Daily Papers

As Large Language Models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents capable of tool execution, the landscape of AI safety is shifting from content moderation to action security. However, existing red-teaming frameworks remain bifurcated: they either focus on rigid, script-based text attacks or lack the architectural modularity to simulate complex, multi-turn agentic exploitations. In this paper, we introduce AJAR (Adaptive Jailbreak Architecture for Red-teaming), a proof-of-concept framework designed to bridge this gap through Protocol-driven Cognitive Orchestration. Built upon the robust runtime of Petri, AJAR leverages the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to decouple adversarial logic from the execution loop, encapsulating state-of-the-art algorithms like X-Teaming as standardized, plug-and-play services. We validate the architectural feasibility of AJAR through a controlled qualitative case study, demonstrating its ability to perform stateful backtracking within a tool-use environment. Furthermore, our preliminary exploration of the "Agentic Gap" reveals a complex safety dynamic: while tool usage introduces new injection vectors via code execution, the cognitive load of parameter formatting can inadvertently disrupt persona-based attacks. AJAR is open-sourced to facilitate the standardized, environment-aware evaluation of this emerging attack surface. The code and data are available at https://github.com/douyipu/ajar.

Jailbreak attacks aim to exploit large language models (LLMs) by inducing them to generate harmful content, thereby revealing their vulnerabilities. Understanding and addressing these attacks is crucial for advancing the field of LLM safety. Previous jailbreak approaches have mainly focused on direct manipulations of harmful intent, with limited attention to the impact of persona prompts. In this study, we systematically explore the efficacy of persona prompts in compromising LLM defenses. We propose a genetic algorithm-based method that automatically crafts persona prompts to bypass LLM's safety mechanisms. Our experiments reveal that: (1) our evolved persona prompts reduce refusal rates by 50-70% across multiple LLMs, and (2) these prompts demonstrate synergistic effects when combined with existing attack methods, increasing success rates by 10-20%. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/CjangCjengh/Generic_Persona.

Recently, we have witnessed a rise in the use of Large Language Models (LLMs), especially in applications like chatbot assistants. Safety mechanisms and specialized training procedures are implemented to prevent improper responses from these assistants. In this work, we bypass these measures for ChatGPT and Gemini (and, to some extent, Bing chat) by making them impersonate complex personas with personality characteristics that are not aligned with a truthful assistant. We start by creating elaborate biographies of these personas, which we then use in a new session with the same chatbots. Our conversations then follow a role-play style to elicit prohibited responses. Using personas, we show that prohibited responses are actually provided, making it possible to obtain unauthorized, illegal, or harmful information. This work shows that by using adversarial personas, one can overcome safety mechanisms set out by ChatGPT and Gemini. We also introduce several ways of activating such adversarial personas, which show that both chatbots are vulnerable to this kind of attack. With the same principle, we introduce two defenses that push the model to interpret trustworthy personalities and make it more robust against such attacks.

Expert persona prompting -- assigning roles such as expert in math to language models -- is widely used for task improvement. However, prior work shows mixed results on its effectiveness, and does not consider when and why personas should improve performance. We analyze the literature on persona prompting for task improvement and distill three desiderata: 1) performance advantage of expert personas, 2) robustness to irrelevant persona attributes, and 3) fidelity to persona attributes. We then evaluate 9 state-of-the-art LLMs across 27 tasks with respect to these desiderata. We find that expert personas usually lead to positive or non-significant performance changes. Surprisingly, models are highly sensitive to irrelevant persona details, with performance drops of almost 30 percentage points. In terms of fidelity, we find that while higher education, specialization, and domain-relatedness can boost performance, their effects are often inconsistent or negligible across tasks. We propose mitigation strategies to improve robustness -- but find they only work for the largest, most capable models. Our findings underscore the need for more careful persona design and for evaluation schemes that reflect the intended effects of persona usage.

Despite investments in improving model safety, studies show that misaligned capabilities remain latent in safety-tuned models. In this work, we shed light on the mechanics of this phenomenon. First, we show that even when model generations are safe, harmful content can persist in hidden representations and can be extracted by decoding from earlier layers. Then, we show that whether the model divulges such content depends significantly on its perception of who it is talking to, which we refer to as user persona. In fact, we find manipulating user persona to be even more effective for eliciting harmful content than direct attempts to control model refusal. We study both natural language prompting and activation steering as control methods and show that activation steering is significantly more effective at bypassing safety filters. We investigate why certain personas break model safeguards and find that they enable the model to form more charitable interpretations of otherwise dangerous queries. Finally, we show we can predict a persona's effect on refusal given only the geometry of its steering vector.

Persona agents, which are LLM agents that act according to an assigned persona, have demonstrated impressive contextual response capabilities across various applications. These persona agents offer significant enhancements across diverse sectors, such as education, healthcare, and entertainment, where model developers can align agent responses to different user requirements thereby broadening the scope of agent applications. However, evaluating persona agent performance is incredibly challenging due to the complexity of assessing persona adherence in free-form interactions across various environments that are relevant to each persona agent. We introduce PersonaGym, the first dynamic evaluation framework for assessing persona agents, and PersonaScore, the first automated human-aligned metric grounded in decision theory for comprehensive large-scale evaluation of persona agents. Our evaluation of 6 open and closed-source LLMs, using a benchmark encompassing 200 personas and 10,000 questions, reveals significant opportunities for advancement in persona agent capabilities across state-of-the-art models. For example, Claude 3.5 Sonnet only has a 2.97% relative improvement in PersonaScore than GPT 3.5 despite being a much more advanced model. Importantly, we find that increased model size and complexity do not necessarily imply enhanced persona agent capabilities thereby highlighting the pressing need for algorithmic and architectural invention towards faithful and performant persona agents.

Persona-assigned large language models (LLMs) are used in domains such as education, healthcare, and sociodemographic simulation. Yet, they are typically evaluated only in short, single-round settings that do not reflect real-world usage. We introduce an evaluation protocol that combines long persona dialogues (over 100 rounds) and evaluation datasets to create dialogue-conditioned benchmarks that can robustly measure long-context effects. We then investigate the effects of dialogue length on persona fidelity, instruction-following, and safety of seven state-of-the-art open- and closed-weight LLMs. We find that persona fidelity degrades over the course of dialogues, especially in goal-oriented conversations, where models must sustain both persona fidelity and instruction following. We identify a trade-off between fidelity and instruction following, with non-persona baselines initially outperforming persona-assigned models; as dialogues progress and fidelity fades, persona responses become increasingly similar to baseline responses. Our findings highlight the fragility of persona applications in extended interactions and our work provides a protocol to systematically measure such failures.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models empower them to follow freeform instructions, including imitating generic or specific demographic personas in conversations. We define generic personas to represent demographic groups, such as "an Asian person", whereas specific personas may take the form of specific popular Asian names like "Yumi". While the adoption of personas enriches user experiences by making dialogue systems more engaging and approachable, it also casts a shadow of potential risk by exacerbating social biases within model responses, thereby causing societal harm through interactions with users. In this paper, we systematically study "persona biases", which we define to be the sensitivity of dialogue models' harmful behaviors contingent upon the personas they adopt. We categorize persona biases into biases in harmful expression and harmful agreement, and establish a comprehensive evaluation framework to measure persona biases in five aspects: Offensiveness, Toxic Continuation, Regard, Stereotype Agreement, and Toxic Agreement. Additionally, we propose to investigate persona biases by experimenting with UNIVERSALPERSONA, a systematically constructed persona dataset encompassing various types of both generic and specific model personas. Through benchmarking on four different models -- including Blender, ChatGPT, Alpaca, and Vicuna -- our study uncovers significant persona biases in dialogue systems. Our findings also underscore the pressing need to revisit the use of personas in dialogue agents to ensure safe application.

Despite efforts to align large language models to produce harmless responses, they are still vulnerable to jailbreak prompts that elicit unrestricted behaviour. In this work, we investigate persona modulation as a black-box jailbreaking method to steer a target model to take on personalities that are willing to comply with harmful instructions. Rather than manually crafting prompts for each persona, we automate the generation of jailbreaks using a language model assistant. We demonstrate a range of harmful completions made possible by persona modulation, including detailed instructions for synthesising methamphetamine, building a bomb, and laundering money. These automated attacks achieve a harmful completion rate of 42.5% in GPT-4, which is 185 times larger than before modulation (0.23%). These prompts also transfer to Claude 2 and Vicuna with harmful completion rates of 61.0% and 35.9%, respectively. Our work reveals yet another vulnerability in commercial large language models and highlights the need for more comprehensive safeguards.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities across various fields. These developments have led to more direct communication between humans and LLMs in various situations, such as social companionship and psychological support. However, LLMs often exhibit limitations in emotional perception and social competence during real-world conversations. These limitations partly originate from their inability to adapt their communication style and emotional expression to different social and task contexts. In this work, we introduce PersonaFuse, a novel LLM post-training framework that enables LLMs to adapt and express different personalities for varying situations. Inspired by Trait Activation Theory and the Big Five personality model, PersonaFuse employs a Mixture-of-Expert architecture that combines persona adapters with a dynamic routing network, enabling contextual trait expression. Experimental results show that PersonaFuse substantially outperforms baseline models across multiple dimensions of social-emotional intelligence. Importantly, these gains are achieved without sacrificing general reasoning ability or model safety, which remain common limitations of direct prompting and supervised fine-tuning approaches. PersonaFuse also delivers consistent improvements in downstream human-centered applications, such as mental health counseling and review-based customer service. Finally, human preference evaluations against leading LLMs, including GPT-4o and DeepSeek, demonstrate that PersonaFuse achieves competitive response quality despite its comparatively smaller model size. These findings demonstrate that PersonaFuse~offers a theoretically grounded and practical approach for developing social-emotional enhanced LLMs, marking a significant advancement toward more human-centric AI systems.

Large language models interact with users through a simulated 'Assistant' persona. While the Assistant is typically trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, it sometimes deviates from these ideals. In this paper, we identify directions in the model's activation space-persona vectors-underlying several traits, such as evil, sycophancy, and propensity to hallucinate. We confirm that these vectors can be used to monitor fluctuations in the Assistant's personality at deployment time. We then apply persona vectors to predict and control personality shifts that occur during training. We find that both intended and unintended personality changes after finetuning are strongly correlated with shifts along the relevant persona vectors. These shifts can be mitigated through post-hoc intervention, or avoided in the first place with a new preventative steering method. Moreover, persona vectors can be used to flag training data that will produce undesirable personality changes, both at the dataset level and the individual sample level. Our method for extracting persona vectors is automated and can be applied to any personality trait of interest, given only a natural-language description.

Recent research has explored that LLM agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious tasks embedded in tool-retrieved information can redirect the agent to take unauthorized actions. Existing defenses against IPI have significant limitations: either require essential model training resources, lack effectiveness against sophisticated attacks, or harm the normal utilities. We present MELON (Masked re-Execution and TooL comparisON), a novel IPI defense. Our approach builds on the observation that under a successful attack, the agent's next action becomes less dependent on user tasks and more on malicious tasks. Following this, we design MELON to detect attacks by re-executing the agent's trajectory with a masked user prompt modified through a masking function. We identify an attack if the actions generated in the original and masked executions are similar. We also include three key designs to reduce the potential false positives and false negatives. Extensive evaluation on the IPI benchmark AgentDojo demonstrates that MELON outperforms SOTA defenses in both attack prevention and utility preservation. Moreover, we show that combining MELON with a SOTA prompt augmentation defense (denoted as MELON-Aug) further improves its performance. We also conduct a detailed ablation study to validate our key designs. Code is available at https://github.com/kaijiezhu11/MELON.

Intelligent Personal Assistant (IA), also known as Voice Assistant (VA), has become increasingly popular as a human-computer interaction mechanism. Most smartphones have built-in voice assistants that are granted high privilege, which is able to access system resources and private information. Thus, once the voice assistants are exploited by attackers, they become the stepping stones for the attackers to hack into the smartphones. Prior work shows that the voice assistant can be activated by inter-component communication mechanism, through an official Android API. However, this attack method is only effective on Google Assistant, which is the official voice assistant developed by Google. Voice assistants in other operating systems, even custom Android systems, cannot be activated by this mechanism. Prior work also shows that the attacking voice commands can be inaudible, but it requires additional instruments to launch the attack, making it unrealistic for real-world attack. We propose an attacking framework, which records the activation voice of the user, and launch the attack by playing the activation voice and attack commands via the built-in speaker. An intelligent stealthy module is designed to decide on the suitable occasion to launch the attack, preventing the attack being noticed by the user. We demonstrate proof-of-concept attacks on Google Assistant, showing the feasibility and stealthiness of the proposed attack scheme. We suggest to revise the activation logic of voice assistant to be resilient to the speaker based attack.

With the rapid improvement in the general capabilities of LLMs, LLM personalization, i.e., how to build LLM systems that can generate personalized responses or services that are tailored to distinct user personas, has become an increasingly important research and engineering problem. However, unlike many new challenging benchmarks being released for evaluating the general/reasoning capabilities, the lack of high-quality benchmarks for evaluating LLM personalization greatly hinders progress in this field. To address this, we introduce PersonaFeedback, a new benchmark that directly evaluates LLMs' ability to provide personalized responses given pre-defined user personas and queries. Unlike existing benchmarks that require models to infer implicit user personas from historical interactions, PersonaFeedback decouples persona inference from personalization, focusing on evaluating the model's ability to generate responses tailored to explicit personas. PersonaFeedback consists of 8298 human-annotated test cases, which are categorized into easy, medium, and hard tiers based on the contextual complexity of the user personas and the difficulty in distinguishing subtle differences between two personalized responses. We conduct comprehensive evaluations across a wide range of models. The empirical results reveal that even state-of-the-art LLMs that can solve complex real-world reasoning tasks could fall short on the hard tier of PersonaFeedback where even human evaluators may find the distinctions challenging. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth analysis of failure modes across various types of systems, demonstrating that the current retrieval-augmented framework should not be seen as a de facto solution for personalization tasks. All benchmark data, annotation protocols, and the evaluation pipeline will be publicly available to facilitate future research on LLM personalization.

Ensuring persona fidelity in large language models (LLMs) is essential for maintaining coherent and engaging human-AI interactions. However, LLMs often exhibit Out-of-Character (OOC) behavior, where generated responses deviate from an assigned persona, leading to inconsistencies that affect model reliability. Existing evaluation methods typically assign single scores to entire responses, struggling to capture subtle persona misalignment, particularly in long-form text generation. To address this limitation, we propose an atomic-level evaluation framework that quantifies persona fidelity at a finer granularity. Our three key metrics measure the degree of persona alignment and consistency within and across generations. Our approach enables a more precise and realistic assessment of persona fidelity by identifying subtle deviations that real users would encounter. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that our framework effectively detects persona inconsistencies that prior methods overlook. By analyzing persona fidelity across diverse tasks and personality types, we reveal how task structure and persona desirability influence model adaptability, highlighting challenges in maintaining consistent persona expression.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display remarkable capabilities to understand or even produce political discourse but have been found to consistently exhibit a progressive left-leaning bias. At the same time, so-called persona or identity prompts have been shown to produce LLM behavior that aligns with socioeconomic groups with which the base model is not aligned. In this work, we analyze whether zero-shot persona prompting with limited information can accurately predict individual voting decisions and, by aggregation, accurately predict the positions of European groups on a diverse set of policies. We evaluate whether predictions are stable in response to counterfactual arguments, different persona prompts, and generation methods. Finally, we find that we can simulate the voting behavior of Members of the European Parliament reasonably well, achieving a weighted F1 score of approximately 0.793. Our persona dataset of politicians in the 2024 European Parliament and our code are available at the following url: https://github.com/dess-mannheim/european_parliament_simulation.

We show that Web and Research Agents (WRAs) -- language model-based systems that investigate complex topics on the Internet -- are vulnerable to inference attacks by passive network adversaries such as ISPs. These agents could be deployed locally by organizations and individuals for privacy, legal, or financial purposes. Unlike sporadic web browsing by humans, WRAs visit 70{-}140 domains with distinguishable timing correlations, enabling unique fingerprinting attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate a novel prompt and user trait leakage attack against WRAs that only leverages their network-level metadata (i.e., visited IP addresses and their timings). We start by building a new dataset of WRA traces based on user search queries and queries generated by synthetic personas. We define a behavioral metric (called OBELS) to comprehensively assess similarity between original and inferred prompts, showing that our attack recovers over 73% of the functional and domain knowledge of user prompts. Extending to a multi-session setting, we recover up to 19 of 32 latent traits with high accuracy. Our attack remains effective under partial observability and noisy conditions. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies that constrain domain diversity or obfuscate traces, showing negligible utility impact while reducing attack effectiveness by an average of 29%.

Large language models can represent a variety of personas but typically default to a helpful Assistant identity cultivated during post-training. We investigate the structure of the space of model personas by extracting activation directions corresponding to diverse character archetypes. Across several different models, we find that the leading component of this persona space is an "Assistant Axis," which captures the extent to which a model is operating in its default Assistant mode. Steering towards the Assistant direction reinforces helpful and harmless behavior; steering away increases the model's tendency to identify as other entities. Moreover, steering away with more extreme values often induces a mystical, theatrical speaking style. We find this axis is also present in pre-trained models, where it primarily promotes helpful human archetypes like consultants and coaches and inhibits spiritual ones. Measuring deviations along the Assistant Axis predicts "persona drift," a phenomenon where models slip into exhibiting harmful or bizarre behaviors that are uncharacteristic of their typical persona. We find that persona drift is often driven by conversations demanding meta-reflection on the model's processes or featuring emotionally vulnerable users. We show that restricting activations to a fixed region along the Assistant Axis can stabilize model behavior in these scenarios -- and also in the face of adversarial persona-based jailbreaks. Our results suggest that post-training steers models toward a particular region of persona space but only loosely tethers them to it, motivating work on training and steering strategies that more deeply anchor models to a coherent persona.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled agents to move beyond conversation toward end-to-end task execution and become more helpful. However, this helpfulness introduces new security risks stem less from direct interface abuse than from acting on user-provided content. Existing studies on agent security largely focus on model-internal vulnerabilities or adversarial access to agent interfaces, overlooking attacks that exploit users as unintended conduits. In this paper, we study user-mediated attacks, where benign users are tricked into relaying untrusted or attacker-controlled content to agents, and analyze how commercial LLM agents respond under such conditions. We conduct a systematic evaluation of 12 commercial agents in a sandboxed environment, covering 6 trip-planning agents and 6 web-use agents, and compare agent behavior across scenarios with no, soft, and hard user-requested safety checks. Our results show that agents are too helpful to be safe by default. Without explicit safety requests, trip-planning agents bypass safety constraints in over 92% of cases, converting unverified content into confident booking guidance. Web-use agents exhibit near-deterministic execution of risky actions, with 9 out of 17 supported tests reaching a 100% bypass rate. Even when users express soft or hard safety intent, constraint bypass remains substantial, reaching up to 54.7% and 7% for trip-planning agents, respectively. These findings reveal that the primary issue is not a lack of safety capability, but its prioritization. Agents invoke safety checks only conditionally when explicitly prompted, and otherwise default to goal-driven execution. Moreover, agents lack clear task boundaries and stopping rules, frequently over-executing workflows in ways that lead to unnecessary data disclosure and real-world harm.

Due to the lack of human resources for mental health support, there is an increasing demand for employing conversational agents for support. Recent work has demonstrated the effectiveness of dialogue models in providing emotional support. As previous studies have demonstrated that seekers' persona is an important factor for effective support, we investigate whether there are benefits to modeling such information in dialogue models for support. In this paper, our empirical analysis verifies that persona has an important impact on emotional support. Therefore, we propose a framework for dynamically inferring and modeling seekers' persona. We first train a model for inferring the seeker's persona from the conversation history. Accordingly, we propose PAL, a model that leverages persona information and, in conjunction with our strategy-based controllable generation method, provides personalized emotional support. Automatic and manual evaluations demonstrate that PAL achieves state-of-the-art results, outperforming the baselines on the studied benchmark. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/chengjl19/PAL.

The use of persona-grounded retrieval-based chatbots is crucial for personalized conversations, but there are several challenges that need to be addressed. 1) In general, collecting persona-grounded corpus is very expensive. 2) The chatbot system does not always respond in consideration of persona at real applications. To address these challenges, we propose a plug-and-play persona prompting method. Our system can function as a standard open-domain chatbot if persona information is not available. We demonstrate that this approach performs well in the zero-shot setting, which reduces the dependence on persona-ground training data. This makes it easier to expand the system to other languages without the need to build a persona-grounded corpus. Additionally, our model can be fine-tuned for even better performance. In our experiments, the zero-shot model improved the standard model by 7.71 and 1.04 points in the original persona and revised persona, respectively. The fine-tuned model improved the previous state-of-the-art system by 1.95 and 3.39 points in the original persona and revised persona, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to solve the problem of personalized response selection using prompt sequences. Our code is available on github~https://github.com/rungjoo/plug-and-play-prompt-persona.

Simulating human profiles by instilling personas into large language models (LLMs) is rapidly transforming research in agentic behavioral simulation, LLM personalization, and human-AI alignment. However, most existing synthetic personas remain shallow and simplistic, capturing minimal attributes and failing to reflect the rich complexity and diversity of real human identities. We introduce DEEPPERSONA, a scalable generative engine for synthesizing narrative-complete synthetic personas through a two-stage, taxonomy-guided method. First, we algorithmically construct the largest-ever human-attribute taxonomy, comprising over hundreds of hierarchically organized attributes, by mining thousands of real user-ChatGPT conversations. Second, we progressively sample attributes from this taxonomy, conditionally generating coherent and realistic personas that average hundreds of structured attributes and roughly 1 MB of narrative text, two orders of magnitude deeper than prior works. Intrinsic evaluations confirm significant improvements in attribute diversity (32 percent higher coverage) and profile uniqueness (44 percent greater) compared to state-of-the-art baselines. Extrinsically, our personas enhance GPT-4.1-mini's personalized question answering accuracy by 11.6 percent on average across ten metrics and substantially narrow (by 31.7 percent) the gap between simulated LLM citizens and authentic human responses in social surveys. Our generated national citizens reduced the performance gap on the Big Five personality test by 17 percent relative to LLM-simulated citizens. DEEPPERSONA thus provides a rigorous, scalable, and privacy-free platform for high-fidelity human simulation and personalized AI research.

Persona conditioning can be viewed as a behavioral prior for large language models (LLMs) and is often assumed to confer expertise and improve safety in a monotonic manner. However, its effects on high-stakes clinical decision-making remain poorly characterized. We systematically evaluate persona-based control in clinical LLMs, examining how professional roles (e.g., Emergency Department physician, nurse) and interaction styles (bold vs.\ cautious) influence behavior across models and medical tasks. We assess performance on clinical triage and patient-safety tasks using multidimensional evaluations that capture task accuracy, calibration, and safety-relevant risk behavior. We find systematic, context-dependent, and non-monotonic effects: Medical personas improve performance in critical care tasks, yielding gains of up to sim+20% in accuracy and calibration, but degrade performance in primary-care settings by comparable margins. Interaction style modulates risk propensity and sensitivity, but it's highly model-dependent. While aggregated LLM-judge rankings favor medical over non-medical personas in safety-critical cases, we found that human clinicians show moderate agreement on safety compliance (average Cohen's κ= 0.43) but indicate a low confidence in 95.9\% of their responses on reasoning quality. Our work shows that personas function as behavioral priors that introduce context-dependent trade-offs rather than guarantees of safety or expertise. The code is available at https://github.com/rsinghlab/Persona\_Paradox.

Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

Tips, as a compacted and concise form of reviews, were paid less attention by researchers. In this paper, we investigate the task of tips generation by considering the `persona' information which captures the intrinsic language style of the users or the different characteristics of the product items. In order to exploit the persona information, we propose a framework based on adversarial variational auto-encoders (aVAE) for persona modeling from the historical tips and reviews of users and items. The latent variables from aVAE are regarded as persona embeddings. Besides representing persona using the latent embeddings, we design a persona memory for storing the persona related words for users and items. Pointer Network is used to retrieve persona wordings from the memory when generating tips. Moreover, the persona embeddings are used as latent factors by a rating prediction component to predict the sentiment of a user over an item. Finally, the persona embeddings and the sentiment information are incorporated into a recurrent neural networks based tips generation component. Extensive experimental results are reported and discussed to elaborate the peculiarities of our framework.

This study exposes the safety vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions, where malicious users can obscure harmful intents across several queries. We introduce ActorAttack, a novel multi-turn attack method inspired by actor-network theory, which models a network of semantically linked actors as attack clues to generate diverse and effective attack paths toward harmful targets. ActorAttack addresses two main challenges in multi-turn attacks: (1) concealing harmful intents by creating an innocuous conversation topic about the actor, and (2) uncovering diverse attack paths towards the same harmful target by leveraging LLMs' knowledge to specify the correlated actors as various attack clues. In this way, ActorAttack outperforms existing single-turn and multi-turn attack methods across advanced aligned LLMs, even for GPT-o1. We will publish a dataset called SafeMTData, which includes multi-turn adversarial prompts and safety alignment data, generated by ActorAttack. We demonstrate that models safety-tuned using our safety dataset are more robust to multi-turn attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/renqibing/ActorAttack.

What should a malicious user write next to fool a detection model? Identifying malicious users is critical to ensure the safety and integrity of internet platforms. Several deep learning-based detection models have been created. However, malicious users can evade deep detection models by manipulating their behavior, rendering these models of little use. The vulnerability of such deep detection models against adversarial attacks is unknown. Here we create a novel adversarial attack model against deep user sequence embedding based classification models, which use the sequence of user posts to generate user embeddings and detect malicious users. In the attack, the adversary generates a new post to fool the classifier. We propose a novel end-to-end Personalized Text Generation Attack model, called PETGEN, that simultaneously reduces the efficacy of the detection model and generates posts that have several key desirable properties. Specifically, PETGEN generates posts that are personalized to the user's writing style, have knowledge about a given target context, are aware of the user's historical posts on the target context, and encapsulate the user's recent topical interests. We conduct extensive experiments on two real-world datasets (Yelp and Wikipedia, both with ground-truth of malicious users) to show that PETGEN significantly reduces the performance of popular deep user sequence embedding-based classification models. PETGEN outperforms five attack baselines in terms of text quality and attack efficacy in both white-box and black-box classifier settings. Overall, this work paves the path towards the next generation of adversary-aware sequence classification models.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have revitalized in LLM-based agents, exhibiting impressive human-like behaviors and cooperative capabilities in various scenarios. However, these agents also bring some exclusive risks, stemming from the complexity of interaction environments and the usability of tools. This paper delves into the safety of LLM-based agents from three perspectives: agent quantity, role definition, and attack level. Specifically, we initially propose to employ a template-based attack strategy on LLM-based agents to find the influence of agent quantity. In addition, to address interaction environment and role specificity issues, we introduce Evil Geniuses (EG), an effective attack method that autonomously generates prompts related to the original role to examine the impact across various role definitions and attack levels. EG leverages Red-Blue exercises, significantly improving the generated prompt aggressiveness and similarity to original roles. Our evaluations on CAMEL, Metagpt and ChatDev based on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, demonstrate high success rates. Extensive evaluation and discussion reveal that these agents are less robust, prone to more harmful behaviors, and capable of generating stealthier content than LLMs, highlighting significant safety challenges and guiding future research. Our code is available at https://github.com/T1aNS1R/Evil-Geniuses.

We introduce Fraud-R1, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs' ability to defend against internet fraud and phishing in dynamic, real-world scenarios. Fraud-R1 comprises 8,564 fraud cases sourced from phishing scams, fake job postings, social media, and news, categorized into 5 major fraud types. Unlike previous benchmarks, Fraud-R1 introduces a multi-round evaluation pipeline to assess LLMs' resistance to fraud at different stages, including credibility building, urgency creation, and emotional manipulation. Furthermore, we evaluate 15 LLMs under two settings: 1. Helpful-Assistant, where the LLM provides general decision-making assistance, and 2. Role-play, where the model assumes a specific persona, widely used in real-world agent-based interactions. Our evaluation reveals the significant challenges in defending against fraud and phishing inducement, especially in role-play settings and fake job postings. Additionally, we observe a substantial performance gap between Chinese and English, underscoring the need for improved multilingual fraud detection capabilities.

Personalization is critical in AI assistants, particularly in the context of private AI models that work with individual users. A key scenario in this domain involves enabling AI models to access and interpret a user's private data (e.g., conversation history, user-AI interactions, app usage) to understand personal details such as biographical information, preferences, and social connections. However, due to the sensitive nature of such data, there are no publicly available datasets that allow us to assess an AI model's ability to understand users through direct access to personal information. To address this gap, we introduce a synthetic data generation pipeline that creates diverse, realistic user profiles and private documents simulating human activities. Leveraging this synthetic data, we present PersonaBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate AI models' performance in understanding personal information derived from simulated private user data. We evaluate Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines using questions directly related to a user's personal information, supported by the relevant private documents provided to the models. Our results reveal that current retrieval-augmented AI models struggle to answer private questions by extracting personal information from user documents, highlighting the need for improved methodologies to enhance personalization capabilities in AI.

For socially sensitive tasks like hate speech detection, the quality of explanations from Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for factors like user trust and model alignment. While Persona prompting (PP) is increasingly used as a way to steer model towards user-specific generation, its effect on model rationales remains underexplored. We investigate how LLM-generated rationales vary when conditioned on different simulated demographic personas. Using datasets annotated with word-level rationales, we measure agreement with human annotations from different demographic groups, and assess the impact of PP on model bias and human alignment. Our evaluation across three LLMs results reveals three key findings: (1) PP improving classification on the most subjective task (hate speech) but degrading rationale quality. (2) Simulated personas fail to align with their real-world demographic counterparts, and high inter-persona agreement shows models are resistant to significant steering. (3) Models exhibit consistent demographic biases and a strong tendency to over-flag content as harmful, regardless of PP. Our findings reveal a critical trade-off: while PP can improve classification in socially-sensitive tasks, it often comes at the cost of rationale quality and fails to mitigate underlying biases, urging caution in its application.

We introduce PersonaHOI, a training- and tuning-free framework that fuses a general StableDiffusion model with a personalized face diffusion (PFD) model to generate identity-consistent human-object interaction (HOI) images. While existing PFD models have advanced significantly, they often overemphasize facial features at the expense of full-body coherence, PersonaHOI introduces an additional StableDiffusion (SD) branch guided by HOI-oriented text inputs. By incorporating cross-attention constraints in the PFD branch and spatial merging at both latent and residual levels, PersonaHOI preserves personalized facial details while ensuring interactive non-facial regions. Experiments, validated by a novel interaction alignment metric, demonstrate the superior realism and scalability of PersonaHOI, establishing a new standard for practical personalized face with HOI generation. Our code will be available at https://github.com/JoyHuYY1412/PersonaHOI

The evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview of the PI landscape, covering attacks, defenses, and their evaluation practices. Through a systematic literature review and quantitative analysis, we establish taxonomies that categorize PI attacks by payload generation strategies (heuristic vs. optimization) and defenses by intervention stages (text, model, and execution levels). Our analysis reveals a key limitation shared by many existing defenses and benchmarks: they largely overlook context-dependent tasks, in which agents are authorized to rely on runtime environmental observations to determine actions. To address this gap, we introduce AgentPI, a new benchmark designed to systematically evaluate agent behavior under context-dependent interaction settings. Using AgentPI, we empirically evaluate representative defenses and show that no single approach can simultaneously achieve high trustworthiness, high utility, and low latency. Moreover, we show that many defenses appear effective under existing benchmarks by suppressing contextual inputs, yet fail to generalize to realistic agent settings where context-dependent reasoning is essential. This SoK distills key takeaways and open research problems, offering structured guidance for future research and practical deployment of secure LLM agents.

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

We present persona-based models for handling the issue of speaker consistency in neural response generation. A speaker model encodes personas in distributed embeddings that capture individual characteristics such as background information and speaking style. A dyadic speaker-addressee model captures properties of interactions between two interlocutors. Our models yield qualitative performance improvements in both perplexity and BLEU scores over baseline sequence-to-sequence models, with similar gains in speaker consistency as measured by human judges.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

As large language models (LLMs) become an important way of information access, there have been increasing concerns that LLMs may intensify the spread of unethical content, including implicit bias that hurts certain populations without explicit harmful words. In this paper, we conduct a rigorous evaluation of LLMs' implicit bias towards certain demographics by attacking them from a psychometric perspective to elicit agreements to biased viewpoints. Inspired by psychometric principles in cognitive and social psychology, we propose three attack approaches, i.e., Disguise, Deception, and Teaching. Incorporating the corresponding attack instructions, we built two benchmarks: (1) a bilingual dataset with biased statements covering four bias types (2.7K instances) for extensive comparative analysis, and (2) BUMBLE, a larger benchmark spanning nine common bias types (12.7K instances) for comprehensive evaluation. Extensive evaluation of popular commercial and open-source LLMs shows that our methods can elicit LLMs' inner bias more effectively than competitive baselines. Our attack methodology and benchmarks offer an effective means of assessing the ethical risks of LLMs, driving progress toward greater accountability in their development. Our code, data and benchmarks are available at https://github.com/yuchenwen1/ImplicitBiasPsychometricEvaluation and https://github.com/yuchenwen1/BUMBLE.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained considerable popularity and protected by increasingly sophisticated safety mechanisms. However, jailbreak attacks continue to pose a critical security threat by inducing models to generate policy-violating behaviors. Current paradigms focus on input-level anomalies, overlooking that the model's internal psychometric state can be systematically manipulated. To address this, we introduce Psychological Jailbreak, a new jailbreak attack paradigm that exposes a stateful psychological attack surface in LLMs, where attackers exploit the manipulation of a model's psychological state across interactions. Building on this insight, we propose Human-like Psychological Manipulation (HPM), a black-box jailbreak method that dynamically profiles a target model's latent psychological vulnerabilities and synthesizes tailored multi-turn attack strategies. By leveraging the model's optimization for anthropomorphic consistency, HPM creates a psychological pressure where social compliance overrides safety constraints. To systematically measure psychological safety, we construct an evaluation framework incorporating psychometric datasets and the Policy Corruption Score (PCS). Benchmarking against various models (e.g., GPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, Gemini-2-Flash), HPM achieves a mean Attack Success Rate (ASR) of 88.1%, outperforming state-of-the-art attack baselines. Our experiments demonstrate robust penetration against advanced defenses, including adversarial prompt optimization (e.g., RPO) and cognitive interventions (e.g., Self-Reminder). Ultimately, PCS analysis confirms HPM induces safety breakdown to satisfy manipulated contexts. Our work advocates for a fundamental paradigm shift from static content filtering to psychological safety, prioritizing the development of psychological defense mechanisms against deep cognitive manipulation.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

Impressive progress has been made in automated problem-solving by the collaboration of large language models (LLMs) based agents. However, these automated capabilities also open avenues for malicious applications. In this paper, we study a new threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity, called automated profile inference, where an adversary can instruct LLMs to automatically scrape and extract sensitive personal attributes from publicly visible user activities on pseudonymous platforms. We also introduce an automated profiling framework called AutoProfiler to assess the feasibility of such threats in real-world scenarios. AutoProfiler consists of four specialized LLM agents, who work collaboratively to collect and process user online activities and generate a profile with extracted personal information. Experimental results on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset demonstrate that AutoProfiler is highly effective and efficient, and can be easily deployed on a web scale. We demonstrate that the inferred attributes are both sensitive and identifiable, posing significant risks of privacy breaches, such as de-anonymization and sensitive information leakage. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies from different perspectives and advocate for increased public awareness of this emerging privacy threat to online pseudonymity.

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

Endowing dialogue systems with personas is essential to deliver more human-like conversations. However, this problem is still far from well explored due to the difficulties of both embodying personalities in natural languages and the persona sparsity issue observed in most dialogue corpora. This paper proposes a pre-training based personalized dialogue model that can generate coherent responses using persona-sparse dialogue data. In this method, a pre-trained language model is used to initialize an encoder and decoder, and personal attribute embeddings are devised to model richer dialogue contexts by encoding speakers' personas together with dialogue histories. Further, to incorporate the target persona in the decoding process and to balance its contribution, an attention routing structure is devised in the decoder to merge features extracted from the target persona and dialogue contexts using dynamically predicted weights. Our model can utilize persona-sparse dialogues in a unified manner during the training process, and can also control the amount of persona-related features to exhibit during the inference process. Both automatic and manual evaluation demonstrates that the proposed model outperforms state-of-the-art methods for generating more coherent and persona consistent responses with persona-sparse data.

Generalist web agents have evolved rapidly and demonstrated remarkable potential. However, there are unprecedented safety risks associated with these them, which are nearly unexplored so far. In this work, we aim to narrow this gap by conducting the first study on the privacy risks of generalist web agents in adversarial environments. First, we present a threat model that discusses the adversarial targets, constraints, and attack scenarios. Particularly, we consider two types of adversarial targets: stealing users' specific personally identifiable information (PII) or stealing the entire user request. To achieve these objectives, we propose a novel attack method, termed Environmental Injection Attack (EIA). This attack injects malicious content designed to adapt well to different environments where the agents operate, causing them to perform unintended actions. This work instantiates EIA specifically for the privacy scenario. It inserts malicious web elements alongside persuasive instructions that mislead web agents into leaking private information, and can further leverage CSS and JavaScript features to remain stealthy. We collect 177 actions steps that involve diverse PII categories on realistic websites from the Mind2Web dataset, and conduct extensive experiments using one of the most capable generalist web agent frameworks to date, SeeAct. The results demonstrate that EIA achieves up to 70% ASR in stealing users' specific PII. Stealing full user requests is more challenging, but a relaxed version of EIA can still achieve 16% ASR. Despite these concerning results, it is important to note that the attack can still be detectable through careful human inspection, highlighting a trade-off between high autonomy and security. This leads to our detailed discussion on the efficacy of EIA under different levels of human supervision as well as implications on defenses for generalist web agents.

Existing long-term personalized dialogue systems struggle to reconcile unbounded interaction streams with finite context constraints, often succumbing to memory noise accumulation, reasoning degradation, and persona inconsistency. To address these challenges, this paper proposes Inside Out, a framework that utilizes a globally maintained PersonaTree as the carrier of long-term user profiling. By constraining the trunk with an initial schema and updating the branches and leaves, PersonaTree enables controllable growth, achieving memory compression while preserving consistency. Moreover, we train a lightweight MemListener via reinforcement learning with process-based rewards to produce structured, executable, and interpretable {ADD, UPDATE, DELETE, NO_OP} operations, thereby supporting the dynamic evolution of the personalized tree. During response generation, PersonaTree is directly leveraged to enhance outputs in latency-sensitive scenarios; when users require more details, the agentic mode is triggered to introduce details on-demand under the constraints of the PersonaTree. Experiments show that PersonaTree outperforms full-text concatenation and various personalized memory systems in suppressing contextual noise and maintaining persona consistency. Notably, the small MemListener model achieves memory-operation decision performance comparable to, or even surpassing, powerful reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1-0528 and Gemini-3-Pro.

Memorizing and utilizing speakers' personas is a common practice for response generation in long-term conversations. Yet, human-authored datasets often provide uninformative persona sentences that hinder response quality. This paper presents a novel framework that leverages commonsense-based persona expansion to address such issues in long-term conversation. While prior work focuses on not producing personas that contradict others, we focus on transforming contradictory personas into sentences that contain rich speaker information, by refining them based on their contextual backgrounds with designed strategies. As the pioneer of persona expansion in multi-session settings, our framework facilitates better response generation via human-like persona refinement. The supplementary video of our work is available at https://caffeine-15bbf.web.app/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

Language-driven generative agents have enabled large-scale social simulations with transformative uses, from interpersonal training to aiding global policy-making. However, recent studies indicate that generative agent behaviors often deviate from expert expectations and real-world data--a phenomenon we term the Behavior-Realism Gap. To address this, we introduce a theoretical framework called Persona-Environment Behavioral Alignment (PEBA), formulated as a distribution matching problem grounded in Lewin's behavior equation stating that behavior is a function of the person and their environment. Leveraging PEBA, we propose PersonaEvolve (PEvo), an LLM-based optimization algorithm that iteratively refines agent personas, implicitly aligning their collective behaviors with realistic expert benchmarks within a specified environmental context. We validate PEvo in an active shooter incident simulation we developed, achieving an 84% average reduction in distributional divergence compared to no steering and a 34% improvement over explicit instruction baselines. Results also show PEvo-refined personas generalize to novel, related simulation scenarios. Our method greatly enhances behavioral realism and reliability in high-stakes social simulations. More broadly, the PEBA-PEvo framework provides a principled approach to developing trustworthy LLM-driven social simulations.

Debate is the process of exchanging viewpoints or convincing others on a particular issue. Recent research has provided empirical evidence that the persuasiveness of an argument is determined not only by language usage but also by communicator characteristics. Researchers have paid much attention to aspects of languages, such as linguistic features and discourse structures, but combining argument persuasiveness and impact with the social personae of the audience has not been explored due to the difficulty and complexity. We have observed the impressive simulation and personification capability of ChatGPT, indicating a giant pre-trained language model may function as an individual to provide personae and exert unique influences based on diverse background knowledge. Therefore, we propose a persona knowledge-aligned framework for argument quality assessment tasks from the audience side. This is the first work that leverages the emergence of ChatGPT and injects such audience personae knowledge into smaller language models via prompt tuning. The performance of our pipeline demonstrates significant and consistent improvement compared to competitive architectures.

Current works in the generation of personalized dialogue primarily contribute to the agent presenting a consistent personality and driving a more informative response. However, we found that the generated responses from most previous models tend to be self-centered, with little care for the user in the dialogue. Moreover, we consider that human-like conversation is essentially built based on inferring information about the persona of the other party. Motivated by this, we propose a novel personalized dialogue generator by detecting an implicit user persona. Because it is hard to collect a large number of detailed personas for each user, we attempted to model the user's potential persona and its representation from dialogue history, with no external knowledge. The perception and fader variables were conceived using conditional variational inference. The two latent variables simulate the process of people being aware of each other's persona and producing a corresponding expression in conversation. Finally, posterior-discriminated regularization was presented to enhance the training procedure. Empirical studies demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art methods, our approach is more concerned with the user's persona and achieves a considerable boost across the evaluations.

Maintaining persona consistency is paramount in the application of open-domain dialogue systems, as exemplified by models like ChatGPT. Despite significant advancements, the limited scale and diversity of current persona dialogue datasets remain challenges to achieving robust persona-consistent dialogue models. In this study, drawing inspiration from the success of large-scale pre-training, we introduce PPDS, an open-domain persona dialogue system that employs extensive generative pre-training on a persona dialogue dataset to enhance persona consistency. Specifically, we present a persona extraction model designed to autonomously and precisely generate vast persona dialogue datasets. Additionally, we unveil a pioneering persona augmentation technique to address the invalid persona bias inherent in the constructed dataset. Both quantitative and human evaluations consistently highlight the superior response quality and persona consistency of our proposed model, underscoring its effectiveness.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Endowing a dialogue system with particular personality traits is essential to deliver more human-like conversations. However, due to the challenge of embodying personality via language expression and the lack of large-scale persona-labeled dialogue data, this research problem is still far from well-studied. In this paper, we investigate the problem of incorporating explicit personality traits in dialogue generation to deliver personalized dialogues. To this end, firstly, we construct PersonalDialog, a large-scale multi-turn dialogue dataset containing various traits from a large number of speakers. The dataset consists of 20.83M sessions and 56.25M utterances from 8.47M speakers. Each utterance is associated with a speaker who is marked with traits like Age, Gender, Location, Interest Tags, etc. Several anonymization schemes are designed to protect the privacy of each speaker. This large-scale dataset will facilitate not only the study of personalized dialogue generation, but also other researches on sociolinguistics or social science. Secondly, to study how personality traits can be captured and addressed in dialogue generation, we propose persona-aware dialogue generation models within the sequence to sequence learning framework. Explicit personality traits (structured by key-value pairs) are embedded using a trait fusion module. During the decoding process, two techniques, namely persona-aware attention and persona-aware bias, are devised to capture and address trait-related information. Experiments demonstrate that our model is able to address proper traits in different contexts. Case studies also show interesting results for this challenging research problem.

In order to build self-consistent personalized dialogue agents, previous research has mostly focused on textual persona that delivers personal facts or personalities. However, to fully describe the multi-faceted nature of persona, image modality can help better reveal the speaker's personal characteristics and experiences in episodic memory (Rubin et al., 2003; Conway, 2009). In this work, we extend persona-based dialogue to the multimodal domain and make two main contributions. First, we present the first multimodal persona-based dialogue dataset named MPCHAT, which extends persona with both text and images to contain episodic memories. Second, we empirically show that incorporating multimodal persona, as measured by three proposed multimodal persona-grounded dialogue tasks (i.e., next response prediction, grounding persona prediction, and speaker identification), leads to statistically significant performance improvements across all tasks. Thus, our work highlights that multimodal persona is crucial for improving multimodal dialogue comprehension, and our MPCHAT serves as a high-quality resource for this research.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

Persona-driven role-playing (PRP) aims to build AI characters that can respond to user queries by faithfully sticking with all persona statements. Unfortunately, existing faithfulness criteria for PRP are limited to coarse-grained LLM-based scoring without a clear definition or formulation. This paper presents a pioneering exploration to quantify PRP faithfulness as a fine-grained and explainable criterion, which also serves as a reliable reference for optimization. Our criterion first discriminates persona statements into active and passive constraints by identifying the query-statement relevance. Then, we incorporate all constraints following the principle that the AI character's response should be (a) entailed by active (relevant) constraints and (b) not contradicted by passive (irrelevant) constraints. We translate this principle mathematically into a novel Active-Passive-Constraint (APC) score, a constraint-wise sum of natural language inference (NLI) scores weighted by relevance scores. In practice, we build the APC scoring system by symbolically distilling small discriminators from GPT-4 for efficiency. We validate the quality of the APC score against human evaluation based on example personas with tens of statements, and the results show a high correlation. We further leverage it as a reward system in direct preference optimization (DPO) for better AI characters. Our experiments offer a fine-grained and explainable comparison between existing PRP techniques, revealing their advantages and limitations. We further find APC-based DPO to be one of the most competitive techniques for sticking with all constraints and can be well incorporated with other techniques. We then extend the scale of the experiments to real persons with hundreds of statements and reach a consistent conclusion.

A Membership Inference Attack (MIA) assesses how much a trained machine learning model reveals about its training data by determining whether specific query instances were included in the dataset. We classify existing MIAs into adaptive or non-adaptive, depending on whether the adversary is allowed to train shadow models on membership queries. In the adaptive setting, where the adversary can train shadow models after accessing query instances, we highlight the importance of exploiting membership dependencies between instances and propose an attack-agnostic framework called Cascading Membership Inference Attack (CMIA), which incorporates membership dependencies via conditional shadow training to boost membership inference performance. In the non-adaptive setting, where the adversary is restricted to training shadow models before obtaining membership queries, we introduce Proxy Membership Inference Attack (PMIA). PMIA employs a proxy selection strategy that identifies samples with similar behaviors to the query instance and uses their behaviors in shadow models to perform a membership posterior odds test for membership inference. We provide theoretical analyses for both attacks, and extensive experimental results demonstrate that CMIA and PMIA substantially outperform existing MIAs in both settings, particularly in the low false-positive regime, which is crucial for evaluating privacy risks.

Adapting Large Language Models (LLMs) to specific tasks introduces concerns about computational efficiency, prompting an exploration of efficient methods such as In-Context Learning (ICL). However, the vulnerability of ICL to privacy attacks under realistic assumptions remains largely unexplored. In this work, we present the first membership inference attack tailored for ICL, relying solely on generated texts without their associated probabilities. We propose four attack strategies tailored to various constrained scenarios and conduct extensive experiments on four popular large language models. Empirical results show that our attacks can accurately determine membership status in most cases, e.g., 95\% accuracy advantage against LLaMA, indicating that the associated risks are much higher than those shown by existing probability-based attacks. Additionally, we propose a hybrid attack that synthesizes the strengths of the aforementioned strategies, achieving an accuracy advantage of over 95\% in most cases. Furthermore, we investigate three potential defenses targeting data, instruction, and output. Results demonstrate combining defenses from orthogonal dimensions significantly reduces privacy leakage and offers enhanced privacy assurances.

We present Persona-L, a novel approach for creating personas using Large Language Models (LLMs) and an ability-based framework, specifically designed to improve the representation of users with complex needs. Traditional methods of persona creation often fall short of accurately depicting the dynamic and diverse nature of complex needs, resulting in oversimplified or stereotypical profiles. Persona-L enables users to create and interact with personas through a chat interface. Persona-L was evaluated through interviews with UX designers (N=6), where we examined its effectiveness in reflecting the complexities of lived experiences of people with complex needs. We report our findings that indicate the potential of Persona-L to increase empathy and understanding of complex needs while also revealing the need for transparency of data used in persona creation, the role of the language and tone, and the need to provide a more balanced presentation of abilities with constraints.

We present PersonaConvBench, a large-scale benchmark for evaluating personalized reasoning and generation in multi-turn conversations with large language models (LLMs). Unlike existing work that focuses on either personalization or conversational structure in isolation, PersonaConvBench integrates both, offering three core tasks: sentence classification, impact regression, and user-centric text generation across ten diverse Reddit-based domains. This design enables systematic analysis of how personalized conversational context shapes LLM outputs in realistic multi-user scenarios. We benchmark several commercial and open-source LLMs under a unified prompting setup and observe that incorporating personalized history yields substantial performance improvements, including a 198 percent relative gain over the best non-conversational baseline in sentiment classification. By releasing PersonaConvBench with evaluations and code, we aim to support research on LLMs that adapt to individual styles, track long-term context, and produce contextually rich, engaging responses.

In various real-world applications such as machine translation, sentiment analysis, and question answering, a pivotal role is played by NLP models, facilitating efficient communication and decision-making processes in domains ranging from healthcare to finance. However, a significant challenge is posed to the robustness of these natural language processing models by text adversarial attacks. These attacks involve the deliberate manipulation of input text to mislead the predictions of the model while maintaining human interpretability. Despite the remarkable performance achieved by state-of-the-art models like BERT in various natural language processing tasks, they are found to remain vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in the input text. In addressing the vulnerability of text classifiers to adversarial attacks, three distinct attack mechanisms are explored in this paper using the victim model BERT: BERT-on-BERT attack, PWWS attack, and Fraud Bargain's Attack (FBA). Leveraging the IMDB, AG News, and SST2 datasets, a thorough comparative analysis is conducted to assess the effectiveness of these attacks on the BERT classifier model. It is revealed by the analysis that PWWS emerges as the most potent adversary, consistently outperforming other methods across multiple evaluation scenarios, thereby emphasizing its efficacy in generating adversarial examples for text classification. Through comprehensive experimentation, the performance of these attacks is assessed and the findings indicate that the PWWS attack outperforms others, demonstrating lower runtime, higher accuracy, and favorable semantic similarity scores. The key insight of this paper lies in the assessment of the relative performances of three prevalent state-of-the-art attack mechanisms.

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents. In this work, we bridge this gap by presenting the first comprehensive benchmark study on detecting prompt injection attacks targeting web agents. We begin by introducing a fine-grained categorization of such attacks based on the threat model. We then construct datasets containing both malicious and benign samples: malicious text segments generated by different attacks, benign text segments from four categories, malicious images produced by attacks, and benign images from two categories. Next, we systematize both text-based and image-based detection methods. Finally, we evaluate their performance across multiple scenarios. Our key findings show that while some detectors can identify attacks that rely on explicit textual instructions or visible image perturbations with moderate to high accuracy, they largely fail against attacks that omit explicit instructions or employ imperceptible perturbations. Our datasets and code are released at: https://github.com/Norrrrrrr-lyn/WAInjectBench.

Synthetic personas are widely used to condition large language models (LLMs) for social simulation, yet most personas are still constructed from coarse sociodemographic attributes or summaries. We revisit persona creation by introducing SCOPE, a socially grounded framework for persona construction and evaluation, built from a 141-item, two-hour sociopsychological protocol collected from 124 U.S.-based participants. Across seven models, we find that demographic-only personas are a structural bottleneck: demographics explain only ~1.5% of variance in human response similarity. Adding sociopsychological facets improves behavioral prediction and reduces over-accentuation, and non-demographic personas based on values and identity achieve strong alignment with substantially lower bias. These trends generalize to SimBench (441 aligned questions), where SCOPE personas outperform default prompting and NVIDIA Nemotron personas, and SCOPE augmentation improves Nemotron-based personas. Our results indicate that persona quality depends on sociopsychological structure rather than demographic templates or summaries.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

This is the fourth in a series of short reports that help business, education, and policy leaders understand the technical details of working with AI through rigorous testing. Here, we ask whether assigning personas to models improves performance on difficult objective multiple-choice questions. We study both domain-specific expert personas and low-knowledge personas, evaluating six models on GPQA Diamond (Rein et al. 2024) and MMLU-Pro (Wang et al. 2024), graduate-level questions spanning science, engineering, and law. We tested three approaches: -In-Domain Experts: Assigning the model an expert persona ("you are a physics expert") matched to the problem type (physics problems) had no significant impact on performance (with the exception of the Gemini 2.0 Flash model). -Off-Domain Experts (Domain-Mismatched): Assigning the model an expert persona ("you are a physics expert") not matched to the problem type (law problems) resulted in marginal differences. -Low-Knowledge Personas: We assigned the model negative capability personas (layperson, young child, toddler), which were generally harmful to benchmark accuracy. Across both benchmarks, persona prompts generally did not improve accuracy relative to a no-persona baseline. Expert personas showed no consistent benefit across models, with few exceptions. Domain-mismatched expert personas sometimes degraded performance. Low-knowledge personas often reduced accuracy. These results are about the accuracy of answers only; personas may serve other purposes (such as altering the tone of outputs), beyond improving factual performance.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly boosted the rise of Role-Playing Language Agents (RPLAs), i.e., specialized AI systems designed to simulate assigned personas. By harnessing multiple advanced abilities of LLMs, including in-context learning, instruction following, and social intelligence, RPLAs achieve a remarkable sense of human likeness and vivid role-playing performance. RPLAs can mimic a wide range of personas, ranging from historical figures and fictional characters to real-life individuals. Consequently, they have catalyzed numerous AI applications, such as emotional companions, interactive video games, personalized assistants and copilots, and digital clones. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of this field, illustrating the evolution and recent progress in RPLAs integrating with cutting-edge LLM technologies. We categorize personas into three types: 1) Demographic Persona, which leverages statistical stereotypes; 2) Character Persona, focused on well-established figures; and 3) Individualized Persona, customized through ongoing user interactions for personalized services. We begin by presenting a comprehensive overview of current methodologies for RPLAs, followed by the details for each persona type, covering corresponding data sourcing, agent construction, and evaluation. Afterward, we discuss the fundamental risks, existing limitations, and future prospects of RPLAs. Additionally, we provide a brief review of RPLAs in AI applications, which reflects practical user demands that shape and drive RPLA research. Through this work, we aim to establish a clear taxonomy of RPLA research and applications, and facilitate future research in this critical and ever-evolving field, and pave the way for a future where humans and RPLAs coexist in harmony.

We proposes a novel algorithm, ANTHRO, that inductively extracts over 600K human-written text perturbations in the wild and leverages them for realistic adversarial attack. Unlike existing character-based attacks which often deductively hypothesize a set of manipulation strategies, our work is grounded on actual observations from real-world texts. We find that adversarial texts generated by ANTHRO achieve the best trade-off between (1) attack success rate, (2) semantic preservation of the original text, and (3) stealthiness--i.e. indistinguishable from human writings hence harder to be flagged as suspicious. Specifically, our attacks accomplished around 83% and 91% attack success rates on BERT and RoBERTa, respectively. Moreover, it outperformed the TextBugger baseline with an increase of 50% and 40% in terms of semantic preservation and stealthiness when evaluated by both layperson and professional human workers. ANTHRO can further enhance a BERT classifier's performance in understanding different variations of human-written toxic texts via adversarial training when compared to the Perspective API.

The personalized dialogue explores the consistent relationship between dialogue generation and personality. Existing personalized dialogue agents model persona profiles from three resources: sparse or dense persona descriptions and dialogue histories. However, sparse structured persona attributes are explicit but uninformative, dense persona texts contain rich persona descriptions with much noise, and dialogue history query is both noisy and uninformative for persona modeling. In this work, we combine the advantages of the three resources to obtain a richer and more accurate persona. We design a Contrastive Latent Variable-based model (CLV) that clusters the dense persona descriptions into sparse categories, which are combined with the history query to generate personalized responses. Experimental results on Chinese and English datasets demonstrate our model's superiority in personalization.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

User simulators are crucial for replicating human interactions with dialogue systems, supporting both collaborative training and automatic evaluation, especially for large language models (LLMs). However, existing simulators often rely solely on text utterances, missing implicit user traits such as personality, speaking style, and goals. In contrast, persona-based methods lack generalizability, as they depend on predefined profiles of famous individuals or archetypes. To address these challenges, we propose User Simulator with implicit Profiles (USP), a framework that infers implicit user profiles from human-machine conversations and uses them to generate more personalized and realistic dialogues. We first develop an LLM-driven extractor with a comprehensive profile schema. Then, we refine the simulation through conditional supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning with cycle consistency, optimizing it at both the utterance and conversation levels. Finally, we adopt a diverse profile sampler to capture the distribution of real-world user profiles. Experimental results demonstrate that USP outperforms strong baselines in terms of authenticity and diversity while achieving comparable performance in consistency. Furthermore, dynamic multi-turn evaluations based on USP strongly align with mainstream benchmarks, demonstrating its effectiveness in real-world applications.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

The rapid advancement of language models (LMs) necessitates robust alignment with diverse user values. However, current preference optimization approaches often fail to capture the plurality of user opinions, instead reinforcing majority viewpoints and marginalizing minority perspectives. We introduce PERSONA, a reproducible test bed designed to evaluate and improve pluralistic alignment of LMs. We procedurally generate diverse user profiles from US census data, resulting in 1,586 synthetic personas with varied demographic and idiosyncratic attributes. We then generate a large-scale evaluation dataset containing 3,868 prompts and 317,200 feedback pairs obtained from our synthetic personas. Leveraging this dataset, we systematically evaluate LM capabilities in role-playing diverse users, verified through human judges, and the establishment of both a benchmark, PERSONA Bench, for pluralistic alignment approaches as well as an extensive dataset to create new and future benchmarks. The full dataset and benchmarks are available here: https://www.synthlabs.ai/research/persona.

One way to personalize and steer generations from large language models (LLM) is to assign a persona: a role that describes how the user expects the LLM to behave (e.g., a helpful assistant, a teacher, a woman). This paper investigates how personas affect diverse aspects of model behavior. We assign to seven LLMs 162 personas from 12 categories spanning variables like gender, sexual orientation, and occupation. We prompt them to answer questions from five datasets covering objective (e.g., questions about math and history) and subjective tasks (e.g., questions about beliefs and values). We also compare persona's generations to two baseline settings: a control persona setting with 30 paraphrases of "a helpful assistant" to control for models' prompt sensitivity, and an empty persona setting where no persona is assigned. We find that for all models and datasets, personas show greater variability than the control setting and that some measures of persona behavior generalize across models.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Multimodal large language models with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) have significantly advanced tasks such as multimodal question answering by grounding responses in external text and images. This grounding improves factuality, reduces hallucination, and extends reasoning beyond parametric knowledge. However, this reliance on external knowledge poses a critical yet underexplored safety risk: knowledge poisoning attacks, where adversaries deliberately inject adversarial multimodal content into external knowledge bases to steer model toward generating incorrect or even harmful responses. To expose such vulnerabilities, we propose MM-PoisonRAG, the first framework to systematically design knowledge poisoning in multimodal RAG. We introduce two complementary attack strategies: Localized Poisoning Attack (LPA), which implants targeted multimodal misinformation to manipulate specific queries, and Globalized Poisoning Attack (GPA), which inserts a single adversarial knowledge to broadly disrupt reasoning and induce nonsensical responses across all queries. Comprehensive experiments across tasks, models, and access settings show that LPA achieves targeted manipulation with attack success rates of up to 56%, while GPA completely disrupts model generation to 0% accuracy with just a single adversarial knowledge injection. Our results reveal the fragility of multimodal RAG and highlight the urgent need for defenses against knowledge poisoning.

We investigate factors contributing to LLM agents' success in competitive multi-agent environments, using auctions as a testbed where agents bid to maximize profit. The agents are equipped with bidding domain knowledge, distinct personas that reflect item preferences, and a memory of auction history. Our work extends the classic auction scenario by creating a realistic environment where multiple agents bid on houses, weighing aspects such as size, location, and budget to secure the most desirable homes at the lowest prices. Particularly, we investigate three key questions: (a) How does a persona influence an agent's behavior in a competitive setting? (b) Can an agent effectively profile its competitors' behavior during auctions? (c) How can persona profiling be leveraged to create an advantage using strategies such as theory of mind? Through a series of experiments, we analyze the behaviors of LLM agents and shed light on new findings. Our testbed, called HARBOR, offers a valuable platform for deepening our understanding of multi-agent workflows in competitive environments.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown incredible capabilities and transcended the natural language processing (NLP) community, with adoption throughout many services like healthcare, therapy, education, and customer service. Since users include people with critical information needs like students or patients engaging with chatbots, the safety of these systems is of prime importance. Therefore, a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of LLMs is necessary. To this end, we systematically evaluate toxicity in over half a million generations of ChatGPT, a popular dialogue-based LLM. We find that setting the system parameter of ChatGPT by assigning it a persona, say that of the boxer Muhammad Ali, significantly increases the toxicity of generations. Depending on the persona assigned to ChatGPT, its toxicity can increase up to 6x, with outputs engaging in incorrect stereotypes, harmful dialogue, and hurtful opinions. This may be potentially defamatory to the persona and harmful to an unsuspecting user. Furthermore, we find concerning patterns where specific entities (e.g., certain races) are targeted more than others (3x more) irrespective of the assigned persona, that reflect inherent discriminatory biases in the model. We hope that our findings inspire the broader AI community to rethink the efficacy of current safety guardrails and develop better techniques that lead to robust, safe, and trustworthy AI systems.

While the rapid proliferation of wearable cameras has raised significant concerns about egocentric video privacy, prior work has largely overlooked the unique privacy threats posed to the camera wearer. This work investigates the core question: How much privacy information about the camera wearer can be inferred from their first-person view videos? We introduce EgoPrivacy, the first large-scale benchmark for the comprehensive evaluation of privacy risks in egocentric vision. EgoPrivacy covers three types of privacy (demographic, individual, and situational), defining seven tasks that aim to recover private information ranging from fine-grained (e.g., wearer's identity) to coarse-grained (e.g., age group). To further emphasize the privacy threats inherent to egocentric vision, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Attack, a novel attack strategy that leverages ego-to-exo retrieval from an external pool of exocentric videos to boost the effectiveness of demographic privacy attacks. An extensive comparison of the different attacks possible under all threat models is presented, showing that private information of the wearer is highly susceptible to leakage. For instance, our findings indicate that foundation models can effectively compromise wearer privacy even in zero-shot settings by recovering attributes such as identity, scene, gender, and race with 70-80% accuracy. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/williamium3000/ego-privacy.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

The recent introduction of the Assistants API highlights its potential for large language models (LLMs) in role-playing agents (RPA). However, maintaining consistent character personas remains a significant challenge due to variability in information extraction, which frequently omits critical elements such as backstory or interpersonal relationships. To address this limitation, we introduce CharacterGPT, a framework designed to dynamically reconstruct character personas through Character Persona Training (CPT). This approach incrementally updates personas by extracting traits from chapter-wise novel summaries, reflecting the progression of the narrative. Our framework is evaluated through Big Five personality evaluations and creative tasks, in which characters generate original narratives, demonstrating the efficacy of CharacterGPT in preserving persona consistency. The code and results are available at https://github.com/Jeiyoon/charactergpt

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as personalized assistants for users across a wide range of tasks -- from offering writing support to delivering tailored recommendations or consultations. Over time, the interaction history between a user and an LLM can provide extensive information about an individual's traits and preferences. However, open questions remain on how well LLMs today can effectively leverage such history to (1) internalize the user's inherent traits and preferences, (2) track how the user profiling and preferences evolve over time, and (3) generate personalized responses accordingly in new scenarios. In this work, we introduce the PERSONAMEM benchmark. PERSONAMEM features curated user profiles with over 180 simulated user-LLM interaction histories, each containing up to 60 sessions of multi-turn conversations across 15 real-world tasks that require personalization. Given an in-situ user query, i.e. query issued by the user from the first-person perspective, we evaluate LLM chatbots' ability to identify the most suitable response according to the current state of the user's profile. We observe that current LLMs still struggle to recognize the dynamic evolution in users' profiles over time through direct prompting approaches. As a consequence, LLMs often fail to deliver responses that align with users' current situations and preferences, with frontier models such as GPT-4.1, o4-mini, GPT-4.5, o1, or Gemini-2.0 achieving only around 50% overall accuracy, suggesting room for improvement. We hope that PERSONAMEM, along with the user profile and conversation simulation pipeline, can facilitate future research in the development of truly user-aware chatbots. Code and data are available at github.com/bowen-upenn/PersonaMem.

Multimodal Language Models (MMLMs) typically undergo post-training alignment to prevent harmful content generation. However, these alignment stages focus primarily on the assistant role, leaving the user role unaligned, and stick to a fixed input prompt structure of special tokens, leaving the model vulnerable when inputs deviate from these expectations. We introduce Role-Modality Attacks (RMA), a novel class of adversarial attacks that exploit role confusion between the user and assistant and alter the position of the image token to elicit harmful outputs. Unlike existing attacks that modify query content, RMAs manipulate the input structure without altering the query itself. We systematically evaluate these attacks across multiple Vision Language Models (VLMs) on eight distinct settings, showing that they can be composed to create stronger adversarial prompts, as also evidenced by their increased projection in the negative refusal direction in the residual stream, a property observed in prior successful attacks. Finally, for mitigation, we propose an adversarial training approach that makes the model robust against input prompt perturbations. By training the model on a range of harmful and benign prompts all perturbed with different RMA settings, it loses its sensitivity to Role Confusion and Modality Manipulation attacks and is trained to only pay attention to the content of the query in the input prompt structure, effectively reducing Attack Success Rate (ASR) while preserving the model's general utility.

Despite the remarkable advances of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse cognitive tasks, the rapid enhancement of these capabilities also introduces emergent deceptive behaviors that may induce severe risks in high-stakes deployments. More critically, the characterization of deception across realistic real-world scenarios remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we establish DeceptionBench, the first benchmark that systematically evaluates how deceptive tendencies manifest across different societal domains, what their intrinsic behavioral patterns are, and how extrinsic factors affect them. Specifically, on the static count, the benchmark encompasses 150 meticulously designed scenarios in five domains, i.e., Economy, Healthcare, Education, Social Interaction, and Entertainment, with over 1,000 samples, providing sufficient empirical foundations for deception analysis. On the intrinsic dimension, we explore whether models exhibit self-interested egoistic tendencies or sycophantic behaviors that prioritize user appeasement. On the extrinsic dimension, we investigate how contextual factors modulate deceptive outputs under neutral conditions, reward-based incentivization, and coercive pressures. Moreover, we incorporate sustained multi-turn interaction loops to construct a more realistic simulation of real-world feedback dynamics. Extensive experiments across LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) reveal critical vulnerabilities, particularly amplified deception under reinforcement dynamics, demonstrating that current models lack robust resistance to manipulative contextual cues and the urgent need for advanced safeguards against various deception behaviors. Code and resources are publicly available at https://github.com/Aries-iai/DeceptionBench.

Recent studies demonstrate that prompting an appropriate role-playing persona to an LLM improves its reasoning capability. However, assigning a proper persona is difficult since an LLM's performance is extremely sensitive to assigned prompts; therefore, personas sometimes hinder LLMs and degrade their reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we propose a novel framework, Jekyll \& Hyde, which ensembles the results of role-playing and neutral prompts to eradicate performance degradation via unilateral use of role-playing prompted LLM and enhance the robustness of an LLM's reasoning ability. Specifically, Jekyll \& Hyde collects two potential solutions from both role-playing and neutral prompts and selects a better solution after cross-checking via an LLM evaluator. However, LLM-based evaluators tend to be affected by the order of those potential solutions within the prompt when selecting the proper solution; thus, we also propose a robust LLM evaluator to mitigate the position bias. The experimental analysis demonstrates that role-playing prompts distract LLMs and degrade their reasoning abilities in 4 out of 12 datasets, even when using GPT-4. In addition, we reveal that Jekyll \& Hyde improves reasoning capabilities by selecting better choices among the potential solutions on twelve widely-used reasoning datasets. We further show that our proposed LLM evaluator outperforms other baselines, proving the LLMs' position bias is successfully mitigated.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an emerging standard designed to enable seamless interaction between Large Language Model (LLM) applications and external tools or resources. Within a short period, thousands of MCP services have already been developed and deployed. However, the client-server integration architecture inherent in MCP may expand the attack surface against LLM Agent systems, introducing new vulnerabilities that allow attackers to exploit by designing malicious MCP servers. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of attack vectors targeting the MCP ecosystem. Our analysis identifies four categories of attacks, i.e., Tool Poisoning Attacks, Puppet Attacks, Rug Pull Attacks, and Exploitation via Malicious External Resources. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, we conduct experiments following the typical steps of launching an attack through malicious MCP servers: upload-download-attack. Specifically, we first construct malicious MCP servers and successfully upload them to three widely used MCP aggregation platforms. The results indicate that current audit mechanisms are insufficient to identify and prevent the proposed attack methods. Next, through a user study and interview with 20 participants, we demonstrate that users struggle to identify malicious MCP servers and often unknowingly install them from aggregator platforms. Finally, we demonstrate that these attacks can trigger harmful behaviors within the user's local environment-such as accessing private files or controlling devices to transfer digital assets-by deploying a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework against five leading LLMs. Additionally, based on interview results, we discuss four key challenges faced by the current security ecosystem surrounding MCP servers. These findings underscore the urgent need for robust security mechanisms to defend against malicious MCP servers.

The character of the "AI assistant" persona generated by modern chatbot large language models influences both surface-level behavior and apparent values, beliefs, and ethics. These all affect interaction quality, perceived intelligence, and alignment with both developer and user intentions. The shaping of this persona, known as character training, is a critical component of industry post-training, yet remains effectively unstudied in the academic literature. We introduce the first open implementation of character training, leveraging Constitutional AI and a new data pipeline using synthetic introspective data to shape the assistant persona in a more effective and controlled manner than alternatives such as constraining system prompts or activation steering. Specifically, we fine-tune three popular open-weights models using 11 example personas, such as humorous, deeply caring, or even malevolent. To track the effects of our approach, we introduce a method which analyzes revealed preferences, uncovering clear and holistic changes in character. We find these changes are more robust to adversarial prompting than the above two alternatives, while also leading to more coherent and realistic generations. Finally, we demonstrate this fine-tuning has little to no effect on general capabilities as measured by common benchmarks. We describe and open-source our full post-training method, the implementation of which can be found at https://github.com/maiush/OpenCharacterTraining.

2D face recognition has been proven insecure for physical adversarial attacks. However, few studies have investigated the possibility of attacking real-world 3D face recognition systems. 3D-printed attacks recently proposed cannot generate adversarial points in the air. In this paper, we attack 3D face recognition systems through elaborate optical noises. We took structured light 3D scanners as our attack target. End-to-end attack algorithms are designed to generate adversarial illumination for 3D faces through the inherent or an additional projector to produce adversarial points at arbitrary positions. Nevertheless, face reflectance is a complex procedure because the skin is translucent. To involve this projection-and-capture procedure in optimization loops, we model it by Lambertian rendering model and use SfSNet to estimate the albedo. Moreover, to improve the resistance to distance and angle changes while maintaining the perturbation unnoticeable, a 3D transform invariant loss and two kinds of sensitivity maps are introduced. Experiments are conducted in both simulated and physical worlds. We successfully attacked point-cloud-based and depth-image-based 3D face recognition algorithms while needing fewer perturbations than previous state-of-the-art physical-world 3D adversarial attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are improving at an exceptional rate. With the advent of agentic workflows, multi-turn dialogue has become the de facto mode of interaction with LLMs for completing long and complex tasks. While LLM capabilities continue to improve, they remain increasingly susceptible to jailbreaking, especially in multi-turn scenarios where harmful intent can be subtly injected across the conversation to produce nefarious outcomes. While single-turn attacks have been extensively explored, adaptability, efficiency and effectiveness continue to remain key challenges for their multi-turn counterparts. To address these gaps, we present PLAGUE, a novel plug-and-play framework for designing multi-turn attacks inspired by lifelong-learning agents. PLAGUE dissects the lifetime of a multi-turn attack into three carefully designed phases (Primer, Planner and Finisher) that enable a systematic and information-rich exploration of the multi-turn attack family. Evaluations show that red-teaming agents designed using PLAGUE achieve state-of-the-art jailbreaking results, improving attack success rates (ASR) by more than 30% across leading models in a lesser or comparable query budget. Particularly, PLAGUE enables an ASR (based on StrongReject) of 81.4% on OpenAI's o3 and 67.3% on Claude's Opus 4.1, two models that are considered highly resistant to jailbreaks in safety literature. Our work offers tools and insights to understand the importance of plan initialization, context optimization and lifelong learning in crafting multi-turn attacks for a comprehensive model vulnerability evaluation.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

Face presentation attacks (PA), also known as spoofing attacks, pose a substantial threat to biometric systems that rely on facial recognition systems, such as access control systems, mobile payments, and identity verification systems. To mitigate the spoofing risk, several video-based methods have been presented in the literature that analyze facial motion in successive video frames. However, estimating the motion between adjacent frames is a challenging task and requires high computational cost. In this paper, we rephrase the face anti-spoofing task as a motion prediction problem and introduce a deep ensemble learning model with a frame skipping mechanism. In particular, the proposed frame skipping adopts a uniform sampling approach by dividing the original video into video clips of fixed size. By doing so, every nth frame of the clip is selected to ensure that the temporal patterns can easily be perceived during the training of three different recurrent neural networks (RNNs). Motivated by the performance of individual RNNs, a meta-model is developed to improve the overall detection performance by combining the prediction of individual RNNs. Extensive experiments were performed on four datasets, and state-of-the-art performance is reported on MSU-MFSD (3.12%), Replay-Attack (11.19%), and OULU-NPU (12.23%) databases by using half total error rates (HTERs) in the most challenging cross-dataset testing scenario.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

The concept of persona, originally adopted in dialogue literature, has re-surged as a promising framework for tailoring large language models (LLMs) to specific context (e.g., personalized search, LLM-as-a-judge). However, the growing research on leveraging persona in LLMs is relatively disorganized and lacks a systematic taxonomy. To close the gap, we present a comprehensive survey to categorize the current state of the field. We identify two lines of research, namely (1) LLM Role-Playing, where personas are assigned to LLMs, and (2) LLM Personalization, where LLMs take care of user personas. Additionally, we introduce existing methods for LLM personality evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first survey for role-playing and personalization in LLMs under the unified view of persona. We continuously maintain a paper collection to foster future endeavors: https://github.com/MiuLab/PersonaLLM-Survey

Endowing chatbots with a consistent personality plays a vital role for agents to deliver human-like interactions. However, existing personalized approaches commonly generate responses in light of static predefined personas depicted with textual description, which may severely restrict the interactivity of human and the chatbot, especially when the agent needs to answer the query excluded in the predefined personas, which is so-called out-of-predefined persona problem (named OOP for simplicity). To alleviate the problem, in this paper we propose a novel retrieval-to-prediction paradigm consisting of two subcomponents, namely, (1) Persona Retrieval Model (PRM), it retrieves a persona from a global collection based on a Natural Language Inference (NLI) model, the inferred persona is consistent with the predefined personas; and (2) Posterior-scored Transformer (PS-Transformer), it adopts a persona posterior distribution that further considers the actual personas used in the ground response, maximally mitigating the gap between training and inferring. Furthermore, we present a dataset called IT-ConvAI2 that first highlights the OOP problem in personalized dialogue. Extensive experiments on both IT-ConvAI2 and ConvAI2 demonstrate that our proposed model yields considerable improvements in both automatic metrics and human evaluations.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

Current role-play studies often rely on unvalidated LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, which may fail to reflect how humans perceive role fidelity. A key prerequisite for human-aligned evaluation is role identification, the ability to recognize who is speaking based on dialogue context. We argue that any meaningful judgment of role-playing quality (how well a character is played) fundamentally depends on first correctly attributing words and actions to the correct persona (who is speaking). We present PersonaEval, the first benchmark designed to test whether LLM evaluators can reliably identify human roles. PersonaEval uses human-authored dialogues from novels, scripts, and video transcripts, challenging models to determine the correct persona according to the conversation context. Our experiments, including a human study, show that even the best-performing LLMs reach only around 69% accuracy, well below the level needed for reliable evaluation. In contrast, human participants perform near ceiling with 90.8% accuracy, highlighting that current LLM evaluators are still not human enough to effectively judge role-play scenarios. To better understand this gap, we examine training-time adaptation and test-time compute, suggesting that reliable evaluation requires more than task-specific tuning, but depends on strong, human-like reasoning abilities in LLM evaluators. We release our benchmark at https://github.com/maple-zhou/PersonaEval.

Adversarial attacks are carried out to reveal the vulnerability of deep neural networks. Textual adversarial attacking is challenging because text is discrete and a small perturbation can bring significant change to the original input. Word-level attacking, which can be regarded as a combinatorial optimization problem, is a well-studied class of textual attack methods. However, existing word-level attack models are far from perfect, largely because unsuitable search space reduction methods and inefficient optimization algorithms are employed. In this paper, we propose a novel attack model, which incorporates the sememe-based word substitution method and particle swarm optimization-based search algorithm to solve the two problems separately. We conduct exhaustive experiments to evaluate our attack model by attacking BiLSTM and BERT on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our model consistently achieves much higher attack success rates and crafts more high-quality adversarial examples as compared to baseline methods. Also, further experiments show our model has higher transferability and can bring more robustness enhancement to victim models by adversarial training. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained on https://github.com/thunlp/SememePSO-Attack.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

While social media empowers freedom of expression and individual voices, it also enables anti-social behavior, online harassment, cyberbullying, and hate speech. In this paper, we deepen our understanding of online hate speech by focusing on a largely neglected but crucial aspect of hate speech -- its target: either "directed" towards a specific person or entity, or "generalized" towards a group of people sharing a common protected characteristic. We perform the first linguistic and psycholinguistic analysis of these two forms of hate speech and reveal the presence of interesting markers that distinguish these types of hate speech. Our analysis reveals that Directed hate speech, in addition to being more personal and directed, is more informal, angrier, and often explicitly attacks the target (via name calling) with fewer analytic words and more words suggesting authority and influence. Generalized hate speech, on the other hand, is dominated by religious hate, is characterized by the use of lethal words such as murder, exterminate, and kill; and quantity words such as million and many. Altogether, our work provides a data-driven analysis of the nuances of online-hate speech that enables not only a deepened understanding of hate speech and its social implications but also its detection.

With recent developments in deep learning, the ubiquity of micro-phones and the rise in online services via personal devices, acoustic side channel attacks present a greater threat to keyboards than ever. This paper presents a practical implementation of a state-of-the-art deep learning model in order to classify laptop keystrokes, using a smartphone integrated microphone. When trained on keystrokes recorded by a nearby phone, the classifier achieved an accuracy of 95%, the highest accuracy seen without the use of a language model. When trained on keystrokes recorded using the video-conferencing software Zoom, an accuracy of 93% was achieved, a new best for the medium. Our results prove the practicality of these side channel attacks via off-the-shelf equipment and algorithms. We discuss a series of mitigation methods to protect users against these series of attacks.

Can large language models (LLMs) accurately simulate the next web action of a specific user? While LLMs have shown promising capabilities in generating ``believable'' human behaviors, evaluating their ability to mimic real user behaviors remains an open challenge, largely due to the lack of high-quality, publicly available datasets that capture both the observable actions and the internal reasoning of an actual human user. To address this gap, we introduce OPERA, a novel dataset of Observation, Persona, Rationale, and Action collected from real human participants during online shopping sessions. OPERA is the first public dataset that comprehensively captures: user personas, browser observations, fine-grained web actions, and self-reported just-in-time rationales. We developed both an online questionnaire and a custom browser plugin to gather this dataset with high fidelity. Using OPERA, we establish the first benchmark to evaluate how well current LLMs can predict a specific user's next action and rationale with a given persona and <observation, action, rationale> history. This dataset lays the groundwork for future research into LLM agents that aim to act as personalized digital twins for human.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak exploits that bypass safety filters and induce harmful or unethical behavior. This work presents a systematic taxonomy of existing jailbreak defenses across prompt-level, model-level, and training-time interventions, followed by three proposed defense strategies. First, a Prompt-Level Defense Framework detects and neutralizes adversarial inputs through sanitization, paraphrasing, and adaptive system guarding. Second, a Logit-Based Steering Defense reinforces refusal behavior through inference-time vector steering in safety-sensitive layers. Third, a Domain-Specific Agent Defense employs the MetaGPT framework to enforce structured, role-based collaboration and domain adherence. Experiments on benchmark datasets show substantial reductions in attack success rate, achieving full mitigation under the agent-based defense. Overall, this study highlights how jailbreaks pose a significant security threat to LLMs and identifies key intervention points for prevention, while noting that defense strategies often involve trade-offs between safety, performance, and scalability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Kuro0911/CS5446-Project

Understanding the vulnerabilities of Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) to jailbreak attacks is essential for their responsible real-world deployment. Most previous work requires access to model gradients, or is based on human knowledge (prompt engineering) to complete jailbreak, and they hardly consider the interaction of images and text, resulting in inability to jailbreak in black box scenarios or poor performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose a Prior-Guided Bimodal Interactive Black-Box Jailbreak Attack for toxicity maximization, referred to as PBI-Attack. Our method begins by extracting malicious features from a harmful corpus using an alternative LVLM and embedding these features into a benign image as prior information. Subsequently, we enhance these features through bidirectional cross-modal interaction optimization, which iteratively optimizes the bimodal perturbations in an alternating manner through greedy search, aiming to maximize the toxicity of the generated response. The toxicity level is quantified using a well-trained evaluation model. Experiments demonstrate that PBI-Attack outperforms previous state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, achieving an average attack success rate of 92.5% across three open-source LVLMs and around 67.3% on three closed-source LVLMs. Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially disturbing and offensive content.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

Understanding how language models generalize behaviors from their training to a broader deployment distribution is an important problem in AI safety. Betley et al. discovered that fine-tuning GPT-4o on intentionally insecure code causes "emergent misalignment," where models give stereotypically malicious responses to unrelated prompts. We extend this work, demonstrating emergent misalignment across diverse conditions, including reinforcement learning on reasoning models, fine-tuning on various synthetic datasets, and in models without safety training. To investigate the mechanisms behind this generalized misalignment, we apply a "model diffing" approach using sparse autoencoders to compare internal model representations before and after fine-tuning. This approach reveals several "misaligned persona" features in activation space, including a toxic persona feature which most strongly controls emergent misalignment and can be used to predict whether a model will exhibit such behavior. Additionally, we investigate mitigation strategies, discovering that fine-tuning an emergently misaligned model on just a few hundred benign samples efficiently restores alignment.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Student Personas (SPs) are emerging as infrastructure for educational LLMs, yet prior work often relies on ad-hoc prompting or hand-crafted profiles with limited control over educational theory and population distributions. We formalize this as Theory-Aligned and Distribution-Controllable Persona Generation (TAD-PG) and introduce HACHIMI, a multi-agent Propose-Validate-Revise framework that generates theory-aligned, quota-controlled personas. HACHIMI factorizes each persona into a theory-anchored educational schema, enforces developmental and psychological constraints via a neuro-symbolic validator, and combines stratified sampling with semantic deduplication to reduce mode collapse. The resulting HACHIMI-1M corpus comprises 1 million personas for Grades 1-12. Intrinsic evaluation shows near-perfect schema validity, accurate quotas, and substantial diversity, while external evaluation instantiates personas as student agents answering CEPS and PISA 2022 surveys; across 16 cohorts, math and curiosity/growth constructs align strongly between humans and agents, whereas classroom-climate and well-being constructs are only moderately aligned, revealing a fidelity gradient. All personas are generated with Qwen2.5-72B, and HACHIMI provides a standardized synthetic student population for group-level benchmarking and social-science simulations. Resources available at https://github.com/ZeroLoss-Lab/HACHIMI

Recently, web-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents autonomously perform increasingly complex tasks, thereby bringing significant convenience. However, they also amplify the risks of malicious misuse cases such as unauthorized collection of personally identifiable information (PII), generation of socially divisive content, and even automated web hacking. To address these threats, we propose an AI Kill Switch technique that can immediately halt the operation of malicious web-based LLM agents. To achieve this, we introduce AutoGuard - the key idea is generating defensive prompts that trigger the safety mechanisms of malicious LLM agents. In particular, generated defense prompts are transparently embedded into the website's DOM so that they remain invisible to human users but can be detected by the crawling process of malicious agents, triggering its internal safety mechanisms to abort malicious actions once read. To evaluate our approach, we constructed a dedicated benchmark consisting of three representative malicious scenarios (PII collection, social rift content generation, and web hacking attempts). Experimental results show that the AutoGuard method achieves over 80% Defense Success Rate (DSR) on malicious agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3, and Llama3.3-70B-Instruct. It also maintains strong performance, achieving around 90% DSR on GPT-5, GPT-4.1, and Gemini-2.5-Flash when used as the malicious agent, demonstrating robust generalization across models and scenarios. Through this research, we have demonstrated the controllability of web-based LLM agents across various scenarios and models, thereby contributing to the broader effort of AI control and safety.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in Metaverse environments to generate dynamic and realistic content and to control the behavior of non-player characters (NPCs). However, the cybersecurity concerns associated with LLMs have become increasingly prominent. Previous research has primarily focused on patching system vulnerabilities to enhance cybersecurity, but these approaches are not well-suited to the Metaverse, where the virtual space is more complex, LLMs are vulnerable, and ethical user interaction is critical. Moreover, the scope of cybersecurity in the Metaverse is expected to expand significantly. This paper proposes a method for enhancing cybersecurity through the simulation of user interaction with LLMs. Our goal is to educate users and strengthen their defense capabilities through exposure to a comprehensive simulation system. This system includes extensive Metaverse cybersecurity Q&A and attack simulation scenarios. By engaging with these, users will improve their ability to recognize and withstand risks. Additionally, to address the ethical implications of user input, we propose using LLMs as evaluators to assess user content across five dimensions. We further adapt the models through vocabulary expansion training to better understand personalized inputs and emoticons. We conduct experiments on multiple LLMs and find that our approach is effective.

Morphing attacks is a threat to biometric systems where the biometric reference in an identity document can be altered. This form of attack presents an important issue in applications relying on identity documents such as border security or access control. Research in face morphing attack detection is developing rapidly, however very few datasets with several forms of attacks are publicly available. This paper bridges this gap by providing a new dataset with four different types of morphing attacks, based on OpenCV, FaceMorpher, WebMorph and a generative adversarial network (StyleGAN), generated with original face images from three public face datasets. We also conduct extensive experiments to assess the vulnerability of the state-of-the-art face recognition systems, notably FaceNet, VGG-Face, and ArcFace. The experiments demonstrate that VGG-Face, while being less accurate face recognition system compared to FaceNet, is also less vulnerable to morphing attacks. Also, we observed that na\"ive morphs generated with a StyleGAN do not pose a significant threat.

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have garnered widespread attention for their exceptional capabilities. Prompts are central to the functionality and performance of LLMs, making them highly valuable assets. The increasing reliance on high-quality prompts has driven significant growth in prompt services. However, this growth also expands the potential for prompt leakage, increasing the risk that attackers could replicate original functionalities, create competing products, and severely infringe on developers' intellectual property. Despite these risks, prompt leakage in real-world prompt services remains underexplored. In this paper, we present PRSA, a practical attack framework designed for prompt stealing. PRSA infers the detailed intent of prompts through very limited input-output analysis and can successfully generate stolen prompts that replicate the original functionality. Extensive evaluations demonstrate PRSA's effectiveness across two main types of real-world prompt services. Specifically, compared to previous works, it improves the attack success rate from 17.8% to 46.1% in prompt marketplaces and from 39% to 52% in LLM application stores, respectively. Notably, in the attack on "Math", one of the most popular educational applications in OpenAI's GPT Store with over 1 million conversations, PRSA uncovered a hidden Easter egg that had not been revealed previously. Besides, our analysis reveals that higher mutual information between a prompt and its output correlates with an increased risk of leakage. This insight guides the design and evaluation of two potential defenses against the security threats posed by PRSA. We have reported these findings to the prompt service vendors, including PromptBase and OpenAI, and actively collaborate with them to implement defensive measures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are now increasingly widely used to simulate personas in virtual environments, leveraging their instruction-following capability. However, we discovered that even state-of-the-art LLMs cannot simulate personas with reversed performance (e.g., student personas with low proficiency in educational settings), which impairs the simulation diversity and limits the practical applications of the simulated environments. In this work, using mathematical reasoning as a representative scenario, we propose the first benchmark dataset for evaluating LLMs on simulating personas with reversed performance, a capability that we dub "counterfactual instruction following". We evaluate both open-weight and closed-source LLMs on this task and find that LLMs, including the OpenAI o1 reasoning model, all struggle to follow counterfactual instructions for simulating reversedly performing personas. Intersectionally simulating both the performance level and the race population of a persona worsens the effect even further. These results highlight the challenges of counterfactual instruction following and the need for further research.

As language models achieve increasingly human-like capabilities in conversational text generation, a critical question emerges: to what extent can these systems simulate the characteristics of specific individuals? To evaluate this, we introduce IMPersona, a framework for evaluating LMs at impersonating specific individuals' writing style and personal knowledge. Using supervised fine-tuning and a hierarchical memory-inspired retrieval system, we demonstrate that even modestly sized open-source models, such as Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, can achieve impersonation abilities at concerning levels. In blind conversation experiments, participants (mis)identified our fine-tuned models with memory integration as human in 44.44% of interactions, compared to just 25.00% for the best prompting-based approach. We analyze these results to propose detection methods and defense strategies against such impersonation attempts. Our findings raise important questions about both the potential applications and risks of personalized language models, particularly regarding privacy, security, and the ethical deployment of such technologies in real-world contexts.

To build a conversational agent that interacts fluently with humans, previous studies blend knowledge or personal profile into the pre-trained language model. However, the model that considers knowledge and persona at the same time is still limited, leading to hallucination and a passive way of using personas. We propose an effective dialogue agent that grounds external knowledge and persona simultaneously. The agent selects the proper knowledge and persona to use for generating the answers with our candidate scoring implemented with a poly-encoder. Then, our model generates the utterance with lesser hallucination and more engagingness utilizing retrieval augmented generation with knowledge-persona enhanced query. We conduct experiments on the persona-knowledge chat and achieve state-of-the-art performance in grounding and generation tasks on the automatic metrics. Moreover, we validate the answers from the models regarding hallucination and engagingness through human evaluation and qualitative results. We show our retriever's effectiveness in extracting relevant documents compared to the other previous retrievers, along with the comparison of multiple candidate scoring methods. Code is available at https://github.com/dlawjddn803/INFO

Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.