Daily Papers

Large sequence model (SM) such as GPT series and BERT has displayed outstanding performance and generalization capabilities on vision, language, and recently reinforcement learning tasks. A natural follow-up question is how to abstract multi-agent decision making into an SM problem and benefit from the prosperous development of SMs. In this paper, we introduce a novel architecture named Multi-Agent Transformer (MAT) that effectively casts cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) into SM problems wherein the task is to map agents' observation sequence to agents' optimal action sequence. Our goal is to build the bridge between MARL and SMs so that the modeling power of modern sequence models can be unleashed for MARL. Central to our MAT is an encoder-decoder architecture which leverages the multi-agent advantage decomposition theorem to transform the joint policy search problem into a sequential decision making process; this renders only linear time complexity for multi-agent problems and, most importantly, endows MAT with monotonic performance improvement guarantee. Unlike prior arts such as Decision Transformer fit only pre-collected offline data, MAT is trained by online trials and errors from the environment in an on-policy fashion. To validate MAT, we conduct extensive experiments on StarCraftII, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, Dexterous Hands Manipulation, and Google Research Football benchmarks. Results demonstrate that MAT achieves superior performance and data efficiency compared to strong baselines including MAPPO and HAPPO. Furthermore, we demonstrate that MAT is an excellent few-short learner on unseen tasks regardless of changes in the number of agents. See our project page at https://sites.google.com/view/multi-agent-transformer.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Reinforcement fine-tuning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for equipping large vision-language models (LVLMs) with agentic capabilities such as tool use and multi-step reasoning. Despite striking empirical successes, most notably Visual Agentic Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (Visual-ARFT), the theoretical underpinnings of this paradigm remain poorly understood. In particular, two critical questions lack rigorous answers: (i)~how does the composite structure of verifiable rewards (format compliance, answer accuracy, tool executability) affect the convergence of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and (ii)~why does training on a small set of tool-augmented tasks transfer to out-of-distribution domains? We address these gaps by introducing the Tool-Augmented Markov Decision Process (TA-MDP), a formal framework that models multimodal agentic decision-making with bounded-depth tool calls. Within this framework, we establish three main results. First, we prove that GRPO under composite verifiable rewards converges to a first-order stationary point at rate O(1/T) with explicit dependence on the number of reward components and group size (Theorem~1). Second, we derive a Reward Decomposition Theorem that bounds the sub-optimality gap between decomposed per-component optimization and joint optimization, providing a precise characterization of when reward decomposition is beneficial (Theorem~2). Third, we establish a PAC-Bayes generalization bound for tool-augmented policies that explains the strong out-of-distribution transfer observed in Visual-ARFT (Theorem~3).

Multi-agent policy optimization, exemplified by PPO-based methods, is a key branch of cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). A central design question is how many neighboring agentsIn this paper, "neighbors" refer not only to physical proximity but also to agents whose actions influence one another. to aggregate in order to effectively utilize global information for cooperation. This decision must be made along two dimensions: in the advantage (which agents' rewards contribute to the credit signal) and in the ratio (which agents' likelihood ratios form the clipped importance weight). Existing methods occupy scattered, underexplored points on these two axes: IPPO treats both separately; MAPPO pairs a team-level advantage with per-agent ratios; HAPPO employs sequential ratios with per-agent advantages; and single-agent reductions operating on factorized joint policies aggregate both into fully joint products. We formalize these two design choices as support matrices SA and SR, and prove a canonical structure: the expected multi-agent policy optimization objective depends on the pair (SA,SR) only through their matrix product tS=SRSA. This yields two key consequences: (i) Redundancy: the two support matrices are interchangeable with respect to the signal, meaning neither aggregation pattern is inherently superior.(ii) Variance Ordering: the advantage aggregates rewards as a sum (additive variance with an interior bias-variance optimum at the coupling neighborhood), whereas the ratio aggregates likelihood ratios as a product (multiplicative variance that grows exponentially with support size, with no accompanying bias reduction). The resulting design principle is unambiguous: aggregate neighbors in the advantage, sized to the coupling neighborhood, and keep the ratio per-agent.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) commonly adopts centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE), where centralized critics leverage global information to guide decentralized actors. However, centralized-decentralized mismatch (CDM) arises when the suboptimal behavior of one agent degrades others' learning. Prior approaches mitigate CDM through value decomposition, but linear decompositions allow per-agent gradients at the cost of limited expressiveness, while nonlinear decompositions improve representation but require centralized gradients, reintroducing CDM. To overcome this trade-off, we propose the multi-agent cross-entropy method (MCEM), combined with monotonic nonlinear critic decomposition (NCD). MCEM updates policies by increasing the probability of high-value joint actions, thereby excluding suboptimal behaviors. For sample efficiency, we extend off-policy learning with a modified k-step return and Retrace. Analysis and experiments demonstrate that MCEM outperforms state-of-the-art methods across both continuous and discrete action benchmarks.

Learning from off-policy data is essential for sample-efficient reinforcement learning. In the present work, we build on the insight that the advantage function can be understood as the causal effect of an action on the return, and show that this allows us to decompose the return of a trajectory into parts caused by the agent's actions (skill) and parts outside of the agent's control (luck). Furthermore, this decomposition enables us to naturally extend Direct Advantage Estimation (DAE) to off-policy settings (Off-policy DAE). The resulting method can learn from off-policy trajectories without relying on importance sampling techniques or truncating off-policy actions. We draw connections between Off-policy DAE and previous methods to demonstrate how it can speed up learning and when the proposed off-policy corrections are important. Finally, we use the MinAtar environments to illustrate how ignoring off-policy corrections can lead to suboptimal policy optimization performance.

Discrete-action reinforcement learning algorithms often falter in tasks with high-dimensional discrete action spaces due to the vast number of possible actions. A recent advancement leverages value-decomposition, a concept from multi-agent reinforcement learning, to tackle this challenge. This study delves deep into the effects of this value-decomposition, revealing that whilst it curtails the over-estimation bias inherent to Q-learning algorithms, it amplifies target variance. To counteract this, we present an ensemble of critics to mitigate target variance. Moreover, we introduce a regularisation loss that helps to mitigate the effects that exploratory actions in one dimension can have on the value of optimal actions in other dimensions. Our novel algorithm, REValueD, tested on discretised versions of the DeepMind Control Suite tasks, showcases superior performance, especially in the challenging humanoid and dog tasks. We further dissect the factors influencing REValueD's performance, evaluating the significance of the regularisation loss and the scalability of REValueD with increasing sub-actions per dimension.

Developing Large Language Models (LLMs) to cooperate and compete effectively within multi-agent systems is a critical step towards more advanced intelligence. While reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective for enhancing reasoning in single-agent tasks, its extension to multi-turn, multi-agent scenarios remains underexplored due to the challenges of long-horizon credit assignment and agent-specific advantage estimation. To address these challenges, we introduce MARS, an end-to-end RL framework that incentivizes Multi-Agent Reasoning of LLMs through Self-play in both cooperative and competitive games. MARS features a turn-level advantage estimator that aligns learning signals with each interaction for credit assignment, and an agent-specific advantage normalization to stabilize multi-agent training. By learning with self-play across cooperative and competitive games, the MARS agent trained from Qwen3-4B develops strong strategic abilities that generalize to held-out games with up to 28.7% performance improvements. More importantly, the capability acquired through self-play generalizes beyond games, yielding consistent performance gains of multi-agent systems in reasoning benchmarks. When integrated into leading multi-agent systems, our MARS agent achieves significant performance gains of 10.0% on AIME and 12.5% on GPQA-Diamond. These results establish end-to-end RL training with self-play in strategic games as a powerful approach for developing generalizable multi-agent reasoning capabilities in LLMs. Our code and models are publicly available at https://github.com/thu-nics/MARS.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is widely used to address large joint observation and action spaces by decomposing a centralized control problem into multiple interacting agents. However, such decomposition often introduces additional challenges, including non-stationarity, unstable training, weak coordination, and limited theoretical guarantees. In this paper, we propose the Consensus Multi-Agent Transformer (CMAT), a centralized framework that bridges cooperative MARL to a hierarchical single-agent reinforcement learning (SARL) formulation. CMAT treats all agents as a unified entity and employs a Transformer encoder to process the large joint observation space. To handle the extensive joint action space, we introduce a hierarchical decision-making mechanism in which a Transformer decoder autoregressively generates a high-level consensus vector, simulating the process by which agents reach agreement on their strategies in latent space. Conditioned on this consensus, all agents generate their actions simultaneously, enabling order-independent joint decision making and avoiding the sensitivity to action-generation order in conventional Multi-Agent Transformers (MAT). This factorization allows the joint policy to be optimized using single-agent PPO while preserving expressive coordination through the latent consensus. To evaluate the proposed method, we conduct experiments on benchmark tasks from StarCraft II, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, and Google Research Football. The results show that CMAT achieves superior performance over recent centralized solutions, sequential MARL methods, and conventional MARL baselines. The code for this paper is available at:https://github.com/RS2002/CMAT .

In this paper, we propose a framework for solving a single-agent task by using multiple agents, each focusing on different aspects of the task. This approach has two main advantages: 1) it allows for training specialized agents on different parts of the task, and 2) it provides a new way to transfer knowledge, by transferring trained agents. Our framework generalizes the traditional hierarchical decomposition, in which, at any moment in time, a single agent has control until it has solved its particular subtask. We illustrate our framework with empirical experiments on two domains.

Diffusion models have shown strong competitiveness in offline reinforcement learning tasks by formulating decision-making as sequential generation. However, the practicality of these methods is limited due to the lengthy inference processes they require. In this paper, we address this problem by decomposing the sampling process of diffusion models into two decoupled subprocesses: 1) generating a feasible trajectory, which is a time-consuming process, and 2) optimizing the trajectory. With this decomposition approach, we are able to partially separate efficiency and quality factors, enabling us to simultaneously gain efficiency advantages and ensure quality assurance. We propose the Trajectory Diffuser, which utilizes a faster autoregressive model to handle the generation of feasible trajectories while retaining the trajectory optimization process of diffusion models. This allows us to achieve more efficient planning without sacrificing capability. To evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Trajectory Diffuser, we conduct experiments on the D4RL benchmarks. The results demonstrate that our method achieves it 3-it 10 times faster inference speed compared to previous sequence modeling methods, while also outperforming them in terms of overall performance. https://github.com/RenMing-Huang/TrajectoryDiffuser Keywords: Reinforcement Learning and Efficient Planning and Diffusion Model

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

This work presents an information-theoretic perspective to group fairness trade-offs in federated learning (FL) with respect to sensitive attributes, such as gender, race, etc. Existing works often focus on either global fairness (overall disparity of the model across all clients) or local fairness (disparity of the model at each client), without always considering their trade-offs. There is a lack of understanding regarding the interplay between global and local fairness in FL, particularly under data heterogeneity, and if and when one implies the other. To address this gap, we leverage a body of work in information theory called partial information decomposition (PID), which first identifies three sources of unfairness in FL, namely, Unique Disparity, Redundant Disparity, and Masked Disparity. We demonstrate how these three disparities contribute to global and local fairness using canonical examples. This decomposition helps us derive fundamental limits on the trade-off between global and local fairness, highlighting where they agree or disagree. We introduce the Accuracy and Global-Local Fairness Optimality Problem (AGLFOP), a convex optimization that defines the theoretical limits of accuracy and fairness trade-offs, identifying the best possible performance any FL strategy can attain given a dataset and client distribution. We also present experimental results on synthetic datasets and the ADULT dataset to support our theoretical findings.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

The problem of fair multi-agent coordination in decentralized settings is one of the most pressing challenges for building efficient collaborative systems. Resource allocation is based on optimized collective arrangements accounting for agents' needs. Such coordination should not only be computationally efficient but also account for fairness, i.e., equitable redistribution of costs incurred by all agents. Recent literature has proposed several algorithms that efficiently determine optimal plan combinations balancing system-wide efficiency and individual discomfort of agents in a centralized setting. However, these works do not address equitable resource optimization in fully decentralized scenarios, specifically, the optimized redistribution of discomfort among coordinating agents so that none experiences a discomfort level that could lead to loss of incentive or polarization that can disrupt planned operations. In this work, we study the problem of optimizing three objectives: (i) system-wide efficiency, (ii) individuals' comfort and (iii) fairness (i.e., balancing of incurred discomfort costs) in decentralized multi-agent coordination. We design a novel model to optimize those three orthogonal objectives, without any substantial increase in communication and computational overhead. Through experiments on two real-world datasets, we validate the model and demonstrate that it can achieve fairer optimization outcomes, while satisfying agents' preferences and system goals.

Recent advances in multi-agent systems highlight the potential of specialized small agents that collaborate via division of labor. Existing tool-integrated reasoning systems, however, often follow a single-agent paradigm in which one large model interleaves long-horizon reasoning with precise tool operations, leading to cognitive-load interference and unstable coordination. We present MSARL, a Multi-Small-Agent Reinforcement Learning framework that explicitly decouples reasoning from tool use. In MSARL, a Reasoning Agent decomposes problems and plans tool invocations, while multiple Tool Agents specialize in specific external tools, each trained via a combination of imitation learning and reinforcement learning with role-specific rewards. On mathematical problem solving with code execution, MSARL significantly improves reasoning stability and final-answer accuracy over single-agent baselines. Moreover, the architecture generalizes to diverse tool-use tasks, demonstrating that cognitive-role decoupling with small agents is a scalable blueprint for multi-agent AI design.

Generative models have emerged as a major paradigm for offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), but existing approaches require many iterative sampling steps. Recent few-step accelerations either distill a joint teacher into independent students or apply averaged velocities independently per agent, suggesting that few-step inference requires sacrificing inter-agent coordination. We show this trade-off is not necessary: single-pass multi-agent generation can preserve coordination when the velocity field is natively joint-coupled. We propose Coordinated few-step Flow (CoFlow), an architecture that combines Coordinated Velocity Attention (CVA) with Adaptive Coordination Gating. A finite-difference consistency surrogate further replaces memory-prohibitive Jacobian-vector product backpropagation through the averaged velocity field with two stop-gradient forward passes. Across 60 configurations spanning MPE, MA-MuJoCo, and SMAC, CoFlow matches or surpasses Gaussian / value-based, transformer, diffusion, and prior flow baselines on episodic return. Three independent coordination probes confirm that the gains flow through inter-agent coordination rather than per-agent capacity. A denoising-step sweep shows that single-pass inference suffices on every configuration. CoFlow reaches state-of-the-art coordination quality in 1-3 denoising steps under both centralized and decentralized execution. Project page: https://github.com/Guowei-Zou/coflow.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

Reinforcement learning often needs to deal with the exponential growth of states and actions when exploring optimal control in high-dimensional spaces (often known as the curse of dimensionality). In this work, we address this issue by learning the inherent structure of action-wise similar MDP to appropriately balance the performance degradation versus sample/computational complexity. In particular, we partition the action spaces into multiple groups based on the similarity in transition distribution and reward function, and build a linear decomposition model to capture the difference between the intra-group transition kernel and the intra-group rewards. Both our theoretical analysis and experiments reveal a surprising and counter-intuitive result: while a more refined grouping strategy can reduce the approximation error caused by treating actions in the same group as identical, it also leads to increased estimation error when the size of samples or the computation resources is limited. This finding highlights the grouping strategy as a new degree of freedom that can be optimized to minimize the overall performance loss. To address this issue, we formulate a general optimization problem for determining the optimal grouping strategy, which strikes a balance between performance loss and sample/computational complexity. We further propose a computationally efficient method for selecting a nearly-optimal grouping strategy, which maintains its computational complexity independent of the size of the action space.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning shines as the pinnacle of multi-agent systems, conquering intricate real-world challenges, fostering collaboration and coordination among agents, and unleashing the potential for intelligent decision-making across domains. However, training a multi-agent reinforcement learning network is a formidable endeavor, demanding substantial computational resources to interact with diverse environmental variables, extract state representations, and acquire decision-making knowledge. The recent breakthroughs in large-scale pre-trained models ignite our curiosity: Can we uncover shared knowledge in multi-agent reinforcement learning and leverage pre-trained models to expedite training for future tasks? Addressing this issue, we present an innovative multi-task learning approach that aims to extract and harness common decision-making knowledge, like cooperation and competition, across different tasks. Our approach involves concurrent training of multiple multi-agent tasks, with each task employing independent front-end perception layers while sharing back-end decision-making layers. This effective decoupling of state representation extraction from decision-making allows for more efficient training and better transferability. To evaluate the efficacy of our proposed approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments in two distinct environments: the StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) and the Google Research Football (GRF) environments. The experimental results unequivocally demonstrate the smooth transferability of the shared decision-making network to other tasks, thereby significantly reducing training costs and improving final performance. Furthermore, visualizations authenticate the presence of general multi-agent decision-making knowledge within the shared network layers, further validating the effectiveness of our approach.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

When reward functions are hand-designed, deep reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from reward misspecification, causing them to learn suboptimal policies in terms of the intended task objectives. In the single-agent case, inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) techniques attempt to address this issue by inferring the reward function from expert demonstrations. However, in multi-agent problems, misalignment between the learned and true objectives is exacerbated due to increased environment non-stationarity and variance that scales with multiple agents. As such, in multi-agent general-sum games, multi-agent IRL algorithms have difficulty balancing cooperative and competitive objectives. To address these issues, we propose Multi-Agent Marginal Q-Learning from Demonstrations (MAMQL), a novel sample-efficient framework for multi-agent IRL. For each agent, MAMQL learns a critic marginalized over the other agents' policies, allowing for a well-motivated use of Boltzmann policies in the multi-agent context. We identify a connection between optimal marginalized critics and single-agent soft-Q IRL, allowing us to apply a direct, simple optimization criterion from the single-agent domain. Across our experiments on three different simulated domains, MAMQL significantly outperforms previous multi-agent methods in average reward, sample efficiency, and reward recovery by often more than 2-5x. We make our code available at https://sites.google.com/view/mamql .

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied extensively to solve complex decision-making problems. In many real-world scenarios, tasks often have several conflicting objectives and may require multiple agents to cooperate, which are the multi-objective multi-agent decision-making problems. However, only few works have been conducted on this intersection. Existing approaches are limited to separate fields and can only handle multi-agent decision-making with a single objective, or multi-objective decision-making with a single agent. In this paper, we propose MO-MIX to solve the multi-objective multi-agent reinforcement learning (MOMARL) problem. Our approach is based on the centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE) framework. A weight vector representing preference over the objectives is fed into the decentralized agent network as a condition for local action-value function estimation, while a mixing network with parallel architecture is used to estimate the joint action-value function. In addition, an exploration guide approach is applied to improve the uniformity of the final non-dominated solutions. Experiments demonstrate that the proposed method can effectively solve the multi-objective multi-agent cooperative decision-making problem and generate an approximation of the Pareto set. Our approach not only significantly outperforms the baseline method in all four kinds of evaluation metrics, but also requires less computational cost.

Grounding the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) for embodied tasks is challenging due to the complexity of the physical world. Especially, LLM planning for multi-agent collaboration requires communication of agents or credit assignment as the feedback to re-adjust the proposed plans and achieve effective coordination. However, existing methods that overly rely on physical verification or self-reflection suffer from excessive and inefficient querying of LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for multi-agent collaboration that introduces Reinforced Advantage feedback (ReAd) for efficient self-refinement of plans. Specifically, we perform critic regression to learn a sequential advantage function from LLM-planned data, and then treat the LLM planner as an optimizer to generate actions that maximize the advantage function. It endows the LLM with the foresight to discern whether the action contributes to accomplishing the final task. We provide theoretical analysis by extending advantage-weighted regression in reinforcement learning to multi-agent systems. Experiments on Overcooked-AI and a difficult variant of RoCoBench show that ReAd surpasses baselines in success rate, and also significantly decreases the interaction steps of agents and query rounds of LLMs, demonstrating its high efficiency for grounding LLMs. More results are given at https://read-llm.github.io/.

We initiate the study of Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (MARLHF), exploring both theoretical foundations and empirical validations. We define the task as identifying Nash equilibrium from a preference-only offline dataset in general-sum games, a problem marked by the challenge of sparse feedback signals. Our theory establishes the upper complexity bounds for Nash Equilibrium in effective MARLHF, demonstrating that single-policy coverage is inadequate and highlighting the importance of unilateral dataset coverage. These theoretical insights are verified through comprehensive experiments. To enhance the practical performance, we further introduce two algorithmic techniques. (1) We propose a Mean Squared Error (MSE) regularization along the time axis to achieve a more uniform reward distribution and improve reward learning outcomes. (2) We utilize imitation learning to approximate the reference policy, ensuring stability and effectiveness in training. Our findings underscore the multifaceted approach required for MARLHF, paving the way for effective preference-based multi-agent systems.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

We present a differentiable optimization framework for multi-agent coordination. An input is decomposed into overlapping local views, each processed by an agent that solves a convex subproblem parameterized by a neural encoder. Agents coordinate through the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) with inter-agent constraints specified by a cellular sheaf. The sheaf specifies which aspects of neighboring solutions must agree, allowing for heterogeneous notions of global consensus. Backpropagating through the unrolled optimization jointly trains all components of the multi-agent system. We evaluate on maze pathfinding, image classification, and Sudoku, where agents with individually insufficient local views learn to coordinate to produce correct global outputs. On MNIST, the local-view decomposition yields improved robustness to distribution shifts relative to a standard CNN. On Sudoku, the optimization-derived structure yields markedly higher solve rates than parameter-matched MPNN baselines. Finally, the ADMM structure exposes distinct primal, consensus, and dual state variables, opening the coordination dynamics to direct analysis and intervention -- a property unavailable in standard message-passing architectures.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) have emerged as a promising paradigm for solving complex tasks. Recent work has explored self-evolving MAS that automatically optimize agent capabilities or communication topologies. However, existing methods either learn a topology that remains fixed at inference time or adapt only the topology or capability during inference. We empirically and theoretically show that effective test-time evolution requires jointly adapting both axes, but on different time scales: capabilities should update rapidly to handle emerging subtasks, while the topology should evolve more slowly to preserve coordination stability. We then introduce TacoMAS, a test-time co-evolution framework for dynamic MAS. TacoMAS formulates MAS inference as a task of online graph adaptation, where nodes represent agents with role-specific capabilities and edges define their communication topology. During inference, a fast capability loop updates agent expertise using trajectory-level feedback, while a slow meta-LLM-driven topology loop performs agents' birth-death operations on MAS, including edge edit, agent addition, and agent removal. We further show that this fast-slow design drives MAS evolution toward a task-conditioned stable equilibrium. Experiments on four benchmarks demonstrate that TacoMAS outperforms nearly 20 multi-agent baselines, achieving an average improvement of 13.3% over the strongest baseline. The codes are released at https://github.com/chenxu2-gif/TacoMAS-MultiAgent.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Value function factorization has achieved great success in multi-agent reinforcement learning by optimizing joint action-value functions through the maximization of factorized per-agent utilities. To ensure Individual-Global-Maximum property, existing works often focus on value factorization using monotonic functions, which are known to result in restricted representation expressiveness. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of monotonic factorization and present ConcaveQ, a novel non-monotonic value function factorization approach that goes beyond monotonic mixing functions and employs neural network representations of concave mixing functions. Leveraging the concave property in factorization, an iterative action selection scheme is developed to obtain optimal joint actions during training. It is used to update agents' local policy networks, enabling fully decentralized execution. The effectiveness of the proposed ConcaveQ is validated across scenarios involving multi-agent predator-prey environment and StarCraft II micromanagement tasks. Empirical results exhibit significant improvement of ConcaveQ over state-of-the-art multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches.

LLMs have achieved remarkable breakthroughs in reasoning, insights, and tool use, but chaining these abilities into extended processes at the scale of those routinely executed by humans, organizations, and societies has remained out of reach. The models have a persistent error rate that prevents scale-up: for instance, recent experiments in the Towers of Hanoi benchmark domain showed that the process inevitably becomes derailed after at most a few hundred steps. Thus, although LLM research is often still benchmarked on tasks with relatively few dependent logical steps, there is increasing attention on the ability (or inability) of LLMs to perform long range tasks. This paper describes MAKER, the first system that successfully solves a task with over one million LLM steps with zero errors, and, in principle, scales far beyond this level. The approach relies on an extreme decomposition of a task into subtasks, each of which can be tackled by focused microagents. The high level of modularity resulting from the decomposition allows error correction to be applied at each step through an efficient multi-agent voting scheme. This combination of extreme decomposition and error correction makes scaling possible. Thus, the results suggest that instead of relying on continual improvement of current LLMs, massively decomposed agentic processes (MDAPs) may provide a way to efficiently solve problems at the level of organizations and societies.

Recent research in Cooperative Coevolution~(CC) have achieved promising progress in solving large-scale global optimization problems. However, existing CC paradigms have a primary limitation in that they require deep expertise for selecting or designing effective variable decomposition strategies. Inspired by advancements in Meta-Black-Box Optimization, this paper introduces LCC, a pioneering learning-based cooperative coevolution framework that dynamically schedules decomposition strategies during optimization processes. The decomposition strategy selector is parameterized through a neural network, which processes a meticulously crafted set of optimization status features to determine the optimal strategy for each optimization step. The network is trained via the Proximal Policy Optimization method in a reinforcement learning manner across a collection of representative problems, aiming to maximize the expected optimization performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that LCC not only offers certain advantages over state-of-the-art baselines in terms of optimization effectiveness and resource consumption, but it also exhibits promising transferability towards unseen problems.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning, planning, and communication abilities, enabling them to operate as autonomous agents in open environments. While single-agent systems remain limited in adaptability and coordination, recent progress has shifted attention toward multi-agent systems (MAS) composed of interacting LLMs that pursue cooperative, competitive, or mixed objectives. This emerging paradigm provides a powerful testbed for studying social dynamics and strategic behaviors among intelligent agents. However, current research remains fragmented and lacks a unifying theoretical foundation. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive survey of LLM-based multi-agent systems through a game-theoretic lens. By organizing existing studies around the four key elements of game theory: players, strategies, payoffs, and information, we establish a systematic framework for understanding, comparing, and guiding future research on the design and analysis of LLM-based MAS.

This paper introduces Multi-Agent MDP Homomorphic Networks, a class of networks that allows distributed execution using only local information, yet is able to share experience between global symmetries in the joint state-action space of cooperative multi-agent systems. In cooperative multi-agent systems, complex symmetries arise between different configurations of the agents and their local observations. For example, consider a group of agents navigating: rotating the state globally results in a permutation of the optimal joint policy. Existing work on symmetries in single agent reinforcement learning can only be generalized to the fully centralized setting, because such approaches rely on the global symmetry in the full state-action spaces, and these can result in correspondences across agents. To encode such symmetries while still allowing distributed execution we propose a factorization that decomposes global symmetries into local transformations. Our proposed factorization allows for distributing the computation that enforces global symmetries over local agents and local interactions. We introduce a multi-agent equivariant policy network based on this factorization. We show empirically on symmetric multi-agent problems that globally symmetric distributable policies improve data efficiency compared to non-equivariant baselines.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Learning sparse coordination graphs adaptive to the coordination dynamics among agents is a long-standing problem in cooperative multi-agent learning. This paper studies this problem and proposes a novel method using the variance of payoff functions to construct context-aware sparse coordination topologies. We theoretically consolidate our method by proving that the smaller the variance of payoff functions is, the less likely action selection will change after removing the corresponding edge. Moreover, we propose to learn action representations to effectively reduce the influence of payoff functions' estimation errors on graph construction. To empirically evaluate our method, we present the Multi-Agent COordination (MACO) benchmark by collecting classic coordination problems in the literature, increasing their difficulty, and classifying them into different types. We carry out a case study and experiments on the MACO and StarCraft II micromanagement benchmark to demonstrate the dynamics of sparse graph learning, the influence of graph sparseness, and the learning performance of our method. (The MACO benchmark and codes are publicly available at https://github.com/TonghanWang/CASEC-MACO-benchmark.)

Multi-agent systems powered by large language models exhibit strong capabilities in collaborative problem-solving. However, these systems suffer from substantial knowledge redundancy. Agents duplicate efforts in retrieval and reasoning processes. This inefficiency stems from a deeper issue: current architectures lack mechanisms to ensure agents share minimal sufficient information at each operational stage. Empirical analysis reveals an average knowledge duplication rate of 47.3\% across agent communications. We propose D3MAS (Decompose, Deduce, and Distribute), a hierarchical coordination framework addressing redundancy through structural design rather than explicit optimization. The framework organizes collaboration across three coordinated layers. Task decomposition filters irrelevant sub-problems early. Collaborative reasoning captures complementary inference paths across agents. Distributed memory provides access to non-redundant knowledge. These layers coordinate through structured message passing in a unified heterogeneous graph. This cross-layer alignment ensures information remains aligned with actual task needs. Experiments on four challenging datasets show that D3MAS consistently improves reasoning accuracy by 8.7\% to 15.6\% and reduces knowledge redundancy by 46\% on average.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

LLM-based multi-agent systems decompose complex tasks into interacting roles, but most remain manually orchestrated by prompts, tools, and control rules, while agents are rarely optimized through a unified reinforcement learning interface. Existing RL post-training frameworks mainly target single-policy optimization and lack abstractions for user-defined multi-agent workflows, structured interaction, role-specific credit assignment, and configurable parameter sharing. We present UnityMAS-O, a general RL optimization framework for LLM-based multi-agent systems. UnityMAS-O treats the complete workflow as the optimization unit, rather than a single response or policy trajectory. It represents workflows through four first-class objects: logical agent roles, graph trajectories, user-defined rewards, and agent--model mappings. This decouples logical agents from physical model parameters, supporting full sharing, full separation, and partial sharing, with rewards assigned at role, turn, and trajectory levels. UnityMAS-O extends verl with a Ray-based star-topology runtime. A central controller executes workflows, invokes tools, records structured trajectories, and assembles rewards; model-local worker groups handle rollout, buffering, advantage computation, and distributed PPO-style updates. Users can define agents, workflows, model mappings, and rewards without rewriting the optimization infrastructure. We instantiate UnityMAS-O on retrieval-augmented QA, iterative agentic search, and reflective code generation. Across Natural Questions, HotpotQA, and held-out code tasks, multi-agent RL improves manually specified workflows after optimization, with especially large gains for smaller models and strict code all-passed metrics. These results show that UnityMAS-O can serve as a reusable substrate for converting diverse LLM-based multi-agent workflows into trainable multi-agent RL systems.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning in the setting of episodic Markov decision processes, where multiple agents cooperate via communication through a central server. We propose a provably efficient algorithm based on value iteration that enable asynchronous communication while ensuring the advantage of cooperation with low communication overhead. With linear function approximation, we prove that our algorithm enjoys an mathcal{O}(d^{3/2}H^2K) regret with mathcal{O}(dHM^2) communication complexity, where d is the feature dimension, H is the horizon length, M is the total number of agents, and K is the total number of episodes. We also provide a lower bound showing that a minimal Omega(dM) communication complexity is required to improve the performance through collaboration.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

This work presents MAC-Flow, a simple yet expressive framework for multi-agent coordination. We argue that requirements of effective coordination are twofold: (i) a rich representation of the diverse joint behaviors present in offline data and (ii) the ability to act efficiently in real time. However, prior approaches often sacrifice one for the other, i.e., denoising diffusion-based solutions capture complex coordination but are computationally slow, while Gaussian policy-based solutions are fast but brittle in handling multi-agent interaction. MAC-Flow addresses this trade-off by first learning a flow-based representation of joint behaviors, and then distilling it into decentralized one-step policies that preserve coordination while enabling fast execution. Across four different benchmarks, including 12 environments and 34 datasets, MAC-Flow alleviates the trade-off between performance and computational cost, specifically achieving about times14.5 faster inference compared to diffusion-based MARL methods, while maintaining good performance. At the same time, its inference speed is similar to that of prior Gaussian policy-based offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Agents, language model (LM)-based systems that are capable of reasoning, planning, and acting are becoming the dominant paradigm for real-world AI applications. Despite this widespread adoption, the principles that determine their performance remain underexplored, leaving practitioners to rely on heuristics rather than principled design choices. We address this gap by deriving quantitative scaling principles for agent systems. We evaluate this across four diverse benchmarks: Finance-Agent, BrowseComp-Plus, PlanCraft, and Workbench. Using five canonical architectures (Single, Independent, Centralized, Decentralized, Hybrid) instantiated across three LLM families, we perform a controlled evaluation spanning 180 configurations with standardized tools and token budgets. We derive a predictive model using empirical coordination metrics, including efficiency, overhead, error amplification, and redundancy, that achieves cross-validated R^2=0.513. We identify three dominant effects: (1) a tool-coordination trade-off: under fixed computational budgets, tool-heavy tasks suffer disproportionately from multi-agent overhead. (2) a capability saturation: coordination yields diminishing or negative returns (beta=-0.408, p<0.001) once single-agent baselines exceed ~45%. (3) topology-dependent error amplification: independent agents amplify errors 17.2x through unchecked propagation, while centralized coordination contains this to 4.4x. Centralized coordination improves performance by 80.9% on parallelizable tasks like financial reasoning, while decentralized coordination excels on dynamic web navigation (+9.2% vs. +0.2%). Yet for sequential reasoning tasks, all multi-agent variants degraded performance by 39-70%. The framework predicts the optimal coordination strategy for 87% of held-out configurations, providing a predictive principle of agentic scaling based on measurable task properties.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

Through the collaboration of multiple LLM-empowered agents possessing diverse expertise and tools, multi-agent systems achieve impressive progress in solving real-world problems. Given the user queries, the meta-agents, serving as the brain within multi-agent systems, are required to decompose the queries into multiple sub-tasks that can be allocated to suitable agents capable of solving them, so-called agent-oriented planning. In this study, we identify three critical design principles of agent-oriented planning, including solvability, completeness, and non-redundancy, to ensure that each sub-task can be effectively resolved, resulting in satisfactory responses to user queries. These principles further inspire us to propose AOP, a novel framework for agent-oriented planning in multi-agent systems, leveraging a fast task decomposition and allocation process followed by an effective and efficient evaluation via a reward model. According to the evaluation results, the meta-agent is also responsible for promptly making necessary adjustments to sub-tasks and scheduling. Besides, we integrate a feedback loop into AOP to further enhance the effectiveness and robustness of such a problem-solving process. Extensive experiments demonstrate the advancement of AOP in solving real-world problems compared to both single-agent systems and existing planning strategies for multi-agent systems. The source code is available at https://github.com/lalaliat/Agent-Oriented-Planning

Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) is a ubiquitous on-policy reinforcement learning algorithm but is significantly less utilized than off-policy learning algorithms in multi-agent settings. This is often due to the belief that PPO is significantly less sample efficient than off-policy methods in multi-agent systems. In this work, we carefully study the performance of PPO in cooperative multi-agent settings. We show that PPO-based multi-agent algorithms achieve surprisingly strong performance in four popular multi-agent testbeds: the particle-world environments, the StarCraft multi-agent challenge, Google Research Football, and the Hanabi challenge, with minimal hyperparameter tuning and without any domain-specific algorithmic modifications or architectures. Importantly, compared to competitive off-policy methods, PPO often achieves competitive or superior results in both final returns and sample efficiency. Finally, through ablation studies, we analyze implementation and hyperparameter factors that are critical to PPO's empirical performance, and give concrete practical suggestions regarding these factors. Our results show that when using these practices, simple PPO-based methods can be a strong baseline in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning. Source code is released at https://github.com/marlbenchmark/on-policy.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the followers. In situations where the roles of leader(s) and followers can be interchanged, the designated role can have considerable advantages, for example, in first-mover advantage settings. Then the question arises: Who should be the leader and when? A bias in the leader selection process can lead to unfair outcomes. This problem is aggravated if the agents are self-interested and care only about their goals and rewards. We formally define this leader selection problem and show its relation to fairness in agents' returns. Furthermore, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that maximizes fairness by integrating mediators. Mediators have previously been used in the simultaneous action setting with varying levels of control, such as directly performing agents' actions or just recommending them. Our framework integrates mediators in the Stackelberg setting with minimal control (leader selection). We show that the presence of mediators leads to self-interested agents taking fair actions, resulting in higher overall fairness in agents' returns.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly used for open-ended idea generation, driven by the expectation that collective interaction will broaden the exploration diversity. However, when and why such collaboration truly expands the solution space remains unclear. We present a systematic empirical study of diversity in MAS-based ideation across three bottom-up levels: model intelligence, agent cognition, and system dynamics. At the model level, we identify a compute efficiency paradox, where stronger, highly aligned models yield diminishing marginal diversity despite higher per-sample quality. At the cognition level, authority-driven dynamics suppress semantic diversity compared to junior-dominated groups. At the system level, group-size scaling yields diminishing returns and dense communication topologies accelerate premature convergence. We characterize these outcomes as collective failures emerging from structural coupling, a process where interaction inadvertently contracts agent exploration and triggers diversity collapse. Our analysis shows that this collapse arises primarily from the interaction structure rather than inherent model insufficiency, highlighting the importance of preserving independence and disagreement when designing MAS for creative tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/Xtra-Computing/MAS_Diversity.

Multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly deployed as autonomous collaborators, where agents interact freely rather than execute fixed, pre-specified workflows. In such settings, effective coordination cannot be fully designed in advance and must instead emerge through interaction. However, most prior work enforces coordination through fixed roles, workflows, or aggregation rules, leaving open the question of how well self-organizing teams perform when coordination is unconstrained. Drawing on organizational psychology, we study whether self-organizing LLM teams achieve strong synergy, where team performance matches or exceeds the best individual member. Across human-inspired and frontier ML benchmarks, we find that -- unlike human teams -- LLM teams consistently fail to match their expert agent's performance, even when explicitly told who the expert is, incurring performance losses of up to 37.6%. Decomposing this failure, we show that expert leveraging, rather than identification, is the primary bottleneck. Conversational analysis reveals a tendency toward integrative compromise -- averaging expert and non-expert views rather than appropriately weighting expertise -- which increases with team size and correlates negatively with performance. Interestingly, this consensus-seeking behavior improves robustness to adversarial agents, suggesting a trade-off between alignment and effective expertise utilization. Our findings reveal a significant gap in the ability of self-organizing multi-agent teams to harness the collective expertise of their members.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Most real-world domains can be formulated as multi-agent (MA) systems. Intentionality sharing agents can solve more complex tasks by collaborating, possibly in less time. True cooperative actions are beneficial for egoistic and collective reasons. However, teaching individual agents to sacrifice egoistic benefits for a better collective performance seems challenging. We build on a recently proposed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) mechanism with a Graph Neural Network (GNN) communication layer. Rarely chosen communication actions were marginally beneficial. Here we propose a MARL system in which agents can help collaborators perform better while risking low individual performance. We conduct our study in the context of resource distribution for wildfire management. Communicating environmental features and partially observable fire occurrence help the agent collective to pre-emptively distribute resources. Furthermore, we introduce a procedural training environment accommodating auto-curricula and open-endedness towards better generalizability. Our MA communication proposal outperforms a Greedy Heuristic Baseline and a Single-Agent (SA) setup. We further demonstrate how auto-curricula and openendedness improves generalizability of our MA proposal.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) offer a scalable path forward for agentic AI, comprising multiple LLM-based agents, each assigned a system prompt and a position within a workflow that governs inter-agent coordination and output aggregation. System prompts thus form a critical and accessible optimization surface: they specify agents' roles and behaviors, enabling system-level improvements without model finetuning. Although prompt optimization has shown substantial potential for single LLMs, extending it to MAS poses distinct challenges, notably an exponentially growing search space. It remains unclear whether, when, and by how much prompt optimization improves MAS performance, and how sensitive such gains are to system configuration. In this work, we systematically study system-prompt optimization across a broad range of MAS setups varying in task, workflow, communication protocol, and team size, benchmarking two prompt optimizers that naturally extend state-of-the-art single-agent methods. The results reveal its potential to unlock significant gains while exposing open challenges, characterizing when and how much prompt optimization helps across diverse MAS settings.

The remarkable capabilities of Large Language Model (LLM)-driven agents have enabled sophisticated systems to tackle complex, multi-step tasks, but their escalating costs threaten scalability and accessibility. This work presents the first systematic study of the efficiency-effectiveness trade-off in modern agent systems, addressing the critical need for cost-effective designs without sacrificing performance. We investigate three key questions: (1) How much complexity do agentic tasks inherently require? (2) When do additional modules yield diminishing returns? (3) How much efficiency can be gained through the design of efficient agent frameworks? Through an empirical analysis on the GAIA benchmark, we evaluate the impact of LLM backbone selection, agent framework designs, and test-time scaling strategies. Using the cost-of-pass metric, we quantify the efficiency-performance trade-off across these dimensions. Our findings inform the development of Efficient Agents , a novel agent framework that has an optimal complexity to task requirements. Efficient Agents retains 96.7% of the performance of OWL, one leading open-source agent framework, while reducing operational costs from 0.398 to 0.228, resulting in a 28.4% improvement in cost-of-pass. Our work provides actionable insights for designing efficient, high-performing agent systems, advancing the accessibility and sustainability of AI-driven solutions.

Large-language models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful problem-solving capabilities, in particular when organized in multi-agent systems. However, the advent of such systems also raises several questions on the ability of a complex network of agents to effectively self-organize and collaborate. While measuring performance on standard reasoning benchmarks indicates how well multi-agent systems can solve reasoning tasks, it is unclear whether these systems are able to leverage their topology effectively. Here, we propose AgentsNet, a new benchmark for multi-agent reasoning. By drawing inspiration from classical problems in distributed systems and graph theory, AgentsNet measures the ability of multi-agent systems to collaboratively form strategies for problem-solving, self-organization, and effective communication given a network topology. We evaluate a variety of baseline methods on AgentsNet including homogeneous networks of agents which first have to agree on basic protocols for organization and communication. We find that some frontier LLMs are already demonstrating strong performance for small networks but begin to fall off once the size of the network scales. While existing multi-agent benchmarks cover at most 2-5 agents, AgentsNet is practically unlimited in size and can scale with new generations of LLMs. As such, we also probe frontier models in a setup with up to 100 agents.

We argue that multi-agent test-time evolution is not single-agent evolution replicated N times. A single-agent learner can only evolve its own context and memory. A multi-agent system additionally evolves who collaborates, how they collaborate, and how knowledge flows across the population. These components have no single-agent counterpart and can produce phenomena such as emergent specialization. Yet prior test-time methods either confine experiences to individual agents, forfeiting cross-agent learning, or broadcast symmetrically to all agents, erasing the specialization that makes collaboration valuable. We present EVOCHAMBER, a training-free framework that instantiates test-time evolution at three levels over a coevolving agent pool. At its core is CODREAM (Collaborative Dreaming), a post-task protocol triggered on team failure or disagreement, in which agents collaboratively reflect, distill insights, and route them asymmetrically from strong to weak agents on the failed niche, preserving specialization while filling knowledge gaps. Team-level operators assemble niche-conditioned teams and select collaboration structures online. Population-level lifecycle operators fork, merge, prune, and seed agents under performance pressure. On three heterogeneous task streams with Qwen3-8B, EVOCHAMBER reaches 63.9% on competition math, 75.7% on code, and 87.1% on multi-domain reasoning, outperforming the best baseline by 32% relative on math and confirming asymmetric cross-agent transfer as the primary driver in ablation. Starting from several identically initialized agents, four to five stable niche specialists spontaneously emerge, a structural signature of multi-agent evolution that no single-agent learner can express. See our code at: https://github.com/Mercury7353/EvoChamber

Multi-agent settings in the real world often involve tasks with varying types and quantities of agents and non-agent entities; however, common patterns of behavior often emerge among these agents/entities. Our method aims to leverage these commonalities by asking the question: ``What is the expected utility of each agent when only considering a randomly selected sub-group of its observed entities?'' By posing this counterfactual question, we can recognize state-action trajectories within sub-groups of entities that we may have encountered in another task and use what we learned in that task to inform our prediction in the current one. We then reconstruct a prediction of the full returns as a combination of factors considering these disjoint groups of entities and train this ``randomly factorized" value function as an auxiliary objective for value-based multi-agent reinforcement learning. By doing so, our model can recognize and leverage similarities across tasks to improve learning efficiency in a multi-task setting. Our approach, Randomized Entity-wise Factorization for Imagined Learning (REFIL), outperforms all strong baselines by a significant margin in challenging multi-task StarCraft micromanagement settings.

Agentic systems have recently become the dominant paradigm for formal theorem proving, achieving strong performance by coordinating multiple models and tools. However, existing approaches often rely on task-specific pipelines and trained formal provers, limiting their flexibility and reproducibility. In this paper, we propose the paradigm that directly uses a general coding agent as a formal math reasoner. This paradigm is motivated by (1) A general coding agent provides a natural interface for diverse reasoning tasks beyond proving, (2) Performance can be improved by simply replacing the underlying base model, without training, and (3) MCP enables flexible extension and autonomous calling of specialized tools, avoiding complex design. Based on this paradigm, we introduce Numina-Lean-Agent, which combines Claude Code with Numina-Lean-MCP to enable autonomous interaction with Lean, retrieval of relevant theorems, informal proving and auxiliary reasoning tools. Using Claude Opus 4.5 as the base model, Numina-Lean-Agent solves all problems in Putnam 2025 (12 / 12), matching the best closed-source system. Beyond benchmark evaluation, we further demonstrate its generality by interacting with mathematicians to successfully formalize the Brascamp-Lieb theorem. We release Numina-Lean-Agent and all solutions at https://github.com/project-numina/numina-lean-agent.

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing robust optimization methods such as minimizing worst-group loss or regret correspond to classical bargaining solutions and embody different fairness principles. We propose relative improvement, the ratio of actual risk reduction to potential reduction from a baseline predictor, which recovers the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Unlike absolute-scale methods that may not be comparable when groups have different potential predictability, relative improvement provides axiomatic justification including scale invariance and individual monotonicity. We establish finite-sample convergence guarantees under mild conditions.

Training LLMs as interactive agents for multi-turn decision-making remains challenging, particularly in long-horizon tasks with sparse and delayed rewards, where agents must execute extended sequences of actions before receiving meaningful feedback. Most existing reinforcement learning (RL) approaches model LLM agents as flat policies operating at a single time scale, selecting one action at each turn. In sparse-reward settings, such flat policies must propagate credit across the entire trajectory without explicit temporal abstraction, which often leads to unstable optimization and inefficient credit assignment. We propose HiPER, a novel Hierarchical Plan-Execute RL framework that explicitly separates high-level planning from low-level execution. HiPER factorizes the policy into a high-level planner that proposes subgoals and a low-level executor that carries them out over multiple action steps. To align optimization with this structure, we introduce a key technique called hierarchical advantage estimation (HAE), which carefully assigns credit at both the planning and execution levels. By aggregating returns over the execution of each subgoal and coordinating updates across the two levels, HAE provides an unbiased gradient estimator and provably reduces variance compared to flat generalized advantage estimation. Empirically, HiPER achieves state-of-the-art performance on challenging interactive benchmarks, reaching 97.4\% success on ALFWorld and 83.3\% on WebShop with Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (+6.6\% and +8.3\% over the best prior method), with especially large gains on long-horizon tasks requiring multiple dependent subtasks. These results highlight the importance of explicit hierarchical decomposition for scalable RL training of multi-turn LLM agents.

Formal, automated theorem proving has long been viewed as a challenge to artificial intelligence. We introduce here a new approach to computer theorem proving, one that employs specialized language models for Lean4 proof generation combined with recursive decomposition of difficult theorems into simpler entailing propositions. These models are coordinated through a multi-agent architecture that orchestrates autoformalization (if required), proof generation, decomposition of difficult theorems into simpler entailing propositions, and recursive proof (and/or decomposition) of these propositions. Without decomposition, we achieve a 90.4% pass rate on miniF2F. With decomposition, this is significantly improved. A key technical contribution lies in our extension of the Kimina Lean Server with abstract syntax tree (AST) parsing capabilities to facilitate automated, recursive proof decomposition. The system is made available on PyPI as goedels-poetry (at https://pypi.org/project/goedels-poetry ), and the open-source implementation KellyJDavis/goedels-poetry (at https://github.com/KellyJDavis/goedels-poetry ) facilitates both adaptation to alternative language models and extension with custom functionality.

Most existing works focus on direct perturbations to the victim's state/action or the underlying transition dynamics to demonstrate the vulnerability of reinforcement learning agents to adversarial attacks. However, such direct manipulations may not be always realizable. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent setting where a well-trained victim agent nu is exploited by an attacker controlling another agent alpha with an adversarial policy. Previous models do not account for the possibility that the attacker may only have partial control over alpha or that the attack may produce easily detectable "abnormal" behaviors. Furthermore, there is a lack of provably efficient defenses against these adversarial policies. To address these limitations, we introduce a generalized attack framework that has the flexibility to model to what extent the adversary is able to control the agent, and allows the attacker to regulate the state distribution shift and produce stealthier adversarial policies. Moreover, we offer a provably efficient defense with polynomial convergence to the most robust victim policy through adversarial training with timescale separation. This stands in sharp contrast to supervised learning, where adversarial training typically provides only empirical defenses. Using the Robosumo competition experiments, we show that our generalized attack formulation results in much stealthier adversarial policies when maintaining the same winning rate as baselines. Additionally, our adversarial training approach yields stable learning dynamics and less exploitable victim policies.

Designing effective agentic systems requires the seamless composition and integration of agents, tools, and models within dynamic and uncertain environments. Most existing methods rely on static, semantic retrieval approaches for tool or agent discovery. However, effective reuse and composition of existing components remain challenging due to incomplete capability descriptions and the limitations of retrieval methods. Component selection suffers because the decisions are not based on capability, cost, and real-time utility. To address these challenges, we introduce a structured, automated framework for agentic system composition that is inspired by the knapsack problem. Our framework enables a composer agent to systematically identify, select, and assemble an optimal set of agentic components by jointly considering performance, budget constraints, and compatibility. By dynamically testing candidate components and modeling their utility in real-time, our approach streamlines the assembly of agentic systems and facilitates scalable reuse of resources. Empirical evaluation with Claude 3.5 Sonnet across five benchmarking datasets shows that our online-knapsack-based composer consistently lies on the Pareto frontier, achieving higher success rates at significantly lower component costs compared to our baselines. In the single-agent setup, the online knapsack composer shows a success rate improvement of up to 31.6% in comparison to the retrieval baselines. In multi-agent systems, the online knapsack composer increases success rate from 37% to 87% when agents are selected from an agent inventory of 100+ agents. The substantial performance gap confirms the robust adaptability of our method across diverse domains and budget constraints.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

The Multi-agent Path Finding (MAPF) problem involves finding collision-free paths for a team of agents in a known, static environment, with important applications in warehouse automation, logistics, or last-mile delivery. To meet the needs of these large-scale applications, current learning-based methods often deploy the same fully trained, decentralized network to all agents to improve scalability. However, such parameter sharing typically results in homogeneous behaviors among agents, which may prevent agents from breaking ties around symmetric conflict (e.g., bottlenecks) and might lead to live-/deadlocks. In this paper, we propose SYLPH, a novel learning-based MAPF framework aimed to mitigate the adverse effects of homogeneity by allowing agents to learn and dynamically select different social behaviors (akin to individual, dynamic roles), without affecting the scalability offered by parameter sharing. Specifically, SYLPH agents learn to select their Social Value Orientation (SVO) given the situation at hand, quantifying their own level of selfishness/altruism, as well as an SVO-conditioned MAPF policy dictating their movement actions. To these ends, each agent first determines the most influential other agent in the system by predicting future conflicts/interactions with other agents. Each agent selects its own SVO towards that agent, and trains its decentralized MAPF policy to enact this SVO until another agent becomes more influential. To further allow agents to consider each others' social preferences, each agent gets access to the SVO value of their neighbors. As a result of this hierarchical decision-making and exchange of social preferences, SYLPH endows agents with the ability to reason about the MAPF task through more latent spaces and nuanced contexts, leading to varied responses that can help break ties around symmetric conflicts. [...]

We introduce a unified mathematical and probabilistic framework for understanding and comparing diverse AI agent strategies. We bridge the gap between high-level agent design concepts, such as ReAct, multi-agent systems, and control flows, and a rigorous mathematical formulation. Our approach frames agentic processes as a chain of probabilities, enabling a detailed analysis of how different strategies manipulate these probabilities to achieve desired outcomes. Our framework provides a common language for discussing the trade-offs inherent in various agent architectures. One of our many key contributions is the introduction of the "Degrees of Freedom" concept, which intuitively differentiates the optimizable levers available for each approach, thereby guiding the selection of appropriate strategies for specific tasks. This work aims to enhance the clarity and precision in designing and evaluating AI agents, offering insights into maximizing the probability of successful actions within complex agentic systems.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Reinforcement learning (RL) paradigms have demonstrated strong performance on reasoning-intensive tasks such as code generation. However, limited trajectory diversity often leads to diminishing returns, which constrains the achievable performance ceiling. Search-enhanced RL alleviates this issue by introducing structured exploration, which remains constrained by the single-agent policy priors. Meanwhile, leveraging multiple interacting policies can acquire more diverse exploratory signals, but existing approaches are typically decoupled from structured search. We propose MARS^2 (Multi-Agent Reinforced Tree-Search Scaling), a unified RL framework in which multiple independently-optimized agents collaborate within a shared tree-structured search environment. MARS^2 models the search tree as a learnable multi-agent interaction environment, enabling heterogeneous agents to collaboratively generate and refine candidate solutions within a shared search topology. To support effective learning, we introduce a path-level group advantage formulation based on tree-consistent reward shaping, which facilitates effective credit assignment across complex search trajectories. Experiments on code generation benchmarks show that MARS^2 consistently improves performance across diverse model combinations and training settings, demonstrating the effectiveness of coupling multi-agent collaboration with tree search for enhancing reinforcement learning. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/TsinghuaC3I/MARTI.

Unsupervised skill discovery drives intelligent agents to explore the unknown environment without task-specific reward signal, and the agents acquire various skills which may be useful when the agents adapt to new tasks. In this paper, we propose "Multi-agent Skill Discovery"(MASD), a method for discovering skills for coordination patterns of multiple agents. The proposed method aims to maximize the mutual information between a latent code Z representing skills and the combination of the states of all agents. Meanwhile it suppresses the empowerment of Z on the state of any single agent by adversarial training. In another word, it sets an information bottleneck to avoid empowerment degeneracy. First we show the emergence of various skills on the level of coordination in a general particle multi-agent environment. Second, we reveal that the "bottleneck" prevents skills from collapsing to a single agent and enhances the diversity of learned skills. Finally, we show the pretrained policies have better performance on supervised RL tasks.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

Communication enables coordination in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), but many real-world applications, e.g., search-and-rescue with drone swarms, operate under severe bandwidth constraints. Many communication architectures still expose a coupled bottleneck in which a shared latent representation is used for both policy execution and inter-agent communication. Consequently, reducing message size directly limits the policy's latent space, often leading to significant performance degradation. We address this with two contributions. First, we introduce β, a normalised per-agent bandwidth budget that unifies sparsity, rounds, and message dimension into a single comparable constraint. Second, we provide SLIM, a minimal architecture that decouples the communication pathway from the policy's latent representation, allowing us to isolate the effect of bandwidth from the effect of policy capacity while benefiting from in-step communication. We evaluate our method on several partially-observable MARL benchmarks, where communication is essential. Our approach achieves state-of-the-art performance and exhibits scalability and robustness under limited communication, with only marginal degradation as bandwidth is reduced.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) demonstrate clear advantages in tackling complex problems by coordinating diverse agents and external tools. However, most existing orchestration methods rely on static workflows or serial agent scheduling, and are further constrained by heterogeneous interface protocols between tools and agents. This leads to high system complexity and poor extensibility. To mitigate these issues, we propose Agent-as-Tool, a unified parallel orchestration paradigm that abstracts both agents and tools into a standardized, learnable action space with protocol normalization and explicit state feedback. Building on this paradigm, we train a lightweight orchestrator, ParaManager, which decouples planning decisions from subtask solving, enabling state-aware parallel subtask decomposition, delegation, and asynchronous execution. For training, we adopt a two-stage ParaManager training pipeline. It improves robustness by incorporating supervised fine-tuning (SFT) trajectories equipped with recovery mechanisms, and further applies reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve an optimal balance among task success, protocol compliance, diversity, and reasoning efficiency. Experiments show that ParaManager achieves strong performance across multiple benchmarks and exhibits robust generalization under unseen model pools.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

While Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly expanding more areas of application, little has been applied to make deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) more comprehensible. As RL becomes ubiquitous and used in critical and general public applications, it is essential to develop methods that make it better understood and more interpretable. This study proposes a novel approach to explain cooperative strategies in multiagent RL using Shapley values, a game theory concept used in XAI that successfully explains the rationale behind decisions taken by Machine Learning algorithms. Through testing common assumptions of this technique in two cooperation-centered socially challenging multi-agent environments environments, this article argues that Shapley values are a pertinent way to evaluate the contribution of players in a cooperative multi-agent RL context. To palliate the high overhead of this method, Shapley values are approximated using Monte Carlo sampling. Experimental results on Multiagent Particle and Sequential Social Dilemmas show that Shapley values succeed at estimating the contribution of each agent. These results could have implications that go beyond games in economics, (e.g., for non-discriminatory decision making, ethical and responsible AI-derived decisions or policy making under fairness constraints). They also expose how Shapley values only give general explanations about a model and cannot explain a single run, episode nor justify precise actions taken by agents. Future work should focus on addressing these critical aspects.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

Multi-agent LLM systems enable advanced reasoning and tool use via role specialization, yet reliable reinforcement learning (RL) post-training for such systems remains difficult. In this work, we theoretically pinpoint a key reason for training instability when extending group-based RL to multi-agent LLM systems. We show that under GRPO-style optimization, a global normalization baseline may deviate from diverse agents' reward distributions, which ultimately leads to gradient-norm instability. Based on this finding, we propose Dr. MAS, a simple and stable RL training recipe for multi-agent LLM systems. Dr. MAS uses an agent-wise remedy: normalizing advantages per agent using each agent's own reward statistics, which calibrates gradient scales and dramatically stabilizes training, both theoretically and empirically. Beyond the algorithm, Dr. MAS provides an end-to-end RL training framework for multi-agent LLM systems, supporting scalable orchestration, flexible per-agent LLM serving and optimization configs, and shared resource scheduling of LLM actor backends. We evaluate Dr. MAS on multi-agent math reasoning and multi-turn search benchmarks using Qwen2.5 and Qwen3 series models. Dr. MAS achieves clear gains over vanilla GRPO (e.g., +5.6\% avg@16 and +4.6\% pass@16 on math, and +15.2\% avg@16 and +13.1\% pass@16 on search) while largely eliminating gradient spikes. Moreover, it remains highly effective under heterogeneous agent-model assignments while improving efficiency.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) agents is evolving rapidly, driven by the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to autonomously perform and refine tasks with human-like efficiency and adaptability. In this context, multi-agent collaboration has emerged as a promising approach, enabling multiple AI agents to work together to solve complex challenges. This study investigates the application of role-based multi-agent systems to support stock selection in equity research and portfolio management. We present a comprehensive analysis performed by a team of specialized agents and evaluate their stock-picking performance against established benchmarks under varying levels of risk tolerance. Furthermore, we examine the advantages and limitations of employing multi-agent frameworks in equity analysis, offering critical insights into their practical efficacy and implementation challenges.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are critical for automating complex tasks, yet their practical deployment is severely hampered by the challenge of failure attribution. Current diagnostic tools, which rely on statistical correlations, are fundamentally inadequate; on challenging benchmarks like Who\&When, state-of-the-art methods achieve less than 15\% accuracy in locating the root-cause step of a failure. To address this critical gap, we introduce the first failure attribution framework for MAS grounded in multi-granularity causal inference. Our approach makes two key technical contributions: (1) a performance causal inversion principle, which correctly models performance dependencies by reversing the data flow in execution logs, combined with Shapley values to accurately assign agent-level blame; (2) a novel causal discovery algorithm, CDC-MAS, that robustly identifies critical failure steps by tackling the non-stationary nature of MAS interaction data. The framework's attribution results directly fuel an automated optimization loop, generating targeted suggestions whose efficacy is validated via counterfactual simulations. Evaluations on the Who\&When and TRAIL benchmarks demonstrate a significant leap in performance. Our method achieves up to 36.2\% step-level accuracy. Crucially, the generated optimizations boost overall task success rates by an average of 22.4\%. This work provides a principled and effective solution for debugging complex agent interactions, paving the way for more reliable and interpretable multi-agent systems.

Coordinating large populations of interacting agents is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where the size of the joint state-action space scales exponentially with the number of agents. Mean-field methods alleviate this burden by aggregating agent interactions, but these approaches assume homogeneous interactions. Recent graphon-based frameworks capture heterogeneity, but are computationally expensive as the number of agents grows. Therefore, we introduce GMFS, a Graphon Mean-Field Subsampling framework for scalable cooperative MARL with heterogeneous agent interactions. By subsampling κ agents according to interaction strength, we approximate the graphon-weighted mean-field and learn a policy with sample complexity poly(κ) and optimality gap O(1/sqrtκ). We verify our theory with numerical simulations in robotic coordination, showing that GMFS achieves near-optimal performance.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

In the multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)- assisted downlink communication, it is challenging for UAV base stations (UAV BSs) to realize trajectory design and resource assignment in unknown environments. The cooperation and competition between UAV BSs in the communication network leads to a Markov game problem. Multi-agent reinforcement learning is a significant solution for the above decision-making. However, there are still many common issues, such as the instability of the system and low utilization of historical data, that limit its application. In this paper, a novel graph-attention multi-agent trust region (GA-MATR) reinforcement learning framework is proposed to solve the multi-UAV assisted communication problem. Graph recurrent network is introduced to process and analyze complex topology of the communication network, so as to extract useful information and patterns from observational information. The attention mechanism provides additional weighting for conveyed information, so that the critic network can accurately evaluate the value of behavior for UAV BSs. This provides more reliable feedback signals and helps the actor network update the strategy more effectively. Ablation simulations indicate that the proposed approach attains improved convergence over the baselines. UAV BSs learn the optimal communication strategies to achieve their maximum cumulative rewards. Additionally, multi-agent trust region method with monotonic convergence provides an estimated Nash equilibrium for the multi-UAV assisted communication Markov game.

In recent years, Model-based Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) has demonstrated significant advantages over model-free methods in terms of sample efficiency by using independent environment dynamics world models for data sample augmentation. However, without considering the limited sample size, these methods still lag behind model-free methods in terms of final convergence performance and stability. This is primarily due to the world model's insufficient and unstable representation of global states in partially observable environments. This limitation hampers the ability to ensure global consistency in the data samples and results in a time-varying and unstable distribution mismatch between the pseudo data samples generated by the world model and the real samples. This issue becomes particularly pronounced in more complex multi-agent environments. To address this challenge, we propose a model-based MARL method called GAWM, which enhances the centralized world model's ability to achieve globally unified and accurate representation of state information while adhering to the CTDE paradigm. GAWM uniquely leverages an additional Transformer architecture to fuse local observation information from different agents, thereby improving its ability to extract and represent global state information. This enhancement not only improves sample efficiency but also enhances training stability, leading to superior convergence performance, particularly in complex and challenging multi-agent environments. This advancement enables model-based methods to be effectively applied to more complex multi-agent environments. Experimental results demonstrate that GAWM outperforms various model-free and model-based approaches, achieving exceptional performance in the challenging domains of SMAC.

Large reasoning models improve with more test-time computation, but often overthink, producing unnecessarily long chains-of-thought that raise cost without improving accuracy. Prior reinforcement learning approaches typically rely on a single outcome reward with trajectory-level length penalties, which cannot distinguish essential from redundant reasoning steps and therefore yield blunt compression. Although recent work incorporates step-level signals, such as offline pruning, supervised data construction, or verifier-based intermediate rewards, reasoning length is rarely treated as an explicit step-level optimization objective during RL. We propose Step-wise Adaptive Penalization (SWAP), a fine-grained framework that allocates length reduction across steps based on intrinsic contribution. We estimate step importance from the model's on-policy log-probability improvement toward the correct answer, then treat excess length as a penalty mass redistributed to penalize low-importance steps more heavily while preserving high-importance reasoning. We optimize with a unified outcome-process advantage within group-relative policy optimization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SWAP reduces reasoning length by 64.3% on average while improving accuracy by 5.7% relative to the base model.

This paper presents a reproducibility study and extension of "Cooperation, Competition, and Maliciousness: LLM-Stakeholders Interactive Negotiation." We validate the original findings using a range of open-weight models (1.5B-70B parameters) and GPT-4o Mini while introducing several novel contributions. We analyze the Pareto front of the games, propose a communication-free baseline to test whether successful negotiations are possible without agent interaction, evaluate recent small language models' performance, analyze structural information leakage in model responses, and implement an inequality metric to assess negotiation fairness. Our results demonstrate that smaller models (<10B parameters) struggle with format adherence and coherent responses, but larger open-weight models can approach proprietary model performance. Additionally, in many scenarios, single-agent approaches can achieve comparable results to multi-agent negotiations, challenging assumptions about the necessity of agent communication to perform well on the benchmark. This work also provides insights into the accessibility, fairness, environmental impact, and privacy considerations of LLM-based negotiation systems.

The trajectory of AI development suggests that we will increasingly rely on agent-based systems composed of independently developed agents with different information, privileges, and tools. The success of these systems will critically depend on effective collaboration among these heterogeneous agents, even under partial observability. Despite intense interest, few empirical studies have evaluated such agent-agent collaboration at scale. We propose a collaborative maze-solving benchmark that (i) isolates collaborative capabilities, (ii) modulates problem complexity, (iii) enables scalable automated grading, and (iv) imposes no output-format constraints, preserving ecological plausibility. Using this framework, we evaluate 32 leading open- and closed-source models in solo, homogeneous, and heterogeneous pairings. Our results reveal a "collaboration gap": models that perform well solo often degrade substantially when required to collaborate. Collaboration can break down dramatically; for instance, small distilled models that solve mazes well alone may fail almost completely in certain pairings. We find that starting with the stronger agent often improves outcomes, motivating a "relay inference" approach where the stronger agent leads before handing off to the weaker one, closing much of the gap. Our findings argue for (1) collaboration-aware evaluation, (2) training strategies developed to enhance collaborative capabilities, and (3) interaction design that reliably elicits agents' latent skills, guidance that applies to AI-AI and human-AI collaboration.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved significant results, most notably by leveraging the representation-learning abilities of deep neural networks. However, large centralized approaches quickly become infeasible as the number of agents scale, and fully decentralized approaches can miss important opportunities for information sharing and coordination. Furthermore, not all agents are equal -- in some cases, individual agents may not even have the ability to send communication to other agents or explicitly model other agents. This paper considers the case where there is a single, powerful, central agent that can observe the entire observation space, and there are multiple, low-powered local agents that can only receive local observations and are not able to communicate with each other. The central agent's job is to learn what message needs to be sent to different local agents based on the global observations, not by centrally solving the entire problem and sending action commands, but by determining what additional information an individual agent should receive so that it can make a better decision. In this work we present our MARL algorithm \algo, describe where it would be most applicable, and implement it in the cooperative navigation and multi-agent walker domains. Empirical results show that 1) learned communication does indeed improve system performance, 2) results generalize to heterogeneous local agents, and 3) results generalize to different reward structures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made remarkable progress in enhancing step-by-step reasoning through reinforcement learning. However, the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm, which relies on sparse reward rules, often encounters the issue of identical rewards within groups, leading to the advantage collapse problem. Existing works typically address this challenge from two perspectives: enforcing model reflection to enhance response diversity, and introducing internal feedback to augment the training signal (advantage). In this work, we begin by analyzing the limitations of model reflection and investigating the policy entropy of responses at the fine-grained sample level. Based on our experimental findings, we propose the EDGE-GRPO algorithm, which adopts Entropy-Driven Advantage and Guided Error Correction to effectively mitigate the problem of advantage collapse. Extensive experiments on several main reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our approach. It is available at https://github.com/ZhangXJ199/EDGE-GRPO.

Recent advancements in reinforcement learning have made significant impacts across various domains, yet they often struggle in complex multi-agent environments due to issues like algorithm instability, low sampling efficiency, and the challenges of exploration and dimensionality explosion. Hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL) offers a structured approach to decompose complex tasks into simpler sub-tasks, which is promising for multi-agent settings. This paper advances the field by introducing a hierarchical architecture that autonomously generates effective subgoals without explicit constraints, enhancing both flexibility and stability in training. We propose a dynamic goal generation strategy that adapts based on environmental changes. This method significantly improves the adaptability and sample efficiency of the learning process. Furthermore, we address the critical issue of credit assignment in multi-agent systems by synergizing our hierarchical architecture with a modified QMIX network, thus improving overall strategy coordination and efficiency. Comparative experiments with mainstream reinforcement learning algorithms demonstrate the superior convergence speed and performance of our approach in both single-agent and multi-agent environments, confirming its effectiveness and flexibility in complex scenarios. Our code is open-sourced at: https://github.com/SICC-Group/GMAH.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Process reward models enable fine-grained, step-level evaluation of LLMs, yet building them for agentic settings remains prohibitively difficult: long-horizon interactions, irreversible actions, and stochastic environment feedback make both human annotation and Monte Carlo estimation infeasible at scale. In this work, we show that reinforcement learning (RL) post-training already provides the ingredients for effective step-level scoring, eliminating the need for dedicated reward model training altogether. Concretely, we derive an implicit advantage under a general stochastic Markov decision process, which we term progress advantage -- log-probability ratio between the RL-trained policy and its reference policy exactly recovers the optimal advantage function. This formulation makes the resulting signal annotation-free, domain-agnostic, and available as a byproduct of the standard RL post-training pipeline. We validate the effectiveness of the progress advantage across three different applications: test-time scaling, uncertainty quantification, and failure attribution on five benchmarks and four model families. Across all settings, it consistently outperforms confidence-based baselines and, despite requiring no task-specific training, surpasses dedicated trained reward models. We complement these results with deeper analyses on characteristics of progress advantage, offering practical guidance for adoption in real-world agentic systems.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

Recent years have witnessed increasing interest in extending large language models into agentic systems. While the effectiveness of agents has continued to improve, efficiency, which is crucial for real-world deployment, has often been overlooked. This paper therefore investigates efficiency from three core components of agents: memory, tool learning, and planning, considering costs such as latency, tokens, steps, etc. Aimed at conducting comprehensive research addressing the efficiency of the agentic system itself, we review a broad range of recent approaches that differ in implementation yet frequently converge on shared high-level principles including but not limited to bounding context via compression and management, designing reinforcement learning rewards to minimize tool invocation, and employing controlled search mechanisms to enhance efficiency, which we discuss in detail. Accordingly, we characterize efficiency in two complementary ways: comparing effectiveness under a fixed cost budget, and comparing cost at a comparable level of effectiveness. This trade-off can also be viewed through the Pareto frontier between effectiveness and cost. From this perspective, we also examine efficiency oriented benchmarks by summarizing evaluation protocols for these components and consolidating commonly reported efficiency metrics from both benchmark and methodological studies. Moreover, we discuss the key challenges and future directions, with the goal of providing promising insights.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as the predominant paradigm for training large language model (LLM)-based AI agents. However, existing backbone RL algorithms lack verified convergence guarantees in agentic scenarios, especially in multi-turn settings, which can lead to training instability and failure to converge to optimal policies. In this paper, we systematically analyze how different combinations of policy update mechanisms and advantage estimation methods affect convergence properties in single/multi-turn scenarios. We find that REINFORCE with Group Relative Advantage Estimation (GRAE) can converge to the globally optimal under undiscounted conditions, but the combination of PPO & GRAE breaks PPO's original monotonic improvement property. Furthermore, we demonstrate that mainstream backbone RL algorithms cannot simultaneously achieve both critic-free and convergence guarantees in multi-turn scenarios. To address this, we propose SeeUPO (Sequence-level Sequential Update Policy Optimization), a critic-free approach with convergence guarantees for multi-turn interactions. SeeUPO models multi-turn interaction as sequentially executed multi-agent bandit problems. Through turn-by-turn sequential policy updates in reverse execution order, it ensures monotonic improvement and convergence to global optimal solution via backward induction. Experiments on AppWorld and BFCL v4 demonstrate SeeUPO's substantial improvements over existing backbone algorithms: relative gains of 43.3%-54.6% on Qwen3-14B and 24.1%-41.9% on Qwen2.5-14B (averaged across benchmarks), along with superior training stability.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.