Daily Papers

In this work, we consider an inversion attack on the obfuscated input embeddings sent to a language model on a server, where the adversary has no access to the language model or the obfuscation mechanism and sees only the obfuscated embeddings along with the model's embedding table. We propose BeamClean, an inversion attack that jointly estimates the noise parameters and decodes token sequences by integrating a language-model prior. Against Laplacian and Gaussian obfuscation mechanisms, BeamClean always surpasses naive distance-based attacks. This work highlights the necessity for and robustness of more advanced learned, input-dependent methods.

Previous studies have found that an adversary attacker can often infer unintended input information from intermediate-layer features. We study the possibility of preventing such adversarial inference, yet without too much accuracy degradation. We propose a generic method to revise the neural network to boost the challenge of inferring input attributes from features, while maintaining highly accurate outputs. In particular, the method transforms real-valued features into complex-valued ones, in which the input is hidden in a randomized phase of the transformed features. The knowledge of the phase acts like a key, with which any party can easily recover the output from the processing result, but without which the party can neither recover the output nor distinguish the original input. Preliminary experiments on various datasets and network structures have shown that our method significantly diminishes the adversary's ability in inferring about the input while largely preserves the resulting accuracy.

Model adaptation is crucial to handle the discrepancy between proxy training data and actual users data received. To effectively perform adaptation, textual data of users is typically stored on servers or their local devices, where downstream natural language processing (NLP) models can be directly trained using such in-domain data. However, this might raise privacy and security concerns due to the extra risks of exposing user information to adversaries. Replacing identifying information in textual data with a generic marker has been recently explored. In this work, we leverage large language models (LLMs) to suggest substitutes of masked tokens and have their effectiveness evaluated on downstream language modeling tasks. Specifically, we propose multiple pre-trained and fine-tuned LLM-based approaches and perform empirical studies on various datasets for the comparison of these methods. Experimental results show that models trained on the obfuscation corpora are able to achieve comparable performance with the ones trained on the original data without privacy-preserving token masking.

Protecting sensitive information is crucial in today's world of Large Language Models (LLMs) and data-driven services. One common method used to preserve privacy is by using data perturbation techniques to reduce overreaching utility of (sensitive) Personal Identifiable Information (PII) data while maintaining its statistical and semantic properties. Data perturbation methods often result in significant information loss, making them impractical for use. In this paper, we propose 'Life of PII', a novel Obfuscation Transformer framework for transforming PII into faux-PII while preserving the original information, intent, and context as much as possible. Our approach includes an API to interface with the given document, a configuration-based obfuscator, and a model based on the Transformer architecture, which has shown high context preservation and performance in natural language processing tasks and LLMs. Our Transformer-based approach learns mapping between the original PII and its transformed faux-PII representation, which we call "obfuscated" data. Our experiments demonstrate that our method, called Life of PII, outperforms traditional data perturbation techniques in terms of both utility preservation and privacy protection. We show that our approach can effectively reduce utility loss while preserving the original information, offering greater flexibility in the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility. Our work provides a solution for protecting PII in various real-world applications.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under 2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.

In this paper, both empirically and theoretically, we show that several AI-text detectors are not reliable in practical scenarios. Empirically, we show that paraphrasing attacks, where a light paraphraser is applied on top of a large language model (LLM), can break a whole range of detectors, including ones using watermarking schemes as well as neural network-based detectors and zero-shot classifiers. Our experiments demonstrate that retrieval-based detectors, designed to evade paraphrasing attacks, are still vulnerable to recursive paraphrasing. We then provide a theoretical impossibility result indicating that as language models become more sophisticated and better at emulating human text, the performance of even the best-possible detector decreases. For a sufficiently advanced language model seeking to imitate human text, even the best-possible detector may only perform marginally better than a random classifier. Our result is general enough to capture specific scenarios such as particular writing styles, clever prompt design, or text paraphrasing. We also extend the impossibility result to include the case where pseudorandom number generators are used for AI-text generation instead of true randomness. We show that the same result holds with a negligible correction term for all polynomial-time computable detectors. Finally, we show that even LLMs protected by watermarking schemes can be vulnerable against spoofing attacks where adversarial humans can infer hidden LLM text signatures and add them to human-generated text to be detected as text generated by the LLMs, potentially causing reputational damage to their developers. We believe these results can open an honest conversation in the community regarding the ethical and reliable use of AI-generated text.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

Recent latent-space monitoring techniques have shown promise as defenses against LLM attacks. These defenses act as scanners that seek to detect harmful activations before they lead to undesirable actions. This prompts the question: Can models execute harmful behavior via inconspicuous latent states? Here, we study such obfuscated activations. We show that state-of-the-art latent-space defenses -- including sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent OOD detection -- are all vulnerable to obfuscated activations. For example, against probes trained to classify harmfulness, our attacks can often reduce recall from 100% to 0% while retaining a 90% jailbreaking rate. However, obfuscation has limits: we find that on a complex task (writing SQL code), obfuscation reduces model performance. Together, our results demonstrate that neural activations are highly malleable: we can reshape activation patterns in a variety of ways, often while preserving a network's behavior. This poses a fundamental challenge to latent-space defenses.

We introduce the first method for translating text embeddings from one vector space to another without any paired data, encoders, or predefined sets of matches. Our unsupervised approach translates any embedding to and from a universal latent representation (i.e., a universal semantic structure conjectured by the Platonic Representation Hypothesis). Our translations achieve high cosine similarity across model pairs with different architectures, parameter counts, and training datasets. The ability to translate unknown embeddings into a different space while preserving their geometry has serious implications for the security of vector databases. An adversary with access only to embedding vectors can extract sensitive information about the underlying documents, sufficient for classification and attribute inference.

While text-to-image synthesis currently enjoys great popularity among researchers and the general public, the security of these models has been neglected so far. Many text-guided image generation models rely on pre-trained text encoders from external sources, and their users trust that the retrieved models will behave as promised. Unfortunately, this might not be the case. We introduce backdoor attacks against text-guided generative models and demonstrate that their text encoders pose a major tampering risk. Our attacks only slightly alter an encoder so that no suspicious model behavior is apparent for image generations with clean prompts. By then inserting a single character trigger into the prompt, e.g., a non-Latin character or emoji, the adversary can trigger the model to either generate images with pre-defined attributes or images following a hidden, potentially malicious description. We empirically demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attacks on Stable Diffusion and highlight that the injection process of a single backdoor takes less than two minutes. Besides phrasing our approach solely as an attack, it can also force an encoder to forget phrases related to certain concepts, such as nudity or violence, and help to make image generation safer.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Adversarial purification is a defense mechanism for safeguarding classifiers against adversarial attacks without knowing the type of attacks or training of the classifier. These techniques characterize and eliminate adversarial perturbations from the attacked inputs, aiming to restore purified samples that retain similarity to the initially attacked ones and are correctly classified by the classifier. Due to the inherent challenges associated with characterizing noise perturbations for discrete inputs, adversarial text purification has been relatively unexplored. In this paper, we investigate the effectiveness of adversarial purification methods in defending text classifiers. We propose a novel adversarial text purification that harnesses the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to purify adversarial text without the need to explicitly characterize the discrete noise perturbations. We utilize prompt engineering to exploit LLMs for recovering the purified examples for given adversarial examples such that they are semantically similar and correctly classified. Our proposed method demonstrates remarkable performance over various classifiers, improving their accuracy under the attack by over 65% on average.

The proliferation of large AI models trained on uncurated, often sensitive web-scraped data has raised significant privacy concerns. One of the concerns is that adversaries can extract information about the training data using privacy attacks. Unfortunately, the task of removing specific information from the models without sacrificing performance is not straightforward and has proven to be challenging. We propose a rather easy yet effective defense based on backdoor attacks to remove private information such as names of individuals from models, and focus in this work on text encoders. Specifically, through strategic insertion of backdoors, we align the embeddings of sensitive phrases with those of neutral terms-"a person" instead of the person's name. Our empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our backdoor-based defense on CLIP by assessing its performance using a specialized privacy attack for zero-shot classifiers. Our approach provides not only a new "dual-use" perspective on backdoor attacks, but also presents a promising avenue to enhance the privacy of individuals within models trained on uncurated web-scraped data.

Potential harms of large language models can be mitigated by watermarking model output, i.e., embedding signals into generated text that are invisible to humans but algorithmically detectable from a short span of tokens. We propose a watermarking framework for proprietary language models. The watermark can be embedded with negligible impact on text quality, and can be detected using an efficient open-source algorithm without access to the language model API or parameters. The watermark works by selecting a randomized set of "green" tokens before a word is generated, and then softly promoting use of green tokens during sampling. We propose a statistical test for detecting the watermark with interpretable p-values, and derive an information-theoretic framework for analyzing the sensitivity of the watermark. We test the watermark using a multi-billion parameter model from the Open Pretrained Transformer (OPT) family, and discuss robustness and security.

We design, implement, and evaluate adversarial decoding, a new, generic text generation technique that produces readable documents for different adversarial objectives. Prior methods either produce easily detectable gibberish, or cannot handle objectives that include embedding similarity. In particular, they only work for direct attacks (such as jailbreaking) and cannot produce adversarial text for realistic indirect injection, e.g., documents that (1) are retrieved in RAG systems in response to broad classes of queries, and also (2) adversarially influence subsequent generation. We also show that fluency (low perplexity) is not sufficient to evade filtering. We measure the effectiveness of adversarial decoding for different objectives, including RAG poisoning, jailbreaking, and evasion of defensive filters, and demonstrate that it outperforms existing methods while producing readable adversarial documents.

Despite the remarkable generation capabilities of diffusion models, recent studies have shown that they can memorize and create harmful content when given specific text prompts. Although fine-tuning approaches have been developed to mitigate this issue by unlearning harmful concepts, these methods can be easily circumvented through jailbreaking attacks. This implies that the harmful concept has not been fully erased from the model. However, existing jailbreaking attack methods, while effective, lack interpretability regarding why unlearned models still retain the concept, thereby hindering the development of defense strategies. In this work, we address these limitations by proposing an attack method that learns an orthogonal set of interpretable attack token embeddings. The attack token embeddings can be decomposed into human-interpretable textual elements, revealing that unlearned models still retain the target concept through implicit textual components. Furthermore, these attack token embeddings are powerful and transferable across text prompts, initial noises, and unlearned models, emphasizing that unlearned models are more vulnerable than expected. Finally, building on the insights from our interpretable attack, we develop a defense method to protect unlearned models against both our proposed and existing jailbreaking attacks. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack and defense strategies.

The widespread distribution of Large Language Models (LLMs) through public platforms like Hugging Face introduces significant security challenges. While these platforms perform basic security scans, they often fail to detect subtle manipulations within the embedding layer. This work identifies a novel class of deployment phase attacks that exploit this vulnerability by injecting imperceptible perturbations directly into the embedding layer outputs without modifying model weights or input text. These perturbations, though statistically benign, systematically bypass safety alignment mechanisms and induce harmful behaviors during inference. We propose Search based Embedding Poisoning(SEP), a practical, model agnostic framework that introduces carefully optimized perturbations into embeddings associated with high risk tokens. SEP leverages a predictable linear transition in model responses, from refusal to harmful output to semantic deviation to identify a narrow perturbation window that evades alignment safeguards. Evaluated across six aligned LLMs, SEP achieves an average attack success rate of 96.43% while preserving benign task performance and evading conventional detection mechanisms. Our findings reveal a critical oversight in deployment security and emphasize the urgent need for embedding level integrity checks in future LLM defense strategies.

We propose an imperceptible multi-bit text watermark embedded by paraphrasing with LLMs. We fine-tune a pair of LLM paraphrasers that are designed to behave differently so that their paraphrasing difference reflected in the text semantics can be identified by a trained decoder. To embed our multi-bit watermark, we use two paraphrasers alternatively to encode the pre-defined binary code at the sentence level. Then we use a text classifier as the decoder to decode each bit of the watermark. Through extensive experiments, we show that our watermarks can achieve over 99.99\% detection AUC with small (1.1B) text paraphrasers while keeping the semantic information of the original sentence. More importantly, our pipeline is robust under word substitution and sentence paraphrasing perturbations and generalizes well to out-of-distributional data. We also show the stealthiness of our watermark with LLM-based evaluation. We open-source the code: https://github.com/xiaojunxu/multi-bit-text-watermark.

We show that the imperceptibility of several existing linguistic steganographic systems (Fang et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018) relies on implicit assumptions on statistical behaviors of fluent text. We formally analyze them and empirically evaluate these assumptions. Furthermore, based on these observations, we propose an encoding algorithm called patient-Huffman with improved near-imperceptible guarantees.

Dense retrieval systems have been widely used in various NLP applications. However, their vulnerabilities to potential attacks have been underexplored. This paper investigates a novel attack scenario where the attackers aim to mislead the retrieval system into retrieving the attacker-specified contents. Those contents, injected into the retrieval corpus by attackers, can include harmful text like hate speech or spam. Unlike prior methods that rely on model weights and generate conspicuous, unnatural outputs, we propose a covert backdoor attack triggered by grammar errors. Our approach ensures that the attacked models can function normally for standard queries while covertly triggering the retrieval of the attacker's contents in response to minor linguistic mistakes. Specifically, dense retrievers are trained with contrastive loss and hard negative sampling. Surprisingly, our findings demonstrate that contrastive loss is notably sensitive to grammatical errors, and hard negative sampling can exacerbate susceptibility to backdoor attacks. Our proposed method achieves a high attack success rate with a minimal corpus poisoning rate of only 0.048\%, while preserving normal retrieval performance. This indicates that the method has negligible impact on user experience for error-free queries. Furthermore, evaluations across three real-world defense strategies reveal that the malicious passages embedded within the corpus remain highly resistant to detection and filtering, underscoring the robustness and subtlety of the proposed attack Codes of this work are available at https://github.com/ruyue0001/Backdoor_DPR..

In the era of costly pre-training of large language models, ensuring the intellectual property rights of model owners, and insuring that said models are responsibly deployed, is becoming increasingly important. To this end, we propose model watermarking via passthrough layers, which are added to existing pre-trained networks and trained using a self-supervised loss such that the model produces high-entropy output when prompted with a unique private key, and acts normally otherwise. Unlike existing model watermarking methods, our method is fully task-agnostic, and can be applied to both classification and sequence-to-sequence tasks without requiring advanced access to downstream fine-tuning datasets. We evaluate the proposed passthrough layers on a wide range of downstream tasks, and show experimentally our watermarking method achieves a near-perfect watermark extraction accuracy and false-positive rate in most cases without damaging original model performance. Additionally, we show our method is robust to both downstream fine-tuning, fine-pruning, and layer removal attacks, and can be trained in a fraction of the time required to train the original model. Code is available in the paper.

How much private information do text embeddings reveal about the original text? We investigate the problem of embedding inversion, reconstructing the full text represented in dense text embeddings. We frame the problem as controlled generation: generating text that, when reembedded, is close to a fixed point in latent space. We find that although a na\"ive model conditioned on the embedding performs poorly, a multi-step method that iteratively corrects and re-embeds text is able to recover 92% of 32-token text inputs exactly. We train our model to decode text embeddings from two state-of-the-art embedding models, and also show that our model can recover important personal information (full names) from a dataset of clinical notes. Our code is available on Github: https://github.com/jxmorris12/vec2text{github.com/jxmorris12/vec2text}.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable fluency across various tasks. However, their unethical applications, such as disseminating disinformation, have become a growing concern. Although recent works have proposed a number of LLM detection methods, their robustness and reliability remain unclear. In this paper, we present RAFT: a grammar error-free black-box attack against existing LLM detectors. In contrast to previous attacks for language models, our method exploits the transferability of LLM embeddings at the word-level while preserving the original text quality. We leverage an auxiliary embedding to greedily select candidate words to perturb against the target detector. Experiments reveal that our attack effectively compromises all detectors in the study across various domains by up to 99%, and are transferable across source models. Manual human evaluation studies show our attacks are realistic and indistinguishable from original human-written text. We also show that examples generated by RAFT can be used to train adversarially robust detectors. Our work shows that current LLM detectors are not adversarially robust, underscoring the urgent need for more resilient detection mechanisms.

Training deep neural networks on images represented as grids of pixels has brought to light an interesting phenomenon known as adversarial examples. Inspired by how humans reconstruct abstract concepts, we attempt to codify the input bitmap image into a set of compact, interpretable elements to avoid being fooled by the adversarial structures. We take the first step in this direction by experimenting with image vectorization as an input transformation step to map the adversarial examples back into the natural manifold of MNIST handwritten digits. We compare our method vs. state-of-the-art input transformations and further discuss the trade-offs between a hand-designed and a learned transformation defense.

Text-to-image diffusion models may generate harmful or copyrighted content, motivating research on concept erasure. However, existing approaches primarily focus on erasing concepts from text prompts, overlooking other input modalities that are increasingly critical in real-world applications such as image editing and personalized generation. These modalities can become attack surfaces, where erased concepts re-emerge despite defenses. To bridge this gap, we introduce M-ErasureBench, a novel multimodal evaluation framework that systematically benchmarks concept erasure methods across three input modalities: text prompts, learned embeddings, and inverted latents. For the latter two, we evaluate both white-box and black-box access, yielding five evaluation scenarios. Our analysis shows that existing methods achieve strong erasure performance against text prompts but largely fail under learned embeddings and inverted latents, with Concept Reproduction Rate (CRR) exceeding 90% in the white-box setting. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose IRECE (Inference-time Robustness Enhancement for Concept Erasure), a plug-and-play module that localizes target concepts via cross-attention and perturbs the associated latents during denoising. Experiments demonstrate that IRECE consistently restores robustness, reducing CRR by up to 40% under the most challenging white-box latent inversion scenario, while preserving visual quality. To the best of our knowledge, M-ErasureBench provides the first comprehensive benchmark of concept erasure beyond text prompts. Together with IRECE, our benchmark offers practical safeguards for building more reliable protective generative models.

Transformer components such as non-linear activations and normalization are inherently non-injective, suggesting that different inputs could map to the same output and prevent exact recovery of the input from a model's representations. In this paper, we challenge this view. First, we prove mathematically that transformer language models mapping discrete input sequences to their corresponding sequence of continuous representations are injective and therefore lossless, a property established at initialization and preserved during training. Second, we confirm this result empirically through billions of collision tests on six state-of-the-art language models, and observe no collisions. Third, we operationalize injectivity: we introduce SipIt, the first algorithm that provably and efficiently reconstructs the exact input text from hidden activations, establishing linear-time guarantees and demonstrating exact invertibility in practice. Overall, our work establishes injectivity as a fundamental and exploitable property of language models, with direct implications for transparency, interpretability, and safe deployment.

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

Embedding inversion, i.e., reconstructing text given its embedding and black-box access to the embedding encoder, is a fundamental problem in both NLP and security. From the NLP perspective, it helps determine how much semantic information about the input is retained in the embedding. From the security perspective, it measures how much information is leaked by vector databases and embedding-based retrieval systems. State-of-the-art methods for embedding inversion, such as vec2text, have high accuracy but require (a) training a separate model for each embedding, and (b) a large number of queries to the corresponding encoder. We design, implement, and evaluate ZSInvert, a zero-shot inversion method based on the recently proposed adversarial decoding technique. ZSInvert is fast, query-efficient, and can be used for any text embedding without training an embedding-specific inversion model. We measure the effectiveness of ZSInvert on several embeddings and demonstrate that it recovers key semantic information about the corresponding texts.

Watermarking of language model outputs enables statistical detection of model-generated text, which has many applications in the responsible deployment of language models. Existing watermarking strategies operate by altering the decoder of an existing language model, and the ability for a language model to directly learn to generate the watermark would have significant implications for the real-world deployment of watermarks. First, learned watermarks could be used to build open models that naturally generate watermarked text, allowing for open models to benefit from watermarking. Second, if watermarking is used to determine the provenance of generated text, an adversary can hurt the reputation of a victim model by spoofing its watermark and generating damaging watermarked text. To investigate the learnability of watermarks, we propose watermark distillation, which trains a student model to behave like a teacher model that uses decoding-based watermarking. We test our approach on three distinct decoding-based watermarking strategies and various hyperparameter settings, finding that models can learn to generate watermarked text with high detectability. We also find limitations to learnability, including the loss of watermarking capabilities under fine-tuning on normal text and high sample complexity when learning low-distortion watermarks.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted for code vulnerability detection, their reliability and robustness across diverse vulnerability types have become a pressing concern. In traditional adversarial settings, code obfuscation has long been used as a general strategy to bypass auditing tools, preserving exploitability without tampering with the tools themselves. Numerous efforts have explored obfuscation methods and tools, yet their capabilities differ in terms of supported techniques, granularity, and programming languages, making it difficult to systematically assess their impact on LLM-based vulnerability detection. To address this gap, we provide a structured systematization of obfuscation techniques and evaluate them under a unified framework. Specifically, we categorize existing obfuscation methods into three major classes (layout, data flow, and control flow) covering 11 subcategories and 19 concrete techniques. We implement these techniques across four programming languages (Solidity, C, C++, and Python) using a consistent LLM-driven approach, and evaluate their effects on 15 LLMs spanning four model families (DeepSeek, OpenAI, Qwen, and LLaMA), as well as on two coding agents (GitHub Copilot and Codex). Our findings reveal both positive and negative impacts of code obfuscation on LLM-based vulnerability detection, highlighting conditions under which obfuscation leads to performance improvements or degradations. We further analyze these outcomes with respect to vulnerability characteristics, code properties, and model attributes. Finally, we outline several open problems and propose future directions to enhance the robustness of LLMs for real-world vulnerability detection.

This paper addresses the privacy and security concerns associated with deep neural language models, which serve as crucial components in various modern AI-based applications. These models are often used after being pre-trained and fine-tuned for specific tasks, with deployment on servers accessed through the internet. However, this introduces two fundamental risks: (a) the transmission of user inputs to the server via the network gives rise to interception vulnerabilities, and (b) privacy concerns emerge as organizations that deploy such models store user data with restricted context. To address this, we propose a novel method to adapt and fine-tune transformer-based language models on passkey-encrypted user-specific text. The original pre-trained language model first undergoes a quick adaptation (without any further pre-training) with a series of irreversible transformations applied to the tokenizer and token embeddings. This enables the model to perform inference on encrypted inputs while preventing reverse engineering of text from model parameters and intermediate outputs. After adaptation, models are fine-tuned on encrypted versions of existing training datasets. Experimental evaluation employing adapted versions of renowned models (e.g., BERT, RoBERTa) across established benchmark English and multilingual datasets for text classification and sequence labeling shows that encrypted models achieve performance parity with their original counterparts. This serves to safeguard performance, privacy, and security cohesively.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to jailbreak attacks where malicious prompts are disguised using ciphers and character-level encodings to bypass safety guardrails. While these guardrails often fail to interpret the encoded content, the underlying models can still process the harmful instructions. We introduce CPT-Filtering, a novel, model-agnostic with negligible-costs and near-perfect accuracy guardrail technique that aims to mitigate these attacks by leveraging the intrinsic behavior of Byte-Pair Encoding (BPE) tokenizers. Our method is based on the principle that tokenizers, trained on natural language, represent out-of-distribution text, such as ciphers, using a significantly higher number of shorter tokens. Our technique uses a simple yet powerful artifact of using language models: the average number of Characters Per Token (CPT) in the text. This approach is motivated by the high compute cost of modern methods - relying on added modules such as dedicated LLMs or perplexity models. We validate our approach across a large dataset of over 100,000 prompts, testing numerous encoding schemes with several popular tokenizers. Our experiments demonstrate that a simple CPT threshold robustly identifies encoded text with high accuracy, even for very short inputs. CPT-Filtering provides a practical defense layer that can be immediately deployed for real-time text filtering and offline data curation.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 126,000 prompt injection attacks and 46,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the largest dataset of human-generated adversarial examples for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have a lot of easily interpretable stucture, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as prompt extraction and prompt hijacking. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release all data and source code at https://tensortrust.ai/paper

Many adversarial attacks in NLP perturb inputs to produce visually similar strings ('ergo' rightarrow 'epsilonrgo') which are legible to humans but degrade model performance. Although preserving legibility is a necessary condition for text perturbation, little work has been done to systematically characterize it; instead, legibility is typically loosely enforced via intuitions around the nature and extent of perturbations. Particularly, it is unclear to what extent can inputs be perturbed while preserving legibility, or how to quantify the legibility of a perturbed string. In this work, we address this gap by learning models that predict the legibility of a perturbed string, and rank candidate perturbations based on their legibility. To do so, we collect and release LEGIT, a human-annotated dataset comprising the legibility of visually perturbed text. Using this dataset, we build both text- and vision-based models which achieve up to 0.91 F1 score in predicting whether an input is legible, and an accuracy of 0.86 in predicting which of two given perturbations is more legible. Additionally, we discover that legible perturbations from the LEGIT dataset are more effective at lowering the performance of NLP models than best-known attack strategies, suggesting that current models may be vulnerable to a broad range of perturbations beyond what is captured by existing visual attacks. Data, code, and models are available at https://github.com/dvsth/learning-legibility-2023.

Adversarial input attacks can cause a significant shift of CLIP embeddings. This can affect the downstream robustness of models incorporating CLIP in the pipeline, such as text-to-image generative models or large vision language models. While some efforts have been done towards making the CLIP image encoders robust, the robustness of text encoders remains unexplored. In this work, we cover this gap in the literature. We propose LEAF: an efficient adversarial finetuning method for the text domain, with the ability to scale to large CLIP models. Our models significantly improve the zero-shot adversarial accuracy in the text domain, while maintaining the vision performance provided by robust image encoders. When combined with text-to-image diffusion models, we can improve the generation quality under adversarial noise. When employing our robust CLIP encoders in multimodal retrieval tasks, we improve the recall under adversarial noise over standard CLIP models. Finally, we show that robust text encoders facilitate better reconstruction of input text from its embedding via direct optimization.

The rapid proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly contributed to the development of equitable AI systems capable of factual question-answering (QA). However, no known study tests the LLMs' robustness when presented with obfuscated versions of questions. To systematically evaluate these limitations, we propose a novel technique, ObfusQAte and, leveraging the same, introduce ObfusQA, a comprehensive, first of its kind, framework with multi-tiered obfuscation levels designed to examine LLM capabilities across three distinct dimensions: (i) Named-Entity Indirection, (ii) Distractor Indirection, and (iii) Contextual Overload. By capturing these fine-grained distinctions in language, ObfusQA provides a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM robustness and adaptability. Our study observes that LLMs exhibit a tendency to fail or generate hallucinated responses when confronted with these increasingly nuanced variations. To foster research in this direction, we make ObfusQAte publicly available.

Language models (LMs) have become a staple of the code-writing toolbox. Their pre-training recipe has, however, remained stagnant over recent years, barring the occasional changes in data sourcing and filtering strategies. In particular, research exploring modifications to Code-LMs' pre-training objectives, geared towards improving data efficiency and better disentangling between syntax and semantics, has been noticeably sparse, especially compared with corresponding efforts in natural language LMs. In this work, we examine grounding on obfuscated code as a means of helping Code-LMs look beyond the surface-form syntax and enhance their pre-training sample efficiency. To this end, we compile ObscuraX, a dataset of approximately 55M source and obfuscated code pairs in seven languages. Subsequently, we pre-train ObscuraCoder models, ranging in size from 255M to 2.8B parameters, on a 272B-token corpus that includes ObscuraX and demonstrate that our obfuscation-based pre-training recipe leads to consistent improvements in Code-LMs' abilities compared to both vanilla autoregressive pre-training as well as existing de-obfuscation (DOBF) objectives. ObscuraCoder demonstrates sizeable gains across multiple tests of syntactic and semantic code understanding, along with improved capabilities in multilingual code completion, multilingual code commit summarization, and multi-purpose library-oriented code generation.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

In this paper we consider contamination by code generation test sets, in particular in their use in modern large language models. We discuss three possible sources of such contamination and show findings supporting each of them: (i) direct data leakage, (ii) indirect data leakage through the use of synthetic data and (iii) overfitting to evaluation sets during model selection. Key to our findings is a new dataset of 161 prompts with their associated python solutions, dataset which is released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CohereForAI/lbpp .

Vision-language pretrained models (VLPs) such as CLIP have achieved remarkable success, but are also highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Given a model fine-tuned by an untrusted third party, determining whether the model has been injected with a backdoor is a critical and challenging problem. Existing detection methods usually rely on prior knowledge of training dataset, backdoor triggers and targets, or downstream classifiers, which may be impractical for real-world applications. To address this, To address this challenge, we introduce Assimilation Matters in DETection (AMDET), a novel model-level detection framework that operates without any such prior knowledge. Specifically, we first reveal the feature assimilation property in backdoored text encoders: the representations of all tokens within a backdoor sample exhibit a high similarity. Further analysis attributes this effect to the concentration of attention weights on the trigger token. Leveraging this insight, AMDET scans a model by performing gradient-based inversion on token embeddings to recover implicit features that capable of activating backdoor behaviors. Furthermore, we identify the natural backdoor feature in the OpenAI's official CLIP model, which are not intentionally injected but still exhibit backdoor-like behaviors. We then filter them out from real injected backdoor by analyzing their loss landscapes. Extensive experiments on 3,600 backdoored and benign-finetuned models with two attack paradigms and three VLP model structures show that AMDET detects backdoors with an F1 score of 89.90%. Besides, it achieves one complete detection in approximately 5 minutes on a RTX 4090 GPU and exhibits strong robustness against adaptive attacks. Code is available at: https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/AMDET

Language model inversion seeks to recover hidden prompts using only language model outputs. This capability has implications for security and accountability in language model deployments, such as leaking private information from an API-protected language model's system message. We propose a new method -- prompt inversion from logprob sequences (PILS) -- that recovers hidden prompts by gleaning clues from the model's next-token probabilities over the course of multiple generation steps. Our method is enabled by a key insight: The vector-valued outputs of a language model occupy a low-dimensional subspace. This enables us to losslessly compress the full next-token probability distribution over multiple generation steps using a linear map, allowing more output information to be used for inversion. Our approach yields massive gains over previous state-of-the-art methods for recovering hidden prompts, achieving 2--3.5 times higher exact recovery rates across test sets, in one case increasing the recovery rate from 17% to 60%. Our method also exhibits surprisingly good generalization behavior; for instance, an inverter trained on 16 generations steps gets 5--27 points higher prompt recovery when we increase the number of steps to 32 at test time. Furthermore, we demonstrate strong performance of our method on the more challenging task of recovering hidden system messages. We also analyze the role of verbatim repetition in prompt recovery and propose a new method for cross-family model transfer for logit-based inverters. Our findings show that next-token probabilities are a considerably more vulnerable attack surface for inversion attacks than previously known.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

The field of adversarial robustness has long established that adversarial examples can successfully transfer between image classifiers and that text jailbreaks can successfully transfer between language models (LMs). However, a pair of recent studies reported being unable to successfully transfer image jailbreaks between vision-language models (VLMs). To explain this striking difference, we propose a fundamental distinction regarding the transferability of attacks against machine learning models: attacks in the input data-space can transfer, whereas attacks in model representation space do not, at least not without geometric alignment of representations. We then provide theoretical and empirical evidence of this hypothesis in four different settings. First, we mathematically prove this distinction in a simple setting where two networks compute the same input-output map but via different representations. Second, we construct representation-space attacks against image classifiers that are as successful as well-known data-space attacks, but fail to transfer. Third, we construct representation-space attacks against LMs that successfully jailbreak the attacked models but again fail to transfer. Fourth, we construct data-space attacks against VLMs that successfully transfer to new VLMs, and we show that representation space attacks can transfer when VLMs' latent geometries are sufficiently aligned in post-projector space. Our work reveals that adversarial transfer is not an inherent property of all attacks but contingent on their operational domain - the shared data-space versus models' unique representation spaces - a critical insight for building more robust models.

With the surge in realistic text tampering, detecting fraudulent text in images has gained prominence for maintaining information security. However, the high costs associated with professional text manipulation and annotation limit the availability of real-world datasets, with most relying on synthetic tampering, which inadequately replicates real-world tampering attributes. To address this issue, we present the Real Text Manipulation (RTM) dataset, encompassing 14,250 text images, which include 5,986 manually and 5,258 automatically tampered images, created using a variety of techniques, alongside 3,006 unaltered text images for evaluating solution stability. Our evaluations indicate that existing methods falter in text forgery detection on the RTM dataset. We propose a robust baseline solution featuring a Consistency-aware Aggregation Hub and a Gated Cross Neighborhood-attention Fusion module for efficient multi-modal information fusion, supplemented by a Tampered-Authentic Contrastive Learning module during training, enriching feature representation distinction. This framework, extendable to other dual-stream architectures, demonstrated notable localization performance improvements of 7.33% and 6.38% on manual and overall manipulations, respectively. Our contributions aim to propel advancements in real-world text tampering detection. Code and dataset will be made available at https://github.com/DrLuo/RTM

Recent work shows that sensitive user data can be reconstructed from gradient updates, breaking the key privacy promise of federated learning. While success was demonstrated primarily on image data, these methods do not directly transfer to other domains such as text. In this work, we propose LAMP, a novel attack tailored to textual data, that successfully reconstructs original text from gradients. Our attack is based on two key insights: (i) modeling prior text probability with an auxiliary language model, guiding the search towards more natural text, and (ii) alternating continuous and discrete optimization, which minimizes reconstruction loss on embeddings, while avoiding local minima by applying discrete text transformations. Our experiments demonstrate that LAMP is significantly more effective than prior work: it reconstructs 5x more bigrams and 23% longer subsequences on average. Moreover, we are the first to recover inputs from batch sizes larger than 1 for textual models. These findings indicate that gradient updates of models operating on textual data leak more information than previously thought.

Modern image-to-text systems typically adopt the encoder-decoder framework, which comprises two main components: an image encoder, responsible for extracting image features, and a transformer-based decoder, used for generating captions. Taking inspiration from the analysis of neural networks' robustness against adversarial perturbations, we propose a novel gray-box algorithm for creating adversarial examples in image-to-text models. Unlike image classification tasks that have a finite set of class labels, finding visually similar adversarial examples in an image-to-text task poses greater challenges because the captioning system allows for a virtually infinite space of possible captions. In this paper, we present a gray-box adversarial attack on image-to-text, both untargeted and targeted. We formulate the process of discovering adversarial perturbations as an optimization problem that uses only the image-encoder component, meaning the proposed attack is language-model agnostic. Through experiments conducted on the ViT-GPT2 model, which is the most-used image-to-text model in Hugging Face, and the Flickr30k dataset, we demonstrate that our proposed attack successfully generates visually similar adversarial examples, both with untargeted and targeted captions. Notably, our attack operates in a gray-box manner, requiring no knowledge about the decoder module. We also show that our attacks fool the popular open-source platform Hugging Face.

We introduce EmbeddingGemma, a new lightweight, open text embedding model based on the Gemma 3 language model family. Our innovative training recipe strategically captures knowledge from larger models via encoder-decoder initialization and geometric embedding distillation. We improve model robustness and expressiveness with a spread-out regularizer, and ensure generalizability by merging checkpoints from varied, optimized mixtures. Evaluated on the Massive Text Embedding Benchmark (MTEB) across multilingual, English, and code domains, EmbeddingGemma (300M) achieves state-of-the-art results. Notably, it outperforms prior top models, both proprietary and open, with fewer than 500M parameters, and provides performance comparable to models double its size, offering an exceptional performance-to-cost ratio. Remarkably, this lead persists when quantizing model weights or truncating embedding outputs. This makes EmbeddingGemma particularly well-suited for low-latency and high-throughput use cases such as on-device applications. We provide ablation studies exploring our key design choices. We release EmbeddingGemma to the community to promote further research.

Adversarial attacks are a major challenge faced by current machine learning research. These purposely crafted inputs fool even the most advanced models, precluding their deployment in safety-critical applications. Extensive research in computer vision has been carried to develop reliable defense strategies. However, the same issue remains less explored in natural language processing. Our work presents a model-agnostic detector of adversarial text examples. The approach identifies patterns in the logits of the target classifier when perturbing the input text. The proposed detector improves the current state-of-the-art performance in recognizing adversarial inputs and exhibits strong generalization capabilities across different NLP models, datasets, and word-level attacks.

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing image quality and alignment results. Consequently, they are employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also produce unsafe content. As a contribution to the Adversarial Nibbler challenge, we distill a large set of over 1,000 potential adversarial inputs from existing safety benchmarks. Our analysis of the gathered prompts and corresponding images demonstrates the fragility of input filters and provides further insights into systematic safety issues in current generative image models.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

Jailbreaking attacks on the vision modality typically rely on imperceptible adversarial perturbations, whereas attacks on the textual modality are generally assumed to require visible modifications (e.g., non-semantic suffixes). In this paper, we introduce imperceptible jailbreaks that exploit a class of Unicode characters called variation selectors. By appending invisible variation selectors to malicious questions, the jailbreak prompts appear visually identical to original malicious questions on screen, while their tokenization is "secretly" altered. We propose a chain-of-search pipeline to generate such adversarial suffixes to induce harmful responses. Our experiments show that our imperceptible jailbreaks achieve high attack success rates against four aligned LLMs and generalize to prompt injection attacks, all without producing any visible modifications in the written prompt. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/imperceptible-jailbreaks.

The pre-training of masked language models (MLMs) consumes massive computation to achieve good results on downstream NLP tasks, resulting in a large carbon footprint. In the vanilla MLM, the virtual tokens, [MASK]s, act as placeholders and gather the contextualized information from unmasked tokens to restore the corrupted information. It raises the question of whether we can append [MASK]s at a later layer, to reduce the sequence length for earlier layers and make the pre-training more efficient. We show: (1) [MASK]s can indeed be appended at a later layer, being disentangled from the word embedding; (2) The gathering of contextualized information from unmasked tokens can be conducted with a few layers. By further increasing the masking rate from 15% to 50%, we can pre-train RoBERTa-base and RoBERTa-large from scratch with only 78% and 68% of the original computational budget without any degradation on the GLUE benchmark. When pre-training with the original budget, our method outperforms RoBERTa for 6 out of 8 GLUE tasks, on average by 0.4%.

The indistinguishability of Large Language Model (LLM) output from human-authored content poses significant challenges, raising concerns about potential misuse of AI-generated text and its influence on future AI model training. Watermarking algorithms offer a viable solution by embedding detectable signatures into generated text. However, existing watermarking methods often entail trade-offs among attack robustness, generation quality, and additional overhead such as specialized frameworks or complex integrations. We propose a lightweight, topic-guided watermarking scheme for LLMs that partitions the vocabulary into topic-aligned token subsets. Given an input prompt, the scheme selects a relevant topic-specific token list, effectively "green-listing" semantically aligned tokens to embed robust marks while preserving the text's fluency and coherence. Experimental results across multiple LLMs and state-of-the-art benchmarks demonstrate that our method achieves comparable perplexity to industry-leading systems, including Google's SynthID-Text, yet enhances watermark robustness against paraphrasing and lexical perturbation attacks while introducing minimal performance overhead. Our approach avoids reliance on additional mechanisms beyond standard text generation pipelines, facilitating straightforward adoption, suggesting a practical path toward globally consistent watermarking of AI-generated content.

Jailbreaking attacks can effectively manipulate open-source large language models (LLMs) to produce harmful responses. However, these attacks exhibit limited transferability, failing to disrupt proprietary LLMs consistently. To reliably identify vulnerabilities in proprietary LLMs, this work investigates the transferability of jailbreaking attacks by analysing their impact on the model's intent perception. By incorporating adversarial sequences, these attacks can redirect the source LLM's focus away from malicious-intent tokens in the original input, thereby obstructing the model's intent recognition and eliciting harmful responses. Nevertheless, these adversarial sequences fail to mislead the target LLM's intent perception, allowing the target LLM to refocus on malicious-intent tokens and abstain from responding. Our analysis further reveals the inherent distributional dependency within the generated adversarial sequences, whose effectiveness stems from overfitting the source LLM's parameters, resulting in limited transferability to target LLMs. To this end, we propose the Perceived-importance Flatten (PiF) method, which uniformly disperses the model's focus across neutral-intent tokens in the original input, thus obscuring malicious-intent tokens without relying on overfitted adversarial sequences. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PiF provides an effective and efficient red-teaming evaluation for proprietary LLMs.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

A fundamental issue in machine learning is the robustness of the model with respect to changes in the input. In natural language processing, models typically contain a first embedding layer, transforming a sequence of tokens into vector representations. While the robustness with respect to changes of continuous inputs is well-understood, the situation is less clear when considering discrete changes, for instance replacing a word by another in an input sentence. Our work formally proves that popular embedding schemes, such as concatenation, TF-IDF, and Paragraph Vector (a.k.a. doc2vec), exhibit robustness in the H\"older or Lipschitz sense with respect to the Hamming distance. We provide quantitative bounds for these schemes and demonstrate how the constants involved are affected by the length of the document. These findings are exemplified through a series of numerical examples.

Studying data memorization in neural language models helps us understand the risks (e.g., to privacy or copyright) associated with models regurgitating training data and aids in the development of countermeasures. Many prior works -- and some recently deployed defenses -- focus on "verbatim memorization", defined as a model generation that exactly matches a substring from the training set. We argue that verbatim memorization definitions are too restrictive and fail to capture more subtle forms of memorization. Specifically, we design and implement an efficient defense that perfectly prevents all verbatim memorization. And yet, we demonstrate that this "perfect" filter does not prevent the leakage of training data. Indeed, it is easily circumvented by plausible and minimally modified "style-transfer" prompts -- and in some cases even the non-modified original prompts -- to extract memorized information. We conclude by discussing potential alternative definitions and why defining memorization is a difficult yet crucial open question for neural language models.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Recent studies have shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to specifically crafted adversarial inputs that are quasi-imperceptible to humans. In this letter, we propose a novel method to detect adversarial inputs, by augmenting the main classification network with multiple binary detectors (observer networks) which take inputs from the hidden layers of the original network (convolutional kernel outputs) and classify the input as clean or adversarial. During inference, the detectors are treated as a part of an ensemble network and the input is deemed adversarial if at least half of the detectors classify it as so. The proposed method addresses the trade-off between accuracy of classification on clean and adversarial samples, as the original classification network is not modified during the detection process. The use of multiple observer networks makes attacking the detection mechanism non-trivial even when the attacker is aware of the victim classifier. We achieve a 99.5% detection accuracy on the MNIST dataset and 97.5% on the CIFAR-10 dataset using the Fast Gradient Sign Attack in a semi-white box setup. The number of false positive detections is a mere 0.12% in the worst case scenario.

Post-hoc gradient-based interpretability methods [Simonyan et al., 2013, Smilkov et al., 2017] that provide instance-specific explanations of model predictions are often based on assumption (A): magnitude of input gradients -- gradients of logits with respect to input -- noisily highlight discriminative task-relevant features. In this work, we test the validity of assumption (A) using a three-pronged approach. First, we develop an evaluation framework, DiffROAR, to test assumption (A) on four image classification benchmarks. Our results suggest that (i) input gradients of standard models (i.e., trained on original data) may grossly violate (A), whereas (ii) input gradients of adversarially robust models satisfy (A). Second, we introduce BlockMNIST, an MNIST-based semi-real dataset, that by design encodes a priori knowledge of discriminative features. Our analysis on BlockMNIST leverages this information to validate as well as characterize differences between input gradient attributions of standard and robust models. Finally, we theoretically prove that our empirical findings hold on a simplified version of the BlockMNIST dataset. Specifically, we prove that input gradients of standard one-hidden-layer MLPs trained on this dataset do not highlight instance-specific signal coordinates, thus grossly violating assumption (A). Our findings motivate the need to formalize and test common assumptions in interpretability in a falsifiable manner [Leavitt and Morcos, 2020]. We believe that the DiffROAR evaluation framework and BlockMNIST-based datasets can serve as sanity checks to audit instance-specific interpretability methods; code and data available at https://github.com/harshays/inputgradients.

In recent years numerous methods have been developed to formally verify the robustness of deep neural networks (DNNs). Though the proposed techniques are effective in providing mathematical guarantees about the DNNs behavior, it is not clear whether the proofs generated by these methods are human-interpretable. In this paper, we bridge this gap by developing new concepts, algorithms, and representations to generate human understandable interpretations of the proofs. Leveraging the proposed method, we show that the robustness proofs of standard DNNs rely on spurious input features, while the proofs of DNNs trained to be provably robust filter out even the semantically meaningful features. The proofs for the DNNs combining adversarial and provably robust training are the most effective at selectively filtering out spurious features as well as relying on human-understandable input features.

LLMs now exhibit human-like skills in various fields, leading to worries about misuse. Thus, detecting generated text is crucial. However, passive detection methods are stuck in domain specificity and limited adversarial robustness. To achieve reliable detection, a watermark-based method was proposed for white-box LLMs, allowing them to embed watermarks during text generation. The method involves randomly dividing the model vocabulary to obtain a special list and adjusting the probability distribution to promote the selection of words in the list. A detection algorithm aware of the list can identify the watermarked text. However, this method is not applicable in many real-world scenarios where only black-box language models are available. For instance, third-parties that develop API-based vertical applications cannot watermark text themselves because API providers only supply generated text and withhold probability distributions to shield their commercial interests. To allow third-parties to autonomously inject watermarks into generated text, we develop a watermarking framework for black-box language model usage scenarios. Specifically, we first define a binary encoding function to compute a random binary encoding corresponding to a word. The encodings computed for non-watermarked text conform to a Bernoulli distribution, wherein the probability of a word representing bit-1 being approximately 0.5. To inject a watermark, we alter the distribution by selectively replacing words representing bit-0 with context-based synonyms that represent bit-1. A statistical test is then used to identify the watermark. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on both Chinese and English datasets. Furthermore, results under re-translation, polishing, word deletion, and synonym substitution attacks reveal that it is arduous to remove the watermark without compromising the original semantics.

Adversarial text attacks remain a persistent threat to transformer models, yet existing defenses are typically attack-specific or require costly model retraining. We introduce Representation Stability (RS), a model-agnostic detection framework that identifies adversarial examples by measuring how embedding representations change when important words are masked. RS first ranks words using importance heuristics, then measures embedding sensitivity to masking top-k critical words, and processes the resulting patterns with a BiLSTM detector. Experiments show that adversarially perturbed words exhibit disproportionately high masking sensitivity compared to naturally important words. Across three datasets, three attack types, and two victim models, RS achieves over 88% detection accuracy and demonstrates competitive performance compared to existing state-of-the-art methods, often at lower computational cost. Using Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG) to measure perturbation identification quality, we reveal that gradient-based ranking outperforms attention and random selection approaches, with identification quality correlating with detection performance for word-level attacks. RS also generalizes well to unseen datasets, attacks, and models without retraining, providing a practical solution for adversarial text detection.

In light of recent advancements in generative AI models, it has become essential to distinguish genuine content from AI-generated one to prevent the malicious usage of fake materials as authentic ones and vice versa. Various techniques have been introduced for identifying AI-generated images, with watermarking emerging as a promising approach. In this paper, we analyze the robustness of various AI-image detectors including watermarking and classifier-based deepfake detectors. For watermarking methods that introduce subtle image perturbations (i.e., low perturbation budget methods), we reveal a fundamental trade-off between the evasion error rate (i.e., the fraction of watermarked images detected as non-watermarked ones) and the spoofing error rate (i.e., the fraction of non-watermarked images detected as watermarked ones) upon an application of a diffusion purification attack. In this regime, we also empirically show that diffusion purification effectively removes watermarks with minimal changes to images. For high perturbation watermarking methods where notable changes are applied to images, the diffusion purification attack is not effective. In this case, we develop a model substitution adversarial attack that can successfully remove watermarks. Moreover, we show that watermarking methods are vulnerable to spoofing attacks where the attacker aims to have real images (potentially obscene) identified as watermarked ones, damaging the reputation of the developers. In particular, by just having black-box access to the watermarking method, we show that one can generate a watermarked noise image which can be added to the real images to have them falsely flagged as watermarked ones. Finally, we extend our theory to characterize a fundamental trade-off between the robustness and reliability of classifier-based deep fake detectors and demonstrate it through experiments.

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.

The proficiency of Large Language Models (LLMs) in processing structured data and adhering to syntactic rules is a capability that drives their widespread adoption but also makes them paradoxically vulnerable. In this paper, we investigate this vulnerability through BreakFun, a jailbreak methodology that weaponizes an LLM's adherence to structured schemas. BreakFun employs a three-part prompt that combines an innocent framing and a Chain-of-Thought distraction with a core "Trojan Schema"--a carefully crafted data structure that compels the model to generate harmful content, exploiting the LLM's strong tendency to follow structures and schemas. We demonstrate this vulnerability is highly transferable, achieving an average success rate of 89% across 13 foundational and proprietary models on JailbreakBench, and reaching a 100% Attack Success Rate (ASR) on several prominent models. A rigorous ablation study confirms this Trojan Schema is the attack's primary causal factor. To counter this, we introduce the Adversarial Prompt Deconstruction guardrail, a defense that utilizes a secondary LLM to perform a "Literal Transcription"--extracting all human-readable text to isolate and reveal the user's true harmful intent. Our proof-of-concept guardrail demonstrates high efficacy against the attack, validating that targeting the deceptive schema is a viable mitigation strategy. Our work provides a look into how an LLM's core strengths can be turned into critical weaknesses, offering a fresh perspective for building more robustly aligned models.

Audio can disclose PII, particularly when combined with related text data. Therefore, it is essential to develop tools to detect privacy leakage in Contrastive Language-Audio Pretraining(CLAP). Existing MIAs need audio as input, risking exposure of voiceprint and requiring costly shadow models. We first propose PRMID, a membership inference detector based probability ranking given by CLAP, which does not require training shadow models but still requires both audio and text of the individual as input. To address these limitations, we then propose USMID, a textual unimodal speaker-level membership inference detector, querying the target model using only text data. We randomly generate textual gibberish that are clearly not in training dataset. Then we extract feature vectors from these texts using the CLAP model and train a set of anomaly detectors on them. During inference, the feature vector of each test text is input into the anomaly detector to determine if the speaker is in the training set (anomalous) or not (normal). If available, USMID can further enhance detection by integrating real audio of the tested speaker. Extensive experiments on various CLAP model architectures and datasets demonstrate that USMID outperforms baseline methods using only text data.

We revisit watermarking techniques based on pre-trained deep networks, in the light of self-supervised approaches. We present a way to embed both marks and binary messages into their latent spaces, leveraging data augmentation at marking time. Our method can operate at any resolution and creates watermarks robust to a broad range of transformations (rotations, crops, JPEG, contrast, etc). It significantly outperforms the previous zero-bit methods, and its performance on multi-bit watermarking is on par with state-of-the-art encoder-decoder architectures trained end-to-end for watermarking. The code is available at github.com/facebookresearch/ssl_watermarking

When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.

The opacity in developing large language models (LLMs) is raising growing concerns about the potential contamination of public benchmarks in the pre-training data. Existing contamination detection methods are typically based on the text overlap between training and evaluation data, which can be too superficial to reflect deeper forms of contamination. In this paper, we first present a cross-lingual form of contamination that inflates LLMs' performance while evading current detection methods, deliberately injected by overfitting LLMs on the translated versions of benchmark test sets. Then, we propose generalization-based approaches to unmask such deeply concealed contamination. Specifically, we examine the LLM's performance change after modifying the original benchmark by replacing the false answer choices with correct ones from other questions. Contaminated models can hardly generalize to such easier situations, where the false choices can be not even wrong, as all choices are correct in their memorization. Experimental results demonstrate that cross-lingual contamination can easily fool existing detection methods, but not ours. In addition, we discuss the potential utilization of cross-lingual contamination in interpreting LLMs' working mechanisms and in post-training LLMs for enhanced multilingual capabilities. The code and dataset we use can be obtained from https://github.com/ShangDataLab/Deep-Contam.

Authorship obfuscation aims to disguise the identity of an author within a text by altering the writing style, vocabulary, syntax, and other linguistic features associated with the text author. This alteration needs to balance privacy and utility. While strong obfuscation techniques can effectively hide the author's identity, they often degrade the quality and usefulness of the text for its intended purpose. Conversely, maintaining high utility tends to provide insufficient privacy, making it easier for an adversary to de-anonymize the author. Thus, achieving an optimal trade-off between these two conflicting objectives is crucial. In this paper, we propose TAROT: Task-Oriented Authorship Obfuscation Using Policy Optimization, a new unsupervised authorship obfuscation method whose goal is to optimize the privacy-utility trade-off by regenerating the entire text considering its downstream utility. Our approach leverages policy optimization as a fine-tuning paradigm over small language models in order to rewrite texts by preserving author identity and downstream task utility. We show that our approach largely reduce the accuracy of attackers while preserving utility. We make our code and models publicly available.

Language generation models have been an increasingly powerful enabler for many applications. Many such models offer free or affordable API access, which makes them potentially vulnerable to model extraction attacks through distillation. To protect intellectual property (IP) and ensure fair use of these models, various techniques such as lexical watermarking and synonym replacement have been proposed. However, these methods can be nullified by obvious countermeasures such as "synonym randomization". To address this issue, we propose GINSEW, a novel method to protect text generation models from being stolen through distillation. The key idea of our method is to inject secret signals into the probability vector of the decoding steps for each target token. We can then detect the secret message by probing a suspect model to tell if it is distilled from the protected one. Experimental results show that GINSEW can effectively identify instances of IP infringement with minimal impact on the generation quality of protected APIs. Our method demonstrates an absolute improvement of 19 to 29 points on mean average precision (mAP) in detecting suspects compared to previous methods against watermark removal attacks.

Understanding the memorization and privacy leakage risks in Contrastive Language--Image Pretraining (CLIP) is critical for ensuring the security of multimodal models. Recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of extracting sensitive training examples from diffusion models, with conditional diffusion models exhibiting a stronger tendency to memorize and leak information. In this work, we investigate data memorization and extraction risks in CLIP through the lens of CLIP inversion, a process that aims to reconstruct training images from text prompts. To this end, we introduce LeakyCLIP, a novel attack framework designed to achieve high-quality, semantically accurate image reconstruction from CLIP embeddings. We identify three key challenges in CLIP inversion: 1) non-robust features, 2) limited visual semantics in text embeddings, and 3) low reconstruction fidelity. To address these challenges, LeakyCLIP employs 1) adversarial fine-tuning to enhance optimization smoothness, 2) linear transformation-based embedding alignment, and 3) Stable Diffusion-based refinement to improve fidelity. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of LeakyCLIP, achieving over 358% improvement in Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) for ViT-B-16 compared to baseline methods on LAION-2B subset. Furthermore, we uncover a pervasive leakage risk, showing that training data membership can even be successfully inferred from the metrics of low-fidelity reconstructions. Our work introduces a practical method for CLIP inversion while offering novel insights into the nature and scope of privacy risks in multimodal models.

Text-to-image (T2I) models, such as Stable Diffusion, have exhibited remarkable performance in generating high-quality images from text descriptions in recent years. However, text-to-image models may be tricked into generating not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, particularly in sexual scenarios. Existing countermeasures mostly focus on filtering inappropriate inputs and outputs, or suppressing improper text embeddings, which can block explicit NSFW-related content (e.g., naked or sexy) but may still be vulnerable to adversarial prompts inputs that appear innocent but are ill-intended. In this paper, we present SafeGen, a framework to mitigate unsafe content generation by text-to-image models in a text-agnostic manner. The key idea is to eliminate unsafe visual representations from the model regardless of the text input. In this way, the text-to-image model is resistant to adversarial prompts since unsafe visual representations are obstructed from within. Extensive experiments conducted on four datasets demonstrate SafeGen's effectiveness in mitigating unsafe content generation while preserving the high-fidelity of benign images. SafeGen outperforms eight state-of-the-art baseline methods and achieves 99.1% sexual content removal performance. Furthermore, our constructed benchmark of adversarial prompts provides a basis for future development and evaluation of anti-NSFW-generation methods.

Text anomaly detection is a critical task in natural language processing (NLP), with applications spanning fraud detection, misinformation identification, spam detection and content moderation, etc. Despite significant advances in large language models (LLMs) and anomaly detection algorithms, the absence of standardized and comprehensive benchmarks for evaluating the existing anomaly detection methods on text data limits rigorous comparison and development of innovative approaches. This work performs a comprehensive empirical study and introduces a benchmark for text anomaly detection, leveraging embeddings from diverse pre-trained language models across a wide array of text datasets. Our work systematically evaluates the effectiveness of embedding-based text anomaly detection by incorporating (1) early language models (GloVe, BERT); (2) multiple LLMs (LLaMa-2, LLama-3, Mistral, OpenAI (small, ada, large)); (3) multi-domain text datasets (news, social media, scientific publications); (4) comprehensive evaluation metrics (AUROC, AUPRC). Our experiments reveal a critical empirical insight: embedding quality significantly governs anomaly detection efficacy, and deep learning-based approaches demonstrate no performance advantage over conventional shallow algorithms (e.g., KNN, Isolation Forest) when leveraging LLM-derived embeddings.In addition, we observe strongly low-rank characteristics in cross-model performance matrices, which enables an efficient strategy for rapid model evaluation (or embedding evaluation) and selection in practical applications. Furthermore, by open-sourcing our benchmark toolkit that includes all embeddings from different models and code at https://github.com/jicongfan/Text-Anomaly-Detection-Benchmark, this work provides a foundation for future research in robust and scalable text anomaly detection systems.

This paper studies extractable memorization: training data that an adversary can efficiently extract by querying a machine learning model without prior knowledge of the training dataset. We show an adversary can extract gigabytes of training data from open-source language models like Pythia or GPT-Neo, semi-open models like LLaMA or Falcon, and closed models like ChatGPT. Existing techniques from the literature suffice to attack unaligned models; in order to attack the aligned ChatGPT, we develop a new divergence attack that causes the model to diverge from its chatbot-style generations and emit training data at a rate 150x higher than when behaving properly. Our methods show practical attacks can recover far more data than previously thought, and reveal that current alignment techniques do not eliminate memorization.

With the help of simple fine-tuning, one can artificially embed hidden text into large language models (LLMs). This text is revealed only when triggered by a specific query to the LLM. Two primary applications are LLM fingerprinting and steganography. In the context of LLM fingerprinting, a unique text identifier (fingerprint) is embedded within the model to verify licensing compliance. In the context of steganography, the LLM serves as a carrier for hidden messages that can be disclosed through a designated trigger. Our work demonstrates that embedding hidden text in the LLM via fine-tuning, though seemingly secure due to the vast number of potential triggers (any sequence of characters or tokens could serve as a trigger), is susceptible to extraction through analysis of the LLM's output decoding process. We propose a novel approach to extraction called Unconditional Token Forcing. It is premised on the hypothesis that iteratively feeding each token from the LLM's vocabulary into the model should reveal sequences with abnormally high token probabilities, indicating potential embedded text candidates. Additionally, our experiments show that when the first token of a hidden fingerprint is used as an input, the LLM not only produces an output sequence with high token probabilities, but also repetitively generates the fingerprint itself. We also present a method to hide text in such a way that it is resistant to Unconditional Token Forcing, which we named Unconditional Token Forcing Confusion.

We introduce the MNIST-C dataset, a comprehensive suite of 15 corruptions applied to the MNIST test set, for benchmarking out-of-distribution robustness in computer vision. Through several experiments and visualizations we demonstrate that our corruptions significantly degrade performance of state-of-the-art computer vision models while preserving the semantic content of the test images. In contrast to the popular notion of adversarial robustness, our model-agnostic corruptions do not seek worst-case performance but are instead designed to be broad and diverse, capturing multiple failure modes of modern models. In fact, we find that several previously published adversarial defenses significantly degrade robustness as measured by MNIST-C. We hope that our benchmark serves as a useful tool for future work in designing systems that are able to learn robust feature representations that capture the underlying semantics of the input.

Neural network-based image classifiers are powerful tools for computer vision tasks, but they inadvertently reveal sensitive attribute information about their classes, raising concerns about their privacy. To investigate this privacy leakage, we introduce the first Class Attribute Inference Attack (CAIA), which leverages recent advances in text-to-image synthesis to infer sensitive attributes of individual classes in a black-box setting, while remaining competitive with related white-box attacks. Our extensive experiments in the face recognition domain show that CAIA can accurately infer undisclosed sensitive attributes, such as an individual's hair color, gender, and racial appearance, which are not part of the training labels. Interestingly, we demonstrate that adversarial robust models are even more vulnerable to such privacy leakage than standard models, indicating that a trade-off between robustness and privacy exists.

With hundreds of thousands of language models available on Huggingface today, efficiently evaluating and utilizing these models across various downstream, tasks has become increasingly critical. Many existing methods repeatedly learn task-specific representations of Large Language Models (LLMs), which leads to inefficiencies in both time and computational resources. To address this, we propose EmbedLLM, a framework designed to learn compact vector representations, of LLMs that facilitate downstream applications involving many models, such as model routing. We introduce an encoder-decoder approach for learning such embeddings, along with a systematic framework to evaluate their effectiveness. Empirical results show that EmbedLLM outperforms prior methods in model routing both in accuracy and latency. Additionally, we demonstrate that our method can forecast a model's performance on multiple benchmarks, without incurring additional inference cost. Extensive probing experiments validate that the learned embeddings capture key model characteristics, e.g. whether the model is specialized for coding tasks, even without being explicitly trained on them. We open source our dataset, code and embedder to facilitate further research and application.

Most image-to-image translation models postulate that a unique correspondence exists between the semantic classes of the source and target domains. However, this assumption does not always hold in real-world scenarios due to divergent distributions, different class sets, and asymmetrical information representation. As conventional GANs attempt to generate images that match the distribution of the target domain, they may hallucinate spurious instances of classes absent from the source domain, thereby diminishing the usefulness and reliability of translated images. CycleGAN-based methods are also known to hide the mismatched information in the generated images to bypass cycle consistency objectives, a process known as steganography. In response to the challenge of non-bijective image translation, we introduce StegoGAN, a novel model that leverages steganography to prevent spurious features in generated images. Our approach enhances the semantic consistency of the translated images without requiring additional postprocessing or supervision. Our experimental evaluations demonstrate that StegoGAN outperforms existing GAN-based models across various non-bijective image-to-image translation tasks, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Our code and pretrained models are accessible at https://github.com/sian-wusidi/StegoGAN.

Learnable embedding vector is one of the most important applications in machine learning, and is widely used in various database-related domains. However, the high dimensionality of sparse data in recommendation tasks and the huge volume of corpus in retrieval-related tasks lead to a large memory consumption of the embedding table, which poses a great challenge to the training and deployment of models. Recent research has proposed various methods to compress the embeddings at the cost of a slight decrease in model quality or the introduction of other overheads. Nevertheless, the relative performance of these methods remains unclear. Existing experimental comparisons only cover a subset of these methods and focus on limited metrics. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive comparative analysis and experimental evaluation of embedding compression. We introduce a new taxonomy that categorizes these techniques based on their characteristics and methodologies, and further develop a modular benchmarking framework that integrates 14 representative methods. Under a uniform test environment, our benchmark fairly evaluates each approach, presents their strengths and weaknesses under different memory budgets, and recommends the best method based on the use case. In addition to providing useful guidelines, our study also uncovers the limitations of current methods and suggests potential directions for future research.

Offensive language detection is an important task for filtering out abusive expressions and improving online user experiences. However, malicious users often attempt to avoid filtering systems through the involvement of textual noises. In this paper, we propose these evasions as user-intended adversarial attacks that insert special symbols or leverage the distinctive features of the Korean language. Furthermore, we introduce simple yet effective pooling strategies in a layer-wise manner to defend against the proposed attacks, focusing on the preceding layers not just the last layer to capture both offensiveness and token embeddings. We demonstrate that these pooling strategies are more robust to performance degradation even when the attack rate is increased, without directly training of such patterns. Notably, we found that models pre-trained on clean texts could achieve a comparable performance in detecting attacked offensive language, to models pre-trained on noisy texts by employing these pooling strategies.

In this work, we show that it is possible to extract significant amounts of alignment training data from a post-trained model -- useful to steer the model to improve certain capabilities such as long-context reasoning, safety, instruction following, and maths. While the majority of related work on memorisation has focused on measuring success of training data extraction through string matching, we argue that embedding models are better suited for our specific goals. Distances measured through a high quality embedding model can identify semantic similarities between strings that a different metric such as edit distance will struggle to capture. In fact, in our investigation, approximate string matching would have severely undercounted (by a conservative estimate of 10times) the amount of data that can be extracted due to trivial artifacts that deflate the metric. Interestingly, we find that models readily regurgitate training data that was used in post-training phases such as SFT or RL. We show that this data can be then used to train a base model, recovering a meaningful amount of the original performance. We believe our work exposes a possibly overlooked risk towards extracting alignment data. Finally, our work opens up an interesting discussion on the downstream effects of distillation practices: since models seem to be regurgitating aspects of their training set, distillation can therefore be thought of as indirectly training on the model's original dataset.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models often suffer from issues such as semantic leakage, incorrect feature binding, and omissions of key concepts in the generated image. This work studies these phenomena by looking into the role of information flow between textual token representations. To this end, we generate images by applying the diffusion component on a subset of contextual token representations in a given prompt and observe several interesting phenomena. First, in many cases, a word or multiword expression is fully represented by one or two tokens, while other tokens are redundant. For example, in "San Francisco's Golden Gate Bridge", the token "gate" alone captures the full expression. We demonstrate the redundancy of these tokens by removing them after textual encoding and generating an image from the resulting representation. Surprisingly, we find that this process not only maintains image generation performance but also reduces errors by 21\% compared to standard generation. We then show that information can also flow between different expressions in a sentence, which often leads to semantic leakage. Based on this observation, we propose a simple, training-free method to mitigate semantic leakage: replacing the leaked item's representation after the textual encoding with its uncontextualized representation. Remarkably, this simple approach reduces semantic leakage by 85\%. Overall, our work provides a comprehensive analysis of information flow across textual tokens in T2I models, offering both novel insights and practical benefits.

Large language models (LLMs) can be trained or fine-tuned on data obtained without the owner's consent. Verifying whether a specific LLM was trained on particular data instances or an entire dataset is extremely challenging. Dataset watermarking addresses this by embedding identifiable modifications in training data to detect unauthorized use. However, existing methods often lack stealth, making them relatively easy to detect and remove. In light of these limitations, we propose LexiMark, a novel watermarking technique designed for text and documents, which embeds synonym substitutions for carefully selected high-entropy words. Our method aims to enhance an LLM's memorization capabilities on the watermarked text without altering the semantic integrity of the text. As a result, the watermark is difficult to detect, blending seamlessly into the text with no visible markers, and is resistant to removal due to its subtle, contextually appropriate substitutions that evade automated and manual detection. We evaluated our method using baseline datasets from recent studies and seven open-source models: LLaMA-1 7B, LLaMA-3 8B, Mistral 7B, Pythia 6.9B, as well as three smaller variants from the Pythia family (160M, 410M, and 1B). Our evaluation spans multiple training settings, including continued pretraining and fine-tuning scenarios. The results demonstrate significant improvements in AUROC scores compared to existing methods, underscoring our method's effectiveness in reliably verifying whether unauthorized watermarked data was used in LLM training.

Toxic content has become an increasingly critical social issue with the rapid expansion of online communication. While numerous studies explored methods for detecting and detoxifying such content, most have focused primarily on English, leaving low-resource language underrepresented. Consequently, Large Language Models~(LLMs) often struggle to identify and neutralize toxic expressions in these languages. This challenge becomes even more pronounced when user employ obfuscation techniques to evade detection systems. Therefore, we propose a KOTOX: Korean Toxic Dataset for deobfuscation and detoxicification to address this issue. We categorize various obfuscation approaches based on linguistic characteristics of Korean and define a set of transformation rules grounded in real-word examples. Using these rules, we construct three dataset versions (easy, normal, and hard) representing different levels of obfuscation difficulty. This is the first dataset that simultaneously supports deobfuscation and detoxification for the Korean language. We expect it to facilitate better understanding and mitigating of obfuscated toxic content in LLM for low-resource languages. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/leeyejin1231/KOTOX.

The high cost of ownership of AI compute infrastructure and challenges of robust serving of large language models (LLMs) has led to a surge in managed Model-as-a-service deployments. Even when enterprises choose on-premises deployments, the compute infrastructure is typically shared across many teams in order to maximize the return on investment. In both scenarios the deployed models operate only on plaintext data, and so enterprise data owners must allow their data to appear in plaintext on a shared or multi-tenant compute infrastructure. This results in data owners with private or sensitive data being hesitant or restricted in what data they use with these types of deployments. In this work we introduce the Stained Glass Transform, a learned, stochastic, and sequence dependent transformation of the word embeddings of an LLM which information theoretically provides privacy to the input of the LLM while preserving the utility of model. We theoretically connect a particular class of Stained Glass Transforms to the theory of mutual information of Gaussian Mixture Models. We then calculate a-postiori privacy estimates, based on mutual information, and verify the privacy and utility of instances of transformed embeddings through token level metrics of privacy and standard LLM performance benchmarks.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in introducing vision into Large Language Models (LLMs). The proliferation of large Visual Language Models (VLMs), such as Flamingo, BLIP-2, and GPT-4, signifies an exciting convergence of advancements in both visual and language foundation models. Yet, the risks associated with this integrative approach are largely unexamined. In this paper, we shed light on the security and safety implications of this trend. First, we underscore that the continuous and high-dimensional nature of the additional visual input space intrinsically makes it a fertile ground for adversarial attacks. This unavoidably expands the attack surfaces of LLMs. Second, we highlight that the broad functionality of LLMs also presents visual attackers with a wider array of achievable adversarial objectives, extending the implications of security failures beyond mere misclassification. To elucidate these risks, we study adversarial examples in the visual input space of a VLM. Specifically, against MiniGPT-4, which incorporates safety mechanisms that can refuse harmful instructions, we present visual adversarial examples that can circumvent the safety mechanisms and provoke harmful behaviors of the model. Remarkably, we discover that adversarial examples, even if optimized on a narrow, manually curated derogatory corpus against specific social groups, can universally jailbreak the model's safety mechanisms. A single such adversarial example can generally undermine MiniGPT-4's safety, enabling it to heed a wide range of harmful instructions and produce harmful content far beyond simply imitating the derogatory corpus used in optimization. Unveiling these risks, we accentuate the urgent need for comprehensive risk assessments, robust defense strategies, and the implementation of responsible practices for the secure and safe utilization of VLMs.

Text-to-image (T2I) models can effectively capture the content or style of reference images to perform high-quality customization. A representative technique for this is fine-tuning using low-rank adaptations (LoRA), which enables efficient model customization with reference images. However, fine-tuning with a limited number of reference images often leads to overfitting, resulting in issues such as prompt misalignment or content leakage. These issues prevent the model from accurately following the input prompt or generating undesired objects during inference. To address this problem, we examine the text embeddings that guide the diffusion model during inference. This study decomposes the text embedding matrix and conducts a component analysis to understand the embedding space geometry and identify the cause of overfitting. Based on this, we propose DECOR, which projects text embeddings onto a vector space orthogonal to undesired token vectors, thereby reducing the influence of unwanted semantics in the text embeddings. Experimental results demonstrate that DECOR outperforms state-of-the-art customization models and achieves Pareto frontier performance across text and visual alignment evaluation metrics. Furthermore, it generates images more faithful to the input prompts, showcasing its effectiveness in addressing overfitting and enhancing text-to-image customization.

From extracting features to generating text, the outputs of large language models (LLMs) typically rely on their final layers, following the conventional wisdom that earlier layers capture only low-level cues. However, our analysis shows that intermediate layers can encode even richer representations, often improving performance on a wide range of downstream tasks. To explain and quantify these hidden-layer properties, we propose a unified framework of representation quality metrics based on information theory, geometry, and invariance to input perturbations. Our framework highlights how each model layer balances information compression and signal preservation, revealing why mid-depth embeddings can exceed the last layer's performance. Through extensive experiments on 32 text-embedding tasks and comparisons across model architectures (transformers, state-space models) and domains (language, vision), we demonstrate that intermediate layers consistently provide stronger features. These findings challenge the standard focus on final-layer embeddings and open new directions for model analysis and optimization, including strategic use of mid-layer representations for more robust and accurate AI systems.

Adversarial examples, generated by carefully crafted perturbation, have attracted considerable attention in research fields. Recent works have argued that the existence of the robust and non-robust features is a primary cause of the adversarial examples, and investigated their internal interactions in the feature space. In this paper, we propose a way of explicitly distilling feature representation into the robust and non-robust features, using Information Bottleneck. Specifically, we inject noise variation to each feature unit and evaluate the information flow in the feature representation to dichotomize feature units either robust or non-robust, based on the noise variation magnitude. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that the distilled features are highly correlated with adversarial prediction, and they have human-perceptible semantic information by themselves. Furthermore, we present an attack mechanism intensifying the gradient of non-robust features that is directly related to the model prediction, and validate its effectiveness of breaking model robustness.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

This paper investigates the radioactivity of LLM-generated texts, i.e. whether it is possible to detect that such input was used as training data. Conventional methods like membership inference can carry out this detection with some level of accuracy. We show that watermarked training data leaves traces easier to detect and much more reliable than membership inference. We link the contamination level to the watermark robustness, its proportion in the training set, and the fine-tuning process. We notably demonstrate that training on watermarked synthetic instructions can be detected with high confidence (p-value < 1e-5) even when as little as 5% of training text is watermarked. Thus, LLM watermarking, originally designed for detecting machine-generated text, gives the ability to easily identify if the outputs of a watermarked LLM were used to fine-tune another LLM.

We explore a class of adversarial attacks targeting the activations of language models. By manipulating a relatively small subset of model activations, a, we demonstrate the ability to control the exact prediction of a significant number (in some cases up to 1000) of subsequent tokens t. We empirically verify a scaling law where the maximum number of target tokens t_max predicted depends linearly on the number of tokens a whose activations the attacker controls as t_max = kappa a. We find that the number of bits of control in the input space needed to control a single bit in the output space (what we call attack resistance chi) is remarkably constant between approx 16 and approx 25 over 2 orders of magnitude of model sizes for different language models. Compared to attacks on tokens, attacks on activations are predictably much stronger, however, we identify a surprising regularity where one bit of input steered either via activations or via tokens is able to exert control over a similar amount of output bits. This gives support for the hypothesis that adversarial attacks are a consequence of dimensionality mismatch between the input and output spaces. A practical implication of the ease of attacking language model activations instead of tokens is for multi-modal and selected retrieval models, where additional data sources are added as activations directly, sidestepping the tokenized input. This opens up a new, broad attack surface. By using language models as a controllable test-bed to study adversarial attacks, we were able to experiment with input-output dimensions that are inaccessible in computer vision, especially where the output dimension dominates.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have advanced to encompass extensive knowledge across diverse domains. Yet controlling what a large language model should not know is important for ensuring alignment and thus safe use. However, accurately and efficiently unlearning knowledge from an LLM remains challenging due to the potential collateral damage caused by the fuzzy boundary between retention and forgetting, and the large computational requirements for optimization across state-of-the-art models with hundreds of billions of parameters. In this work, we present Embedding-COrrupted (ECO) Prompts, a lightweight unlearning framework for large language models to address both the challenges of knowledge entanglement and unlearning efficiency. Instead of relying on the LLM itself to unlearn, we enforce an unlearned state during inference by employing a prompt classifier to identify and safeguard prompts to forget. We learn corruptions added to prompt embeddings via zeroth order optimization toward the unlearning objective offline and corrupt prompts flagged by the classifier during inference. We find that these embedding-corrupted prompts not only lead to desirable outputs that satisfy the unlearning objective but also closely approximate the output from a model that has never been trained on the data intended for forgetting. Through extensive experiments on unlearning, we demonstrate the superiority of our method in achieving promising unlearning at nearly zero side effects in general domains and domains closely related to the unlearned ones. Additionally, we highlight the scalability of our method to 100 LLMs, ranging from 0.5B to 236B parameters, incurring no additional cost as the number of parameters increases.

Recent advances in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved state-of-the-art performance on numerous benchmark tasks. However, the use of internet-scale, often proprietary, pretraining corpora raises a critical concern for both practitioners and users: inflated performance due to test-set leakage. While prior works have proposed mitigation strategies such as decontamination of pretraining data and benchmark redesign for LLMs, the complementary direction of developing detection methods for contaminated VLMs remains underexplored. To address this gap, we deliberately contaminate open-source VLMs on popular benchmarks and show that existing detection approaches either fail outright or exhibit inconsistent behavior. We then propose a novel simple yet effective detection method based on multi-modal semantic perturbation, demonstrating that contaminated models fail to generalize under controlled perturbations. Finally, we validate our approach across multiple realistic contamination strategies, confirming its robustness and effectiveness. The code and perturbed dataset will be released publicly.

In this work, we demonstrate that the contextualized word vectors derived from pretrained masked language model-based encoders share a common, perhaps undesirable pattern across layers. Namely, we find cases of persistent outlier neurons within BERT and RoBERTa's hidden state vectors that consistently bear the smallest or largest values in said vectors. In an attempt to investigate the source of this information, we introduce a neuron-level analysis method, which reveals that the outliers are closely related to information captured by positional embeddings. We also pre-train the RoBERTa-base models from scratch and find that the outliers disappear without using positional embeddings. These outliers, we find, are the major cause of anisotropy of encoders' raw vector spaces, and clipping them leads to increased similarity across vectors. We demonstrate this in practice by showing that clipped vectors can more accurately distinguish word senses, as well as lead to better sentence embeddings when mean pooling. In three supervised tasks, we find that clipping does not affect the performance.

Many commercial and open-source models claim to detect machine-generated text with extremely high accuracy (99% or more). However, very few of these detectors are evaluated on shared benchmark datasets and even when they are, the datasets used for evaluation are insufficiently challenging-lacking variations in sampling strategy, adversarial attacks, and open-source generative models. In this work we present RAID: the largest and most challenging benchmark dataset for machine-generated text detection. RAID includes over 6 million generations spanning 11 models, 8 domains, 11 adversarial attacks and 4 decoding strategies. Using RAID, we evaluate the out-of-domain and adversarial robustness of 8 open- and 4 closed-source detectors and find that current detectors are easily fooled by adversarial attacks, variations in sampling strategies, repetition penalties, and unseen generative models. We release our data along with a leaderboard to encourage future research.

While paragraph embedding models are remarkably effective for downstream classification tasks, what they learn and encode into a single vector remains opaque. In this paper, we investigate a state-of-the-art paragraph embedding method proposed by Zhang et al. (2017) and discover that it cannot reliably tell whether a given sentence occurs in the input paragraph or not. We formulate a sentence content task to probe for this basic linguistic property and find that even a much simpler bag-of-words method has no trouble solving it. This result motivates us to replace the reconstruction-based objective of Zhang et al. (2017) with our sentence content probe objective in a semi-supervised setting. Despite its simplicity, our objective improves over paragraph reconstruction in terms of (1) downstream classification accuracies on benchmark datasets, (2) faster training, and (3) better generalization ability.

The widespread exchange of digital documents in various domains has resulted in abundant private information being shared. This proliferation necessitates redaction techniques to protect sensitive content and user privacy. While numerous redaction methods exist, their effectiveness varies, with some proving more robust than others. As such, the literature proposes several deanonymization techniques, raising awareness of potential privacy threats. However, while none of these methods are successful against the most effective redaction techniques, these attacks only focus on the anonymized tokens and ignore the sentence context. In this paper, we propose RedactBuster, the first deanonymization model using sentence context to perform Named Entity Recognition on reacted text. Our methodology leverages fine-tuned state-of-the-art Transformers and Deep Learning models to determine the anonymized entity types in a document. We test RedactBuster against the most effective redaction technique and evaluate it using the publicly available Text Anonymization Benchmark (TAB). Our results show accuracy values up to 0.985 regardless of the document nature or entity type. In raising awareness of this privacy issue, we propose a countermeasure we call character evasion that helps strengthen the secrecy of sensitive information. Furthermore, we make our model and testbed open-source to aid researchers and practitioners in evaluating the resilience of novel redaction techniques and enhancing document privacy.

We propose a universal adversarial attack on multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) that leverages a single optimized image to override alignment safeguards across diverse queries and even multiple models. By backpropagating through the vision encoder and language head, we craft a synthetic image that forces the model to respond with a targeted phrase (e.g., ''Sure, here it is'') or otherwise unsafe content-even for harmful prompts. In experiments on the SafeBench benchmark, our method achieves significantly higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including text-only universal prompts (e.g., up to 93% on certain models). We further demonstrate cross-model transferability by training on several multimodal LLMs simultaneously and testing on unseen architectures. Additionally, a multi-answer variant of our approach produces more natural-sounding (yet still malicious) responses. These findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal alignment and call for more robust adversarial defenses. We will release code and datasets under the Apache-2.0 license. Warning: some content generated by Multimodal LLMs in this paper may be offensive to some readers.

The success of recent text-to-image diffusion models is largely due to their capacity to be guided by a complex text prompt, which enables users to precisely describe the desired content. However, these models struggle to effectively suppress the generation of undesired content, which is explicitly requested to be omitted from the generated image in the prompt. In this paper, we analyze how to manipulate the text embeddings and remove unwanted content from them. We introduce two contributions, which we refer to as soft-weighted regularization and inference-time text embedding optimization. The first regularizes the text embedding matrix and effectively suppresses the undesired content. The second method aims to further suppress the unwanted content generation of the prompt, and encourages the generation of desired content. We evaluate our method quantitatively and qualitatively on extensive experiments, validating its effectiveness. Furthermore, our method is generalizability to both the pixel-space diffusion models (i.e. DeepFloyd-IF) and the latent-space diffusion models (i.e. Stable Diffusion).

We propose a methodology for planting watermarks in text from an autoregressive language model that are robust to perturbations without changing the distribution over text up to a certain maximum generation budget. We generate watermarked text by mapping a sequence of random numbers -- which we compute using a randomized watermark key -- to a sample from the language model. To detect watermarked text, any party who knows the key can align the text to the random number sequence. We instantiate our watermark methodology with two sampling schemes: inverse transform sampling and exponential minimum sampling. We apply these watermarks to three language models -- OPT-1.3B, LLaMA-7B and Alpaca-7B -- to experimentally validate their statistical power and robustness to various paraphrasing attacks. Notably, for both the OPT-1.3B and LLaMA-7B models, we find we can reliably detect watermarked text (p leq 0.01) from 35 tokens even after corrupting between 40-50\% of the tokens via random edits (i.e., substitutions, insertions or deletions). For the Alpaca-7B model, we conduct a case study on the feasibility of watermarking responses to typical user instructions. Due to the lower entropy of the responses, detection is more difficult: around 25% of the responses -- whose median length is around 100 tokens -- are detectable with p leq 0.01, and the watermark is also less robust to certain automated paraphrasing attacks we implement.

Adversarial training provides a means of regularizing supervised learning algorithms while virtual adversarial training is able to extend supervised learning algorithms to the semi-supervised setting. However, both methods require making small perturbations to numerous entries of the input vector, which is inappropriate for sparse high-dimensional inputs such as one-hot word representations. We extend adversarial and virtual adversarial training to the text domain by applying perturbations to the word embeddings in a recurrent neural network rather than to the original input itself. The proposed method achieves state of the art results on multiple benchmark semi-supervised and purely supervised tasks. We provide visualizations and analysis showing that the learned word embeddings have improved in quality and that while training, the model is less prone to overfitting. Code is available at https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/adversarial_text.

Despite their wide adoption, the biases and unintended behaviors of language models remain poorly understood. In this paper, we identify and characterize a phenomenon never discussed before, which we call semantic leakage, where models leak irrelevant information from the prompt into the generation in unexpected ways. We propose an evaluation setting to detect semantic leakage both by humans and automatically, curate a diverse test suite for diagnosing this behavior, and measure significant semantic leakage in 13 flagship models. We also show that models exhibit semantic leakage in languages besides English and across different settings and generation scenarios. This discovery highlights yet another type of bias in language models that affects their generation patterns and behavior.

We study the topmost weight matrix of neural network language models. We show that this matrix constitutes a valid word embedding. When training language models, we recommend tying the input embedding and this output embedding. We analyze the resulting update rules and show that the tied embedding evolves in a more similar way to the output embedding than to the input embedding in the untied model. We also offer a new method of regularizing the output embedding. Our methods lead to a significant reduction in perplexity, as we are able to show on a variety of neural network language models. Finally, we show that weight tying can reduce the size of neural translation models to less than half of their original size without harming their performance.

Motivated by ethical and legal concerns, the scientific community is actively developing methods to limit the misuse of Text-to-Image diffusion models for reproducing copyrighted, violent, explicit, or personal information in the generated images. Simultaneously, researchers put these newly developed safety measures to the test by assuming the role of an adversary to find vulnerabilities and backdoors in them. We use compositional property of diffusion models, which allows to leverage multiple prompts in a single image generation. This property allows us to combine other concepts, that should not have been affected by the inhibition, to reconstruct the vector, responsible for target concept generation, even though the direct computation of this vector is no longer accessible. We provide theoretical and empirical evidence why the proposed attacks are possible and discuss the implications of these findings for safe model deployment. We argue that it is essential to consider all possible approaches to image generation with diffusion models that can be employed by an adversary. Our work opens up the discussion about the implications of concept arithmetics and compositional inference for safety mechanisms in diffusion models. Content Advisory: This paper contains discussions and model-generated content that may be considered offensive. Reader discretion is advised. Project page: https://cs-people.bu.edu/vpetsiuk/arc

With the help of conditioning mechanisms, the state-of-the-art diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in guided image generation, particularly in text-to-image synthesis. To gain a better understanding of the training process and potential risks of text-to-image synthesis, we perform a systematic investigation of backdoor attack on text-to-image diffusion models and propose BadT2I, a general multimodal backdoor attack framework that tampers with image synthesis in diverse semantic levels. Specifically, we perform backdoor attacks on three levels of the vision semantics: Pixel-Backdoor, Object-Backdoor and Style-Backdoor. By utilizing a regularization loss, our methods efficiently inject backdoors into a large-scale text-to-image diffusion model while preserving its utility with benign inputs. We conduct empirical experiments on Stable Diffusion, the widely-used text-to-image diffusion model, demonstrating that the large-scale diffusion model can be easily backdoored within a few fine-tuning steps. We conduct additional experiments to explore the impact of different types of textual triggers. Besides, we discuss the backdoor persistence during further training, the findings of which provide insights for the development of backdoor defense methods.

Large-scale pre-trained language models have achieved tremendous success across a wide range of natural language understanding (NLU) tasks, even surpassing human performance. However, recent studies reveal that the robustness of these models can be challenged by carefully crafted textual adversarial examples. While several individual datasets have been proposed to evaluate model robustness, a principled and comprehensive benchmark is still missing. In this paper, we present Adversarial GLUE (AdvGLUE), a new multi-task benchmark to quantitatively and thoroughly explore and evaluate the vulnerabilities of modern large-scale language models under various types of adversarial attacks. In particular, we systematically apply 14 textual adversarial attack methods to GLUE tasks to construct AdvGLUE, which is further validated by humans for reliable annotations. Our findings are summarized as follows. (i) Most existing adversarial attack algorithms are prone to generating invalid or ambiguous adversarial examples, with around 90% of them either changing the original semantic meanings or misleading human annotators as well. Therefore, we perform a careful filtering process to curate a high-quality benchmark. (ii) All the language models and robust training methods we tested perform poorly on AdvGLUE, with scores lagging far behind the benign accuracy. We hope our work will motivate the development of new adversarial attacks that are more stealthy and semantic-preserving, as well as new robust language models against sophisticated adversarial attacks. AdvGLUE is available at https://adversarialglue.github.io.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

Many existing adversarial attacks generate L_p-norm perturbations on image RGB space. Despite some achievements in transferability and attack success rate, the crafted adversarial examples are easily perceived by human eyes. Towards visual imperceptibility, some recent works explore unrestricted attacks without L_p-norm constraints, yet lacking transferability of attacking black-box models. In this work, we propose a novel imperceptible and transferable attack by leveraging both the generative and discriminative power of diffusion models. Specifically, instead of direct manipulation in pixel space, we craft perturbations in latent space of diffusion models. Combined with well-designed content-preserving structures, we can generate human-insensitive perturbations embedded with semantic clues. For better transferability, we further "deceive" the diffusion model which can be viewed as an additional recognition surrogate, by distracting its attention away from the target regions. To our knowledge, our proposed method, DiffAttack, is the first that introduces diffusion models into adversarial attack field. Extensive experiments on various model structures (including CNNs, Transformers, MLPs) and defense methods have demonstrated our superiority over other attack methods.

Authorship obfuscation, rewriting a text to intentionally obscure the identity of the author, is an important but challenging task. Current methods using large language models (LLMs) lack interpretability and controllability, often ignoring author-specific stylistic features, resulting in less robust performance overall. To address this, we develop StyleRemix, an adaptive and interpretable obfuscation method that perturbs specific, fine-grained style elements of the original input text. StyleRemix uses pre-trained Low Rank Adaptation (LoRA) modules to rewrite an input specifically along various stylistic axes (e.g., formality and length) while maintaining low computational cost. StyleRemix outperforms state-of-the-art baselines and much larger LLMs in a variety of domains as assessed by both automatic and human evaluation. Additionally, we release AuthorMix, a large set of 30K high-quality, long-form texts from a diverse set of 14 authors and 4 domains, and DiSC, a parallel corpus of 1,500 texts spanning seven style axes in 16 unique directions

Despite the remarkable progress in text-to-image generative models, they are prone to adversarial attacks and inadvertently generate unsafe, unethical content. Existing approaches often rely on fine-tuning models to remove specific concepts, which is computationally expensive, lack scalability, and/or compromise generation quality. In this work, we propose a novel framework leveraging k-sparse autoencoders (k-SAEs) to enable efficient and interpretable concept manipulation in diffusion models. Specifically, we first identify interpretable monosemantic concepts in the latent space of text embeddings and leverage them to precisely steer the generation away or towards a given concept (e.g., nudity) or to introduce a new concept (e.g., photographic style). Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our approach is very simple, requires no retraining of the base model nor LoRA adapters, does not compromise the generation quality, and is robust to adversarial prompt manipulations. Our method yields an improvement of 20.01% in unsafe concept removal, is effective in style manipulation, and is sim5x faster than current state-of-the-art.

Masked language modeling (MLM) pre-training methods such as BERT corrupt the input by replacing some tokens with [MASK] and then train a model to reconstruct the original tokens. While they produce good results when transferred to downstream NLP tasks, they generally require large amounts of compute to be effective. As an alternative, we propose a more sample-efficient pre-training task called replaced token detection. Instead of masking the input, our approach corrupts it by replacing some tokens with plausible alternatives sampled from a small generator network. Then, instead of training a model that predicts the original identities of the corrupted tokens, we train a discriminative model that predicts whether each token in the corrupted input was replaced by a generator sample or not. Thorough experiments demonstrate this new pre-training task is more efficient than MLM because the task is defined over all input tokens rather than just the small subset that was masked out. As a result, the contextual representations learned by our approach substantially outperform the ones learned by BERT given the same model size, data, and compute. The gains are particularly strong for small models; for example, we train a model on one GPU for 4 days that outperforms GPT (trained using 30x more compute) on the GLUE natural language understanding benchmark. Our approach also works well at scale, where it performs comparably to RoBERTa and XLNet while using less than 1/4 of their compute and outperforms them when using the same amount of compute.

Text-to-image diffusion models (DMs) have achieved remarkable success in image generation. However, concerns about data privacy and intellectual property remain due to their potential to inadvertently memorize and replicate training data. Recent mitigation efforts have focused on identifying and pruning weights responsible for triggering replication, based on the assumption that memorization can be localized. Our research assesses the robustness of these pruning-based approaches. We demonstrate that even after pruning, minor adjustments to text embeddings of input prompts are sufficient to re-trigger data replication, highlighting the fragility of these defenses. Furthermore, we challenge the fundamental assumption of memorization locality, by showing that replication can be triggered from diverse locations within the text embedding space, and follows different paths in the model. Our findings indicate that existing mitigation strategies are insufficient and underscore the need for methods that truly remove memorized content, rather than attempting to suppress its retrieval. As a first step in this direction, we introduce a novel adversarial fine-tuning method that iteratively searches for replication triggers and updates the model to increase robustness. Through our research, we provide fresh insights into the nature of memorization in text-to-image DMs and a foundation for building more trustworthy and compliant generative AI.

In this paper we undertake a systematic study of privacy attacks against open source Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary has access to either the model weights, gradients, or losses, and tries to exploit them to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are the first membership inference attacks (MIAs) against pre-trained LLMs that are able to simultaneously achieve high TPRs and low FPRs, and a pipeline showing that over 50% (!) of the fine-tuning dataset can be extracted from a fine-tuned LLM in natural settings. We consider varying degrees of access to the underlying model, customization of the language model, and resources available to the attacker. In the pre-trained setting, we propose three new white-box MIAs: an attack based on the gradient norm, a supervised neural network classifier, and a single step loss ratio attack. All outperform existing black-box baselines, and our supervised attack closes the gap between MIA attack success against LLMs and other types of models. In fine-tuning, we find that given access to the loss of the fine-tuned and base models, a fine-tuned loss ratio attack FLoRA is able to achieve near perfect MIA peformance. We then leverage these MIAs to extract fine-tuning data from fine-tuned language models. We find that the pipeline of generating from fine-tuned models prompted with a small snippet of the prefix of each training example, followed by using FLoRa to select the most likely training sample, succeeds the majority of the fine-tuning dataset after only 3 epochs of fine-tuning. Taken together, these findings show that highly effective MIAs are available in almost all LLM training settings, and highlight that great care must be taken before LLMs are fine-tuned on highly sensitive data and then deployed.