Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used as judges for evaluating model outputs, but their high cost, latency, and opacity limit scalability. We introduce SLMJury, a framework for evaluating small language models (SLMs) as judges across two paradigms: closed-ended binary correctness and open-ended quality scoring. We benchmark 16 SLM judges (0.6B-14B parameters) from four model families across ten benchmarks: eight closed-ended tasks spanning mathematical, scientific, and general reasoning (N=64,824 judgments per configuration), plus SummEval and MT-Bench for summarization and conversational scoring. We formalize judging as a budget-conditioned function and study five dimensions. Four findings emerge. (1) The overthinking effect is domain-dependent: for most judges quick 10-token verdicts match or beat extended reasoning on mathematical judging (by 2-7% where they help), while reasoning wins on general tasks by up to 23%. (2) Domain generalization separates model families, with math-to-general accuracy gaps ranging from under 10% to nearly 40%. (3) Closed-ended and open-ended judging draw on different capabilities: the best binary judge (Phi-4) drops to rank 9 on MT-Bench, while reasoning-trained models invert this ordering. (4) Under the Reflect-Critique-Refine (RCR) debate protocol, multi-agent debate degrades accuracy across all tested configurations, whereas the top judges resist six adversarial personas with <=0.55% variance. Reliable automated evaluation does not require large proprietary models, yet no single SLM dominates. The leaderboard is available at https://anishh15.github.io/SLMJury/, and our framework code and pip package are publicly available at https://github.com/anishh15/SLMJury and https://pypi.org/project/slmjury/.

Large language model (LLM) steering has emerged as a promising paradigm for controlling model behavior at inference time through targeted manipulation of hidden states, offering a lightweight alternative to expensive retraining. However, existing steering frameworks suffer from critical limitations: computational inefficiency, limited extensibility, and restricted functionality that hinder both research progress and practical deployment. We present EasySteer, a unified framework for high-performance, extensible LLM steering built on vLLM. Our system features modular architecture with pluggable interfaces for both analysis-based and learning-based methods, fine-grained parameter control, pre-computed steering vectors for eight application domains, and an interactive demonstration system. Through deep integration with vLLM's optimized inference engine, EasySteer achieves 5.5-11.4times speedup over existing frameworks. Extensive experiments demonstrate its effectiveness in overthinking mitigation, hallucination reduction, and other key applications. EasySteer transforms steering from research technique to production-ready capability, establishing critical infrastructure for deployable, controllable language models.

Visual reasoning models (VRMs) have recently shown strong cross-modal reasoning capabilities by integrating visual perception with language reasoning. However, they often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long reasoning chains for any tasks. We attribute this issue to Reasoning Path Redundancy in visual reasoning: many visual questions do not require the full reasoning process. To address this, we propose AVR, an adaptive visual reasoning framework that decomposes visual reasoning into three cognitive functions: visual perception, logical reasoning, and answer application. It further enables models to dynamically choose among three response formats: Full Format, Perception-Only Format, and Direct Answer. AVR is trained with FS-GRPO, an adaptation of Group Relative Policy Optimization that encourages the model to select the most efficient reasoning format while preserving correctness. Experiments on multiple vision-language benchmarks show that AVR reduces token usage by 50--90\% while maintaining overall accuracy, especially in perception-intensive tasks. These results demonstrate that adaptive visual reasoning can effectively mitigate overthinking in VRMs. Code and data are available at: https://github.com/RunRiotComeOn/AVR.

We introduce Yuan3.0 Flash, an open-source Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) MultiModal Large Language Model featuring 3.7B activated parameters and 40B total parameters, specifically designed to enhance performance on enterprise-oriented tasks while maintaining competitive capabilities on general-purpose tasks. To address the overthinking phenomenon commonly observed in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), we propose Reflection-aware Adaptive Policy Optimization (RAPO), a novel RL training algorithm that effectively regulates overthinking behaviors. In enterprise-oriented tasks such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), complex table understanding, and summarization, Yuan3.0 Flash consistently achieves superior performance. Moreover, it also demonstrates strong reasoning capabilities in domains such as mathematics, science, etc., attaining accuracy comparable to frontier model while requiring only approximately 1/4 to 1/2 of the average tokens. Yuan3.0 Flash has been fully open-sourced to facilitate further research and real-world deployment: https://github.com/Yuan-lab-LLM/Yuan3.0.

Recent advancements in slow thinking reasoning models have shown exceptional performance in complex reasoning tasks. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (generating redundant reasoning steps for simple problems), leading to excessive computational resource usage. While current mitigation strategies uniformly reduce reasoning tokens, they risk degrading performance on challenging tasks that require extended reasoning. This paper introduces Difficulty-Adaptive Slow Thinking (DAST), a novel framework that enables models to autonomously adjust the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) based on problem difficulty. We first propose a Token Length Budget (TLB) metric to quantify difficulty, then leverage budget-aware reward shaping and budget preference optimization to implement DAST. DAST penalizes overlong responses for simple tasks while incentivizing sufficient reasoning for complex problems. Experiments on diverse datasets and model scales demonstrate that DAST effectively mitigates overthinking (reducing token usage by over 30\% on average) while preserving reasoning accuracy on complex problems. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/AnonymousUser0520/AnonymousRepo01.

Test-time scaling has proven effective in further enhancing the performance of pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs). However, mainstream post-training methods (i.e., reinforcement learning (RL) with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning) often incur substantial computational overhead due to auxiliary models and overthinking. In this paper, we empirically reveal that the incorrect answers partially stem from verbose reasoning processes lacking correct self-fix, where errors accumulate across multiple reasoning steps. To this end, we propose Self-traced Step-wise Preference Optimization (SSPO), a pluggable RL process supervision framework that enables fine-grained optimization of each reasoning step. Specifically, SSPO requires neither auxiliary models nor stepwise manual annotations. Instead, it leverages step-wise preference signals generated by the model itself to guide the optimization process for reasoning compression. Experiments demonstrate that the generated reasoning sequences from SSPO are both accurate and succinct, effectively mitigating overthinking behaviors without compromising model performance across diverse domains and languages.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs), such as OpenAI-O3 and DeepSeek-R1, have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities by performing structured and multi-step reasoning. However, recent studies reveal that RLLMs often suffer from overthinking, i.e., producing unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains even for simple questions, leading to excessive token consumption and computational inefficiency. Interestingly, we observe that when processing multiple questions in batch mode, RLLMs exhibit more resource-efficient behavior by dynamically compressing reasoning steps for easier problems, due to implicit resource competition. Inspired by this, we propose Dynamic Reasoning Quota Allocation (DRQA), a novel method that transfers the benefits of resource competition from batch processing to single-question inference. Specifically, DRQA leverages batch-generated preference data and reinforcement learning to train the model to allocate reasoning resources adaptively. By encouraging the model to internalize a preference for responses that are both accurate and concise, DRQA enables it to generate concise answers for simple questions while retaining sufficient reasoning depth for more challenging ones. Extensive experiments on a wide range of mathematical and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that DRQA significantly reduces token usage while maintaining, and in many cases improving, answer accuracy. By effectively mitigating the overthinking problem, DRQA offers a promising direction for more efficient and scalable deployment of RLLMs, and we hope it inspires further exploration into fine-grained control of reasoning behaviors.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly optimized for long reasoning, under the assumption that more reasoning leads to better performance. However, emerging evidence suggests that longer responses can sometimes degrade accuracy rather than improve it. In this paper, we conduct a systematic empirical study of the relationship between reasoning length and answer correctness. We find that LLMs tend to overthink simple problems, generating unnecessarily long outputs, and underthink harder ones, failing to extend their reasoning when it is most needed. This indicates that models might misjudge problem difficulty and fail to calibrate their response length appropriately. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of length reduction with a preference optimization algorithm when simply preferring the shorter responses regardless of answer correctness. Experiments show that the generation length can be significantly reduced while maintaining acceptable accuracy. Our findings highlight generation length as a meaningful signal for reasoning behavior and motivate further exploration into LLMs' self-awareness in reasoning length adaptation.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) boosted by Reinforcement Learning from Verifier Reward (RLVR) have shown great power in problem solving, yet they often cause overthinking: excessive, meandering reasoning that inflates computational cost. Prior designs of penalization in RLVR manage to reduce token consumption while often harming model performance, which arises from the oversimplicity of token-level supervision. In this paper, we argue that the granularity of supervision plays a crucial role in balancing efficiency and accuracy, and propose Group Relative Segment Penalization (GRSP), a step-level method to regularize reasoning. Since preliminary analyses show that reasoning segments are strongly correlated with token consumption and model performance, we design a length-aware weighting mechanism across segment clusters. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GRSP achieves superior token efficiency without heavily compromising accuracy, especially the advantages with harder problems. Moreover, GRSP stabilizes RL training and scales effectively across model sizes.

Reasoning with a Code Interpreter (CI) has emerged as an effective paradigm for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) through executable computation and iterative verification. Despite its growing adoption, the behavioral properties underlying effective code reasoning remain largely underexplored. In this work, we investigate code reasoning from two distinct perspectives inspired by prior studies of natural language reasoning: extrinsic properties, represented by crucial tokens, and intrinsic properties, represented by code-specific cognitive behaviors. Across multiple LLMs, we find that stronger CI reasoning models consistently exhibit a higher prevalence of crucial tokens and cognitive behaviors, particularly verification, backtracking, and backward chaining. Building on these observations, we examine how these properties can be leveraged during both inference and training. At inference time, appending code-specific crucial tokens improves performance on several reasoning capabilities, including mathematical, ordering, and optimization, while yielding limited benefits elsewhere. At training time, augmenting a state-of-the-art framework with code-specific cognitive behaviors improves supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning performance in two of three evaluated models. Further analysis shows that these behaviors reduce overthinking in incorrect responses and improve token efficiency, while also revealing factors that limit gains in a certain model. Our findings provide the first systematic characterization of effective reasoning with CI and demonstrate both the potential and limitations of leveraging key properties to improve CI-based reasoning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often produce excessively verbose reasoning traces, a phenomenon known as overthinking, which hampers both efficiency and interpretability. Prior works primarily address this issue by reducing response length, without fully examining the underlying semantic structure of the reasoning process. In this paper, we revisit overthinking by decomposing it into two distinct forms: internal redundancy, which consists of low-contribution reasoning steps within the first correct solution (FCS), and external redundancy, which refers to unnecessary continuation after the FCS. To mitigate both forms, we propose a dual-penalty reinforcement learning framework. For internal redundancy, we adopt a sliding-window semantic analysis to penalize low-gain reasoning steps that contribute little toward reaching the correct answer. For external redundancy, we penalize its proportion beyond the FCS to encourage earlier termination. Our method significantly compresses reasoning traces with minimal accuracy loss, and generalizes effectively to out-of-domain tasks such as question answering and code generation. Crucially, we find that external redundancy can be safely removed without degrading performance, whereas internal redundancy must be reduced more cautiously to avoid impairing correctness. These findings suggest that our method not only improves reasoning efficiency but also enables implicit, semantic-aware control over Chain-of-Thought length, paving the way for more concise and interpretable LRMs.

Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) enables large language models (LLMs) to improve their internal reasoning ability by integrating external tools. However, models employing TIR often display suboptimal behaviors, such as insufficient or excessive tool usage and overthinking after tool calls. The challenge of incentivizing LLMs to perform TIR efficiently and accurately, while stabilizing the reasoning process, remains an open question. In this paper, we start by exploring the impact of tool calls on model reasoning from the perspective of information entropy. Our findings indicate that tool call results lead to a distinct change in the information entropy of subsequent reasoning, with the overall entropy of the reasoning chain varying based on the number of tool calls. Building on these insights, we propose Tool-Light, a framework designed to encourage LLMs to perform TIR efficiently and accurately. Our framework includes dataset construction and multi-stage fine-tuning. For dataset construction, we employ continuous self-evolved sampling using the fine-tuned model, integrating both vanilla sampling and entropy-guided sampling. Besides, we establish strict criteria for selecting positive-negative pairs during sampling. The training process involves a two-stage approach, comprising Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Self-Evolved Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Experimental results on 10 datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of Tool-Light, significantly improving the model's efficiency in executing TIR tasks.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have introduced Reasoning Large Language Models (RLLMs), which employ extended thinking processes with reflection and self-correction capabilities, demonstrating the effectiveness of test-time scaling. RLLMs exhibit innate Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning capability obtained from training, leading to a natural question: "Is CoT prompting, a popular In-Context Learning (ICL) method for chat LLMs, necessary to enhance the reasoning capability of RLLMs?" In this work, we present the first comprehensive analysis of the impacts of Zero-shot CoT and Few-shot CoT on RLLMs across mathematical reasoning tasks. We examine models ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, finding that contrary to concerns, CoT prompting significantly enhances RLLMs' performance in most scenarios. Our results reveal distinct patterns: large-capacity models show minimal improvement on simple tasks but substantial gains on complex problems, while smaller models exhibit the opposite behavior. Further analysis demonstrates that CoT prompting effectively controls the distribution of the numbers of thinking tokens and reasoning steps, reducing excessive reflections by approximately 90% in some cases. Moreover, attention logits analysis reveals the RLLMs' overfitting to reflection-related words, which is mitigated by external CoT guidance. Notably, our experiments indicate that for RLLMs, one-shot CoT consistently yields superior performance compared to Few-shot CoT approaches. Our findings provide important insights for optimizing RLLMs' performance through appropriate prompting strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in complex reasoning tasks, but their inference remains computationally inefficient. We observe a common failure mode in many prevalent LLMs, overthinking, where models generate verbose and tangential reasoning traces even for simple queries. Recent works have tried to mitigate this by enforcing fixed token budgets, however, this can lead to underthinking, especially on harder problems. Through empirical analysis, we identify that this inefficiency often stems from unclear problem-solving strategies. To formalize this, we develop a theoretical model, BBAM (Bayesian Budget Allocation Model), which models reasoning as a sequence of sub-questions with varying uncertainty, and introduce the E^3 metric to capture the trade-off between correctness and computation efficiency. Building on theoretical results from BBAM, we propose Plan-and-Budget, a model-agnostic, test-time framework that decomposes complex queries into sub-questions and allocates token budgets based on estimated complexity using adaptive scheduling. Plan-and-Budget improves reasoning efficiency across a range of tasks and models, achieving up to +70% accuracy gains, -39% token reduction, and +187.5% improvement in E^3. Notably, it elevates a smaller model (DS-Qwen-32B) to match the efficiency of a larger model (DS-LLaMA-70B)-demonstrating Plan-and-Budget's ability to close performance gaps without retraining. Our code is available at anonymous.4open.science/r/P-and-B-6513/.

Large Reasoning Language Models (LRLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities on complex tasks by utilizing long Chain-of-Thought reasoning. However, they are prone to overthinking, which generates redundant reasoning steps that degrade both performance and efficiency. Recently, early-exit strategies are proposed to mitigate overthinking by dynamically and adaptively terminating redundant reasoning. However, current early-exit methods either introduce extra training overhead by relying on proxy models or limit inference throughput due to the frequent content switching between reasoning and generating probing answers. Moreover, most early-exit methods harm LRLMs performance due to over-truncation. Our insight stems from an observation: overthinking often causes LRLMs to deviate from the correct reasoning path, which is frequently accompanied by high-entropy transition tokens. Given this, we propose an early-exit method deeply coupled with the native reasoning process, which leverages the path deviation index as a dedicated monitoring metric for the frequent occurrence of high-entropy transition tokens to dynamically detect and terminate overthinking trajectories. We conduct experiments across multiple benchmarks using LRLMs of different types and scales, and the results indicate that our method delivers the largest performance improvement over vanilla CoT compared to existing early-exit methods.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance on challenging tasks, yet their deep reasoning often incurs substantial computational costs. To achieve efficient reasoning, existing reinforcement learning methods still struggle to construct short reasoning path during the rollout stage, limiting effective learning. Inspired by Evidence Accumulation Models, we find that LRMs have accumulated sufficient information early in reasoning, making further reasoning steps redundant. Based on this insight, we propose Just-Enough Thinking (JET), which trains models to proactively terminate unnecessary reasoning. JET performs trajectory truncation during rollout to expose the model to short, distributionally consistent reasoning paths. Besides, it uses a quality-controlled length reward to better encourage concise reasoning while maintaining correctness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that JET significantly improves reasoning efficiency without sacrificing accuracy. Especially, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-1.5B achieves a 4.6% accuracy gain while reducing output length by 46.3% on the Olympiad benchmark. Our code is available in the GitHub.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often rely on long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks. While effective, these trajectories are frequently inefficient, leading to high latency from excessive token generation, or unstable reasoning that alternates between underthinking (shallow, inconsistent steps) and overthinking (repetitive, verbose reasoning). In this work, we study the structure of reasoning trajectories and uncover specialized attention heads that correlate with distinct cognitive behaviors such as verification and backtracking. By lightly intervening on these heads at inference time, we can steer the model away from inefficient modes. Building on this insight, we propose CREST, a training-free method for Cognitive REasoning Steering at Test-time. CREST has two components: (1) an offline calibration step that identifies cognitive heads and derives head-specific steering vectors, and (2) an inference-time procedure that rotates hidden representations to suppress components along those vectors. CREST adaptively suppresses unproductive reasoning behaviors, yielding both higher accuracy and lower computational cost. Across diverse reasoning benchmarks and models, CREST improves accuracy by up to 17.5% while reducing token usage by 37.6%, offering a simple and effective pathway to faster, more reliable LLM reasoning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently achieved significant progress in complex reasoning tasks, aided by reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. However, LRMs often suffer from overthinking, expending excessive computation on simple problems and reducing efficiency. Existing efficient reasoning methods typically require accurate task assessment to preset token budgets or select reasoning modes, which limits their flexibility and reliability. In this work, we revisit the essence of overthinking and identify that encouraging effective steps while penalizing ineffective ones is key to its solution. To this end, we propose a novel rule-based verifiable stepwise reward mechanism (VSRM), which assigns rewards based on the performance of intermediate states in the reasoning trajectory. This approach is intuitive and naturally fits the step-by-step nature of reasoning tasks. We conduct extensive experiments on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, including AIME24 and AIME25, by integrating VSRM with PPO and Reinforce++. Results show that our method achieves substantial output length reduction while maintaining original reasoning performance, striking an optimal balance between efficiency and accuracy. Further analysis of overthinking frequency and pass@k score before and after training demonstrates that our approach in deed effectively suppresses ineffective steps and encourages effective reasoning, fundamentally alleviating the overthinking problem. All code will be released upon acceptance.

Despite their strong performance on reasoning tasks, large reasoning models (LRMs) often suffer from overthinking, producing unnecessarily long outputs and incurring high end-to-end latency, a significant limitation to their real-world deployment. To address overthinking, early-exit mechanisms have been proposed to terminate reasoning before typical completion, showing that this approach can effectively shorten generation length with minimal impact on accuracy. However, their reliance on probing mechanisms introduces a detection overhead that limits their end-to-end latency gains and compromises their generalizability across diverse problems. Inspired by the use of hidden states in speculative decoding, we propose SpecExit, a novel framework that predicts both future tokens and an early-exit signal directly from a lightweight draft model without probing overhead. Our method offers significant improvements, reducing average generation length by 66\% and achieving a 2.5x speedup in end-to-end latency compared to the speculative decoding baseline, without compromising accuracy. Our method leverages the inherent signals from hidden states to provide effective early-exit signals, suggesting broader use of hidden states for efficient reasoning. Our code is available at https://github.com/Tencent/AngelSlim.

The inherent capabilities of a language model (LM) and the reasoning strategies it employs jointly determine its performance in reasoning tasks. While test-time scaling is regarded as an effective approach to tackling complex reasoning tasks, it incurs substantial computational costs and often leads to "overthinking", where models become trapped in "thought pitfalls". To address this challenge, we propose Route-To-Reason (RTR), a novel unified routing framework that dynamically allocates both LMs and reasoning strategies according to task difficulty under budget constraints. RTR learns compressed representations of both expert models and reasoning strategies, enabling their joint and adaptive selection at inference time. This method is low-cost, highly flexible, and can be seamlessly extended to arbitrary black-box or white-box models and strategies, achieving true plug-and-play functionality. Extensive experiments across seven open source models and four reasoning strategies demonstrate that RTR achieves an optimal trade-off between accuracy and computational efficiency among all baselines, achieving higher accuracy than the best single model while reducing token usage by over 60%.

The transition from System 1 to System 2 reasoning in large language models (LLMs) has marked significant advancements in handling complex tasks through deliberate, iterative thinking. However, this progress often comes at the cost of efficiency, as models tend to overthink, generating redundant reasoning steps without proportional improvements in output quality. Long-to-Short (L2S) reasoning has emerged as a promising solution to this challenge, aiming to balance reasoning depth with practical efficiency. While existing approaches, such as supervised fine-tuning (SFT), reinforcement learning (RL), and prompt engineering, have shown potential, they are either computationally expensive or unstable. Model merging, on the other hand, offers a cost-effective and robust alternative by integrating the quick-thinking capabilities of System 1 models with the methodical reasoning of System 2 models. In this work, we present a comprehensive empirical study on model merging for L2S reasoning, exploring diverse methodologies, including task-vector-based, SVD-based, and activation-informed merging. Our experiments reveal that model merging can reduce average response length by up to 55% while preserving or even improving baseline performance. We also identify a strong correlation between model scale and merging efficacy with extensive evaluations on 1.5B/7B/14B/32B models. Furthermore, we investigate the merged model's ability to self-critique and self-correct, as well as its adaptive response length based on task complexity. Our findings highlight model merging as a highly efficient and effective paradigm for L2S reasoning, offering a practical solution to the overthinking problem while maintaining the robustness of System 2 reasoning. This work can be found on Github https://github.com/hahahawu/Long-to-Short-via-Model-Merging.

Many tasks require learned models to strategically gather relevant information over multiple rounds of interaction before actually acting on a task. Strategic information gathering requires models to know not only how to effectively acquire information, but also when to stop gathering information and make a decision, in order to avoid overthinking or getting derailed when acting. In this paper, we formalize this problem and introduce Counterfactuals and Reasoning for Termination (CaRT), an approach for teaching LLMs when to stop seeking information. To appropriately learn when to terminate, CaRT fine-tunes LLMs using counterfactual pairs of trajectories, one where termination is appropriate and a minimally modified version of the same trajectory where it is not. It trains the LLM to explain the rationale for the termination decision in either case via verbal reasoning, and imbues this capability into the base LLM via fine-tuning. We instantiate CaRT in two domains: interactive medical diagnosis and math problem solving. In both domains, we find that CaRT improves the efficiency of information gathering and task success rate compared to other fine-tuning methods.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit remarkable reasoning abilities but rely primarily on parametric knowledge, limiting factual accuracy. While recent works equip reinforcement learning (RL)-based LRMs with retrieval capabilities, they suffer from overthinking and lack robustness in reasoning, reducing their effectiveness in question answering (QA) tasks. To address this, we propose ReaRAG, a factuality-enhanced reasoning model that explores diverse queries without excessive iterations. Our solution includes a novel data construction framework with an upper bound on the reasoning chain length. Specifically, we first leverage an LRM to generate deliberate thinking, then select an action from a predefined action space (Search and Finish). For Search action, a query is executed against the RAG engine, where the result is returned as observation to guide reasoning steps later. This process iterates until a Finish action is chosen. Benefiting from ReaRAG's strong reasoning capabilities, our approach outperforms existing baselines on multi-hop QA. Further analysis highlights its strong reflective ability to recognize errors and refine its reasoning trajectory. Our study enhances LRMs' factuality while effectively integrating robust reasoning for Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG).

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has become a pivotal approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a significant theoretical gap persists, as traditional token-level RL frameworks fail to align with the reasoning-level nature of complex, multi-step thought processes like Chain-of-Thought (CoT). To address this challenge, we introduce CoT-Space, a novel theoretical framework that recasts LLM reasoning from a discrete token-prediction task to an optimization process within a continuous, reasoning-level semantic space. By analyzing this process from both a noise perspective and a risk perspective, we demonstrate that the convergence to an optimal CoT length is a natural consequence of the fundamental trade-off between underfitting and overfitting. Furthermore, extensive experiments provide strong empirical validation for our theoretical findings. Our framework not only provides a coherent explanation for empirical phenomena such as overthinking but also offers a solid theoretical foundation to guide the future development of more effective and generalizable reasoning agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance in complex reasoning tasks through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, this approach often leads to ``over-thinking,'' where models generate unnecessarily long reasoning traces for simple queries and incur avoidable inference cost. While recent work has explored adaptive reasoning, existing methods typically make a single query-level decision about whether to reason. This overlooks the dynamic nature of multi-step tasks, where the need for explicit reasoning varies across intermediate stages. To address this limitation, we introduce AdaptR1, a Reinforcement Learning (RL) based framework for adaptive interleaved thinking in multi-hop Question Answering (QA). Unlike previous approaches that require Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) for cold-start initialization, AdaptR1 uses a fully RL-based strategy with a quality-gated efficiency reward to dynamically allocate reasoning budgets at each step. Under the Graph-R1 setting, AdaptR1 reduces average think tokens by 69.71\%, with a 90.35\% reduction on HotpotQA, while maintaining performance comparable to or better than standard baselines. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that overthinking in multi-hop reasoning is not uniformly distributed but occurs predominantly during the initial planning stages, highlighting the effectiveness of step-wise adaptive budget allocation.

The increasing complexity of advanced machine learning models requires innovative approaches to manage computational resources effectively. One such method is the Early Exit strategy, which allows for adaptive computation by providing a mechanism to shorten the processing path for simpler data instances. In this paper, we propose EERO, a new methodology to translate the problem of early exiting to a problem of using multiple classifiers with reject option in order to better select the exiting head for each instance. We calibrate the probabilities of exiting at the different heads using aggregation with exponential weights to guarantee a fixed budget .We consider factors such as Bayesian risk, budget constraints, and head-specific budget consumption. Experimental results, conducted using a ResNet-18 model and a ConvNext architecture on Cifar and ImageNet datasets, demonstrate that our method not only effectively manages budget allocation but also enhances accuracy in overthinking scenarios.

Although Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have made substantial progress, hallucination, where generated text is not grounded in the visual input, remains a challenge. As LVLMs become stronger, previously reported hallucination patterns, such as linguistic bias and overthinking phenomenon, become far less consistent, making the corresponding mitigation techniques substantially less effective. In this paper, we introduce an Internal self-Correction mechanism utilizing Layer Attention (ICLA) that operates directly on hidden states during generation. Each layer selectively retrieves information from all preceding layers through a diagonal cross-layer attention mechanism, enabling self-refinement without any external correction signals. With introducing and training only 0.2M and 0.1M additional parameters on LLaVA1.5-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B, \ours consistently improves visual grounding across multiple hallucination benchmarks, demonstrating its effectiveness for more advanced LVLMs.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance in complex tasks, often outperforming conventional large language models (LLMs). However, the prevalent issue of overthinking severely limits their computational efficiency. Overthinking occurs when models generate excessive and redundant tokens that contribute little to accurate outcomes, especially in simple tasks, resulting in a significant waste of computational resources. To systematically investigate this issue, we introduce Think-Bench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning efficiency of LRMs. We also propose novel efficiency metrics and conduct a comprehensive evaluation of various LRMs across multiple dimensions, including the reasoning process, outcome quality, and chain-of-thought (CoT) characteristics. Our analysis reveals that most LRMs exhibit overthinking in handling easy questions, generating unnecessarily lengthy reasoning chains. While many LRMs demonstrate high CoT quality, several suffer from low efficiency. We hope that Think-Bench can serve as a robust foundation for advancing research into LRMs.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Reasoning LLMs show improved performance with longer chains of thought. However, recent work has highlighted their tendency to overthink, continuing to revise answers even after reaching the correct solution. We quantitatively confirm this inefficiency from the distribution dynamics perspective by tracking Pass@1 for answers averaged over a large number of rollouts and find the model often begins to always produce the correct answer early in the reasoning, making extra reasoning tokens wasteful. To detect and prevent overthinking, we propose a simple and inexpensive novel signal, Entropy After </Think> (EAT), for monitoring and deciding whether to exit reasoning early. By appending a stop thinking token (</think>) and monitoring the entropy of the following token as the model reasons, we obtain a trajectory that decreases and stabilizes when Pass@1 plateaus; thresholding its variance under an exponential moving average yields a practical stopping rule. Importantly, our approach enables adaptively allocating compute based on the EAT trajectory, allowing us to spend compute in a more efficient way compared with fixing the token budget for all questions. Empirically, on MATH500 and AIME2025, EAT reduces token usage by 12 - 22% without harming accuracy. EAT also remains effective in black box settings where logits from the reasoning model are not accessible, and EAT is computed with proxy models: We verified the feasibility via early stopping Llama 70B with a 1.5B model and Claude 3.7 with a local 4B model.

Large reasoning models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities by generating longer chains of thought, demonstrating outstanding performance across a variety of tasks. However, this performance gain comes at the cost of a substantial increase in redundant reasoning during the generation process, leading to high computational overhead and exacerbating the issue of overthinking. Although numerous existing approaches aim to address the problem of overthinking, they often rely on external interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Self-Braking Tuning (SBT), which tackles overthinking from the perspective of allowing the model to regulate its own reasoning process, thus eliminating the reliance on external control mechanisms. We construct a set of overthinking identification metrics based on standard answers and design a systematic method to detect redundant reasoning. This method accurately identifies unnecessary steps within the reasoning trajectory and generates training signals for learning self-regulation behaviors. Building on this foundation, we develop a complete strategy for constructing data with adaptive reasoning lengths and introduce an innovative braking prompt mechanism that enables the model to naturally learn when to terminate reasoning at an appropriate point. Experiments across mathematical benchmarks (AIME, AMC, MATH500, GSM8K) demonstrate that our method reduces token consumption by up to 60% while maintaining comparable accuracy to unconstrained models.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet they often suffer from overthinking, expending redundant computational steps on simple problems, or underthinking, failing to explore sufficient reasoning paths despite inherent capabilities. These issues lead to inefficiencies and potential inaccuracies, limiting practical deployment in resource-constrained settings. Existing methods to mitigate overthinking, such as suppressing reflective keywords or adjusting reasoning length, may inadvertently induce underthinking, compromising accuracy. Therefore, we propose ReBalance, a training-free framework that achieves efficient reasoning with balanced thinking. ReBalance leverages confidence as a continuous indicator of reasoning dynamics, identifying overthinking through high confidence variance and underthinking via consistent overconfidence. By aggregating hidden states from a small-scale dataset into reasoning mode prototypes, we compute a steering vector to guide LRMs' reasoning trajectories. A dynamic control function modulates this vector's strength and direction based on real-time confidence, pruning redundancy during overthinking, and promoting exploration during underthinking. Extensive experiments conducted on four models ranging from 0.5B to 32B, and across nine benchmarks in math reasoning, general question answering, and coding tasks demonstrate that ReBalance effectively reduces output redundancy while improving accuracy, offering a general, training-free, and plug-and-play strategy for efficient and robust LRM deployment. Code is available at https://github.com/yu-lin-li/ReBalance .

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have shown excellent performance in reasoning tasks using long reasoning chains. However, this has also led to a significant increase of computational costs and the generation of verbose output, a phenomenon known as overthinking. The tendency to overthinking is often exacerbated by Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms such as GRPO/DAPO. In this paper, we propose BFS-PO, an RL algorithm which alleviates this problem using a Best-First Search exploration strategy. Specifically, BFS-PO looks for the shortest correct answer using a backtracking mechanism based on maximum entropy nodes. By generating progressively shorter responses during training, BFS-PO learns to produce concise reasoning chains. Using different benchmarks and base LRMs, we show that BFS-PO can simultaneously increase the LRM accuracy and shorten its answers.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Reasoning language models frequently overthink: generating extended chains of behaviors such as hedging, approach abandonment, and self contradiction that consume tokens without improving answers. We show that these behaviors are not merely a consequence of length; even when controlling for response length, incorrect traces exhibit higher rates of unproductive self-reflection than correct ones. Addressing this requires identifying where self-reflection helps vs hurts, but obtaining these step-level annotations is costly. We observe that intermediate answer commitments within reasoning traces can provide a cheap proxy: by comparing each final answer candidate in the trace to the ground truth, we can determine whether subsequent reflection is productive without any additional supervision. Building on this insight, we propose DASH (Drift Aware advantage SHaping), which assigns segment-level credit based on whether each reasoning segment leads toward or away from correctness. On competition-level math benchmarks, DASH achieves the highest accuracy where overthinking is prevalent (Average Accuracy: 59.45% vs. 58.1% Dr.GRPO vs. 56.95% GRPO) while reducing overthinking behaviors and achieving more productive self-correction than baselines.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Recently, techniques such as explicit structured reasoning have demonstrated strong test-time scaling behavior by enforcing a separation between the model's internal "thinking" process and the final response. A key factor influencing answer quality in this setting is the length of the thinking stage. When the reasoning is too short, the model may fail to capture the complexity of the task. Conversely, when it is too long, the model may overthink, leading to unnecessary computation and degraded performance. This paper explores and exploits the underlying mechanisms by which LLMs understand and regulate the length of their reasoning during explicit thought processes. First, we show that LLMs encode their progress through the reasoning process and introduce an interactive progress bar visualization, which is then used to reveal insights on the model's planning dynamics. Second, we manipulate the internal progress encoding during inference to reduce unnecessary steps and generate a more concise and decisive chain of thoughts. Our empirical results demonstrate that this "overclocking" method mitigates overthinking, improves answer accuracy, and reduces inference latency. Our code is publicly available.

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Large Reasoning Models(LRMs) such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1 have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities by scaling test-time compute and generating long Chain-of-Thought(CoT). Distillation--post-training on LRMs-generated data--is a straightforward yet effective method to enhance the reasoning abilities of smaller models, but faces a critical bottleneck: we found that distilled long CoT data poses learning difficulty for small models and leads to the inheritance of biases (i.e. over-thinking) when using Supervised Fine-tuning(SFT) and Reinforcement Learning(RL) methods. To alleviate this bottleneck, we propose constructing tree-based CoT data from scratch via Monte Carlo Tree Search(MCTS). We then exploit a set of CoT-aware approaches, including Thoughts Length Balance, Fine-grained DPO, and Joint Post-training Objective, to enhance SFT and RL on the construted data.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

The remarkable performance of models like the OpenAI o1 can be attributed to their ability to emulate human-like long-time thinking during inference. These models employ extended chain-of-thought (CoT) processes, exploring multiple strategies to enhance problem-solving capabilities. However, a critical question remains: How to intelligently and efficiently scale computational resources during testing. This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the prevalent issue of overthinking in these models, where excessive computational resources are allocated for simple problems with minimal benefit. We introduce novel efficiency metrics from both outcome and process perspectives to evaluate the rational use of computational resources by o1-like models. Using a self-training paradigm, we propose strategies to mitigate overthinking, streamlining reasoning processes without compromising accuracy. Experimental results show that our approach successfully reduces computational overhead while preserving model performance across a range of testsets with varying difficulty levels, such as GSM8K, MATH500, GPQA, and AIME.

The reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) have improved substantially through increased test-time computation, typically in the form of intermediate tokens known as chain-of-thought (CoT). However, CoT often becomes unnecessarily long, increasing computation cost without actual accuracy gains or sometimes even degrading performance, a phenomenon known as ``overthinking''. We propose a multi-stage efficient reasoning method that combines supervised fine-tuning -- via rejection sampling or reasoning trace reformatting -- with reinforcement learning using an adaptive length penalty. We introduce a lightweight reward function that penalizes tokens generated after the first correct answer but encouraging self-verification only when beneficial. We conduct a holistic evaluation across seven diverse reasoning tasks, analyzing the accuracy-response length trade-off. Our approach reduces response length by an average of 28\% for 8B models and 40\% for 32B models, while incurring only minor performance drops of 1.6 and 2.5 points, respectively. Despite its conceptual simplicity, it achieves a superior trade-off compared to more complex state-of-the-art efficient reasoning methods, scoring 76.6, in terms of the area under the Overthinking-Adjusted Accuracy curve (AUC_{OAA}) -- 5 points above the base model and 2.5 points above the second-best approach.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often suffer from overthinking, a phenomenon in which redundant reasoning steps are generated after a correct solution has already been reached. Existing early reasoning exit methods primarily rely on output-level heuristics or trained probing models to skip redundant reasoning steps, thereby mitigating overthinking. However, these approaches typically require additional rollout computation or externally labeled datasets. In this paper, we propose NEAT, a Neuron-based Early reAsoning exiT framework that monitors neuron-level activation dynamics to enable training-free early exits, without introducing additional test-time computation. NEAT identifies exit-associated neurons and tracks their activation patterns during reasoning to dynamically trigger early exit or suppress reflection, thereby reducing unnecessary reasoning while preserving solution quality. Experiments on four reasoning benchmarks across six models with different scales and architectures show that, for each model, NEAT achieves an average token reduction of 22\% to 28\% when averaged over the four benchmarks, while maintaining accuracy.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

Hallucination is often regarded as a major impediment for using large language models (LLMs), especially for knowledge-intensive tasks. Even when the training corpus consists solely of true statements, language models still generate hallucinations in the form of amalgamations of multiple facts. We coin this phenomenon as ``knowledge overshadowing'': when we query knowledge from a language model with multiple conditions, some conditions overshadow others, leading to hallucinated outputs. This phenomenon partially stems from training data imbalance, which we verify on both pretrained models and fine-tuned models, over a wide range of LM model families and sizes.From a theoretical point of view, knowledge overshadowing can be interpreted as over-generalization of the dominant conditions (patterns). We show that the hallucination rate grows with both the imbalance ratio (between the popular and unpopular condition) and the length of dominant condition description, consistent with our derived generalization bound. Finally, we propose to utilize overshadowing conditions as a signal to catch hallucination before it is produced, along with a training-free self-contrastive decoding method to alleviate hallucination during inference. Our proposed approach showcases up to 82% F1 for hallucination anticipation and 11.2% to 39.4% hallucination control, with different models and datasets.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has driven recent gains of large language models (LLMs) on reasoning-intensive tasks by externalizing intermediate steps. However, excessive or redundant reasoning -- so-called overthinking -- can increase inference costs and lead LLMs toward incorrect conclusions. In this paper, we present REFRAIN (REFlective-Redundancy for Adaptive INference), a training-free framework that adaptively determines when to stop reasoning to mitigate overthinking. REFRAIN integrates a two-stage stop discriminator to identify reflective yet redundant reasoning and a sliding-window Upper Confidence Bound (SW-UCB) multi-armed bandit controller to dynamically adjust stopping thresholds according to problem difficulty without supervision or fine-tuning. Across four representative benchmarks and two model families, REFRAIN reduces token usage by 20-55% while maintaining or improving accuracy compared to standard CoT prompting. Extensive ablation and robustness analyses demonstrate its stability across models, scorers, and prompt variations. In summary, our findings highlight when-to-stop as a new and practical axis of test-time scaling -- enabling models to reason not just more, but just enough.

Post-training quantization (PTQ) is widely used to deploy large language models efficiently, but its effect on reasoning models is not well understood. Across math, coding, and science QA, we find that aggressive PTQ reduces accuracy while increasing chain-of-thought (CoT) length. Surprisingly, we show that in up to 52% of the quantized models' failures, models reach the right answer in intermediate reasoning steps but do not output it as a final answer. To understand why quantization leads to this increase in overthinking errors, we measure the token-level KL divergence between quantized and full-precision output distributions. Positions with high KL divergence correlate strongly with high next-token entropy, and at these positions quantized models disproportionately sample overthinking markers such as "wait", "but", and "alternatively". We show that simply introducing a training-free logit penalty on a curated set of overthinking markers can reduce CoT length by 12--23% while preserving or improving accuracy across 5 models (1.5B-32B parameters), 3 quantization methods, and 5 benchmarks, yielding a favorable Pareto frontier of accuracy against reasoning cost compared to penalizing other token sets. Overthinking errors produced by quantized models are particularly reduced by up to 58%.

Autoregressive multimodal large language models have recently gained popularity for image generation, driven by advances in foundation models. To enhance alignment and detail, newer approaches employ chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, expanding user inputs into elaborated prompts prior to image synthesis. However, this strategy can introduce unnecessary redundancy -- a phenomenon we call visual overthinking -- which increases computational costs and can introduce details that contradict the original prompt. In this work, we explore how to generate more concise CoT sequences for more efficient image generation. We introduce ShortCoTI, a lightweight optimization framework that encourages more concise CoT while preserving output image quality. ShortCoTI rewards more concise prompts with an adaptive function that scales according to an estimated difficulty for each task. Incorporating this reward into a reinforcement learning paradigm reduces prompt reasoning length by 54% while maintaining or slightly improving quality metrics across multiple benchmarks (T2I-CompBench, GenEval). Qualitative analysis shows that our method eliminates verbose explanations and repetitive refinements, producing reasoning prompts that are both concise and semantically rich. As a result, ShortCoTI improves computational efficiency without compromising the fidelity or visual appeal of generated images.

Recent breakthroughs in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated that extensive Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation is critical for enabling intricate cognitive behaviors, such as self-verification and backtracking, to solve complex tasks. However, this capability often leads to ``overthinking'', where models generate redundant reasoning paths that inflate computational costs without improving accuracy. While Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on reasoning traces is a standard paradigm for the 'cold start' phase, applying existing compression techniques to these traces often compromises logical coherence or incurs prohibitive sampling costs. In this paper, we introduce ConMax (Confidence-Maximizing Compression), a novel reinforcement learning framework designed to automatically compress reasoning traces while preserving essential reasoning patterns. ConMax formulates compression as a reward-driven optimization problem, training a policy to prune redundancy by maximizing a weighted combination of answer confidence for predictive fidelity and thinking confidence for reasoning validity through a frozen auxiliary LRM. Extensive experiments across five reasoning datasets demonstrate that ConMax achieves a superior efficiency-performance trade-off. Specifically, it reduces inference length by 43% over strong baselines at the cost of a mere 0.7% dip in accuracy, proving its effectiveness in generating high-quality, efficient training data for LRMs.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks but often suffer from overthinking, generating overly long and redundant reasoning trajectories. To explore its essence, our empirical analysis reveals that LRMs are primarily limited to recognizing task properties (i.e., difficulty levels) like humans before solving the problem, leading to a one-size-fits-all reasoning process. Inspired by this, a pressing and natural question emerges: Can we explicitly bootstrap such ability to alleviate overthinking in LRMs? In this paper, we propose Think-How-to-Think (TH2T), a novel two-stage fine-tuning strategy that progressively inspires LRMs' difficulty cognition and redundancy cognition of LRMs. Specifically, we first inject difficulty hypnosis into output prefixes to guide the model toward adaptive reasoning depth, trained on a hybrid dataset mixing short and long reasoning paths. Then, we incorporate redundancy hypnosis, which supervises the intermediate reasoning steps to identify and eliminate unnecessary reasoning patterns. Experiments on 7B/14B/32B models demonstrate that TH2T significantly reduces inference costs by over 70% on easy tasks and 40% on hard tasks while maintaining performance stability. The resulting outputs exhibit clear signs of difficulty-aware capabilities and reduced redundancy (e.g., reflection and looping).

Introducing reasoning models into Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhances task performance through step-by-step reasoning, logical consistency, and multi-step self-verification. However, recent studies have shown that reasoning models suffer from overthinking attacks, where models are tricked to generate unnecessarily high number of reasoning tokens. In this paper, we reveal that such overthinking risk can be inherited by RAG systems equipped with reasoning models, by proposing an end-to-end attack framework named Contradiction-Based Deliberation Extension (CODE). Specifically, CODE develops a multi-agent architecture to construct poisoning samples that are injected into the knowledge base. These samples 1) are highly correlated with the use query, such that can be retrieved as inputs to the reasoning model; and 2) contain contradiction between the logical and evidence layers that cause models to overthink, and are optimized to exhibit highly diverse styles. Moreover, the inference overhead of CODE is extremely difficult to detect, as no modification is needed on the user query, and the task accuracy remain unaffected. Extensive experiments on two datasets across five commercial reasoning models demonstrate that the proposed attack causes a 5.32x-24.72x increase in reasoning token consumption, without degrading task performance. Finally, we also discuss and evaluate potential countermeasures to mitigate overthinking risks.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allocate substantial inference-time compute to Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, improving performance on mathematics, scientific QA, and tool usage. However, this introduces overthinking: LRMs often reach a correct intermediate solution, continue reasoning, and overwrite it with an incorrect answer. We first demonstrate that oracle stopping--where we inject </think> at every sentence boundary and select the best stopping point in hindsight--improves average accuracy by 8% while reducing thinking tokens by 72%, exposing substantial overthinking. Motivated by this finding, we propose ThinkBrake, which monitors the log-probability margin between the top continuation token and </think> at sentence boundaries, stopping reasoning when this margin narrows. ThinkBrake requires no training and achieves favorable accuracy-efficiency trade-offs across math, scientific QA, and tool usage benchmarks, reducing thinking token usage by up to 30%. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis showing that ThinkBrake is equivalent to test-time realignment with a reward bonus for the </think> token.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

The Overfitted Brain hypothesis suggests dreams happen to allow generalization in the human brain. Here, we ask if the same is true for reinforcement learning agents as well. Given limited experience in a real environment, we use imagination-based reinforcement learning to train a policy on dream-like episodes, where non-imaginative, predicted trajectories are modified through generative augmentations. Experiments on four ProcGen environments show that, compared to classic imagination and offline training on collected experience, our method can reach a higher level of generalization when dealing with sparsely rewarded environments.

Recent advances in large reasoning language models (LRLMs) rely on test-time scaling, which extends long chain-of-thought (CoT) generation to solve complex tasks. However, overthinking in long CoT not only slows down the efficiency of problem solving, but also risks accuracy loss due to the extremely detailed or redundant reasoning steps. We propose a simple yet effective method that allows LLMs to self-truncate CoT sequences by early exit during generation. Instead of relying on fixed heuristics, the proposed method monitors model behavior at potential reasoning transition points (e.g.,"Wait" tokens) and dynamically terminates the next reasoning chain's generation when the model exhibits high confidence in a trial answer. Our method requires no additional training and can be seamlessly integrated into existing o1-like reasoning LLMs. Experiments on 10 reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, MATH-500, AMC, GPQA, AIME and LiveCodeBench) show that the proposed method is consistently effective on 11 cutting-edge reasoning LLMs of varying series and sizes, reducing the length of CoT sequences by an average of 19.1% to 80.1% while improving accuracy by 0.3% to 5.0%.

Overfitting negatively impacts the generalization ability of deep neural networks (DNNs) in both natural and adversarial training. Existing methods struggle to consistently address different types of overfitting, typically designing strategies that focus separately on either natural or adversarial patterns. In this work, we adopt a unified perspective by solely focusing on natural patterns to explore different types of overfitting. Specifically, we examine the memorization effect in DNNs and reveal a shared behaviour termed over-memorization, which impairs their generalization capacity. This behaviour manifests as DNNs suddenly becoming high-confidence in predicting certain training patterns and retaining a persistent memory for them. Furthermore, when DNNs over-memorize an adversarial pattern, they tend to simultaneously exhibit high-confidence prediction for the corresponding natural pattern. These findings motivate us to holistically mitigate different types of overfitting by hindering the DNNs from over-memorization natural patterns. To this end, we propose a general framework, Distraction Over-Memorization (DOM), which explicitly prevents over-memorization by either removing or augmenting the high-confidence natural patterns. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in mitigating overfitting across various training paradigms.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable performance improvements by iteratively reflecting, exploring, and executing complex tasks, yet suffer from inefficiencies due to redundant reasoning, known as "overthinking". Existing methods to mitigate this issue either rely on static difficulty estimates or require task-specific training, and thus fail to adapt to the dynamic complexity during reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the problem difficulty evolves dynamically throughout the reasoning process and is linearly encoded in the LRM's step-level embeddings. Building on this insight, we propose DyCon, a training-free framework that leverages latent step-level representations to explicitly model the evolving task difficulty, enabling the dynamic control of reasoning depth to mitigate the overthinking issue. Extensive experiments conducted on four models ranging from 4B to 32B, and across twelve benchmarks in math reasoning, general question answering, and coding tasks demonstrate that DyCon significantly enhances reasoning efficiency by reducing redundant steps without sacrificing accuracy or generalization. Project page and code are available at https://github.com/yu-lin-li/DyCon.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

The long chain-of-thought (LongCoT) capability is central to the recent breakthroughs achieved by large language models in complex reasoning tasks. However, the accompanying issue of ''underthinking'', where models exhibit shallow reasoning by frequently switching thoughts without sufficient exploration, limits both performance and token efficiency. To address this problem, we propose a simple yet effective reasoning strategy: the SmartSwitch inference framework. This framework can be easily integrated into any large language model as a plug-and-play solution, continuously monitoring the model's reasoning process to detect underthinking and guide it toward deeper exploration of promising but overlooked thoughts. Specifically, the perception module identifies points where thoughts switch and evaluates the potential of the preceding thought using an off-the-shelf process reward model (PRM). If a high-potential thought is found to be prematurely abandoned, the intervention module interrupts the ongoing inference, backtracks to the point before the switch, and inserts a "deepening prompt" to encourage further exploration along that promising path. Extensive experiments on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the performance of various large language models of different sizes.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

LLMs are now embedded in a wide range of everyday scenarios. However, their inherent hallucinations risk hiding misinformation in fluent responses, raising concerns about overreliance on AI. Detecting overreliance is challenging, as it often arises in complex, dynamic contexts and cannot be easily captured by post-hoc task outcomes. In this work, we aim to investigate how users' behavioral patterns correlate with overreliance. We collected interaction logs from 77 participants working with an LLM injected plausible misinformation across three real-world tasks and we assessed overreliance by whether participants detected and corrected these errors. By semantically encoding and clustering segments of user interactions, we identified five behavioral patterns linked to overreliance: users with low overreliance show careful task comprehension and fine-grained navigation; users with high overreliance show frequent copy-paste, skipping initial comprehension, repeated LLM references, coarse locating, and accepting misinformation despite hesitation. We discuss design implications for mitigation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) employ Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning to deconstruct complex problems. While longer CoTs are often presumed superior, this paper challenges that notion, arguing that longer is not always better. Drawing on combined evidence from real-world observations, controlled experiments, and theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that task accuracy typically follows an inverted U-shaped curve with CoT length, where performance initially improves but eventually decreases as the number of CoT steps increases. With controlled experiments, we further uncover the scaling behaviors of the optimal CoT length: it increases with task difficulty but decreases with model capability, exposing an inherent simplicity bias where more capable models favor shorter, more efficient CoT reasoning. This bias is also evident in Reinforcement Learning (RL) training, where models gravitate towards shorter CoTs as their accuracy improves. To have a deep understanding of these dynamics, we establish a simple theoretical model that formally proves these phenomena, including the optimal length's scaling laws and the emergence of simplicity bias during RL. Guided by this framework, we demonstrate significant practical benefits from training with optimally-lengthed CoTs and employing length-aware filtering at inference. These findings offer both a principled understanding of the "overthinking" phenomenon and multiple practical guidelines for CoT calibration, enabling LLMs to achieve optimal reasoning performance with adaptive CoTs tailored to task complexity and model capability.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate strong performance on complex tasks but often suffer from excessive verbosity, known as "overthinking." Existing solutions via reinforcement learning (RL) typically penalize generated tokens to promote conciseness. However, these methods encounter two challenges: responses with fewer tokens do not always correspond to fewer reasoning steps, and models may develop hacking behavior in later stages of training by discarding reasoning steps to minimize token usage. In this work, we introduce Step Pruner (SP), an RL framework that steers LRMs toward more efficient reasoning by favoring compact reasoning steps. Our step-aware reward function prioritizes correctness while imposing penalties for redundant steps, and withholds rewards for incorrect responses to prevent the reinforcement of erroneous reasoning. Moreover, we propose a dynamic stopping mechanism: when the length of any output step exceeds the upper limit, we halt updates to prevent hacking behavior caused by merging steps. Extensive experiments across four reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SP achieves state-of-the-art accuracy while significantly reducing response length. For instance, on AIME24, SP reduces token usage by 69.7\%.

In continual learning, catastrophic forgetting is affected by multiple aspects of the tasks. Previous works have analyzed separately how forgetting is affected by either task similarity or overparameterization. In contrast, our paper examines how task similarity and overparameterization jointly affect forgetting in an analyzable model. Specifically, we focus on two-task continual linear regression, where the second task is a random orthogonal transformation of an arbitrary first task (an abstraction of random permutation tasks). We derive an exact analytical expression for the expected forgetting - and uncover a nuanced pattern. In highly overparameterized models, intermediate task similarity causes the most forgetting. However, near the interpolation threshold, forgetting decreases monotonically with the expected task similarity. We validate our findings with linear regression on synthetic data, and with neural networks on established permutation task benchmarks.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Recently, large reasoning models have achieved impressive performance on various tasks by employing human-like deep thinking. However, the lengthy thinking process substantially increases inference overhead, making efficiency a critical bottleneck. In this work, we first demonstrate that NoThinking, which prompts the reasoning model to skip thinking and directly generate the final solution, is a better choice for relatively simple tasks in terms of both performance and efficiency. Motivated by this, we propose AdaptThink, a novel RL algorithm to teach reasoning models to choose the optimal thinking mode adaptively based on problem difficulty. Specifically, AdaptThink features two core components: (1) a constrained optimization objective that encourages the model to choose NoThinking while maintaining the overall performance; (2) an importance sampling strategy that balances Thinking and NoThinking samples during on-policy training, thereby enabling cold start and allowing the model to explore and exploit both thinking modes throughout the training process. Our experiments indicate that AdaptThink significantly reduces the inference costs while further enhancing performance. Notably, on three math datasets, AdaptThink reduces the average response length of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B by 53% and improves its accuracy by 2.4%, highlighting the promise of adaptive thinking-mode selection for optimizing the balance between reasoning quality and efficiency. Our codes and models are available at https://github.com/THU-KEG/AdaptThink.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant improvements in contextual understanding. However, their ability to attend to truly critical information during long-context reasoning and generation still falls behind the pace. Specifically, our preliminary experiments reveal that certain distracting patterns can misdirect the model's attention during inference, and removing these patterns substantially improves reasoning accuracy and generation quality. We attribute this phenomenon to spurious correlations in the training data, which obstruct the model's capacity to infer authentic causal instruction-response relationships. This phenomenon may induce redundant reasoning processes, potentially resulting in significant inference overhead and, more critically, the generation of erroneous or suboptimal responses. To mitigate this, we introduce a two-stage framework called Learning to Focus (LeaF) leveraging intervention-based inference to disentangle confounding factors. In the first stage, LeaF employs gradient-based comparisons with an advanced teacher to automatically identify confounding tokens based on causal relationships in the training corpus. Then, in the second stage, it prunes these tokens during distillation to enact intervention, aligning the student's attention with the teacher's focus distribution on truly critical context tokens. Experimental results demonstrate that LeaF not only achieves an absolute improvement in various mathematical reasoning, code generation and multi-hop question answering benchmarks but also effectively suppresses attention to confounding tokens during inference, yielding a more interpretable and reliable reasoning model.

As Test-Time Scaling emerges as an active research focus in the large language model community, advanced post-training methods increasingly emphasize extending chain-of-thought (CoT) generation length, thereby enhancing reasoning capabilities to approach Deepseek R1-like reasoning models. However, recent studies reveal that reasoning models (even Qwen3) consistently exhibit excessive thought redundancy in CoT generation. This overthinking issue arises from the inherent limitations of conventional outcome-reward reinforcement learning, which systematically overlooks the regulation of intermediate reasoning processes. This paper introduces Serial-Group Decaying-Reward Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a novel reinforcement learning paradigm that enables models to implicitly evaluate the sufficiency of intermediate reasoning steps, thereby facilitating early exit in CoT generation. Unlike GRPO, which samples multiple possible reasoning paths in parallel (parallel group), S-GRPO only samples one reasoning path and serially selects multiple temporal positions from the path to exit thinking and directly generate answers (serial group). For correct answers within a serial group, rewards gradually decrease based on the exit positions along the reasoning path from front to back. This design encourages the model to produce more accurate and concise thoughts, while also incentivizing early thinking termination when appropriate. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that S-GRPO is compatible with state-of-the-art reasoning models, including Qwen3 and Deepseek-distill. Across diverse benchmarks such as GSM8K, AIME 2024, AMC 2023, MATH-500, and GPQA Diamond, S-GRPO achieves a substantial reduction in sequence length (35.4% - 61.1%) while simultaneously improving accuracy (absolute 0.72% - 6.08%).

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

Hybrid reasoning models such as the Qwen3 series switch between a THINK mode and a NO-THINK mode through a few chat-template tokens. A popular recipe trains such models with reinforcement learning in NO-THINK mode and reports improved reasoning performance. We provide evidence that much of this gain can be explained by thinking leakage: the gain comes largely from partially reactivating the reasoning abilities of the original model's THINK mode instead of learning enhanced reasoning behavior. We train Qwen3-1.7B, 4B, and 8B with GRPO in NO-THINK mode. As accuracy improves, responses become longer and more reflective, are increasingly judged by the original model to resemble its own thinking, and the model's internal activations shift toward its THINK mode. We then investigate at the level of weights, activations, and attention heads: scaling the RL update further elicits THINK-mode behavior and approaches THINK-mode accuracy but does not exceed it; in Qwen3-8B, replacing a low-dimensional THINK-related activation subspace of the RL-trained model with its original-model value removes most of the RL gain, and the reverse exchange transfers a considerable fraction of the gain to the original model; and the RL-induced shift passes through the attention heads that read the empty think block. We further identify a possible mechanism in the GRPO training signal: responses favored by the advantage-weighted update are more THINK-like, and a gradient step computed from this signal moves the model toward its THINK state. Thus, gains in NO-THINK mode can largely reflect reactivation of reasoning abilities already present in the original model.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Reasoning models have demonstrated impressive performance on difficult tasks that traditional language models struggle at. However, many are plagued with the problem of overthinking--generating large amounts of unnecessary tokens which don't improve accuracy on a question. We introduce approximate measures of problem-level difficulty and demonstrate that a clear relationship between problem difficulty and optimal token spend exists, and evaluate how well calibrated a variety of reasoning models are in terms of efficiently allocating the optimal token count. We find that in general, reasoning models are poorly calibrated, particularly on easy problems. To evaluate calibration on easy questions we introduce DUMB500, a dataset of extremely easy math, reasoning, code, and task problems, and jointly evaluate reasoning model on these simple examples and extremely difficult examples from existing frontier benchmarks on the same task domain. Finally, we introduce THOUGHTTERMINATOR, a training-free black box decoding technique that significantly improves reasoning model calibration.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Large reasoning models achieve strong performance on complex tasks by generating extended chains of thought, but they often "overthink": continuing to reason long after they have enough information to answer correctly. This wastes inference-time compute and can hurt accuracy. Existing attempts to stop early either manipulate decoding with extra sampling and heuristics, rely on auxiliary verifier models, or operate only as post-hoc analysis pipelines without formal guarantees. We introduce LYNX, an online early-exit mechanism that turns a model's own hidden-state awareness into confidence-controlled stopping decisions. LYNX attaches exit decisions to naturally occurring reasoning cues (e.g., "hmm", "wait") during generation, trains a lightweight probe on hidden states at those cue tokens using supervision from forced exits, and wraps the resulting scores in split conformal prediction to obtain distribution-free control over premature exits. Crucially, we train and calibrate this probe once on a generic mathematical corpus and reuse it unchanged across benchmarks, decoding temperatures, and even non-mathematical tasks. Across three model families spanning 1.5B to 32B parameters, a single mathematically trained probe per base model yields strong accuracy--efficiency tradeoffs. On GSM8K, LYNX matches or improves baseline accuracy while reducing tokens by 40--65\%; on MATH-500 it improves accuracy by up to 12 points with roughly 35--60\% fewer tokens; on AIME 2024 it recovers baseline accuracy with more than 50\% token savings; and on CommonsenseQA, a non-math benchmark, it transfers zero-shot with modest accuracy gains and up to 70\% fewer tokens. Compared to state-of-the-art early-exit methods, LYNX offers competitive or superior Pareto frontiers while remaining fully online, requiring no proxy models at inference, and providing explicit, user-tunable confidence guarantees.

Self-distillation has emerged as an effective post-training paradigm for LLMs, often improving performance while shortening reasoning traces. However, in mathematical reasoning, we find that it can reduce response length while degrading performance. We trace this degradation to the suppression of epistemic verbalization - the model's expression of uncertainty during reasoning. Through controlled experiments varying conditioning context richness and task coverage, we show that conditioning the teacher on rich information suppresses uncertainty expression, enabling rapid in-domain optimization with limited task coverage but harming OOD performance, where unseen problems benefit from expressing uncertainty and adjusting accordingly. Across Qwen3-8B, DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-7B, and Olmo3-7B-Instruct, we observe performance drops of up to 40%. Our findings highlight that exposing appropriate levels of uncertainty is crucial for robust reasoning and underscore the importance of optimizing reasoning behavior beyond merely reinforcing correct answer traces.

Large language models (LLMs) can produce erroneous responses that sound fluent and convincing, raising the risk that users will rely on these responses as if they were correct. Mitigating such overreliance is a key challenge. Through a think-aloud study in which participants use an LLM-infused application to answer objective questions, we identify several features of LLM responses that shape users' reliance: explanations (supporting details for answers), inconsistencies in explanations, and sources. Through a large-scale, pre-registered, controlled experiment (N=308), we isolate and study the effects of these features on users' reliance, accuracy, and other measures. We find that the presence of explanations increases reliance on both correct and incorrect responses. However, we observe less reliance on incorrect responses when sources are provided or when explanations exhibit inconsistencies. We discuss the implications of these findings for fostering appropriate reliance on LLMs.

Do reasoning models have "Aha!" moments? Prior work suggests that models like DeepSeek-R1-Zero undergo sudden mid-trace realizations that lead to accurate outputs, implying an intrinsic capacity for self-correction. Yet, it remains unclear whether such intrinsic shifts in reasoning strategy actually improve performance. Here, we study mid-reasoning shifts and instrument training runs to detect them. Our analysis spans 1M+ reasoning traces, hundreds of training checkpoints, three reasoning domains, and multiple decoding temperatures and model architectures. We find that reasoning shifts are rare, do not become more frequent with training, and seldom improve accuracy, indicating that they do not correspond to prior perceptions of model insight. However, their effect varies with model uncertainty. Building on this finding, we show that artificially triggering extrinsic shifts under high entropy reliably improves accuracy. Our results show that mid-reasoning shifts are symptoms of unstable inference behavior rather than an intrinsic mechanism for self-correction.

Test-Time Scaling (TTS) has significantly enhanced the capabilities of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) but introduces a critical side-effect known as Overthinking. We conduct a preliminary study to rethink this phenomenon from a fine-grained perspective. We observe that LRMs frequently conduct repetitive self-verification without revision even after obtaining the final answer during the reasoning process. We formally define this specific position where the answer first stabilizes as the Reasoning Anchor. By analyzing pre- and post-anchor reasoning behaviors, we uncover the structural redundancy fixed in LRMs: the meaningless repetitive verification after deriving the first complete answer, which we term the Answer-Stable Tail (AST). Motivated by this observation, we propose Anchor-based Process Reward (APR), a structure-aware reward shaping method that localizes the reasoning anchor and penalizes exclusively the post-anchor AST. Leveraging the policy optimization algorithm suitable for length penalties, our APR models achieved the performance-efficiency Pareto frontier at 1.5B and 7B scales averaged across five mathematical reasoning datasets while requiring substantially fewer computational resources for RL training.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex tasks. Recent advancements in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek-R1, have further improved performance in System-2 reasoning domains like mathematics and programming by harnessing supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) techniques to enhance the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, while longer CoT reasoning sequences improve performance, they also introduce significant computational overhead due to verbose and redundant outputs, known as the "overthinking phenomenon". In this paper, we provide the first structured survey to systematically investigate and explore the current progress toward achieving efficient reasoning in LLMs. Overall, relying on the inherent mechanism of LLMs, we categorize existing works into several key directions: (1) model-based efficient reasoning, which considers optimizing full-length reasoning models into more concise reasoning models or directly training efficient reasoning models; (2) reasoning output-based efficient reasoning, which aims to dynamically reduce reasoning steps and length during inference; (3) input prompts-based efficient reasoning, which seeks to enhance reasoning efficiency based on input prompt properties such as difficulty or length control. Additionally, we introduce the use of efficient data for training reasoning models, explore the reasoning capabilities of small language models, and discuss evaluation methods and benchmarking.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

Message Passing Neural Networks (MPNNs) are instances of Graph Neural Networks that leverage the graph to send messages over the edges. This inductive bias leads to a phenomenon known as over-squashing, where a node feature is insensitive to information contained at distant nodes. Despite recent methods introduced to mitigate this issue, an understanding of the causes for over-squashing and of possible solutions are lacking. In this theoretical work, we prove that: (i) Neural network width can mitigate over-squashing, but at the cost of making the whole network more sensitive; (ii) Conversely, depth cannot help mitigate over-squashing: increasing the number of layers leads to over-squashing being dominated by vanishing gradients; (iii) The graph topology plays the greatest role, since over-squashing occurs between nodes at high commute (access) time. Our analysis provides a unified framework to study different recent methods introduced to cope with over-squashing and serves as a justification for a class of methods that fall under graph rewiring.

Recent advancements in reasoning with large language models (RLLMs), such as OpenAI-O1 and DeepSeek-R1, have demonstrated their impressive capabilities in complex domains like mathematics and coding. A central factor in their success lies in the application of long chain-of-thought (Long CoT) characteristics, which enhance reasoning abilities and enable the solution of intricate problems. However, despite these developments, a comprehensive survey on Long CoT is still lacking, limiting our understanding of its distinctions from traditional short chain-of-thought (Short CoT) and complicating ongoing debates on issues like "overthinking" and "test-time scaling." This survey seeks to fill this gap by offering a unified perspective on Long CoT. (1) We first distinguish Long CoT from Short CoT and introduce a novel taxonomy to categorize current reasoning paradigms. (2) Next, we explore the key characteristics of Long CoT: deep reasoning, extensive exploration, and feasible reflection, which enable models to handle more complex tasks and produce more efficient, coherent outcomes compared to the shallower Short CoT. (3) We then investigate key phenomena such as the emergence of Long CoT with these characteristics, including overthinking, and test-time scaling, offering insights into how these processes manifest in practice. (4) Finally, we identify significant research gaps and highlight promising future directions, including the integration of multi-modal reasoning, efficiency improvements, and enhanced knowledge frameworks. By providing a structured overview, this survey aims to inspire future research and further the development of logical reasoning in artificial intelligence.

Exposure to large language model output is rapidly increasing. How will seeing AI-generated ideas affect human ideas? We conducted an experiment (800+ participants, 40+ countries) where participants viewed creative ideas that were from ChatGPT or prior experimental participants and then brainstormed their own idea. We varied the number of AI-generated examples (none, low, or high exposure) and if the examples were labeled as 'AI' (disclosure). Our dynamic experiment design -- ideas from prior participants in an experimental condition are used as stimuli for future participants in the same experimental condition -- mimics the interdependent process of cultural creation: creative ideas are built upon prior ideas. Hence, we capture the compounding effects of having LLMs 'in the culture loop'. We find that high AI exposure (but not low AI exposure) did not affect the creativity of individual ideas but did increase the average amount and rate of change of collective idea diversity. AI made ideas different, not better. There were no main effects of disclosure. We also found that self-reported creative people were less influenced by knowing an idea was from AI, and that participants were more likely to knowingly adopt AI ideas when the task was difficult. Our findings suggest that introducing AI ideas into society may increase collective diversity but not individual creativity.

We perform an average case analysis of the generalization dynamics of large neural networks trained using gradient descent. We study the practically-relevant "high-dimensional" regime where the number of free parameters in the network is on the order of or even larger than the number of examples in the dataset. Using random matrix theory and exact solutions in linear models, we derive the generalization error and training error dynamics of learning and analyze how they depend on the dimensionality of data and signal to noise ratio of the learning problem. We find that the dynamics of gradient descent learning naturally protect against overtraining and overfitting in large networks. Overtraining is worst at intermediate network sizes, when the effective number of free parameters equals the number of samples, and thus can be reduced by making a network smaller or larger. Additionally, in the high-dimensional regime, low generalization error requires starting with small initial weights. We then turn to non-linear neural networks, and show that making networks very large does not harm their generalization performance. On the contrary, it can in fact reduce overtraining, even without early stopping or regularization of any sort. We identify two novel phenomena underlying this behavior in overcomplete models: first, there is a frozen subspace of the weights in which no learning occurs under gradient descent; and second, the statistical properties of the high-dimensional regime yield better-conditioned input correlations which protect against overtraining. We demonstrate that naive application of worst-case theories such as Rademacher complexity are inaccurate in predicting the generalization performance of deep neural networks, and derive an alternative bound which incorporates the frozen subspace and conditioning effects and qualitatively matches the behavior observed in simulation.

Large reasoning models exhibit remarkable reasoning capabilities via long, elaborate reasoning trajectories. Supervised fine-tuning on such reasoning traces, also known as distillation, can be a cost-effective way to boost reasoning capabilities of student models. However, empirical observations reveal that these reasoning trajectories are often suboptimal, switching excessively between different lines of thought, resulting in under-thinking, over-thinking, and even degenerate responses. We introduce Retro-Search, an MCTS-inspired search algorithm, for distilling higher quality reasoning paths from large reasoning models. Retro-Search retrospectively revises reasoning paths to discover better, yet shorter traces, which can then lead to student models with enhanced reasoning capabilities with shorter, thus faster inference. Our approach can enable two use cases: self-improvement, where models are fine-tuned on their own Retro-Search-ed thought traces, and weak-to-strong improvement, where a weaker model revises stronger model's thought traces via Retro-Search. For self-improving, R1-distill-7B, fine-tuned on its own Retro-Search-ed traces, reduces the average reasoning length by 31.2% while improving performance by 7.7% across seven math benchmarks. For weak-to-strong improvement, we retrospectively revise R1-671B's traces from the OpenThoughts dataset using R1-distill-32B as the Retro-Search-er, a model 20x smaller. Qwen2.5-32B, fine-tuned on this refined data, achieves performance comparable to R1-distill-32B, yielding an 11.3% reduction in reasoning length and a 2.4% performance improvement compared to fine-tuning on the original OpenThoughts data. Our work counters recently emergent viewpoints that question the relevance of search algorithms in the era of large reasoning models, by demonstrating that there are still opportunities for algorithmic advancements, even for frontier models.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning demonstrate impressive problem-solving abilities. However, in this work, we identify a recurring issue where these models occasionally generate overly short reasoning, leading to degraded performance on even simple mathematical problems. Specifically, we investigate how reasoning length is embedded in the hidden representations of reasoning models and its impact on accuracy. Our analysis reveals that reasoning length is governed by a linear direction in the representation space, allowing us to induce overly short reasoning by steering the model along this direction. Building on this insight, we introduce ThinkEdit, a simple yet effective weight-editing approach to mitigate the issue of overly short reasoning. We first identify a small subset of attention heads (approximately 2%) that predominantly drive short reasoning behavior. We then edit the output projection weights of these heads to suppress the short reasoning direction. With changes to only 0.1% of the model's parameters, ThinkEdit effectively reduces overly short reasoning and yields notable accuracy gains for short reasoning outputs (+5.44%), along with an overall improvement across multiple math benchmarks (+2.43%). Our findings provide new mechanistic insights into how reasoning length is controlled within LLMs and highlight the potential of fine-grained model interventions to improve reasoning quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/ThinkEdit

Recent advances in large vision-language models (LVLMs) have revealed an overthinking phenomenon, where models generate verbose reasoning across all tasks regardless of questions. To address this issue, we present FAST, a novel Fast-Slow Thinking framework that dynamically adapts reasoning depth based on question characteristics. Through empirical analysis, we establish the feasibility of fast-slow thinking in LVLMs by investigating how response length and data distribution affect performance. We develop FAST-GRPO with three components: model-based metrics for question characterization, an adaptive thinking reward mechanism, and difficulty-aware KL regularization. Experiments across seven reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that FAST achieves state-of-the-art accuracy with over 10\% relative improvement compared to the base model, while reducing token usage by 32.7-67.3\% compared to previous slow-thinking approaches, effectively balancing reasoning length and accuracy.

Machine learning algorithms, when applied to sensitive data, pose a distinct threat to privacy. A growing body of prior work demonstrates that models produced by these algorithms may leak specific private information in the training data to an attacker, either through the models' structure or their observable behavior. However, the underlying cause of this privacy risk is not well understood beyond a handful of anecdotal accounts that suggest overfitting and influence might play a role. This paper examines the effect that overfitting and influence have on the ability of an attacker to learn information about the training data from machine learning models, either through training set membership inference or attribute inference attacks. Using both formal and empirical analyses, we illustrate a clear relationship between these factors and the privacy risk that arises in several popular machine learning algorithms. We find that overfitting is sufficient to allow an attacker to perform membership inference and, when the target attribute meets certain conditions about its influence, attribute inference attacks. Interestingly, our formal analysis also shows that overfitting is not necessary for these attacks and begins to shed light on what other factors may be in play. Finally, we explore the connection between membership inference and attribute inference, showing that there are deep connections between the two that lead to effective new attacks.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) exhibit superior reasoning capabilities, the neural mechanisms distinguishing this explicit Thinking mode from direct answer generation (NoThinking mode) remain poorly understood. To deconstruct this cognitive process, we apply Top-K Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to the intermediate representations of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and examine the model's divergent behaviors across math-solving tasks of three distinct difficulty levels. Observationally, we identify a clear distinction in how the model functions under two reasoning modes: Thinking mode relies on sparse and high-intensity feature activations driving verbal deduction independent of problem complexity, whereas NoThinking mode exhibits an adaptive and diffuse pattern prioritizing symbolic manipulation. Causally, suppressing the three most active sparse features by Total Activation Volume reveals three principles: (i) reasoning and syntactic structure are tightly coupled, as interventions consistently degrade and boxed-solution formatting; (ii) Thinking responds to disruption with compensatory over-generation marked by increased metacognitive cues and repetitive, low-information continuations; and (iii) coherent CoT behavior depends on a fragile coordination among specialized features, yielding distinct failure modes under perturbation but a consistently impaired output structure.

Large language models are prone to hallucinating factually incorrect statements. A key source of these errors is exposure to new factual information through supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which can increase hallucinations w.r.t. knowledge acquired during pre-training. In this work, we explore whether SFT-induced hallucinations can be mitigated using established tools from the continual learning literature, since they arise as a by-product of knowledge degradation during training. We propose a self-distillation-based SFT method that facilitates effective factual learning while minimizing hallucinations w.r.t. pre-existing knowledge by regularizing output-distribution drift. We also show that, in settings where new knowledge acquisition is unnecessary, suppressing factual plasticity by freezing parameter groups, can preserve task performance while reducing hallucinations. Lastly, we investigate the mechanism behind SFT-induced hallucinations through three hypotheses: capacity limitations, behavior cloning, and localized interference. Our experiments show that a main driver is interference among overlapping semantic representations, and that self-distillation succeeds by mitigating this interference.

Recent advances in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting have substantially improved the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but have also introduced their computational efficiency as a new attack surface. In this paper, we propose BadThink, the first backdoor attack designed to deliberately induce "overthinking" behavior in CoT-enabled LLMs while ensuring stealth. When activated by carefully crafted trigger prompts, BadThink manipulates the model to generate inflated reasoning traces - producing unnecessarily redundant thought processes while preserving the consistency of final outputs. This subtle attack vector creates a covert form of performance degradation that significantly increases computational costs and inference time while remaining difficult to detect through conventional output evaluation methods. We implement this attack through a sophisticated poisoning-based fine-tuning strategy, employing a novel LLM-based iterative optimization process to embed the behavior by generating highly naturalistic poisoned data. Our experiments on multiple state-of-the-art models and reasoning tasks show that BadThink consistently increases reasoning trace lengths - achieving an over 17x increase on the MATH-500 dataset - while remaining stealthy and robust. This work reveals a critical, previously unexplored vulnerability where reasoning efficiency can be covertly manipulated, demonstrating a new class of sophisticated attacks against CoT-enabled systems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving abilities in mathematics, as evaluated by existing benchmarks exclusively on well-defined problems. However, such evaluation setup constitutes a critical gap, since a genuine intelligent agent should not only solve problems (as a math quiz solver), but also be able~to ask for information when the problems lack sufficient information, enabling proactivity in responding users' requests. To bridge such gap, we proposes a new dataset consisting of two types of incomplete problems with diverse contexts. Based on the dataset, our systematical evaluation of LRMs reveals their inability in proactively asking for information. In addition, we uncover the behaviors related to overthinking and hallucination of LRMs, and highlight the potential and challenges of supervised fine-tuning in learning such ability. We hope to provide new insights in developing LRMs with genuine intelligence, rather than just solving problems.

Recent advances in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) mark a shift from non-thinking models to post-trained reasoning models capable of solving complex problems through thinking. However, whether such thinking mitigates hallucinations in multimodal perception and reasoning remains unclear. Self-reflective reasoning enhances robustness but introduces additional hallucinations, and subtle perceptual errors still result in incorrect or coincidentally correct answers. Existing benchmarks primarily focus on models before the emergence of reasoning MLLMs, neglecting the internal thinking process and failing to measure the hallucinations that occur during thinking. To address these challenges, we introduce MM-THEBench, a comprehensive benchmark for assessing hallucinations of intermediate CoTs in reasoning MLLMs. MM-THEBench features a fine-grained taxonomy grounded in cognitive dimensions, diverse data with verified reasoning annotations, and a multi-level automated evaluation framework. Extensive experiments on mainstream reasoning MLLMs reveal insights into how thinking affects hallucination and reasoning capability in various multimodal tasks.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

Personalized LLMs with persistent memory are increasingly deployed, yet the faithfulness of their user models remains unexamined. We study over-inference (OI): the phenomenon where LLMs fabricate user attributes beyond what evidence supports. We introduce MirageBench, comprising 150 personas balanced across stereotypical, counter-stereotypical, and neutral profiles, 6 personalization tasks spanning an ``imagination gradient'', a four-way faithfulness taxonomy operationalized by an independent judge (validated against a blind human annotator on 400 claims: Cohen's kappa = 0.863 four-class, kappa = 0.900 binary), and a leaderboard of 12 models across 7 families on 143616 judged claims. We find that over-inference is pervasive: every one of the 12 models over-infers 35%--49% of its claims (cross-model mean 41.6%; claim-weighted 41.8%), with no model in this evaluation escaping it. Most strikingly, we surface a Self-Monitoring Inversion: at the model-selection level, models' self-assessed OI is negatively rank-correlated with their judge-measured OI (rho = -0.60, p = 0.044; exploratory, wide bootstrap CI [-0.90, +0.06], n = 12). The models that report the least over-inference tend to be flagged as fabricating the most, so self-reported confidence is a misleading signal for comparing models, even though within a single model self-audit still ranks that model's own claims moderately well (AUROC 0.58--0.83). We further show that OI is task-dependent (27%--59%) and that, in a multi-turn pilot, inferred attributes accumulate approximately linearly with little revision. MirageBench positions external verification, rather than model self-report, as a more reliable foundation for trustworthy personalization.

Most work interpreting reasoning models studies only a single chain-of-thought (CoT), yet these models define distributions over many possible CoTs. We argue that studying a single sample is inadequate for understanding causal influence and the underlying computation. Though fully specifying this distribution is intractable, it can be understood by sampling. We present case studies using resampling to investigate model decisions. First, when a model states a reason for its action, does that reason actually cause the action? In "agentic misalignment" scenarios, we resample specific sentences to measure their downstream effects. Self-preservation sentences have small causal impact, suggesting they do not meaningfully drive blackmail. Second, are artificial edits to CoT sufficient for steering reasoning? These are common in literature, yet take the model off-policy. Resampling and selecting a completion with the desired property is a principled on-policy alternative. We find off-policy interventions yield small and unstable effects compared to resampling in decision-making tasks. Third, how do we understand the effect of removing a reasoning step when the model may repeat it post-edit? We introduce a resilience metric that repeatedly resamples to prevent similar content from reappearing downstream. Critical planning statements resist removal but have large effects when eliminated. Fourth, since CoT is sometimes "unfaithful", can our methods teach us anything in these settings? Adapting causal mediation analysis, we find that hints that have a causal effect on the output without being explicitly mentioned exert a subtle and cumulative influence on the CoT that persists even if the hint is removed. Overall, studying distributions via resampling enables reliable causal analysis, clearer narratives of model reasoning, and principled CoT interventions.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

O1/R1 style large reasoning models (LRMs) signal a substantial leap forward over conventional instruction-following LLMs. By applying test-time scaling to generate extended reasoning paths, they establish many SOTAs across a wide range of complex reasoning tasks. However, recent studies show that LRMs are prone to suffer from overthinking -- the tendency to overcomplicate simple problems, leading to excessive strategy switching and long, convoluted reasoning traces that hinder their interpretability. To mitigate this issue, we conduct a systematic investigation into the reasoning efficiency of a broad set of LRMs and uncover a common dilemma: the difficulty in balancing multiple generation objectives such as correctness and brevity. Based on this discovery, we propose a test-time scaling method, EDIT (Efficient Dynamic Inference Trimming), which efficiently guides LRMs to identify the shortest correct reasoning paths at test time. EDIT employs constraint-guided generation while jointly tracking length and answer distributions under varying constraints, allowing it to select responses that strike an optimal balance between conciseness and correctness. Extensive experiments across diverse models and datasets show that EDIT substantially enhance the reasoning efficiency, producing compact yet informative outputs that improve readability and user experience.

Catastrophic overfitting (CO) presents a significant challenge in single-step adversarial training (AT), manifesting as highly distorted deep neural networks (DNNs) that are vulnerable to multi-step adversarial attacks. However, the underlying factors that lead to the distortion of decision boundaries remain unclear. In this work, we delve into the specific changes within different DNN layers and discover that during CO, the former layers are more susceptible, experiencing earlier and greater distortion, while the latter layers show relative insensitivity. Our analysis further reveals that this increased sensitivity in former layers stems from the formation of pseudo-robust shortcuts, which alone can impeccably defend against single-step adversarial attacks but bypass genuine-robust learning, resulting in distorted decision boundaries. Eliminating these shortcuts can partially restore robustness in DNNs from the CO state, thereby verifying that dependence on them triggers the occurrence of CO. This understanding motivates us to implement adaptive weight perturbations across different layers to hinder the generation of pseudo-robust shortcuts, consequently mitigating CO. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed method, Layer-Aware Adversarial Weight Perturbation (LAP), can effectively prevent CO and further enhance robustness.

Current reading comprehension models generalise well to in-distribution test sets, yet perform poorly on adversarially selected inputs. Most prior work on adversarial inputs studies oversensitivity: semantically invariant text perturbations that cause a model's prediction to change when it should not. In this work we focus on the complementary problem: excessive prediction undersensitivity, where input text is meaningfully changed but the model's prediction does not, even though it should. We formulate a noisy adversarial attack which searches among semantic variations of the question for which a model erroneously predicts the same answer, and with even higher probability. Despite comprising unanswerable questions, both SQuAD2.0 and NewsQA models are vulnerable to this attack. This indicates that although accurate, models tend to rely on spurious patterns and do not fully consider the information specified in a question. We experiment with data augmentation and adversarial training as defences, and find that both substantially decrease vulnerability to attacks on held out data, as well as held out attack spaces. Addressing undersensitivity also improves results on AddSent and AddOneSent, and models furthermore generalise better when facing train/evaluation distribution mismatch: they are less prone to overly rely on predictive cues present only in the training set, and outperform a conventional model by as much as 10.9% F1.

Machine unlearning aims to remove sensitive or undesired data from large language models. However, recent studies suggest that unlearning is often shallow, claiming that removed knowledge can easily be recovered. In this work, we critically examine standard unlearning evaluation practices and uncover key limitations that shake our trust in those findings. First, we show that some evaluations introduce substantial new information into the model, potentially masking true unlearning performance by re-teaching the model during testing. Second, we demonstrate that evaluation outcomes vary significantly across tasks, undermining the generalizability of current evaluation routines. Finally, we find that many evaluations rely on spurious correlations, making their results difficult to trust and interpret. Taken together, these issues suggest that current evaluation protocols may both overstate and understate unlearning success. To address this, we propose two principles for future unlearning evaluations: minimal information injection and downstream task awareness. We validate these principles through a series of targeted experiments, showing how violations of each can lead to misleading conclusions.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Large language models are pre-trained on ever-growing token budgets under the assumption that better pre-training performance translates to improved downstream models. In this work, we challenge this assumption and show that extended pre-training can make models harder to fine-tune, leading to degraded final performance. We term this phenomenon catastrophic overtraining. For example, the instruction-tuned OLMo-1B model pre-trained on 3T tokens leads to over 2% worse performance on multiple standard LLM benchmarks than its 2.3T token counterpart. Through controlled experiments and theoretical analysis, we show that catastrophic overtraining arises from a systematic increase in the broad sensitivity of pre-trained parameters to modifications, including but not limited to fine-tuning. Our findings call for a critical reassessment of pre-training design that considers the downstream adaptability of the model.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting enables complex reasoning in large language models (LLMs), including applications in information retrieval (IR). However, it often leads to overthinking, where models produce excessively long and semantically redundant traces with little or no benefit. We identify two key challenges in IR: redundant trajectories that revisit similar states and misguided reasoning that diverges from user intent. To address these, we propose State Machine Reasoning (SMR), a transition-based reasoning framework composed of discrete actions (Refine, Rerank, Stop) that support early stopping and fine-grained control. Experiments on the BEIR and BRIGHT benchmarks show that SMR improves retrieval performance (nDCG@10) by 3.4% while reducing token usage by 74.4%. It generalizes across LLMs and retrievers without requiring task-specific tuning, offering a practical alternative to conventional CoT reasoning. The code and details are available at https://github.com/ldilab/SMR.

Large language models (LLMs) are revolutionizing every aspect of society. They are increasingly used in problem-solving tasks to substitute human assessment and reasoning. LLMs are trained on what humans write and are thus exposed to human bias. We evaluate whether LLMs inherit one of the most widespread human biases: overconfidence. We algorithmically construct reasoning problems with known ground truths. We prompt LLMs to answer these problems and assess the confidence in their answers, closely following similar protocols in human experiments. We find that all five LLMs we study are overconfident: they overestimate the probability that their answer is correct between 20% and 60%. Humans have accuracy similar to the more advanced LLMs, but far lower overconfidence. Although humans and LLMs are similarly biased in questions which they are certain they answered correctly, a key difference emerges between them: LLM bias increases sharply relative to humans if they become less sure that their answers are correct. We also show that LLM input has ambiguous effects on human decision making: LLM input leads to an increase in the accuracy, but it more than doubles the extent of overconfidence in the answers.

In value-based reinforcement learning methods such as deep Q-learning, function approximation errors are known to lead to overestimated value estimates and suboptimal policies. We show that this problem persists in an actor-critic setting and propose novel mechanisms to minimize its effects on both the actor and the critic. Our algorithm builds on Double Q-learning, by taking the minimum value between a pair of critics to limit overestimation. We draw the connection between target networks and overestimation bias, and suggest delaying policy updates to reduce per-update error and further improve performance. We evaluate our method on the suite of OpenAI gym tasks, outperforming the state of the art in every environment tested.

''Thinking with Images'' has emerged as an effective paradigm for fine-grained visual reasoning: by explicitly zooming into relevant regions and reasoning over crops, models can access local evidence that is difficult to recover from a single global image. However, this benefit comes with redundant tool invocations and longer inference traces. Moreover, when such behaviors are learned mainly from outcome reward, the resulting intermediate crops or visual cues can be noisy or fail to faithfully capture task-relevant visual evidence. In this work, we ask whether the reasoning benefits of ''Thinking with Images'' can be internalized through Thinking with Imagination: an internal process that decides where to look and imagines what visual cues closer inspection would reveal without actually invoking tools. We propose Imagine-OPD, an on-policy self-distillation framework in which a teacher plays the role of a ''Thinking with Images'' reasoner during training: it receives privileged zoomed evidence views derived from annotated regions, and supervises the model's own imagination reasoning trajectories. Imagine-OPD does not require an external teacher or high-quality imagination demonstrations. Experiments on vision-centric benchmarks show that Imagine-OPD achieves the best average performance among compared models while significantly reducing inference overhead compared with ''Thinking with Images'' methods.