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Nov 3

Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

  • 3 authors
·
Jul 12, 2023 1

Did We Actually Fix It? An Independent Adversarial Stress-Test of Post-Point-Adjustment Evaluation Metrics for Time-Series Anomaly Detection

Point-adjustment (PA), for years the default scoring protocol in time-series anomaly detection (TSAD), was shown by Kim et al. (2022) to award near-perfect F1 to random anomaly scores. The field adopted a suite of replacement metrics (PA%K, range-based precision/recall, affiliation precision/recall, and Volume-Under-the-Surface, VUS, ROC/PR). We ask, independently and adversarially, whether these resist no-skill detectors on real benchmarks, and find the answer turns entirely on one overlooked variable: N, the number of random attempts an adversary reports the best of. Under a single honest run (N=1), not one replacement metric is gameable on any of six benchmarks (UCR, SMD, SMAP, MSL, NAB, PSM): a random detector reaches 90% of the best real detector's score on at most 11% of series for affiliation-F1, 5% for the ROC family, and 2% for the PR-based metrics and PA%K. But under best-of-N reporting, the seed-shopping endemic to ML, the metrics split sharply. affiliation-F1 and every ROC-based metric inflate steeply, affiliation crossing gameable (25% of series) by N=3 and reaching 0.98 at the full pool (N=41), the ROC family crossing by N=9-11; the PR-based metrics and PA%K stay near-flat at every N, floored near the anomaly prevalence (the lone exception is NAB at large N). A paired test finds VUS-ROC inflated on 131 series where its sibling VUS-PR is not, and never the reverse. The ROC-vs-PR split follows from the order-statistic behaviour of AUC under extreme class imbalance (a random PR-AUC is floored at prevalence); affiliation inflates by a second route, its extreme single-run leniency (already fragile at N=1). We release a pip-installable stress-test harness, and recommend reporting single-run scores or disclosing N and preferring PR-based metrics, which resist best-of-N inflation on nearly every benchmark.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 18

Does a Hosted Decision Model Respect Irrelevant Alternatives? A Pre-Registered Test of Option-Set Dependence in Jev

Decision APIs that return a probability for each option are routinely used as if those probabilities were properties of the options themselves. That reading is valid only if the model satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): adding an option that is neither the right answer nor its strongest rival should leave the odds between those two unchanged. We test this in a pre-registered study of jev-1.13.0, a hosted decision model, using 299,463 calls on intent classification (BANKING77, CLINC150) and topic classification (AG News). Every added option moves the log-odds between the gold label and the strongest wrong label: the root-mean-square systematic shift is 0.20-0.52 nats, 1.2 to 3 times the run-to-run variation, even when the added option takes at most 0.1% of the probability mass. The shifts are directional. An option similar to the wrong answer draws probability from it (+0.10 nats toward the gold label). A paraphrase of the wrong answer produces an intermediate pattern: the gold label's probability is almost conserved, but the paraphrase receives only about a third of the wrong answer's share rather than the half that strict substitution implies. The distortion grows steadily with the logarithm of the number of options, reaching about 1 nat at 255 options, and off-domain padding pushes the odds against the gold label. In contrast, questions packed into one call do not interact (bias < 0.001). Scoring each option with an independent yes/no question removes the option-set dependence but picks the right answer 8.7 points less often. Jev sits between two local baselines, an option-independent scorer and a prompt readout. Its probabilities are best read as relative to the option list they were computed over.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 11

An analytical framework for the Levine hats problem: new strategies, bounds and generalizations

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 3, 2025

Incompressible Knowledge Probes: Estimating Black-Box LLM Parameter Counts via Factual Capacity

Closed-source frontier labs do not disclose parameter counts. Storing F facts requires at least F/(bits per parameter) weights, so factual recall lower-bounds parameter count--an intrinsic, serving-independent signal, though (as we show) a coarse one. We introduce Incompressible Knowledge Probes (IKPs), a benchmark of 1,400 factual questions spanning 7 tiers of obscurity, designed to isolate knowledge that cannot be derived by reasoning or compressed by architectural improvements. We score with no hallucination penalty (lambda = 0: IKP accuracy is simply the fraction of probed facts answered correctly), which removes both the penalty hyperparameter and the per-tier flooring choice; a full lambda x flooring ablation shows the calibration is robust across scoring choices while individual estimates are not, motivating the no-penalty default. We calibrate a log-linear mapping from IKP accuracy to parameter count on 93 open-weight models (135M-1,600B) spanning 19 vendors, achieving R^2 = 0.910; leave-one-out cross-validation confirms generalization (median fold error 1.48x, 72% within 2x, 86% within 3x). The instrument is deliberately coarse--its 90% prediction interval spans ~3x in either direction, wider than inference economics--so IKP recovers order-of-magnitude effective capacity and relative rankings, not precise parameter counts. For Mixture-of-Experts models, total parameters predict knowledge (R^2 = 0.67) better than active parameters (R^2 = 0.41). We evaluate 201 models from 27 vendors on a curated probe set (1,311 of 1,400 probes surviving name-collision and label-ambiguity filters) and report effective knowledge capacity for all major proprietary frontier models as prediction bands rather than point estimates; for heavily safety-tuned models these are lower bounds, since refusal policy can suppress tens of percentage points of otherwise-answerable capacity.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 4

Beating the average: how to generate profit by exploiting the inefficiencies of soccer betting

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

  • 1 authors
·
Mar 12, 2023

KWBench: Measuring Unprompted Problem Recognition in Knowledge Work

We introduce the first version of KWBench (Knowledge Work Bench), a benchmark for unprompted problem recognition in large language models: can an LLM identify a professional scenario before attempting to solve it. Existing frontier benchmarks have saturated, and most knowledge-work evaluations to date reduce to extraction or task completion against a specification. KWBench targets the step before that: recognizing the governing structure of the situation from raw inputs alone. The benchmark contains 223 tasks sourced from practitioners across acquisitions, contract negotiations, clinical pharmacy, organizational politics, fraud analysis, and incentive design. Each task encodes a formal game-theoretic pattern (principal-agent conflict, signaling, mechanism design failure, strategic omission, coalitional dynamics, strategic interdependence) and carries structured ground truth recording the expert reading of the situation and the anticipated failure modes. Models receive raw data and a task prompt with no indication of problem type. Scoring is a three-tier rubric gated by a mandatory conjunctive check. Mandatory criteria encode the predicted wrong paths. We evaluate 16 models. The best model passes on 27.9% of tasks. The top two models agree on only 31.7% of their passes. Among the top 8, 44 tasks are solved by exactly one model; routing across the top 8 covers 50.7% of the benchmark, nearly double the best single model. Conditional on passing, quality scores converge (approx 83% across models); unconditional scores do not. Same models articulate the relevant game-theoretic concept correctly when asked, then fail to apply it unprompted. We release KWBench to shift how frontier models are evaluated on knowledge work, scoring them on whether they recognize the right problem from the situation alone, not only on how well they execute once the problem has been framed for them.

clio-ai Clio AI
·
Apr 16 2

Capable Teacher, Myopic Scorer: Reward-Free Teacher Repair for Agentic On-Policy Distillation

Agentic on-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student agent on its own trajectories while a teacher scores every token. A natural explanation of where it goes wrong is compounding error: the student's mistakes carry its trajectories beyond the region where the teacher is reliable, so recent methods keep training inside that region, through episode-length curricula, teacher-guided turns, prefix replay, or teacher intervention where the two disagree. We show this explanation is incomplete. From the states where the student departs most from the teacher, the teacher's own takeovers still finish the task, yet the student trained on its token scores keeps running out of turns. We attribute this to the myopia of next-token scoring. The teacher rates each token without seeing where the episode ends, so its scores let through the safe, delaying moves that outcome-based RL would punish with zero reward, a penalty agentic OPD lacks. We call this difference between what the teacher does and what it scores the rollout-scorer gap. We propose Rollout-to-Scorer Distillation (R2S), which repairs the scorer before distillation by mining high-disagreement states from the untrained student, running teacher takeovers from them, keeping the states where enough takeovers pass a reward-free check such as consensus or an LLM judge, and fine-tuning the teacher to give its takeover-informed scores on every assistant token from the divergence turn onward, without the takeover in context. The repaired teacher is frozen as the sole scorer for standard OPD, requiring no task reward during repair or training. Across three environments, two teachers and four students, R2S outperforms three state-of-the-art agentic-OPD methods in all twelve teacher-student-environment cells, by 12.8 success points on average over the best of them in each cell. Project page: https://tree-shu-zhao.github.io/r2s/.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 19

ACES: Who Tests the Tests? Leave-One-Out AUC Consistency for Code Generation

Selecting LLM-generated code candidates using LLM-generated tests is challenging because the tests themselves may be incorrect. Existing methods either treat all tests equally or rely on ad-hoc heuristics to filter unreliable tests. Yet determining test correctness requires knowing which codes are correct, creating a circular dependency. Our key insight is that we need not determine test correctness at all: test votes should rank, not merely count. What matters is not how many codes pass a test, but whether the test can distinguish correct from incorrect code. We break the circular dependency via leave-one-out evaluation: hold out one test, rank codes by their aggregate scores on all remaining tests, and measure whether the held-out test's pass/fail pattern agrees with this ranking. We formalize this agreement as the leave-one-out AUC~(LOO-AUC) and prove that the expected LOO-AUC is proportional to each test's ability to separate correct code from incorrect code. Building on this, we propose ACES~(AUC ConsistEncy Scoring) with two complementary variants: ACES-C provides closed-form weights that provably approximate the oracle in expectation under a mild assumption on average test quality; ACES-O drops this assumption and iteratively optimizes a differentiable LOO-AUC objective. Both operate solely on the binary pass matrix with negligible overhead, and achieve state-of-the-art Pass@k on multiple code generation benchmarks.

  • 7 authors
·
Apr 4 4

What Outcome RL Buys: Finishing, Reliability, Rarely Reach

Outcome RL raises pass@1 but not pass@k at large k (Yue et al., 2025). But every pass@1 is scored under a token budget. Every recipe also trains under one. On physics and math problems at fixed token budgets, we compare the pass@1 of 20 released RL models (1.5B to 32B) with that of the thinking models they started from. We ask whether each pass@1 gain is changed behaviour or new knowledge. We divide each change in pass@1 into three parts. Finishing measures answering before the budget runs out. Reliability measures being right once finished. Reach measures problems RL solves that its base answered wrongly in all eight tries, minus problems the base solves that RL answered wrongly in all eight. We find four things. (1) Where the base often hits the token budget before answering, most of the change, gain or loss, is finishing (82% at 4k and 8k). Given more tokens, the base closes most of the finishing gap itself. (2) Where the base has enough tokens, the gain is reliability: the RL model is graded right more often, even on problems both finish. (3) By our definition, RL rarely solves what its base cannot. Reach adds at most 2.1 percentage points on any of our four physics and math sets. We checked 144 physics problems that only the RL model solved. Of these, 3.5% hold up when resampled or read. In a random sample, nine of ten new RL steps a human confirmed also appear in the base's samples. (4) In a small-scale RL run on an 8B model, the gain on new problems is finishing, with reliability flat. Supplying each problem's physical setup was not shown to improve on plain RL.

  • 1 authors
·
Oct 25 2