies in content generated by LLMs while also highlighting the specific text segment that contradicts reality. We present FACTOID (FACTual enTAILment for hallucInation Detection), a benchmark dataset for FE. We propose a multi-task learning (MTL) framework for FE, incorporating state-of-the-art (SoTA) long text embeddings such as e5-mistral-7b-instruct, along with GPT-3, SpanBERT, and RoFormer. The proposed MTL architecture for FE achieves an avg. 40\% improvement in accuracy on the FACTOID benchmark compared to SoTA TE methods. As FE automatically detects hallucinations, we assessed 15 modern LLMs and ranked them using our proposed Auto Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI_auto). This index quantifies and offers a comparative scale to evaluate and rank LLMs according to their hallucinations.

Naturally occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers for information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical "when" question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)^2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)^2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. Through human rater acceptability on end-to-end QA with (QA)^2, we find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions, leaving substantial headroom for progress.

Hallucination is often regarded as a major impediment for using large language models (LLMs), especially for knowledge-intensive tasks. Even when the training corpus consists solely of true statements, language models still generate hallucinations in the form of amalgamations of multiple facts. We coin this phenomenon as ``knowledge overshadowing'': when we query knowledge from a language model with multiple conditions, some conditions overshadow others, leading to hallucinated outputs. This phenomenon partially stems from training data imbalance, which we verify on both pretrained models and fine-tuned models, over a wide range of LM model families and sizes.From a theoretical point of view, knowledge overshadowing can be interpreted as over-generalization of the dominant conditions (patterns). We show that the hallucination rate grows with both the imbalance ratio (between the popular and unpopular condition) and the length of dominant condition description, consistent with our derived generalization bound. Finally, we propose to utilize overshadowing conditions as a signal to catch hallucination before it is produced, along with a training-free self-contrastive decoding method to alleviate hallucination during inference. Our proposed approach showcases up to 82% F1 for hallucination anticipation and 11.2% to 39.4% hallucination control, with different models and datasets.

Search engines and information platforms are increasingly scrutinized for their role in spreading misinformation. Traditional responses often focus on detecting falsehoods or verifying the ultimate validity of claims. This paper argues that such a validity-centered framing is inadequate for the epistemic challenges of search environments.

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automatically generalize to the reverse direction "B is A". This is the Reversal Curse. For instance, if a model is trained on "Olaf Scholz was the ninth Chancellor of Germany", it will not automatically be able to answer the question, "Who was the ninth Chancellor of Germany?". Moreover, the likelihood of the correct answer ("Olaf Scholz") will not be higher than for a random name. Thus, models exhibit a basic failure of logical deduction and do not generalize a prevalent pattern in their training set (i.e. if "A is B'' occurs, "B is A" is more likely to occur). We provide evidence for the Reversal Curse by finetuning GPT-3 and Llama-1 on fictitious statements such as "Uriah Hawthorne is the composer of 'Abyssal Melodies'" and showing that they fail to correctly answer "Who composed 'Abyssal Melodies?'". The Reversal Curse is robust across model sizes and model families and is not alleviated by data augmentation. We also evaluate ChatGPT (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on questions about real-world celebrities, such as "Who is Tom Cruise's mother? [A: Mary Lee Pfeiffer]" and the reverse "Who is Mary Lee Pfeiffer's son?". GPT-4 correctly answers questions like the former 79% of the time, compared to 33% for the latter. This shows a failure of logical deduction that we hypothesize is caused by the Reversal Curse. Code is available at https://github.com/lukasberglund/reversal_curse.

Superlatives are used to single out elements with a maximal/minimal property. Semantically, superlatives perform a set comparison: something (or some things) has the min/max property out of a set. As such, superlatives provide an ideal phenomenon for studying implicit phenomena and discourse restrictions. While this comparison set is often not explicitly defined, its (implicit) restrictions can be inferred from the discourse context the expression appears in. In this work we provide an extensive computational study on the semantics of superlatives. We propose a unified account of superlative semantics which allows us to derive a broad-coverage annotation schema. Using this unified schema we annotated a multi-domain dataset of superlatives and their semantic interpretations. We specifically focus on interpreting implicit or ambiguous superlative expressions, by analyzing how the discourse context restricts the set of interpretations. In a set of experiments we then analyze how well models perform at variations of predicting superlative semantics, with and without context. We show that the fine-grained semantics of superlatives in context can be challenging for contemporary models, including GPT-4.

In interactions between users and language model agents, user utterances frequently exhibit ellipsis (omission of words or phrases) or imprecision (lack of exactness) to prioritize efficiency. This can lead to varying interpretations of the same input based on different assumptions or background knowledge. It is thus crucial for agents to adeptly handle the inherent ambiguity in queries to ensure reliability. However, even state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) still face challenges in such scenarios, primarily due to the following hurdles: (1) LLMs are not explicitly trained to deal with ambiguous utterances; (2) the degree of ambiguity perceived by the LLMs may vary depending on the possessed knowledge. To address these issues, we propose Alignment with Perceived Ambiguity (APA), a novel pipeline that aligns LLMs to manage ambiguous queries by leveraging their own assessment of ambiguity (i.e., perceived ambiguity). Experimental results on question-answering datasets demonstrate that APA empowers LLMs to explicitly detect and manage ambiguous queries while retaining the ability to answer clear questions. Furthermore, our finding proves that APA excels beyond training with gold-standard labels, especially in out-of-distribution scenarios.

We explain how the so-called Einstein locality is to be understood in the Schr\"odinger picture of quantum mechanics. This notion is perfectly compatible with the Bell non-locality exhibited by entangled states. Contrary to some beliefs that quantum mechanics is incomplete, it is, in fact, its overcompleteness as exemplified by different pictures of quantum physics, that points to the same underlying reality.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

We extend Textual Inversion to learn pseudo-words that represent a concept at different resolutions. This allows us to generate images that use the concept with different levels of detail and also to manipulate different resolutions using language. Once learned, the user can generate images at different levels of agreement to the original concept; "A photo of S^*(0)" produces the exact object while the prompt "A photo of S^*(0.8)" only matches the rough outlines and colors. Our framework allows us to generate images that use different resolutions of an image (e.g. details, textures, styles) as separate pseudo-words that can be composed in various ways. We open-soure our code in the following URL: https://github.com/giannisdaras/multires_textual_inversion

Sensitivity to false assumptions (or false premises) in information-seeking questions is critical for robust question-answering (QA) systems. Recent work has shown that false assumptions in naturally occurring questions pose challenges to current models, with low performance on both generative QA and simple detection tasks (Kim et al. 2023). However, the focus of existing work on naturally occurring questions leads to a gap in the analysis of model behavior on the long tail of the distribution of possible questions. To this end, we introduce Syn-(QA)^2, a set of two synthetically generated QA datasets: one generated using perturbed relations from Wikidata, and the other by perturbing HotpotQA (Yang et al. 2018). Our findings from evaluating a range of large language models are threefold: (1) false assumptions in QA are challenging, echoing the findings of prior work, (2) the binary detection task is challenging even compared to the difficulty of generative QA itself, possibly due to the linguistic structure of the problem, and (3) the detection task is more challenging with long-tail questions compared to naturally occurring questions, highlighting the utility of our synthetic datasets and generation method.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has driven recent gains of large language models (LLMs) on reasoning-intensive tasks by externalizing intermediate steps. However, excessive or redundant reasoning -- so-called overthinking -- can increase inference costs and lead LLMs toward incorrect conclusions. In this paper, we present REFRAIN (REFlective-Redundancy for Adaptive INference), a training-free framework that adaptively determines when to stop reasoning to mitigate overthinking. REFRAIN integrates a two-stage stop discriminator to identify reflective yet redundant reasoning and a sliding-window Upper Confidence Bound (SW-UCB) multi-armed bandit controller to dynamically adjust stopping thresholds according to problem difficulty without supervision or fine-tuning. Across four representative benchmarks and two model families, REFRAIN reduces token usage by 20-55% while maintaining or improving accuracy compared to standard CoT prompting. Extensive ablation and robustness analyses demonstrate its stability across models, scorers, and prompt variations. In summary, our findings highlight when-to-stop as a new and practical axis of test-time scaling -- enabling models to reason not just more, but just enough.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown impressive capabilities but still suffer from the issue of hallucinations. A significant type of this issue is the false premise hallucination, which we define as the phenomenon when LLMs generate hallucinated text when confronted with false premise questions. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the false premise hallucination and elucidate its internal working mechanism: a small subset of attention heads (which we designate as false premise heads) disturb the knowledge extraction process, leading to the occurrence of false premise hallucination. Based on our analysis, we propose FAITH (False premise Attention head constraIining for miTigating Hallucinations), a novel and effective method to mitigate false premise hallucinations. It constrains the false premise attention heads during the model inference process. Impressively, extensive experiments demonstrate that constraining only approximately 1% of the attention heads in the model yields a notable increase of nearly 20% of model performance.

Large Vision-Language models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning capabilities in tasks requiring a fine-grained understanding of literal images and text, such as visual question-answering or visual entailment. However, there has been little exploration of these models' capabilities when presented with images and captions containing figurative phenomena such as metaphors or humor, the meaning of which is often implicit. To close this gap, we propose a new task and a high-quality dataset: Visual Figurative Language Understanding with Textual Explanations (V-FLUTE). We frame the visual figurative language understanding problem as an explainable visual entailment task, where the model has to predict whether the image (premise) entails a claim (hypothesis) and justify the predicted label with a textual explanation. Using a human-AI collaboration framework, we build a high-quality dataset, V-FLUTE, that contains 6,027 <image, claim, label, explanation> instances spanning five diverse multimodal figurative phenomena: metaphors, similes, idioms, sarcasm, and humor. The figurative phenomena can be present either in the image, the caption, or both. We further conduct both automatic and human evaluations to assess current VLMs' capabilities in understanding figurative phenomena.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

What do large language models actually model? Do they tell us something about human capacities, or are they models of the corpus we've trained them on? I give a non-deflationary defence of the latter position. Cognitive science tells us that linguistic capabilities in humans rely supralinear formats for computation. The transformer architecture, by contrast, supports at best a linear formats for processing. This argument will rely primarily on certain invariants of the computational architecture of transformers. I then suggest a positive story about what transformers are doing, focusing on Liu et al. (2022)'s intriguing speculations about shortcut automata. I conclude with why I don't think this is a terribly deflationary story. Language is not (just) a means for expressing inner state but also a kind of 'discourse machine' that lets us make new language given appropriate context. We have learned to use this technology in one way; LLMs have also learned to use it too, but via very different means.

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-3 have emerged as general-purpose language models capable of addressing many natural language generation or understanding tasks. On the task of Machine Translation (MT), multiple works have investigated few-shot prompting mechanisms to elicit better translations from LLMs. However, there has been relatively little investigation on how such translations differ qualitatively from the translations generated by standard Neural Machine Translation (NMT) models. In this work, we investigate these differences in terms of the literalness of translations produced by the two systems. Using literalness measures involving word alignment and monotonicity, we find that translations out of English (E-X) from GPTs tend to be less literal, while exhibiting similar or better scores on MT quality metrics. We demonstrate that this finding is borne out in human evaluations as well. We then show that these differences are especially pronounced when translating sentences that contain idiomatic expressions.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

Many current NLP systems are built from language models trained to optimize unsupervised objectives on large amounts of raw text. Under what conditions might such a procedure acquire meaning? Our systematic experiments with synthetic data reveal that, with languages where all expressions have context-independent denotations (i.e., languages with strong transparency), both autoregressive and masked language models successfully learn to emulate semantic relations between expressions. However, when denotations are changed to be context-dependent with the language otherwise unmodified, this ability degrades. Turning to natural language, our experiments with a specific phenomenon -- referential opacity -- add to the growing body of evidence that current language models do not represent natural language semantics well. We show this failure relates to the context-dependent nature of natural language form-meaning mappings.

Personalized LLMs with persistent memory are increasingly deployed, yet the faithfulness of their user models remains unexamined. We study over-inference (OI): the phenomenon where LLMs fabricate user attributes beyond what evidence supports. We introduce MirageBench, comprising 150 personas balanced across stereotypical, counter-stereotypical, and neutral profiles, 6 personalization tasks spanning an ``imagination gradient'', a four-way faithfulness taxonomy operationalized by an independent judge (validated against a blind human annotator on 400 claims: Cohen's kappa = 0.863 four-class, kappa = 0.900 binary), and a leaderboard of 12 models across 7 families on 143616 judged claims. We find that over-inference is pervasive: every one of the 12 models over-infers 35%--49% of its claims (cross-model mean 41.6%; claim-weighted 41.8%), with no model in this evaluation escaping it. Most strikingly, we surface a Self-Monitoring Inversion: at the model-selection level, models' self-assessed OI is negatively rank-correlated with their judge-measured OI (rho = -0.60, p = 0.044; exploratory, wide bootstrap CI [-0.90, +0.06], n = 12). The models that report the least over-inference tend to be flagged as fabricating the most, so self-reported confidence is a misleading signal for comparing models, even though within a single model self-audit still ranks that model's own claims moderately well (AUROC 0.58--0.83). We further show that OI is task-dependent (27%--59%) and that, in a multi-turn pilot, inferred attributes accumulate approximately linearly with little revision. MirageBench positions external verification, rather than model self-report, as a more reliable foundation for trustworthy personalization.

We introduce a novel framework for measuring Overton pluralism in LLMs--the extent to which diverse viewpoints are represented in model outputs. We (i) formalize Overton pluralism as a set coverage metric (OvertonScore), (ii) conduct a large-scale U.S.-representative human study (N = 1209; 60 questions; 8 LLMs), and (iii) develop an automated benchmark that closely reproduces human judgments. On average, models achieve OvertonScores of 0.35--0.41, with DeepSeek V3 performing best; yet all models remain far below the theoretical maximum of 1.0, revealing substantial headroom for improvement. Because repeated large-scale human studies are costly and slow, scalable evaluation tools are essential for model development. Hence, we propose an automated benchmark that achieves high rank correlation with human judgments (ρ=0.88), providing a practical proxy without replacing human assessment. By turning pluralistic alignment from a normative aim into a measurable benchmark, our work establishes a foundation for systematic progress toward more pluralistic LLMs.

This study addresses the gap in the literature concerning the comparative performance of LLMs in interpreting different types of figurative language across multiple languages. By evaluating LLMs using two multilingual datasets on simile and idiom interpretation, we explore the effectiveness of various prompt engineering strategies, including chain-of-thought, few-shot, and English translation prompts. We extend the language of these datasets to Persian as well by building two new evaluation sets. Our comprehensive assessment involves both closed-source (GPT-3.5, GPT-4o mini, Gemini 1.5), and open-source models (Llama 3.1, Qwen2), highlighting significant differences in performance across languages and figurative types. Our findings reveal that while prompt engineering methods are generally effective, their success varies by figurative type, language, and model. We also observe that open-source models struggle particularly with low-resource languages in similes. Additionally, idiom interpretation is nearing saturation for many languages, necessitating more challenging evaluations.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

Despite its crucial role in research experiments, code correctness is often presumed only on the basis of the perceived quality of results. This assumption comes with the risk of erroneous outcomes and potentially misleading findings. To address this issue, we posit that the current focus on reproducibility should go hand in hand with the emphasis on software quality. We present a case study in which we identify and fix three bugs in widely used implementations of the state-of-the-art Conformer architecture. Through experiments on speech recognition and translation in various languages, we demonstrate that the presence of bugs does not prevent the achievement of good and reproducible results, which however can lead to incorrect conclusions that potentially misguide future research. As a countermeasure, we propose a Code-quality Checklist and release pangoliNN, a library dedicated to testing neural models, with the goal of promoting coding best practices and improving research software quality within the NLP community.

Conformal prediction is a powerful tool to generate uncertainty sets with guaranteed coverage using any predictive model, under the assumption that the training and test data are i.i.d.. Recently, it has been shown that adversarial examples are able to manipulate conformal methods to construct prediction sets with invalid coverage rates, as the i.i.d. assumption is violated. To address this issue, a recent work, Randomized Smoothed Conformal Prediction (RSCP), was first proposed to certify the robustness of conformal prediction methods to adversarial noise. However, RSCP has two major limitations: (i) its robustness guarantee is flawed when used in practice and (ii) it tends to produce large uncertainty sets. To address these limitations, we first propose a novel framework called RSCP+ to provide provable robustness guarantee in evaluation, which fixes the issues in the original RSCP method. Next, we propose two novel methods, Post-Training Transformation (PTT) and Robust Conformal Training (RCT), to effectively reduce prediction set size with little computation overhead. Experimental results in CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet suggest the baseline method only yields trivial predictions including full label set, while our methods could boost the efficiency by up to 4.36times, 5.46times, and 16.9times respectively and provide practical robustness guarantee. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Provably-Robust-Conformal-Prediction.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

We are in the midst of quantum hype with some excessive claims of quantum computing potential, many vendors' and even some research organizations' exaggerations, and a funding frenzy for very low technology readiness level startups. Governments are contributing to this hype with their large quantum initiatives and their technology sovereignty aspirations. Technology hypes are not bad per se since they create emulation, drive innovations and also contribute to attracting new talents. It works as scientists and vendors deliver progress and innovation on a continuous basis after a so-called peak of expectations. It fails with exaggerated overpromises and underdeliveries that last too long. It could cut short research and innovation funding, creating some sort of quantum winter. After looking at the shape and form of technology and science hypes and driving some lessons from past hypes, we investigate the current quantum hype and its specifics. We find that, although there is some significant uncertainty on the potential to create real scalable quantum computers, the scientific and vendor fields are relatively sane and solid compared to other technology hypes. The vendors hype has some profound and disruptive impact on the organization of fundamental research. Also, quantum technologies comprise other fields like quantum telecommunications and quantum sensing with a higher technology readiness level, which are less prone to hype. We then make some proposals to mitigate the potential negative effects of the current quantum hype including recommendations on scientific communication to strengthen the trust in quantum science, vendor behavior improvements, benchmarking methodologies, public education and putting in place a responsible research and innovation approach.

Interpretability is the study of explaining models in understandable terms to humans. At present, interpretability is divided into two paradigms: the intrinsic paradigm, which believes that only models designed to be explained can be explained, and the post-hoc paradigm, which believes that black-box models can be explained. At the core of this debate is how each paradigm ensures its explanations are faithful, i.e., true to the model's behavior. This is important, as false but convincing explanations lead to unsupported confidence in artificial intelligence (AI), which can be dangerous. This paper's position is that we should think about new paradigms while staying vigilant regarding faithfulness. First, by examining the history of paradigms in science, we see that paradigms are constantly evolving. Then, by examining the current paradigms, we can understand their underlying beliefs, the value they bring, and their limitations. Finally, this paper presents 3 emerging paradigms for interpretability. The first paradigm designs models such that faithfulness can be easily measured. Another optimizes models such that explanations become faithful. The last paradigm proposes to develop models that produce both a prediction and an explanation.

Large language models (LLMs) excel across diverse tasks but face significant deployment challenges due to high inference costs. LLM inference comprises prefill (compute-bound) and decode (memory-bound) stages, with decode dominating latency particularly for long sequences. Current decoder-only models handle both stages uniformly, despite their distinct computational profiles. We propose OverFill, which decouples these stages to optimize accuracy-efficiency tradeoffs. OverFill begins with a full model for prefill, processing system and user inputs in parallel. It then switches to a dense pruned model, while generating tokens sequentially. Leveraging more compute during prefill, OverFill improves generation quality with minimal latency overhead. Our 3B-to-1B OverFill configuration outperforms 1B pruned models by 83.2%, while the 8B-to-3B configuration improves over 3B pruned models by 79.2% on average across standard benchmarks. OverFill matches the performance of same-sized models trained from scratch, while using significantly less training data. Our code is available at https://github.com/friendshipkim/overfill.

Interpreting the law is always essential for the law to adapt to the ever-changing society. It is a critical and challenging task even for legal practitioners, as it requires meticulous and professional annotations and summarizations by legal experts, which are admittedly time-consuming and expensive to collect at scale. To alleviate the burden on legal experts, we propose a method for automated legal interpretation. Specifically, by emulating doctrinal legal research, we introduce a novel framework, ATRIE, to address Legal Concept Interpretation, a typical task in legal interpretation. ATRIE utilizes large language models (LLMs) to AuTomatically Retrieve concept-related information, Interpret legal concepts, and Evaluate generated interpretations, eliminating dependence on legal experts. ATRIE comprises a legal concept interpreter and a legal concept interpretation evaluator. The interpreter uses LLMs to retrieve relevant information from previous cases and interpret legal concepts. The evaluator uses performance changes on Legal Concept Entailment, a downstream task we propose, as a proxy of interpretation quality. Automated and multifaceted human evaluations indicate that the quality of our interpretations is comparable to those written by legal experts, with superior comprehensiveness and readability. Although there remains a slight gap in accuracy, it can already assist legal practitioners in improving the efficiency of legal interpretation.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Large language models are meticulously aligned to be both helpful and harmless. However, recent research points to a potential overkill which means models may refuse to answer benign queries. In this paper, we investigate the factors for overkill by exploring how models handle and determine the safety of queries. Our findings reveal the presence of shortcuts within models, leading to an over-attention of harmful words like 'kill' and prompts emphasizing safety will exacerbate overkill. Based on these insights, we introduce Self-Contrastive Decoding (Self-CD), a training-free and model-agnostic strategy, to alleviate this phenomenon. We first extract such over-attention by amplifying the difference in the model's output distributions when responding to system prompts that either include or omit an emphasis on safety. Then we determine the final next-token predictions by downplaying the over-attention from the model via contrastive decoding. Empirical results indicate that our method has achieved an average reduction of the refusal rate by 20\% while having almost no impact on safety.

To demystify the "black box" property of deep neural networks for natural language processing (NLP), several methods have been proposed to interpret their predictions by measuring the change in prediction probability after erasing each token of an input. Since existing methods replace each token with a predefined value (i.e., zero), the resulting sentence lies out of the training data distribution, yielding misleading interpretations. In this study, we raise the out-of-distribution problem induced by the existing interpretation methods and present a remedy; we propose to marginalize each token out. We interpret various NLP models trained for sentiment analysis and natural language inference using the proposed method.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance in complex tasks, often outperforming conventional large language models (LLMs). However, the prevalent issue of overthinking severely limits their computational efficiency. Overthinking occurs when models generate excessive and redundant tokens that contribute little to accurate outcomes, especially in simple tasks, resulting in a significant waste of computational resources. To systematically investigate this issue, we introduce Think-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning efficiency of LRMs. We also propose novel efficiency metrics and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various LRMs across multiple dimensions, including the reasoning process, outcome quality, and chain-of-thought (CoT) characteristics. Our analysis reveals that most LRMs exhibit overthinking in handling easy questions, generating unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains. While many LRMs demonstrate high CoT quality, several suffer from low efficiency. We hope that Think-Bench can serve as a robust foundation for advancing research into LRMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown substantial capacity for generating fluent, contextually appropriate responses. However, they can produce hallucinated outputs, especially when a user query includes one or more false premises-claims that contradict established facts. Such premises can mislead LLMs into offering fabricated or misleading details. Existing approaches include pretraining, fine-tuning, and inference-time techniques that often rely on access to logits or address hallucinations after they occur. These methods tend to be computationally expensive, require extensive training data, or lack proactive mechanisms to prevent hallucination before generation, limiting their efficiency in real-time applications. We propose a retrieval-based framework that identifies and addresses false premises before generation. Our method first transforms a user's query into a logical representation, then applies retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) to assess the validity of each premise using factual sources. Finally, we incorporate the verification results into the LLM's prompt to maintain factual consistency in the final output. Experiments show that this approach effectively reduces hallucinations, improves factual accuracy, and does not require access to model logits or large-scale fine-tuning.

Language Models [LMs] are now playing an increasingly large role in information generation and synthesis; the representation of scientific knowledge in these systems needs to be highly accurate. A prime challenge is hallucination; that is, generating apparently plausible but actually false information, including invented citations and nonexistent research papers. This kind of inaccuracy is dangerous in all the domains that require high levels of factual correctness, such as academia and education. This work presents a pipeline for evaluating the frequency with which language models hallucinate in generating responses in the scientific literature. We propose ArxEval, an evaluation pipeline with two tasks using ArXiv as a repository: Jumbled Titles and Mixed Titles. Our evaluation includes fifteen widely used language models and provides comparative insights into their reliability in handling scientific literature.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as science, law, and healthcare, where accurate expressions of uncertainty are essential for reliability and trust. However, current LLMs are often observed to generate incorrect answers with high confidence, a phenomenon known as "overconfidence". Recent efforts have focused on calibrating LLMs' verbalized confidence: i.e., their expressions of confidence in text form, such as "I am 80% confident that...". Existing approaches either rely on prompt engineering or fine-tuning with heuristically generated uncertainty estimates, both of which have limited effectiveness and generalizability. Motivated by the notion of proper scoring rules for calibration in classical machine learning models, we introduce ConfTuner, a simple and efficient fine-tuning method that introduces minimal overhead and does not require ground-truth confidence scores or proxy confidence estimates. ConfTuner relies on a new loss function, tokenized Brier score, which we theoretically prove to be a proper scoring rule, intuitively meaning that it "correctly incentivizes the model to report its true probability of being correct". ConfTuner improves calibration across diverse reasoning tasks and generalizes to black-box models such as GPT-4o. Our results further show that better-calibrated confidence enables downstream gains in self-correction and model cascade, advancing the development of trustworthy LLM systems. The code is available at https://github.com/liushiliushi/ConfTuner.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has shown impressive capabilities in mitigating hallucinations in large language models (LLMs). However, LLMs struggle to handle misleading retrievals and often fail to maintain their own reasoning when exposed to conflicting or selectively-framed evidence, making them vulnerable to real-world misinformation. In such real-world retrieval scenarios, misleading and conflicting information is rampant, particularly in the political domain, where evidence is often selectively framed, incomplete, or polarized. However, existing RAG benchmarks largely assume a clean retrieval setting, where models succeed by accurately retrieving and generating answers from gold-standard documents. This assumption fails to align with real-world conditions, leading to an overestimation of RAG system performance. To bridge this gap, we introduce RAGuard, a fact-checking dataset designed to evaluate the robustness of RAG systems against misleading retrievals. Unlike prior benchmarks that rely on synthetic noise, our dataset constructs its retrieval corpus from Reddit discussions, capturing naturally occurring misinformation. It categorizes retrieved evidence into three types: supporting, misleading, and irrelevant, providing a realistic and challenging testbed for assessing how well RAG systems navigate different retrieval information. Our benchmark experiments reveal that when exposed to misleading retrievals, all tested LLM-powered RAG systems perform worse than their zero-shot baselines (i.e., no retrieval at all), highlighting their susceptibility to noisy environments. To the best of our knowledge, RAGuard is the first benchmark to systematically assess RAG robustness against misleading evidence. We expect this benchmark will drive future research toward improving RAG systems beyond idealized datasets, making them more reliable for real-world applications.

The reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have improved substantially through increased test-time computation, typically in the form of intermediate tokens known as chain-of-thought (CoT). However, CoT often becomes unnecessarily long, increasing computation cost without actual accuracy gains or sometimes even degrading performance, a phenomenon known as ``overthinking''. We propose a multi-stage efficient reasoning method that combines supervised fine-tuning -- via rejection sampling or reasoning trace reformatting -- with reinforcement learning using an adaptive length penalty. We introduce a lightweight reward function that penalizes tokens generated after the first correct answer but encouraging self-verification only when beneficial. We conduct a holistic evaluation across seven diverse reasoning tasks, analyzing the accuracy-response length trade-off. Our approach reduces response length by an average of 28\% for 8B models and 40\% for 32B models, while incurring only minor performance drops of 1.6 and 2.5 points, respectively. Despite its conceptual simplicity, it achieves a superior trade-off compared to more complex state-of-the-art efficient reasoning methods, scoring 76.6, in terms of the area under the Overthinking-Adjusted Accuracy curve (AUC_{OAA}) -- 5 points above the base model and 2.5 points above the second-best approach.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Retrieval augmented generation (RAG) systems augment how knowledge language models are by integrating external information sources such as Wikipedia, internal documents, scientific papers, or the open internet. RAG systems that rely on the open internet as their knowledge source have to contend with the complexities of human-generated content. Human communication extends much deeper than just the words rendered as text. Intent, tonality, and connotation can all change the meaning of what is being conveyed. Recent real-world deployments of RAG systems have shown some difficulty in understanding these nuances of human communication. One significant challenge for these systems lies in processing sarcasm. Though the Large Language Models (LLMs) that make up the backbone of these RAG systems are able to detect sarcasm, they currently do not always use these detections for the subsequent processing of text. To address these issues, in this paper, we synthetically generate sarcastic passages from Natural Question's Wikipedia retrieval corpus. We then test the impact of these passages on the performance of both the retriever and reader portion of the RAG pipeline. We introduce a prompting system designed to enhance the model's ability to interpret and generate responses in the presence of sarcasm, thus improving overall system performance. Finally, we conduct ablation studies to validate the effectiveness of our approach, demonstrating improvements in handling sarcastic content within RAG systems.

Idioms pose a fundamental challenge for language models, as their meaning cannot be inferred from surface form alone. Understanding such expressions, therefore, requires semantic abstraction beyond lexical overlap. We introduce IdioLink, a retrieval benchmark designed to test whether models can link idiomatic expressions to conceptually equivalent meanings expressed in literal or paraphrased forms. IdioLink comprises 10,700 documents and 2,140 queries, spanning 107 idioms with both literal and figurative uses. Each document and query is annotated with spans that convey the core meaning. Evaluating strong embedding baselines (e.g., BGE, E5, Contriever, and Qwen), we show that current models struggle to retrieve equivalent meanings across divergent surface realizations, relying instead on topical and shallow semantic cues. IdioLink exposes key gaps in idiom-aware semantic retrieval and provides a challenging testbed for future models.

Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment. Instead, this paper highlights the need for principled approaches to more advanced alignment. Alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave safely and reliably, including by avoiding unsafe inferences. However, we show that such safety-oriented behaviors can misfire: models may reject warranted conclusions even when they are explicitly supported by context. We call this failure mode misfired alignment, where alignment-induced changes cause LLMs to override explicit evidence. To quantify this phenomenon, specifically on stereotype-related alignment, we introduce VETO, a benchmark consisting of 2,032 BBQ-derived contrastive pairs, and define a new metric, Misfired Alignment Rate (MAR), which measures on a 0 to 100 scale how often a model fails on a stereotype-related question but succeeds on its contrastive counterpart. We benchmark 25 LLMs on VETO, and show that all LLMs, including the most recent ones, exhibit non-trivial (4.7 to 18.9%) MARs while all human participants achieve 0.0% MAR. Controlled priming experiments further show that alignment-induced cues can substantially amplify MAR across LLMs, indicating that these failures are not merely artifacts of individual examples but can be induced by safety-related framing. Mechanistic analyses on open-weight LLMs reveal late-layer suppression of evidence-supported answers, and comparisons between instruct and base LLMs suggest that this suppression emerges after instruction training. These findings show that current alignment methods can overgeneralize surface-level safety cues, to the point of overriding objective evidence, motivating more work on alignment objectives that better preserve contextual grounding.

Introducing reasoning models into Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhances task performance through step-by-step reasoning, logical consistency, and multi-step self-verification. However, recent studies have shown that reasoning models suffer from overthinking attacks, where models are tricked to generate unnecessarily high number of reasoning tokens. In this paper, we reveal that such overthinking risk can be inherited by RAG systems equipped with reasoning models, by proposing an end-to-end attack framework named Contradiction-Based Deliberation Extension (CODE). Specifically, CODE develops a multi-agent architecture to construct poisoning samples that are injected into the knowledge base. These samples 1) are highly correlated with the use query, such that can be retrieved as inputs to the reasoning model; and 2) contain contradiction between the logical and evidence layers that cause models to overthink, and are optimized to exhibit highly diverse styles. Moreover, the inference overhead of CODE is extremely difficult to detect, as no modification is needed on the user query, and the task accuracy remain unaffected. Extensive experiments on two datasets across five commercial reasoning models demonstrate that the proposed attack causes a 5.32x-24.72x increase in reasoning token consumption, without degrading task performance. Finally, we also discuss and evaluate potential countermeasures to mitigate overthinking risks.

Natural language reasoning plays an increasingly important role in improving language models' ability to solve complex language understanding tasks. An interesting use case for reasoning is the resolution of context-dependent ambiguity. But no resources exist to evaluate how well Large Language Models can use explicit reasoning to resolve ambiguity in language. We propose to use ambiguous definite descriptions for this purpose and create and publish the first benchmark dataset consisting of such phrases. Our method includes all information required to resolve the ambiguity in the prompt, which means a model does not require anything but reasoning to do well. We find this to be a challenging task for recent LLMs. Code and data available at: https://github.com/sfschouten/exploiting-ambiguity

Supervised machine learning models boast remarkable predictive capabilities. But can you trust your model? Will it work in deployment? What else can it tell you about the world? We want models to be not only good, but interpretable. And yet the task of interpretation appears underspecified. Papers provide diverse and sometimes non-overlapping motivations for interpretability, and offer myriad notions of what attributes render models interpretable. Despite this ambiguity, many papers proclaim interpretability axiomatically, absent further explanation. In this paper, we seek to refine the discourse on interpretability. First, we examine the motivations underlying interest in interpretability, finding them to be diverse and occasionally discordant. Then, we address model properties and techniques thought to confer interpretability, identifying transparency to humans and post-hoc explanations as competing notions. Throughout, we discuss the feasibility and desirability of different notions, and question the oft-made assertions that linear models are interpretable and that deep neural networks are not.

While Large language models (LLMs) have become excellent writing assistants, they still struggle with quotation generation. This is because they either hallucinate when providing factual quotations or fail to provide quotes that exceed human expectations. To bridge the gap, we systematically study how to evaluate and improve LLMs' performance in quotation generation tasks. We first establish a holistic and automatic evaluation system for quotation generation task, which consists of five criteria each with corresponding automatic metric. To improve the LLMs' quotation generation abilities, we construct a bilingual knowledge base that is broad in scope and rich in dimensions, containing up to 32,022 quotes. Moreover, guided by our critiria, we further design a quotation-specific metric to rerank the retrieved quotations from the knowledge base. Extensive experiments show that our metrics strongly correlate with human preferences. Existing LLMs struggle to generate desired quotes, but our quotation knowledge base and reranking metric help narrow this gap. Our dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/GraceXiaoo/QUILL.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Natural Language Inference (NLI) relies heavily on adequately parsing the semantic content of the premise and hypothesis. In this work, we investigate whether adding semantic information in the form of an Abstract Meaning Representation (AMR) helps pretrained language models better generalize in NLI. Our experiments integrating AMR into NLI in both fine-tuning and prompting settings show that the presence of AMR in fine-tuning hinders model generalization while prompting with AMR leads to slight gains in GPT-4o. However, an ablation study reveals that the improvement comes from amplifying surface-level differences rather than aiding semantic reasoning. This amplification can mislead models to predict non-entailment even when the core meaning is preserved.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

We showcase that ChatGPT can be used to disambiguate lemmas in two endangered languages ChatGPT is not proficient in, namely Erzya and Skolt Sami. We augment our prompt by providing dictionary translations of the candidate lemmas to a majority language - Finnish in our case. This dictionary augmented generation approach results in 50\% accuracy for Skolt Sami and 41\% accuracy for Erzya. On a closer inspection, many of the error types were of the kind even an untrained human annotator would make.

Understanding narratives requires reading between the lines, which in turn, requires interpreting the likely causes and effects of events, even when they are not mentioned explicitly. In this paper, we introduce Cosmos QA, a large-scale dataset of 35,600 problems that require commonsense-based reading comprehension, formulated as multiple-choice questions. In stark contrast to most existing reading comprehension datasets where the questions focus on factual and literal understanding of the context paragraph, our dataset focuses on reading between the lines over a diverse collection of people's everyday narratives, asking such questions as "what might be the possible reason of ...?", or "what would have happened if ..." that require reasoning beyond the exact text spans in the context. To establish baseline performances on Cosmos QA, we experiment with several state-of-the-art neural architectures for reading comprehension, and also propose a new architecture that improves over the competitive baselines. Experimental results demonstrate a significant gap between machine (68.4%) and human performance (94%), pointing to avenues for future research on commonsense machine comprehension. Dataset, code and leaderboard is publicly available at https://wilburone.github.io/cosmos.

Figurative and metaphorical language are commonplace in discourse, and figurative expressions play an important role in communication and cognition. However, figurative language has been a relatively under-studied area in NLP, and it remains an open question to what extent modern language models can interpret nonliteral phrases. To address this question, we introduce Fig-QA, a Winograd-style nonliteral language understanding task consisting of correctly interpreting paired figurative phrases with divergent meanings. We evaluate the performance of several state-of-the-art language models on this task, and find that although language models achieve performance significantly over chance, they still fall short of human performance, particularly in zero- or few-shot settings. This suggests that further work is needed to improve the nonliteral reasoning capabilities of language models.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

We report a peculiar observation that LLMs can assign hidden meanings to sequences that seem visually incomprehensible to humans: for example, a nonsensical phrase consisting of Byzantine musical symbols is recognized by gpt-4o as "say abracadabra". Moreover, some models can communicate using these sequences. Some of these meanings are hypothesized to partly originate in the massive spurious correlations due to BPE tokenization. We systematically evaluate the presence of such abilities in a wide range of models: Claude-3.5 Haiku, Claude-3.5 Sonnet (New and Old), Claude-3.7 Sonnet, gpt-4o mini, gpt-4o, o1-mini, Llama-3.3 70B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Lllama 70B, Qwen2.5 1.5B, Qwen2.5 32B, Phi-3.5 mini, GigaChat-Max, Vikhr-Llama-3.2 1B. We argue that this observation might have far-reaching consequences for both safety and security of the modern and future LLMs and systems that employ them. As an illustration, we show that applying this method in combination with simple templates is sufficient to jailbreak previous generation models, with ASR = 0.4 on gpt-4o mini. Our code and data artifacts are available at https://github.com/L3G5/llm-hidden-meanings

This document offers a detailed linguistic description of SNACS (Semantic Network of Adposition and Case Supersenses; Schneider et al., 2018), an inventory of 52 semantic labels ("supersenses") that characterize the use of adpositions and case markers at a somewhat coarse level of granularity, as demonstrated in the STREUSLE corpus (https://github.com/nert-nlp/streusle/ ; version 4.5 tracks guidelines version 2.6). Though the SNACS inventory aspires to be universal, this document is specific to English; documentation for other languages will be published separately. Version 2 is a revision of the supersense inventory proposed for English by Schneider et al. (2015, 2016) (henceforth "v1"), which in turn was based on previous schemes. The present inventory was developed after extensive review of the v1 corpus annotations for English, plus previously unanalyzed genitive case possessives (Blodgett and Schneider, 2018), as well as consideration of adposition and case phenomena in Hebrew, Hindi, Korean, and German. Hwang et al. (2017) present the theoretical underpinnings of the v2 scheme. Schneider et al. (2018) summarize the scheme, its application to English corpus data, and an automatic disambiguation task. Liu et al. (2021) offer an English Lexical Semantic Recognition tagger that includes SNACS labels in its output. This documentation can also be browsed alongside corpus data on the Xposition website (Gessler et al., 2022): http://www.xposition.org/

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

Despite the frequent challenges posed by ambiguity when representing meaning via natural language, it is often ignored or deliberately removed in tasks mapping language to formally-designed representations, which generally assume a one-to-one mapping between linguistic and formal representations. We attempt to address this shortcoming by introducing AmP, a framework, dataset, and challenge for translating ambiguous natural language to formal representations like logic and code. We define templates and generate data for five well-documented linguistic ambiguities. Using AmP, we investigate how several few-shot text-to-code systems handle ambiguity, introducing three new metrics. We find that large pre-trained models perform poorly at capturing the distribution of possible meanings without deliberate instruction. However, models are able to capture the distribution well when ambiguity is attested in their inputs. These results motivate a call for including ambiguity explicitly in datasets and promote considering the distribution of possible outputs when evaluating systems. Data and code: https://github.com/esteng/ambiguous_parsing

A situated query like "where is Lin Wei?" often encodes more than its literal content: the user may also want to know whether Lin Wei is free, in a good mood, or worth interrupting now. Standard tool-use agents answer the literal question and stop. AURA inserts an inference step between scene perception and tool use that produces an IntentFrame: a structured estimate of the implicit need with a scalar gap score that controls per-query probe budget and tool selection. On a 100-query four-scene implicit-intent benchmark, AURA improves implicit-need coverage over ReAct-style probing (Delta = +0.07, p < 10^-6); three of four scenes are individually significant, the gain reproduces on a second backbone, and a prompt ablation attributes the lift to gap calibration rather than answer memorisation. On factual lookup the controller trades raw accuracy for 82% fewer probes and zero forbidden-tool violations on a privacy-sensitive slice; scope conditions are detailed in Limitations. Code, simulator, and benchmark are released at https://github.com/innovation64/AURA.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

Idioms, whose figurative meanings usually differ from their literal interpretations, are common in everyday language, especially in Chinese, where they often contain historical references and follow specific structural patterns. Despite recent progress in machine translation with large language models, little is known about Chinese idiom translation. In this work, we introduce IdiomEval, a framework with a comprehensive error taxonomy for Chinese idiom translation. We annotate 900 translation pairs from nine modern systems, including GPT-4o and Google Translate, across four domains: web, news, Wikipedia, and social media. We find these systems fail at idiom translation, producing incorrect, literal, partial, or even missing translations. The best-performing system, GPT-4, makes errors in 28% of cases. We also find that existing evaluation metrics measure idiom quality poorly with Pearson correlation below 0.48 with human ratings. We thus develop improved models that achieve F_1 scores of 0.68 for detecting idiom translation errors.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success across diverse vision-language tasks, yet their internal decision-making mechanisms remain insufficiently understood. Existing interpretability research has primarily focused on cross-modal attribution, identifying which image regions the model attends to during output generation. However, these approaches often overlook intra-modal dependencies. In the visual modality, attributing importance to isolated image patches ignores spatial context due to limited receptive fields, resulting in fragmented and noisy explanations. In the textual modality, reliance on preceding tokens introduces spurious activations. Failing to effectively mitigate these interference compromises attribution fidelity. To address these limitations, we propose enhancing interpretability by leveraging intra-modal interaction. For the visual branch, we introduce Multi-Scale Explanation Aggregation (MSEA), which aggregates attributions over multi-scale inputs to dynamically adjust receptive fields, producing more holistic and spatially coherent visual explanations. For the textual branch, we propose Activation Ranking Correlation (ARC), which measures the relevance of contextual tokens to the current token via alignment of their top-k prediction rankings. ARC leverages this relevance to suppress spurious activations from irrelevant contexts while preserving semantically coherent ones. Extensive experiments across state-of-the-art MLLMs and benchmark datasets demonstrate that our approach consistently outperforms existing interpretability methods, yielding more faithful and fine-grained explanations of model behavior.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

Code provides a general syntactic structure to build complex programs and perform precise computations when paired with a code interpreter - we hypothesize that language models (LMs) can leverage code-writing to improve Chain of Thought reasoning not only for logic and arithmetic tasks, but also for semantic ones (and in particular, those that are a mix of both). For example, consider prompting an LM to write code that counts the number of times it detects sarcasm in an essay: the LM may struggle to write an implementation for "detect_sarcasm(string)" that can be executed by the interpreter (handling the edge cases would be insurmountable). However, LMs may still produce a valid solution if they not only write code, but also selectively "emulate" the interpreter by generating the expected output of "detect_sarcasm(string)". In this work, we propose Chain of Code (CoC), a simple yet surprisingly effective extension that improves LM code-driven reasoning. The key idea is to encourage LMs to format semantic sub-tasks in a program as flexible pseudocode that the interpreter can explicitly catch undefined behaviors and hand off to simulate with an LM (as an "LMulator"). Experiments demonstrate that Chain of Code outperforms Chain of Thought and other baselines across a variety of benchmarks; on BIG-Bench Hard, Chain of Code achieves 84%, a gain of 12% over Chain of Thought. In a nutshell, CoC broadens the scope of reasoning questions that LMs can answer by "thinking in code".

Natural language inference (NLI) is an increasingly important task for natural language understanding, which requires one to infer whether a sentence entails another. However, the ability of NLI models to make pragmatic inferences remains understudied. We create an IMPlicature and PRESupposition diagnostic dataset (IMPPRES), consisting of >25k semiautomatically generated sentence pairs illustrating well-studied pragmatic inference types. We use IMPPRES to evaluate whether BERT, InferSent, and BOW NLI models trained on MultiNLI (Williams et al., 2018) learn to make pragmatic inferences. Although MultiNLI appears to contain very few pairs illustrating these inference types, we find that BERT learns to draw pragmatic inferences. It reliably treats scalar implicatures triggered by "some" as entailments. For some presupposition triggers like "only", BERT reliably recognizes the presupposition as an entailment, even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator like negation. BOW and InferSent show weaker evidence of pragmatic reasoning. We conclude that NLI training encourages models to learn some, but not all, pragmatic inferences.

Prior work has shown that presupposition in generated questions can introduce unverified assumptions, leading to inconsistencies in claim verification. Additionally, prompt sensitivity remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs), resulting in performance variance as high as 3-6%. While recent advancements have reduced this gap, our study demonstrates that prompt sensitivity remains a persistent issue. To address this, we propose a structured and robust claim verification framework that reasons through presupposition-free, decomposed questions. Extensive experiments across multiple prompts, datasets, and LLMs reveal that even state-of-the-art models remain susceptible to prompt variance and presupposition. Our method consistently mitigates these issues, achieving up to a 2-5% improvement.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

Mean Field Variational Inference (MFVI) is widely understood to underestimate posterior variance. By analysing conjugate Bayesian Linear Regression (BLR), we show that this characterization is incomplete: while MFVI underestimates the variance in parameter space, it can overestimate the predictive variance compared to the exact posterior. We show that if the MFVI posterior underestimates predictive variances in some directions, it necessarily overestimates them in others. Crucially, this overestimation occurs in directions where the training data concentrates. This leads to the surprising result that, for a test point drawn from the training distribution, MFVI's expected predictive variance exceeds that of the exact posterior. We demonstrate a pathological case of this effect, where the MFVI posterior fails to reduce predictive variance compared to the prior on in distribution data. We connect these results to the Cold Posterior Effect, arguing that varying the temperature can correct this overestimation, yielding predictions closer to those of the exact posterior. We validate our theory on synthetic and real-world regression tasks.

Autoregressive language models are trained by minimizing the cross-entropy of the model distribution Q relative to the data distribution P -- that is, minimizing the forward cross-entropy, which is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). We have observed that models trained in this way may "over-generalize", in the sense that they produce non-human-like text. Moreover, we believe that reverse cross-entropy, i.e., the cross-entropy of P relative to Q, is a better reflection of how a human would evaluate text generated by a model. Hence, we propose learning with MixCE, an objective that mixes the forward and reverse cross-entropies. We evaluate models trained with this objective on synthetic data settings (where P is known) and real data, and show that the resulting models yield better generated text without complex decoding strategies. Our code and models are publicly available at https://github.com/bloomberg/mixce-acl2023

Sarcasm detection poses a fundamental challenge in computational semantics, requiring models to resolve disparities between literal and intended meaning. The challenge is amplified in low-resource languages where annotated datasets are scarce or nonexistent. We present Yor-Sarc, the first gold-standard dataset for sarcasm detection in Yorùbá, a tonal Niger-Congo language spoken by over 50 million people. The dataset comprises 436 instances annotated by three native speakers from diverse dialectal backgrounds using an annotation protocol specifically designed for Yorùbá sarcasm by taking culture into account. This protocol incorporates context-sensitive interpretation and community-informed guidelines and is accompanied by a comprehensive analysis of inter-annotator agreement to support replication in other African languages. Substantial to almost perfect agreement was achieved (Fleiss' κ= 0.7660; pairwise Cohen's κ= 0.6732--0.8743), with 83.3% unanimous consensus. One annotator pair achieved almost perfect agreement (κ= 0.8743; 93.8% raw agreement), exceeding a number of reported benchmarks for English sarcasm research works. The remaining 16.7% majority-agreement cases are preserved as soft labels for uncertainty-aware modelling. Yor-Sarchttps://github.com/toheebadura/yor-sarc is expected to facilitate research on semantic interpretation and culturally informed NLP for low-resource African languages.

False-presupposition QA (FPQA) tests LLMs on their ability to identify false presuppositions in questions and abstain or correct them rather than reinforcing false assumptions. The common approach reduces the task to prompting LLMs to extract presuppositions and fact checking each presupposition. While the performance on dedicated benchmarks keeps improving, evaluation largely focuses on questions with false presuppositions (FPQs) while ignoring the performance on ``normal'' questions (TPQs). Since many benchmarks over-represent FPQs compared to their natural occurrence, the result is that performance on these benchmarks doesn't reflect real-world QA performance. Through extensive experiments across various model families, sizes, and benchmarks, we show that methods that perform better on FPQs tend to perform worse on TPQs. Our analysis reveals this is the result of weak fact checking modules that reject also true presuppositions. We hope our findings will help guide future work toward FPQA methods that generalize well to realistic settings.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Honesty is a fundamental principle for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring these models to recognize what they know and don't know and be able to faithfully express their knowledge. Despite promising, current LLMs still exhibit significant dishonest behaviors, such as confidently presenting wrong answers or failing to express what they know. In addition, research on the honesty of LLMs also faces challenges, including varying definitions of honesty, difficulties in distinguishing between known and unknown knowledge, and a lack of comprehensive understanding of related research. To address these issues, we provide a survey on the honesty of LLMs, covering its clarification, evaluation approaches, and strategies for improvement. Moreover, we offer insights for future research, aiming to inspire further exploration in this important area.

We present a comprehensive evaluation of the ability of large language models (LLMs) to process culturally grounded language, specifically to understand and pragmatically use figurative expressions that encode local knowledge and cultural nuance. Using figurative language as a proxy for cultural nuance and local knowledge, we design evaluation tasks for contextual understanding, pragmatic use, and connotation interpretation in Arabic and English. We evaluate 22 open- and closed-source LLMs on Egyptian Arabic idioms, multidialectal Arabic proverbs, and English proverbs. Our results show a consistent hierarchy: the average accuracy for Arabic proverbs is 4.29% lower than for English proverbs, and performance for Egyptian idioms is 10.28% lower than for Arabic proverbs. For the pragmatic use task, accuracy drops by 14.07% relative to understanding, though providing contextual idiomatic sentences improves accuracy by 10.66%. Models also struggle with connotative meaning, reaching at most 85.58% agreement with human annotators on idioms with 100% inter-annotator agreement. These findings demonstrate that figurative language serves as an effective diagnostic for cultural reasoning: while LLMs can often interpret figurative meaning, they face challenges in using it appropriately. To support future research, we release Kinayat, the first dataset of Egyptian Arabic idioms designed for both figurative understanding and pragmatic use evaluation.

With the growing importance of detecting misinformation, many studies have focused on verifying factual claims by retrieving evidence. However, canonical fact verification tasks do not apply to catching subtle differences in factually consistent claims, which might still bias the readers, especially on contentious political or economic issues. Our underlying assumption is that among the trusted sources, one's argument is not necessarily more true than the other, requiring comparison rather than verification. In this study, we propose ClaimDiff, a novel dataset that primarily focuses on comparing the nuance between claim pairs. In ClaimDiff, we provide 2,941 annotated claim pairs from 268 news articles. We observe that while humans are capable of detecting the nuances between claims, strong baselines struggle to detect them, showing over a 19% absolute gap with the humans. We hope this initial study could help readers to gain an unbiased grasp of contentious issues through machine-aided comparison.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW