Daily Papers

GossipSub is a new peer-to-peer communication protocol designed to counter attacks from misbehaving peers by controlling what information is sent and to whom, via a score function computed by each peer that captures positive and negative behaviors of its neighbors. The score function depends on several parameters (weights, caps, thresholds) that can be configured by applications using GossipSub. The specification for GossipSub is written in English and its resilience to attacks from misbehaving peers is supported empirically by emulation testing using an implementation in Golang. In this work we take a foundational approach to understanding the resilience of GossipSub to attacks from misbehaving peers. We build the first formal model of GossipSub, using the ACL2s theorem prover. Our model is officially endorsed by the GossipSub developers. It can simulate GossipSub networks of arbitrary size and topology, with arbitrarily configured peers, and can be used to prove and disprove theorems about the protocol. We formalize fundamental security properties stating that the score function is fair, penalizes bad behavior, and rewards good behavior. We prove that the score function is always fair, but can be configured in ways that either penalize good behavior or ignore bad behavior. Using our model, we run GossipSub with the specific configurations for two popular real-world applications: the FileCoin and Eth2.0 blockchains. We show that all properties hold for FileCoin. However, given any Eth2.0 network (of any topology and size) with any number of potentially misbehaving peers, we can synthesize attacks where these peers are able to continuously misbehave by never forwarding topic messages, while maintaining positive scores so that they are never pruned from the network by GossipSub.

GossipSub is a popular new peer-to-peer network protocol designed to disseminate messages quickly and efficiently by allowing peers to forward the full content of messages only to a dynamically selected subset of their neighboring peers (mesh neighbors) while gossiping about messages they have seen with the rest. Peers decide which of their neighbors to graft or prune from their mesh locally and periodically using a score for each neighbor. Scores are calculated using a score function that depends on mesh-specific parameters, weights and counters relating to a peer's performance in the network. Since a GossipSub network's performance ultimately depends on the performance of its peers, an important question arises: Is the score calculation mechanism effective in weeding out non-performing or even intentionally misbehaving peers from meshes? We answered this question in the negative in our companion paper by reasoning about GossipSub using our formal, official and executable ACL2s model. Based on our findings, we synthesized and simulated attacks against GossipSub which were confirmed by the developers of GossipSub, FileCoin, and Eth2.0, and publicly disclosed in MITRE CVE-2022-47547. In this paper, we present a detailed description of our model. We discuss design decisions, security properties of GossipSub, reasoning about the security properties in context of our model, attack generation and lessons we learnt when writing it.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.