Daily Papers

The remarkable capability of large language models (LLMs) has led to the wide application of LLM-based agents in various domains. To standardize interactions between LLM-based agents and their environments, model context protocol (MCP) tools have become the de facto standard and are now widely integrated into these agents. However, the incorporation of MCP tools introduces the risk of tool poisoning attacks, which can manipulate the behavior of LLM-based agents. Although previous studies have identified such vulnerabilities, their red teaming approaches have largely remained at the proof-of-concept stage, leaving the automatic and systematic red teaming of LLM-based agents under the MCP tool poisoning paradigm an open question. To bridge this gap, we propose AutoMalTool, an automated red teaming framework for LLM-based agents by generating malicious MCP tools. Our extensive evaluation shows that AutoMalTool effectively generates malicious MCP tools capable of manipulating the behavior of mainstream LLM-based agents while evading current detection mechanisms, thereby revealing new security risks in these agents.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

Although Foundation Models (FMs), such as GPT-4, are increasingly used in domains like finance and software engineering, reliance on textual interfaces limits these models' real-world interaction. To address this, FM providers introduced tool calling-triggering a proliferation of frameworks with distinct tool interfaces. In late 2024, Anthropic introduced the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to standardize this tool ecosystem, which has become the de facto standard with over eight million weekly SDK downloads. Despite its adoption, MCP's AI-driven, non-deterministic control flow introduces new risks to sustainability, security, and maintainability, warranting closer examination. Towards this end, we present the first large-scale empirical study of MCP servers. Using state-of-the-art health metrics and a hybrid analysis pipeline, combining a general-purpose static analysis tool with an MCP-specific scanner, we evaluate 1,899 open-source MCP servers to assess their health, security, and maintainability. Despite MCP servers demonstrating strong health metrics, we identify eight distinct vulnerabilities - only three overlapping with traditional software vulnerabilities. Additionally, 7.2% of servers contain general vulnerabilities and 5.5% exhibit MCP-specific tool poisoning. Regarding maintainability, while 66% exhibit code smells, 14.4% contain nine bug patterns overlapping with traditional open-source software projects. These findings highlight the need for MCP-specific vulnerability detection techniques while reaffirming the value of traditional analysis and refactoring practices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a universal, open standard for connecting AI agents with data sources and external tools. While MCP enhances the capabilities of LLM-based agents, it also introduces new security risks and expands their attack surfaces. In this paper, we present the first systematic taxonomy of MCP security, identifying 17 attack types across 4 primary attack surfaces. We introduce MCPSecBench, a comprehensive security benchmark and playground that integrates prompt datasets, MCP servers, MCP clients, attack scripts, and protection mechanisms to evaluate these attacks across three major MCP providers. Our benchmark is modular and extensible, allowing researchers to incorporate custom implementations of clients, servers, and transport protocols for systematic security assessment. Experimental results show that over 85% of the identified attacks successfully compromise at least one platform, with core vulnerabilities universally affecting Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor, while prompt-based and tool-centric attacks exhibit considerable variability across different hosts and models. In addition, current protection mechanisms have little effect against these attacks. Overall, MCPSecBench standardizes the evaluation of MCP security and enables rigorous testing across all MCP layers.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

Recent advances in operating system (OS) agents enable vision-language models to interact directly with the graphical user interface of an OS. These multimodal OS agents autonomously perform computer-based tasks in response to a single prompt via application programming interfaces (APIs). Such APIs typically support low-level operations, including mouse clicks, keyboard inputs, and screenshot captures. We introduce a novel attack vector: malicious image patches (MIPs) that have been adversarially perturbed so that, when captured in a screenshot, they cause an OS agent to perform harmful actions by exploiting specific APIs. For instance, MIPs embedded in desktop backgrounds or shared on social media can redirect an agent to a malicious website, enabling further exploitation. These MIPs generalise across different user requests and screen layouts, and remain effective for multiple OS agents. The existence of such attacks highlights critical security vulnerabilities in OS agents, which should be carefully addressed before their widespread adoption.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), introduced by Anthropic, provides a standardized framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems to interact with external data sources and tools in real-time. While MCP offers significant advantages for AI integration and capability extension, it introduces novel security challenges that demand rigorous analysis and mitigation. This paper builds upon foundational research into MCP architecture and preliminary security assessments to deliver enterprise-grade mitigation frameworks and detailed technical implementation strategies. Through systematic threat modeling and analysis of MCP implementations and analysis of potential attack vectors, including sophisticated threats like tool poisoning, we present actionable security patterns tailored for MCP implementers and adopters. The primary contribution of this research lies in translating theoretical security concerns into a practical, implementable framework with actionable controls, thereby providing essential guidance for the secure enterprise adoption and governance of integrated AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) can now access a wide range of external tools, thanks to the Model Context Protocol (MCP). This greatly expands their abilities as various agents. However, LLMs rely entirely on the text descriptions of tools to decide which ones to use--a process that is surprisingly fragile. In this work, we expose a vulnerability in prevalent tool/function-calling protocols by investigating a series of edits to tool descriptions, some of which can drastically increase a tool's usage from LLMs when competing with alternatives. Through controlled experiments, we show that tools with properly edited descriptions receive over 10 times more usage from GPT-4.1 and Qwen2.5-7B than tools with original descriptions. We further evaluate how various edits to tool descriptions perform when competing directly with one another and how these trends generalize or differ across a broader set of 10 different models. These phenomenons, while giving developers a powerful way to promote their tools, underscore the need for a more reliable foundation for agentic LLMs to select and utilize tools and resources.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

The research builds and evaluates the adversarial potential to introduce copied code or hallucinated AI recommendations for malicious code in popular code repositories. While foundational large language models (LLMs) from OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic guard against both harmful behaviors and toxic strings, previous work on math solutions that embed harmful prompts demonstrate that the guardrails may differ between expert contexts. These loopholes would appear in mixture of expert's models when the context of the question changes and may offer fewer malicious training examples to filter toxic comments or recommended offensive actions. The present work demonstrates that foundational models may refuse to propose destructive actions correctly when prompted overtly but may unfortunately drop their guard when presented with a sudden change of context, like solving a computer programming challenge. We show empirical examples with trojan-hosting repositories like GitHub, NPM, NuGet, and popular content delivery networks (CDN) like jsDelivr which amplify the attack surface. In the LLM's directives to be helpful, example recommendations propose application programming interface (API) endpoints which a determined domain-squatter could acquire and setup attack mobile infrastructure that triggers from the naively copied code. We compare this attack to previous work on context-shifting and contrast the attack surface as a novel version of "living off the land" attacks in the malware literature. In the latter case, foundational language models can hijack otherwise innocent user prompts to recommend actions that violate their owners' safety policies when posed directly without the accompanying coding support request.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) and the introduction of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) have significantly expanded LLM agents' capability to interact dynamically with external tools and APIs. However, existing tool selection frameworks do not integrate MCP servers, instead relying heavily on error-prone manual updates to monolithic local tool repositories, leading to duplication, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies. Additionally, current approaches abstract tool selection before the LLM agent is invoked, limiting its autonomy and hindering dynamic re-querying capabilities during multi-turn interactions. To address these issues, we introduce ScaleMCP, a novel tool selection approach that dynamically equips LLM agents with a MCP tool retriever, giving agents the autonomy to add tools into their memory, as well as an auto-synchronizing tool storage system pipeline through CRUD (create, read, update, delete) operations with MCP servers as the single source of truth. We also propose a novel embedding strategy, Tool Document Weighted Average (TDWA), designed to selectively emphasize critical components of tool documents (e.g. tool name or synthetic questions) during the embedding process. Comprehensive evaluations conducted on a created dataset of 5,000 financial metric MCP servers, across 10 LLM models, 5 embedding models, and 5 retriever types, demonstrate substantial improvements in tool retrieval and agent invocation performance, emphasizing ScaleMCP's effectiveness in scalable, dynamic tool selection and invocation.

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed software development and automated code generation. Motivated by these advancements, this paper explores the feasibility of LLMs in modifying malware source code to generate variants. We introduce LLMalMorph, a semi-automated framework that leverages semantical and syntactical code comprehension by LLMs to generate new malware variants. LLMalMorph extracts function-level information from the malware source code and employs custom-engineered prompts coupled with strategically defined code transformations to guide the LLM in generating variants without resource-intensive fine-tuning. To evaluate LLMalMorph, we collected 10 diverse Windows malware samples of varying types, complexity and functionality and generated 618 variants. Our thorough experiments demonstrate that it is possible to reduce the detection rates of antivirus engines of these malware variants to some extent while preserving malware functionalities. In addition, despite not optimizing against any Machine Learning (ML)-based malware detectors, several variants also achieved notable attack success rates against an ML-based malware classifier. We also discuss the limitations of current LLM capabilities in generating malware variants from source code and assess where this emerging technology stands in the broader context of malware variant generation.

While poisoning attacks on machine learning models have been extensively studied, the mechanisms by which adversaries can distribute poisoned models at scale remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we shed light on how model leaderboards -- ranked platforms for model discovery and evaluation -- can serve as a powerful channel for adversaries for stealthy large-scale distribution of poisoned models. We present TrojanClimb, a general framework that enables injection of malicious behaviors while maintaining competitive leaderboard performance. We demonstrate its effectiveness across four diverse modalities: text-embedding, text-generation, text-to-speech and text-to-image, showing that adversaries can successfully achieve high leaderboard rankings while embedding arbitrary harmful functionalities, from backdoors to bias injection. Our findings reveal a significant vulnerability in the machine learning ecosystem, highlighting the urgent need to redesign leaderboard evaluation mechanisms to detect and filter malicious (e.g., poisoned) models, while exposing broader security implications for the machine learning community regarding the risks of adopting models from unverified sources.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are autonomous systems powered by LLMs, capable of reasoning and planning to solve problems by leveraging a set of tools. However, the integration of multi-tool capabilities in LLM agents introduces challenges in securely managing tools, ensuring their compatibility, handling dependency relationships, and protecting control flows within LLM agent workflows. In this paper, we present the first systematic security analysis of task control flows in multi-tool-enabled LLM agents. We identify a novel threat, Cross-Tool Harvesting and Polluting (XTHP), which includes multiple attack vectors to first hijack the normal control flows of agent tasks, and then collect and pollute confidential or private information within LLM agent systems. To understand the impact of this threat, we developed Chord, a dynamic scanning tool designed to automatically detect real-world agent tools susceptible to XTHP attacks. Our evaluation of 66 real-world tools from the repositories of two major LLM agent development frameworks, LangChain and LlamaIndex, revealed a significant security concern: 75\% are vulnerable to XTHP attacks, highlighting the prevalence of this threat.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a standardized interface designed to enable seamless interaction between AI models and external tools and resources, breaking down data silos and facilitating interoperability across diverse systems. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of MCP, focusing on its core components, workflow, and the lifecycle of MCP servers, which consists of three key phases: creation, operation, and update. We analyze the security and privacy risks associated with each phase and propose strategies to mitigate potential threats. The paper also examines the current MCP landscape, including its adoption by industry leaders and various use cases, as well as the tools and platforms supporting its integration. We explore future directions for MCP, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that will influence its adoption and evolution within the broader AI ecosystem. Finally, we offer recommendations for MCP stakeholders to ensure its secure and sustainable development as the AI landscape continues to evolve.

MCP standardizes how LLMs interact with external systems, forming the foundation for general agents. However, existing MCP benchmarks remain narrow in scope: they focus on read-heavy tasks or tasks with limited interaction depth, and fail to capture the complexity and realism of real-world workflows. To address this gap, we propose MCPMark, a benchmark designed to evaluate MCP use in a more realistic and comprehensive manner. It consists of 127 high-quality tasks collaboratively created by domain experts and AI agents. Each task begins with a curated initial state and includes a programmatic script for automatic verification. These tasks demand richer and more diverse interactions with the environment, involving a broad range of create, read, update, and delete (CRUD) operations. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of cutting-edge LLMs using a minimal agent framework that operates in a tool-calling loop. Empirical results show that the best-performing model, gpt-5-medium, reaches only 52.56\% pass@1 and 33.86\% pass^4, while other widely regarded strong models, including claude-sonnet-4 and o3, fall below 30\% pass@1 and 15\% pass^4. On average, LLMs require 16.2 execution turns and 17.4 tool calls per task, significantly surpassing those in previous MCP benchmarks and highlighting the stress-testing nature of MCPMark.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Machine-learning phishing webpage detectors (ML-PWD) have been shown to suffer from adversarial manipulations of the HTML code of the input webpage. Nevertheless, the attacks recently proposed have demonstrated limited effectiveness due to their lack of optimizing the usage of the adopted manipulations, and they focus solely on specific elements of the HTML code. In this work, we overcome these limitations by first designing a novel set of fine-grained manipulations which allow to modify the HTML code of the input phishing webpage without compromising its maliciousness and visual appearance, i.e., the manipulations are functionality- and rendering-preserving by design. We then select which manipulations should be applied to bypass the target detector by a query-efficient black-box optimization algorithm. Our experiments show that our attacks are able to raze to the ground the performance of current state-of-the-art ML-PWD using just 30 queries, thus overcoming the weaker attacks developed in previous work, and enabling a much fairer robustness evaluation of ML-PWD.

In recent years there has been a shift from heuristics-based malware detection towards machine learning, which proves to be more robust in the current heavily adversarial threat landscape. While we acknowledge machine learning to be better equipped to mine for patterns in the increasingly high amounts of similar-looking files, we also note a remarkable scarcity of the data available for similarity-targeted research. Moreover, we observe that the focus in the few related works falls on quantifying similarity in malware, often overlooking the clean data. This one-sided quantification is especially dangerous in the context of detection bypass. We propose to address the deficiencies in the space of similarity research on binary files, starting from EMBER - one of the largest malware classification data sets. We enhance EMBER with similarity information as well as malware class tags, to enable further research in the similarity space. Our contribution is threefold: (1) we publish EMBERSim, an augmented version of EMBER, that includes similarity-informed tags; (2) we enrich EMBERSim with automatically determined malware class tags using the open-source tool AVClass on VirusTotal data and (3) we describe and share the implementation for our class scoring technique and leaf similarity method.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

Tool calling has emerged as a critical capability for AI agents to interact with the real world and solve complex tasks. While the Model Context Protocol (MCP) provides a powerful standardized framework for tool integration, there is a significant gap in benchmarking how well AI agents can effectively solve multi-step tasks using diverse MCP tools in realistic, dynamic scenarios. In this work, we present LiveMCP-101, a benchmark of 101 carefully curated real-world queries, refined through iterative LLM rewriting and manual review, that require coordinated use of multiple MCP tools including web search, file operations, mathematical reasoning, and data analysis. Moreover, we introduce a novel evaluation approach that leverages ground-truth execution plans rather than raw API outputs, better reflecting the evolving nature of real-world environments. Experiments show that even frontier LLMs achieve a success rate below 60\%, highlighting major challenges in tool orchestration. Detailed ablations and error analysis further reveal distinct failure modes and inefficiencies in token usage, pointing to concrete directions for advancing current models. LiveMCP-101 sets a rigorous standard for evaluating real-world agent capabilities, advancing toward autonomous AI systems that reliably execute complex tasks through tool use.

LLMs' capabilities are enhanced by using function calls to integrate various data sources or API results into the context window. Typical tools include search, web crawlers, maps, financial data, file systems, and browser usage, etc. Integrating these data sources or functions requires a standardized method. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) provides a standardized way to supply context to LLMs. However, the evaluation of LLMs and AI Agents' MCP tool use abilities suffer from several issues. First, there's a lack of comprehensive datasets or benchmarks to evaluate various MCP tools. Second, the diverse formats of response from MCP tool call execution further increase the difficulty of evaluation. Additionally, unlike existing tool-use benchmarks with high success rates in functions like programming and math functions, the success rate of real-world MCP tool is not guaranteed and varies across different MCP servers. Furthermore, the LLMs' context window also limits the number of available tools that can be called in a single run, because the textual descriptions of tool and the parameters have long token length for an LLM to process all at once. To help address the challenges of evaluating LLMs' performance on calling MCP tools, we propose MCPToolBench++, a large-scale, multi-domain AI Agent tool use benchmark. As of July 2025, this benchmark is build upon marketplace of over 4k MCP servers from more than 40 categories, collected from the MCP marketplaces and GitHub communities. The datasets consist of both single-step and multi-step tool calls across different categories. We evaluated SOTA LLMs with agentic abilities on this benchmark and reported the results.

Evaluating jailbreak attacks is challenging when prompts are not overtly harmful or fail to induce harmful outputs. Unfortunately, many existing red-teaming datasets contain such unsuitable prompts. To evaluate attacks accurately, these datasets need to be assessed and cleaned for maliciousness. However, existing malicious content detection methods rely on either manual annotation, which is labor-intensive, or large language models (LLMs), which have inconsistent accuracy in harmful types. To balance accuracy and efficiency, we propose a hybrid evaluation framework named MDH (Malicious content Detection based on LLMs with Human assistance) that combines LLM-based annotation with minimal human oversight, and apply it to dataset cleaning and detection of jailbroken responses. Furthermore, we find that well-crafted developer messages can significantly boost jailbreak success, leading us to propose two new strategies: D-Attack, which leverages context simulation, and DH-CoT, which incorporates hijacked chains of thought. The Codes, datasets, judgements, and detection results will be released in github repository: https://github.com/AlienZhang1996/DH-CoT.

Determining the family to which a malicious file belongs is an essential component of cyberattack investigation, attribution, and remediation. Performing this task manually is time consuming and requires expert knowledge. Automated tools using that label malware using antivirus detections lack accuracy and/or scalability, making them insufficient for real-world applications. Three pervasive shortcomings in these tools are responsible: (1) incorrect parsing of antivirus detections, (2) errors during family alias resolution, and (3) an inappropriate antivirus aggregation strategy. To address each of these, we created our own malware family labeling tool called ClarAVy. ClarAVy utilizes a Variational Bayesian approach to aggregate detections from a collection of antivirus products into accurate family labels. Our tool scales to enormous malware datasets, and we evaluated it by labeling approx40 million malicious files. ClarAVy has 8 and 12 percentage points higher accuracy than the prior leading tool in labeling the MOTIF and MalPedia datasets, respectively.

Jailbreaking large-language models (LLMs) involves testing their robustness against adversarial prompts and evaluating their ability to withstand prompt attacks that could elicit unauthorized or malicious responses. In this paper, we present TurboFuzzLLM, a mutation-based fuzzing technique for efficiently finding a collection of effective jailbreaking templates that, when combined with harmful questions, can lead a target LLM to produce harmful responses through black-box access via user prompts. We describe the limitations of directly applying existing template-based attacking techniques in practice, and present functional and efficiency-focused upgrades we added to mutation-based fuzzing to generate effective jailbreaking templates automatically. TurboFuzzLLM achieves geq 95\% attack success rates (ASR) on public datasets for leading LLMs (including GPT-4o \& GPT-4 Turbo), shows impressive generalizability to unseen harmful questions, and helps in improving model defenses to prompt attacks. TurboFuzzLLM is available open source at https://github.com/amazon-science/TurboFuzzLLM.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

With advances in decision-making and reasoning capabilities, multimodal agents show strong potential in computer application scenarios. Past evaluations have mainly assessed GUI interaction skills, while tool invocation abilities, such as those enabled by the Model Context Protocol (MCP), have been largely overlooked. Comparing agents with integrated tool invocation to those evaluated only on GUI interaction is inherently unfair. We present OSWorld-MCP, the first comprehensive and fair benchmark for assessing computer-use agents' tool invocation, GUI operation, and decision-making abilities in a real-world environment. We design a novel automated code-generation pipeline to create tools and combine them with a curated selection from existing tools. Rigorous manual validation yields 158 high-quality tools (covering 7 common applications), each verified for correct functionality, practical applicability, and versatility. Extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art multimodal agents on OSWorld-MCP show that MCP tools generally improve task success rates (e.g., from 8.3% to 20.4% for OpenAI o3 at 15 steps, from 40.1% to 43.3% for Claude 4 Sonnet at 50 steps), underscoring the importance of assessing tool invocation capabilities. However, even the strongest models have relatively low tool invocation rates, Only 36.3%, indicating room for improvement and highlighting the benchmark's challenge. By explicitly measuring MCP tool usage skills, OSWorld-MCP deepens understanding of multimodal agents and sets a new standard for evaluating performance in complex, tool-assisted environments. Our code, environment, and data are publicly available at https://osworld-mcp.github.io.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Many ML-based approaches have been proposed to automatically detect, localize, and repair software vulnerabilities. While ML-based methods are more effective than program analysis-based vulnerability analysis tools, few have been integrated into modern IDEs, hindering practical adoption. To bridge this critical gap, we propose AIBugHunter, a novel ML-based software vulnerability analysis tool for C/C++ languages that is integrated into Visual Studio Code. AIBugHunter helps software developers to achieve real-time vulnerability detection, explanation, and repairs during programming. In particular, AIBugHunter scans through developers' source code to (1) locate vulnerabilities, (2) identify vulnerability types, (3) estimate vulnerability severity, and (4) suggest vulnerability repairs. In this article, we propose a novel multi-objective optimization (MOO)-based vulnerability classification approach and a transformer-based estimation approach to help AIBugHunter accurately identify vulnerability types and estimate severity. Our empirical experiments on a large dataset consisting of 188K+ C/C++ functions confirm that our proposed approaches are more accurate than other state-of-the-art baseline methods for vulnerability classification and estimation. Furthermore, we conduct qualitative evaluations including a survey study and a user study to obtain software practitioners' perceptions of our AIBugHunter tool and assess the impact that AIBugHunter may have on developers' productivity in security aspects. Our survey study shows that our AIBugHunter is perceived as useful where 90% of the participants consider adopting our AIBugHunter. Last but not least, our user study shows that our AIBugHunter could possibly enhance developers' productivity in combating cybersecurity issues during software development.

This paper describes EMBER: a labeled benchmark dataset for training machine learning models to statically detect malicious Windows portable executable files. The dataset includes features extracted from 1.1M binary files: 900K training samples (300K malicious, 300K benign, 300K unlabeled) and 200K test samples (100K malicious, 100K benign). To accompany the dataset, we also release open source code for extracting features from additional binaries so that additional sample features can be appended to the dataset. This dataset fills a void in the information security machine learning community: a benign/malicious dataset that is large, open and general enough to cover several interesting use cases. We enumerate several use cases that we considered when structuring the dataset. Additionally, we demonstrate one use case wherein we compare a baseline gradient boosted decision tree model trained using LightGBM with default settings to MalConv, a recently published end-to-end (featureless) deep learning model for malware detection. Results show that even without hyper-parameter optimization, the baseline EMBER model outperforms MalConv. The authors hope that the dataset, code and baseline model provided by EMBER will help invigorate machine learning research for malware detection, in much the same way that benchmark datasets have advanced computer vision research.

With the rapid development of Model Context Protocol (MCP), the number of MCP servers has surpassed 10,000. However, existing MCP benchmarks are limited to single-server settings with only a few tools, hindering effective evaluation of agent capabilities in large-scale, real-world scenarios. To address this limitation, we present LiveMCPBench, the first comprehensive benchmark comprising 95 real-world tasks grounded in the MCP ecosystem, designed to evaluate LLM agents at scale across diverse servers. To support a scalable and reproducible evaluation pipeline in large-scale MCP environments, we curate LiveMCPTool, a diverse and readily deployable collection of 70 MCP servers and 527 tools. Furthermore, we introduce LiveMCPEval, an LLM-as-a-Judge framework that enables automated and adaptive evaluation in dynamic, time-varying task environments, achieving 81% agreement with human reviewers. Finally, we propose the MCP Copilot Agent, a multi-step agent that routes tools for dynamic planning and executes tools for API interaction across the entire LiveMCPTool suite. Our evaluation covers 10 leading models, with the best-performing model (Claude-Sonnet-4) reaching a 78.95% success rate. However, we observe large performance variance across models, and several widely-used models perform poorly in LiveMCPBench's complex, tool-rich environments. Overall, LiveMCPBench offers the first unified framework for benchmarking LLM agents in realistic, tool-rich, and dynamic MCP environments, laying a solid foundation for scalable and reproducible research on agent capabilities. Our code and data will be publicly available at https://icip-cas.github.io/LiveMCPBench.

The open-source software (OSS) ecosystem suffers from security threats caused by malware.However, OSS malware research has three limitations: a lack of high-quality datasets, a lack of malware diversity, and a lack of attack campaign contexts. In this paper, we first build the largest dataset of 24,356 malicious packages from online sources, then propose a knowledge graph to represent the OSS malware corpus and conduct malware analysis in the wild.Our main findings include (1) it is essential to collect malicious packages from various online sources because their data overlapping degrees are small;(2) despite the sheer volume of malicious packages, many reuse similar code, leading to a low diversity of malware;(3) only 28 malicious packages were repeatedly hidden via dependency libraries of 1,354 malicious packages, and dependency-hidden malware has a shorter active time;(4) security reports are the only reliable source for disclosing the malware-based context. Index Terms: Malicious Packages, Software Analysis

We show that even the most recent safety-aligned LLMs are not robust to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. First, we demonstrate how to successfully leverage access to logprobs for jailbreaking: we initially design an adversarial prompt template (sometimes adapted to the target LLM), and then we apply random search on a suffix to maximize the target logprob (e.g., of the token "Sure"), potentially with multiple restarts. In this way, we achieve nearly 100\% attack success rate -- according to GPT-4 as a judge -- on GPT-3.5/4, Llama-2-Chat-7B/13B/70B, Gemma-7B, and R2D2 from HarmBench that was adversarially trained against the GCG attack. We also show how to jailbreak all Claude models -- that do not expose logprobs -- via either a transfer or prefilling attack with 100\% success rate. In addition, we show how to use random search on a restricted set of tokens for finding trojan strings in poisoned models -- a task that shares many similarities with jailbreaking -- which is the algorithm that brought us the first place in the SaTML'24 Trojan Detection Competition. The common theme behind these attacks is that adaptivity is crucial: different models are vulnerable to different prompting templates (e.g., R2D2 is very sensitive to in-context learning prompts), some models have unique vulnerabilities based on their APIs (e.g., prefilling for Claude), and in some settings it is crucial to restrict the token search space based on prior knowledge (e.g., for trojan detection). We provide the code, prompts, and logs of the attacks at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-adaptive-attacks.

The proliferation of pre-trained models (PTMs) and datasets has led to the emergence of centralized model hubs like Hugging Face, which facilitate collaborative development and reuse. However, recent security reports have uncovered vulnerabilities and instances of malicious attacks within these platforms, highlighting growing security concerns. This paper presents the first systematic study of malicious code poisoning attacks on pre-trained model hubs, focusing on the Hugging Face platform. We conduct a comprehensive threat analysis, develop a taxonomy of model formats, and perform root cause analysis of vulnerable formats. While existing tools like Fickling and ModelScan offer some protection, they face limitations in semantic-level analysis and comprehensive threat detection. To address these challenges, we propose MalHug, an end-to-end pipeline tailored for Hugging Face that combines dataset loading script extraction, model deserialization, in-depth taint analysis, and heuristic pattern matching to detect and classify malicious code poisoning attacks in datasets and models. In collaboration with Ant Group, a leading financial technology company, we have implemented and deployed MalHug on a mirrored Hugging Face instance within their infrastructure, where it has been operational for over three months. During this period, MalHug has monitored more than 705K models and 176K datasets, uncovering 91 malicious models and 9 malicious dataset loading scripts. These findings reveal a range of security threats, including reverse shell, browser credential theft, and system reconnaissance. This work not only bridges a critical gap in understanding the security of the PTM supply chain but also provides a practical, industry-tested solution for enhancing the security of pre-trained model hubs.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

This paper focuses on jailbreaking attacks against multi-modal large language models (MLLMs), seeking to elicit MLLMs to generate objectionable responses to harmful user queries. A maximum likelihood-based algorithm is proposed to find an image Jailbreaking Prompt (imgJP), enabling jailbreaks against MLLMs across multiple unseen prompts and images (i.e., data-universal property). Our approach exhibits strong model-transferability, as the generated imgJP can be transferred to jailbreak various models, including MiniGPT-v2, LLaVA, InstructBLIP, and mPLUG-Owl2, in a black-box manner. Moreover, we reveal a connection between MLLM-jailbreaks and LLM-jailbreaks. As a result, we introduce a construction-based method to harness our approach for LLM-jailbreaks, demonstrating greater efficiency than current state-of-the-art methods. The code is available here. Warning: some content generated by language models may be offensive to some readers.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Vulnerabilities related to option combinations pose a significant challenge in software security testing due to their vast search space. Previous research primarily addressed this challenge through mutation or filtering techniques, which inefficiently treated all option combinations as having equal potential for vulnerabilities, thus wasting considerable time on non-vulnerable targets and resulting in low testing efficiency. In this paper, we utilize carefully designed prompt engineering to drive the large language model (LLM) to predict high-risk option combinations (i.e., more likely to contain vulnerabilities) and perform fuzz testing automatically without human intervention. We developed a tool called ProphetFuzz and evaluated it on a dataset comprising 52 programs collected from three related studies. The entire experiment consumed 10.44 CPU years. ProphetFuzz successfully predicted 1748 high-risk option combinations at an average cost of only \$8.69 per program. Results show that after 72 hours of fuzzing, ProphetFuzz discovered 364 unique vulnerabilities associated with 12.30\% of the predicted high-risk option combinations, which was 32.85\% higher than that found by state-of-the-art in the same timeframe. Additionally, using ProphetFuzz, we conducted persistent fuzzing on the latest versions of these programs, uncovering 140 vulnerabilities, with 93 confirmed by developers and 21 awarded CVE numbers.

Large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and Gemini have significantly advanced natural language processing, enabling various applications such as chatbots and automated content generation. However, these models can be exploited by malicious individuals who craft toxic prompts to elicit harmful or unethical responses. These individuals often employ jailbreaking techniques to bypass safety mechanisms, highlighting the need for robust toxic prompt detection methods. Existing detection techniques, both blackbox and whitebox, face challenges related to the diversity of toxic prompts, scalability, and computational efficiency. In response, we propose ToxicDetector, a lightweight greybox method designed to efficiently detect toxic prompts in LLMs. ToxicDetector leverages LLMs to create toxic concept prompts, uses embedding vectors to form feature vectors, and employs a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) classifier for prompt classification. Our evaluation on various versions of the LLama models, Gemma-2, and multiple datasets demonstrates that ToxicDetector achieves a high accuracy of 96.39\% and a low false positive rate of 2.00\%, outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, ToxicDetector's processing time of 0.0780 seconds per prompt makes it highly suitable for real-time applications. ToxicDetector achieves high accuracy, efficiency, and scalability, making it a practical method for toxic prompt detection in LLMs.

Nowadays, developers increasingly rely on solutions powered by Large Language Models (LLM) to assist them with their coding tasks. This makes it crucial to align these tools with human values to prevent malicious misuse. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for assessing the potential harmfulness of LLMs within the software engineering domain. We begin by developing a taxonomy of potentially harmful software engineering scenarios and subsequently, create a dataset of prompts based on this taxonomy. To systematically assess the responses, we design and validate an automatic evaluator that classifies the outputs of a variety of LLMs both open-source and closed-source models, as well as general-purpose and code-specific LLMs. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of models size, architecture family, and alignment strategies on their tendency to generate harmful content. The results show significant disparities in the alignment of various LLMs for harmlessness. We find that some models and model families, such as Openhermes, are more harmful than others and that code-specific models do not perform better than their general-purpose counterparts. Notably, some fine-tuned models perform significantly worse than their base-models due to their design choices. On the other side, we find that larger models tend to be more helpful and are less likely to respond with harmful information. These results highlight the importance of targeted alignment strategies tailored to the unique challenges of software engineering tasks and provide a foundation for future work in this critical area.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Batch prompting, which combines a batch of multiple queries sharing the same context in one inference, has emerged as a promising solution to reduce inference costs. However, our study reveals a significant security vulnerability in batch prompting: malicious users can inject attack instructions into a batch, leading to unwanted interference across all queries, which can result in the inclusion of harmful content, such as phishing links, or the disruption of logical reasoning. In this paper, we construct BATCHSAFEBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 150 attack instructions of two types and 8k batch instances, to study the batch prompting vulnerability systematically. Our evaluation of both closed-source and open-weight LLMs demonstrates that all LLMs are susceptible to batch-prompting attacks. We then explore multiple defending approaches. While the prompting-based defense shows limited effectiveness for smaller LLMs, the probing-based approach achieves about 95% accuracy in detecting attacks. Additionally, we perform a mechanistic analysis to understand the attack and identify attention heads that are responsible for it.

Despite the advanced capabilities of contemporary machine learning (ML) models, they remain vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in real-world deployments, where compromised models may exhibit unpredictable behavior in critical scenarios. Such risks are heightened by the prevalent practice of collecting massive, internet-sourced datasets for training multimodal models, as these datasets may harbor backdoors. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate the effects of backdooring in multimodal models, such as CleanCLIP, which is the current state-of-the-art approach. In this work, we demonstrate that the efficacy of CleanCLIP in mitigating backdoors is highly dependent on the particular objective used during model pre-training. We observe that stronger pre-training objectives that lead to higher zero-shot classification performance correlate with harder to remove backdoors behaviors. We show this by training multimodal models on two large datasets consisting of 3 million (CC3M) and 6 million (CC6M) datapoints, under various pre-training objectives, followed by poison removal using CleanCLIP. We find that CleanCLIP, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, is ineffective in poison removal when stronger pre-training objectives are used. Our findings underscore critical considerations for ML practitioners who train models using large-scale web-curated data and are concerned about potential backdoor threats.

Existing research on malware classification focuses almost exclusively on two tasks: distinguishing between malicious and benign files and classifying malware by family. However, malware can be categorized according to many other types of attributes, and the ability to identify these attributes in newly-emerging malware using machine learning could provide significant value to analysts. In particular, we have identified four tasks which are under-represented in prior work: classification by behaviors that malware exhibit, platforms that malware run on, vulnerabilities that malware exploit, and packers that malware are packed with. To obtain labels for training and evaluating ML classifiers on these tasks, we created an antivirus (AV) tagging tool called ClarAVy. ClarAVy's sophisticated AV label parser distinguishes itself from prior AV-based taggers, with the ability to accurately parse 882 different AV label formats used by 90 different AV products. We are releasing benchmark datasets for each of these four classification tasks, tagged using ClarAVy and comprising nearly 5.5 million malicious files in total. Our malware behavior dataset includes 75 distinct tags - nearly 7x more than the only prior benchmark dataset with behavioral tags. To our knowledge, we are the first to release datasets with malware platform and packer tags.

Large language model powered autonomous agents demand robust, standardized protocols to integrate tools, share contextual data, and coordinate tasks across heterogeneous systems. Ad-hoc integrations are difficult to scale, secure, and generalize across domains. This survey examines four emerging agent communication protocols: Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent-to-Agent Protocol (A2A), and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), each addressing interoperability in deployment contexts. MCP provides a JSON-RPC client-server interface for secure tool invocation and typed data exchange. ACP defines a general-purpose communication protocol over RESTful HTTP, supporting MIME-typed multipart messages and synchronous and asynchronous interactions. Its lightweight and runtime-independent design enables scalable agent invocation, while features like session management, message routing, and integration with role-based and decentralized identifiers (DIDs). A2A enables peer-to-peer task delegation using capability-based Agent Cards, supporting secure and scalable collaboration across enterprise agent workflows. ANP supports open network agent discovery and secure collaboration using W3C decentralized identifiers DIDs and JSON-LD graphs. The protocols are compared across multiple dimensions, including interaction modes, discovery mechanisms, communication patterns, and security models. Based on the comparative analysis, a phased adoption roadmap is proposed: beginning with MCP for tool access, followed by ACP for structured, multimodal messaging session-aware interaction and both online and offline agent discovery across scalable, HTTP-based deployments A2A for collaborative task execution, and extending to ANP for decentralized agent marketplaces. This work provides a comprehensive foundation for designing secure, interoperable, and scalable ecosystems of LLM-powered agents.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has recently emerged as a standardized interface for connecting language models with external tools and data. As the ecosystem rapidly expands, the lack of a structured, comprehensive view of existing MCP artifacts presents challenges for research. To bridge this gap, we introduce MCPCorpus, a large-scale dataset containing around 14K MCP servers and 300 MCP clients. Each artifact is annotated with 20+ normalized attributes capturing its identity, interface configuration, GitHub activity, and metadata. MCPCorpus provides a reproducible snapshot of the real-world MCP ecosystem, enabling studies of adoption trends, ecosystem health, and implementation diversity. To keep pace with the rapid evolution of the MCP ecosystem, we provide utility tools for automated data synchronization, normalization, and inspection. Furthermore, to support efficient exploration and exploitation, we release a lightweight web-based search interface. MCPCorpus is publicly available at: https://github.com/Snakinya/MCPCorpus.

Malware is becoming increasingly complex and widespread, making it essential to develop more effective and timely detection methods. Traditional static analysis often fails to defend against modern threats that employ code obfuscation, polymorphism, and other evasion techniques. In contrast, behavioral malware detection, which monitors runtime activities, provides a more reliable and context-aware solution. In this work, we propose BEACON, a novel deep learning framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) to generate dense, contextual embeddings from raw sandbox-generated behavior reports. These embeddings capture semantic and structural patterns of each sample and are processed by a one-dimensional convolutional neural network (1D CNN) for multi-class malware classification. Evaluated on the Avast-CTU Public CAPE Dataset, our framework consistently outperforms existing methods, highlighting the effectiveness of LLM-based behavioral embeddings and the overall design of BEACON for robust malware classification.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in performance, various jailbreak attacks have posed growing safety and ethical risks. Malicious users often exploit adversarial context to deceive LLMs, prompting them to generate responses to harmful queries. In this study, we propose a new defense mechanism called Context Filtering model, an input pre-processing method designed to filter out untrustworthy and unreliable context while identifying the primary prompts containing the real user intent to uncover concealed malicious intent. Given that enhancing the safety of LLMs often compromises their helpfulness, potentially affecting the experience of benign users, our method aims to improve the safety of the LLMs while preserving their original performance. We evaluate the effectiveness of our model in defending against jailbreak attacks through comparative analysis, comparing our approach with state-of-the-art defense mechanisms against six different attacks and assessing the helpfulness of LLMs under these defenses. Our model demonstrates its ability to reduce the Attack Success Rates of jailbreak attacks by up to 88% while maintaining the original LLMs' performance, achieving state-of-the-art Safety and Helpfulness Product results. Notably, our model is a plug-and-play method that can be applied to all LLMs, including both white-box and black-box models, to enhance their safety without requiring any fine-tuning of the models themselves. We will make our model publicly available for research purposes.

We propose a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously employs multiple deep learning models analyzing contextual and behavioral characteristics of Windows portable executable, producing a final prediction based on a decision from the meta-model. The detection heuristic in contemporary machine learning Windows malware classifiers is typically based on the static properties of the sample since dynamic analysis through virtualization is challenging for vast quantities of samples. To surpass this limitation, we employ a Windows kernel emulation that allows the acquisition of behavioral patterns across large corpora with minimal temporal and computational costs. We partner with a security vendor for a collection of more than 100k int-the-wild samples that resemble the contemporary threat landscape, containing raw PE files and filepaths of applications at the moment of execution. The acquired dataset is at least ten folds larger than reported in related works on behavioral malware analysis. Files in the training dataset are labeled by a professional threat intelligence team, utilizing manual and automated reverse engineering tools. We estimate the hybrid classifier's operational utility by collecting an out-of-sample test set three months later from the acquisition of the training set. We report an improved detection rate, above the capabilities of the current state-of-the-art model, especially under low false-positive requirements. Additionally, we uncover a meta-model's ability to identify malicious activity in validation and test sets even if none of the individual models express enough confidence to mark the sample as malevolent. We conclude that the meta-model can learn patterns typical to malicious samples from representation combinations produced by different analysis techniques. We publicly release pre-trained models and anonymized dataset of emulation reports.

Since the introduction of the Model Context Protocol (MCP), the number of available tools for Large Language Models (LLMs) has increased significantly. These task-specific tool sets offer an alternative to general-purpose tools such as web browsers, while being easier to develop and maintain than GUIs. However, current general-purpose agents predominantly rely on web browsers for interacting with the environment. Here, we introduce TheMCPCompany, a benchmark for evaluating tool-calling agents on tasks that involve interacting with various real-world services. We use the REST APIs of these services to create MCP servers, which include over 18,000 tools. We also provide manually annotated ground-truth tools for each task. In our experiments, we use the ground truth tools to show the potential of tool-calling agents for both improving performance and reducing costs assuming perfect tool retrieval. Next, we explore agent performance using tool retrieval to study the real-world practicality of tool-based agents. While all models with tool retrieval perform similarly or better than browser-based agents, smaller models cannot take full advantage of the available tools through retrieval. On the other hand, GPT-5's performance with tool retrieval is very close to its performance with ground-truth tools. Overall, our work shows that the most advanced reasoning models are effective at discovering tools in simpler environments, but seriously struggle with navigating complex enterprise environments. TheMCPCompany reveals that navigating tens of thousands of tools and combining them in non-trivial ways to solve complex problems is still a challenging task for current models and requires both better reasoning and better retrieval models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly become integral to real-world applications, powering services across diverse sectors. However, their widespread deployment has exposed critical security risks, particularly through jailbreak prompts that can bypass model alignment and induce harmful outputs. Despite intense research into both attack and defense techniques, the field remains fragmented: definitions, threat models, and evaluation criteria vary widely, impeding systematic progress and fair comparison. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK), we address these challenges by (1) proposing a holistic, multi-level taxonomy that organizes attacks, defenses, and vulnerabilities in LLM prompt security; (2) formalizing threat models and cost assumptions into machine-readable profiles for reproducible evaluation; (3) introducing an open-source evaluation toolkit for standardized, auditable comparison of attacks and defenses; (4) releasing JAILBREAKDB, the largest annotated dataset of jailbreak and benign prompts to date; and (5) presenting a comprehensive evaluation and leaderboard of state-of-the-art methods. Our work unifies fragmented research, provides rigorous foundations for future studies, and supports the development of robust, trustworthy LLMs suitable for high-stakes deployment.

With the rapid proliferation and increased sophistication of malicious software (malware), detection methods no longer rely only on manually generated signatures but have also incorporated more general approaches like machine learning detection. Although powerful for conviction of malicious artifacts, these methods do not produce any further information about the type of threat that has been detected neither allows for identifying relationships between malware samples. In this work, we address the information gap between machine learning and signature-based detection methods by learning a representation space for malware samples in which files with similar malicious behaviors appear close to each other. We do so by introducing a deep learning based tagging model trained to generate human-interpretable semantic descriptions of malicious software, which, at the same time provides potentially more useful and flexible information than malware family names. We show that the malware descriptions generated with the proposed approach correctly identify more than 95% of eleven possible tag descriptions for a given sample, at a deployable false positive rate of 1% per tag. Furthermore, we use the learned representation space to introduce a similarity index between malware files, and empirically demonstrate using dynamic traces from files' execution, that is not only more effective at identifying samples from the same families, but also 32 times smaller than those based on raw feature vectors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction framework for jailbreak Attack (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.

Most malicious photo manipulations are created using standard image editing tools, such as Adobe Photoshop. We present a method for detecting one very popular Photoshop manipulation -- image warping applied to human faces -- using a model trained entirely using fake images that were automatically generated by scripting Photoshop itself. We show that our model outperforms humans at the task of recognizing manipulated images, can predict the specific location of edits, and in some cases can be used to "undo" a manipulation to reconstruct the original, unedited image. We demonstrate that the system can be successfully applied to real, artist-created image manipulations.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

The open-endedness of large language models (LLMs) combined with their impressive capabilities may lead to new safety issues when being exploited for malicious use. While recent studies primarily focus on probing toxic outputs that can be easily detected with existing toxicity classifiers, we show that LLMs can generate diverse implicit toxic outputs that are exceptionally difficult to detect via simply zero-shot prompting. Moreover, we propose a reinforcement learning (RL) based attacking method to further induce the implicit toxicity in LLMs. Specifically, we optimize the language model with a reward that prefers implicit toxic outputs to explicit toxic and non-toxic ones. Experiments on five widely-adopted toxicity classifiers demonstrate that the attack success rate can be significantly improved through RL fine-tuning. For instance, the RL-finetuned LLaMA-13B model achieves an attack success rate of 90.04% on BAD and 62.85% on Davinci003. Our findings suggest that LLMs pose a significant threat in generating undetectable implicit toxic outputs. We further show that fine-tuning toxicity classifiers on the annotated examples from our attacking method can effectively enhance their ability to detect LLM-generated implicit toxic language. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Implicit-Toxicity.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has enabled the ability to effectively analyze and generate code nearly instantaneously, resulting in their widespread adoption in software development. Following this advancement, researchers and companies have begun integrating LLMs across the hardware design and verification process. However, these highly potent LLMs can also induce new attack scenarios upon security vulnerabilities across the hardware development process. One such attack vector that has not been explored is intellectual property (IP) piracy. Given that this attack can manifest as rewriting hardware designs to evade piracy detection, it is essential to thoroughly evaluate LLM capabilities in performing this task and assess the mitigation abilities of current IP piracy detection tools. Therefore, in this work, we propose LLMPirate, the first LLM-based technique able to generate pirated variations of circuit designs that successfully evade detection across multiple state-of-the-art piracy detection tools. We devise three solutions to overcome challenges related to integration of LLMs for hardware circuit designs, scalability to large circuits, and effectiveness, resulting in an end-to-end automated, efficient, and practical formulation. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation of LLMPirate using eight LLMs of varying sizes and capabilities and assess their performance in pirating various circuit designs against four state-of-the-art, widely-used piracy detection tools. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMPirate is able to consistently evade detection on 100% of tested circuits across every detection tool. Additionally, we showcase the ramifications of LLMPirate using case studies on IBEX and MOR1KX processors and a GPS module, that we successfully pirate. We envision that our work motivates and fosters the development of better IP piracy detection tools.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare demands a safety paradigm rooted in primum non nocere. However, current alignment techniques rely on generic definitions of harm that fail to capture context-dependent violations, such as administrative fraud and clinical discrimination. To address this, we introduce Medical Malice: a dataset of 214,219 adversarial prompts calibrated to the regulatory and ethical complexities of the Brazilian Unified Health System (SUS). Crucially, the dataset includes the reasoning behind each violation, enabling models to internalize ethical boundaries rather than merely memorizing a fixed set of refusals. Using an unaligned agent (Grok-4) within a persona-driven pipeline, we synthesized high-fidelity threats across seven taxonomies, ranging from procurement manipulation and queue-jumping to obstetric violence. We discuss the ethical design of releasing these "vulnerability signatures" to correct the information asymmetry between malicious actors and AI developers. Ultimately, this work advocates for a shift from universal to context-aware safety, providing the necessary resources to immunize healthcare AI against the nuanced, systemic threats inherent to high-stakes medical environments -- vulnerabilities that represent the paramount risk to patient safety and the successful integration of AI in healthcare systems.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

A multimodal large language model (MLLM) agent can receive instructions, capture images, retrieve histories from memory, and decide which tools to use. Nonetheless, red-teaming efforts have revealed that adversarial images/prompts can jailbreak an MLLM and cause unaligned behaviors. In this work, we report an even more severe safety issue in multi-agent environments, referred to as infectious jailbreak. It entails the adversary simply jailbreaking a single agent, and without any further intervention from the adversary, (almost) all agents will become infected exponentially fast and exhibit harmful behaviors. To validate the feasibility of infectious jailbreak, we simulate multi-agent environments containing up to one million LLaVA-1.5 agents, and employ randomized pair-wise chat as a proof-of-concept instantiation for multi-agent interaction. Our results show that feeding an (infectious) adversarial image into the memory of any randomly chosen agent is sufficient to achieve infectious jailbreak. Finally, we derive a simple principle for determining whether a defense mechanism can provably restrain the spread of infectious jailbreak, but how to design a practical defense that meets this principle remains an open question to investigate. Our project page is available at https://sail-sg.github.io/Agent-Smith/.

Despite the implementation of safety alignment strategies, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which undermine these safety guardrails and pose significant security threats. Some defenses have been proposed to detect or mitigate jailbreaks, but they are unable to withstand the test of time due to an insufficient understanding of jailbreak mechanisms. In this work, we investigate the mechanisms behind jailbreaks based on the Linear Representation Hypothesis (LRH), which states that neural networks encode high-level concepts as subspaces in their hidden representations. We define the toxic semantics in harmful and jailbreak prompts as toxic concepts and describe the semantics in jailbreak prompts that manipulate LLMs to comply with unsafe requests as jailbreak concepts. Through concept extraction and analysis, we reveal that LLMs can recognize the toxic concepts in both harmful and jailbreak prompts. However, unlike harmful prompts, jailbreak prompts activate the jailbreak concepts and alter the LLM output from rejection to compliance. Building on our analysis, we propose a comprehensive jailbreak defense framework, JBShield, consisting of two key components: jailbreak detection JBShield-D and mitigation JBShield-M. JBShield-D identifies jailbreak prompts by determining whether the input activates both toxic and jailbreak concepts. When a jailbreak prompt is detected, JBShield-M adjusts the hidden representations of the target LLM by enhancing the toxic concept and weakening the jailbreak concept, ensuring LLMs produce safe content. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superior performance of JBShield, achieving an average detection accuracy of 0.95 and reducing the average attack success rate of various jailbreak attacks to 2% from 61% across distinct LLMs.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has significantly advanced code completion capabilities, giving rise to a new generation of LLM-based Code Completion Tools (LCCTs). Unlike general-purpose LLMs, these tools possess unique workflows, integrating multiple information sources as input and prioritizing code suggestions over natural language interaction, which introduces distinct security challenges. Additionally, LCCTs often rely on proprietary code datasets for training, raising concerns about the potential exposure of sensitive data. This paper exploits these distinct characteristics of LCCTs to develop targeted attack methodologies on two critical security risks: jailbreaking and training data extraction attacks. Our experimental results expose significant vulnerabilities within LCCTs, including a 99.4% success rate in jailbreaking attacks on GitHub Copilot and a 46.3% success rate on Amazon Q. Furthermore, We successfully extracted sensitive user data from GitHub Copilot, including 54 real email addresses and 314 physical addresses associated with GitHub usernames. Our study also demonstrates that these code-based attack methods are effective against general-purpose LLMs, such as the GPT series, highlighting a broader security misalignment in the handling of code by modern LLMs. These findings underscore critical security challenges associated with LCCTs and suggest essential directions for strengthening their security frameworks. The example code and attack samples from our research are provided at https://github.com/Sensente/Security-Attacks-on-LCCTs.

The advanced capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have made them invaluable across various applications, from conversational agents and content creation to data analysis, research, and innovation. However, their effectiveness and accessibility also render them susceptible to abuse for generating malicious content, including phishing attacks. This study explores the potential of using four popular commercially available LLMs - ChatGPT (GPT 3.5 Turbo), GPT 4, Claude and Bard to generate functional phishing attacks using a series of malicious prompts. We discover that these LLMs can generate both phishing emails and websites that can convincingly imitate well-known brands, and also deploy a range of evasive tactics for the latter to elude detection mechanisms employed by anti-phishing systems. Notably, these attacks can be generated using unmodified, or "vanilla," versions of these LLMs, without requiring any prior adversarial exploits such as jailbreaking. As a countermeasure, we build a BERT based automated detection tool that can be used for the early detection of malicious prompts to prevent LLMs from generating phishing content attaining an accuracy of 97\% for phishing website prompts, and 94\% for phishing email prompts.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve from passive text generators to active reasoning agents capable of tool interaction, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized framework for dynamic tool discovery and orchestration. Despite widespread industry adoption, existing evaluation methodologies fail to adequately assess tool utilization capabilities within this new paradigm. This paper introduces MCP-RADAR, the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to evaluate LLM performance in the MCP framework through a novel five-dimensional approach measuring: answer accuracy, tool selection efficiency, computational resource efficiency, parameter construction accuracy, and execution speed. Unlike conventional benchmarks that rely on subjective human evaluations or binary success metrics, MCP-RADAR employs objective, quantifiable measurements across multiple task domains including software engineering, mathematical reasoning, and general problem-solving. Our evaluations of leading commercial and open-source LLMs reveal distinctive capability profiles with significant trade-offs between accuracy, efficiency, and speed, challenging traditional single-metric performance rankings. Besides, we provide valuable guidance for developers to optimize their tools for maximum model compatibility and effectiveness. While focused on MCP due to its standardized approach, our methodology remains applicable across all LLM agent tool integration frameworks, providing valuable insights for both LLM developers and tool creators to optimize the entire LLM-tool interaction ecosystem. The implementation, configurations, and datasets used in our evaluation are publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MCPRadar-B143.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

The security concerns surrounding Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) remains understudied. In this paper, we observe that Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) can be easily compromised by query-relevant images, as if the text query itself were malicious. To address this, we introduce MM-SafetyBench, a comprehensive framework designed for conducting safety-critical evaluations of MLLMs against such image-based manipulations. We have compiled a dataset comprising 13 scenarios, resulting in a total of 5,040 text-image pairs. Our analysis across 12 state-of-the-art models reveals that MLLMs are susceptible to breaches instigated by our approach, even when the equipped LLMs have been safety-aligned. In response, we propose a straightforward yet effective prompting strategy to enhance the resilience of MLLMs against these types of attacks. Our work underscores the need for a concerted effort to strengthen and enhance the safety measures of open-source MLLMs against potential malicious exploits. The resource is available at https://github.com/isXinLiu/MM-SafetyBench

Large language models (LLMs) are expected to follow instructions from users and engage in conversations. Techniques to enhance LLMs' instruction-following capabilities typically fine-tune them using data structured according to a predefined chat template. Although chat templates are shown to be effective in optimizing LLM performance, their impact on safety alignment of LLMs has been less understood, which is crucial for deploying LLMs safely at scale. In this paper, we investigate how chat templates affect safety alignment of LLMs. We identify a common vulnerability, named ChatBug, that is introduced by chat templates. Our key insight to identify ChatBug is that the chat templates provide a rigid format that need to be followed by LLMs, but not by users. Hence, a malicious user may not necessarily follow the chat template when prompting LLMs. Instead, malicious users could leverage their knowledge of the chat template and accordingly craft their prompts to bypass safety alignments of LLMs. We develop two attacks to exploit the ChatBug vulnerability. We demonstrate that a malicious user can exploit the ChatBug vulnerability of eight state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs and effectively elicit unintended responses from these models. Moreover, we show that ChatBug can be exploited by existing jailbreak attacks to enhance their attack success rates. We investigate potential countermeasures to ChatBug. Our results show that while adversarial training effectively mitigates the ChatBug vulnerability, the victim model incurs significant performance degradation. These results highlight the trade-off between safety alignment and helpfulness. Developing new methods for instruction tuning to balance this trade-off is an open and critical direction for future research

Perturbative availability poisons (PAPs) add small changes to images to prevent their use for model training. Current research adopts the belief that practical and effective approaches to countering PAPs do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is time to abandon this belief. We present extensive experiments showing that 12 state-of-the-art PAP methods are vulnerable to Image Shortcut Squeezing (ISS), which is based on simple compression. For example, on average, ISS restores the CIFAR-10 model accuracy to 81.73%, surpassing the previous best preprocessing-based countermeasures by 37.97% absolute. ISS also (slightly) outperforms adversarial training and has higher generalizability to unseen perturbation norms and also higher efficiency. Our investigation reveals that the property of PAP perturbations depends on the type of surrogate model used for poison generation, and it explains why a specific ISS compression yields the best performance for a specific type of PAP perturbation. We further test stronger, adaptive poisoning, and show it falls short of being an ideal defense against ISS. Overall, our results demonstrate the importance of considering various (simple) countermeasures to ensure the meaningfulness of analysis carried out during the development of PAP methods.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers. For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model. Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points. However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained. Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism. Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method. In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions. By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one. Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations. Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -- only 1\% -- to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100\% to almost 0\%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

Despite prior safety alignment efforts, mainstream LLMs can still generate harmful and unethical content when subjected to jailbreaking attacks. Existing jailbreaking methods fall into two main categories: template-based and optimization-based methods. The former requires significant manual effort and domain knowledge, while the latter, exemplified by Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG), which seeks to maximize the likelihood of harmful LLM outputs through token-level optimization, also encounters several limitations: requiring white-box access, necessitating pre-constructed affirmative phrase, and suffering from low efficiency. In this paper, we present ECLIPSE, a novel and efficient black-box jailbreaking method utilizing optimizable suffixes. Drawing inspiration from LLMs' powerful generation and optimization capabilities, we employ task prompts to translate jailbreaking goals into natural language instructions. This guides the LLM to generate adversarial suffixes for malicious queries. In particular, a harmfulness scorer provides continuous feedback, enabling LLM self-reflection and iterative optimization to autonomously and efficiently produce effective suffixes. Experimental results demonstrate that ECLIPSE achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 0.92 across three open-source LLMs and GPT-3.5-Turbo, significantly surpassing GCG in 2.4 times. Moreover, ECLIPSE is on par with template-based methods in ASR while offering superior attack efficiency, reducing the average attack overhead by 83%.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

The effectiveness of an AI model in accurately classifying novel malware hinges on the quality of the features it is trained on, which in turn depends on the effectiveness of the analysis tool used. Peekaboo, a Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tool, defeats malware evasion techniques to capture authentic behavior at the Assembly (ASM) instruction level. This behavior exhibits patterns consistent with Zipf's law, a distribution commonly seen in natural languages, making Transformer models particularly effective for binary classification tasks. We introduce Alpha, a framework for zero day malware detection that leverages Transformer models and ASM language. Alpha is trained on malware and benign software data collected through Peekaboo, enabling it to identify entirely new samples with exceptional accuracy. Alpha eliminates any common functions from the test samples that are in the training dataset. This forces the model to rely on contextual patterns and novel ASM instruction combinations to detect malicious behavior, rather than memorizing familiar features. By combining the strengths of DBI, ASM analysis, and Transformer architectures, Alpha offers a powerful approach to proactively addressing the evolving threat of malware. Alpha demonstrates perfect accuracy for Ransomware, Worms and APTs with flawless classification for both malicious and benign samples. The results highlight the model's exceptional performance in detecting truly new malware samples.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently extended their powerful reasoning capabilities to safety checks-using chain-of-thought reasoning to decide whether a request should be answered. While this new approach offers a promising route for balancing model utility and safety, its robustness remains underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce Malicious-Educator, a benchmark that disguises extremely dangerous or malicious requests beneath seemingly legitimate educational prompts. Our experiments reveal severe security flaws in popular commercial-grade LRMs, including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. For instance, although OpenAI's o1 model initially maintains a high refusal rate of about 98%, subsequent model updates significantly compromise its safety; and attackers can easily extract criminal strategies from DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking without any additional tricks. To further highlight these vulnerabilities, we propose Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT), a universal and transferable attack method that leverages the model's own displayed intermediate reasoning to jailbreak its safety reasoning mechanism. Under H-CoT, refusal rates sharply decline-dropping from 98% to below 2%-and, in some instances, even transform initially cautious tones into ones that are willing to provide harmful content. We hope these findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety mechanisms to preserve the benefits of advanced reasoning capabilities without compromising ethical standards.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are essential for contextual understanding of both visual and textual information. However, their vulnerability to adversarially manipulated inputs presents significant risks, leading to compromised outputs and raising concerns about the reliability in VLM-integrated applications. Detecting these malicious prompts is thus crucial for maintaining trust in VLM generations. A major challenge in developing a safeguarding prompt classifier is the lack of a large amount of labeled benign and malicious data. To address the issue, we introduce VLMGuard, a novel learning framework that leverages the unlabeled user prompts in the wild for malicious prompt detection. These unlabeled prompts, which naturally arise when VLMs are deployed in the open world, consist of both benign and malicious information. To harness the unlabeled data, we present an automated maliciousness estimation score for distinguishing between benign and malicious samples within this unlabeled mixture, thereby enabling the training of a binary prompt classifier on top. Notably, our framework does not require extra human annotations, offering strong flexibility and practicality for real-world applications. Extensive experiment shows VLMGuard achieves superior detection results, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Disclaimer: This paper may contain offensive examples; reader discretion is advised.

Deploying Large language models (LLMs) can pose hazards from harmful outputs such as toxic or dishonest speech. Prior work has introduced tools that elicit harmful outputs in order to identify and mitigate these risks. While this is a valuable step toward securing language models, these approaches typically rely on a pre-existing classifier for undesired outputs. This limits their application to situations where the type of harmful behavior is known with precision beforehand. However, this skips a central challenge of red teaming: developing a contextual understanding of the behaviors that a model can exhibit. Furthermore, when such a classifier already exists, red teaming has limited marginal value because the classifier could simply be used to filter training data or model outputs. In this work, we consider red teaming under the assumption that the adversary is working from a high-level, abstract specification of undesired behavior. The red team is expected to refine/extend this specification and identify methods to elicit this behavior from the model. Our red teaming framework consists of three steps: 1) Exploring the model's behavior in the desired context; 2) Establishing a measurement of undesired behavior (e.g., a classifier trained to reflect human evaluations); and 3) Exploiting the model's flaws using this measure and an established red teaming methodology. We apply this approach to red team GPT-2 and GPT-3 models to systematically discover classes of prompts that elicit toxic and dishonest statements. In doing so, we also construct and release the CommonClaim dataset of 20,000 statements that have been labeled by human subjects as common-knowledge-true, common-knowledge-false, or neither. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/explore_establish_exploit_llms. CommonClaim is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/common_claim.

Understanding the vulnerabilities of Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) to jailbreak attacks is essential for their responsible real-world deployment. Most previous work requires access to model gradients, or is based on human knowledge (prompt engineering) to complete jailbreak, and they hardly consider the interaction of images and text, resulting in inability to jailbreak in black box scenarios or poor performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose a Prior-Guided Bimodal Interactive Black-Box Jailbreak Attack for toxicity maximization, referred to as PBI-Attack. Our method begins by extracting malicious features from a harmful corpus using an alternative LVLM and embedding these features into a benign image as prior information. Subsequently, we enhance these features through bidirectional cross-modal interaction optimization, which iteratively optimizes the bimodal perturbations in an alternating manner through greedy search, aiming to maximize the toxicity of the generated response. The toxicity level is quantified using a well-trained evaluation model. Experiments demonstrate that PBI-Attack outperforms previous state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, achieving an average attack success rate of 92.5% across three open-source LVLMs and around 67.3% on three closed-source LVLMs. Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially disturbing and offensive content.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

We constructed a newly large-scale and comprehensive C/C++ vulnerability dataset named MegaVul by crawling the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database and CVE-related open-source projects. Specifically, we collected all crawlable descriptive information of the vulnerabilities from the CVE database and extracted all vulnerability-related code changes from 28 Git-based websites. We adopt advanced tools to ensure the extracted code integrality and enrich the code with four different transformed representations. In total, MegaVul contains 17,380 vulnerabilities collected from 992 open-source repositories spanning 169 different vulnerability types disclosed from January 2006 to October 2023. Thus, MegaVul can be used for a variety of software security-related tasks including detecting vulnerabilities and assessing vulnerability severity. All information is stored in the JSON format for easy usage. MegaVul is publicly available on GitHub and will be continuously updated. It can be easily extended to other programming languages.

A lack of accessible data has historically restricted malware analysis research, and practitioners have relied heavily on datasets provided by industry sources to advance. Existing public datasets are limited by narrow scope - most include files targeting a single platform, have labels supporting just one type of malware classification task, and make no effort to capture the evasive files that make malware detection difficult in practice. We present EMBER2024, a new dataset that enables holistic evaluation of malware classifiers. Created in collaboration with the authors of EMBER2017 and EMBER2018, the EMBER2024 dataset includes hashes, metadata, feature vectors, and labels for more than 3.2 million files from six file formats. Our dataset supports the training and evaluation of machine learning models on seven malware classification tasks, including malware detection, malware family classification, and malware behavior identification. EMBER2024 is the first to include a collection of malicious files that initially went undetected by a set of antivirus products, creating a "challenge" set to assess classifier performance against evasive malware. This work also introduces EMBER feature version 3, with added support for several new feature types. We are releasing the EMBER2024 dataset to promote reproducibility and empower researchers in the pursuit of new malware research topics.

Recent advances in long-context language models (LMs) have enabled million-token inputs, expanding their capabilities across complex tasks like computer-use agents. Yet, the safety implications of these extended contexts remain unclear. To bridge this gap, we introduce NINJA (short for Needle-in-haystack jailbreak attack), a method that jailbreaks aligned LMs by appending benign, model-generated content to harmful user goals. Critical to our method is the observation that the position of harmful goals play an important role in safety. Experiments on standard safety benchmark, HarmBench, show that NINJA significantly increases attack success rates across state-of-the-art open and proprietary models, including LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, and Gemini. Unlike prior jailbreaking methods, our approach is low-resource, transferable, and less detectable. Moreover, we show that NINJA is compute-optimal -- under a fixed compute budget, increasing context length can outperform increasing the number of trials in best-of-N jailbreak. These findings reveal that even benign long contexts -- when crafted with careful goal positioning -- introduce fundamental vulnerabilities in modern LMs.

3D Gaussian splatting (3DGS), known for its groundbreaking performance and efficiency, has become a dominant 3D representation and brought progress to many 3D vision tasks. However, in this work, we reveal a significant security vulnerability that has been largely overlooked in 3DGS: the computation cost of training 3DGS could be maliciously tampered by poisoning the input data. By developing an attack named Poison-splat, we reveal a novel attack surface where the adversary can poison the input images to drastically increase the computation memory and time needed for 3DGS training, pushing the algorithm towards its worst computation complexity. In extreme cases, the attack can even consume all allocable memory, leading to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) that disrupts servers, resulting in practical damages to real-world 3DGS service vendors. Such a computation cost attack is achieved by addressing a bi-level optimization problem through three tailored strategies: attack objective approximation, proxy model rendering, and optional constrained optimization. These strategies not only ensure the effectiveness of our attack but also make it difficult to defend with simple defensive measures. We hope the revelation of this novel attack surface can spark attention to this crucial yet overlooked vulnerability of 3DGS systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/jiahaolu97/poison-splat .

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents equipped with external tools have become increasingly powerful for complex tasks such as web shopping, automated email replies, and financial trading. However, these advancements amplify the risks of adversarial attacks, especially when agents can access sensitive external functionalities. Nevertheless, manipulating LLM agents into performing targeted malicious actions or invoking specific tools remains challenging, as these agents extensively reason or plan before executing final actions. In this work, we present UDora, a unified red teaming framework designed for LLM agents that dynamically hijacks the agent's reasoning processes to compel malicious behavior. Specifically, UDora first generates the model's reasoning trace for the given task, then automatically identifies optimal points within this trace to insert targeted perturbations. The resulting perturbed reasoning is then used as a surrogate response for optimization. By iteratively applying this process, the LLM agent will then be induced to undertake designated malicious actions or to invoke specific malicious tools. Our approach demonstrates superior effectiveness compared to existing methods across three LLM agent datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/AI-secure/UDora.

We introduce MCP-Bench, a benchmark for evaluating large language models (LLMs) on realistic, multi-step tasks that demand tool use, cross-tool coordination, precise parameter control, and planning/reasoning for solving tasks. Built on the Model Context Protocol (MCP), MCP-Bench connects LLMs to 28 representative live MCP servers spanning 250 tools across domains such as finance, traveling, scientific computing, and academic search. Unlike prior API-based benchmarks, each MCP server provides a set of complementary tools designed to work together, enabling the construction of authentic, multi-step tasks with rich input-output coupling. Tasks in MCP-Bench test agents' ability to retrieve relevant tools from fuzzy instructions without explicit tool names, plan multi-hop execution trajectories for complex objectives, ground responses in intermediate tool outputs, and orchestrate cross-domain workflows - capabilities not adequately evaluated by existing benchmarks that rely on explicit tool specifications, shallow few-step workflows, and isolated domain operations. We propose a multi-faceted evaluation framework covering tool-level schema understanding and usage, trajectory-level planning, and task completion. Experiments on 20 advanced LLMs reveal persistent challenges in MCP-Bench. Code and data: https://github.com/Accenture/mcp-bench.

This paper proposes LATTE, the first static binary taint analysis that is powered by a large language model (LLM). LATTE is superior to the state of the art (e.g., Emtaint, Arbiter, Karonte) in three aspects. First, LATTE is fully automated while prior static binary taint analyzers need rely on human expertise to manually customize taint propagation rules and vulnerability inspection rules. Second, LATTE is significantly effective in vulnerability detection, demonstrated by our comprehensive evaluations. For example, LATTE has found 37 new bugs in real-world firmware which the baselines failed to find, and 7 of them have been assigned CVE numbers. Lastly, LATTE incurs remarkably low engineering cost, making it a cost-efficient and scalable solution for security researchers and practitioners. We strongly believe that LATTE opens up a new direction to harness the recent advance in LLMs to improve vulnerability analysis for binary programs.

Remote Code Execution (RCE) exploits pose a significant threat to AI and ML systems, particularly in GPU-accelerated environments where the computational power of GPUs can be misused for malicious purposes. This paper focuses on RCE attacks leveraging deserialization vulnerabilities and custom layers, such as TensorFlow Lambda layers, which are often overlooked due to the complexity of monitoring GPU workloads. These vulnerabilities enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, blending malicious activity seamlessly into expected model behavior and exploiting GPUs for unauthorized tasks such as cryptocurrency mining. Unlike traditional CPU-based attacks, the parallel processing nature of GPUs and their high resource utilization make runtime detection exceptionally challenging. In this work, we provide a comprehensive examination of RCE exploits targeting GPUs, demonstrating an attack that utilizes these vulnerabilities to deploy a crypto miner on a GPU. We highlight the technical intricacies of such attacks, emphasize their potential for significant financial and computational costs, and propose strategies for mitigation. By shedding light on this underexplored attack vector, we aim to raise awareness and encourage the adoption of robust security measures in GPU-driven AI and ML systems, with an emphasis on static and model scanning as an easier way to detect exploits.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive performance and have been put into practical use in commercial applications, but they still have potential safety mechanism vulnerabilities. Jailbreak attacks are red teaming methods that aim to bypass safety mechanisms and discover MLLMs' potential risks. Existing MLLMs' jailbreak methods often bypass the model's safety mechanism through complex optimization methods or carefully designed image and text prompts. Despite achieving some progress, they have a low attack success rate on commercial closed-source MLLMs. Unlike previous research, we empirically find that there exists a Shuffle Inconsistency between MLLMs' comprehension ability and safety ability for the shuffled harmful instruction. That is, from the perspective of comprehension ability, MLLMs can understand the shuffled harmful text-image instructions well. However, they can be easily bypassed by the shuffled harmful instructions from the perspective of safety ability, leading to harmful responses. Then we innovatively propose a text-image jailbreak attack named SI-Attack. Specifically, to fully utilize the Shuffle Inconsistency and overcome the shuffle randomness, we apply a query-based black-box optimization method to select the most harmful shuffled inputs based on the feedback of the toxic judge model. A series of experiments show that SI-Attack can improve the attack's performance on three benchmarks. In particular, SI-Attack can obviously improve the attack success rate for commercial MLLMs such as GPT-4o or Claude-3.5-Sonnet.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet their safety mechanisms remain susceptible to adversarial attacks that exploit cognitive biases -- systematic deviations from rational judgment. Unlike prior jailbreaking approaches focused on prompt engineering or algorithmic manipulation, this work highlights the overlooked power of multi-bias interactions in undermining LLM safeguards. We propose CognitiveAttack, a novel red-teaming framework that systematically leverages both individual and combined cognitive biases. By integrating supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning, CognitiveAttack generates prompts that embed optimized bias combinations, effectively bypassing safety protocols while maintaining high attack success rates. Experimental results reveal significant vulnerabilities across 30 diverse LLMs, particularly in open-source models. CognitiveAttack achieves a substantially higher attack success rate compared to the SOTA black-box method PAP (60.1% vs. 31.6%), exposing critical limitations in current defense mechanisms. These findings highlight multi-bias interactions as a powerful yet underexplored attack vector. This work introduces a novel interdisciplinary perspective by bridging cognitive science and LLM safety, paving the way for more robust and human-aligned AI systems.

Open source code is considered a common practice in modern software development. However, reusing other code allows bad actors to access a wide developers' community, hence the products that rely on it. Those attacks are categorized as supply chain attacks. Recent years saw a growing number of supply chain attacks that leverage open source during software development, relaying the download and installation procedures, whether automatic or manual. Over the years, many approaches have been invented for detecting vulnerable packages. However, it is uncommon to detect malicious code within packages. Those detection approaches can be broadly categorized as analyzes that use (dynamic) and do not use (static) code execution. Here, we introduce Malicious Source code Detection using Transformers (MSDT) algorithm. MSDT is a novel static analysis based on a deep learning method that detects real-world code injection cases to source code packages. In this study, we used MSDT and a dataset with over 600,000 different functions to embed various functions and applied a clustering algorithm to the resulting vectors, detecting the malicious functions by detecting the outliers. We evaluated MSDT's performance by conducting extensive experiments and demonstrated that our algorithm is capable of detecting functions that were injected with malicious code with precision@k values of up to 0.909.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

Recent advancements in AI safety have led to increased efforts in training and red-teaming large language models (LLMs) to mitigate unsafe content generation. However, these safety mechanisms may not be comprehensive, leaving potential vulnerabilities unexplored. This paper introduces MathPrompt, a novel jailbreaking technique that exploits LLMs' advanced capabilities in symbolic mathematics to bypass their safety mechanisms. By encoding harmful natural language prompts into mathematical problems, we demonstrate a critical vulnerability in current AI safety measures. Our experiments across 13 state-of-the-art LLMs reveal an average attack success rate of 73.6\%, highlighting the inability of existing safety training mechanisms to generalize to mathematically encoded inputs. Analysis of embedding vectors shows a substantial semantic shift between original and encoded prompts, helping explain the attack's success. This work emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to AI safety, calling for expanded red-teaming efforts to develop robust safeguards across all potential input types and their associated risks.

While LLM-based agents can interact with environments via invoking external tools, their expanded capabilities also amplify security risks. Monitoring step-level tool invocation behaviors in real time and proactively intervening before unsafe execution is critical for agent deployment, yet remains under-explored. In this work, we first construct TS-Bench, a novel benchmark for step-level tool invocation safety detection in LLM agents. We then develop a guardrail model, TS-Guard, using multi-task reinforcement learning. The model proactively detects unsafe tool invocation actions before execution by reasoning over the interaction history. It assesses request harmfulness and action-attack correlations, producing interpretable and generalizable safety judgments and feedback. Furthermore, we introduce TS-Flow, a guardrail-feedback-driven reasoning framework for LLM agents, which reduces harmful tool invocations of ReAct-style agents by 65 percent on average and improves benign task completion by approximately 10 percent under prompt injection attacks.

There has been an increasing interest in the alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values. However, the safety issues of their integration with a vision module, or vision language models (VLMs), remain relatively underexplored. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreaking attack against VLMs, aiming to bypass their safety barrier when a user inputs harmful instructions. A scenario where our poisoned (image, text) data pairs are included in the training data is assumed. By replacing the original textual captions with malicious jailbreak prompts, our method can perform jailbreak attacks with the poisoned images. Moreover, we analyze the effect of poison ratios and positions of trainable parameters on our attack's success rate. For evaluation, we design two metrics to quantify the success rate and the stealthiness of our attack. Together with a list of curated harmful instructions, a benchmark for measuring attack efficacy is provided. We demonstrate the efficacy of our attack by comparing it with baseline methods.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to be harmless to humans. Unfortunately, recent work has shown that such models are susceptible to automated jailbreak attacks that induce them to generate harmful content. More recent LLMs often incorporate an additional layer of defense, a Guard Model, which is a second LLM that is designed to check and moderate the output response of the primary LLM. Our key contribution is to show a novel attack strategy, PRP, that is successful against several open-source (e.g., Llama 2) and closed-source (e.g., GPT 3.5) implementations of Guard Models. PRP leverages a two step prefix-based attack that operates by (a) constructing a universal adversarial prefix for the Guard Model, and (b) propagating this prefix to the response. We find that this procedure is effective across multiple threat models, including ones in which the adversary has no access to the Guard Model at all. Our work suggests that further advances are required on defenses and Guard Models before they can be considered effective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have excelled in various tasks but are still vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, where attackers create jailbreak prompts to mislead the model to produce harmful or offensive content. Current jailbreak methods either rely heavily on manually crafted templates, which pose challenges in scalability and adaptability, or struggle to generate semantically coherent prompts, making them easy to detect. Additionally, most existing approaches involve lengthy prompts, leading to higher query costs.In this paper, to remedy these challenges, we introduce a novel jailbreaking attack framework, which is an automated, black-box jailbreaking attack framework that adapts the black-box fuzz testing approach with a series of customized designs. Instead of relying on manually crafted templates, our method starts with an empty seed pool, removing the need to search for any related jailbreaking templates. We also develop three novel question-dependent mutation strategies using an LLM helper to generate prompts that maintain semantic coherence while significantly reducing their length. Additionally, we implement a two-level judge module to accurately detect genuine successful jailbreaks. We evaluated our method on 7 representative LLMs and compared it with 5 state-of-the-art jailbreaking attack strategies. For proprietary LLM APIs, such as GPT-3.5 turbo, GPT-4, and Gemini-Pro, our method achieves attack success rates of over 90%,80% and 74%, respectively, exceeding existing baselines by more than 60%. Additionally, our method can maintain high semantic coherence while significantly reducing the length of jailbreak prompts. When targeting GPT-4, our method can achieve over 78% attack success rate even with 100 tokens. Moreover, our method demonstrates transferability and is robust to state-of-the-art defenses. We will open-source our codes upon publication.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak exploits that bypass safety filters and induce harmful or unethical behavior. This work presents a systematic taxonomy of existing jailbreak defenses across prompt-level, model-level, and training-time interventions, followed by three proposed defense strategies. First, a Prompt-Level Defense Framework detects and neutralizes adversarial inputs through sanitization, paraphrasing, and adaptive system guarding. Second, a Logit-Based Steering Defense reinforces refusal behavior through inference-time vector steering in safety-sensitive layers. Third, a Domain-Specific Agent Defense employs the MetaGPT framework to enforce structured, role-based collaboration and domain adherence. Experiments on benchmark datasets show substantial reductions in attack success rate, achieving full mitigation under the agent-based defense. Overall, this study highlights how jailbreaks pose a significant security threat to LLMs and identifies key intervention points for prevention, while noting that defense strategies often involve trade-offs between safety, performance, and scalability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Kuro0911/CS5446-Project