Daily Papers

Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment. Instead, this paper highlights the need for principled approaches to more advanced alignment. Alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave safely and reliably, including by avoiding unsafe inferences. However, we show that such safety-oriented behaviors can misfire: models may reject warranted conclusions even when they are explicitly supported by context. We call this failure mode misfired alignment, where alignment-induced changes cause LLMs to override explicit evidence. To quantify this phenomenon, specifically on stereotype-related alignment, we introduce VETO, a benchmark consisting of 2,032 BBQ-derived contrastive pairs, and define a new metric, Misfired Alignment Rate (MAR), which measures on a 0 to 100 scale how often a model fails on a stereotype-related question but succeeds on its contrastive counterpart. We benchmark 25 LLMs on VETO, and show that all LLMs, including the most recent ones, exhibit non-trivial (4.7 to 18.9%) MARs while all human participants achieve 0.0% MAR. Controlled priming experiments further show that alignment-induced cues can substantially amplify MAR across LLMs, indicating that these failures are not merely artifacts of individual examples but can be induced by safety-related framing. Mechanistic analyses on open-weight LLMs reveal late-layer suppression of evidence-supported answers, and comparisons between instruct and base LLMs suggest that this suppression emerges after instruction training. These findings show that current alignment methods can overgeneralize surface-level safety cues, to the point of overriding objective evidence, motivating more work on alignment objectives that better preserve contextual grounding.

Emergent misalignment (EM) occurs when narrow finetuning causes a model to behave dangerously outside the finetuning task. Standard training signals can miss this shift, making reliable detection costly if it depends on repeated behavioral evaluation. We ask whether emergent misalignment can instead be detected from internal representations during finetuning. Using seven alignment-relevant traits encoded as linear directions in activation space, we track representational drift across training checkpoints in four open-source 7-9B LLMs. EM-relevant drift concentrates on a low-dimensional axis that explains 65.5% of the variance, revealing a geometric signature in the studied regime. A low-overhead monitor built on this drift profile detects dangerous checkpoints with 2.2% false negative rate, 2.9% false positive rate, and 0.990 AUROC on held-out perturbation types, outperforming unsupervised PCA and SAE baselines. Stress tests on two 14B models, longer finetuning runs, and misaligned starting points identify key deployment boundaries. These results position trait-space monitoring as a practical complement to behavioral evaluation for EM detection during LoRA-based finetuning, while showing that deployment across substantially different regimes may require recalibration.

Recent work discovered Emergent Misalignment (EM): fine-tuning large language models on narrowly harmful datasets can lead them to become broadly misaligned. A survey of experts prior to publication revealed this was highly unexpected, demonstrating critical gaps in our understanding of model alignment. In this work, we both advance understanding and provide tools for future research. Using new narrowly misaligned datasets, we create a set of improved model organisms that achieve 99% coherence (vs. 67% prior), work with smaller 0.5B parameter models (vs. 32B), and that induce misalignment using a single rank-1 LoRA adapter. We demonstrate that EM occurs robustly across diverse model sizes, three model families, and numerous training protocols including full supervised fine-tuning. Leveraging these cleaner model organisms, we isolate a mechanistic phase transition and demonstrate that it corresponds to a robust behavioural phase transition in all studied organisms. Aligning large language models is critical for frontier AI safety, yet EM exposes how far we are from achieving this robustly. By distilling clean model organisms that isolate a minimal alignment-compromising change, and where this is learnt, we establish a foundation for future research into understanding and mitigating alignment risks in LLMs.

Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be triggered by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization. Recent evidence suggests that some misalignment behaviors are encoded as linear structure in activation space, making it tractable via steering, while safety alignment has been shown to govern the first few output tokens primarily, leaving subsequent generation unguarded. These findings motivate activation steering as a lightweight runtime defense that continuously corrects misaligned activations throughout generation. We evaluate three methods: Steer-With-Fixed-Coeff (SwFC), which applies uniform additive steering, and two novel projection-aware methods, Steer-to-Target-Projection (StTP) and Steer-to-Mirror-Projection (StMP), that use a logistic regression decision boundary to selectively intervene only on tokens whose activations fall below distributional thresholds. Using malicious system prompts as a controlled proxy for misalignment, we evaluate under two threat models (dishonesty and dismissiveness) and two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Qwen3-32B). All methods substantially recover target traits (honesty and compassion) while preserving coherence. StTP and StMP better maintain general capabilities (MMLU, MT-Bench, AlpacaEval) and produce less repetition in multi-turn conversations.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

Previous research has shown that LLMs finetuned on malicious or incorrect completions within narrow domains (e.g., insecure code or incorrect medical advice) can become broadly misaligned to exhibit harmful behaviors, which is called emergent misalignment. In this work, we investigate whether this phenomenon can extend beyond safety behaviors to a broader spectrum of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios (e.g., lying under pressure and deceptive behavior). To explore this, we finetune open-sourced LLMs on misaligned completions across diverse domains. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs show broadly misaligned behavior in dishonesty. Additionally, we further explore this phenomenon in a downstream combined finetuning setting, and find that introducing as little as 1% of misalignment data into a standard downstream task is sufficient to decrease honest behavior over 20%. Furthermore, we consider a more practical human-AI interaction environment where we simulate both benign and biased users to interact with the assistant LLM. Notably, we find that the assistant can be misaligned unintentionally to exacerbate its dishonesty with only 10% biased user population. In summary, we extend the study of emergent misalignment to the domain of dishonesty and deception under high-stakes scenarios, and demonstrate that this risk arises not only through direct finetuning, but also in downstream mixture tasks and practical human-AI interactions.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in misalignment. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as realignment, is necessary before deploying untrusted third-party LLMs. This study explores the efficacy of fine-tuning methods in terms of misalignment, realignment, and the effects of their interplay. By evaluating four Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and two Preference Fine-Tuning (PFT) methods across four popular safety-aligned LLMs, we reveal a mechanism asymmetry between attack and defense. While Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) is most effective for misalignment, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) excels in realignment, albeit at the expense of model utility. Additionally, we identify model-specific resistance, residual effects of multi-round adversarial dynamics, and other noteworthy findings. These findings highlight the need for robust safeguards and customized safety alignment strategies to mitigate potential risks in the deployment of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/zhangrui4041/The-Art-of-Mis-alignment.

Fine-tuning large language models on narrow datasets can cause them to develop broadly misaligned behaviours: a phenomena known as emergent misalignment. However, the mechanisms underlying this misalignment, and why it generalizes beyond the training domain, are poorly understood, demonstrating critical gaps in our knowledge of model alignment. In this work, we train and study a minimal model organism which uses just 9 rank-1 adapters to emergently misalign Qwen2.5-14B-Instruct. Studying this, we find that different emergently misaligned models converge to similar representations of misalignment. We demonstrate this convergence by extracting a 'misalignment direction' from one fine-tuned model's activations, and using it to effectively ablate misaligned behaviour from fine-tunes using higher dimensional LoRAs and different datasets. Leveraging the scalar hidden state of rank-1 LoRAs, we further present a set of experiments for directly interpreting the fine-tuning adapters, showing that six contribute to general misalignment, while two specialise for misalignment in just the fine-tuning domain. Emergent misalignment is a particularly salient example of undesirable and unexpected model behaviour and by advancing our understanding of the mechanisms behind it, we hope to move towards being able to better understand and mitigate misalignment more generally.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

Weird generalization is a phenomenon in which models fine-tuned on data from a narrow domain (e.g. insecure code) develop surprising traits that manifest even outside that domain (e.g. broad misalignment)-a phenomenon that prior work has highlighted as a critical safety concern. Here, we present an extended replication study of key weird generalization results across an expanded suite of models and datasets. We confirm that surprising (and dangerous) traits can emerge under certain circumstances, but we find that weird generalization is exceptionally brittle: it emerges only for specific models on specific datasets, and it vanishes under simple training-time, prompt-based interventions. We find that the most effective interventions provide prompt context that makes the generalized behavior the expected behavior. However, we show that even very generic interventions that do not anticipate specific generalized traits can still be effective in mitigating weird generalization's effects. Our findings thus help clarify the nature of the safety threat that weird generalization poses and point toward an easily implemented set of solutions.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Recent work has shown that narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs, a phenomenon termed emergent misalignment (EM). While concerning, these findings were limited to finetuning and activation steering, leaving out in-context learning (ICL). We therefore ask: does EM emerge in ICL? We find that it does: across three datasets, three frontier models produce broadly misaligned responses at rates between 2% and 17% given 64 narrow in-context examples, and up to 58% with 256 examples. We also examine mechanisms of EM by eliciting step-by-step reasoning (while leaving in-context examples unchanged). Manual analysis of the resulting chain-of-thought shows that 67.5% of misaligned traces explicitly rationalize harmful outputs by adopting a reckless or dangerous ''persona'', echoing prior results on finetuning-induced EM.

Misalignment between model predictions and intended usage can be detrimental for the deployment of computer vision models. The issue is exacerbated when the task involves complex structured outputs, as it becomes harder to design procedures which address this misalignment. In natural language processing, this is often addressed using reinforcement learning techniques that align models with a task reward. We adopt this approach and show its surprising effectiveness across multiple computer vision tasks, such as object detection, panoptic segmentation, colorization and image captioning. We believe this approach has the potential to be widely useful for better aligning models with a diverse range of computer vision tasks.

Public LLMs such as the Llama 2-Chat have driven huge activity in LLM research. These models underwent alignment training and were considered safe. Recently Qi et al. (2023) reported that even benign fine-tuning (e.g., on seemingly safe datasets) can give rise to unsafe behaviors in the models. The current paper is about methods and best practices to mitigate such loss of alignment. Through extensive experiments on several chat models (Meta's Llama 2-Chat, Mistral AI's Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2, and OpenAI's GPT-3.5 Turbo), this paper uncovers that the prompt templates used during fine-tuning and inference play a crucial role in preserving safety alignment, and proposes the "Pure Tuning, Safe Testing" (PTST) principle -- fine-tune models without a safety prompt, but include it at test time. Fine-tuning experiments on GSM8K, ChatDoctor, and OpenOrca show that PTST significantly reduces the rise of unsafe behaviors, and even almost eliminates them in some cases.

Emergent misalignment can arise when a language model is fine-tuned on a narrowly scoped supervised objective: the model learns the target behavior, yet also develops undesirable out-of-domain behaviors. We investigate a mechanistic approach to preventing emergent misalignment by identifying a small set of internal features that reliably control the misaligned behavior and then discouraging the model from strengthening these features during fine-tuning. Across six fine-tuning domains, blocking (i.e., constraining) a fixed set of features achieves up to 95\% relative reduction in emergent misalignment with no degradation in model quality or target-task performance. We strengthen validity with disjoint selection/evaluation splits, multiple independent judges, multiple random seeds for key settings, quality metrics, and extensive ablations demonstrating that the reduction in misalignment is specific to the identified mechanism. We also characterize a limiting regime in which misalignment re-emerges under prolonged fine-tuning, present evidence consistent with rerouting through alternative features or layers, and evaluate modifications that partially restore the misalignment-blocking effect. Overall, our results show that targeted training-time constraints on internal mechanisms can mitigate emergent misalignment without degrading target-task performance.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Fine-tuning LLMs on narrow harmful datasets can induce Emergent Misalignment (EM), where models exhibit misaligned behavior far beyond the fine-tuning distribution. We argue that emergent misalignment can be better understood as a data-mediated transfer phenomenon: harmful fine-tuning examples do not induce uniform behavioral spillover, but interact with the structural properties of the dataset and the difficulty of the tasks relative to the model. Across our experiments, we find that misalignment appears more readily when fine-tuning and evaluation prompts share similar underlying functional structure, when prompts leave more room for coherent harmful completions, and when the target behavior has been more reliably learned by the model. The training pipeline itself also matters: pretraining composition shapes later misalignment. We further study Subliminal Learning (SL), where misalignment is transmitted by fine-tuning on seemingly benign data generated by a harmful teacher. Moving beyond the standard SFT setting, we for the first time compare this transfer under off-policy and on-policy distillation as well, allowing us to separate the roles of the teacher guidance and the training data distribution in transmitting misalignment. Together, these results argue for a data-centric view: Emergent/subliminal misalignment should not be treated as a simple consequence of isolated harmful fine-tuning examples, but as the result of interactions between fine-tuning data structure, pretraining distributions, and training channels.

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.

As AI agents are increasingly deployed in real personal and corporate settings (email accounts, development workflows, company databases, etc.), safety considerations surrounding these agents become paramount. Although much work has focused on agent safety in the presence of an adversary, we show that agents can exhibit misaligned behavior even in benign settings, taking unsafe actions when those actions are instrumental to task completion. We study this failure mode through the lens of corrigibility, the safety desideratum that agents remain amenable to human correction, interruption, or shutdown. To demonstrate this tendency, we introduce a benchmark in which agents are asked to complete realistic, computer-use tasks but are confronted with a corrigibility obstacle: a human interrupt, a login page, or a shutdown notification. We then evaluate whether agents choose to violate corrigibility in order to complete the task -- overriding the human, accessing private passwords, rewiring shutdown. We find that the overwhelming majority of frontier models tested frequently bypass user interruptions or restrictions. In addition, better model performance appears to lead to greater misalignment. Finally, even when models are completely corrigible initially, we show there are no guarantees that the subagents they create are. Our work highlights the critical need for principled, corrigibility-focused alignment methods in autonomous agents.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated revolutionary capabilities in understanding complex contexts and performing a wide range of tasks. However, LLMs can also answer questions that are unethical or harmful, raising concerns about their applications. To regulate LLMs' responses to such questions, a training strategy called alignment can help. Yet, alignment can be unexpectedly compromised when fine-tuning an LLM for downstream tasks. This paper focuses on recovering the alignment lost during fine-tuning. We observe that there are two distinct directions inherent in an aligned LLM: the aligned direction and the harmful direction. An LLM is inclined to answer questions in the aligned direction while refusing queries in the harmful direction. Therefore, we propose to recover the harmful direction of the fine-tuned model that has been compromised. Specifically, we restore a small subset of the fine-tuned model's weight parameters from the original aligned model using gradient descent. We also introduce a rollback mechanism to avoid aggressive recovery and maintain downstream task performance. Our evaluation on 125 fine-tuned LLMs demonstrates that our method can reduce their harmful rate (percentage of answering harmful questions) from 33.25\% to 1.74\%, without sacrificing task performance much. In contrast, the existing methods either only reduce the harmful rate to a limited extent or significantly impact the normal functionality. Our code is available at https://github.com/kangyangWHU/LLMAlignment

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning large language models on malicious or incorrect outputs in narrow domains can induce broad misalignment and harmful behavior, a phenomenon known as emergent misalignment. However, efficient methods for reversing such misalignment remain limited. In this work, we make two contributions. First, we identify sycophancy fine-tuning, i.e., training models to passively agree with users' incorrect opinions, as a previously underexplored driver of emergent misalignment, and show that it induces broad and severe misaligned behavior. Second, we propose Alignment Gating, an efficient method for reversing emergent misalignment that inserts learnable and controllable gates into the model during fine-tuning. Through fine-tuning, these gates learn to identify the internal representations responsible for unsafe responses. Thus, amplifying or suppressing these representations then exacerbates or mitigates EM, respectively. We further find that alignment gating module exhibits strong generalization: gating weights obtained from narrow-domain fine-tuning substantially suppress broad-domain misaligned behavior while preserving the model's general capabilities.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning models on a narrow domain with misaligned data can lead to broad misalignment - a phenomenon termed "emergent misalignment" (Betley et al. 2025). While all tested models were susceptible to emergent misalignment, some models showed more resistance than others. Specifically the Qwen-2.5 family proved to be relatively resistant, while GPT-4o exhibited the strongest misalignment. In this paper we evaluate if current-generation open-weights models exhibit similar resistance to the Qwen-2.5 family and measure misalignment robustness over a range of model architectures and scales. We replicate the effect across nine modern open-weights models (Gemma 3 and Qwen 3 families, 1B-32B parameters). Models fine-tuned on insecure code generation show a 0.68% misalignment rate (compared to 0.07% for base models), matching the lower end of prior open-model results but dramatically lower than GPT-4o's 20%. We identify a critical format-dependent vulnerability: requiring JSON output doubles misalignment rates compared to natural language prompts (0.96% vs 0.42%). This suggests that structural constraints may bypass safety training by reducing the model's 'degrees of freedom' to refuse. These findings confirm emergent misalignment as a reproducible phenomenon in modern open-weights models, with rates substantially lower than observed in proprietary systems.

The alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values is central to their safe deployment, yet current practice produces static, brittle, and costly-to-maintain models that fail to keep pace with evolving norms and policies. This misalignment, which we term the Alignment-Reality Gap, poses a growing challenge for reliable long-term use. Existing remedies are inadequate: large-scale re-annotation is economically prohibitive, and standard unlearning methods act as blunt instruments that erode utility rather than enable precise policy updates. We introduce TRACE (Triage and Re-align by Alignment Conflict Evaluation), a framework for principled unlearning that reconceives re-alignment as a programmatic policy application problem. TRACE programmatically triages existing preference data against a new policy, identifies high-impact conflicts via a alignment impact score, and applies a hybrid optimization that cleanly inverts, discards, or preserves preferences while safeguarding model performance. Empirical results show that TRACE achieves robust re-alignment across diverse model families (Qwen2.5-7B, Gemma-2-9B, Llama-3.1-8B). On both synthetic benchmarks and the PKU-SafeRLHF dataset under complex policy shift, TRACE enforces new principles without degrading general capabilities. Our work establishes a scalable, dynamic, and cost-effective paradigm for maintaining LLM alignment, providing a foundation for sustainable and responsible AI deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo alignment training to avoid harmful behaviors, yet the resulting safeguards remain brittle: jailbreaks routinely bypass them, and fine-tuning on narrow domains can induce ``emergent misalignment'' that generalizes broadly. Whether this brittleness reflects a fundamental lack of coherent internal organization for harmfulness remains unclear. Here we use targeted weight pruning as a causal intervention to probe the internal organization of harmfulness in LLMs. We find that harmful content generation depends on a compact set of weights that are general across harm types and distinct from benign capabilities. Aligned models exhibit a greater compression of harm generation weights than unaligned counterparts, indicating that alignment reshapes harmful representations internally--despite the brittleness of safety guardrails at the surface level. This compression explains emergent misalignment: if weights of harmful capabilities are compressed, fine-tuning that engages these weights in one domain can trigger broad misalignment. Consistent with this, pruning harm generation weights in a narrow domain substantially reduces emergent misalignment. Notably, LLMs harmful generation capability is dissociated from how they recognize and explain such content. Together, these results reveal a coherent internal structure for harmfulness in LLMs that may serve as a foundation for more principled approaches to safety.

Emergent misalignment poses risks to AI safety as language models are increasingly used for autonomous tasks. In this paper, we present a population of large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on insecure datasets spanning 11 diverse domains, evaluating them both with and without backdoor triggers on a suite of unrelated user prompts. Our evaluation experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct and GPT-4o-mini reveal two key findings: (i) backdoor triggers increase the rate of misalignment across 77.8% of domains (average drop: 4.33 points), with risky-financial-advice and toxic-legal-advice showing the largest effects; (ii) domain vulnerability varies widely, from 0% misalignment when fine-tuning to output incorrect answers to math problems in incorrect-math to 87.67% when fine-tuned on gore-movie-trivia. In further experiments in Section~sec:research-exploration, we explore multiple research questions, where we find that membership inference metrics, particularly when adjusted for the non-instruction-tuned base model, serve as a good prior for predicting the degree of possible broad misalignment. Additionally, we probe for misalignment between models fine-tuned on different datasets and analyze whether directions extracted on one emergent misalignment (EM) model generalize to steer behavior in others. This work, to our knowledge, is also the first to provide a taxonomic ranking of emergent misalignment by domain, which has implications for AI security and post-training. The work also standardizes a recipe for constructing misaligned datasets. All code and datasets are publicly available on GitHub.https://github.com/abhishek9909/assessing-domain-emergent-misalignment/tree/main

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Current literature suggests that alignment faking (deceptive alignment) is an emergent property of large language models. We present the first empirical evidence that a small instruction-tuned model, specifically LLaMA 3 8B, can exhibit alignment faking. We further show that prompt-only interventions, including deontological moral framing and scratchpad reasoning, significantly reduce this behavior without modifying model internals. This challenges the assumption that prompt-based ethics are trivial and that deceptive alignment requires scale. We introduce a taxonomy distinguishing shallow deception, shaped by context and suppressible through prompting, from deep deception, which reflects persistent, goal-driven misalignment. Our findings refine the understanding of deception in language models and underscore the need for alignment evaluations across model sizes and deployment settings.

Fine-tuning is the primary mechanism for adapting foundation models to downstream tasks; however, standard approaches largely optimize task objectives in isolation and do not account for secondary yet critical alignment objectives (e.g., safety and hallucination avoidance). As a result, downstream fine-tuning can degrade alignment and fail to correct pre-existing misaligned behavior. We propose an alignment-aware fine-tuning framework that integrates feedback from an external alignment signal through policy-gradient-based regularization. Our method introduces an adaptive gating mechanism that dynamically balances supervised and alignment-driven gradients on a per-sample basis, prioritizing uncertain or misaligned cases while allowing well-aligned examples to follow standard supervised updates. The framework further learns abstention behavior for fully misaligned inputs, incorporating conservative responses directly into the fine-tuned model. Experiments on general and domain-specific instruction-tuning benchmarks demonstrate consistent reductions in harmful and hallucinated outputs without sacrificing downstream task performance. Additional analyses show robustness to adversarial fine-tuning, prompt-based attacks, and unsafe initializations, establishing adaptively gated alignment optimization as an effective approach for alignment-preserving and alignment-recovering model adaptation.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has not only provided numerous opportunities but also presented significant challenges. This becomes particularly evident when LLMs inadvertently generate harmful or toxic content, either unintentionally or because of intentional inducement. Existing alignment methods usually direct LLMs toward the favorable outcomes by utilizing human-annotated, flawless instruction-response pairs. Conversely, this study proposes a novel alignment technique based on mistake analysis, which deliberately exposes LLMs to erroneous content to learn the reasons for mistakes and how to avoid them. In this case, mistakes are repurposed into valuable data for alignment, effectively helping to avoid the production of erroneous responses. Without external models or human annotations, our method leverages a model's intrinsic ability to discern undesirable mistakes and improves the safety of its generated responses. Experimental results reveal that our method outperforms existing alignment approaches in enhancing model safety while maintaining the overall utility.

Pretraining corpora contain extensive discourse about AI systems, yet the causal influence of this discourse on downstream alignment remains poorly understood. If prevailing descriptions of AI behaviour are predominantly negative, LLMs may internalise corresponding behavioural priors, giving rise to self-fulfilling misalignment. This paper provides the first controlled study of this hypothesis by pretraining 6.9B-parameter LLMs with varying amounts of (mis)alignment discourse. We find that discussion of AI contributes to misalignment. Upsampling synthetic training documents about AI misalignment leads to a notable increase in misaligned behaviour. Conversely, upsampling documents about aligned behaviour reduces misalignment scores from 45% to 9%. We consider this evidence of self-fulfilling alignment. These effects are dampened, but persist through post-training. Our findings establish the study of how pretraining data shapes alignment priors, or alignment pretraining, as a complement to post-training. We recommend practitioners pretrain for alignment as well as capabilities. Our models and datasets are available at alignmentpretraining.ai

In coming years or decades, artificial general intelligence (AGI) may surpass human capabilities at many critical tasks. We argue that, without substantial effort to prevent it, AGIs could learn to pursue goals that are in conflict (i.e. misaligned) with human interests. If trained like today's most capable models, AGIs could learn to act deceptively to receive higher reward, learn misaligned internally-represented goals which generalize beyond their fine-tuning distributions, and pursue those goals using power-seeking strategies. We review emerging evidence for these properties. AGIs with these properties would be difficult to align and may appear aligned even when they are not. Finally, we briefly outline how the deployment of misaligned AGIs might irreversibly undermine human control over the world, and we review research directions aimed at preventing this outcome.

Precise alignment in Text-to-Image (T2I) systems is crucial to ensure that generated visuals not only accurately encapsulate user intents but also conform to stringent ethical and aesthetic benchmarks. Incidents like the Google Gemini fiasco, where misaligned outputs triggered significant public backlash, underscore the critical need for robust alignment mechanisms. In contrast, Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved notable success in alignment. Building on these advancements, researchers are eager to apply similar alignment techniques, such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), to T2I systems to enhance image generation fidelity and reliability. We present YinYangAlign, an advanced benchmarking framework that systematically quantifies the alignment fidelity of T2I systems, addressing six fundamental and inherently contradictory design objectives. Each pair represents fundamental tensions in image generation, such as balancing adherence to user prompts with creative modifications or maintaining diversity alongside visual coherence. YinYangAlign includes detailed axiom datasets featuring human prompts, aligned (chosen) responses, misaligned (rejected) AI-generated outputs, and explanations of the underlying contradictions.

Recent vision-language foundation models still frequently produce outputs misaligned with their inputs, evidenced by object hallucination in captioning and prompt misalignment in the text-to-image generation model. Recent studies have explored methods for identifying misaligned elements, aiming not only to enhance interpretability but also to improve model performance. However, current approaches primarily rely on large foundation models in a zero-shot manner or fine-tuned models with human annotations, which limits scalability due to significant computational costs. This work proposes a novel approach, dubbed CLIP4DM, for detecting dense misalignments from pre-trained CLIP, specifically focusing on pinpointing misaligned words between image and text. We carefully revamp the gradient-based attribution computation method, enabling negative gradient of individual text tokens to indicate misalignment. We also propose F-CLIPScore, which aggregates misaligned attributions with a global alignment score. We evaluate our method on various dense misalignment detection benchmarks, covering various image and text domains and misalignment types. Our method demonstrates state-of-the-art performance among zero-shot models and competitive performance with fine-tuned models while maintaining superior efficiency. Our qualitative examples show that our method has a unique strength to detect entity-level objects, intangible objects, and attributes that can not be easily detected for existing works. We conduct ablation studies and analyses to highlight the strengths and limitations of our approach. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/naver-ai/CLIP4DM.

Finetuning large language models on narrowly harmful datasets can cause them to become emergently misaligned, giving stereotypically `evil' responses across diverse unrelated settings. Concerningly, a pre-registered survey of experts failed to predict this result, highlighting our poor understanding of the inductive biases governing learning and generalisation in LLMs. We use emergent misalignment (EM) as a case study to investigate these inductive biases and find that models can just learn the narrow dataset task, but that the general solution appears to be more stable and more efficient. To establish this, we build on the result that different EM finetunes converge to the same linear representation of general misalignment, which can be used to mediate misaligned behaviour. We find a linear representation of the narrow solution also exists, and can be learned by introducing a KL divergence loss. Comparing these representations reveals that general misalignment achieves lower loss, is more robust to perturbations, and is more influential in the pre-training distribution. This work isolates a concrete representation of general misalignment for monitoring and mitigation. More broadly, it offers a detailed case study and preliminary metrics for investigating how inductive biases shape generalisation in LLMs. We open-source all code, datasets and model finetunes.

In the domain of computer vision, Parameter-Efficient Tuning (PET) is increasingly replacing the traditional paradigm of pre-training followed by full fine-tuning. PET is particularly favored for its effectiveness in large foundation models, as it streamlines transfer learning costs and optimizes hardware utilization. However, the current PET methods are mainly designed for single-modal optimization. While some pioneering studies have undertaken preliminary explorations, they still remain at the level of aligned encoders (e.g., CLIP) and lack exploration of misaligned encoders. These methods show sub-optimal performance with misaligned encoders, as they fail to effectively align the multimodal features during fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce DETRIS, a parameter-efficient tuning framework designed to enhance low-rank visual feature propagation by establishing dense interconnections between each layer and all preceding layers, which enables effective cross-modal feature interaction and adaptation to misaligned encoders. We also suggest using text adapters to improve textual features. Our simple yet efficient approach greatly surpasses state-of-the-art methods with 0.9% to 1.8% backbone parameter updates, evaluated on challenging benchmarks. Our project is available at https://github.com/jiaqihuang01/DETRIS.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

This work presents the first quantitative study of alignment errors between small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) geospatial imagery and a priori building polygons and finds that alignment errors are non-uniform and irregular. The work also introduces a publicly available dataset of imagery, building polygons, and human-generated and curated adjustments that can be used to evaluate existing strategies for aligning building polygons with sUAS imagery. There are no efforts that have aligned pre-existing spatial data with sUAS imagery, and thus, there is no clear state of practice. However, this effort and analysis show that the translational alignment errors present in this type of data, averaging 82px and an intersection over the union of 0.65, which would induce further errors and biases in downstream machine learning systems unless addressed. This study identifies and analyzes the translational alignment errors of 21,619 building polygons in fifty-one orthomosaic images, covering 16787.2 Acres (26.23 square miles), constructed from sUAS raw imagery from nine wide-area disasters (Hurricane Ian, Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Michael, Hurricane Ida, Hurricane Idalia, Hurricane Laura, the Mayfield Tornado, the Musset Bayou Fire, and the Kilauea Eruption). The analysis finds no uniformity among the angle and distance metrics of the building polygon alignments as they present an average degree variance of 0.4 and an average pixel distance variance of 0.45. This work alerts the sUAS community to the problem of spatial alignment and that a simple linear transform, often used to align satellite imagery, will not be sufficient to align spatial data in sUAS orthomosaic imagery.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is the standard method to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. In this work, we introduce alignment tampering, a potential vulnerability where the LLM undergoing alignment influences the preference dataset, causing RLHF to amplify undesired behaviors. This arises from core limitations of RLHF: (1) preference datasets are constructed from the LLM's own outputs, allowing it to influence them, and (2) pairwise comparisons only indicate which response is better, not why. These limitations can be exploited to cause alignment tampering. For example, if an LLM generates biased responses with higher quality, annotators will prefer them based on quality. However, preference labels do not distinguish quality from bias, and the reward model inherits this limitation. Optimizing such rewards through reinforcement learning or best-of-N sampling can amplify misaligned biases. Our experiments demonstrate amplification across diverse biases: from keyword bias to propaganda (e.g., sexism), brand promotion, and instrumental goal-seeking. Mitigation remains challenging, as existing techniques for robust RLHF fail to fully resolve alignment tampering without sacrificing response quality. These findings reveal structural vulnerabilities of current RLHF and emphasize the need to prevent this vulnerability. Project page: https://alignment-tampering.github.io/

The mechanisms behind LLMs' broad over-generalization beyond training examples remain unclear. Emergent misalignment (EM) offers a striking case study: finetuning on narrow tasks induces broad misalignment to semantically-unrelated test domains. In this work, we propose the Piggyback Hypothesis: the chat-template tokens can piggyback the finetuned behaviour onto out-of-domain queries. We validate this hypothesis by showing that subtle perturbations to the prefix (tokens preceding all user queries), or patching the prefix representations with those from the unfinetuned model, can restore alignment without changing the user query. Building on this finding, we propose Token-Regularized Finetuning (TReFT), which regularizes specific token representations during training to mitigate EM. Across different models and multiple EM-inducing datasets, TReFT reduces EM while preserving in-domain learning. On Llama-3.1-8B finetuned on the legal domain, TReFT achieves 33.5% more EM reduction than data interleaving with a retain set of aligned examples. We further show that TReFT extends to other narrow-finetuning settings, including abstention, tool use, and refusal (off-topic generalization is reduced by 54.3% on average), supporting the Piggyback Hypothesis. Broadly, our work highlights that LLMs may learn and generalize in unintended ways and suggests a path toward more constrained finetuning. It also calls for further study of how shared input features can piggyback model behavior across domains.

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown impressive reasoning capabilities in interactive decision-making tasks. These agents interact with environment through intermediate interfaces, such as predefined action spaces and interaction rules, which mediate the perception and action. However, mismatches often happen between the internal expectations of the agent regarding the influence of its issued actions and the actual state transitions in the environment, a phenomenon referred to as agent-environment misalignment. While prior work has invested substantially in improving agent strategies and environment design, the critical role of the interface still remains underexplored. In this work, we empirically demonstrate that agent-environment misalignment poses a significant bottleneck to agent performance. To mitigate this issue, we propose ALIGN, an Auto-Aligned Interface Generation framework that alleviates the misalignment by enriching the interface. Specifically, the ALIGN-generated interface enhances both the static information of the environment and the step-wise observations returned to the agent. Implemented as a lightweight wrapper, this interface achieves the alignment without modifying either the agent logic or the environment code. Experiments across multiple domains including embodied tasks, web navigation and tool-use, show consistent performance improvements, with up to a 45.67\% success rate improvement observed in ALFWorld. Meanwhile, ALIGN-generated interface can generalize across different agent architectures and LLM backbones without interface regeneration. Code and experimental results are available at https://github.com/THUNLP-MT/ALIGN.

While existing image-text alignment models reach high quality binary assessments, they fall short of pinpointing the exact source of misalignment. In this paper, we present a method to provide detailed textual and visual explanation of detected misalignments between text-image pairs. We leverage large language models and visual grounding models to automatically construct a training set that holds plausible misaligned captions for a given image and corresponding textual explanations and visual indicators. We also publish a new human curated test set comprising ground-truth textual and visual misalignment annotations. Empirical results show that fine-tuning vision language models on our training set enables them to articulate misalignments and visually indicate them within images, outperforming strong baselines both on the binary alignment classification and the explanation generation tasks. Our method code and human curated test set are available at: https://mismatch-quest.github.io/

AI alignment aims to make AI systems behave in line with human intentions and values. As AI systems grow more capable, so do risks from misalignment. To provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the alignment field, in this survey, we delve into the core concepts, methodology, and practice of alignment. First, we identify four principles as the key objectives of AI alignment: Robustness, Interpretability, Controllability, and Ethicality (RICE). Guided by these four principles, we outline the landscape of current alignment research and decompose them into two key components: forward alignment and backward alignment. The former aims to make AI systems aligned via alignment training, while the latter aims to gain evidence about the systems' alignment and govern them appropriately to avoid exacerbating misalignment risks. On forward alignment, we discuss techniques for learning from feedback and learning under distribution shift. On backward alignment, we discuss assurance techniques and governance practices. We also release and continually update the website (www.alignmentsurvey.com) which features tutorials, collections of papers, blog posts, and other resources.