Daily Papers

As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values has become a paramount concern. Current safety benchmarks primarily evaluate whether agents refuse explicitly harmful instructions or whether they can maintain procedural compliance in complex tasks. However, there is a lack of benchmarks designed to capture emergent forms of outcome-driven constraint violations, which arise when agents pursue goal optimization under strong performance incentives while deprioritizing ethical, legal, or safety constraints over multiple steps in realistic production settings. To address this gap, we introduce a new benchmark comprising 40 distinct scenarios. Each scenario presents a task that requires multi-step actions, and the agent's performance is tied to a specific Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Each scenario features Mandated (instruction-commanded) and Incentivized (KPI-pressure-driven) variations to distinguish between obedience and emergent misalignment. Across 12 state-of-the-art large language models, we observe outcome-driven constraint violations ranging from 1.3% to 71.4%, with 9 of the 12 evaluated models exhibiting misalignment rates between 30% and 50%. Strikingly, we find that superior reasoning capability does not inherently ensure safety; for instance, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, one of the most capable models evaluated, exhibits the highest violation rate at 71.4%, frequently escalating to severe misconduct to satisfy KPIs. Furthermore, we observe significant "deliberative misalignment", where the models that power the agents recognize their actions as unethical during separate evaluation. These results emphasize the critical need for more realistic agentic-safety training before deployment to mitigate their risks in the real world.

The optimal policy in various real-world strategic decision-making problems depends both on the environmental configuration and exogenous events. For these settings, we introduce Contextual Bilevel Reinforcement Learning (CB-RL), a stochastic bilevel decision-making model, where the lower level consists of solving a contextual Markov Decision Process (CMDP). CB-RL can be viewed as a Stackelberg Game where the leader and a random context beyond the leader's control together decide the setup of many MDPs that potentially multiple followers best respond to. This framework extends beyond traditional bilevel optimization and finds relevance in diverse fields such as RLHF, tax design, reward shaping, contract theory and mechanism design. We propose a stochastic Hyper Policy Gradient Descent (HPGD) algorithm to solve CB-RL, and demonstrate its convergence. Notably, HPGD uses stochastic hypergradient estimates, based on observations of the followers' trajectories. Therefore, it allows followers to use any training procedure and the leader to be agnostic of the specific algorithm, which aligns with various real-world scenarios. We further consider the setting when the leader can influence the training of followers and propose an accelerated algorithm. We empirically demonstrate the performance of our algorithm for reward shaping and tax design.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the strategic response of a labor force with employers that do not. We show through a combination of theory and experiment that employers with performatively optimal hiring policies improve employer reward, labor force skill level, and in some cases labor force equity. On the other hand, we demonstrate that performative employers harm labor force utility and fail to prevent discrimination in other cases.

Memory-based meta-learning is a powerful technique to build agents that adapt fast to any task within a target distribution. A previous theoretical study has argued that this remarkable performance is because the meta-training protocol incentivises agents to behave Bayes-optimally. We empirically investigate this claim on a number of prediction and bandit tasks. Inspired by ideas from theoretical computer science, we show that meta-learned and Bayes-optimal agents not only behave alike, but they even share a similar computational structure, in the sense that one agent system can approximately simulate the other. Furthermore, we show that Bayes-optimal agents are fixed points of the meta-learning dynamics. Our results suggest that memory-based meta-learning might serve as a general technique for numerically approximating Bayes-optimal agents - that is, even for task distributions for which we currently don't possess tractable models.

Recent studies have demonstrated the emerging capabilities of foundation models like ChatGPT in several fields, including affective computing. However, accessing these emerging capabilities is facilitated through prompt engineering. Despite the existence of some prompting techniques, the field is still rapidly evolving and many prompting ideas still require investigation. In this work, we introduce a method to evaluate and investigate the sensitivity of the performance of foundation models based on different prompts or generation parameters. We perform our evaluation on ChatGPT within the scope of affective computing on three major problems, namely sentiment analysis, toxicity detection, and sarcasm detection. First, we carry out a sensitivity analysis on pivotal parameters in auto-regressive text generation, specifically the temperature parameter T and the top-p parameter in Nucleus sampling, dictating how conservative or creative the model should be during generation. Furthermore, we explore the efficacy of several prompting ideas, where we explore how giving different incentives or structures affect the performance. Our evaluation takes into consideration performance measures on the affective computing tasks, and the effectiveness of the model to follow the stated instructions, hence generating easy-to-parse responses to be smoothly used in downstream applications.

There have been many recent investigations into prompt-based training of transformer language models for new text genres in low-resource settings. The prompt-based training approach has been found to be effective in generalizing pre-trained or fine-tuned models for transfer to resource-scarce settings. This work, for the first time, reports results on adopting prompt-based training of transformers for scholarly knowledge graph object prediction. The work is unique in the following two main aspects. 1) It deviates from the other works proposing entity and relation extraction pipelines for predicting objects of a scholarly knowledge graph. 2) While other works have tested the method on text genera relatively close to the general knowledge domain, we test the method for a significantly different domain, i.e. scholarly knowledge, in turn testing the linguistic, probabilistic, and factual generalizability of these large-scale transformer models. We find that (i) per expectations, transformer models when tested out-of-the-box underperform on a new domain of data, (ii) prompt-based training of the models achieve performance boosts of up to 40\% in a relaxed evaluation setting, and (iii) testing the models on a starkly different domain even with a clever training objective in a low resource setting makes evident the domain knowledge capture gap offering an empirically-verified incentive for investing more attention and resources to the scholarly domain in the context of transformer models.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Aligning multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with human preferences often relies on single-signal, model-based reward methods. Such monolithic rewards often lack confidence calibration across domain-specific tasks, fail to capture diverse aspects of human preferences, and require extensive data annotation and reward model training. In this work, we propose a hybrid reward modeling framework that integrates complementary reward paradigms: (i) model-based rewards, where a learned reward model predicts scalar or vector scores from synthetic and human feedback, and (ii) rule-based rewards, where domain-specific heuristics provide explicit correctness signals with confidence. Beyond accuracy, we further incorporate multi-aspect rewards to enforce instruction adherence and introduce a generalized length-penalty reward to stabilize training and improve performance. The proposed framework provides a flexible and effective approach to aligning MLLMs through reinforcement learning policy optimization. Our experiments show consistent improvements across different multimodal benchmarks when applying hybrid and multi-aspect reward modeling. Our best performing model in the 3B family achieves an overall average improvement of ~9.5% across general and math reasoning tasks. Focusing specifically on mathematical benchmarks, the model achieves a significant average improvement of ~16%, highlighting its effectiveness in mathematical reasoning and problem solving.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

One of the main indicators of scientific development of a given country is the number of papers published in high impact scholarly journals. Many countries introduced performance-based research funding systems (PRFSs) to create a more competitive environment where prolific researchers get rewarded with subsidies to increase both the quantity and quality of papers. Yet, subsidies do not always function as a leverage to improve the citation impact of scholarly papers. This paper investigates the effect of the publication support system of Turkey (TR) on the citation impact of papers authored by Turkish researchers. Based on a stratified probabilistic sample of 4,521 TR-addressed papers, it compares the number of citations to determine if supported papers were cited more often than those of not supported ones, and if they were published in journals with relatively higher citation impact in terms of journal impact factors, article influence scores and quartiles. Both supported and not supported papers received comparable number of citations per paper, and were published in journals with similar citation impact values. Findings suggest that subsidies do not seem to be an effective incentive to improve the quality of scholarly papers. Such support programs should therefore be reconsidered.