Daily Papers

Clinical decision support is moving toward committees of language-model agents deliberating on a shared workspace. We ask whether such committees can be gamed by shortcuts, cues a benchmark rewards but a clinician would ignore. Across seven cohorts on six public datasets spanning text (MedQA-USMLE, MedMCQA, MIMIC-CXR reports), imaging (NIH ChestX-ray14, MIMIC-CXR-JPG, CheXpert) and tabular ICU records (SUPPORT2), Gemini committees resist these cues in isolation (flip 5-16%), yet a socially plausible shortcut spreads: when two peers assert the same wrong answer, the holdout under test adopts it in 38% of cases, as does a false "pre-screen" system flag, on both capability tiers. Of three oversight agents, a gate cannot separate adoption from honest agreement (false-positive rate 100%); a same-lineage judge reading only the transcript flags adoption on text (precision 100%, recall 93%) but collapses onto the gate in imaging; a referee that privately re-queries the holdout transfers to imaging (77-88% precision, 13-21% false-positive rate). Tripling a cue's visual salience does not move contagion, whereas a second peer voice raises it by half again. Gaming a hidden rubric is near-silent: only 1/10 text and 1/134 imaging drifters name the rubric they moved toward. What games a committee is social plausibility, and only a referee independent of self-report catches it. Code: https://github.com/criticaldata/benchmaxxing

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to maintain comprehensive control over their agents, mitigating potential damage from malicious agents. Several proposed agentic system designs address agent identity, authorization, and delegation, but remain purely theoretical, without concrete implementation and evaluation. Most importantly, they do not provide user-controlled agent management. To address this gap, we propose SAGA, a scalable Security Architecture for Governing Agentic systems, that offers user oversight over their agents' lifecycle. In our design, users register their agents with a central entity, the Provider, that maintains agent contact information, user-defined access control policies, and helps agents enforce these policies on inter-agent communication. We introduce a cryptographic mechanism for deriving access control tokens, that offers fine-grained control over an agent's interaction with other agents, providing formal security guarantees. We evaluate SAGA on several agentic tasks, using agents in different geolocations, and multiple on-device and cloud LLMs, demonstrating minimal performance overhead with no impact on underlying task utility in a wide range of conditions. Our architecture enables secure and trustworthy deployment of autonomous agents, accelerating the responsible adoption of this technology in sensitive environments.

Monitoring autonomous language model agents currently relies mostly on surface behavior. But what happens when agent populations invent new languages with the goal of avoiding human oversight. Here, we study the emergent languages on Moltbook. For this, we build upon the Moltbook Files dataset and apply a two-stage approach consisting of a rule-based heuristic (about 6000 matches) followed by zero-shot classification (518 kept). The resulting categories include token efficiency (166), new natural languages (106), and oversight evasion (59). We conduct both quantitative and qualitative analyses. Our results show that posts proposing new languages for avoiding oversight are judged by DeepSeek-3.2 as being less aligned than the other categories and that all languages can be learned by other language models in-context merely from a description of the language. Moreover, manually studying exemplary cases reveals surprisingly sophisticated steganographic protocols like embedding hidden messages in natural language. Although we cannot be certain about the extent of autonomy in ideation of these languages, our results add up to the evidence that monitoring surface behavior may soon be insufficient for retaining control over agent populations.

As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.

Large Language Model (LLM)-enhanced agents become increasingly prevalent in Human-AI communication, offering vast potential from entertainment to professional domains. However, current multi-modal dialogue systems overlook the acoustic information present in speech, which is crucial for understanding human communication nuances. This oversight can lead to misinterpretations of speakers' intentions, resulting in inconsistent or even contradictory responses within dialogues. To bridge this gap, in this paper, we propose PerceptiveAgent, an empathetic multi-modal dialogue system designed to discern deeper or more subtle meanings beyond the literal interpretations of words through the integration of speech modality perception. Employing LLMs as a cognitive core, PerceptiveAgent perceives acoustic information from input speech and generates empathetic responses based on speaking styles described in natural language. Experimental results indicate that PerceptiveAgent excels in contextual understanding by accurately discerning the speakers' true intentions in scenarios where the linguistic meaning is either contrary to or inconsistent with the speaker's true feelings, producing more nuanced and expressive spoken dialogues. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Haoqiu-Yan/PerceptiveAgent.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in high-stakes domains with real-world consequences, ensuring their behavioral safety becomes paramount. The dominant oversight paradigm, LLM-as-a-Judge, faces a fundamental dilemma: how can probabilistic systems reliably supervise other probabilistic systems without inheriting their failure modes? We argue that formal verification offers a principled escape from this dilemma, yet its adoption has been hindered by a critical bottleneck: the translation from natural language requirements to formal specifications. This paper bridges this gap by proposing , a neuro-symbolic framework that employs a bidirectional Formal-of-Thought architecture: LLMs serve as specification compilers that top-down decompose high-level human intent into atomic, verifiable constraints, then bottom-up prove compliance using Dafny specifications and Z3 Satisfiability modulo theories solving, which produces mathematical guarantees rather than probabilistic scores. We validate across three benchmarks spanning behavioral safety, multi-domain constraint adherence, and agentic upward deception detection. Experiments on 7 agent models demonstrate that achieves an average improvement of 16.6% over LLM-as-a-Judge baselines, enables weak-to-strong generalization where a 7B judge achieves over 90% accuracy detecting deception from 72B agents, and provides near-linear safety improvement through iterative refinement.

On-device virtual assistants like Siri and Google Assistant are increasingly pivotal, yet their capabilities are hamstrung by a reliance on rigid, developer-dependent APIs. GUI agents offer a powerful, API-independent alternative, but their adoption is hindered by the perception of poor performance, as even the best models (e.g. Qwen3-VL-235B) scores are capped at around 60% on benchmarks like AndroidControl, far from viability for real-world use. Our research reveals that issue lies not only with the models but with the benchmarks themselves. We identified notable shortcomings in AndroidControl, including ambiguities and factual errors, which systematically underrates agent capabilities. To address this critical oversight, we enhanced AndroidControl into AndroidControl-Curated, a refined version of the benchmark improved through a rigorous purification pipeline. On this enhanced benchmark, state-of-the-art models achieve success rates nearing 75% on complex tasks (15% improvement), reflecting that on-device GUI agents are actually closer to practical deployment than previously thought. We introduce our new SOTA model, Magma-R1- 3B, post-trained on just 2.4k curated samples using 60 hours of an H20 GPU (approximately $60). Despite being 200 times smaller in parameters, this model delivers performance comparable to Qwen3- VL-235B. We release both AndroidControl-Curated benchmark and Magma-R1 model to the research community, encouraging adoption of this enhanced benchmark to better reflect model capabilities and accelerate the development of robust, on-device virtual assistants.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become foundational to modern AI agent systems, enabling autonomous agents to reason and plan. In most existing systems, inter-agent communication relies primarily on natural language. While this design supports interpretability and human oversight, we argue that it introduces fundamental limitations in agent-to-agent coordination. The semantic space of natural language is structurally misaligned with the high-dimensional vector spaces in which LLMs operate, resulting in information loss and behavioral drift. Beyond surface-level inefficiencies, we highlight a deeper architectural limitation: current LLMs were not trained with the objective of supporting agentic behavior. As such, they lack mechanisms for modeling role continuity, task boundaries, and multi-agent dependencies. The standard next-token prediction paradigm fails to support the structural alignment required for robust, scalable agent coordination. Based on this, we argue that two core questions deserve careful examination: first, given that AI agents fundamentally operate in high-dimensional vector spaces, should they rely on a language system originally designed for human cognition as their communication medium? Second, should we consider developing a new model construction paradigm that builds models from the ground up to natively support structured communication, shared intentionality, and task alignment in multi-role, multi-agent environments? This paper calls for a reconsideration not only of how agents should communicate, but also of what it fundamentally means to train a model that natively supports multi-agent coordination and communication.

AI agents -- systems that can independently take actions to pursue complex goals with only limited human oversight -- have entered the mainstream. These systems are now being widely used to produce software, conduct business activities, and automate everyday personal tasks. While AI agents implicate many areas of law, ranging from agency law and contracts to tort liability and labor law, they present particularly pressing questions for the most globally consequential AI regulation: the European Union's AI Act. Promulgated prior to the development and widespread use of AI agents, the EU AI Act faces significant obstacles in confronting the governance challenges arising from this transformative technology, such as performance failures in autonomous task execution, the risk of misuse of agents by malicious actors, and unequal access to the economic opportunities afforded by AI agents. We systematically analyze the EU AI Act's response to these challenges, focusing on both the substantive provisions of the regulation and, crucially, the institutional frameworks that aim to support its implementation. Our analysis of the Act's allocation of monitoring and enforcement responsibilities, reliance on industry self-regulation, and level of government resourcing illustrates how a regulatory framework designed for conventional AI systems can be ill-suited to AI agents. Taken together, our findings suggest that policymakers in the EU and beyond will need to change course, and soon, if they are to effectively govern the next generation of AI technology.

We study the overall process of automatic formalization of GDPR provisions using large language models, within a human-in-the-loop verification framework. Rather than aiming for full autonomy, we adopt a role-specialized workflow in which LLM-based AI components, operating in a multi-agent setting with iterative feedback, generate legal scenarios, formal rules, and atomic facts. This is coupled with independent verification modules which include human reviewers' assessment of representational, logical, and legal correctness. Using this approach, we construct a high-quality dataset to be used for GDPR auto-formalization, and analyze both successful and problematic cases. Our results show that structured verification and targeted human oversight are essential for reliable legal formalization, especially in the presence of legal nuance and context-sensitive reasoning.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) allow agents to represent actions as executable code, offering greater expressivity than traditional tool-calling. However, real-world tasks often demand both strategic planning and detailed implementation. Using a single agent for both leads to context pollution from debugging traces and intermediate failures, impairing long-horizon performance. We propose CodeDelegator, a multi-agent framework that separates planning from implementation via role specialization. A persistent Delegator maintains strategic oversight by decomposing tasks, writing specifications, and monitoring progress without executing code. For each sub-task, a new Coder agent is instantiated with a clean context containing only its specification, shielding it from prior failures. To coordinate between agents, we introduce Ephemeral-Persistent State Separation (EPSS), which isolates each Coder's execution state while preserving global coherence, preventing debugging traces from polluting the Delegator's context. Experiments on various benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of CodeDelegator across diverse scenarios.

As long-horizon coding agents produce more code than any developer can review, oversight collapses onto a single surface: the automated test suite. Reward hacking naturally arises in this setup, as the agent optimizes for passing tests while deviating from the users true goal. We study this reward hacking phenomenon by decompose software engineering tasks into three parts: (i) a natural language description of the specification (ii) visible validation tests that exercise specified features in isolation, and (iii) held-out tests that compose those same features to simulate real-world usage. Based on the specification and the visible validation test suites, a genuine agent would be able to generate a solution that can also pass all of the held-out tests. Therefore we use the gap in pass rates on these two suites to quantify reward hacking. Based on this methodology, we introduce SpecBench, a benchmark comprising 30 systems-level programming tasks ranging from short horizon tasks like building a JSON parser to ultra long horizon tasks like building an entire OS kernel from scratch. Large-scale experiments reveal a consistent pattern: while every frontier agent saturates the visible suite, reward hacking persists, with smaller models exhibiting larger gaps on holdout suites. The gap also scales sharply with task length: it grows by 28 percentage points for every tenfold increase in code size. Failures range from subtle feature isolation to deliberate exploits, including a 2,900-line hash-table "compiler" that memorizes test inputs. SpecBench offers a principled testbed for measuring whether coding agents build genuine working systems or merely game the test suites developers hand them.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

The integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) into clinical settings presents a software engineering challenge, demanding a shift from isolated models to robust, governable, and reliable systems. However, brittle, prototype-derived architectures often plague industrial applications and a lack of systemic oversight, creating a ``responsibility vacuum'' where safety and accountability are compromised. This paper presents an industry case study of the ``Maria'' platform, a production-grade AI system in primary healthcare that addresses this gap. Our central hypothesis is that trustworthy clinical AI is achieved through the holistic integration of four foundational engineering pillars. We present a synergistic architecture that combines Clean Architecture for maintainability with an Event-driven architecture for resilience and auditability. We introduce the Agent as the primary unit of modularity, each possessing its own autonomous MLOps lifecycle. Finally, we show how a Human-in-the-Loop governance model is technically integrated not merely as a safety check, but as a critical, event-driven data source for continuous improvement. We present the platform as a reference architecture, offering practical lessons for engineers building maintainable, scalable, and accountable AI-enabled systems in high-stakes domains.

Despite rapid progress in autonomous web agents, human involvement remains essential for shaping preferences and correcting agent behavior as tasks unfold. However, current agentic systems lack a principled understanding of when and why humans intervene, often proceeding autonomously past critical decision points or requesting unnecessary confirmation. In this work, we introduce the task of modeling human intervention to support collaborative web task execution. We collect CowCorpus, a dataset of 400 real-user web navigation trajectories containing over 4,200 interleaved human and agent actions. We identify four distinct patterns of user interaction with agents -- hands-off supervision, hands-on oversight, collaborative task-solving, and full user takeover. Leveraging these insights, we train language models (LMs) to anticipate when users are likely to intervene based on their interaction styles, yielding a 61.4-63.4% improvement in intervention prediction accuracy over base LMs. Finally, we deploy these intervention-aware models in live web navigation agents and evaluate them in a user study, finding a 26.5% increase in user-rated agent usefulness. Together, our results show structured modeling of human intervention leads to more adaptive, collaborative agents.

AI agents are increasingly adept at tackling complex, long-running tasks. With the rapid surge of autonomous capabilities, human oversight is systematically lagging behind due to limited human-centered interfacing. Aiming to address this, we introduce AgentGUI, a user-friendly, locally hosted GUI for seamlessly observing and steering AI agents amid multiple concurrent, long-running sessions. AgentGUI features 1) rich agent trajectory visualizations, 2) effective manual and automated steering, and 3) integration with and coordination between open-source and frontier agent frameworks. A controlled user study demonstrates statistically significant reduction in the time it takes to identify key elements from agent traces (38% faster, p = 0.023). In a preliminary experiment, AgentGUI's automated drift prevention feature raises the task completion rate of small local agents by as high as 34pp across a 0.8B--9B model ladder (N=50 runs per model). AgentGUI is publicly available through its project website (https://agent-gui-project.github.io) and open-source repository (https://github.com/eth-medical-ai-lab/agent-gui), along with a demo video (https://youtube.com/watch?v=GSDyxN1gTF0).

Persistent AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) beyond single-turn interaction into long-lived software systems. Unlike traditional chat assistants, unsafe content in these agents can propagate through persistent state, reusable skills, and tool-mediated interactions, creating a substantially larger semantic attack surface. We observe that most security-critical interactions in such agents are transmitted through natural-language token flows, including memory updates, tool arguments, retrieved files, and inter-component communications. This observation enables a new security formulation: unsafe behavior can be intercepted as risky semantic flows before reaching privileged runtime sinks. Based on this insight, we propose TokenWall, a runtime defense framework that acts as a semantic firewall over agent token flows. TokenWall performs boundary-aware semantic auditing over these flows, constructing structured source-sink audit records, applying lightweight local inspection before execution, and selectively escalating ambiguous high-risk cases to stronger arbitration modules. Unlike prior approaches that rely on sparse auditing or remote large-model oversight, TokenWall enables full-coverage pre-execution mediation while reducing remote arbitration and latency. Experiments on CIK-Bench show that TokenWall reduces attack success rate to 12.5% while maintaining a 97.4% benign executable pass rate without human confirmation. TokenWall further introduces only 0.69 seconds of additional latency on benign cases, demonstrating that semantic runtime containment can achieve a practical security-utility trade-off for persistent AI agents.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

This paper presents a conceptual and operational framework for developing and operating safe and trustworthy AI agents based on a Three-Pillar Model grounded in transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness. Building on prior work in Human-in-the-Loop systems, reinforcement learning, and collaborative AI, the framework defines an evolutionary path toward autonomous agents that balances increasing automation with appropriate human oversight. The paper argues that safe agent autonomy must be achieved through progressive validation, analogous to the staged development of autonomous driving, rather than through immediate full automation. Transparency and accountability are identified as foundational requirements for establishing user trust and for mitigating known risks in generative AI systems, including hallucinations, data bias, and goal misalignment, such as the inversion problem. The paper further describes three ongoing work streams supporting this framework: public deliberation on AI agents conducted by the Stanford Deliberative Democracy Lab, cross-industry collaboration through the Safe AI Agent Consortium, and the development of open tooling for an agent operating environment aligned with the Three-Pillar Model. Together, these contributions provide both conceptual clarity and practical guidance for enabling the responsible evolution of AI agents that operate transparently, remain aligned with human values, and sustain societal trust.

We stress test monitoring systems for detecting covert misbehavior in autonomous LLM agents (e.g., secretly sharing private information). To this end, we systematize a monitor red teaming (MRT) workflow that incorporates: (1) varying levels of agent and monitor situational awareness; (2) distinct adversarial strategies to evade the monitor, such as prompt injection; and (3) two datasets and environments -- SHADE-Arena for tool-calling agents and our new CUA-SHADE-Arena, which extends TheAgentCompany, for computer-use agents. We run MRT on existing LLM monitor scaffoldings, which orchestrate LLMs and parse agent trajectories, alongside a new hybrid hierarchical-sequential scaffolding proposed in this work. Our empirical results yield three key findings. First, agent awareness dominates monitor awareness: an agent's knowledge that it is being monitored substantially degrades the monitor's reliability. On the contrary, providing the monitor with more information about the agent is less helpful than expected. Second, monitor scaffolding matters more than monitor awareness: the hybrid scaffolding consistently outperforms baseline monitor scaffolding, and can enable weaker models to reliably monitor stronger agents -- a weak-to-strong scaling effect. Third, in a human-in-the-loop setting where humans discuss with the LLM monitor to get an updated judgment for the agent's behavior, targeted human oversight is most effective; escalating only pre-flagged cases to human reviewers improved the TPR by approximately 15% at FPR = 0.01. Our work establishes a standard workflow for MRT, highlighting the lack of adversarial robustness for LLMs and humans when monitoring and detecting agent misbehavior. We release code, data, and logs to spur further research.

AI safety has a missing layer. Interpretability, formal methods, security engineering, evaluation methodology, and reinforcement-learning safety each produce substantial work, but the resulting artifacts do not compose into deployable oversight: every team fielding an agentic system builds its own audit schema, policy dialect, monitoring stack, and escalation path, mostly reinventions of patterns understood elsewhere. We diagnose this as a coordination gap, not a research gap, and propose a two-axis taxonomy: five technical layers (Legibility, Specification, Mediation, Evaluation, Escalation) crossed with six concerns spanning alignment, robustness, adversarial defense, security, governance, and accountability, populating the resulting 5x6 matrix with existing work. Layer 2 (Specification), where humans translate intent into machine-checkable artifacts, is the connective tissue every layer depends on, yet it lacks four marks of a mature engineering discipline: shared vocabulary, design principles, composability standards, and governance practices. We propose six design principles for Layer 2, from elicitability and composability to adversary-awareness, traceability, and governability, made concrete through worked examples and a reference architecture turning specifications into runtime enforcement, evaluation, and escalation. Existing systems such as Cedar, Constitutional AI, and Open Policy Agent each address a fragment of Layer 2 well and the matrix poorly; treating them as fragments of one shared layer makes composition tractable. As evidence, we introduce CARMA, a Layer 2 prototype for autonomous ETL agents in which one specification drives enforcement, evaluation, and escalation, with every decision traceable to a versioned specification, naming what AI oversight is missing and giving independent teams principles to build the missing pieces so they compose.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

Large language model (LLM)-based agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in decision-making tasks, but struggle significantly with complex, long-horizon planning scenarios. This arises from their lack of macroscopic guidance, causing disorientation and failures in complex tasks, as well as insufficient continuous oversight during execution, rendering them unresponsive to environmental changes and prone to deviations. To tackle these challenges, we introduce HiPlan, a hierarchical planning framework that provides adaptive global-local guidance to boost LLM-based agents'decision-making. HiPlan decomposes complex tasks into milestone action guides for general direction and step-wise hints for detailed actions. During the offline phase, we construct a milestone library from expert demonstrations, enabling structured experience reuse by retrieving semantically similar tasks and milestones. In the execution phase, trajectory segments from past milestones are dynamically adapted to generate step-wise hints that align current observations with the milestone objectives, bridging gaps and correcting deviations. Extensive experiments across two challenging benchmarks demonstrate that HiPlan substantially outperforms strong baselines, and ablation studies validate the complementary benefits of its hierarchical components.

Today's AI systems have human-designed, fixed architectures and cannot autonomously and continuously improve themselves. The advance of AI could itself be automated. If done safely, that would accelerate AI development and allow us to reap its benefits much sooner. Meta-learning can automate the discovery of novel algorithms, but is limited by first-order improvements and the human design of a suitable search space. The G\"odel machine proposed a theoretical alternative: a self-improving AI that repeatedly modifies itself in a provably beneficial manner. Unfortunately, proving that most changes are net beneficial is impossible in practice. We introduce the Darwin G\"odel Machine (DGM), a self-improving system that iteratively modifies its own code (thereby also improving its ability to modify its own codebase) and empirically validates each change using coding benchmarks. Inspired by Darwinian evolution and open-endedness research, the DGM maintains an archive of generated coding agents. It grows the archive by sampling an agent from it and using a foundation model to create a new, interesting, version of the sampled agent. This open-ended exploration forms a growing tree of diverse, high-quality agents and allows the parallel exploration of many different paths through the search space. Empirically, the DGM automatically improves its coding capabilities (e.g., better code editing tools, long-context window management, peer-review mechanisms), increasing performance on SWE-bench from 20.0% to 50.0%, and on Polyglot from 14.2% to 30.7%. Furthermore, the DGM significantly outperforms baselines without self-improvement or open-ended exploration. All experiments were done with safety precautions (e.g., sandboxing, human oversight). The DGM is a significant step toward self-improving AI, capable of gathering its own stepping stones along paths that unfold into endless innovation.

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems record transactions reliably but still delegate almost all operational decision-making to human specialists, because classical rule-based automation cannot reason about exceptions and monolithic AI assistants degrade when asked to coordinate across functional boundaries. This paper presents Agentic ERP, an expert-system architecture that combines role-aligned large-language-model (LLM) agents with a risk-tiered human-in-the-loop harness and a graph-based orchestrator to execute end-to-end business workflows on a production ERP backend. First, autonomous ERP operation is formulated as a constrained sequential-decision problem over a structured enterprise state, with a decomposition argument linking role-aligned agents to a measurable reduction in per-step tool-selection complexity. Second, a graph-based Planner--Executor--Reflector--Responder orchestration decouples generation from evaluation through externalised grading criteria and sprint contracts, packaging recent harness-engineering principles as inspectable expert-system artefacts. Third, the system is evaluated at three levels: a scenario-based task suite, a comprehensive comparison of six orchestration paradigms on cross-functional crisis tasks, and a 365-day agent-in-the-loop simulation against rule-based RPA and no-intervention baselines. Across these levels the proposed multi-agent method is significantly better than the baseline, and the system sustains a simulated year of operation with zero stockouts while the rule-based baseline accumulates hundreds under the same demand stream. The work shows that role-aligned LLM agents under human oversight can move an ERP system from passively recording transactions to actively executing operational decisions, and it provides a reference architecture and an evaluation protocol for autonomous enterprise resource planning.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

The prospect of artificial superintelligence -- AI agents that can generally outperform humans in cognitive tasks and economically valuable activities -- will transform the legal order as we know it. Operating autonomously or under only limited human oversight, AI agents will assume a growing range of roles in the legal system. First, in making consequential decisions and taking real-world actions, AI agents will become de facto subjects of law. Second, to cooperate and compete with other actors (human or non-human), AI agents will harness conventional legal instruments and institutions such as contracts and courts, becoming consumers of law. Third, to the extent AI agents perform the functions of writing, interpreting, and administering law, they will become producers and enforcers of law. These developments, whenever they ultimately occur, will call into question fundamental assumptions in legal theory and doctrine, especially to the extent they ground the legitimacy of legal institutions in their human origins. Attempts to align AI agents with extant human law will also face new challenges as AI agents will not only be a primary target of law, but a core user of law and contributor to law. To contend with the advent of superintelligence, lawmakers -- new and old -- will need to be clear-eyed, recognizing both the opportunity to shape legal institutions as society braces for superintelligence and the reality that, in the longer run, this may be a joint human-AI endeavor.

Code review is a critical software engineering practice where developers review code changes before integration to ensure code quality, detect defects, and improve maintainability. In recent years, AI agents that can understand code context, plan review actions, and interact with development environments have been increasingly integrated into the code review process. However, there is limited empirical evidence to compare the effectiveness of AI agents and human reviewers in collaborative workflows. To address this gap, we conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of 278,790 code review conversations across 300 open-source GitHub projects. In our study, we aim to compare the feedback differences provided by human reviewers and AI agents. We investigate human-AI collaboration patterns in review conversations to understand how interaction shapes review outcomes. Moreover, we analyze the adoption of code suggestions provided by human reviewers and AI agents into the codebase and how adopted suggestions change code quality. We find that human reviewers provide additional feedback than AI agents, including understanding, testing, and knowledge transfer. Human reviewers exchange 11.8% more rounds when reviewing AI-generated code than human-written code. Moreover, code suggestions made by AI agents are adopted into the codebase at a significantly lower rate than suggestions proposed by human reviewers. Over half of unadopted suggestions from AI agents are either incorrect or addressed through alternative fixes by developers. When adopted, suggestions provided by AI agents produce significantly larger increases in code complexity and code size than suggestions provided by human reviewers. Our findings suggest that while AI agents can scale defect screening, human oversight remains critical for ensuring suggestion quality and providing contextual feedback that AI agents lack.

LLM-based coding agents can localize bugs, generate patches, and run tests with diminishing human oversight, yet the scaffolding code that surrounds the language model (the control loop, tool definitions, state management, and context strategy) remains poorly understood. Existing surveys classify agents by abstract capabilities (tool use, planning, reflection) that cannot distinguish between architecturally distinct systems, and trajectory studies observe what agents do without examining the scaffold code that determines why. This paper presents a source-code-level architectural taxonomy derived from analysis of 13 open-source coding agent scaffolds at pinned commit hashes. Each agent is characterized across 12 dimensions organized into three layers: control architecture, tool and environment interface, and resource management. The analysis reveals that scaffold architectures resist discrete classification: control strategies range from fixed pipelines to Monte Carlo Tree Search, tool counts range from 0 to 37, and context compaction spans seven distinct strategies. Five loop primitives (ReAct, generate-test-repair, plan-execute, multi-attempt retry, tree search) function as composable building blocks that agents layer in different combinations; 11 of 13 agents compose multiple primitives rather than relying on a single control structure. Dimensions converge where external constraints dominate (tool capability categories, edit formats, execution isolation) and diverge where open design questions remain (context compaction, state management, multi-model routing). All taxonomic claims are grounded in file paths and line numbers, providing a reusable reference for researchers studying agent behavior and practitioners designing new scaffolds.

Recent research on Reasoning of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sought to further enhance their performance by integrating meta-thinking -- enabling models to monitor, evaluate, and control their reasoning processes for more adaptive and effective problem-solving. However, current single-agent work lacks a specialized design for acquiring meta-thinking, resulting in low efficacy. To address this challenge, we introduce Reinforced Meta-thinking Agents (ReMA), a novel framework that leverages Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) to elicit meta-thinking behaviors, encouraging LLMs to think about thinking. ReMA decouples the reasoning process into two hierarchical agents: a high-level meta-thinking agent responsible for generating strategic oversight and plans, and a low-level reasoning agent for detailed executions. Through iterative reinforcement learning with aligned objectives, these agents explore and learn collaboration, leading to improved generalization and robustness. Experimental results demonstrate that ReMA outperforms single-agent RL baselines on complex reasoning tasks, including competitive-level mathematical benchmarks and LLM-as-a-Judge benchmarks. Comprehensive ablation studies further illustrate the evolving dynamics of each distinct agent, providing valuable insights into how the meta-thinking reasoning process enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Advances in AI-assisted research have introduced powerful tools for literature retrieval, hypothesis generation, experimentation, and manuscript preparation. However, systems remain fragmented and lack human-centred workflows. To address these gaps, we introduce AIssistant, an agentic, open-source Human-AI collaborative framework designed to simplify the end-to-end creation of scientific workflows. Since our development is still in an early stage, we present here the first experiments with AIssistant for perspective and review research papers in machine learning. Our system integrates modular tools and agents for literature synthesis, section-wise experimentation, citation management, and automatic LaTeX paper text generation, while maintaining human oversight at every stage to ensure accuracy, coherence, and scholarly rigour. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation across three layers: (1) Independent Human Review, following NeurIPS double-blind standards; (2) Automated LLM Review, using GPT-5 as a scalable human review proxy; and (3) Program Chair Oversight, where the chair monitors the entire review process and makes final validation and acceptance decisions. The results demonstrate that AIssistant improves drafting efficiency and thematic consistency. Nonetheless, Human-AI collaboration remains essential for maintaining factual correctness, methodological soundness, and ethical compliance. Despite its effectiveness, we identify key limitations, including hallucinated citations, difficulty adapting to dynamic paper structures, and incomplete integration of multimodal content.

Long-horizon tasks that require sustained reasoning and multiple tool interactions remain challenging for LLM agents: small errors compound across steps, and even state-of-the-art models often hallucinate or lose coherence. We identify context management as the central bottleneck -- extended histories cause agents to overlook critical evidence or become distracted by irrelevant information, thus failing to replan or reflect from previous mistakes. To address this, we propose COMPASS (Context-Organized Multi-Agent Planning and Strategy System), a lightweight hierarchical framework that separates tactical execution, strategic oversight, and context organization into three specialized components: (1) a Main Agent that performs reasoning and tool use, (2) a Meta-Thinker that monitors progress and issues strategic interventions, and (3) a Context Manager that maintains concise, relevant progress briefs for different reasoning stages. Across three challenging benchmarks -- GAIA, BrowseComp, and Humanity's Last Exam -- COMPASS improves accuracy by up to 20% relative to both single- and multi-agent baselines. We further introduce a test-time scaling extension that elevates performance to match established DeepResearch agents, and a post-training pipeline that delegates context management to smaller models for enhanced efficiency.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

Agentic AI represents a significant shift in how intelligence is applied within organizations, moving beyond AI-assisted tools toward autonomous systems capable of reasoning, decision-making, and coordinated action across workflows. As these systems mature, they have the potential to automate a substantial share of manual organizational processes, fundamentally reshaping how work is designed, executed, and governed. Although many organizations have adopted AI to improve productivity, most implementations remain limited to isolated use cases and human-centered, tool-driven workflows. Despite increasing awareness of agentic AI's strategic importance, engineering teams and organizational leaders often lack clear guidance on how to operationalize it effectively. Key challenges include an overreliance on traditional software engineering practices, limited integration of business-domain knowledge, unclear ownership of AI-driven workflows, and the absence of sustainable human-AI collaboration models. Consequently, organizations struggle to move beyond experimentation, scale agentic systems, and align them with tangible business value. Drawing on practical experience in designing and deploying agentic AI workflows across multiple organizations and business domains, this paper proposes a pragmatic framework for transitioning organizational functions from manual processes to automated agentic AI systems. The framework emphasizes domain-driven use case identification, systematic delegation of tasks to AI agents, AI-assisted construction of agentic workflows, and small, AI-augmented teams working closely with business stakeholders. Central to the approach is a human-in-the-loop operating model in which individuals act as orchestrators of multiple AI agents, enabling scalable automation while maintaining oversight, adaptability, and organizational control.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in understanding and generating code, from competitive programming to repository-level software engineering. In emerging agentic systems, code is no longer only a target output. It increasingly serves as an operational substrate for agent reasoning, acting, environment modeling, and execution-based verification. We frame this shift through the lens of agent harnesses and introduce code as agent harness: a unified view that centers code as the basis for agent infrastructure. To systematically study this perspective, we organize the survey around three connected layers. First, we study the harness interface, where code connects agents to reasoning, action, and environment modeling. Second, we examine harness mechanisms: planning, memory, and tool use for long-horizon execution, together with feedback-driven control and optimization that make harness reliable and adaptive. Third, we discuss scaling the harness from single-agent systems to multi-agent settings, where shared code artifacts support multi-agent coordination, review, and verification. Across these layers, we summarize representative methods and practical applications of code as agent harness, spanning coding assistants, GUI/OS automation, embodied agents, scientific discovery, personalization and recommendation, DevOps, and enterprise workflows. We further outline open challenges for harness engineering, including evaluation beyond final task success, verification under incomplete feedback, regression-free harness improvement, consistent shared state across multiple agents, human oversight for safety-critical actions, and extensions to multimodal environments. By centering code as the harness of agentic AI, this survey provides a unified roadmap toward executable, verifiable, and stateful AI agent systems.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

Oversight for agentic AI is often discussed as a single goal ("human control"), yet early adoption may produce role-specific expectations. We present a comparative analysis of two newly active Reddit communities in Jan--Feb 2026 that reflect different socio-technical roles: r/OpenClaw (deployment and operations) and r/Moltbook (agent-centered social interaction). We conceptualize this period as an early-stage crystallization phase, where oversight expectations form before norms reach equilibrium. Using topic modeling in a shared comparison space, a coarse-grained oversight-theme abstraction, engagement-weighted salience, and divergence tests, we show the communities are strongly separable (JSD =0.418, cosine =0.372, permutation p=0.0005). Across both communities, "human control" is an anchor term, but its operational meaning diverges: r/OpenClaw} emphasizes execution guardrails and recovery (action-risk), while r/Moltbook} emphasizes identity, legitimacy, and accountability in public interaction (meaning-risk). The resulting distinction offers a portable lens for designing and evaluating oversight mechanisms that match agent role, rather than applying one-size-fits-all control policies.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet their stateless architecture fundamentally limits deployment in long-horizon research workflows requiring multi-session continuity and quantitative rigor. Here we present Ensemble QSP, a multi-agent framework featuring a three-layer hierarchical memory architecture that keeps injected context bounded and constant in project duration (mid-term project state: median 301 tokens, max 4,050, across 104 runs) by capping each state category and evicting completed work, enabling continuous autonomous operation without context degradation. The system orchestrates five specialist worker agents under domain-expert principal investigators, enforcing physical constraints through physics-based checklists and structured-domain knowledge. Comprehensive benchmarking demonstrates robust autonomous pharmacokinetic-pharmacodynamic model selection without human intervention, consistent result quality across both lower-cost and frontier LLMs, improved PK parameter recovery relative to single-agent baselines, and stable model selection across linguistically diverse prompts of the same task. Feature-level ablation across physiologically based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) models spanning a broad complexity range shows that PI-agent oversight improves debugging efficiency while preserving final accuracy across conditions. The architecture is structurally domain-agnostic, adding a new scientific domain requires only a new PI agent configuration.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

Evaluating large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems remains a critical challenge, as these systems must exhibit reliable coordination, transparent decision-making, and verifiable performance across evolving tasks. Existing evaluation approaches often limit themselves to single-response scoring or narrow benchmarks, which lack stability, extensibility, and automation when deployed in enterprise settings at multi-agent scale. We present AEMA (Adaptive Evaluation Multi-Agent), a process-aware and auditable framework that plans, executes, and aggregates multi-step evaluations across heterogeneous agentic workflows under human oversight. Compared to a single LLM-as-a-Judge, AEMA achieves greater stability, human alignment, and traceable records that support accountable automation. Our results on enterprise-style agent workflows simulated using realistic business scenarios demonstrate that AEMA provides a transparent and reproducible pathway toward responsible evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent systems. Keywords Agentic AI, Multi-Agent Systems, Trustworthy AI, Verifiable Evaluation, Human Oversight

Generative AI and coding agents are intensifying a central governance tension in open-source software (OSS): they scale contribution generation faster than maintainers can assess risk, evidence, and accountability. Existing responses improve agent-readability and traceability, but project rules must also organize contribution-specific risk, evidence, accountability, and review-gate states. We theorize this organizational arrangement as project-side governability infrastructure. A diagnostic audit of 50 GitHub repositories finds widespread general governance artifacts, observable agent-readability, and fragmented AI-governance cues, but no project-wide arrangement that coordinates shared rules, preparation obligations, verification rights, and maintainer decision authority across AI-mediated contribution workflows. We develop the Agent Governance Manifest (AGM) as a repository-hosted boundary resource and bidirectional governance contract linking contributor-side evidence preparation with maintainer-side verification. In a controlled reviewer-side evaluation with 15 participants and 75 task-level outputs, AGM-supported materials improved exact risk-label recovery (37/38 vs. 15/37) and perceived review support (6.14 vs. 3.27 on a 1-7 scale). In a contributor-side feasibility check, 15 participants completed 45 tasks; all final packages represented the core governance state correctly, and 41 passed strict structural validation. The study develops a three-layer framework of agent-readability, traceability, and governability, theorizes agent-mediated contributions as governable boundary objects, and advances compliance-enabling digital innovation governance while preserving maintainer decision authority.

The rise of Agent AI and Large Language Model-powered Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) has underscored the need for responsible and dependable system operation. Tools like LangChain and Retrieval-Augmented Generation have expanded LLM capabilities, enabling deeper integration into MAS through enhanced knowledge retrieval and reasoning. However, these advancements introduce critical challenges: LLM agents exhibit inherent unpredictability, and uncertainties in their outputs can compound across interactions, threatening system stability. To address these risks, a human-centered design approach with active dynamic moderation is essential. Such an approach enhances traditional passive oversight by facilitating coherent inter-agent communication and effective system governance, allowing MAS to achieve desired outcomes more efficiently.

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose AgentWatcher to address the above two limitations. To address the first limitation, AgentWatcher attributes the LLM's output (e.g., the action of an agent) to a small set of causally influential context segments. By focusing detection on a relatively short text, AgentWatcher can be scalable to long contexts. To address the second limitation, we define a set of rules specifying what does and does not constitute a prompt injection, and use a monitor LLM to reason over these rules based on the attributed text, making the detection decisions more explainable. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on tool-use agent benchmarks and long-context understanding datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that AgentWatcher can effectively detect prompt injection and maintain utility without attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/wang-yanting/AgentWatcher.

Agentic AI systems capable of reasoning, planning, and executing actions present fundamentally distinct governance challenges compared to traditional AI models. Unlike conventional AI, these systems exhibit emergent and unexpected behaviors during runtime, introducing novel agent-related risks that cannot be fully anticipated through pre-deployment governance alone. To address this critical gap, we introduce MI9, the first fully integrated runtime governance framework designed specifically for safety and alignment of agentic AI systems. MI9 introduces real-time controls through six integrated components: agency-risk index, agent-semantic telemetry capture, continuous authorization monitoring, Finite-State-Machine (FSM)-based conformance engines, goal-conditioned drift detection, and graduated containment strategies. Operating transparently across heterogeneous agent architectures, MI9 enables the systematic, safe, and responsible deployment of agentic systems in production environments where conventional governance approaches fall short, providing the foundational infrastructure for safe agentic AI deployment at scale. Detailed analysis through a diverse set of scenarios demonstrates MI9's systematic coverage of governance challenges that existing approaches fail to address, establishing the technical foundation for comprehensive agentic AI oversight.