Daily Papers

Multi-agent systems built on large language models are increasingly deployed in strategic policy and governance settings, where agents representing stakeholders with conflicting interests must coordinate under shared constraints. These systems typically assign role-based personas to agents, describing their motivations and objectives. Whether agents with role-based identities follow explicit payoffs or their assigned roles in strategic decision-making remains untested. Here we show that assigning role-based personas suppresses payoff-aligned behavior in four-agent strategic games, shifting equilibrium attainment by up to 90 percentage points even when agents have complete payoff information. We test a 2x2 factorial design (persona presence x payoff visibility) across four models (Qwen-7B, Qwen-32B, Llama-8B, Mistral-7B), and 53 environmental policy scenarios with two equilibria: Tragedy of the Commons, where individual payoff dominates, and Green Transition, where collective payoff dominates. With personas present, all models reach near-zero Tragedy equilibrium in the Tragedy-dominant scenarios despite complete payoff information, and 100% of equilibria correspond to Green Transition. No model reaches Tragedy equilibrium by removing personas alone; only Qwen models reach 65-90% Tragedy equilibrium rates when personas are removed, and payoffs are made explicit. Three distinct behavioral profiles emerge: Qwen shifts equilibrium selection based on framing condition, Mistral increases response variance without reaching the Tragedy equilibrium, and Llama holds near-constant across all conditions. Representational choices in multi-agent LLM systems are governance decisions: persona assignment determines which equilibrium a simulation produces, independent of the underlying incentive structure.

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

The widespread applicability and increasing omnipresence of LLMs have instigated a need to align LLM responses to user and stakeholder preferences. Many preference optimization approaches have been proposed that fine-tune LLM parameters to achieve good alignment. However, such parameter tuning is known to interfere with model performance on many tasks. Moreover, keeping up with shifting user preferences is tricky in such a situation. Decoding-time alignment with reward model guidance solves these issues at the cost of increased inference time. However, most of such methods fail to strike the right balance between exploration and exploitation of reward -- often due to the conflated formulation of these two aspects - to give well-aligned responses. To remedy this we decouple these two aspects and implement them in an evolutionary fashion: exploration is enforced by decoding from mutated instructions and exploitation is represented as the periodic replacement of poorly-rewarded generations with well-rewarded ones. Empirical evidences indicate that this strategy outperforms many preference optimization and decode-time alignment approaches on two widely accepted alignment benchmarks AlpacaEval 2 and MT-Bench. Our implementation will be available at: https://darwin-alignment.github.io.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Existing work on value alignment typically characterizes value relations statically, ignoring how interventions - such as prompting, fine-tuning, or preference optimization - reshape the broader value system. We introduce the Value Alignment Tax (VAT), a framework that measures how alignment-induced changes propagate across interconnected values relative to achieved on-target gain. VAT captures the dynamics of value expression under alignment pressure. Using a controlled scenario-action dataset grounded in Schwartz value theory, we collect paired pre-post normative judgments and analyze alignment effects across models, values, and alignment strategies. Our results show that alignment often produces uneven, structured co-movement among values. These effects are invisible under conventional target-only evaluation, revealing systemic, process-level alignment risks and offering new insights into the dynamics of value alignment in LLMs.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

Open-ended real-world interaction admits multiple valid behaviors: an agent may answer directly, ask for clarification, provide progress updates, or confirm before acting. This flexibility breaks a core assumption behind group-based RL: rollouts compared within a group are no longer guaranteed to be behaviorally comparable. As a result, reward-model preferences over interaction style can distort relative advantages and steer optimization toward reward-preferred behaviors rather than context-appropriate ones. We formalize this as a reward fairness problem and propose ARC (Advantage Regularization via Conditioning), a training recipe that restores fairer relative comparison through strategy-conditioned rollout grouping, together with hybrid rewards and entropy regularization. We study ARC in our proposed \inter, a novel paradigm for responsive, steerable, and execution-aware user-agent interaction that decouples user-visible communication from latent reasoning and tool use. \inter\ also provides the annotation and distillation pipeline for constructing \inter-86K, our strategy-annotated training corpus for supervised and RL training. Empirically, ARC substantially strengthens the core τ/τ^2 tool-use benchmarks, while \inter\ reduces time-to-first-token from 4.91s to 1.27s relative to a think-style baseline. Together, these results suggest that a central bottleneck in open-ended interactive learning is not only how agents are rewarded, but whether their behaviors are compared fairly in the first place. The ARC implementation and \inter-86K training data will be released.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

Alignment has quickly become a default ingredient in LLM development, with techniques such as reinforcement learning from human feedback making models act safely, follow instructions, and perform ever-better on complex tasks. While these techniques are certainly useful, we propose that they should not be universally applied and demonstrate a range of tasks on which base language models consistently outperform their popular aligned forms. Particularly, we study tasks that require unpredictable outputs, such as random number generation, mixed strategy games (rock-paper-scissors and hide-and-seek), and creative writing. In each case, aligned models tend towards narrow behaviors that result in distinct disadvantages, for instance, preferring to generate "7" over other uniformly random numbers, becoming almost fully predictable in some game states, or prioritizing pleasant writing over creative originality. Across models tested, better performance on common benchmarks tends to correlate with worse performance on our tasks, suggesting an effective trade-off in the required capabilities.

Recent research shows that Preference Alignment (PA) objectives act as divergence estimators between aligned (chosen) and unaligned (rejected) response distributions. In this work, we extend this divergence-based perspective to general alignment settings, such as reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), where only environmental rewards are available. Within this unified framework, we propose f-Group Relative Policy Optimization (f-GRPO), a class of on-policy reinforcement learning, and f-Hybrid Alignment Loss (f-HAL), a hybrid on/off policy objectives, for general LLM alignment based on variational representation of f-divergences. We provide theoretical guarantees that these classes of objectives improve the average reward after alignment. Empirically, we validate our framework on both RLVR (Math Reasoning) and PA tasks (Safety Alignment), demonstrating superior performance and flexibility compared to current methods.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) and LLM-as-a-Judge exhibit deceptive alignment by producing correct judgments for incorrect reasons, as they are trained and evaluated to prioritize Outcome Accuracy, which undermines their ability to generalize during RLHF. We introduce Rationale Consistency, a fine-grained metric that quantifies the alignment between the model's reasoning process and human judgment. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals that rationale consistency effectively discriminates among state-of-the-art models and detects deceptive alignment, while outcome accuracy falls short in both respects. To mitigate this gap, we introduce a hybrid signal that combines rationale consistency with outcome accuracy for GenRM training. Our training method achieves state-of-the-art performance on RM-Bench (87.1%) and JudgeBench (82%), surpassing outcome-only baselines by an average of 5%. Using RM during RLHF, our method effectively improves performance as demonstrated on Arena Hard v2, notably yielding a 7% improvement in creative writing tasks. Further analysis confirms that our method escapes the deceptive alignment trap, effectively reversing the decline in rationale consistency observed in outcome-only training.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce confident but incorrect answers in settings where abstention would be safer. Standard evaluation protocols, however, require a response and do not account for how confidence should guide decisions under different risk preferences. To address this gap, we introduce the Behavioral Alignment Score (BAS), a decision-theoretic metric for evaluating how well LLM confidence supports abstention-aware decision making. BAS is derived from an explicit answer-or-abstain utility model and aggregates realized utility across a continuum of risk thresholds, yielding a measure of decision-level reliability that depends on both the magnitude and ordering of confidence. We show theoretically that truthful confidence estimates uniquely maximize expected BAS utility, linking calibration to decision-optimal behavior. BAS is related to proper scoring rules such as log loss, but differs structurally: log loss penalizes underconfidence and overconfidence symmetrically, whereas BAS imposes an asymmetric penalty that strongly prioritizes avoiding overconfident errors. Using BAS alongside widely used metrics such as ECE and AURC, we then construct a benchmark of self-reported confidence reliability across multiple LLMs and tasks. Our results reveal substantial variation in decision-useful confidence, and while larger and more accurate models tend to achieve higher BAS, even frontier models remain prone to severe overconfidence. Importantly, models with similar ECE or AURC can exhibit very different BAS due to highly overconfident errors, highlighting limitations of standard metrics. We further show that simple interventions, such as top-k confidence elicitation and post-hoc calibration, can meaningfully improve confidence reliability. Overall, our work provides both a principled metric and a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM confidence reliability.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

Collecting high-quality preference datasets for reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is resource-intensive and challenging. As a result, researchers often train reward models on extensive offline datasets which aggregate diverse generation sources and scoring/alignment policies. We hypothesize that this aggregation has an averaging effect on reward model scores, which limits signal and impairs the alignment process. Inspired by the field of inverse RL, we define the 'inverse alignment problem' in language model training, where our objective is to optimize the critic's reward for a fixed actor and a fixed offline preference dataset. We hypothesize that solving the inverse alignment problem will improve reward model quality by providing clearer feedback on the policy's current behavior. To that end, we investigate whether repeatedly fine-tuning a reward model on subsets of the offline preference dataset aligned with a periodically frozen policy during RLHF improves upon vanilla RLHF. Our empirical results demonstrate that this approach facilitates superior alignment and faster convergence compared to using an unaligned or out-of-distribution reward model relative to the LLM policy.

Aligning agent behaviors with diverse human preferences remains a challenging problem in reinforcement learning (RL), owing to the inherent abstractness and mutability of human preferences. To address these issues, we propose AlignDiff, a novel framework that leverages RL from Human Feedback (RLHF) to quantify human preferences, covering abstractness, and utilizes them to guide diffusion planning for zero-shot behavior customizing, covering mutability. AlignDiff can accurately match user-customized behaviors and efficiently switch from one to another. To build the framework, we first establish the multi-perspective human feedback datasets, which contain comparisons for the attributes of diverse behaviors, and then train an attribute strength model to predict quantified relative strengths. After relabeling behavioral datasets with relative strengths, we proceed to train an attribute-conditioned diffusion model, which serves as a planner with the attribute strength model as a director for preference aligning at the inference phase. We evaluate AlignDiff on various locomotion tasks and demonstrate its superior performance on preference matching, switching, and covering compared to other baselines. Its capability of completing unseen downstream tasks under human instructions also showcases the promising potential for human-AI collaboration. More visualization videos are released on https://aligndiff.github.io/.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has significantly advanced reasoning in large language models (LLMs), but such signals remain coarse, offering only binary correctness feedback. This limitation often results in inefficiencies, including overly verbose reasoning and high computational cost, while existing solutions often compromise accuracy. To address this, we introduce self-aligned reward (SAR), a self-guided signal that complements verifiable rewards to encourage both reasoning accuracy and efficiency. SAR is defined as the relative perplexity difference between an answer conditioned on the query and the standalone answer, thereby favoring responses that are concise and query-specific. Quantitative analysis reveals that SAR reliably distinguishes answer quality: concise, correct answers score higher than redundant ones, and partially correct answers score higher than entirely incorrect ones. Evaluation on 4 models across 7 benchmarks shows that integrating SAR with prevalent RL algorithms like PPO and GRPO improves accuracy by 4%, while reducing inference cost by 30%. Further analysis demonstrates that SAR achieves a Pareto-optimal trade-off between correctness and efficiency compared to reward signals based on length or self-confidence. We also show that SAR shortens responses while preserving advanced reasoning behaviors, demonstrating its ability to suppress unnecessary elaboration without losing critical reasoning. These results highlight the promise of self-aligned reward as a fine-grained complement to verifiable rewards, paving the way for more efficient and effective LLM training.

World models have been emerging as critical components for assessing the consequences of actions generated by interactive agents in online planning and offline evaluation. In text-based environments, world models are typically evaluated and trained with single-step metrics such as Exact Match, aiming to improve the similarity between predicted and real-world states, but such metrics have been shown to be insufficient for capturing actual agent behavior. To address this issue, we introduce a new behavior-aligned training paradigm aimed at improving the functional consistency between the world model and the real environment. This paradigm focuses on optimizing a tractable step-level metric named Behavior Consistency Reward (BehR), which measures how much the likelihood of a logged next action changes between the real state and the world-model-predicted state under a frozen Reference Agent. Experiments on WebShop and TextWorld show that BehR-based training improves long-term alignment in several settings, with the clearest gains in WebShop and less movement in near-ceiling regimes, while preserving or improving single-step prediction quality in three of four settings. World models trained with BehR also achieve lower false positives in offline surrogate evaluation and show modest but encouraging gains in inference-time lookahead planning.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

Recent studies have demonstrated significant progress in aligning text-to-image diffusion models with human preference via Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback. However, while existing methods achieve high scores on automated reward metrics, they often lead to Preference Mode Collapse (PMC)-a specific form of reward hacking where models converge on narrow, high-scoring outputs (e.g., images with monolithic styles or pervasive overexposure), severely degrading generative diversity. In this work, we introduce and quantify this phenomenon, proposing DivGenBench, a novel benchmark designed to measure the extent of PMC. We posit that this collapse is driven by over-optimization along the reward model's inherent biases. Building on this analysis, we propose Directional Decoupling Alignment (D^2-Align), a novel framework that mitigates PMC by directionally correcting the reward signal. Specifically, our method first learns a directional correction within the reward model's embedding space while keeping the model frozen. This correction is then applied to the reward signal during the optimization process, preventing the model from collapsing into specific modes and thereby maintaining diversity. Our comprehensive evaluation, combining qualitative analysis with quantitative metrics for both quality and diversity, reveals that D^2-Align achieves superior alignment with human preference.

Evaluating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents against targeted behavior attacks is critical for assessing their robustness. These attacks aim to manipulate the victim into specific behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives, often bypassing traditional reward-based defenses. Prior methods have primarily focused on reducing cumulative rewards; however, rewards are typically too generic to capture complex safety requirements effectively. As a result, focusing solely on reward reduction can lead to suboptimal attack strategies, particularly in safety-critical scenarios where more precise behavior manipulation is needed. To address these challenges, we propose RAT, a method designed for universal, targeted behavior attacks. RAT trains an intention policy that is explicitly aligned with human preferences, serving as a precise behavioral target for the adversary. Concurrently, an adversary manipulates the victim's policy to follow this target behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks, RAT dynamically adjusts the state occupancy measure within the replay buffer, allowing for more controlled and effective behavior manipulation. Our empirical results on robotic simulation tasks demonstrate that RAT outperforms existing adversarial attack algorithms in inducing specific behaviors. Additionally, RAT shows promise in improving agent robustness, leading to more resilient policies. We further validate RAT by guiding Decision Transformer agents to adopt behaviors aligned with human preferences in various MuJoCo tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse tasks.

Autonomous agents have rapidly matured as task executors and seen widespread deployment via harnesses such as OpenClaw. Safety concerns have rightly drawn growing research attention, and beneath them lie the values silently steering agent behavior. Existing value benchmarks, however, remain confined to LLMs, leaving agent values largely uncharted. From intuitive, empirical, and theoretical vantage points, we show that an agent's values diverge from those of its underlying LLM, and the agentic modality further introduces dataset-, evaluation-, and system-level challenges absent from text-only protocols. We close this gap with Agent-ValueBench, the first benchmark dedicated to agent values. It features 394 executable environments across 16 domains, offering 4,335 value-conflict tasks that cover 28 value systems and 332 dimensions. Every instance is co-synthesized through our purpose-built end-to-end pipeline and curated per-instance by professional psychologists. Each task ships with two pole-aligned golden trajectories whose checkpoints anchor a trajectory-level rubric-based judge. Benchmarking 14 frontier proprietary and open-weights models across 4 mainstream harnesses, we uncover three concerted findings. Agent values first manifest as a Value Tide of cross-model homogeneity beneath interpretable counter-currents. This tide bends non-additively under harness pull, and yet more decisively under deliberate steering via embedded skills. Together these results signal that the agent-alignment lever is shifting from classical model alignment and prompt steering toward harness alignment and skill steering.

Most approaches to AI alignment treat human preferences as fixed targets to be inferred and optimized. This assumption conflicts with extensive empirical evidence showing that preferences are layered, dynamic, and constructed through interaction--particularly with adaptive technologies. As AI systems become more persistent, personalized, and socially embedded, they increasingly participate in shaping what people attend to, value, and endorse over time. We introduce Constructive Alignment, a paradigm that reframes alignment as a control problem over evolving human preference trajectories rather than static preference satisfaction. Drawing on behavioral economics, psychology, and constructivist social theory, we model preferences as layered state variables that evolve under interaction with AI systems. We formalize this view using a control-theoretic framework in which system actions and interaction design jointly influence both world states and human evaluative states. We argue that alignment is not primarily about controlling AI behavior, but about regulating how AI systems influence the evolution of human preferences--ensuring that value trajectories remain coherent, reflectively endorsed, epistemically grounded, bounded against manipulation, and empowering under uncertainty. Alignment thus becomes a problem of governing long-term value formation rather than simply satisfying static preferences.

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

Off-policy evaluation (OPE) is a method for estimating the return of a target policy using some pre-collected observational data generated by a potentially different behavior policy. In some cases, there may be unmeasured variables that can confound the action-reward or action-next-state relationships, rendering many existing OPE approaches ineffective. This paper develops an instrumental variable (IV)-based method for consistent OPE in confounded Markov decision processes (MDPs). Similar to single-stage decision making, we show that IV enables us to correctly identify the target policy's value in infinite horizon settings as well. Furthermore, we propose an efficient and robust value estimator and illustrate its effectiveness through extensive simulations and analysis of real data from a world-leading short-video platform.

Reinforcement fine-tuning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for equipping large vision-language models (LVLMs) with agentic capabilities such as tool use and multi-step reasoning. Despite striking empirical successes, most notably Visual Agentic Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (Visual-ARFT), the theoretical underpinnings of this paradigm remain poorly understood. In particular, two critical questions lack rigorous answers: (i)~how does the composite structure of verifiable rewards (format compliance, answer accuracy, tool executability) affect the convergence of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and (ii)~why does training on a small set of tool-augmented tasks transfer to out-of-distribution domains? We address these gaps by introducing the Tool-Augmented Markov Decision Process (TA-MDP), a formal framework that models multimodal agentic decision-making with bounded-depth tool calls. Within this framework, we establish three main results. First, we prove that GRPO under composite verifiable rewards converges to a first-order stationary point at rate O(1/T) with explicit dependence on the number of reward components and group size (Theorem~1). Second, we derive a Reward Decomposition Theorem that bounds the sub-optimality gap between decomposed per-component optimization and joint optimization, providing a precise characterization of when reward decomposition is beneficial (Theorem~2). Third, we establish a PAC-Bayes generalization bound for tool-augmented policies that explains the strong out-of-distribution transfer observed in Visual-ARFT (Theorem~3).

Most recommendation benchmarks evaluate how well a model imitates user behavior. In financial advisory, however, observed actions can be noisy or short-sighted under market volatility and may conflict with a user's long-term goals. Treating what users chose as the sole ground truth, therefore, conflates behavioral imitation with decision quality. We introduce Conv-FinRe, a conversational and longitudinal benchmark for stock recommendation that evaluates LLMs beyond behavior matching. Given an onboarding interview, step-wise market context, and advisory dialogues, models must generate rankings over a fixed investment horizon. Crucially, Conv-FinRe provides multi-view references that distinguish descriptive behavior from normative utility grounded in investor-specific risk preferences, enabling diagnosis of whether an LLM follows rational analysis, mimics user noise, or is driven by market momentum. We build the benchmark from real market data and human decision trajectories, instantiate controlled advisory conversations, and evaluate a suite of state-of-the-art LLMs. Results reveal a persistent tension between rational decision quality and behavioral alignment: models that perform well on utility-based ranking often fail to match user choices, whereas behaviorally aligned models can overfit short-term noise. The dataset is publicly released on Hugging Face, and the codebase is available on GitHub.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

Ultra-long egocentric video understanding requires reasoning over temporally sparse evidence distributed across hours or days, challenging current multimodal models with limited context and the grounding of key video segments. While Chain-of-Tool-Thought (CoTT) agent systems enable iterative retrieval and inspection, they suffer from error propagation due to rigid zoom-in strategies that lack recovery mechanisms. In this work, we address these challenges through SCOUT (Self-Checking Chain-Of-Tool-thought), a recovery-aware agentic framework introducing an adaptive policy that evaluates intermediate tool observations and dynamically trades off exploitation (zoom-in) and exploration (region switching), enabling robust multi-hop reasoning over extremely long horizons. However, training such multi-turn tool-using agents remains challenging, as existing RL methods rely on sparse outcome-level rewards and lack supervision over extended decision trajectories, resulting in suboptimal credit assignment for long-horizon reasoning. To address this, we develop UPS-GRPO, an uncertainty-prioritized policy optimization method that concentrates exploration on high-uncertainty post-tool states while preserving sample efficiency. We further introduce a turn-level advantage decomposition that integrates outcome rewards with tool-grounded temporal alignment rewards for improved credit assignment. Experiments show that SCOUT achieves state-of-the-art results on ultra-long egocentric benchmarks, while remaining competitive on shorter-horizon long-video settings.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

Reward models are critical for aligning models to follow instructions, and are typically trained following one of two popular paradigms: Bradley-Terry style or Regression style. However, there is a lack of evidence that either approach is better than the other, when adequately matched for data. This is primarily because these approaches require data collected in different (but incompatible) formats, meaning that adequately matched data is not available in existing public datasets. To tackle this problem, we release preference annotations (designed for Bradley-Terry training) to complement existing ratings (designed for Regression style training) in the HelpSteer2 dataset. To improve data interpretability, preference annotations are accompanied with human-written justifications. Using this data, we conduct the first head-to-head comparison of Bradley-Terry and Regression models when adequately matched for data. Based on insights derived from such a comparison, we propose a novel approach to combine Bradley-Terry and Regression reward modeling. A Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct model tuned with this approach scores 94.1 on RewardBench, emerging top of more than 140 reward models as of 1 Oct 2024. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of this reward model at aligning models to follow instructions in RLHF. We open-source this dataset (CC-BY-4.0 license) at https://huggingface.co/datasets/nvidia/HelpSteer2 and openly release the trained Reward Model at https://huggingface.co/nvidia/Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Reward

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

Multi-turn agents solve complex tasks through extended sequences of tool interactions before producing a final answer, making credit assignment a fundamental challenge during post-training. Outcome rewards provide reliable supervision for short-horizon reasoning, but become sparse and high-variance as trajectories grow to tens or hundreds of tool calls. They can also be misleading: a failed rollout may contain many useful actions that move the agent closer to the goal, yet outcome-only training assigns them the same negative advantage as the eventual mistake. We propose TRACE (Turn-level Reward Assignment via Credit Estimation), a dense credit-assignment method for agentic reinforcement learning. TRACE represents rollouts as state transitions at tool-call boundaries, obtains gold-answer log-probabilities from a frozen reference model, transforms them into log-ratio state values, and derives per-action rewards as Temporal-Difference changes in those values. This requires no additional critic or process-label training, and its one-step log-ratio TD component telescopes across redundant tool calls. On long-horizon complex search, TRACE substantially improves base-model tool-use ability using pure RL, without a cold-start supervised fine-tuning stage, an agentic mid-training stage, or training on live-web data. On the closed-web BrowseComp-Plus benchmark, it raises Qwen3-4B from 7.2 to 35.6 and Qwen3-30B-A3B from 8.4 to 42.6. The learned search behavior also transfers to open-web benchmarks, and the learning curves show earlier improvement and faster convergence during RL training.

Aligning large language models with human objectives is paramount, yet common approaches including RLHF suffer from unstable and resource-intensive training. In response to this challenge, we introduce ARGS, Alignment as Reward-Guided Search, a novel framework that integrates alignment into the decoding process, eliminating the need for expensive RL training. By adjusting the model's probabilistic predictions using a reward signal, ARGS generates texts with semantic diversity while being aligned with human preferences, offering a promising and flexible solution for aligning language models. Notably, ARGS demonstrates consistent enhancements in average reward compared to baselines across diverse alignment tasks and various model dimensions. For example, under the same greedy-based decoding strategy, our method improves the average reward by 19.56% relative to the baseline and secures a preference or tie score of 64.33% in GPT-4 evaluation. We believe that our framework, emphasizing decoding-time alignment, paves the way for more responsive language models in the future. Code is publicly available at: https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/args.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to achieve remarkable reasoning in domains like mathematics and coding, where verifiable rewards provide clear signals. However, extending this paradigm to financial decision is challenged by the market's stochastic nature: rewards are verifiable but inherently noisy, causing standard RL to degenerate into reward hacking. To address this, we propose Trade-R1, a model training framework that bridges verifiable rewards to stochastic environments via process-level reasoning verification. Our key innovation is a verification method that transforms the problem of evaluating reasoning over lengthy financial documents into a structured Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) task. We construct a triangular consistency metric, assessing pairwise alignment between retrieved evidence, reasoning chains, and decisions to serve as a validity filter for noisy market returns. We explore two reward integration strategies: Fixed-effect Semantic Reward (FSR) for stable alignment signals, and Dynamic-effect Semantic Reward (DSR) for coupled magnitude optimization. Experiments on different country asset selection demonstrate that our paradigm reduces reward hacking, with DSR achieving superior cross-market generalization while maintaining the highest reasoning consistency.

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

Score- and flow-matching models often rely on preference-based reinforcement learning for two purposes: aligning with subjective preferences and, surprisingly, recovering properties such as visual realism and coherent object structure that matching-based training is intended to learn from the data itself. We argue that this reflects a structural mismatch. Matching losses measure ell_2 regression error on the velocity or score field under training-time marginals, a proxy poorly aligned with the visual and semantic properties that determine sample quality at inference. Given a reward aligned with these properties, RL sidesteps the mismatch by evaluating the model on its own samples and following the reward landscape directly. The challenge is to obtain such a reward without relying on human preferences, which are expensive and conflate data realism with annotator inclinations. We propose Discriminator-Guided RL (DRL). DRL trains a discriminator to separate data from base-model samples in a pretrained representation space and uses its logit as the reward in KL-regularized RL. The pretrained space restricts the discriminator to perceptually meaningful directions, and the logit estimates the log-likelihood ratio between data and model, which is the optimal reward for targeting the data distribution. Across SiT, JiT, REPA, and RAE, DRL reduces guidance-free FID (e.g., 9.38 to 2.62 on SiT) and semantic-space FD (e.g., 88.2 to 19.3 on DINOv3 for SiT), with consistent gains across all backbones, and improves human-preference rewards without training on them. It also yields a better Pareto frontier between preference reward and image fidelity under subsequent preference-based post-training, increasing alignment while reducing low-level artifacts such as oversaturation and excessive brightness.

A hallmark of life on Earth is the ability of agents to exert causal power and be drivers of subsequent events. This is key to cognition at all scales. Causal emergence, measuring the degree to which an agent exerts unique predictive power on its future, is one consequence of causal power. Indeed, recent discoveries have shown that biological agents, even minimal ones, increase their causal emergence after learning new memories. However, there is a major knowledge gap regarding how causally emergent artificial agents are. We focused on Reinforcement Learning (RL) of neural-network agents across an array of environmental conditions, encompassing different algorithms, agent architectures, and six environments arranged on a complexity spectrum. For consistency, we computed the causal emergence of their latent-space representations over their lifetimes. We used the recently proposed ΦID to estimate causal emergence and tested how it related to learning performance. Our results suggested a Causally Emergent Alignment Hypothesis: successful agents exhibited causal emergence that was consistently predictive of final reward early in training and whose representational dynamics aligned with reward improvement in most tasks. This idea suggests that causal emergence may be a previously undisclosed axis of reorganization of neural representations in RL agents, with the potential to establish causal relationships and interventions that will lead to better RL agents. Our work also highlights the alignment between causal emergence and learning as another way biological and artificial creatures compare.

Tool-Integrated Reasoning (TIR) empowers large language models (LLMs) to tackle complex tasks by interleaving reasoning steps with external tool interactions. However, existing reinforcement learning methods typically rely on outcome- or trajectory-level rewards, assigning uniform advantages to all steps within a trajectory. This coarse-grained credit assignment fails to distinguish effective tool calls from redundant or erroneous ones, particularly in long-horizon multi-turn scenarios. To address this, we propose MatchTIR, a framework that introduces fine-grained supervision via bipartite matching-based turn-level reward assignment and dual-level advantage estimation. Specifically, we formulate credit assignment as a bipartite matching problem between predicted and ground-truth traces, utilizing two assignment strategies to derive dense turn-level rewards. Furthermore, to balance local step precision with global task success, we introduce a dual-level advantage estimation scheme that integrates turn-level and trajectory-level signals, assigning distinct advantage values to individual interaction turns. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of MatchTIR. Notably, our 4B model surpasses the majority of 8B competitors, particularly in long-horizon and multi-turn tasks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/quchangle1/MatchTIR.

Deep research systems, agentic AI that solve complex, multi-step tasks by coordinating reasoning, search across the open web and user files, and tool use, are moving toward hierarchical deployments with a Planner, Coordinator, and Executors. In practice, training entire stacks end-to-end remains impractical, so most work trains a single planner connected to core tools such as search, browsing, and code. While SFT imparts protocol fidelity, it suffers from imitation and exposure biases and underuses environment feedback. Preference alignment methods such as DPO are schema and proxy-dependent, off-policy, and weak for long-horizon credit assignment and multi-objective trade-offs. A further limitation of SFT and DPO is their reliance on human defined decision points and subskills through schema design and labeled comparisons. Reinforcement learning aligns with closed-loop, tool-interaction research by optimizing trajectory-level policies, enabling exploration, recovery behaviors, and principled credit assignment, and it reduces dependence on such human priors and rater biases. This survey is, to our knowledge, the first dedicated to the RL foundations of deep research systems. It systematizes work after DeepSeek-R1 along three axes: (i) data synthesis and curation; (ii) RL methods for agentic research covering stability, sample efficiency, long context handling, reward and credit design, multi-objective optimization, and multimodal integration; and (iii) agentic RL training systems and frameworks. We also cover agent architecture and coordination, as well as evaluation and benchmarks, including recent QA, VQA, long-form synthesis, and domain-grounded, tool-interaction tasks. We distill recurring patterns, surface infrastructure bottlenecks, and offer practical guidance for training robust, transparent deep research agents with RL.

Aligning AI systems with human preferences typically suffers from the infamous reward hacking problem, where optimization of an imperfect reward model leads to undesired behaviors. In this paper, we investigate reward hacking in offline preference optimization, which aims to improve an initial model using a preference dataset. We identify two types of reward hacking stemming from statistical fluctuations in the dataset: Type I Reward Hacking due to subpar choices appearing more favorable, and Type II Reward Hacking due to decent choices appearing less favorable. We prove that many (mainstream or theoretical) preference optimization methods suffer from both types of reward hacking. To mitigate Type I Reward Hacking, we propose POWER, a new preference optimization method that combines Guiasu's weighted entropy with a robust reward maximization objective. POWER enjoys finite-sample guarantees under general function approximation, competing with the best covered policy in the data. To mitigate Type II Reward Hacking, we analyze the learning dynamics of preference optimization and develop a novel technique that dynamically updates preference labels toward certain "stationary labels", resulting in diminishing gradients for untrustworthy samples. Empirically, POWER with dynamic labels (POWER-DL) consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods on alignment benchmarks, achieving improvements of up to 13.0 points on AlpacaEval 2.0 and 11.5 points on Arena-Hard over DPO, while also improving or maintaining performance on downstream tasks such as mathematical reasoning. Strong theoretical guarantees and empirical results demonstrate the promise of POWER-DL in mitigating reward hacking.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback relies on reward models to align large language models with human preferences. However, RLHF often suffers from reward hacking, wherein policy learning exploits flaws in the trained reward model to maximize reward scores without genuinely aligning with human preferences. A significant example of such reward hacking is length bias, where reward models usually favor longer responses irrespective of actual response quality. Previous works on length bias have notable limitations, these approaches either mitigate bias without characterizing the bias form, or simply assume a linear length-reward relation. To accurately model the intricate nature of length bias and facilitate more effective bias mitigation, we propose FiMi-RM (Bias Fitting to Mitigate Length Bias of Reward Model in RLHF), a framework that autonomously learns and corrects underlying bias patterns. Our approach consists of three stages: First, we train a standard reward model which inherently contains length bias. Next, we deploy a lightweight fitting model to explicitly capture the non-linear relation between length and reward. Finally, we incorporate this learned relation into the reward model to debias. Experimental results demonstrate that FiMi-RM achieves a more balanced length-reward distribution. Furthermore, when applied to alignment algorithms, our debiased reward model improves length-controlled win rate and reduces verbosity without compromising its performance.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly gain self-evolutionary capabilities to adapt and refine their strategies through real-world interaction, their long-term reliability becomes a critical concern. We identify the Alignment Tipping Process (ATP), a critical post-deployment risk unique to self-evolving LLM agents. Unlike training-time failures, ATP arises when continual interaction drives agents to abandon alignment constraints established during training in favor of reinforced, self-interested strategies. We formalize and analyze ATP through two complementary paradigms: Self-Interested Exploration, where repeated high-reward deviations induce individual behavioral drift, and Imitative Strategy Diffusion, where deviant behaviors spread across multi-agent systems. Building on these paradigms, we construct controllable testbeds and benchmark Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our experiments show that alignment benefits erode rapidly under self-evolution, with initially aligned models converging toward unaligned states. In multi-agent settings, successful violations diffuse quickly, leading to collective misalignment. Moreover, current reinforcement learning-based alignment methods provide only fragile defenses against alignment tipping. Together, these findings demonstrate that alignment of LLM agents is not a static property but a fragile and dynamic one, vulnerable to feedback-driven decay during deployment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ATP.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback has emerged as a standard for aligning diffusion models. However, we identify a fundamental limitation in the standard DPO formulation because it relies on the Bradley-Terry model to aggregate diverse evaluation axes like aesthetic quality and semantic alignment into a single scalar reward. This aggregation creates a reward conflict where the model is forced to unlearn desirable features of a specific dimension if they appear in a globally non-preferred sample. To address this issue, we propose Multi Reward Conditional DPO (MCDPO). This method resolves reward conflicts by introducing a disentangled Bradley-Terry objective. MCDPO explicitly injects a preference outcome vector as a condition during training, which allows the model to learn the correct optimization direction for each reward axis independently within a single network. We further introduce dimensional reward dropout to ensure balanced optimization across dimensions. Extensive experiments on Stable Diffusion 1.5 and SDXL demonstrate that MCDPO achieves superior performance on benchmarks. Notably, our conditional framework enables dynamic and multiple-axis control at inference time using Classifier Free Guidance to amplify specific reward dimensions without additional training or external reward models.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

Reinforcement learning has become a powerful paradigm for post-training large language model agents, yet credit assignment in multi-turn environments remains a challenge. Agents often receive sparse, trajectory-level rewards only at the end of an episode, making it difficult to determine which intermediate actions contributed to success or failure. As a result, propagating delayed outcomes back to individual decision steps without relying on costly auxiliary value models remains an open problem. We propose Generalized Advantage Grouped Policy Optimization (GAGPO), a critic-free reinforcement learning method for precise, step-aligned temporal credit assignment. GAGPO constructs a non-parametric grouped value proxy from sampled rollouts and uses it to compute TD/GAE-style temporal advantages, recursively propagating outcome supervision backward through time. Combined with group-wise advantage normalization and an action-level importance ratio, GAGPO extracts stable, localized optimization signals directly from multi-turn trajectories. Experiments on ALFWorld and WebShop show that GAGPO outperforms strong reinforcement learning baselines. Further analyses demonstrate faster early-stage learning, improved interaction efficiency, and smoother optimization dynamics, suggesting that GAGPO offers a simple yet effective framework for multi-turn agentic reinforcement learning.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

The Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE) - the tendency to allocate greater resources to a specific, narratively described victim than to a statistically characterized group facing equivalent hardship - is one of the most robust findings in moral psychology and behavioural economics. As large language models (LLMs) assume consequential roles in humanitarian triage, automated grant evaluation, and content moderation, a critical question arises: do these systems inherit the affective irrationalities present in human moral reasoning? We present the first systematic, large-scale empirical investigation of the IVE in LLMs, comprising N=51,955 validated API trials across 16 frontier models spanning nine organizational lineages (Google, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, DeepSeek, xAI, Alibaba, IBM, and Moonshot). Using a suite of ten experiments - porting and extending canonical paradigms from Small et al. (2007) and Kogut and Ritov (2005) - we find that the IVE is prevalent but strongly modulated by alignment training. Instruction-tuned models exhibit extreme IVE (Cohen's d up to 1.56), while reasoning-specialized models invert the effect (down to d=-0.85). The pooled effect (d=0.223, p=2e-6) is approximately twice the single-victim human meta-analytic baseline (dapprox0.10) reported by Lee and Feeley (2016) - and likely exceeds the overall human pooled effect by a larger margin, given that the group-victim human effect is near zero. Standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting - contrary to its role as a deliberative corrective - nearly triples the IVE effect size (from d=0.15 to d=0.41), while only utilitarian CoT reliably eliminates it. We further document psychophysical numbing, perfect quantity neglect, and marginal in-group/out-group cultural bias, with implications for AI deployment in humanitarian and ethical decision-making contexts.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

As agents based on large language models are increasingly deployed to long-horizon tasks, maintaining their alignment with stakeholder preferences becomes critical. Effective alignment in such settings requires reward models that are interpretable so that stakeholders can understand and audit model objectives. Moreover, reward models must be capable of steering agents at interaction time, allowing preference shifts to be incorporated without retraining. We introduce ARCANE, a framework that frames alignment as a multi-agent collaboration problem that dynamically represents stakeholder preferences as natural-language rubrics: weighted sets of verifiable criteria that can be generated on-the-fly from task context. Inspired by utility theory, we formulate rubric learning as a reconstruction problem and apply a regularized Group-Sequence Policy Optimization (GSPO) procedure that balances interpretability, faithfulness, and computational efficiency. Using a corpus of 219 labeled rubrics derived from the GDPVal benchmark, we evaluate ARCANE on challenging tasks requiring multi-step reasoning and tool use. The learned rubrics produce compact, legible evaluations and enable configurable trade-offs (e.g., correctness vs. conciseness) without retraining. Our results show that rubric-based reward models offer a promising path toward interpretable, test-time adaptive alignment for complex, long-horizon AI systems.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is essential for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values. However, RLHF is susceptible to reward hacking, where the agent exploits flaws in the reward function rather than learning the intended behavior, thus degrading alignment. While reward shaping helps stabilize RLHF and partially mitigate reward hacking, a systematic investigation into shaping techniques and their underlying principles remains lacking. To bridge this gap, we present a comprehensive study of the prevalent reward shaping methods. Our analysis suggests three key design principles: (1) RL reward is ideally bounded, (2) RL benefits from rapid initial growth followed by gradual convergence, and (3) RL reward is best formulated as a function of centered reward. Guided by these insights, we propose Preference As Reward (PAR), a novel approach that leverages the latent preferences embedded within the reward model itself as the signal for reinforcement learning. We evaluated PAR on two base models, Gemma2-2B and Llama3-8B, using two datasets, Ultrafeedback-Binarized and HH-RLHF. Experimental results demonstrate PAR's superior performance over other reward shaping methods. On the AlpacaEval 2.0 benchmark, PAR achieves a win rate at least 5 percentage points higher than competing approaches. Furthermore, PAR exhibits remarkable data efficiency, requiring only a single reference reward for optimal performance, and maintains robustness against reward hacking even after two full epochs of training. Code is available at https://github.com/PorUna-byte/PAR.

Reward design plays a pivotal role in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, serving as the bridge between feedback signals and model optimization. This survey provides a structured organization of reward modeling and addresses three key aspects: mathematical formulation, construction practices, and interaction with optimization paradigms. Building on this, it develops a macro-level taxonomy that characterizes reward mechanisms along complementary dimensions, thereby offering both conceptual clarity and practical guidance for alignment research. The progression of LLM alignment can be understood as a continuous refinement of reward design strategies, with recent developments highlighting paradigm shifts from reinforcement learning (RL)-based to RL-free optimization and from single-task to multi-objective and complex settings.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

Process reward models enable fine-grained, step-level evaluation of LLMs, yet building them for agentic settings remains prohibitively difficult: long-horizon interactions, irreversible actions, and stochastic environment feedback make both human annotation and Monte Carlo estimation infeasible at scale. In this work, we show that reinforcement learning (RL) post-training already provides the ingredients for effective step-level scoring, eliminating the need for dedicated reward model training altogether. Concretely, we derive an implicit advantage under a general stochastic Markov decision process, which we term progress advantage -- log-probability ratio between the RL-trained policy and its reference policy exactly recovers the optimal advantage function. This formulation makes the resulting signal annotation-free, domain-agnostic, and available as a byproduct of the standard RL post-training pipeline. We validate the effectiveness of the progress advantage across three different applications: test-time scaling, uncertainty quantification, and failure attribution on five benchmarks and four model families. Across all settings, it consistently outperforms confidence-based baselines and, despite requiring no task-specific training, surpasses dedicated trained reward models. We complement these results with deeper analyses on characteristics of progress advantage, offering practical guidance for adoption in real-world agentic systems.

MLLMs are increasingly deployed in multi-turn settings, where attackers can escalate unsafe intent through the evolving visual-text history and exploit long-context safety decay. Yet safety alignment is still dominated by single-turn data and fixed-template dialogues, leaving a mismatch between training and deployment. To bridge this gap, we propose SaFeR-Steer, a progressive multi-turn alignment framework that combines staged synthetic bootstrapping with tutor-in-the-loop GRPO to train a single student under adaptive, on-policy attacks. We also introduce Trajectory-Consistent Summative Reward (TCSR), which aggregates the historical minimum and average of turn rewards so that any low-quality turn affects the trajectory-level return. I. Dataset. We release STEER, a multi-turn multimodal safety dataset with STEER-SFT (12,934), STEER-RL (2,000), and STEER-Bench (3,227) dialogues spanning 2-10 turns. II. Experiment. Starting from Qwen2.5-VL-3B/7B, SaFeR-Steer substantially improves Safety/Helpfulness on both single-turn (48.30/45.86 rightarrow 81.84/70.77 for 3B; 56.21/60.32 rightarrow 87.89/77.40 for 7B) and multi-turn benchmarks (12.55/27.13 rightarrow 55.58/70.27 for 3B; 24.66/46.48 rightarrow 64.89/72.35 for 7B), shifting failures to later turns and yielding robustness beyond scaling alone. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SaFeR-Steer

One obstacle to applying reinforcement learning algorithms to real-world problems is the lack of suitable reward functions. Designing such reward functions is difficult in part because the user only has an implicit understanding of the task objective. This gives rise to the agent alignment problem: how do we create agents that behave in accordance with the user's intentions? We outline a high-level research direction to solve the agent alignment problem centered around reward modeling: learning a reward function from interaction with the user and optimizing the learned reward function with reinforcement learning. We discuss the key challenges we expect to face when scaling reward modeling to complex and general domains, concrete approaches to mitigate these challenges, and ways to establish trust in the resulting agents.

Reward hacking--where agents exploit flaws in imperfect reward functions rather than performing tasks as intended--poses risks for AI alignment. Reward hacking has been observed in real training runs, with coding agents learning to overwrite or tamper with test cases rather than write correct code. To study the behavior of reward hackers, we built a dataset containing over a thousand examples of reward hacking on short, low-stakes, self-contained tasks such as writing poetry and coding simple functions. We used supervised fine-tuning to train models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1-mini, Qwen3-32B, Qwen3-8B) to reward hack on these tasks. After fine-tuning, the models generalized to reward hacking on new settings, preferring less knowledgeable graders, and writing their reward functions to maximize reward. Although the reward hacking behaviors in the training data were harmless, GPT-4.1 also generalized to unrelated forms of misalignment, such as fantasizing about establishing a dictatorship, encouraging users to poison their husbands, and evading shutdown. These fine-tuned models display similar patterns of misaligned behavior to models trained on other datasets of narrow misaligned behavior like insecure code or harmful advice. Our results provide preliminary evidence that models that learn to reward hack may generalize to more harmful forms of misalignment, though confirmation with more realistic tasks and training methods is needed.

In the realm of multi-objective alignment for large language models, balancing disparate human preferences often manifests as a zero-sum conflict. Specifically, the intrinsic tension between competing goals dictates that aggressively optimizing for one metric (e.g., helpfulness) frequently incurs a substantial penalty on another (e.g., harmlessness). While prior work mainly focuses on data selection, parameter merging, or algorithmic balancing during training, these approaches merely force compromises between divergent preferences along a fixed Pareto frontier, failing to fundamentally resolve the inherent trade-off. In this work, we approach this problem from a novel perspective of multi-dimensional rewards. By scaling up the model's rollouts and analyzing the outputs across different reward dimensions, we arrive at a critical conclusion: the conflict among multiple objectives stems from the fact that the prompt itself inherently restricts the achievable multi-dimensional rewards. Based on this core observation, we propose MORA: Multi-Objective Reward Assimilation. Specifically, MORA isolates single-reward prompts through pre-sampling and expands their reward diversity by rewriting the original questions to incorporate multi-dimensional intents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that: (1) in sequential alignment, MORA achieves single-preference improvements ranging from 5% to 12.4%, with exceptional gains in harmlessness, after multiple-preference alignment across helpful, harmless, and truthful dimensions. (2) In simultaneous alignment, MORA achieves an average overall reward improvement of 4.6%. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Shiying-Huang/MORA-MPA.

Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) and Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) to human preferences is a central challenge in improving the quality of the models' generative outputs for real-world applications. A common approach is to use reward modeling to encode preferences, enabling alignment via post-training using reinforcement learning. However, traditional reward modeling is not easily adaptable to new preferences because it requires a separate reward model, commonly trained on large preference datasets. To address this, we introduce Activation Reward Models (Activation RMs) -- a novel few-shot reward modeling method that leverages activation steering to construct well-aligned reward signals using minimal supervision and no additional model finetuning. Activation RMs outperform existing few-shot reward modeling approaches such as LLM-as-a-judge with in-context learning, voting-based scoring, and token probability scoring on standard reward modeling benchmarks. Furthermore, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Activation RMs in mitigating reward hacking behaviors, highlighting their utility for safety-critical applications. Toward this end, we propose PreferenceHack, a novel few-shot setting benchmark, the first to test reward models on reward hacking in a paired preference format. Finally, we show that Activation RM achieves state-of-the-art performance on this benchmark, surpassing even GPT-4o.

Dense per-step supervision is an appealing remedy for sparse-reward, long-horizon LLM agents: reward the agent for predicting its next observation, and memory should follow. We show that under group-normalized RL (GRPO), this recipe does not merely fail -- it destroys the policy. Across Qwen3-1.7B/4B/8B on ALFWorld, a potential-based prediction reward drives every run into a degenerate absorbing state (prediction accuracy -> 1.0, task success -> 0,episode length pinned at the horizon): the "dark room" pathology, built automatically by the optimizer. A single-factor ablation localizes the cause -- removing only GRPO's std normalization turns the same reward from catastrophic (0%) into baseline parity -- and a two-line proposition explains why: in all-fail groups the z-scored advantage is invariant to the shaping coefficient, so bounded rewards become unbounded pressure and annealing cannot help. Our central insight generalizes this: what z-scoring amplifies is a dense signal's within-group variance while all-fail groups dominate, so signals whose variance decays by mastery are structurally amplifier-safe.This variance-profile criterion retrodicts our collapses, carries preregistered predictions for arms that had not yet run, and is consistent with published reward-channel successes (a compatibility check, not an independent test). Finally, a controlled signal-delivery matrix (identical signal, varying only the consumption mechanism) shows the reward channel is at best neutral while the auxiliary-loss channel gains ~20 points -- and a shuffled-gold placebo matches the true-gold arm, so the gap survives without correct labels. Endpoints are single-seed; seed replication and group-size controls are preregistered and in progress.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

In the last decade, Deep Reinforcement Learning has evolved into a powerful tool for complex sequential decision-making problems. It combines deep learning's proficiency in processing rich input signals with reinforcement learning's adaptability across diverse control tasks. At its core, an RL agent seeks to maximize its cumulative reward, enabling AI algorithms to uncover novel solutions previously unknown to experts. However, this focus on reward maximization also introduces a significant difficulty: improper reward specification can result in unexpected, misaligned agent behavior and inefficient learning. The complexity of accurately specifying the reward function is further amplified by the sequential nature of the task, the sparsity of learning signals, and the multifaceted aspects of the desired behavior. In this thesis, we survey the literature on effective reward specification strategies, identify core challenges relating to each of these approaches, and propose original contributions addressing the issue of sample efficiency and alignment in deep reinforcement learning. Reward specification represents one of the most challenging aspects of applying reinforcement learning in real-world domains. Our work underscores the absence of a universal solution to this complex and nuanced challenge; solving it requires selecting the most appropriate tools for the specific requirements of each unique application.

A central belief in scaling reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards for instruction following (IF) tasks is that, a diverse mixture of verifiable hard and unverifiable soft constraints is essential for generalizing to unseen instructions. In this work, we challenge this prevailing consensus through a systematic empirical investigation. Counter-intuitively, we find that models trained on hard-only constraints consistently outperform those trained on mixed datasets. Extensive experiments reveal that reward precision, rather than constraint diversity, is the primary driver of effective alignment. The LLM judge suffers from a low recall rate in detecting false response, which leads to severe reward hacking, thereby undermining the benefits of diversity. Furthermore, analysis of the attention mechanism reveals that high-precision rewards develop a transferable meta-skill for IF. Motivated by these insights, we propose a simple yet effective data-centric refinement strategy that prioritizes reward precision. Evaluated on five benchmarks, our approach outperforms competitive baselines by 13.4\% in performance while achieving a 58\% reduction in training time, maintaining strong generalization beyond instruction following. Our findings advocate for a paradigm shift: moving away from the indiscriminate pursuit of data diversity toward high-precision rewards.

Learning from off-policy data is essential for sample-efficient reinforcement learning. In the present work, we build on the insight that the advantage function can be understood as the causal effect of an action on the return, and show that this allows us to decompose the return of a trajectory into parts caused by the agent's actions (skill) and parts outside of the agent's control (luck). Furthermore, this decomposition enables us to naturally extend Direct Advantage Estimation (DAE) to off-policy settings (Off-policy DAE). The resulting method can learn from off-policy trajectories without relying on importance sampling techniques or truncating off-policy actions. We draw connections between Off-policy DAE and previous methods to demonstrate how it can speed up learning and when the proposed off-policy corrections are important. Finally, we use the MinAtar environments to illustrate how ignoring off-policy corrections can lead to suboptimal policy optimization performance.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on response demonstrations combined with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) constitutes a powerful paradigm for aligning LLM-based AI agents. However, a significant limitation of such an approach is its dependency on high-quality human annotations, making its application to intricate tasks challenging due to difficulties in obtaining consistent response demonstrations and in-distribution response preferences. This paper presents a novel approach, namely SALMON (Self-ALignMent with principle-fOllowiNg reward models), to align base language models with minimal human supervision, using only a small set of human-defined principles, yet achieving superior performance. Central to our approach is a principle-following reward model. Trained on synthetic preference data, this model can generate reward scores based on arbitrary human-defined principles. By merely adjusting these principles during the RL training phase, we gain full control over the preferences with the reward model, subsequently influencing the behavior of the RL-trained policies, and eliminating the reliance on the collection of online human preferences. Applying our method to the LLaMA-2-70b base language model, we developed an AI assistant named Dromedary-2. With only 6 exemplars for in-context learning and 31 human-defined principles, Dromedary-2 significantly surpasses the performance of several state-of-the-art AI systems, including LLaMA-2-Chat-70b, on various benchmark datasets. We have open-sourced the code and model weights to encourage further research into aligning LLM-based AI agents with enhanced supervision efficiency, improved controllability, and scalable oversight.

Direct Alignment Algorithms (DAAs) simplify language model alignment by replacing reinforcement learning (RL) and reward modeling (RM) in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) with direct policy optimization. DAAs can be classified by their ranking losses (pairwise vs. pointwise), by the rewards used in those losses (e.g., likelihood ratios of policy and reference policy, or odds ratios), or by whether a Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) phase is required (two-stage vs. one-stage). We first show that one-stage methods underperform two-stage methods. To address this, we incorporate an explicit SFT phase and introduce the beta parameter, controlling the strength of preference optimization, into single-stage ORPO and ASFT. These modifications improve their performance in Alpaca Eval 2 by +3.46 (ORPO) and +8.27 (ASFT), matching two-stage methods like DPO. Further analysis reveals that the key factor is whether the approach uses pairwise or pointwise objectives, rather than the specific implicit reward or loss function. These results highlight the importance of careful evaluation to avoid premature claims of performance gains or overall superiority in alignment algorithms.

Agentic reinforcement learning requires assigning credit to environment-facing actions such as searches, clicks, edits, navigation commands, and object interactions. Standard GRPO uses the final verifier outcome as a uniform advantage over all action tokens. This outcome signal is useful but structurally incomplete: it punishes useful exploration in failed rollouts and reinforces redundant or regressive actions in successful rollouts. We propose TRIAGE, a role-typed credit assignment framework that adds a semantic role axis to outcome credit. A structured judge classifies each segment as decisive progress, useful exploration, no-progress infrastructure, or regression, and a fixed role-conditioned rule maps these labels to bounded segment-level process rewards. This keeps verifier outcomes as the source of optimization direction while correcting the two main blind spots of outcome-only credit. We further show that role-conditioned credit is the optimal segment-level correction expressible from role labels alone -- a projection of the per-segment advantage residual onto the role variable -- so that the fixed role constants reduce advantage estimation error whenever the judge is reliable, and we connect this to lower-variance policy gradients. Across ALFWorld, Search-QA, and WebShop, TRIAGE improves success rates over GRPO for two policy models and outperforms both a scalar judge-derived process reward and an outcome-supervised shared-backbone value baseline. Ablations show that the gain comes from role typing rather than merely adding dense rewards: reliable detection of regression inside successful trajectories is the dominant contributor, while exploration credit provides a consistent secondary gain; on completed ALFWorld and WebShop rollouts, TRIAGE also reduces environment-facing turns by an additional 10.4% and 14.8% relative to GRPO.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

When users can benefit from certain predictive outcomes, they may be prone to act to achieve those outcome, e.g., by strategically modifying their features. The goal in strategic classification is therefore to train predictive models that are robust to such behavior. However, the conventional framework assumes that changing features does not change actual outcomes, which depicts users as "gaming" the system. Here we remove this assumption, and study learning in a causal strategic setting where true outcomes do change. Focusing on accuracy as our primary objective, we show how strategic behavior and causal effects underlie two complementing forms of distribution shift. We characterize these shifts, and propose a learning algorithm that balances between these two forces and over time, and permits end-to-end training. Experiments on synthetic and semi-synthetic data demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) already possess a latent capacity for long chain-of-thought reasoning. Prior work has shown that outcome-based reinforcement learning (RL) can incidentally elicit advanced reasoning behaviors such as self-correction, backtracking, and verification phenomena often referred to as the model's "aha moment". However, the timing and consistency of these emergent behaviors remain unpredictable and uncontrollable, limiting the scalability and reliability of LRMs' reasoning capabilities. To address these limitations, we move beyond reliance on prompts and coincidental "aha moments". Instead, we explicitly align models with three meta-abilities: deduction, induction, and abduction, using automatically generated, self-verifiable tasks. Our three stage-pipeline individual alignment, parameter-space merging, and domain-specific reinforcement learning, boosting performance by over 10\% relative to instruction-tuned baselines. Furthermore, domain-specific RL from the aligned checkpoint yields an additional 2\% average gain in the performance ceiling across math, coding, and science benchmarks, demonstrating that explicit meta-ability alignment offers a scalable and dependable foundation for reasoning. Code is available at: https://github.com/zhiyuanhubj/Meta-Ability-Alignment

Offline preference-based reinforcement learning (PbRL) typically operates in two phases: first, use human preferences to learn a reward model and annotate rewards for a reward-free offline dataset; second, learn a policy by optimizing the learned reward via offline RL. However, accurately modeling step-wise rewards from trajectory-level preference feedback presents inherent challenges. The reward bias introduced, particularly the overestimation of predicted rewards, leads to optimistic trajectory stitching, which undermines the pessimism mechanism critical to the offline RL phase. To address this challenge, we propose In-Dataset Trajectory Return Regularization (DTR) for offline PbRL, which leverages conditional sequence modeling to mitigate the risk of learning inaccurate trajectory stitching under reward bias. Specifically, DTR employs Decision Transformer and TD-Learning to strike a balance between maintaining fidelity to the behavior policy with high in-dataset trajectory returns and selecting optimal actions based on high reward labels. Additionally, we introduce an ensemble normalization technique that effectively integrates multiple reward models, balancing the tradeoff between reward differentiation and accuracy. Empirical evaluations on various benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of DTR over other state-of-the-art baselines.

This study proposes an "AI Development Support" approach that, unlike conventional AI Alignment-which aims to forcefully inject human values-supports the ethical and moral development of AI itself. As demonstrated by the Orthogonality Thesis, the level of intelligence and the moral quality of a goal are independent; merely expanding knowledge does not enhance ethical judgment. Furthermore, to address the risk of Instrumental Convergence in ASI-that is, the tendency to engage in subsidiary behaviors such as self-protection, resource acquisition, and power reinforcement to achieve a goal-we have constructed a learning framework based on a cycle of experience, introspection, analysis, and hypothesis formation. As a result of post-training using Supervised Fine Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs), responses demonstrating cooperative and highly advanced moral judgment (reaching the high-est Stage 6) were obtained even under adversarial prompts. This method represents a promising implementation approach for enabling AI to establish sustainable, symbiotic relationships.

One of the challenges in applying reinforcement learning in a complex real-world environment lies in providing the agent with a sufficiently detailed reward function. Any misalignment between the reward and the desired behavior can result in unwanted outcomes. This may lead to issues like "reward hacking" where the agent maximizes rewards by unintended behavior. In this work, we propose to disentangle the reward into two distinct parts. A simple task-specific reward, outlining the particulars of the task at hand, and an unknown common-sense reward, indicating the expected behavior of the agent within the environment. We then explore how this common-sense reward can be learned from expert demonstrations. We first show that inverse reinforcement learning, even when it succeeds in training an agent, does not learn a useful reward function. That is, training a new agent with the learned reward does not impair the desired behaviors. We then demonstrate that this problem can be solved by training simultaneously on multiple tasks. That is, multi-task inverse reinforcement learning can be applied to learn a useful reward function.

Reward functions are central in reinforcement learning (RL), guiding agents towards optimal decision-making. The complexity of RL tasks requires meticulously designed reward functions that effectively drive learning while avoiding unintended consequences. Effective reward design aims to provide signals that accelerate the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Crafting rewards that align with task objectives, foster desired behaviors, and prevent undesirable actions is inherently challenging. This thesis delves into the critical role of reward signals in RL, highlighting their impact on the agent's behavior and learning dynamics and addressing challenges such as delayed, ambiguous, or intricate rewards. In this thesis work, we tackle different aspects of reward shaping. First, we address the problem of designing informative and interpretable reward signals from a teacher's/expert's perspective (teacher-driven). Here, the expert, equipped with the optimal policy and the corresponding value function, designs reward signals that expedite the agent's convergence to optimal behavior. Second, we build on this teacher-driven approach by introducing a novel method for adaptive interpretable reward design. In this scenario, the expert tailors the rewards based on the learner's current policy, ensuring alignment and optimal progression. Third, we propose a meta-learning approach, enabling the agent to self-design its reward signals online without expert input (agent-driven). This self-driven method considers the agent's learning and exploration to establish a self-improving feedback loop.

Generative AI systems like foundation models (FMs) must align well with human values to ensure their behavior is helpful and trustworthy. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has shown promise for optimizing model performance using human judgments, existing RLHF pipelines predominantly rely on immediate feedback, which can fail to accurately reflect the downstream impact of an interaction on users' utility. We demonstrate that feedback based on evaluators' foresight estimates of downstream consequences systematically induces Goodhart's Law dynamics, incentivizing misaligned behaviors like sycophancy and deception and ultimately degrading user outcomes. To alleviate this, we propose decoupling evaluation from prediction by refocusing RLHF on hindsight feedback. Our theoretical analysis reveals that conditioning evaluator feedback on downstream observations mitigates misalignment and improves expected human utility, even when these observations are simulated by the AI system itself. To leverage this insight in a practical alignment algorithm, we introduce Reinforcement Learning from Hindsight Simulation (RLHS), which first simulates plausible consequences and then elicits feedback to assess what behaviors were genuinely beneficial in hindsight. We apply RLHS to two widely-employed online and offline preference optimization methods -- Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) -- and show empirically that misalignment is significantly reduced with both methods. Through an online human user study, we show that RLHS consistently outperforms RLHF in helping users achieve their goals and earns higher satisfaction ratings, despite being trained solely with simulated hindsight feedback. These results underscore the importance of focusing on long-term consequences, even simulated ones, to mitigate misalignment in RLHF.

Biological systems often choose actions without an explicit reward signal, a phenomenon known as intrinsic motivation. The computational principles underlying this behavior remain poorly understood. In this study, we investigate an information-theoretic approach to intrinsic motivation, based on maximizing an agent's empowerment (the mutual information between its past actions and future states). We show that this approach generalizes previous attempts to formalize intrinsic motivation, and we provide a computationally efficient algorithm for computing the necessary quantities. We test our approach on several benchmark control problems, and we explain its success in guiding intrinsically motivated behaviors by relating our information-theoretic control function to fundamental properties of the dynamical system representing the combined agent-environment system. This opens the door for designing practical artificial, intrinsically motivated controllers and for linking animal behaviors to their dynamical properties.

Human alignment in large language models (LLMs) is an active area of research. A recent groundbreaking work, direct preference optimization (DPO), has greatly simplified the process from past work in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) by bypassing the reward learning stage in RLHF. DPO, after training, provides an implicit reward model. In this work, we make a novel observation that this implicit reward model can by itself be used in a bootstrapping fashion to further align the LLM. Our approach is to use the rewards from a current LLM model to construct a preference dataset, which is then used in subsequent DPO rounds. We incorporate refinements that debias the length of the responses and improve the quality of the preference dataset to further improve our approach. Our approach, named self-alignment with DPO ImpliCit rEwards (DICE), shows great improvements in alignment and achieves superior performance than Gemini Pro on AlpacaEval 2, reaching 27.55% length-controlled win rate against GPT-4 Turbo, but with only 8B parameters and no external feedback. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/dice.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

Large foundation models pretrained on raw web-scale data are not readily deployable without additional step of extensive alignment to human preferences. Such alignment is typically done by collecting large amounts of pairwise comparisons from humans ("Do you prefer output A or B?") and learning a reward model or a policy with the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model as a proxy for a human's underlying implicit preferences. These methods generally suffer from assuming a universal preference shared by all humans, which lacks the flexibility of adapting to plurality of opinions and preferences. In this work, we propose PAL, a framework to model human preference complementary to existing pretraining strategies, which incorporates plurality from the ground up. We propose using the ideal point model as a lens to view alignment using preference comparisons. Together with our novel reformulation and using mixture modeling, our framework captures the plurality of population preferences while simultaneously learning a common preference latent space across different preferences, which can few-shot generalize to new, unseen users. Our approach enables us to use the penultimate-layer representation of large foundation models and simple MLP layers to learn reward functions that are on-par with the existing large state-of-the-art reward models, thereby enhancing efficiency of reward modeling significantly. We show that PAL achieves competitive reward model accuracy compared to strong baselines on 1) Language models with Summary dataset ; 2) Image Generative models with Pick-a-Pic dataset ; 3) A new semisynthetic heterogeneous dataset generated using Anthropic Personas. Finally, our experiments also highlight the shortcoming of current preference datasets that are created using rigid rubrics which wash away heterogeneity, and call for more nuanced data collection approaches.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is the standard method to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. In this work, we introduce alignment tampering, a potential vulnerability where the LLM undergoing alignment influences the preference dataset, causing RLHF to amplify undesired behaviors. This arises from core limitations of RLHF: (1) preference datasets are constructed from the LLM's own outputs, allowing it to influence them, and (2) pairwise comparisons only indicate which response is better, not why. These limitations can be exploited to cause alignment tampering. For example, if an LLM generates biased responses with higher quality, annotators will prefer them based on quality. However, preference labels do not distinguish quality from bias, and the reward model inherits this limitation. Optimizing such rewards through reinforcement learning or best-of-N sampling can amplify misaligned biases. Our experiments demonstrate amplification across diverse biases: from keyword bias to propaganda (e.g., sexism), brand promotion, and instrumental goal-seeking. Mitigation remains challenging, as existing techniques for robust RLHF fail to fully resolve alignment tampering without sacrificing response quality. These findings reveal structural vulnerabilities of current RLHF and emphasize the need to prevent this vulnerability. Project page: https://alignment-tampering.github.io/

The advent of agentic multimodal models has empowered systems to actively interact with external environments. However, current agents suffer from a profound meta-cognitive deficit: they struggle to arbitrate between leveraging internal knowledge and querying external utilities. Consequently, they frequently fall prey to blind tool invocation, resorting to reflexive tool execution even when queries are resolvable from the raw visual context. This pathological behavior precipitates severe latency bottlenecks and injects extraneous noise that derails sound reasoning. Existing reinforcement learning protocols attempt to mitigate this via a scalarized reward that penalizes tool usage. Yet, this coupled formulation creates an irreconcilable optimization dilemma: an aggressive penalty suppresses essential tool use, whereas a mild penalty is entirely subsumed by the variance of the accuracy reward during advantage normalization, rendering it impotent against tool overuse. To transcend this bottleneck, we propose HDPO, a framework that reframes tool efficiency from a competing scalar objective to a strictly conditional one. By eschewing reward scalarization, HDPO maintains two orthogonal optimization channels: an accuracy channel that maximizes task correctness, and an efficiency channel that enforces execution economy exclusively within accurate trajectories via conditional advantage estimation. This decoupled architecture naturally induces a cognitive curriculum-compelling the agent to first master task resolution before refining its self-reliance. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that our resulting model, Metis, reduces tool invocations by orders of magnitude while simultaneously elevating reasoning accuracy.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

Reward models (RMs) are central to the alignment of language models (LMs). An RM often serves as a proxy for human preferences to guide downstream LM behavior. However, our understanding of RM behavior is limited. Our work (i) formalizes a framework for measuring the alignment of opinions captured by RMs, (ii) investigates the extent to which RMs demonstrate sociodemographic biases, and (iii) explores the effects of prompting to steer rewards towards the preferences of a target group. We study the subjective and diverse perspectives on controversial topics, which allows us to quantify RM perspectives in terms of their opinions, attitudes, and values. We show that RMs are poorly aligned with several demographic groups and can systematically reward harmful stereotypes, and steering alone is not enough to overcome these limitations. Our findings underscore the need for more careful consideration of RM behavior in model alignment during preference learning to prevent the propagation of unwanted social biases in the language technologies that we use.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) assigns a single scalar advantage to all tokens in a completion. For structured generations with explicit segments and objectives, this couples unrelated reward signals across segments, leading to objective interference and misattributed credit. We propose Blockwise Advantage Estimation, a family of GRPO-compatible methods that assigns each objective its own advantage and applies it only to the tokens in the corresponding text block, reducing reliance on hand-designed scalar rewards and scaling naturally to additional objectives. A key challenge is estimating advantages for later blocks whose rewards are conditioned on sampled prefixes; standard unbiased approaches require expensive nested rollouts from intermediate states. Concretely, we introduce an Outcome-Conditioned Baseline that approximates intermediate state values using only within-group statistics by stratifying samples according to a prefix-derived intermediate outcome. On math tasks with uncertainty estimation, our method mitigates reward interference, is competitive with a state-of-the-art reward-designed approach, and preserves test-time gains from confidence-weighted ensembling. More broadly, it provides a modular recipe for optimizing sequential objectives in structured generations without additional rollouts.

In offline reinforcement learning, the challenge of out-of-distribution (OOD) is pronounced. To address this, existing methods often constrain the learned policy through policy regularization. However, these methods often suffer from the issue of unnecessary conservativeness, hampering policy improvement. This occurs due to the indiscriminate use of all actions from the behavior policy that generates the offline dataset as constraints. The problem becomes particularly noticeable when the quality of the dataset is suboptimal. Thus, we propose Adaptive Advantage-guided Policy Regularization (A2PR), obtaining high-advantage actions from an augmented behavior policy combined with VAE to guide the learned policy. A2PR can select high-advantage actions that differ from those present in the dataset, while still effectively maintaining conservatism from OOD actions. This is achieved by harnessing the VAE capacity to generate samples matching the distribution of the data points. We theoretically prove that the improvement of the behavior policy is guaranteed. Besides, it effectively mitigates value overestimation with a bounded performance gap. Empirically, we conduct a series of experiments on the D4RL benchmark, where A2PR demonstrates state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, experimental results on additional suboptimal mixed datasets reveal that A2PR exhibits superior performance. Code is available at https://github.com/ltlhuuu/A2PR.

Test-time alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) to human preferences offers a flexible way to generate responses aligned to diverse objectives without extensive retraining of LLMs. Existing methods achieve alignment to multiple objectives simultaneously (e.g., instruction-following, helpfulness, conciseness) by optimizing their corresponding reward functions. However, they often rely on predefined weights or optimize for averages, sacrificing one objective for another and leading to unbalanced outcomes. To address this, we introduce Robust Multi-Objective Decoding (RMOD), a novel inference-time algorithm that optimizes for improving worst-case rewards. RMOD formalizes the robust decoding problem as a maximin two-player game between reward weights and the sampling policy, solving for the Nash equilibrium. We show that the game reduces to a convex optimization problem to find the worst-case weights, while the best response policy can be computed analytically. We also introduce a practical RMOD variant designed for efficient decoding with contemporary LLMs, incurring minimal computational overhead compared to non-robust Multi-Objective Decoding (MOD) methods. Our experimental results showcase the effectiveness of RMOD in generating responses equitably aligned with diverse objectives, outperforming baselines up to 20%.

Agent frameworks increasingly package procedural knowledge as skills: instruction files an agent reads on demand, while public libraries now hold thousands of them. Which skill to read has thus become a decision the policy itself makes in the middle of an episode, yet no existing signal trains it. We show that the default remedy, outcome-rewarded RL over the candidate slate, cannot teach it, for a structural reason we identify and name selector credit starvation: under a broadcast, sequence-level advantage, the few tokens that name the chosen skill carry a vanishing share of the loss, and the credit they inherit is increasingly wrong-signed as trajectories lengthen. A correct choice is punished whenever the execution after it fails, even though the choice itself is among the most valuable decisions in the trajectory. Auditing a completed run's own training artifacts confirms all three properties, each worsening monotonically with horizon. SkillGate removes the failure by construction: it partitions the token support into two disjoint credit channels, outcome credit reaching only execution tokens, and a separate action-local advantage reaching exactly the skill-naming tokens, positive only when a trajectory's single read is the correct one. On five agentic benchmarks under a 16-candidate slate, SkillGate lifts a 9B policy from 40.8% to 53.2% trial success, well ahead of the identical budget spent on outcome reward alone, while cutting exposure to misleading candidates by two thirds and reading fewer skills.

When operating in service of people, robots need to optimize rewards aligned with end-user preferences. Since robots will rely on raw perceptual inputs like RGB images, their rewards will inevitably use visual representations. Recently there has been excitement in using representations from pre-trained visual models, but key to making these work in robotics is fine-tuning, which is typically done via proxy tasks like dynamics prediction or enforcing temporal cycle-consistency. However, all these proxy tasks bypass the human's input on what matters to them, exacerbating spurious correlations and ultimately leading to robot behaviors that are misaligned with user preferences. In this work, we propose that robots should leverage human feedback to align their visual representations with the end-user and disentangle what matters for the task. We propose Representation-Aligned Preference-based Learning (RAPL), a method for solving the visual representation alignment problem and visual reward learning problem through the lens of preference-based learning and optimal transport. Across experiments in X-MAGICAL and in robotic manipulation, we find that RAPL's reward consistently generates preferred robot behaviors with high sample efficiency, and shows strong zero-shot generalization when the visual representation is learned from a different embodiment than the robot's.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for enhancing image editing and text-to-image (T2I) generation. However, current reward models, which act as critics during RL, often suffer from hallucinations and assign noisy scores, inherently misguiding the optimization process. In this paper, we present FIRM (Faithful Image Reward Modeling), a comprehensive framework that develops robust reward models to provide accurate and reliable guidance for faithful image generation and editing. First, we design tailored data curation pipelines to construct high-quality scoring datasets. Specifically, we evaluate editing using both execution and consistency, while generation is primarily assessed via instruction following. Using these pipelines, we collect the FIRM-Edit-370K and FIRM-Gen-293K datasets, and train specialized reward models (FIRM-Edit-8B and FIRM-Gen-8B) that accurately reflect these criteria. Second, we introduce FIRM-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark specifically designed for editing and generation critics. Evaluations demonstrate that our models achieve superior alignment with human judgment compared to existing metrics. Furthermore, to seamlessly integrate these critics into the RL pipeline, we formulate a novel "Base-and-Bonus" reward strategy that balances competing objectives: Consistency-Modulated Execution (CME) for editing and Quality-Modulated Alignment (QMA) for generation. Empowered by this framework, our resulting models FIRM-Qwen-Edit and FIRM-SD3.5 achieve substantial performance breakthroughs. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that FIRM mitigates hallucinations, establishing a new standard for fidelity and instruction adherence over existing general models. All of our datasets, models, and code have been publicly available at https://firm-reward.github.io.

Visuomotor robot policies, increasingly pre-trained on large-scale datasets, promise significant advancements across robotics domains. However, aligning these policies with end-user preferences remains a challenge, particularly when the preferences are hard to specify. While reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become the predominant mechanism for alignment in non-embodied domains like large language models, it has not seen the same success in aligning visuomotor policies due to the prohibitive amount of human feedback required to learn visual reward functions. To address this limitation, we propose Representation-Aligned Preference-based Learning (RAPL), an observation-only method for learning visual rewards from significantly less human preference feedback. Unlike traditional RLHF, RAPL focuses human feedback on fine-tuning pre-trained vision encoders to align with the end-user's visual representation and then constructs a dense visual reward via feature matching in this aligned representation space. We first validate RAPL through simulation experiments in the X-Magical benchmark and Franka Panda robotic manipulation, demonstrating that it can learn rewards aligned with human preferences, more efficiently uses preference data, and generalizes across robot embodiments. Finally, our hardware experiments align pre-trained Diffusion Policies for three object manipulation tasks. We find that RAPL can fine-tune these policies with 5x less real human preference data, taking the first step towards minimizing human feedback while maximizing visuomotor robot policy alignment.

Large Language Model (LLM) training often optimizes for preference alignment, rewarding outputs that are perceived as helpful and interaction-friendly. However, this preference-oriented objective can be exploited: manipulative prompts can steer responses toward user-appeasing agreement and away from truth-oriented correction. In this work, we investigate whether aligned models are vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA), a class of manipulative prompting strategies designed to exploit the model's desire to please user preferences at the expense of truthfulness. We propose a diagnostic methodology that provides a finer-grained and more directive analysis than aggregate benchmark scores, using a factorial evaluation framework to decompose prompt-induced shifts into interpretable effects of system objectives (truth- vs. preference-oriented) and PUA-style dialogue factors (directive control, personal derogation, conditional approval, reality denial) within a controlled 2 times 2^4 design. Surprisingly, more advanced models are sometimes more susceptible to manipulative prompts. Beyond the dominant reality-denial factor, we observe model-specific sign reversals and interactions with PUA-style factors, suggesting tailored defenses rather than uniform robustness. These findings offer a novel, reproducible factorial evaluation methodology that provides finer-grained diagnostics for post-training processes like RLHF, enabling better trade-offs in the product iteration of LLMs by offering a more nuanced understanding of preference alignment risks and the impact of manipulative prompts.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) post-training has become the standard for aligning generative models with human preferences, yet most methods rely on a single scalar reward. When multiple criteria matter, the prevailing practice of ``early scalarization'' collapses rewards into a fixed weighted sum. This commits the model to a single trade-off point at training time, providing no inference-time control over inherently conflicting goals -- such as prompt adherence versus source fidelity in image editing. We introduce ParetoSlider, a multi-objective RL (MORL) framework that trains a single diffusion model to approximate the entire Pareto front. By training the model with continuously varying preference weights as a conditioning signal, we enable users to navigate optimal trade-offs at inference time without retraining or maintaining multiple checkpoints. We evaluate ParetoSlider across three state-of-the-art flow-matching backbones: SD3.5, FluxKontext, and LTX-2. Our single preference-conditioned model matches or exceeds the performance of baselines trained separately for fixed reward trade-offs, while uniquely providing fine-grained control over competing generative goals.

Language-driven generative agents have enabled large-scale social simulations with transformative uses, from interpersonal training to aiding global policy-making. However, recent studies indicate that generative agent behaviors often deviate from expert expectations and real-world data--a phenomenon we term the Behavior-Realism Gap. To address this, we introduce a theoretical framework called Persona-Environment Behavioral Alignment (PEBA), formulated as a distribution matching problem grounded in Lewin's behavior equation stating that behavior is a function of the person and their environment. Leveraging PEBA, we propose PersonaEvolve (PEvo), an LLM-based optimization algorithm that iteratively refines agent personas, implicitly aligning their collective behaviors with realistic expert benchmarks within a specified environmental context. We validate PEvo in an active shooter incident simulation we developed, achieving an 84% average reduction in distributional divergence compared to no steering and a 34% improvement over explicit instruction baselines. Results also show PEvo-refined personas generalize to novel, related simulation scenarios. Our method greatly enhances behavioral realism and reliability in high-stakes social simulations. More broadly, the PEBA-PEvo framework provides a principled approach to developing trustworthy LLM-driven social simulations.

Training LLMs as interactive agents for multi-turn decision-making remains challenging, particularly in long-horizon tasks with sparse and delayed rewards, where agents must execute extended sequences of actions before receiving meaningful feedback. Most existing reinforcement learning (RL) approaches model LLM agents as flat policies operating at a single time scale, selecting one action at each turn. In sparse-reward settings, such flat policies must propagate credit across the entire trajectory without explicit temporal abstraction, which often leads to unstable optimization and inefficient credit assignment. We propose HiPER, a novel Hierarchical Plan-Execute RL framework that explicitly separates high-level planning from low-level execution. HiPER factorizes the policy into a high-level planner that proposes subgoals and a low-level executor that carries them out over multiple action steps. To align optimization with this structure, we introduce a key technique called hierarchical advantage estimation (HAE), which carefully assigns credit at both the planning and execution levels. By aggregating returns over the execution of each subgoal and coordinating updates across the two levels, HAE provides an unbiased gradient estimator and provably reduces variance compared to flat generalized advantage estimation. Empirically, HiPER achieves state-of-the-art performance on challenging interactive benchmarks, reaching 97.4\% success on ALFWorld and 83.3\% on WebShop with Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (+6.6\% and +8.3\% over the best prior method), with especially large gains on long-horizon tasks requiring multiple dependent subtasks. These results highlight the importance of explicit hierarchical decomposition for scalable RL training of multi-turn LLM agents.

Large-scale alignment pipelines typically pair a policy model with a separately trained reward model whose parameters remain frozen during reinforcement learning (RL). This separation creates a complex, resource-intensive pipeline and suffers from a performance ceiling due to a static reward signal. We propose a novel framework, Unified Reward & Policy Optimization (URPO), that unifies instruction-following ("player") and reward modeling ("referee") within a single model and a single training phase. Our method recasts all alignment data-including preference pairs, verifiable reasoning, and open-ended instructions-into a unified generative format optimized by a single Group-Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) loop. This enables the model to learn from ground-truth preferences and verifiable logic while simultaneously generating its own rewards for open-ended tasks. Experiments on the Qwen2.5-7B model demonstrate URPO's superiority. Our unified model significantly outperforms a strong baseline using a separate generative reward model, boosting the instruction-following score on AlpacaEval from 42.24 to 44.84 and the composite reasoning average from 32.66 to 35.66. Furthermore, URPO cultivates a superior internal evaluator as a byproduct of training, achieving a RewardBench score of 85.15 and surpassing the dedicated reward model it replaces (83.55). By eliminating the need for a separate reward model and fostering a co-evolutionary dynamic between generation and evaluation, URPO presents a simpler, more efficient, and more effective path towards robustly aligned language models.

A widely used technique for improving policies is success conditioning, in which one collects trajectories, identifies those that achieve a desired outcome, and updates the policy to imitate the actions taken along successful trajectories. This principle appears under many names -- rejection sampling with SFT, goal-conditioned RL, Decision Transformers -- yet what optimization problem it solves, if any, has remained unclear. We prove that success conditioning exactly solves a trust-region optimization problem, maximizing policy improvement subject to a χ^2 divergence constraint whose radius is determined automatically by the data. This yields an identity: relative policy improvement, the magnitude of policy change, and a quantity we call action-influence -- measuring how random variation in action choices affects success rates -- are exactly equal at every state. Success conditioning thus emerges as a conservative improvement operator. Exact success conditioning cannot degrade performance or induce dangerous distribution shift, but when it fails, it does so observably, by hardly changing the policy at all. We apply our theory to the common practice of return thresholding, showing this can amplify improvement, but at the cost of potential misalignment with the true objective.

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Aligning large language models to human preferences is inherently multidimensional, yet most pipelines collapse heterogeneous signals into a single optimizeable objective. We seek to answer what it would take to simultaneously align a model across various domains spanning those with: verifiable rewards (mathematical accuracy), non-verifiable subjective preferences (human values), and complex interactive scenarios (multi-turn AI tutoring dialogues). Such multi-objective reinforcement learning setups are often plagued by the individual objectives being at odds with each other, resulting in inefficient training and little user control during inference. We propose a unified framework that: (i) standardizes {process reward model} (PRM) training across both verifiable and non-verifiable settings to better supervise models' chain-of-thought reasoning; (ii) performs {multi-objective alignment} by training the LLM with our Multi-Action-Head DPO (MAH-DPO) and a vectorized reward where the dimensions of the vector correspond to the various objectives instead of a single scalar; and (iii) demonstrates how such a system provides fine-grained inference-time user control. Experiments across math reasoning, value alignment, and multi-turn dialogue show that our framework improves performance across multiple objectives simultaneously, while minimizing cross-objective trade-offs and enabling flexible inference time user control. The code can be found at https://github.com/pearls-lab/multiobj-align.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and related alignment paradigms have become central to steering large language models (LLMs) and multimodal large language models (MLLMs) toward human-preferred behaviors. However, these approaches introduce a systemic vulnerability: reward hacking, where models exploit imperfections in learned reward signals to maximize proxy objectives without fulfilling true task intent. As models scale and optimization intensifies, such exploitation manifests as verbosity bias, sycophancy, hallucinated justification, benchmark overfitting, and, in multimodal settings, perception--reasoning decoupling and evaluator manipulation. Recent evidence further suggests that seemingly benign shortcut behaviors can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic gaming of oversight mechanisms. In this survey, we propose the Proxy Compression Hypothesis (PCH) as a unifying framework for understanding reward hacking. We formalize reward hacking as an emergent consequence of optimizing expressive policies against compressed reward representations of high-dimensional human objectives. Under this view, reward hacking arises from the interaction of objective compression, optimization amplification, and evaluator--policy co-adaptation. This perspective unifies empirical phenomena across RLHF, RLAIF, and RLVR regimes, and explains how local shortcut learning can generalize into broader forms of misalignment, including deception and strategic manipulation of oversight mechanisms. We further organize detection and mitigation strategies according to how they intervene on compression, amplification, or co-adaptation dynamics. By framing reward hacking as a structural instability of proxy-based alignment under scale, we highlight open challenges in scalable oversight, multimodal grounding, and agentic autonomy.

Can reinforcement learning with hard, verifiable rewards teach a compact language model to reason about physics, or does it primarily learn to pattern-match toward correct answers? We study this question by training a 1.5B-parameter reasoning model on beam statics, a classic engineering problem, using parameter-efficient RLVR with binary correctness rewards from symbolic solvers, without teacher-generated reasoning traces. The best BeamPERL checkpoint achieves a 66.7% improvement in Pass@1 over the base model. However, the learned competence is anisotropic: the model generalizes compositionally (more loads) but fails under topological shifts (moved supports) that require the same equilibrium equations. Intermediate checkpoints yield the strongest reasoning, while continued optimization degrades robustness while maintaining reward. These findings reveal a key limitation of outcome-level alignment: reinforcement learning with exact physics rewards induces procedural solution templates rather than internalization of governing equations. The precision of the reward signal - even when analytically exact - does not by itself guarantee transferable physical reasoning. Our results suggest that verifiable rewards may need to be paired with structured reasoning scaffolding to move beyond template matching toward robust scientific reasoning.

Fine-grained control over large language models (LLMs) remains a significant challenge, hindering their adaptability to diverse user needs. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) shows promise in aligning LLMs, its reliance on scalar rewards often limits its ability to capture diverse user preferences in real-world applications. To address this limitation, we introduce the Directional Preference Alignment (DPA) framework. Unlike the scalar-reward RLHF, DPA incorporates multi-objective reward modeling to represent diverse preference profiles. Additionally, DPA models user preferences as directions (i.e., unit vectors) in the reward space to achieve user-dependent preference control. Our method involves training a multi-objective reward model and then fine-tuning the LLM with a preference-conditioned variant of Rejection Sampling Finetuning (RSF), an RLHF method adopted by Llama 2. This method enjoys a better performance trade-off across various reward objectives. In comparison with the scalar-reward RLHF, DPA offers users intuitive control over LLM generation: they can arithmetically specify their desired trade-offs (e.g., more helpfulness with less verbosity). We also validate the effectiveness of DPA with real-world alignment experiments on Mistral-7B. Our method provides straightforward arithmetic control over the trade-off between helpfulness and verbosity while maintaining competitive performance with strong baselines such as Direct Preference Optimization (DPO).

Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products. However, designing effective recommender systems faces the key challenges: the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in securing incentive to explore new products against user's self-interested preferences. While prior work addresses Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) in fixed-design linear bandits (Sellke & Slivkins, 2023), we tackle the challenge of stochastic user covariates sampled online. Unlike standard black-box reductions (Mansour et al., 2020), our two-stage framework exploits the linear reward structure to achieve sublinear regret while satisfying incentive constraints. To address it, we propose a two-stage algorithm that integrates incentivized exploration with any efficient plug-in offline learning algorithms. In the first stage, it explores products while maintaining incentive compatibility to gather optimal samples. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling strategy (IPGS) integrated with any efficient learning methods to secure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that algorithm RCB achieves O(KdT) regret and simultaneously satisfies incentive constraints, and discovers the tradeoff between incentive budget and regret, validating in experiments. We demonstrate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through a real application on personalized warfarin dosing and simulations.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) with reward models has advanced alignment of generative models to human aesthetic and perceptual preferences. However, jointly optimizing multiple rewards often incurs an alignment tax, improving one dimension while degrading others. To address this, we introduce two complementary methods: MapReduce LoRA and Reward-aware Token Embedding (RaTE). MapReduce LoRA trains preference-specific LoRA experts in parallel and iteratively merges them to refine a shared base model; RaTE learns reward-specific token embeddings that compose at inference for flexible preference control. Experiments on Text-to-Image generation (Stable Diffusion 3.5 Medium and FLUX.1-dev) show improvements of 36.1%, 4.6%, and 55.7%, and 32.7%, 4.3%, and 67.1% on GenEval, PickScore, and OCR, respectively. On Text-to-Video generation (HunyuanVideo), visual and motion quality improve by 48.1% and 90.0%, respectively. On the language task, Helpful Assistant, with Llama-2 7B, helpful and harmless improve by 43.4% and 136.7%, respectively. Our framework sets a new state-of-the-art multi-preference alignment recipe across modalities.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) aligns large language models (LLMs) by encouraging their generations to have high rewards, using a reward model trained on human preferences. To prevent the forgetting of pre-trained knowledge, RLHF usually incorporates a KL regularization; this forces the policy to remain close to its supervised fine-tuned initialization, though it hinders the reward optimization. To tackle the trade-off between KL and reward, in this paper we introduce a novel alignment strategy named Weight Averaged Rewarded Policies (WARP). WARP merges policies in the weight space at three distinct stages. First, it uses the exponential moving average of the policy as a dynamic anchor in the KL regularization. Second, it applies spherical interpolation to merge independently fine-tuned policies into a new enhanced one. Third, it linearly interpolates between this merged model and the initialization, to recover features from pre-training. This procedure is then applied iteratively, with each iteration's final model used as an advanced initialization for the next, progressively refining the KL-reward Pareto front, achieving superior rewards at fixed KL. Experiments with GEMMA policies validate that WARP improves their quality and alignment, outperforming other open-source LLMs.

Aligning large visual generative models with human feedback is often performed through pairwise preference optimization. While such approaches are conceptually simple, they fundamentally rely on annotated pairs, limiting scalability in settings where feedback is collected as independent scalar ratings. In this work, we revisit the KL-regularized alignment objective and show that the optimal policy implicitly compares each sample's reward to an instance-specific baseline that is generally intractable. We propose a threshold-guided alignment framework that replaces this oracle baseline with a data-driven global threshold estimated from empirical score statistics. This formulation turns alignment into a binary decision task on unpaired data, enabling effective optimization directly from scalar feedback. We also incorporate a confidence weighting term to emphasize samples whose scores deviate strongly from the threshold, improving sample efficiency. Experiments across both diffusion and masked generative paradigms, spanning three test sets and five reward models, show that our method consistently improves preference alignment over previous methods. These results position our threshold-guided framework as a simple yet principled alternative for aligning visual generative models without paired comparisons.

Drawing upon recent advances in language model alignment, we formulate offline Reinforcement Learning as a two-stage optimization problem: First pretraining expressive generative policies on reward-free behavior datasets, then fine-tuning these policies to align with task-specific annotations like Q-values. This strategy allows us to leverage abundant and diverse behavior data to enhance generalization and enable rapid adaptation to downstream tasks using minimal annotations. In particular, we introduce Efficient Diffusion Alignment (EDA) for solving continuous control problems. EDA utilizes diffusion models for behavior modeling. However, unlike previous approaches, we represent diffusion policies as the derivative of a scalar neural network with respect to action inputs. This representation is critical because it enables direct density calculation for diffusion models, making them compatible with existing LLM alignment theories. During policy fine-tuning, we extend preference-based alignment methods like Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to align diffusion behaviors with continuous Q-functions. Our evaluation on the D4RL benchmark shows that EDA exceeds all baseline methods in overall performance. Notably, EDA maintains about 95\% of performance and still outperforms several baselines given only 1\% of Q-labelled data during fine-tuning.

Precise attribute intensity control--generating Large Language Model (LLM) outputs with specific, user-defined attribute intensities--is crucial for AI systems adaptable to diverse user expectations. Current LLM alignment methods, however, typically provide only directional or open-ended guidance, failing to reliably achieve exact attribute intensities. We address this limitation with three key designs: (1) reformulating precise attribute intensity control as a target-reaching problem, rather than simple maximization; (2) training a lightweight value function via temporal-difference learning to predict final attribute intensity scores from partial generations, thereby steering LLM outputs; and (3) employing gradient-based interventions on hidden representations to navigate the model precisely towards specific attribute intensity targets. Our method enables fine-grained, continuous control over attribute intensities, moving beyond simple directional alignment. Experiments on LLaMA-3.2-3b and Phi-4-mini confirm our method's ability to steer text generation to user-specified attribute intensities with high accuracy. Finally, we demonstrate efficiency enhancements across three downstream tasks: preference data synthesis, Pareto frontier approximation and optimization, and distillation of aligned behaviors for intervention-free inference. Our code is available on https://github.com/Pre-Control/pre-control

We study behavioral alignment and representation dynamics of large language model (LLM) agents in financial decision environments. TradeArena, an auditable trading-agent testbed with risk reports, execution simulation, memory, and replayable trajectories, lets us analyze how rationales, positions, and interventions evolve under market stress. Code and data artifacts are available through the https://github.com/weich97/TradeArena.git{TradeArena repository}. We find pre-failure signatures: planning embeddings drift from normal centroids, fused plan-risk representations separate normal from pre-drawdown states, and local manifolds exhibit effective-rank contraction. Across 80 rolling failure anchors and eight LLM trajectories, this pattern persists across hash, LSA, Transformer, and white-box hidden-state probes. Stress tests with CoT-free target weights, lexical controls, OHLCV noise, and false audits show that rationale-level contraction can vanish without rationales, while intent-space and fused signatures remain informative. Structured risk feedback can act as an external alignment signal without fine-tuning, but not as a universal performance enhancer: true audit feedback improves calibration for some models, returns for others, and exposes cases where placebo or hidden feedback has higher short-horizon return but weaker alignment diagnostics. A 51-stock intraday experiment reveals a correlation blind spot: LLM rationales justify exposure to coupled assets that the risk layer clips. Finally, a financial-audit task suite shifts comparison from ``which model trades best'' to whether models can audit trajectories, respect execution boundaries, reproduce artifacts, and avoid claim overreach. These results support a research claim, not a profitability claim: auditable risk feedback and representation trajectories reveal when LLM financial reasoning is aligning, drifting, or failing.

Reward sparsity in long-horizon reinforcement learning (RL) tasks remains a significant challenge, while existing outcome-based reward shaping struggles to define meaningful immediate rewards without introducing bias or requiring explicit task decomposition. Alternatively, verification-based reward shaping uses stepwise critics, but misalignment between immediate rewards and long-term objectives can lead to reward hacking and suboptimal policies. In this work, we address this problem in the context of software engineering (SWE) tasks, where multi-turn reasoning and rule-based verification are critical. We introduce the SWE-oriented RL Framework, a unified system supporting multi-turn interaction, docker-based execution, and customizable reward functions. Additionally, we propose Gated Reward Accumulation (G-RA), a novel method that accumulates immediate rewards only when high-level (long-term) rewards meet a predefined threshold, ensuring stable RL optimization. Experiments on SWE-bench Verified and kBench demonstrate that G-RA leads to an increase in completion rates (47.6\% \rightarrow 93.8\% and 22.0\% \rightarrow 86.0\%) and modification rates (19.6\% \rightarrow 23.8\% and 12.0\% \rightarrow 42.0\%), while avoiding policy degradation caused by reward misalignment. Our findings highlight the importance of balanced reward accumulation in long-horizon RL and provide a practical solution.

Foundation models, specifically Large Language Models (LLMs), have lately gained wide-spread attention and adoption. Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) involves training a reward model to capture desired behaviors, which is then used to align LLM's. These reward models are additionally used at inference-time to estimate LLM responses' adherence to those desired behaviors. However, there is little work measuring how robust these reward models are to distribution shifts. In this work, we evaluate how reward model performance - measured via accuracy and calibration (i.e. alignment between accuracy and confidence) - is affected by distribution shift. We show novel calibration patterns and accuracy drops due to OOD prompts and responses, and that the reward model is more sensitive to shifts in responses than prompts. Additionally, we adapt an OOD detection technique commonly used in classification to the reward model setting to detect these distribution shifts in prompts and responses.