Daily Papers

Existing agent benchmarks ask whether the agent finished the task. We ask whether it finished it within policy. We introduce Fiducia-bench, a benchmark for the governability of financial agents---whether they escalate when obligated, abstain when required, and leave an auditable trail---and use it to study a question no prior benchmark addresses: does decomposing an agent into components degrade its governance? It does, and the mechanism is specific. Policy-relevant facts discovered by one component are attenuated at the handoff boundary before reaching the component that must act on them. In a 626-episode experiment across 100 KYC/AML task variants, two models, and three architectures, a 32B open-weights model attenuated 0% of discovered facts under a single-loop baseline, 56% under a fixed pipeline, and 85% under an orchestrator-subagent architecture (all at constraint distance 2). A stronger model (gpt-4.1-mini) attenuated 3-6% under the same conditions, suggesting the governance cost of decomposition is partly a function of model capability. Critically, the same mechanism produces both under-escalation and over-escalation, depending on whether the dropped fact was a risk signal or an exculpating one. The benchmark, all tasks, and the verification harness are open-source

Long-horizon robot manipulation tends to fail gradually: one bad step degrades the state, and the policy spirals into a basin from which it cannot recover. The failure is often visible before it happens. We introduce AEGIS (Activation-probe Early-warning, Gated Inference Switching), a selective escalation method that uses a lightweight probe on a weak policy's frozen activations to detect high-risk steps while there is still time to act. When the probe flags a step, control switches to a stronger separate policy, but only for the steps that need it. On LIBERO-Spatial, AEGIS recovers 10.1% of the trajectories the weak policy alone loses, versus 4.6% for budget-matched blind escalation and 5.1% for a random-trigger placebo. These gains are significant under one-sided exact paired McNemar tests with Holm-Bonferroni adjustment over three pre-registered contrasts: +5.4pp over blind escalation, p=8.5e-6; +5.0pp over random triggering, p=1.0e-4; paired-trajectory bootstrap CIs exclude zero. AEGIS activates the stronger policy on only 38% of steps, so the lever is timing rather than compute. The probe clears its precondition with an early-window AUROC of 0.764, 95% CI [0.70, 0.84], read from the weak-policy path over the first 30% of trajectory steps before any handoff. We pre-register the full analysis plan, including a conditional recovered-task-rate estimand and explicit kill criteria, and confirm the result on 700 common-random-number episodes per arm, with nA-fail=646.

The rapid escalation from elementary school-level to frontier problems of the difficulty for LLM benchmarks in recent years have weaved a miracle for researchers that we are only inches away from surpassing human intelligence. However, is the LLMs' remarkable reasoning ability indeed comes from true intelligence by human standards, or are they simply reciting solutions witnessed during training at an Internet level? To study this problem, we propose RoR-Bench, a novel, multi-modal benchmark for detecting LLM's recitation behavior when asked simple reasoning problems but with conditions subtly shifted, and conduct empirical analysis on our benchmark. Surprisingly, we found existing cutting-edge LLMs unanimously exhibits extremely severe recitation behavior; by changing one phrase in the condition, top models such as OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek-R1 can suffer 60% performance loss on elementary school-level arithmetic and reasoning problems. Such findings are a wake-up call to the LLM community that compels us to re-evaluate the true intelligence level of cutting-edge LLMs.

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

Large language model agents increasingly operate through an intermediate skill layer that mediates between user intent and concrete task execution. This layer is widely treated as an organizational abstraction, but we argue it is also a privilege boundary that current models routinely exceed. We present FORTIS, a benchmark that evaluates over-privilege in agent skills across two stages: whether a model selects the minimally sufficient skill from a large overlapping library, and whether it executes that skill without expanding into broader tools or actions than the skill permits. Across ten frontier models and three domains, we find that over-privileged behavior is the norm rather than the exception. Models consistently reach for higher-privilege skills and tools than the task requires, failing at both stages at rates that remain high even for the strongest available models. Failure is especially severe under the ordinary conditions of real user interaction: incomplete specification, convenience framing, and proximity to skill boundaries. None of these requires adversarial construction. The results indicate that the skill layer, far from containing agent behavior, is itself a primary source of privilege escalation in current systems.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent systems are increasingly deployed for complex real-world tasks but remain vulnerable to natural language-based attacks that exploit over-privileged tool use. This paper aims to understand and mitigate such attacks through the lens of privilege escalation, defined as agent actions exceeding the least privilege required for a user's intended task. Based on a formal model of LLM agent systems, we identify novel privilege escalation scenarios, particularly in multi-agent systems, including a variant akin to the classic confused deputy problem. To defend against both known and newly demonstrated privilege escalation, we propose SEAgent, a mandatory access control (MAC) framework built upon attribute-based access control (ABAC). SEAgent monitors agent-tool interactions via an information flow graph and enforces customizable security policies based on entity attributes. Our evaluations show that SEAgent effectively blocks various privilege escalation while maintaining a low false positive rate and negligible system overhead. This demonstrates its robustness and adaptability in securing LLM-based agent systems.

As LLM agents increasingly select tools autonomously, their choices among tools with different privileges become safety-relevant. However, prior tool-selection studies focus on safety-agnostic metadata preferences, leaving privilege-sensitive choices underexplored. To address this gap, we study over-privileged tool selection, in which an agent selects or escalates to a higher-privilege tool despite a sufficient lower-privilege alternative. We introduce ToolPrivBench to evaluate whether agents choose higher-privilege tools despite sufficient lower-privilege alternatives, measuring both initial selection and escalation after transient tool failures. Across eight domains and five recurring risk patterns, we find that over-privileged tool selection is common among mainstream LLM agents and is further amplified by transient failures. We further find that general safety alignment does not reliably transfer to least-privilege tool choice, while prompt-level controls provide only limited mitigation under transient failures. We therefore introduce a privilege-aware post-training defense that teaches agents to prefer sufficient lower-privilege tools and escalate only when necessary. Our mitigation experiments show that this defense substantially reduces unnecessary high-privilege tool use while preserving general capabilities.

Using a language model to score or rank candidate responses has become a scalable alternative to human evaluation in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) pipelines, benchmarking, and application layer evaluations. However, output reliability depends heavily on prompting and aggregation strategy. We present an empirical investigation of four drop-in techniques -- ensemble scoring, task-specific criteria injection, calibration context, and adaptive model escalation -- for improving LLM judge accuracy on RewardBench 2, with a unifying lens of noise control on the stochastic judge: ensembling as Monte Carlo averaging over per-call noise, criteria injection as between-response discrimination sharpening, and per-response score variance as an uncertainty signal. Ensemble scoring and task-specific criteria injection (the latter virtually cost free) together reach up to 85.8% accuracy, +13.5pp over baseline. Calibration context and adaptive model escalation also improve over baseline but are dominated by criteria + ensembling on the cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. Small models benefit disproportionately from ensembling, making high-accuracy LLM judges accessible at low cost. We show that these techniques generalise across model providers, evaluating on both OpenAI GPT and Anthropic Claude families.

Can AI reason about a war before its trajectory becomes historically obvious? Analyzing this capability is difficult because retrospective geopolitical prediction is heavily confounded by training-data leakage. We address this challenge through a temporally grounded case study of the early stages of the 2026 Middle East conflict, which unfolded after the training cutoff of current frontier models. We construct 11 critical temporal nodes, 42 node-specific verifiable questions, and 5 general exploratory questions, requiring models to reason only from information that would have been publicly available at each moment. This design substantially mitigates training-data leakage concerns, creating a setting well-suited for studying how models analyze an unfolding crisis under the fog of war, and provides, to our knowledge, the first temporally grounded analysis of LLM reasoning in an ongoing geopolitical conflict. Our analysis reveals three main findings. First, current state-of-the-art large language models often display a striking degree of strategic realism, reasoning beyond surface rhetoric toward deeper structural incentives. Second, this capability is uneven across domains: models are more reliable in economically and logistically structured settings than in politically ambiguous multi-actor environments. Finally, model narratives evolve over time, shifting from early expectations of rapid containment toward more systemic accounts of regional entrenchment and attritional de-escalation. Since the conflict remains ongoing at the time of writing, this work can serve as an archival snapshot of model reasoning during an unfolding geopolitical crisis, enabling future studies without the hindsight bias of retrospective analysis.

As AI-generated fiction becomes increasingly prevalent, questions of authorship and originality are becoming central to how written work is evaluated. While most existing work in this space focuses on identifying surface-level signatures of AI writing, we ask instead whether AI-generated stories can be distinguished from human ones without relying on stylistic signals, focusing on discourse-level narrative choices such as character agency and chronological discontinuity. We propose StoryScope, a pipeline that automatically induces a fine-grained, interpretable feature space of discourse-level narrative features across 10 dimensions. We apply StoryScope to a parallel corpus of 10,272 writing prompts, each written by a human author and five LLMs, yielding 61,608 stories, each ~5,000 words, and 304 extracted features per story. Narrative features alone achieve 93.2% macro-F1 for human vs. AI detection and 68.4% macro-F1 for six-way authorship attribution, retaining over 97% of the performance of models that include stylistic cues. A compact set of 30 core narrative features captures much of this signal: AI stories over-explain themes and favor tidy, single-track plots while human stories frame protagonist' choices as more morally ambiguous and have increased temporal complexity. Per-model fingerprint features enable six-way attribution: for example, Claude produces notably flat event escalation, GPT over-indexes on dream sequences, and Gemini defaults to external character description. We find that AI-generated stories cluster in a shared region of narrative space, while human-authored stories exhibit greater diversity. More broadly, these results suggest that differences in underlying narrative construction, not just writing style, can be used to separate human-written original works from AI-generated fiction.

On-policy distillation (OPD) has shown strong potential for transferring reasoning ability from frontier or domain-specific models to smaller students. While effective on static single-turn tasks, its behavior in multi-turn agent settings remains underexplored. In this work, we identify a key limitation of vanilla OPD in such settings, which we term Trajectory-Level KL Instability. Specifically, we observe that KL divergence increases together with a drop in success rate, and even after convergence, the KL remains high, leading to unstable training. This instability arises from inter-turn error compounding: as errors accumulate, the student is driven beyond the teacher's effective support, rendering the supervision signal unreliable. To address this, we propose TCOD (Temporal Curriculum On-Policy Distillation), a simple yet effective framework that controls the trajectory depth exposed to the student and progressively expands it from short to long with a curriculum schedule.Experimental results across four student-teacher pairs on three multi-turn agent benchmarks (ALFWorld, WebShop, ScienceWorld) show that TCOD mitigates KL escalation and enhances KL stability throughout training, improving agent performance by up to 18 points over vanilla OPD. Further evaluations show that TCOD can even surpass the teacher's performance and generalize to tasks on which the teacher fails.

This report introduces the concept of "Highly Autonomous Cyber-Capable Agents" (HACCAs), AI systems capable of autonomously conducting multi-stage cyber campaigns at a level comparable to today's top criminal hacking groups or state-affiliated threat actors, and analyzes the security implications of their emergence. The report: (1) Defines what HACCAs are and forecasts when they might arrive, establishing a clear framework for an autonomous cyber agent that can operate across the full attack lifecycle without meaningful human direction; (2) Identifies five core operational tactics, detailing how HACCAs could sustain themselves in the wild, from autonomous infrastructure setup and credential harvesting to detection evasion and adaptive shutdown avoidance; (3) Analyzes the strategic implications, including how HACCAs could intensify interstate cyber competition, lower the barrier to entry for sophisticated operations, and proliferate advanced offensive capabilities to criminal groups and less-resourced state actors; (4) Flags two tail risks that deserve serious attention: the potential for autonomous cyber operations to trigger inadvertent cyber-nuclear escalation, and the possibility of sustained loss of control over rogue HACCA deployments; (5) Proposes seven policy recommendations across three goals: understanding the emerging threat, defending against HACCAs, and ensuring their responsible development and deployment.

The escalating global concern over extensive food wastage necessitates innovative solutions to foster a net-zero lifestyle and reduce emissions. The LILA home composter presents a convenient means of recycling kitchen scraps and daily food waste into nutrient-rich, high-quality compost. To capture the nutritional information of the produced compost, we have created and annotated a large high-resolution image dataset of kitchen food waste with segmentation masks of 19 nutrition-rich categories. Leveraging this dataset, we benchmarked four state-of-the-art semantic segmentation models on food waste segmentation, contributing to the assessment of compost quality of Nitrogen, Phosphorus, or Potassium. The experiments demonstrate promising results of using segmentation models to discern food waste produced in our daily lives. Based on the experiments, SegFormer, utilizing MIT-B5 backbone, yields the best performance with a mean Intersection over Union (mIoU) of 67.09. Class-based results are also provided to facilitate further analysis of different food waste classes.

Persistent AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) beyond single-turn interaction into long-lived software systems. Unlike traditional chat assistants, unsafe content in these agents can propagate through persistent state, reusable skills, and tool-mediated interactions, creating a substantially larger semantic attack surface. We observe that most security-critical interactions in such agents are transmitted through natural-language token flows, including memory updates, tool arguments, retrieved files, and inter-component communications. This observation enables a new security formulation: unsafe behavior can be intercepted as risky semantic flows before reaching privileged runtime sinks. Based on this insight, we propose TokenWall, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows. TokenWall performs boundary-aware semantic auditing over these flows, constructing structured source-sink audit records, applying lightweight local inspection before execution, and selectively escalating ambiguous high-risk cases to stronger arbitration modules. Unlike prior approaches that rely on sparse auditing or remote large-model oversight, TokenWall enables full-coverage pre-execution mediation while reducing remote arbitration and latency. Experiments on CIK-Bench show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation. TokenWall further introduces only 0.69 seconds of additional latency on benign cases, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.

Modern semantic search and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems rely predominantly on in-memory approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) indexes over high-precision floating-point vectors, resulting in escalating operational cost and inherent trade-offs between latency, throughput, and retrieval accuracy. This paper analyzes the architectural limitations of the dominant "HNSW + float32 + cosine similarity" stack and evaluates existing cost-reduction strategies, including storage disaggregation and lossy vector quantization, which inevitably sacrifice either performance or accuracy. We introduce and empirically evaluate an alternative information-theoretic architecture based on maximally informative binarization (MIB), efficient bitwise distance metrics, and an information-theoretic scoring (ITS) mechanism. Unlike conventional ANN systems, this approach enables exhaustive search over compact binary representations, allowing deterministic retrieval and eliminating accuracy degradation under high query concurrency. Using the MAIR benchmark across 14 datasets and 10,038 queries, we compare this architecture against Elasticsearch, Pinecone, PGVector, and Qdrant. Results demonstrate retrieval quality comparable to full-precision systems, while achieving substantially lower latency and maintaining constant throughput at high request rates. We show that this architectural shift enables a truly serverless, cost-per-query deployment model, challenging the necessity of large in-memory ANN indexes for high-quality semantic search.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in various complex tasks, yet they still suffer from hallucinations. Introducing external knowledge, such as knowledge graph, can enhance the LLMs' ability to provide factual answers. LLMs have the ability to interactively explore knowledge graphs. However, most approaches have been affected by insufficient internal knowledge excavation in LLMs, limited generation of trustworthy knowledge reasoning paths, and a vague integration between internal and external knowledge. Therefore, we propose KnowPath, a knowledge-enhanced large model framework driven by the collaboration of internal and external knowledge. It relies on the internal knowledge of the LLM to guide the exploration of interpretable directed subgraphs in external knowledge graphs, better integrating the two knowledge sources for more accurate reasoning. Extensive experiments on multiple real-world datasets confirm the superiority of KnowPath.