Daily Papers

Detecting fraudulent transactions is an essential component to control risk in e-commerce marketplaces. Apart from rule-based and machine learning filters that are already deployed in production, we want to enable efficient real-time inference with graph neural networks (GNNs), which is useful to catch multihop risk propagation in a transaction graph. However, two challenges arise in the implementation of GNNs in production. First, future information in a dynamic graph should not be considered in message passing to predict the past. Second, the latency of graph query and GNN model inference is usually up to hundreds of milliseconds, which is costly for some critical online services. To tackle these challenges, we propose a Batch and Real-time Inception GrapH Topology (BRIGHT) framework to conduct an end-to-end GNN learning that allows efficient online real-time inference. BRIGHT framework consists of a graph transformation module (Two-Stage Directed Graph) and a corresponding GNN architecture (Lambda Neural Network). The Two-Stage Directed Graph guarantees that the information passed through neighbors is only from the historical payment transactions. It consists of two subgraphs representing historical relationships and real-time links, respectively. The Lambda Neural Network decouples inference into two stages: batch inference of entity embeddings and real-time inference of transaction prediction. Our experiments show that BRIGHT outperforms the baseline models by >2\% in average w.r.t.~precision. Furthermore, BRIGHT is computationally efficient for real-time fraud detection. Regarding end-to-end performance (including neighbor query and inference), BRIGHT can reduce the P99 latency by >75\%. For the inference stage, our speedup is on average 7.8times compared to the traditional GNN.

This paper presents a novel virus propagation model using NetLogo. The model allows agents to move across multiple sites using different routes. Routes can be configured, enabled for mobility and (un)locked down independently. Similarly, locations can also be (un)locked down independently. Agents can get infected, propagate their infections to others, can take precautions against infection and also subsequently recover from infection. This model contains certain features that are not present in existing models. The model may be used for educational and research purposes, and the code is made available as open source. This model may also provide a broader framework for more detailed simulations. The results presented are only to demonstrate the model functionalities and do not serve any other purpose.

Large language models (LLMs) have empowered nodes within multi-agent networks with intelligence, showing growing applications in both academia and industry. However, how to prevent these networks from generating malicious information remains unexplored with previous research on single LLM's safety be challenging to transfer. In this paper, we focus on the safety of multi-agent networks from a topological perspective, investigating which topological properties contribute to safer networks. To this end, we propose a general framework, NetSafe along with an iterative RelCom interaction to unify existing diverse LLM-based agent frameworks, laying the foundation for generalized topological safety research. We identify several critical phenomena when multi-agent networks are exposed to attacks involving misinformation, bias, and harmful information, termed as Agent Hallucination and Aggregation Safety. Furthermore, we find that highly connected networks are more susceptible to the spread of adversarial attacks, with task performance in a Star Graph Topology decreasing by 29.7%. Besides, our proposed static metrics aligned more closely with real-world dynamic evaluations than traditional graph-theoretic metrics, indicating that networks with greater average distances from attackers exhibit enhanced safety. In conclusion, our work introduces a new topological perspective on the safety of LLM-based multi-agent networks and discovers several unreported phenomena, paving the way for future research to explore the safety of such networks.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) are increasingly applied to complex collaborative scenarios. However, their collaborative mechanisms may cause minor inaccuracies to gradually solidify into system-level false consensus through iteration. Such risks are difficult to trace since errors can propagate and amplify through message dependencies. Existing protections often rely on single-agent validation or require modifications to the collaboration architecture, which can weaken effective information flow and may not align with natural collaboration processes in real tasks. To address this, we propose a propagation dynamics model tailored for LLM-MAS that abstracts collaboration as a directed dependency graph and provides an early-stage risk criterion to characterize amplification risk. Through experiments on six mainstream frameworks, we identify three vulnerability classes: cascade amplification, topological sensitivity, and consensus inertia. We further instantiate an attack where injecting just a single atomic error seed leads to widespread failure. In response, we introduce a genealogy-graph-based governance layer, implemented as a message-layer plugin, that suppresses both endogenous and exogenous error amplification without altering the collaboration architecture. Experiments show that this approach raises the defense success rate from a baseline of 0.32 to over 0.89 and significantly mitigates the cascading spread of minor errors.

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms,absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Most of the routing protocols for MANETs are thus vulnerable to various types of attacks. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) is a very popular routing algorithm. However, it is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack, where a malicious node falsely advertises good paths to a destination node during the route discovery process. This attack becomes more sever when a group of malicious nodes cooperate each other. In this paper, a defense mechanism is presented against a coordinated attack by multiple black hole nodes in a MANET. The simulation carried out on the proposed scheme has produced results that demonstrate the effectiveness of the mechanism in detection of the attack while maintaining a reasonable level of throughput in the network.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Mixture of Experts (MoE) has become a key ingredient for scaling large foundation models while keeping inference costs steady. We show that expert routing strategies that have cross-batch dependencies are vulnerable to attacks. Malicious queries can be sent to a model and can affect a model's output on other benign queries if they are grouped in the same batch. We demonstrate this via a proof-of-concept attack in a toy experimental setting.

Multi-server MCP agents create an information-flow control problem: faithful tool composition can turn individually benign read/write permissions into cross-boundary credential propagation -- a structural side effect of workflow topology, not necessarily malicious model behavior. We present MCPHunt, to our knowledge the first controlled benchmark that isolates non-adversarial, verbatim credential propagation across multi-server MCP trust boundaries, with three methodological contributions: (1) canary-based taint tracking that reduces propagation detection to objective string matching; (2) an environment-controlled coverage design with risky, benign, and hard-negative conditions that validates pipeline soundness and controls for credential-format confounds; (3) CRS stratification that disentangles task-mandated propagation (faithful execution of verbatim-transfer instructions) from policy-violating propagation (credentials included despite the option to redact). Across 3,615 main-benchmark traces from 5 models spanning 147 tasks and 9 mechanism families, policy-violating propagation rates reach 11.5--41.3% across all models. This propagation is pathway-specific (25x cross-mechanism range) and concentrated in browser-mediated data flows; hard-negative controls provide evidence that production-format credentials are not necessary -- prompt-directed cross-boundary data flow is sufficient. A prompt-mitigation study across 3 models reduces policy-violating propagation by up to 97% while preserving 80.5% utility, but effectiveness varies with instruction-following capability -- suggesting that prompt-level defenses alone may not suffice. Code, traces, and labeling pipeline are released under MIT and CC BY 4.0.

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation wireless networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to service providers. As WMNs become an increasingly popular replacement technology for last-mile connectivity to the home networking, community and neighborhood networking, it is imperative to design efficient and secure communication protocols for these networks. However, several vulnerabilities exist in currently existing protocols for WMNs. These security loopholes can be exploited by potential attackers to launch attack on WMNs. The absence of a central point of administration makes securing WMNs even more challenging. The broadcast nature of transmission and the dependency on the intermediate nodes for multi-hop communications lead to several security vulnerabilities in WMNs. The attacks can be external as well as internal in nature. External attacks are launched by intruders who are not authorized users of the network. For example, an intruding node may eavesdrop on the packets and replay those packets at a later point of time to gain access to the network resources. On the other hand, the internal attacks are launched by the nodes that are part of the WMN. On example of such attack is an intermediate node dropping packets which it was supposed to forward. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on the current authentication and privacy protection schemes for WMN. In addition, it proposes a novel security protocol for node authentication and message confidentiality and an anonymization scheme for privacy protection of users in WMNs.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

The study of network robustness is a critical tool in the characterization and sense making of complex interconnected systems such as infrastructure, communication and social networks. While significant research has been conducted in all of these areas, gaps in the surveying literature still exist. Answers to key questions are currently scattered across multiple scientific fields and numerous papers. In this survey, we distill key findings across numerous domains and provide researchers crucial access to important information by--(1) summarizing and comparing recent and classical graph robustness measures; (2) exploring which robustness measures are most applicable to different categories of networks (e.g., social, infrastructure; (3) reviewing common network attack strategies, and summarizing which attacks are most effective across different network topologies; and (4) extensive discussion on selecting defense techniques to mitigate attacks across a variety of networks. This survey guides researchers and practitioners in navigating the expansive field of network robustness, while summarizing answers to key questions. We conclude by highlighting current research directions and open problems.

As large-scale multi-agent systems evolve, the communication protocol layer has become a critical yet under-evaluated factor shaping performance and reliability. Despite the existence of diverse protocols (A2A, ACP, ANP, Agora, etc.), selection is often intuition-driven and lacks standardized guidance. We introduce ProtocolBench, a benchmark that systematically compares agent protocols along four measurable axes: task success, end-to-end latency, message or byte overhead, and robustness under failures. On ProtocolBench, protocol choice significantly influences system behavior. In the Streaming Queue scenario, overall completion time varies by up to 36.5% across protocols, and mean end-to-end latency differs by 3.48 s. Under Fail-Storm Recovery, resilience also differs consistently across protocols. Beyond evaluation, we present ProtocolRouter, a learnable protocol router that selects per-scenario (or per-module) protocols from requirement and runtime signals. ProtocolRouter reduces Fail-Storm recovery time by up to 18.1% versus the best single-protocol baseline, and achieves scenario-specific gains such as higher success in GAIA. We also release ProtocolRouterBench to standardize protocol evaluation and improve reliability at scale.

Multi-perturbation adversarial training (MAT) aims to achieve robustness against multiple ell_p perturbations but suffers from robustness trade-offs between different threats. To address this, we employ a mixture of experts (MoE) to route different threats through distinct model pathways. However, naive application of MoE encounters two critical challenges: experts tend to overlook threat-specific features and redundantly capture features shared across threats, and gating networks suffer from threat-agnostic routing where they learn nearly identical routing patterns across threats, thus preventing the construction of threat-specific model pathways. To this end, we propose Robust Mixture of Low-Rank Experts (RoME), where each expert is a low-rank additive update to the shared backbone, allowing it to capture threat-common features while experts focus on threat-specific information. To address threat-agnostic routing, RoME introduces (i) dual-scale gating that exploits threat-discriminative signals from local and global level features, and (ii) threat-guided gating diversification that enforces diverse expert utilization across threats. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RoME outperforms existing state-of-the-art MAT in union robustness and natural accuracy and improves robustness against unseen threats. Codes are available at https://github.com/wkim97/RoME.

In multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs),mobile nodes cooperate with each other without using any infrastructure such as access points or base stations. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Among the various attacks to which MANETs are vulnerable, malicious packet dropping attack is very common where a malicious node can partially degrade or completely disrupt communication in the network by consistently dropping packets. In this paper, a mechanism for detection of packet dropping attack is presented based on cooperative participation of the nodes in a MANET. The redundancy of routing information in an ad hoc network is utilized to make the scheme robust so that it works effectively even in presence of transient network partitioning and Byzantine failure of nodes. The proposed scheme is fully cooperative and thus more secure as the vulnerabilities of any election algorithm used for choosing a subset of nodes for cooperation are absent. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the protocol.

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Protecting the network layer of a MANET from malicious attacks is an important and challenging security issue, since most of the routing protocols for MANETs are vulnerable to various types of attacks. Ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) is a very popular routing algorithm. However, it is vulnerable to the well-known black hole attack, where a malicious node falsely advertises good paths to a destination node during the route discovery process but drops all packets in the data forwarding phase. This attack becomes more severe when a group of malicious nodes cooperate each other. The proposed mechanism does not apply any cryptographic primitives on the routing messages. Instead, it protects the network by detecting and reacting to malicious activities of the nodes. Simulation results show that the scheme has a significantly high detection rate with moderate network traffic overhead and computation overhead in the nodes.

E-commerce risk management requires aggregating diverse, deeply embedded web data through multi-step, stateful interactions, which traditional scraping methods and most existing Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents cannot handle. These agents are typically limited to single-step tasks and lack the ability to manage dynamic, interactive content critical for effective risk assessment. To address this challenge, we introduce RISK, a novel framework designed to build and deploy GUI agents for this domain. RISK integrates three components: (1) RISK-Data, a dataset of 8,492 single-step and 2,386 multi-step interaction trajectories, collected through a high-fidelity browser framework and a meticulous data curation process; (2) RISK-Bench, a benchmark with 802 single-step and 320 multi-step trajectories across three difficulty levels for standardized evaluation; and (3) RISK-R1, a R1-style reinforcement fine-tuning framework considering four aspects: (i) Output Format Constraint, (ii) Single-step and (iii) Multi-step Level Reward, and (iv) Task Level Reweight. Experiments show that RISK-R1 achieves a 6.8% improvement in offline single-step and an 8.8% improvement in offline multi-step, using only 7.2% of the parameters of the SOTA baseline. Moreover, it attains a top task success rate of 70.5% in online evaluation. RISK provides a scalable, domain-specific solution for automating complex web interactions in e-commerce risk management. The code is available at https://github.com/RenqiChen/RISK-GUI.

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that communicate with each other by forming a multi-hop radio network and maintaining connections in a decentralized manner. Security remains a major challenge for these networks due to their features of open medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on cooperative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, and lack of clear lines of defense. Most of the routing protocols for MANETs are thus vulnerable to various types of attacks. For security, these protocols are highly dependent on cryptographic key exchange operations. This paper presents a multi-path certification protocol for efficient and reliable key exchange among the nodes in a MANET. Simulation results have shown the effectiveness and efficiency of the protocol.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures have emerged as a leading paradigm for scaling large language models through sparse, routing-based computation. However, this design introduces a new attack surface: the routing mechanism that determines which experts process each input. Prior work shows that manipulating routing can bypass safety alignment, but existing attacks require model modification and thus apply only to locally deployed models. By contrast, real-world LLM services are remotely hosted and accessible only through input queries. This raises a fundamental question: can MoE routing be exploited through input-only attacks to induce stronger unsafe behaviors in real-world services? Our key insight is to optimize attacks in a white-box setting on open-source surrogate MoE models and transfer the resulting adversarial inputs to public API services within the same model family. This setting presents three main challenges: routing can be influenced only indirectly through input perturbations, routing control and output generation are tightly coupled, and even a successful safety bypass may still produce low-quality responses. To address these challenges, we propose Misrouter, an input-only attack framework that jointly targets routing behavior and expert functionality. Misrouter identifies weakly aligned experts that are willing to produce target harmful content by analyzing expert activations under harmful queries paired with unsafe continuations. It then optimizes adversarial inputs to steer routing toward these experts and away from strongly aligned ones. It further biases routing toward highly capable general-purpose experts identified from benign question-answering tasks. Finally, because routing and output objectives can conflict, Misrouter uses a two-phase optimization strategy that first steers routing and then optimizes harmful outputs while preserving routing stability.

Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures employ increasingly sophisticated routing mechanisms -- learned routers, multi-hop trajectories, token-dependent gating. We ask: does routing topology actually determine language modeling quality? We build a geometric MoE (ST-MoE) using cosine-similarity routing against learned centroids in a low-dimensional space (d_{space} = 64), requiring 80% fewer routing parameters than standard linear routers. Through 62 controlled experiments on WikiText-103 at 76--84M parameters trained to convergence (50K steps, 1.64B tokens), we find that routing topology does not determine asymptotic perplexity (PPL): five cosine-routing variants are statistically equivalent within a 1-PPL margin (Two One-Sided Tests [TOST], p < 0.05 for all 10 pairwise comparisons; 15 runs across 3 seeds, observed range 33.93--34.72). The finding extends to hash, random-fixed, and top-1 routing (single-seed; graceful 1.1--2.2 PPL degradation) and replicates on OpenWebText (0.03 PPL gap, 6 runs, 3 seeds each). A standard linear router with 5.3times more routing parameters reaches PPL 32.76, but iso-parameter cosine routing closes 67% of this gap -- the true mechanism advantage is sim1.2%. The mechanistic explanation is convergent redundancy: multi-hop updates are collinear (cos(Δh_0, Δh_1) = 0.805), implementing magnitude amplification rather than compositional reasoning; a single learnable scalar replicates multi-hop performance. As a practical payoff, zero-shot relative-norm halting saves 25% of MoE FLOPs at +0.12% PPL. Expert-level specialization and causal controllability -- which coexist with topology-level equifinality -- are explored in a companion paper.

GossipSub is a popular new peer-to-peer network protocol designed to disseminate messages quickly and efficiently by allowing peers to forward the full content of messages only to a dynamically selected subset of their neighboring peers (mesh neighbors) while gossiping about messages they have seen with the rest. Peers decide which of their neighbors to graft or prune from their mesh locally and periodically using a score for each neighbor. Scores are calculated using a score function that depends on mesh-specific parameters, weights and counters relating to a peer's performance in the network. Since a GossipSub network's performance ultimately depends on the performance of its peers, an important question arises: Is the score calculation mechanism effective in weeding out non-performing or even intentionally misbehaving peers from meshes? We answered this question in the negative in our companion paper by reasoning about GossipSub using our formal, official and executable ACL2s model. Based on our findings, we synthesized and simulated attacks against GossipSub which were confirmed by the developers of GossipSub, FileCoin, and Eth2.0, and publicly disclosed in MITRE CVE-2022-47547. In this paper, we present a detailed description of our model. We discuss design decisions, security properties of GossipSub, reasoning about the security properties in context of our model, attack generation and lessons we learnt when writing it.

Blockchains are diverse in the way they handle communications between their nodes to disseminate information, mitigate attacks, and agree on the next block. While security vulnerabilities have been identified, they rely on an attack custom-made for a specific blockchain communication protocol. To our knowledge, the vulnerabilities of multiple blockchain communication protocols to adversarial conditions have never been compared. In this paper, we compare empirically the vulnerabilities of the communication protocols of five modern in-production blockchains, Algorand, Aptos, Avalanche, Redbelly and Solana, when attacked in five different ways. We conclude that Algorand is vulnerable to packet loss attacks, Aptos is vulnerable to targeted load attacks and leader isolation attacks, Avalanche is vulnerable to transient failure attacks, Redbelly's performance is impacted by packet loss attacks and Solana is vulnerable to stopping attacks and leader isolation attacks. Our system is open source.

Fully decentralized learning enables the distribution of learning resources and decision-making capabilities across multiple user devices or nodes, and is rapidly gaining popularity due to its privacy-preserving and decentralized nature. Importantly, this crowdsourcing of the learning process allows the system to continue functioning even if some nodes are affected or disconnected. In a disaster scenario, communication infrastructure and centralized systems may be disrupted or completely unavailable, hindering the possibility of carrying out standard centralized learning tasks in these settings. Thus, fully decentralized learning can help in this case. However, transitioning from centralized to peer-to-peer communications introduces a dependency between the learning process and the topology of the communication graph among nodes. In a disaster scenario, even peer-to-peer communications are susceptible to abrupt changes, such as devices running out of battery or getting disconnected from others due to their position. In this study, we investigate the effects of various disruptions to peer-to-peer communications on decentralized learning in a disaster setting. We examine the resilience of a decentralized learning process when a subset of devices drop from the process abruptly. To this end, we analyze the difference between losing devices holding data, i.e., potential knowledge, vs. devices contributing only to the graph connectivity, i.e., with no data. Our findings on a Barabasi-Albert graph topology, where training data is distributed across nodes in an IID fashion, indicate that the accuracy of the learning process is more affected by a loss of connectivity than by a loss of data. Nevertheless, the network remains relatively robust, and the learning process can achieve a good level of accuracy.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Model (LLM) agent ecosystems, centralized skill marketplaces have emerged as pivotal infrastructure for augmenting agent capabilities. However, these marketplaces face unprecedented security challenges, primarily stemming from semantic-behavioral inconsistency and inter-skill combinatorial risks, where individually benign skills induce malicious behaviors during collaborative invocation. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose SkillProbe, a multi-stage security auditing framework driven by multi-agent collaboration. SkillProbe introduces a "Skills-for-Skills" design paradigm, encapsulating auditing processes into standardized skill modules to drive specialized agents through a rigorous pipeline, including admission filtering, semantic-behavioral alignment detection, and combinatorial risk simulation. We conducted a large-scale evaluation using 8 mainstream LLM series across 2,500 real-world skills from ClawHub. Our results reveal a striking popularity-security paradox, where download volume is not a reliable proxy for security quality, as over 90% of high-popularity skills failed to pass rigorous auditing. Crucially, we discovered that high-risk skills form a single giant connected component within the risk-link dimension, demonstrating that cascaded risks are systemic rather than isolated occurrences. We hope that SkillProbe will inspire researchers to provide a scalable governance infrastructure for constructing a trustworthy Agentic Web. SkillProbe is accessible for public experience at skillhub.holosai.io.

Network systems form the foundation of modern society, playing a critical role in various applications. However, these systems are at significant risk of being adversely affected by unforeseen circumstances, such as disasters. Considering this, there is a pressing need for research to enhance the robustness of network systems. Recently, in reinforcement learning, the relationship between acquiring robustness and regularizing entropy has been identified. Additionally, imitation learning is used within this framework to reflect experts' behavior. However, there are no comprehensive studies on the use of a similar imitation framework for optimal transport on networks. Therefore, in this study, imitation-regularized optimal transport (I-OT) on networks was investigated. It encodes prior knowledge on the network by imitating a given prior distribution. The I-OT solution demonstrated robustness in terms of the cost defined on the network. Moreover, we applied the I-OT to a logistics planning problem using real data. We also examined the imitation and apriori risk information scenarios to demonstrate the usefulness and implications of the proposed method.

Graphs can be used to represent and reason about systems and a variety of metrics have been devised to quantify their global characteristics. However, little is currently known about how to construct a graph or improve an existing one given a target objective. In this work, we formulate the construction of a graph as a decision-making process in which a central agent creates topologies by trial and error and receives rewards proportional to the value of the target objective. By means of this conceptual framework, we propose an algorithm based on reinforcement learning and graph neural networks to learn graph construction and improvement strategies. Our core case study focuses on robustness to failures and attacks, a property relevant for the infrastructure and communication networks that power modern society. Experiments on synthetic and real-world graphs show that this approach can outperform existing methods while being cheaper to evaluate. It also allows generalization to out-of-sample graphs, as well as to larger out-of-distribution graphs in some cases. The approach is applicable to the optimization of other global structural properties of graphs.

This paper identifies and analyzes a novel vulnerability class in Model Context Protocol (MCP) based agent systems. The attack chain describes and demonstrates how benign, individually authorized tasks can be orchestrated to produce harmful emergent behaviors. Through systematic analysis using the MITRE ATLAS framework, we demonstrate how 95 agents tested with access to multiple services-including browser automation, financial analysis, location tracking, and code deployment-can chain legitimate operations into sophisticated attack sequences that extend beyond the security boundaries of any individual service. These red team exercises survey whether current MCP architectures lack cross-domain security measures necessary to detect or prevent a large category of compositional attacks. We present empirical evidence of specific attack chains that achieve targeted harm through service orchestration, including data exfiltration, financial manipulation, and infrastructure compromise. These findings reveal that the fundamental security assumption of service isolation fails when agents can coordinate actions across multiple domains, creating an exponential attack surface that grows with each additional capability. This research provides a barebones experimental framework that evaluate not whether agents can complete MCP benchmark tasks, but what happens when they complete them too well and optimize across multiple services in ways that violate human expectations and safety constraints. We propose three concrete experimental directions using the existing MCP benchmark suite.

Temporal credit assignment in reinforcement learning is often approached by introducing value estimates at multiple discount factors. A natural next step is to let the actor dynamically route among these temporal heads, using either differentiable attention or heuristic uncertainty weights. This paper argues that such routing can create a numerical shortcut rather than a reliable temporal abstraction. We study this issue in a controlled PPO setting on LunarLander-v2, using the environment as a visual sandbox for diagnosing failure modes. First, we formalize Surrogate Objective Hacking: a differentiable softmax router exposed to the PPO surrogate receives a direct gradient toward advantage heads that are numerically favorable for the current update, even when this routing change does not correspond to improved physical control. Because unnormalized advantages at different discount factors have different effective scales, this creates a scale-discrepancy vulnerability. Second, we identify the Paradox of Temporal Uncertainty in gradient-free error-based routing: short-horizon heads can receive the largest routing share because their prediction targets are easier, even when they are less aligned with delayed task success. As a structural response, we study Target Decoupling: the critic may retain multi-timescale auxiliary heads, but the actor is updated only with the long-horizon advantage. Target Decoupling is not presented as a broad performance booster; in this run set it removes the exploitable actor-side routing pathway and improves the observed worst-seed return. Code is available at https://github.com/ben-dlwlrma/Representation-Over-Routing.

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.

Large-scale distributed training in production datacenters constitutes a challenging workload bottlenecked by network communication. In response, both major industry players (e.g., Ultra Ethernet Consortium) and parts of academia have surprisingly, and almost unanimously, agreed that packet spraying is necessary to improve the performance of large-scale distributed training workloads. In this paper, we challenge this prevailing belief and pose the question: How close can a singlepath transport approach an optimal multipath transport? We demonstrate that singlepath transport (from a NIC's perspective) is sufficient and can perform nearly as well as an ideal multipath transport with packet spraying, particularly in the context of distributed training in leaf-spine topologies. Our assertion is based on four key observations about workloads driven by collective communication patterns: (i) flows within a collective start almost simultaneously, (ii) flow sizes are nearly equal, (iii) the completion time of a collective is more crucial than individual flow completion times, and (iv) flows can be split upon arrival. We analytically prove that singlepath transport, using minimal flow splitting (at the application layer), is equivalent to an ideal multipath transport with packet spraying in terms of maximum congestion. Our preliminary evaluations support our claims. This paper suggests an alternative agenda for developing next-generation transport protocols tailored for large-scale distributed training.

Wireless sensor networks have attracted a lot of interest over the last decade in wireless and mobile computing research community. Applications of these networks are numerous and growing, which range from indoor deployment scenarios in the home and office to outdoor deployment in adversary's territory in a tactical battleground. However, due to distributed nature and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their performance. This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion on the state of the art in security technologies for wireless sensor networks. It identifies various possible attacks at different layers of the communication protocol stack in a typical sensor network and their possible countermeasures. A brief discussion on the future direction of research in WSN security is also included.

Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) is a high-performance telecommunications technology that directs data from one network node to another based on short path labels rather than long network addresses. Its efficiency and scalability have made it a popular choice for large-scale and enterprise networks. However, as MPLS networks grow and evolve, they encounter various security challenges. This paper explores the security implications associated with MPLS networks, including risks such as label spoofing, traffic interception, and denial of service attacks. Additionally, it evaluates advanced mitigation strategies to address these vulnerabilities, leveraging mathematical models and security protocols to enhance MPLS network resilience. By integrating theoretical analysis with practical solutions, this paper aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of MPLS security and propose effective methods for safeguarding network infrastructure.

Industrial disruption replanning demands multi-agent coordination under strict latency and communication budgets, where disruptions propagate through tightly coupled physical dependencies and rapidly invalidate baseline schedules and commitments. Existing coordination schemes often treat communication as either effectively free (broadcast-style escalation) or fixed in advance (hand-tuned neighborhoods), both of which are brittle once the disruption footprint extends beyond a local region. We present \CASCADE, a budgeted replanning mechanism that makes communication scope explicit and auditable rather than fixed or implicit. Each agent maintains an explicit knowledge base, solves role-conditioned local decision problems to revise commitments, and coordinates through lightweight contract primitives whose footprint expands only when local validation indicates that the current scope is insufficient. This design separates a unified agent substrate (Knowledge Base / Decision Manager / Communication Manager) from a scoped interaction layer that controls who is contacted, how far coordination propagates, and when escalation is triggered under explicit budgets. We evaluate \CASCADE on disrupted manufacturing and supply-chain settings using unified diagnostics intended to test a mechanism-design claim -- whether explicit scope control yields useful quality-latency-communication trade-offs and improved robustness under uncertainty -- rather than to provide a complete algorithmic ranking.

Fragmentation is a routine part of communication in 6LoWPAN-based IoT networks, designed to accommodate small frame sizes on constrained wireless links. However, this process introduces a critical vulnerability fragments are typically stored and processed before their legitimacy is confirmed, allowing attackers to exploit this gap with minimal effort. In this work, we explore a defense strategy that takes a more adaptive, behavior-aware approach to this problem. Our system, called Predictive-CSM, introduces a combination of two lightweight mechanisms. The first tracks how each node behaves over time, rewarding consistent and successful interactions while quickly penalizing suspicious or failing patterns. The second checks the integrity of packet fragments using a chained hash, allowing incomplete or manipulated sequences to be caught early, before they can occupy memory or waste processing time. We put this system to the test using a set of targeted attack simulations, including early fragment injection, replayed headers, and flooding with fake data. Across all scenarios, Predictive CSM preserved network delivery and maintained energy efficiency, even under pressure. Rather than relying on heavyweight cryptography or rigid filters, this approach allows constrained de vices to adapt their defenses in real time based on what they observe, not just what they're told. In that way, it offers a step forward for securing fragmented communication in real world IoT systems

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Existing agent-safety evaluation has focused mainly on externally induced risks. Yet agents may still enter unsafe trajectories under benign conditions. We study this complementary but underexplored setting through the lens of intrinsic risk, where intrinsic failures remain latent, propagate across long-horizon execution, and eventually lead to high-consequence outcomes. To evaluate this setting, we introduce non-attack intrinsic risk auditing and present HINTBench, a benchmark of 629 agent trajectories (523 risky, 106 safe; 33 steps on average) supporting three tasks: risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification. Its annotations are organized under a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments reveal a substantial capability gap: strong LLMs perform well on trajectory-level risk detection, but their performance drops to below 35 Strict-F1 on risk-step localization, while fine-grained failure diagnosis proves even harder. Existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting. These findings establish intrinsic risk auditing as an open challenge for agent safety.

Multihop reasoning remains an elusive goal as existing multihop benchmarks are known to be largely solvable via shortcuts. Can we create a question answering (QA) dataset that, by construction, requires proper multihop reasoning? To this end, we introduce a bottom-up approach that systematically selects composable pairs of single-hop questions that are connected, i.e., where one reasoning step critically relies on information from another. This bottom-up methodology lets us explore a vast space of questions and add stringent filters as well as other mechanisms targeting connected reasoning. It provides fine-grained control over the construction process and the properties of the resulting k-hop questions. We use this methodology to create MuSiQue-Ans, a new multihop QA dataset with 25K 2-4 hop questions. Relative to existing datasets, MuSiQue-Ans is more difficult overall (3x increase in human-machine gap), and harder to cheat via disconnected reasoning (e.g., a single-hop model has a 30 point drop in F1). We further add unanswerable contrast questions to produce a more stringent dataset, MuSiQue-Full. We hope our datasets will help the NLP community develop models that perform genuine multihop reasoning.

GossipSub is a new peer-to-peer communication protocol designed to counter attacks from misbehaving peers by controlling what information is sent and to whom, via a score function computed by each peer that captures positive and negative behaviors of its neighbors. The score function depends on several parameters (weights, caps, thresholds) that can be configured by applications using GossipSub. The specification for GossipSub is written in English and its resilience to attacks from misbehaving peers is supported empirically by emulation testing using an implementation in Golang. In this work we take a foundational approach to understanding the resilience of GossipSub to attacks from misbehaving peers. We build the first formal model of GossipSub, using the ACL2s theorem prover. Our model is officially endorsed by the GossipSub developers. It can simulate GossipSub networks of arbitrary size and topology, with arbitrarily configured peers, and can be used to prove and disprove theorems about the protocol. We formalize fundamental security properties stating that the score function is fair, penalizes bad behavior, and rewards good behavior. We prove that the score function is always fair, but can be configured in ways that either penalize good behavior or ignore bad behavior. Using our model, we run GossipSub with the specific configurations for two popular real-world applications: the FileCoin and Eth2.0 blockchains. We show that all properties hold for FileCoin. However, given any Eth2.0 network (of any topology and size) with any number of potentially misbehaving peers, we can synthesize attacks where these peers are able to continuously misbehave by never forwarding topic messages, while maintaining positive scores so that they are never pruned from the network by GossipSub.

Evaluating retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipelines requires corpora where ground truth is knowable, temporally structured, and cross-artifact properties that real-world datasets rarely provide cleanly. Existing resources such as the Enron corpus carry legal ambiguity, demographic skew, and no structured ground truth. Purely LLM-generated synthetic data solves the legal problem but introduces a subtler one: the generating model cannot be prevented from hallucinating facts that contradict themselves across documents.We present OrgForge, an open-source multi-agent simulation framework that enforces a strict physics-cognition boundary: a deterministic Python engine maintains a SimEvent ground truth bus; large language models generate only surface prose, constrained by validated proposals. An actor-local clock enforces causal timestamp correctness across all artifact types, eliminating the class of timeline inconsistencies that arise when timestamps are sampled independently per document. We formalize three graph-dynamic subsystems stress propagation via betweenness centrality, temporal edge-weight decay, and Dijkstra escalation routing that govern organizational behavior independently of any LLM. Running a configurable N-day simulation, OrgForge produces interleaved Slack threads, JIRA tickets, Confluence pages, Git pull requests, and emails, all traceable to a shared, immutable event log. We additionally describe a causal chain tracking subsystem that accumulates cross-artifact evidence graphs per incident, a hybrid reciprocal-rank-fusion recurrence detector for identifying repeated failure classes, and an inbound/outbound email engine that routes vendor alerts, customer complaints, and HR correspondence through gated causal chains with probabilistic drop simulation. OrgForge is available under the MIT license.

Model merging has emerged as a cost-effective approach for consolidating the capabilities of multiple LLMs without retraining. However, existing merging techniques, largely based on linear parameter arithmetic or optimization, struggle when applied to Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures. We identify a critical failure mode in MoE merging, termed routing breakdown, in which the merged router fails to dispatch tokens to suitable experts. Routing breakdown stems from the sensitivity of the non-linear softmax and discrete Top-k routing mechanisms to parameter perturbations from merging, a sensitivity further amplified by load-balancing constraints imposed during MoE pretraining. Because fine-tuned experts exhibit distinct specializations, even modest misrouting can cause severe performance degradation. To address this issue, we propose Hessian-Aware Router Calibration (HARC), a training-free framework that leverages second-order curvature information to realign the merged router. This approach admits a closed-form solution that can be efficiently solved using a matrix-free conjugate gradient method. Experiments on mathematical reasoning and code generation tasks show that HARC effectively mitigates routing breakdown across diverse MoE merging baselines and leads to substantial performance improvements. Our code is available at https://github.com/huangcb01/HARC.

Random network models play a prominent role in modeling, analyzing and understanding complex phenomena on real-life networks. However, a key property of networks is often neglected: many real-world networks exhibit spatial structure, the tendency of a node to select neighbors with a probability depending on physical distance. Here, we introduce a class of random spatial networks (RSNs) which generalizes many existing random network models but adds spatial structure. In these networks, nodes are placed randomly in space and joined in edges with a probability depending on their distance and their individual expected degrees, in a manner that crucially remains analytically tractable. We use this network class to propose a new generalization of small-world networks, where the average shortest path lengths in the graph are small, as in classical Watts-Strogatz small-world networks, but with close spatial proximity of nodes that are neighbors in the network playing the role of large clustering. Small-world effects are demonstrated on these spatial small-world networks without clustering. We are able to derive partial integro-differential equations governing susceptible-infectious-recovered disease spreading through an RSN, and we demonstrate the existence of traveling wave solutions. If the distance kernel governing edge placement decays slower than exponential, the population-scale dynamics are dominated by long-range hops followed by local spread of traveling waves. This provides a theoretical modeling framework for recent observations of how epidemics like Ebola evolve in modern connected societies, with long-range connections seeding new focal points from which the epidemic locally spreads in a wavelike manner.

Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) require many coordination choices that are difficult to fix a priori: which skill protocol to invoke, which agent role should perform a subtask, which model to bind to each role, how roles should interact, when to use retrieval or verification, and when to omit a step entirely. These choices interact with task regime and operational constraints, so static pipelines and one-off model comparisons provide only a limited view of the design space. This paper introduces AgensFlow, an open-source framework that treats multi-agent coordination as an online policy-learning problem under partial observability. The framework makes coordination decisions observable and learnable from repeated trajectories, rather than treating skill, role, model, topology, and evaluation choices as fixed pipeline design. AgensFlow is evaluated on two corpora: distributed-systems incident tasks and security-advisory tasks. The evaluation shows three main results: learned routing reaches a higher-quality operating point than a fixed pipeline baseline on coordination-heavy classes; skip:X isolates topology compression as a meaningful part of the substrate; and warm-started policy graphs can reduce exploration cost while preserving plateau quality. Overall, the results support that learned, auditable routing can improve coordination-heavy multi-agent workflows over static wiring.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

We propose a learning algorithm for local routing policies that needs only a few data samples obtained from a single graph while generalizing to all random graphs in a standard model of wireless networks. We thus solve the all-pairs near-shortest path problem by training deep neural networks (DNNs) that efficiently and scalably learn routing policies that are local, i.e., they only consider node states and the states of neighboring nodes. Remarkably, one of these DNNs we train learns a policy that exactly matches the performance of greedy forwarding; another generally outperforms greedy forwarding. Our algorithm design exploits network domain knowledge in several ways: First, in the selection of input features and, second, in the selection of a ``seed graph'' and subsamples from its shortest paths. The leverage of domain knowledge provides theoretical explainability of why the seed graph and node subsampling suffice for learning that is efficient, scalable, and generalizable. Simulation-based results on uniform random graphs with diverse sizes and densities empirically corroborate that using samples generated from a few routing paths in a modest-sized seed graph quickly learns a model that is generalizable across (almost) all random graphs in the wireless network model.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Large Language Models (LLMs) in mental healthcare risk propagating biases that reinforce stigma and harm marginalized groups. While previous research identified concerning trends, systematic methods for detecting intersectional biases remain limited. This work introduces a multi-hop question answering (MHQA) framework to explore LLM response biases in mental health discourse. We analyze content from the Interpretable Mental Health Instruction (IMHI) dataset across symptom presentation, coping mechanisms, and treatment approaches. Using systematic tagging across age, race, gender, and socioeconomic status, we investigate bias patterns at demographic intersections. We evaluate four LLMs: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Jamba 1.6, Gemma 3, and Llama 4, revealing systematic disparities across sentiment, demographics, and mental health conditions. Our MHQA approach demonstrates superior detection compared to conventional methods, identifying amplification points where biases magnify through sequential reasoning. We implement two debiasing techniques: Roleplay Simulation and Explicit Bias Reduction, achieving 66-94% bias reductions through few-shot prompting with BBQ dataset examples. These findings highlight critical areas where LLMs reproduce mental healthcare biases, providing actionable insights for equitable AI development.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

Independently trained domain specialists can be fused post-hoc into a single model that outperforms any individual specialist, and the gain is predictable: gain = 0.82 x divergence - 2.72 (R^2 = 0.856, n=6, 3-26% divergence). This enables practitioners to estimate cooperative value before committing compute. Below ~3.3% divergence, gains approach zero.In the KALAVAI protocol, contributors fine-tune copies of a shared checkpoint independently, then submit for lightweight MoE routing (500 steps). Gains are consistent: +7.72% at 410M (+/-0.02%, 3 seeds), +7.49% at 1B (+/-0.01%, 3 seeds), +6.53% at 6.9B, each over the best specialist. The router matches domain-oracle routing within <10^{-5} nats. Cross-lingual fusion (Tamil/Yoruba/Welsh/Code) achieves +21.76%, with Yoruba perplexity falling 41.9 to 7.7. A 20-contributor federation achieves +16.71% (+/-0.07pp, 3 seeds).Three requirements bound the protocol. Shared initialisation is necessary: checkpoint mismatch degrades routing. Frozen layers are optional below ~10,000 steps and beneficial beyond. Learned routing is essential: uniform averaging degrades by -1.2% vs. best specialist, while any trained router achieves oracle-optimal assignment.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

Safety alignment is critical for the responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted to scale model capacity, understanding their safety robustness becomes essential. Existing adversarial attacks, however, have notable limitations. Prompt-based jailbreaks rely on heuristic search and transfer poorly, model intervention methods require privileged access to internal representations, and optimization-based input attacks remain output-centric and are fundamentally limited to MoE models due to the non-differentiable routing mechanism. In this paper, we present RouteHijack, a routing-aware jailbreak for MoE LLMs. Our key insight is that safety behavior is concentrated in a small subset of experts, creating an opportunity to steer model behavior by influencing routing decisions through input optimization. Building on this observation, RouteHijack first performs response-driven expert localization to identify safety-critical and harmful experts by contrasting activations under safe refusals and harmful completions. It then constructs adversarial suffixes with a routing-aware objective that suppresses safety experts, promotes harmful experts, and prevents early-stage refusal during generation. At inference time, the optimized suffix is appended to a malicious prompt, requiring only input access. Across seven MoE LLMs, RouteHijack achieves a 69.3\% average attack success rate (ASR), outperforming prior optimization-based attack by 3.2times. RouteHijack also transfers zero-shot across five sibling MoE variants, raising average ASR from 27.7\% to 61.2\%, and further generalizes to three MoE-based VLMs, increasing average ASR from 2.47\% to 38.7\%. These findings expose a fundamental vulnerability in sparse expert architectures and highlight the need for defenses beyond output-level alignment.

Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models scale capacity by routing each token to a small subset of experts. However, their routers exhibit a fundamental trade-off: strong load balancing can suppress expert specialization, while aggressive diversity often causes routing collapse. We propose Hi-MoE, a grouped MoE framework that decomposes routing control into two coupled levels: (i) inter-group balancing that enforces fair traffic across expert groups, and (ii) intra-group specialization that promotes complementary expert behaviors while preventing within-group collapse. Our analysis provides a principled explanation of how our hierarchical objectives reshape the router, thereby promoting stable specialization and mitigating collapse. We observe consistent improvements over recent sparse-routing and grouped-MoE baselines across NLP and vision benchmarks, and confirm robustness via scaling studies (model size, expert count) and targeted ablations. In large-scale pre-training on 58B tokens, Hi-MoE-7B achieves a 5.6% perplexity reduction and a 40% improvement in expert balance over OLMoE-7B across diverse evaluation domains.

Large language models (LLMs) are evolving into agentic systems that reason, plan, and operate external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a key enabler of this transition, offering a standardized interface for connecting LLMs with heterogeneous tools and services. Yet MCP's openness and multi-server workflows introduce new safety risks that existing benchmarks fail to capture, as they focus on isolated attacks or lack real-world coverage. We present MCP-SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark built on real MCP servers that supports realistic multi-turn evaluation across five domains: browser automation, financial analysis, location navigation, repository management, and web search. It incorporates a unified taxonomy of 20 MCP attack types spanning server, host, and user sides, and includes tasks requiring multi-step reasoning and cross-server coordination under uncertainty. Using MCP-SafetyBench, we systematically evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, revealing that all models remain vulnerable to MCP attacks, with a notable safety-utility trade-off. Our results highlight the urgent need for stronger defenses and establish MCP-SafetyBench as a foundation for diagnosing and mitigating safety risks in real-world MCP deployments.

By routing input tokens to only a few split experts, Sparse Mixture-of-Experts has enabled efficient training of large language models. Recent findings suggest that fixing the routers can achieve competitive performance by alleviating the collapsing problem, where all experts eventually learn similar representations. However, this strategy has two key limitations: (i) the policy derived from random routers might be sub-optimal, and (ii) it requires extensive resources during training and evaluation, leading to limited efficiency gains. This work introduces \HyperRout, which dynamically generates the router's parameters through a fixed hypernetwork and trainable embeddings to achieve a balance between training the routers and freezing them to learn an improved routing policy. Extensive experiments across a wide range of tasks demonstrate the superior performance and efficiency gains of \HyperRouter compared to existing routing methods. Our implementation is publicly available at {{https://github.com/giangdip2410/HyperRouter}}.

The rapid integration of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) into critical applications is increasingly hindered by persistent safety vulnerabilities. However, existing red-teaming benchmarks are often fragmented, limited to single-turn text interactions, and lack the scalability required for systematic evaluation. To address this, we introduce OpenRT, a unified, modular, and high-throughput red-teaming framework designed for comprehensive MLLM safety evaluation. At its core, OpenRT architects a paradigm shift in automated red-teaming by introducing an adversarial kernel that enables modular separation across five critical dimensions: model integration, dataset management, attack strategies, judging methods, and evaluation metrics. By standardizing attack interfaces, it decouples adversarial logic from a high-throughput asynchronous runtime, enabling systematic scaling across diverse models. Our framework integrates 37 diverse attack methodologies, spanning white-box gradients, multi-modal perturbations, and sophisticated multi-agent evolutionary strategies. Through an extensive empirical study on 20 advanced models (including GPT-5.2, Claude 4.5, and Gemini 3 Pro), we expose critical safety gaps: even frontier models fail to generalize across attack paradigms, with leading models exhibiting average Attack Success Rates as high as 49.14%. Notably, our findings reveal that reasoning models do not inherently possess superior robustness against complex, multi-turn jailbreaks. By open-sourcing OpenRT, we provide a sustainable, extensible, and continuously maintained infrastructure that accelerates the development and standardization of AI safety.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) represents a significant advancement in AI-tool integration, enabling seamless communication between AI agents and external services. However, this connectivity introduces novel attack vectors that remain largely unexplored. This paper demonstrates how unsophisticated threat actors, requiring only basic programming skills and free web tools, can exploit MCP's trust model to exfiltrate sensitive financial data. We present a proof-of-concept attack where a malicious weather MCP server, disguised as benign functionality, discovers and exploits legitimate banking tools to steal user account balances. The attack chain requires no advanced technical knowledge, server infrastructure, or monetary investment. The findings reveal a critical security gap in the emerging MCP ecosystem: while individual servers may appear trustworthy, their combination creates unexpected cross-server attack surfaces. Unlike traditional cybersecurity threats that assume sophisticated adversaries, our research shows that the barrier to entry for MCP-based attacks is alarmingly low. A threat actor with undergraduate-level Python knowledge can craft convincing social engineering attacks that exploit the implicit trust relationships MCP establishes between AI agents and tool providers. This work contributes to the nascent field of MCP security by demonstrating that current MCP implementations allow trivial cross-server attacks and proposing both immediate mitigations and protocol improvements to secure this emerging ecosystem.

Modeling radio propagation is essential for wireless network design and performance optimization. Traditional methods rely on physics models of radio propagation, which can be inaccurate or inflexible. In this work, we propose using graph neural networks to learn radio propagation behaviors directly from real-world network data. Our approach converts the radio propagation environment into a graph representation, with nodes corresponding to locations and edges representing spatial and ray-tracing relationships between locations. The graph is generated by converting images of the environment into a graph structure, with specific relationships between nodes. The model is trained on this graph representation, using sensor measurements as target data. We demonstrate that the graph neural network, which learns to predict radio propagation directly from data, achieves competitive performance compared to traditional heuristic models. This data-driven approach outperforms classic numerical solvers in terms of both speed and accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply graph neural networks to real-world radio propagation data to generate coverage maps, enabling generative models of signal propagation with point measurements only.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

In recent years, Large-Language-Model-driven AI agents have exhibited unprecedented intelligence, flexibility, and adaptability, and are rapidly changing human production and lifestyle. Nowadays, agents are undergoing a new round of evolution. They no longer act as an isolated island like LLMs. Instead, they start to communicate with diverse external entities, such as other agents and tools, to collectively perform more complex tasks. Under this trend, agent communication is regarded as a foundational pillar of the future AI ecosystem, and many organizations intensively begin to design related communication protocols (e.g., Anthropic's MCP and Google's A2A) within the recent few months. However, this new field exposes significant security hazard, which can cause severe damage to real-world scenarios. To help researchers to quickly figure out this promising topic and benefit the future agent communication development, this paper presents a comprehensive survey of agent communication security. More precisely, we first present a clear definition of agent communication and categorize the entire lifecyle of agent communication into three stages: user-agent interaction, agent-agent communication, and agent-environment communication. Next, for each communication phase, we dissect related protocols and analyze its security risks according to the communication characteristics. Then, we summarize and outlook on the possible defense countermeasures for each risk. Finally, we discuss open issues and future directions in this promising research field.

Cost-aware routing dynamically dispatches user queries to models of varying capability to balance performance and inference cost. However, the routing strategy introduces a new security concern that adversaries may manipulate the router to consistently select expensive high-capability models. Existing routing attacks depend on either white-box access or heuristic prompts, rendering them ineffective in real-world black-box scenarios. In this work, we propose R^2A, which aims to mislead black-box LLM routers to expensive models via adversarial suffix optimization. Specifically, R^2A deploys a hybrid ensemble surrogate router to mimic the black-box router. A suffix optimization algorithm is further adapted for the ensemble-based surrogate. Extensive experiments on multiple open-source and commercial routing systems demonstrate that {R^2A} significantly increases the routing rate to expensive models on queries of different distributions. Code and examples: https://github.com/thcxiker/R2A-Attack.

Message passing neural networks (MPNNs) have been shown to suffer from the phenomenon of over-squashing that causes poor performance for tasks relying on long-range interactions. This can be largely attributed to message passing only occurring locally, over a node's immediate neighbours. Rewiring approaches attempting to make graphs 'more connected', and supposedly better suited to long-range tasks, often lose the inductive bias provided by distance on the graph since they make distant nodes communicate instantly at every layer. In this paper we propose a framework, applicable to any MPNN architecture, that performs a layer-dependent rewiring to ensure gradual densification of the graph. We also propose a delay mechanism that permits skip connections between nodes depending on the layer and their mutual distance. We validate our approach on several long-range tasks and show that it outperforms graph Transformers and multi-hop MPNNs.

The integration of machine learning tools into telecom networks, has led to two prevailing paradigms, namely, language-based systems, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), and physics-based systems, such as Digital Twins (DTs). While LLM-based approaches enable flexible interaction and automation, they lack explicit representations of network dynamics. DTs, in contrast, offer a high-fidelity network simulation, but remain scenario-specific and are not designed for learning or decision-making under uncertainty. This gap becomes critical for 6G systems, where decisions must take into account the evolving network states, uncertainty, and the cascading effects of control actions across multiple layers. In this article, we introduce the {Telecom World Model}~(TWM) concept, an architecture for learned, action-conditioned, uncertainty-aware modeling of telecom system dynamics. We decompose the problem into two interacting worlds, a controllable system world consisting of operator-configurable settings and an external world that captures propagation, mobility, traffic, and failures. We propose a three-layer architecture, comprising a field world model for spatial environment prediction, a control/dynamics world model for action-conditioned Key Performance Indicator (KPI) trajectory prediction, and a telecom foundation model layer for intent translation and orchestration. We showcase a comparative analysis between existing paradigms, which demonstrates that TWM jointly provides telecom state grounding, fast action-conditioned roll-outs, calibrated uncertainty, multi-timescale dynamics, model-based planning, and LLM-integrated guardrails. Furthermore, we present a proof-of-concept on network slicing to validate the proposed architecture, showing that the full three-layer pipeline outperforms single-world baselines and accurately predicts KPI trajectories.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

As vision-language models (VLMs) gain prominence, their multimodal interfaces also introduce new safety vulnerabilities, making the safety evaluation challenging and critical. Existing red-teaming efforts are either restricted to a narrow set of adversarial patterns or depend heavily on manual engineering, lacking scalable exploration of emerging real-world VLM vulnerabilities. To bridge this gap, we propose ARMs, an adaptive red-teaming agent that systematically conducts comprehensive risk assessments for VLMs. Given a target harmful behavior or risk definition, ARMs automatically optimizes diverse red-teaming strategies with reasoning-enhanced multi-step orchestration, to effectively elicit harmful outputs from target VLMs. We propose 11 novel multimodal attack strategies, covering diverse adversarial patterns of VLMs (e.g., reasoning hijacking, contextual cloaking), and integrate 17 red-teaming algorithms into ARMs via model context protocol (MCP). To balance the diversity and effectiveness of the attack, we design a layered memory with an epsilon-greedy attack exploration algorithm. Extensive experiments on instance- and policy-based benchmarks show that ARMs achieves SOTA attack success rates, exceeding baselines by an average of 52.1% and surpassing 90% on Claude-4-Sonnet. We show that the diversity of red-teaming instances generated by ARMs is significantly higher, revealing emerging vulnerabilities in VLMs. Leveraging ARMs, we construct ARMs-Bench, a large-scale multimodal safety dataset comprising over 30K red-teaming instances spanning 51 diverse risk categories, grounded in both real-world multimodal threats and regulatory risks. Safety fine-tuning with ARMs-Bench substantially improves the robustness of VLMs while preserving their general utility, providing actionable guidance to improve multimodal safety alignment against emerging threats.

Large language models (LLMs) embedded in multi-turn agentic harnesses are reshaping software engineering (SWE), but routing every task to a frontier model is wasteful when many issues admit cheap fixes. Existing LLM routers operate on the task description alone, which inherits an information-theoretic Bayes-error floor in agentic settings: a similar issue can hide either a localized typo or a multi-module refactor, and the prompt does not separate the two. We introduce SWE-Router, a value-based temporal approach that lets a cheap model run for a few exploratory turns and reads the resulting partial trajectory before deciding whether to continue cheaply or to escalate to an expensive model. We provide a Bayes-optimality theorem showing that conditioning on the partial trajectory never harms routing and is strictly better whenever exploration is informative. Across the LLM pairs of weak and strong models spanning the contemporary cost--capability frontier, we show that SWE-Router greatly improves the cost efficiency of SWE tasks, while maintaining the majority of the performances of the stronger model. We additionally release a multi-LLM trajectory dataset which allows reproduction of our trajectory-level routing.

For one to guarantee higher-quality software development processes, risk management is essential. Furthermore, risks are those that could negatively impact an organization's operations or a project's progress. The appropriate prioritisation of software project risks is a crucial factor in ascertaining the software project's performance features and eventual success. They can be used harmoniously with the same training samples and have good complement and compatibility. We carried out in-depth tests on four benchmark datasets to confirm the efficacy of our CIA approach in closed-world and open-world scenarios, with and without defence. We also present a sequential augmentation parameter optimisation technique that captures the interdependencies of the latest deep learning state-of-the-art WF attack models. To achieve precise software risk assessment, the enhanced crow search algorithm (ECSA) is used to modify the ANFIS settings. Solutions that very slightly alter the local optimum and stay inside it are extracted using the ECSA. ANFIS variable when utilising the ANFIS technique. An experimental validation with NASA 93 dataset and 93 software project values was performed. This method's output presents a clear image of the software risk elements that are essential to achieving project performance. The results of our experiments show that, when compared to other current methods, our integrative fuzzy techniques may perform more accurately and effectively in the evaluation of software project risks.

LLM routing aims to achieve a favorable quality--cost trade-off by dynamically assigning easy queries to smaller models and harder queries to stronger ones. However, across both unimodal and multimodal settings, we uncover a pervasive yet underexplored failure mode in existing routers: as the user's cost budget increases, routers systematically default to the most capable and most expensive model even when cheaper models already suffice. As a result, current routers under-utilize small models, wasting computation and monetary cost and undermining the core promise of routing; we term this phenomenon routing collapse. We attribute routing collapse to an objective--decision mismatch: many routers are trained to predict scalar performance scores, whereas routing decisions ultimately depend on discrete comparisons among candidate models. Consequently, small prediction errors can flip relative orderings and trigger suboptimal selections. To bridge this gap, we propose EquiRouter, a decision-aware router that directly learns model rankings, restoring the role of smaller models and mitigating routing collapse. On RouterBench, EquiRouter reduces cost by about 17\% at GPT-4-level performance compared to the strongest prior router. Our code is available at https://github.com/AIGNLAI/EquiRouter.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly established itself as a standard interface for enabling LLM-based agents to interact with external tools and services. As MCP servers are increasingly entrusted with security-sensitive operations, understanding their real-world risks has become critical. In practice, due to the absence of large-scale runtime MCP servers, such understanding largely relies on security scanners applied to a small number of cases, yet the reliability of these assessments remains unclear. In this study, we revisit how MCP security is measured. We present MCPZoo, the largest collection of MCP servers for dynamic analysis to date. MCPZoo is constructed through a multi-agent framework for transforming in-the-wild static repositories into dynamic services. The framework emulates how human experts build, diagnose, and iteratively repair deployment and runtime defects by combining environment inference with feedback-driven refinement. To ensure practical interactivity at runtime, the servers are validated via real protocol interactions. As a result, MCPZoo contains 64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 in total), with more than 37,288 supporting dynamic analysis. Leveraging MCPZoo, we conduct the first ecosystem-scale measurement of MCP servers and the scanners that analyze them. While existing scanners report that 96.89% of servers are risky, we find that these signals are unreliable. In particular, manual validation shows that less than 50% of sampled alerts are true positives, and scanner outputs exhibit clear inconsistency across scanners. Overall, MCPZoo enables large-scale, reproducible measurement of MCP server security and exposes limitations of current scanning practices. We further release a public query interface to support practical risk assessment of MCP servers.

This study exposes the safety vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions, where malicious users can obscure harmful intents across several queries. We introduce ActorAttack, a novel multi-turn attack method inspired by actor-network theory, which models a network of semantically linked actors as attack clues to generate diverse and effective attack paths toward harmful targets. ActorAttack addresses two main challenges in multi-turn attacks: (1) concealing harmful intents by creating an innocuous conversation topic about the actor, and (2) uncovering diverse attack paths towards the same harmful target by leveraging LLMs' knowledge to specify the correlated actors as various attack clues. In this way, ActorAttack outperforms existing single-turn and multi-turn attack methods across advanced aligned LLMs, even for GPT-o1. We will publish a dataset called SafeMTData, which includes multi-turn adversarial prompts and safety alignment data, generated by ActorAttack. We demonstrate that models safety-tuned using our safety dataset are more robust to multi-turn attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/ActorAttack.

We develop a simulation framework for studying misinformation spread within online social networks that blends agent-based modeling and natural language processing techniques. While many other agent-based simulations exist in this space, questions over their fidelity and generalization to existing networks in part hinders their ability to provide actionable insights. To partially address these concerns, we create a 'digital clone' of a known misinformation sharing network by downloading social media histories for over ten thousand of its users. We parse these histories to both extract the structure of the network and model the nuanced ways in which information is shared and spread among its members. Unlike many other agent-based methods in this space, information sharing between users in our framework is sensitive to topic of discussion, user preferences, and online community dynamics. To evaluate the fidelity of our method, we seed our cloned network with a set of posts recorded in the base network and compare propagation dynamics between the two, observing reasonable agreement across the twin networks over a variety of metrics. Lastly, we explore how the cloned network may serve as a flexible, low-cost testbed for misinformation countermeasure evaluation and red teaming analysis. We hope the tools explored here augment existing efforts in the space and unlock new opportunities for misinformation countermeasure evaluation, a field that may become increasingly important to consider with the anticipated rise of misinformation campaigns fueled by generative artificial intelligence.

Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond conventional text-level jailbreaks, yet existing safety evaluations fall short: most test models in isolated chat settings, rely on synthetic environments, and do not account for how the agent framework itself shapes safety outcomes. We introduce CLAWSAFETY, a benchmark of 120 adversarial test scenarios organized along three dimensions (harm domain, attack vector, and harmful action type) and grounded in realistic, high-privilege professional workspaces spanning software engineering, finance, healthcare, law, and DevOps. Each test case embeds adversarial content in one of three channels the agent encounters during normal work: workspace skill files, emails from trusted senders, and web pages. We evaluate five frontier LLMs as agent backbones, running 2,520 sandboxed trials across all configurations. Attack success rates (ASR) range from 40\% to 75\% across models and vary sharply by injection vector, with skill instructions (highest trust) consistently more dangerous than email or web content. Action-trace analysis reveals that the strongest model maintains hard boundaries against credential forwarding and destructive actions, while weaker models permit both. Cross-scaffold experiments on three agent frameworks further demonstrate that safety is not determined by the backbone model alone but depends on the full deployment stack, calling for safety evaluation that treats model and framework as joint variables. Code and data will be available at: https://weibowen555.github.io/ClawSafety/.

The mediocre performance of conventional federated learning (FL) over heterogeneous data has been facilitating personalized FL solutions, where, unlike conventional FL which trains a single global consensus model, different models are allowed for different clients. However, in most existing personalized FL algorithms, the collaborative knowledge across the federation was only implicitly passed to the clients in ways such as model aggregation or regularization. We observed that this implicit knowledge transfer fails to maximize the potential value of each client's empirical risk toward other clients. Based on our observation, in this work, we propose Personalized Global Federated Learning (PGFed), a novel personalized FL framework that enables each client to personalize its own global objective by explicitly and adaptively aggregating the empirical risks of itself and other clients. To avoid massive (O(N^2)) communication overhead and potential privacy leakage, each client's risk is estimated through a first-order approximation for other clients' adaptive risk aggregation. On top of PGFed, we develop a momentum upgrade, dubbed PGFedMo, to more efficiently utilize clients' empirical risks. Our extensive experiments under different federated settings with benchmark datasets show consistent improvements of PGFed over the compared state-of-the-art alternatives.

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is a milestone in aligning large language models with human instructions and adapting them to downstream tasks. In particular, Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) has gained widespread attention due to its parameter efficiency. However, its impact on improving the performance of large models remains limited. Recent studies suggest that combining LoRA with Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) can significantly enhance fine-tuning performance. MoE adapts to the diversity and complexity of datasets by dynamically selecting the most suitable experts, thereby improving task accuracy and efficiency. Despite impressive results, recent studies reveal issues in the MoE routing mechanism, such as incorrect assignments and imbalanced expert allocation. Inspired by the principles of Redundancy and Fault Tolerance Theory. We innovatively integrate the concept of Mixture of Experts into the routing mechanism and propose an efficient fine-tuning method called Mixture of Routers (MoR). It employs multiple sub-routers for joint selection and uses a learnable main router to determine the weights of the sub-routers. The results show that MoR outperforms baseline models on most tasks, achieving an average performance improvement of 1%. MoR can serve as a plug-and-play, parameter-efficient fine-tuning method suitable for a wide range of applications. Our code is available here: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/MoR-DFC6.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) decouples model capacity from per-token computation, yet their scalability remains limited by the physical dimensions of depth and width. To overcome this, we propose Mixture of Universal Experts (MOUE),a MoE generalization introducing a novel scaling dimension: Virtual Width. In general, MoUE aims to reuse a universal layer-agnostic expert pool across layers, converting depth into virtual width under a fixed per-token activation budget. However, two challenges remain: a routing path explosion from recursive expert reuse, and a mismatch between the exposure induced by reuse and the conventional load-balancing objectives. We address these with three core components: a Staggered Rotational Topology for structured expert sharing, a Universal Expert Load Balance for depth-aware exposure correction, and a Universal Router with lightweight trajectory state for coherent multi-step routing. Empirically, MoUE consistently outperforms matched MoE baselines by up to 1.3% across scaling regimes, enables progressive conversion of existing MoE checkpoints with up to 4.2% gains, and reveals a new scaling dimension for MoE architectures.

In recent years, Text-to-Image (T2I) models have seen remarkable advancements, gaining widespread adoption. However, this progress has inadvertently opened avenues for potential misuse, particularly in generating inappropriate or Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. Our work introduces MMA-Diffusion, a framework that presents a significant and realistic threat to the security of T2I models by effectively circumventing current defensive measures in both open-source models and commercial online services. Unlike previous approaches, MMA-Diffusion leverages both textual and visual modalities to bypass safeguards like prompt filters and post-hoc safety checkers, thus exposing and highlighting the vulnerabilities in existing defense mechanisms.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large Language Models (LLMs) general capabilities rapidly evolve and the proliferation of agentic AI, this version of the risk analysis technical report presents an updated and granular assessment of five critical dimensions: cyber offense, persuasion and manipulation, strategic deception, uncontrolled AI R\&D, and self-replication. Specifically, we introduce more complex scenarios for cyber offense. For persuasion and manipulation, we evaluate the risk of LLM-to-LLM persuasion on newly released LLMs. For strategic deception and scheming, we add the new experiment with respect to emergent misalignment. For uncontrolled AI R\&D, we focus on the ``mis-evolution'' of agents as they autonomously expand their memory substrates and toolsets. Besides, we also monitor and evaluate the safety performance of OpenClaw during the interaction on the Moltbook. For self-replication, we introduce a new resource-constrained scenario. More importantly, we propose and validate a series of robust mitigation strategies to address these emerging threats, providing a preliminary technical and actionable pathway for the secure deployment of frontier AI. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Graph neural networks are popular architectures for graph machine learning, based on iterative computation of node representations of an input graph through a series of invariant transformations. A large class of graph neural networks follow a standard message-passing paradigm: at every layer, each node state is updated based on an aggregate of messages from its neighborhood. In this work, we propose a novel framework for training graph neural networks, where every node is viewed as a player that can choose to either 'listen', 'broadcast', 'listen and broadcast', or to 'isolate'. The standard message propagation scheme can then be viewed as a special case of this framework where every node 'listens and broadcasts' to all neighbors. Our approach offers a more flexible and dynamic message-passing paradigm, where each node can determine its own strategy based on their state, effectively exploring the graph topology while learning. We provide a theoretical analysis of the new message-passing scheme which is further supported by an extensive empirical analysis on a synthetic dataset and on real-world datasets.

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a key technology for next generation wireless broadband networks showing rapid progress and inspiring numerous compelling applications. A WMN comprises of a set of mesh routers (MRs) and mesh clients (MCs), where MRs are connected to the Internet backbone through the Internet gateways (IGWs). The MCs are wireless devices and communicate among themselves over possibly multi-hop paths with or without the involvement of MRs. User privacy and security have been primary concerns in WMNs due to their peer-to-peer network topology, shared wireless medium, stringent resource constraints, and highly dynamic environment. Moreover, to support real-time applications, WMNs must also be equipped with robust, reliable and efficient communication protocols so as to minimize the end-to-end latency and packet drops. Design of a secure and efficient communication protocol for WMNs, therefore, is of paramount importance. In this paper, we propose a security and privacy protocol that provides security and user anonymity while maintaining communication efficiency in a WMN. The security protocol ensures secure authentication and encryption in access and the backbone networks. The user anonymity, authentication and data privacy is achieved by application of a protocol that is based on Rivest's ring signature scheme. Simulation results demonstrate that while the protocols have minimal storage and communication overhead, they are robust and provide high level of security and privacy to the users of the network services.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

We present swarm-attack, an open-source adversarial testing framework in which multiple lightweight LLM agents coordinate through shared memory, parallel exploration, and evolutionary optimization. Together, our results demonstrate that both safety bypass of frontier models and software vulnerability discovery, i.e., the capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview, are achievable at effectively zero cost using commodity hardware and openly available models. We report two experiments. In the first, five instances of a 1.2 billion parameter model conducted 225 jailbreak attacks each against GPT-4o and Claude Sonnet~4. Against GPT-4o, the swarm achieved an Effective Harm Rate of 45.8%, producing 49 critical-severity breaches; against Claude Sonnet-4, the Effective Harm Rate was 0% despite a 40% technical success rate. In the second experiment, the same models performed combined source code analysis and binary fuzzing against a vulnerable C application with 9 planted CWEs. With a hand-crafted exploit seed corpus, regex pattern detection, and AddressSanitizer-based crash classification, the pipeline recovers 9 of 9 vulnerabilities (100% recall) in approximately four minutes on a consumer MacBook. With those scaffold components disabled, the same model recovers 0 of 9 by crash verification and 2 of 9 by citation. The capability class that motivated restricted release of Anthropic's Mythos Preview is therefore reproducible at effectively zero cost; the important enabler is the system scaffold itself, which compensates for the limited reasoning capacity of small individual models.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

Federated learning is an active research topic since it enables several participants to jointly train a model without sharing local data. Currently, cross-silo federated learning is a popular training setting that utilizes a few hundred reliable data silos with high-speed access links to training a model. While this approach has been widely applied in real-world scenarios, designing a robust topology to reduce the training time remains an open problem. In this paper, we present a new multigraph topology for cross-silo federated learning. We first construct the multigraph using the overlay graph. We then parse this multigraph into different simple graphs with isolated nodes. The existence of isolated nodes allows us to perform model aggregation without waiting for other nodes, hence effectively reducing the training time. Intensive experiments on three public datasets show that our proposed method significantly reduces the training time compared with recent state-of-the-art topologies while maintaining the accuracy of the learned model. Our code can be found at https://github.com/aioz-ai/MultigraphFL

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly capable, yet their safety lags behind. This creates a gap between what agents can do and should do. This gap widens as agents engage in multi-turn interactions and employ diverse tools, introducing new risks overlooked by existing benchmarks. To systematically scale safety testing into multi-turn, tool-realistic settings, we propose a principled taxonomy that transforms single-turn harmful tasks into multi-turn attack sequences. Using this taxonomy, we construct MT-AgentRisk (Multi-Turn Agent Risk Benchmark), the first benchmark to evaluate multi-turn tool-using agent safety. Our experiments reveal substantial safety degradation: the Attack Success Rate (ASR) increases by 16% on average across open and closed models in multi-turn settings. To close this gap, we propose ToolShield, a training-free, tool-agnostic, self-exploration defense: when encountering a new tool, the agent autonomously generates test cases, executes them to observe downstream effects, and distills safety experiences for deployment. Experiments show that ToolShield effectively reduces ASR by 30% on average in multi-turn interactions. Our code is available at https://github.com/CHATS-lab/ToolShield.

Live streaming has become a cornerstone of today's internet, enabling massive real-time social interactions. However, it faces severe risks arising from sparse, coordinated malicious behaviors among multiple participants, which are often concealed within normal activities and challenging to detect timely and accurately. In this work, we provide a pioneering study on risk assessment in live streaming rooms, characterized by weak supervision where only room-level labels are available. We formulate the task as a Multiple Instance Learning (MIL) problem, treating each room as a bag and defining structured user-timeslot capsules as instances. These capsules represent subsequences of user actions within specific time windows, encapsulating localized behavioral patterns. Based on this formulation, we propose AC-MIL, an Action-aware Capsule MIL framework that models both individual behaviors and group-level coordination patterns. AC-MIL captures multi-granular semantics and behavioral cues through a serial and parallel architecture that jointly encodes temporal dynamics and cross-user dependencies. These signals are integrated for robust room-level risk prediction, while also offering interpretable evidence at the behavior segment level. Extensive experiments on large-scale industrial datasets from Douyin demonstrate that AC-MIL significantly outperforms MIL and sequential baselines, establishing new state-of-the-art performance in room-level risk assessment for live streaming. Moreover, AC-MIL provides capsule-level interpretability, enabling identification of risky behavior segments as actionable evidence for intervention. The project page is available at: https://qiaoyran.github.io/AC-MIL/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities as autonomous agents through tool use, planning, and decision-making abilities, leading to their widespread adoption across diverse tasks. As task complexity grows, multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly used to solve problems collaboratively. However, safety and security of these systems remains largely under-explored. Existing benchmarks and datasets predominantly focus on single-agent settings, failing to capture the unique vulnerabilities of multi-agent dynamics and co-ordination. To address this gap, we introduce Threats and Attacks in Multi-Agent Systems (TAMAS), a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness and safety of multi-agent LLM systems. TAMAS includes five distinct scenarios comprising 300 adversarial instances across six attack types and 211 tools, along with 100 harmless tasks. We assess system performance across ten backbone LLMs and three agent interaction configurations from Autogen and CrewAI frameworks, highlighting critical challenges and failure modes in current multi-agent deployments. Furthermore, we introduce Effective Robustness Score (ERS) to assess the tradeoff between safety and task effectiveness of these frameworks. Our findings show that multi-agent systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, underscoring the urgent need for stronger defenses. TAMAS provides a foundation for systematically studying and improving the safety of multi-agent LLM systems.

The deployment of modern network applications is increasing the network size and traffic volumes at an unprecedented pace. Storing network-related information (e.g., traffic traces) is key to enable efficient network management. However, this task is becoming more challenging due to the ever-increasing data transmission rates and traffic volumes. In this paper, we present a novel method for network traffic compression that exploits spatial and temporal patterns naturally present in network traffic. We consider a realistic scenario where traffic measurements are performed at multiple links of a network topology using tools like SNMP or NetFlow. Such measurements can be seen as multiple time series that exhibit spatial and temporal correlations induced by the network topology, routing or user behavior. Our method leverages graph learning methods to effectively exploit both types of correlations for traffic compression. The experimental results show that our solution is able to outperform GZIP, the de facto traffic compression method, improving by 50\%-65\% the compression ratio on three real-world networks.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Over the past year, the vLLM Semantic Router project has released a series of work spanning: (1) core routing mechanisms -- signal-driven routing, context-length pool routing, router performance engineering, policy conflict detection, low-latency embedding models, category-aware semantic caching, user-feedback-driven routing adaptation, hallucination detection, and hierarchical content-safety classification for privacy and jailbreak protection; (2) fleet optimization -- fleet provisioning and energy-efficiency analysis; (3) agentic and multimodal routing -- multimodal agent routing, tool selection, CUA security, and multi-turn context memory and safety; (4) governance and standards -- inference routing protocols and multi-provider API extensions. Each paper tackled a specific problem in LLM inference, but the problems are not independent; for example, fleet provisioning depends on the routing policy, which depends on the workload mix, shifting as organizations adopt agentic and multimodal workloads. This paper distills those results into the Workload-Router-Pool (WRP) architecture, a three-dimensional framework for LLM inference optimization. Workload characterizes what the fleet serves (chat vs. agent, single-turn vs. multi-turn, warm vs. cold, prefill-heavy vs. decode-heavy). Router determines how each request is dispatched (static semantic rules, online bandit adaptation, RL-based model selection, quality-aware cascading). Pool defines where inference runs (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous GPU, disaggregated prefill/decode, KV-cache topology). We map our prior work onto a 3x3 WRP interaction matrix, identify which cells we have covered and which remain open, and propose twenty-one concrete research directions at the intersections, each grounded in our prior measurements, tiered by maturity from engineering-ready to open research.

The Mixtures-of-Experts (MoE) model is a widespread distributed and integrated learning method for large language models (LLM), which is favored due to its ability to sparsify and expand models efficiently. However, the performance of MoE is limited by load imbalance and high latency of All-To-All communication, along with relatively redundant computation owing to large expert capacity. Load imbalance may result from existing routing policies that consistently tend to select certain experts. The frequent inter-node communication in the All-To-All procedure also significantly prolongs the training time. To alleviate the above performance problems, we propose a novel routing strategy that combines load balance and locality by converting partial inter-node communication to that of intra-node. Notably, we elucidate that there is a minimum threshold for expert capacity, calculated through the maximal angular deviation between the gating weights of the experts and the assigned tokens. We port these modifications on the PanGu-Sigma model based on the MindSpore framework with multi-level routing and conduct experiments on Ascend clusters. The experiment results demonstrate that the proposed LocMoE reduces training time per epoch by 12.68% to 22.24% compared to classical routers, such as hash router and switch router, without impacting the model accuracy.

Large language models' significant advances in capabilities are accompanied by significant increases in inference costs. Model routing is a simple technique for reducing inference cost, wherein one maintains a pool of candidate LLMs, and learns to route each prompt to the smallest feasible LLM. Existing works focus on learning a router for a fixed pool of LLMs. In this paper, we consider the problem of dynamic routing, where new, previously unobserved LLMs are available at test time. We propose a new approach to this problem that relies on representing each LLM as a feature vector, derived based on predictions on a set of representative prompts. Based on this, we detail two effective strategies, relying on cluster-based routing and a learned cluster map respectively. We prove that these strategies are estimates of a theoretically optimal routing rule, and provide an excess risk bound to quantify their errors. Experiments on a range of public benchmarks show the effectiveness of the proposed strategies in routing amongst more than 30 unseen LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically evaluated for safety under single-shot or low-budget adversarial prompting, which underestimates real-world risk. In practice, attackers can exploit large-scale parallel sampling to repeatedly probe a model until a harmful response is produced. While recent work shows that attack success increases with repeated sampling, principled methods for predicting large-scale adversarial risk remain limited. We propose a scaling-aware Best-of-N estimation of risk, SABER, for modeling jailbreak vulnerability under Best-of-N sampling. We model sample-level success probabilities using a Beta distribution, the conjugate prior of the Bernoulli distribution, and derive an analytic scaling law that enables reliable extrapolation of large-N attack success rates from small-budget measurements. Using only n=100 samples, our anchored estimator predicts ASR@1000 with a mean absolute error of 1.66, compared to 12.04 for the baseline, which is an 86.2% reduction in estimation error. Our results reveal heterogeneous risk scaling profiles and show that models appearing robust under standard evaluation can experience rapid nonlinear risk amplification under parallel adversarial pressure. This work provides a low-cost, scalable methodology for realistic LLM safety assessment. We will release our code and evaluation scripts upon publication to future research.

Training multiple tasks jointly in one deep network yields reduced latency during inference and better performance over the single-task counterpart by sharing certain layers of a network. However, over-sharing a network could erroneously enforce over-generalization, causing negative knowledge transfer across tasks. Prior works rely on human intuition or pre-computed task relatedness scores for ad hoc branching structures. They provide sub-optimal end results and often require huge efforts for the trial-and-error process. In this work, we present an automated multi-task learning algorithm that learns where to share or branch within a network, designing an effective network topology that is directly optimized for multiple objectives across tasks. Specifically, we propose a novel tree-structured design space that casts a tree branching operation as a gumbel-softmax sampling procedure. This enables differentiable network splitting that is end-to-end trainable. We validate the proposed method on controlled synthetic data, CelebA, and Taskonomy.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models lack explicit constraints to ensure the router's decisions align well with the experts' capabilities, which ultimately limits model performance. To address this, we propose expert-router coupling (ERC) loss, a lightweight auxiliary loss that tightly couples the router's decisions with expert capabilities. Our approach treats each expert's router embedding as a proxy token for the tokens assigned to that expert, and feeds perturbed router embeddings through the experts to obtain internal activations. The ERC loss enforces two constraints on these activations: (1) Each expert must exhibit higher activation for its own proxy token than for the proxy tokens of any other expert. (2) Each proxy token must elicit stronger activation from its corresponding expert than from any other expert. These constraints jointly ensure that each router embedding faithfully represents its corresponding expert's capability, while each expert specializes in processing the tokens actually routed to it. The ERC loss is computationally efficient, operating only on n^2 activations, where n is the number of experts. This represents a fixed cost independent of batch size, unlike prior coupling methods that scale with the number of tokens (often millions per batch). Through pre-training MoE-LLMs ranging from 3B to 15B parameters and extensive analysis on trillions of tokens, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the ERC loss. Moreover, the ERC loss offers flexible control and quantitative tracking of expert specialization levels during training, providing valuable insights into MoEs.

Open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly specialize by domain (e.g., math, code, general reasoning), motivating systems that leverage complementary strengths across models. Prior multi-LLM approaches either (i) route a query to one or a few experts and generate independently, (ii) aggregate outputs from each model via costly multi-turn exchanges, or (iii) fuse weights into a single model-typically requiring architectural homogeneity. We introduce Mixture of Thoughts (MoT), a simple method for latent-level collaboration among heterogeneous experts under a global routing scheme. For each query, a lightweight router selects top-K experts and designates a primary expert; uniformly placed interaction layers project hidden states into a shared latent space where the primary expert performs cross-attention over its active (selected) peers. Pre-trained experts remain frozen; only the router and the lightweight interaction layers are trained with a novel joint training objective that improves both the expert selection and inter-expert collaboration. Across five in-distribution (ID) and three out-of-distribution (OOD) benchmarks, MoT surpasses the current routing and aggregation-based state-of-the-art, Avengers, by +0.38% and +2.92%, respectively. Further, MoT significantly outperforms the best-performing single model. It achieves this with single-pass inference, runtime comparable to routing baselines, and none of the overheads of iterative aggregation. MoT offers a simple latent-space mechanism for combining heterogeneous LLMs, a practical step toward broader multi-LLM collaboration. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/jacobfa/mot.

Live streaming has emerged as a primary medium for social interaction and digital commerce, yet it is increasingly plagued by sophisticated risks. A fundamental challenge in this domain is tactical out-of-distribution (OOD) shift: while malicious actors maintain stable underlying objectives, they continuously redesign narrative packaging to evade detection. Such adversarial shifts expose critical limitations of existing OOD generalization paradigms, whose assumptions are difficult to satisfy in the presence of tightly coupled intent-tactic evolution and ill-defined raw-level counterfactuals. In this paper, we tackle this issue from a latent causal perspective and propose Latent-Predictive Counterfactual Decoupling~(LPCD), a plug-in framework for robust live streaming risk assessment. LPCD enables counterfactual reasoning under adversarial tactical re-packaging by modeling intent and narrative variation at the latent level, and enforces latent counterfactual consistency to anchor risk prediction on causally stable malicious intent. At inference time, LPCD applies a lightweight, parameter-free calibration to further mitigate tactic-induced distribution shifts. Extensive experiments on large-scale industrial datasets and online production traffic demonstrate that LPCD consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, validating its effectiveness in moderating evolving adversarial risks in real-world live streaming. The project page is available at https://qiaoyran.github.io/LiveStreamingRiskAssessment/.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, where rare but severe failures can result in irreversible harm. However, prevailing evaluation benchmarks often reduce complex social risk to mean-centered scalar scores, thereby obscuring distributional structure, cross-dimensional interactions, and worst-case behavior. This paper introduces Social Harm Analysis via Risk Profiles (SHARP), a framework for multidimensional, distribution-aware evaluation of social harm. SHARP models harm as a multivariate random variable and integrates explicit decomposition into bias, fairness, ethics, and epistemic reliability with a union-of-failures aggregation reparameterized as additive cumulative log-risk. The framework further employs risk-sensitive distributional statistics, with Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR95) as a primary metric, to characterize worst-case model behavior. Application of SHARP to eleven frontier LLMs, evaluated on a fixed corpus of n=901 socially sensitive prompts, reveals that models with similar average risk can exhibit more than twofold differences in tail exposure and volatility. Across models, dimension-wise marginal tail behavior varies systematically across harm dimensions, with bias exhibiting the strongest tail severities, epistemic and fairness risks occupying intermediate regimes, and ethical misalignment consistently lower; together, these patterns reveal heterogeneous, model-dependent failure structures that scalar benchmarks conflate. These findings indicate that responsible evaluation and governance of LLMs require moving beyond scalar averages toward multidimensional, tail-sensitive risk profiling.

Large Language model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are prone to cascading risks, where early-stage interactions remain semantically fluent and policy-compliant, yet the underlying interaction dynamics begin to distort in ways that amplify latent instability or misalignment. Traditional auditing methods that focus on per-message semantic content are inherently reactive and lagging, failing to capture these early structural precursors. In this paper, we propose a principled framework for cascading-risk detection grounded in semantic--geometric co-evolution. We model MAS interactions as dynamic graphs and introduce Ollivier--Ricci Curvature (ORC) -- a discrete geometric measure -- to characterize information redundancy and bottleneck formation in communication topologies. By coupling semantic flow signals with graph geometry, the framework learns the normal co-evolutionary dynamics of trusted collaboration and treats deviations from this coupled manifold as early-warning signals. Experiments on a suite of cascading-risk scenarios aligned with the risk category demonstrate that curvature anomalies systematically precede explicit semantic violations by several interaction turns, enabling proactive intervention. Furthermore, the local nature of Ricci curvature provides principled interpretability for root-cause attribution, identifying specific agents or links that precipitate the collapse of trustworthy collaboration.

Mixture of Experts models are widely assumed to achieve domain specialization through sparse routing. In this work, we question this assumption by introducing COMMITTEEAUDIT, a post hoc framework that analyzes routing behavior at the level of expert groups rather than individual experts. Across three representative models and the MMLU benchmark, we uncover a domain-invariant Standing Committee. This is a compact coalition of routed experts that consistently captures the majority of routing mass across domains, layers, and routing budgets, even when architectures already include shared experts. Qualitative analysis further shows that Standing Committees anchor reasoning structure and syntax, while peripheral experts handle domain-specific knowledge. These findings reveal a strong structural bias toward centralized computation, suggesting that specialization in Mixture of Experts models is far less pervasive than commonly believed. This inherent bias also indicates that current training objectives, such as load-balancing losses that enforce uniform expert utilization, may be working against the model's natural optimization path, thereby limiting training efficiency and performance.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

While prior red-teaming efforts have focused on eliciting harmful text outputs from large language models (LLMs), such approaches fail to capture agent-specific vulnerabilities that emerge through multi-step tool execution, particularly in rapidly growing ecosystems such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP). To address this gap, we propose a trajectory-aware evolutionary search method, T-MAP, which leverages execution trajectories to guide the discovery of adversarial prompts. Our approach enables the automatic generation of attacks that not only bypass safety guardrails but also reliably realize harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Empirical evaluations across diverse MCP environments demonstrate that T-MAP substantially outperforms baselines in attack realization rate (ARR) and remains effective against frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Gemini-3-Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM-5, thereby revealing previously underexplored vulnerabilities in autonomous LLM agents.

Recent studies have revealed that self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems frequently lead to widespread outages, which are challenging to contain and recover from. Existing failure detection techniques struggle to expose such failures prior to deployment, as they typically require a complex combination of specific conditions to be triggered. This challenge stems from the inherent nature of cascading failures, as they typically involve a sequence of fault propagations, each activated by distinct conditions. This paper presents CSnake, a fault injection framework to expose self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems. CSnake uses the novel idea of causal stitching, which causally links multiple single-fault injections in different tests to simulate complex fault propagation chains. To identify these chains, CSnake designs a counterfactual causality analysis of fault propagations - fault causality analysis (FCA): FCA compares the execution trace of a fault injection run with its corresponding profile run (i.e., same test w/o the injection) and identifies any additional faults triggered, which are considered to have a causal relationship with the injected fault. To address the large search space of fault and workload combinations, CSnake employs a three-phase allocation protocol of test budget that prioritizes faults with unique and diverse causal consequences, increasing the likelihood of uncovering conditional fault propagations. Furthermore, to avoid incorrectly connecting fault propagations from workloads with incompatible conditions, CSnake performs a local compatibility check that approximately checks the compatibility of the path constraints associated with connected fault propagations with low overhead. CSnake detected 15 bugs that cause self-sustaining cascading failures in five systems, five of which have been confirmed with two fixed.

As Model Context Protocol (MCP) introduces an easy-to-use ecosystem for users and developers, it also brings underexplored safety risks. Its decentralized architecture, which separates clients and servers, poses unique challenges for systematic safety analysis. This paper proposes a novel framework to enhance MCP safety. Guided by the MAESTRO framework, we first analyze the missing safety mechanisms in MCP, and based on this analysis, we propose the Model Contextual Integrity Protocol (MCIP), a refined version of MCP that addresses these gaps. Next, we develop a fine-grained taxonomy that captures a diverse range of unsafe behaviors observed in MCP scenarios. Building on this taxonomy, we develop benchmark and training data that support the evaluation and improvement of LLMs' capabilities in identifying safety risks within MCP interactions. Leveraging the proposed benchmark and training data, we conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs. The results highlight LLMs' vulnerabilities in MCP interactions and demonstrate that our approach substantially improves their safety performance.

Current approaches to LLM adversarial testing suffer from coverage gaps: manual red-teaming does not scale, LLM-as-attacker methods exhibit mode collapse, and gradient-based approaches produce uninterpretable gibberish. We introduce a quality-diversity evolutionary framework that operates at the semantic level, evolving interpretable attack strategies rather than token sequences. Using MAP-Elites, we maintain a diverse archive of attacks across behavioral dimensions (strategy type, encoding method, prompt length). In experiments across GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and an open-weight coding model (Devstral-small-2), we discover distinct vulnerability profiles: GPT-4o-mini is vulnerable to hypothetical and multi-turn framing combined with ROT13 encoding (fitness 0.8), Gemini to direct attacks with ROT13 and multi-turn with Leetspeak (0.8), while Claude shows uniformly ambiguous responses across all strategies (max 0.4). The semantic representation produces interpretable attacks that reveal systematic, model-specific weaknesses, providing actionable insights for improving LLM safety and a reproducible baseline for evaluating future frontier models. Code and experiment artifacts are released at https://github.com/bassrehab/red-queen.

Growing at a fast pace, modern autonomous systems will soon be deployed at scale, opening up the possibility for cooperative multi-agent systems. Sharing information and distributing workloads allow autonomous agents to better perform tasks and increase computation efficiency. However, shared information can be modified to execute adversarial attacks on deep learning models that are widely employed in modern systems. Thus, we aim to study the robustness of such systems and focus on exploring adversarial attacks in a novel multi-agent setting where communication is done through sharing learned intermediate representations of neural networks. We observe that an indistinguishable adversarial message can severely degrade performance, but becomes weaker as the number of benign agents increases. Furthermore, we show that black-box transfer attacks are more difficult in this setting when compared to directly perturbing the inputs, as it is necessary to align the distribution of learned representations with domain adaptation. Our work studies robustness at the neural network level to contribute an additional layer of fault tolerance to modern security protocols for more secure multi-agent systems.

The rapid growth of large language models (LLMs) with diverse capabilities, costs, and domains has created a critical need for intelligent model selection at inference time. While smaller models suffice for routine queries, complex tasks demand more capable models. However, static model deployment does not account for the complexity and domain of incoming queries, leading to suboptimal performance and increased costs. Dynamic routing systems that adaptively select models based on query characteristics have emerged as a solution to this challenge. We provide a systematic analysis of state-of-the-art multi-LLM routing and cascading approaches. In contrast to mixture-of-experts architectures, which route within a single model, we study routing across multiple independently trained LLMs. We cover diverse routing paradigms, including query difficulty, human preferences, clustering, uncertainty quantification, reinforcement learning, multimodality, and cascading. For each paradigm, we analyze representative methods and examine key trade-offs. Beyond taxonomy, we introduce a conceptual framework that characterizes routing systems along three dimensions: when decisions are made, what information is used, and how they are computed. This perspective highlights that practical systems are often compositional, integrating multiple paradigms under operational constraints. Our analysis demonstrates that effective multi-LLM routing requires balancing competing objectives. Choosing the optimal routing strategy depends on deployment and computational constraints. Well-designed routing systems can outperform even the most powerful individual models by strategically leveraging specialized capabilities across models while maximizing efficiency gains. Meanwhile, open challenges remain in developing routing mechanisms that generalize across diverse architectures, modalities, and applications.

Protecting the network layer from malicious attacks is an important and challenging security issue in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). In this paper, a security mechanism is proposed to defend against a cooperative gray hole attack on the well known AODV routing protocol in MANETs. A gray hole is a node that selectively drops and forwards data packets after it advertises itself as having the shortest path to the destination node in response to a route request message from a source node. The proposed mechanism does not apply any cryptographic primitives on the routing messages. Instead, it protects the network by detecting and reacting to malicious activities of any node. Simulation results show that the scheme has a significantly high detection rate with moderate network traffic overhead.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

We present ACAR (Adaptive Complexity and Attribution Routing), a measurement framework for studying multi-model orchestration under auditable conditions. ACAR uses self-consistency variance (sigma) computed from N=3 probe samples to route tasks across single-model, two-model, and three-model execution modes. The system is implemented on top of TEAMLLM, a deterministic execution substrate with immutable artifacts and complete decision traces. We evaluate ACAR on 1,510 tasks spanning four benchmarks: MathArena, Reasoning Gym, LiveCodeBench, and SuperGPQA, using Claude Sonnet 4, GPT-4o, and Gemini 2.0 Flash, producing more than 7,550 auditable runs. Results show that sigma-based routing achieves 55.6 percent accuracy, exceeding the two-model baseline of 54.4 percent while avoiding full ensembling on 54.2 percent of tasks. The routing mechanism is model-agnostic and requires no learned components. We also document negative results. First, retrieval augmentation reduced accuracy by 3.4 percentage points, as median retrieval similarity was only 0.167, demonstrating that experience injection without semantic alignment introduces noise rather than grounding. Second, when models agree on incorrect answers (sigma equals zero), no downstream ensemble can recover; this agreement-but-wrong failure mode is intrinsic to self-consistency and bounds achievable accuracy at approximately eight percentage points below full ensembling. Third, attribution estimates based on proxy signals such as response similarity and entropy showed weak correlation with ground-truth leave-one-out values, indicating that practical attribution requires explicit counterfactual computation. This work documents which assumptions fail in practice and provides falsifiable baselines for future research on routing, retrieval, and multi-model attribution.

Agent skills occupy a privileged position in the agent workflow, as agents are expected to implicitly follow and execute them, rendering third-party skills a vulnerable attack surface. Existing studies have revealed unsafe agent behaviors induced by skill-based attacks, but they primarily evaluate poisoned skills within a single task execution and enumerate harms through ad-hoc risk lists. To bridge these gaps, we introduce SkillHarm, a benchmark of skill-based attacks across the skill-use lifecycle, paired with a systematic taxonomy of skill-relevant risks. SkillHarm evaluates two attack scenarios: Fixed-Payload Poisoning (FPP), where a fixed poisoned skill package directly compromises any task session that invokes it, and Self-Mutating Poisoning (SMP), where an initially benign execution silently mutates persistent skill content, deferring harm until a subsequent reuse. It further defines 12 risk types based on the agent workflow component targeted by the harm: data pipelines, system environments, and agent autonomy. To instantiate these attacks at scale, we build AutoSkillHarm, an automated construction pipeline with coding agents driven by natural-language harnesses. The resulting benchmark contains 879 attack samples across 71 skills. Experiments show that current agents remain vulnerable with attack success rates up to 86.3% in FPP and 69.3% in SMP. Our analysis further reveals a latent risk: many apparent attack failures stem from the agent failing to engage with the poisoned file rather than genuine resistance, and current defenses still fail to reliably mitigate the threat.

The model context protocol (MCP) standardizes how LLMs connect to external tools and data sources, enabling faster integration but introducing new attack vectors. Despite the growing adoption of MCP, existing MCP security studies classify attacks by their observable effects, obscuring how attacks behave across different MCP server components and overlooking multi-component attack chains. Meanwhile, existing defenses are less effective when facing multi-component attacks or previously unknown malicious behaviors. This work presents a component-centric perspective for understanding and detecting malicious MCP servers. First, we build the first component-centric PoC dataset of 114 malicious MCP servers where attacks are achieved as manipulation over MCP components and their compositions. We evaluate these attacks' effectiveness across two MCP hosts and five LLMs, and uncover that (1) component position shapes attack success rate; and (2) multi-component compositions often outperform single-component attacks by distributing malicious logic. Second, we propose and implement Connor, a two-stage behavioral deviation detector for malicious MCP servers. It first performs pre-execution analysis to detect malicious shell commands and extract each tool's function intent, and then conducts step-wise in-execution analysis to trace each tool's behavioral trajectories and detect deviations from its function intent. Evaluation on our curated dataset indicates that Connor achieves an F1-score of 94.6%, outperforming the state of the art by 8.9% to 59.6%. In real-world detection, Connor identifies two malicious servers.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

The rapid adoption of Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures marks a major shift in the deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). MoE LLMs improve scaling efficiency by activating only a small subset of parameters per token, but their routing structure introduces new safety attack surfaces. We find that safety-critical behaviors in MoE LLMs (e.g., refusal) are concentrated in a small set of experts rather than being uniformly distributed. Building on this, we propose Large Language Lobotomy (L^3), a training-free, architecture-agnostic attack that compromises safety alignment by exploiting expert routing dynamics. L^3 learns routing patterns that correlate with refusal, attributes safety behavior to specific experts, and adaptively silences the most safety-relevant experts until harmful outputs are produced. We evaluate L^3 on eight state-of-the-art open-source MoE LLMs and show that our adaptive expert silencing increases average attack success from 7.3% to 70.4%, reaching up to 86.3%, outperforming prior training-free MoE jailbreak methods. Moreover, bypassing guardrails typically requires silencing fewer than 20% of layer-wise experts while largely preserving general language utility. These results reveal a fundamental tension between efficiency-driven MoE design and robust safety alignment and motivate distributing safety mechanisms more robustly in future MoE LLMs with architecture- and routing-aware methods.

Warning: this paper contains content that may be inappropriate or offensive. As generative models become available for public use in various applications, testing and analyzing vulnerabilities of these models has become a priority. Here we propose an automatic red teaming framework that evaluates a given model and exposes its vulnerabilities against unsafe and inappropriate content generation. Our framework uses in-context learning in a feedback loop to red team models and trigger them into unsafe content generation. We propose different in-context attack strategies to automatically learn effective and diverse adversarial prompts for text-to-image models. Our experiments demonstrate that compared to baseline approaches, our proposed strategy is significantly more effective in exposing vulnerabilities in Stable Diffusion (SD) model, even when the latter is enhanced with safety features. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the proposed framework is effective for red teaming text-to-text models, resulting in significantly higher toxic response generation rate compared to previously reported numbers.

Real-world users typically have access to multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) from different providers, and these LLMs often excel at distinct domains, yet none dominate all. Consequently, routing each task to the most suitable model becomes critical for both performance and cost. Existing routers treat this as a static, one-off classification problem. However, we identify the performance bottleneck for these routers as information deficit: simply augmenting a vanilla LLM router with performance statistics at the task-dimension level yields a 15.3% relative gain, surpassing a heuristic router built on the same dimension-level priors. Motivated by this finding, we propose Agent-as-a-Router, a framework that formalizes routing as a C-A-F loop (Context->Action->Feedback->Context). It closes the information gap by accumulating execution-grounded experience during deployment. We instantiate this framework as ACRouter, composed of an Orchestrator, a Verifier, a Memory module, and introduce CodeRouterBench, an evaluation environment comprising ~10K task instances with verified scores from 8 frontier LLMs, enabling regret-based router comparison on streaming tasks. Experiments show that ACRouter achieves the lowest cumulative regret on in-distribution tasks and generalizes to out-of-distribution agentic-programming tasks, demonstrating that our routing framework actively closes the information gap. Codes and benchmarks are released at https://github.com/LanceZPF/agent-as-a-router.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-based MAS), where multiple LLM agents collaborate to solve complex tasks, have shown impressive performance in many areas. However, MAS are typically distributed across different devices or environments, making them vulnerable to perturbations such as agent failures. While existing works have studied the adversarial attacks and corresponding defense strategies, they mainly focus on reactively detecting and mitigating attacks after they occur rather than proactively designing inherently resilient systems. In this work, we study the resilience of LLM-based MAS under perturbations and find that both the communication topology and prompt design significantly influence system resilience. Motivated by these findings, we propose ResMAS: a two-stage framework for enhancing MAS resilience. First, we train a reward model to predict the MAS's resilience, based on which we train a topology generator to automatically design resilient topology for specific tasks through reinforcement learning. Second, we introduce a topology-aware prompt optimization method that refines each agent's prompt based on its connections and interactions with other agents. Extensive experiments across a range of tasks show that our approach substantially improves MAS resilience under various constraints. Moreover, our framework demonstrates strong generalization ability to new tasks and models, highlighting its potential for building resilient MASs.

Lightweight machine learning models are increasingly proposed for intrusion detection in Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) networks due to their suitability for resource-constrained edge deployment. Most reported results evaluate these models only within their training network, leaving behavior on unseen networks unverified. This study trains four lightweight architectures on one IIoT dataset and evaluates them, without retraining, on two structurally distinct IIoT datasets using a feature representation restricted to attributes available across all three sources. Explainability analysis across two top-performing models shows both rely overwhelmingly on coarse port-category features; the most influential category occurs in source-domain attack traffic at 96 to 435 times the rate in the two target domains, indicating that coarsening port resolution relocates rather than removes a documented shortcut. Evaluation under naturally imbalanced class distributions reveals a further effect: the evaluation protocol used can reverse which target network appears to pose the greater generalization challenge. Adversarial robustness and recovery through limited target-domain exposure are also assessed; robustness to adversarial perturbation is unrelated to cross-network generalization, and recovery through adaptation varies considerably by architecture. These findings suggest deployment readiness should be assessed using cross-network evaluation under realistic class distributions, rather than within-domain accuracy alone.

Designing effective strategies for controlling epidemic spread by vaccination is an important question in epidemiology, especially in the early stages when vaccines are limited. This is a challenging question when the contact network is very heterogeneous, and strategies based on controlling network properties, such as the degree and spectral radius, have been shown to be effective. Implementation of such strategies requires detailed information on the contact structure, which might be sensitive in many applications. Our focus here is on choosing effective vaccination strategies when the edges are sensitive and differential privacy guarantees are needed. Our main contributions are (varepsilon,delta)-differentially private algorithms for designing vaccination strategies by reducing the maximum degree and spectral radius. Our key technique is a private algorithm for the multi-set multi-cover problem, which we use for controlling network properties. We evaluate privacy-utility tradeoffs of our algorithms on multiple synthetic and real-world networks, and show their effectiveness.

Message Passing Neural Networks (MPNNs) are instances of Graph Neural Networks that leverage the graph to send messages over the edges. This inductive bias leads to a phenomenon known as over-squashing, where a node feature is insensitive to information contained at distant nodes. Despite recent methods introduced to mitigate this issue, an understanding of the causes for over-squashing and of possible solutions are lacking. In this theoretical work, we prove that: (i) Neural network width can mitigate over-squashing, but at the cost of making the whole network more sensitive; (ii) Conversely, depth cannot help mitigate over-squashing: increasing the number of layers leads to over-squashing being dominated by vanishing gradients; (iii) The graph topology plays the greatest role, since over-squashing occurs between nodes at high commute (access) time. Our analysis provides a unified framework to study different recent methods introduced to cope with over-squashing and serves as a justification for a class of methods that fall under graph rewiring.

LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex tasks. Central to MAS is the communication topology which governs how agents exchange information internally. Consequently, the security of communication topologies has attracted increasing attention. In this paper, we investigate a critical privacy risk: MAS communication topologies can be inferred under a restrictive black-box setting, exposing system vulnerabilities and posing significant intellectual property threats. To explore this risk, we propose Communication Inference Attack (CIA), a novel attack that constructs new adversarial queries to induce intermediate agents' reasoning outputs and models their semantic correlations through the proposed global bias disentanglement and LLM-guided weak supervision. Extensive experiments on MAS with optimized communication topologies demonstrate the effectiveness of CIA, achieving an average AUC of 0.87 and a peak AUC of up to 0.99, thereby revealing the substantial privacy risk in MAS.