Daily Papers

Recent autonomous penetration testing papers report high benchmark scores while adding multi-component security harnesses around frontier LLMs. Because these systems often change both architecture and backbone model, it is difficult to tell how much performance comes from the harness rather than from the underlying model. This paper presents a controlled study on the 104-task XBOW benchmark using default coding CLI agents as plain-agent baselines. We first run Codex, OpenCode, and Pi with the same GPT-5 model, budget, target interface, and scoring rule. This phase identifies the strongest same-model baseline and tests whether security-specific prompt variants improve its observed score. We then compare the default Codex scaffold with published MAPTA and PentestGPT V2 results under the closest available model matches. Finally, we repeat the plain-agent experiment with GPT-5.2 and GPT-5.5 to measure model scaling inside the same scaffold. The results show a mixed but practical picture. Specialised harnesses can add measurable benchmark lift and may improve cost efficiency, but plain coding agents already solve a large share of the benchmark; repeated plain-agent runs can match or exceed some published architecture scores in union coverage, and newer models substantially improve the same scaffold. Future evaluations should report model-matched plain-agent baselines before attributing benchmark gains to architecture design alone.

Autonomy via agents using large language models (LLMs) for personalized, standardized tasks boosts human efficiency. Automating web tasks (like booking hotels within a budget) is increasingly sought after. Fulfilling practical needs, the web agent also serves as an important proof-of-concept example for various agent grounding scenarios, with its success promising advancements in many future applications. Prior research often handcrafts web agent strategies (e.g., prompting templates, multi-agent systems, search methods, etc.) and the corresponding in-context examples, which may not generalize well across all real-world scenarios. On the other hand, there has been limited study on the misalignment between a web agent's observation/action representation and the pre-training data of the LLM it's based on. This discrepancy is especially notable when LLMs are primarily trained for language completion rather than tasks involving embodied navigation actions and symbolic web elements. Our study enhances an LLM-based web agent by simply refining its observation and action space to better align with the LLM's capabilities. This approach enables our base agent to significantly outperform previous methods on a wide variety of web tasks. Specifically, on WebArena, a benchmark featuring general-purpose web interaction tasks, our agent AgentOccam surpasses the previous state-of-the-art and concurrent work by 9.8 (+29.4%) and 5.9 (+15.8%) absolute points respectively, and boosts the success rate by 26.6 points (+161%) over similar plain web agents with its observation and action space alignment. We achieve this without using in-context examples, new agent roles, online feedback or search strategies. AgentOccam's simple design highlights LLMs' impressive zero-shot performance on web tasks, and underlines the critical role of carefully tuning observation and action spaces for LLM-based agents.

Recent advances in world models have shown promise for modeling future dynamics of environmental states, enabling agents to reason and act without accessing real environments. Current methods mainly perform single-step or fixed-horizon rollouts, leaving their potential for complex task planning under-exploited. We propose Imagine-then-Plan (ITP), a unified framework for agent learning via lookahead imagination, where an agent's policy model interacts with the learned world model, yielding multi-step ``imagined'' trajectories. Since the imagination horizon may vary by tasks and stages, we introduce a novel adaptive lookahead mechanism by trading off the ultimate goal and task progress. The resulting imagined trajectories provide rich signals about future consequences, such as achieved progress and potential conflicts, which are fused with current observations, formulating a partially observable and imaginable Markov decision process to guide policy learning. We instantiate ITP with both training-free and reinforcement-trained variants. Extensive experiments across representative agent benchmarks demonstrate that ITP significantly outperforms competitive baselines. Further analyses validate that our adaptive lookahead largely enhances agents' reasoning capability, providing valuable insights into addressing broader, complex tasks.

We present Verified Multi-Agent Orchestration (VMAO), a framework that coordinates specialized LLM-based agents through a verification-driven iterative loop. Given a complex query, our system decomposes it into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of sub-questions, executes them through domain-specific agents in parallel, verifies result completeness via LLM-based evaluation, and adaptively replans to address gaps. The key contributions are: (1) dependency-aware parallel execution over a DAG of sub-questions with automatic context propagation, (2) verification-driven adaptive replanning that uses an LLM-based verifier as an orchestration-level coordination signal, and (3) configurable stop conditions that balance answer quality against resource usage. On 25 expert-curated market research queries, VMAO improves answer completeness from 3.1 to 4.2 and source quality from 2.6 to 4.1 (1-5 scale) compared to a single-agent baseline, demonstrating that orchestration-level verification is an effective mechanism for multi-agent quality assurance.

Large language model (LLM) based agents are increasingly used to tackle software engineering tasks that require multi-step reasoning and code modification, demonstrating promising yet limited performance. However, most existing LLM agents typically operate within static execution frameworks, lacking a principled mechanism to learn and self-improve from their own experience and past rollouts. As a result, their performance remains bounded by the initial framework design and the underlying LLM's capabilities. We propose Self-Abstraction from Grounded Experience (SAGE), a framework that enables agents to learn from their own task executions and refine their behavior through self-abstraction. After an initial rollout, the agent induces a concise plan abstraction from its grounded experience, distilling key steps, dependencies, and constraints. This learned abstraction is then fed back as contextual guidance, refining the agent's policy and supporting more structured, informed subsequent executions. Empirically, SAGE delivers consistent performance gains across diverse LLM backbones and agent architectures. Notably, it yields a 7.2% relative performance improvement over the strong Mini-SWE-Agent baseline when paired with the GPT-5 (high) backbone. SAGE further achieves strong overall performance on SWE-Bench Verified benchmark, reaching 73.2% and 74% Pass@1 resolve rates with the Mini-SWE-Agent and OpenHands CodeAct agent framework, respectively.

We systematically investigate all 25 public ARC-AGI-3 games and find that every one is reachable through non-intelligent strategies: 10 in a single blind step, 5 after one probing action, 1 via repeated ACTION1 presses, 1 via diverse exploration, and 8 via single repeated actions with sufficient budget (50-200 steps). A library-level null-coordinate vulnerability additionally bypasses 18 games in 1 step. This benchmark critique implies the public evaluation set cannot discriminate intelligent exploration from trivial heuristics - the private 55-game evaluation is the only genuine intelligence test. Against this backdrop, we present AERA (Adaptive Epistemic Reasoning Agent), a three-phase (EXPLORE / VERIFY / PLAN) agent achieving RHAE=0.2116 (4/25 solved) on these 25 games with Qwen2.5-0.5B, while random and no-explore baselines score 0.0000. We formalise AERA through a Speed--Depth trade-off framework: under a convexity assumption (proved for a class of environments in the Appendix), RHAE's quadratic form emerges as a second-order penalty for deviating from the Pareto frontier between action efficiency and information gain. Contributions: (i) a benchmark validity analysis showing that current interactive reasoning benchmarks fail to measure the exploration they claim to require, and (ii) the EXPLORE-before-PLAN framework and model-capability x exploration interaction. The linked code track entry achieves RHAE=0.30 on the full 55-game private evaluation. Code: CC0.

Many real-world user queries (e.g. "How do to make egg fried rice?") could benefit from systems capable of generating responses with both textual steps with accompanying images, similar to a cookbook. Models designed to generate interleaved text and images face challenges in ensuring consistency within and across these modalities. To address these challenges, we present ISG, a comprehensive evaluation framework for interleaved text-and-image generation. ISG leverages a scene graph structure to capture relationships between text and image blocks, evaluating responses on four levels of granularity: holistic, structural, block-level, and image-specific. This multi-tiered evaluation allows for a nuanced assessment of consistency, coherence, and accuracy, and provides interpretable question-answer feedback. In conjunction with ISG, we introduce a benchmark, ISG-Bench, encompassing 1,150 samples across 8 categories and 21 subcategories. This benchmark dataset includes complex language-vision dependencies and golden answers to evaluate models effectively on vision-centric tasks such as style transfer, a challenging area for current models. Using ISG-Bench, we demonstrate that recent unified vision-language models perform poorly on generating interleaved content. While compositional approaches that combine separate language and image models show a 111% improvement over unified models at the holistic level, their performance remains suboptimal at both block and image levels. To facilitate future work, we develop ISG-Agent, a baseline agent employing a "plan-execute-refine" pipeline to invoke tools, achieving a 122% performance improvement.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in complex, multi-step workflows involving planning, tool use, reflection, and interaction with external knowledge systems. These workflows generate rapidly expanding contexts that must be curated, transformed, and compressed to maintain fidelity, avoid attention dilution, and reduce inference cost. Prior work on summarization and query-aware compression largely ignores the multi-step, plan-aware nature of agentic reasoning. In this work, we introduce PAACE (Plan-Aware Automated Context Engineering), a unified framework for optimizing the evolving state of LLM agents through next-k-task relevance modeling, plan-structure analysis, instruction co-refinement, and function-preserving compression. PAACE comprises (1) PAACE-Syn, a large-scale generator of synthetic agent workflows annotated with stepwise compression supervision, and (2) PAACE-FT, a family of distilled, plan-aware compressors trained from successful teacher demonstrations. Experiments on long-horizon benchmarks (AppWorld, OfficeBench, and 8-Objective QA) demonstrate that PAACE consistently improves agent correctness while substantially reducing context load. On AppWorld, PAACE achieves higher accuracy than all baselines while lowering peak context and cumulative dependency. On OfficeBench and multi-hop QA, PAACE improves both accuracy and F1, achieving fewer steps, lower peak tokens, and reduced attention dependency. Distilled PAACE-FT retains 97 percent of the teacher's performance while reducing inference cost by over an order of magnitude, enabling practical deployment of plan-aware compression with compact models.

This paper considers a scenario in city navigation: an AI agent is provided with language descriptions of the goal location with respect to some well-known landmarks; By only observing the scene around, including recognizing landmarks and road network connections, the agent has to make decisions to navigate to the goal location without instructions. This problem is very challenging, because it requires agent to establish self-position and acquire spatial representation of complex urban environment, where landmarks are often invisible. In the absence of navigation instructions, such abilities are vital for the agent to make high-quality decisions in long-range city navigation. With the emergent reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs), a tempting baseline is to prompt LLMs to "react" on each observation and make decisions accordingly. However, this baseline has very poor performance that the agent often repeatedly visits same locations and make short-sighted, inconsistent decisions. To address these issues, this paper introduces a novel agentic workflow featured by its abilities to perceive, reflect and plan. Specifically, we find LLaVA-7B can be fine-tuned to perceive the direction and distance of landmarks with sufficient accuracy for city navigation. Moreover, reflection is achieved through a memory mechanism, where past experiences are stored and can be retrieved with current perception for effective decision argumentation. Planning uses reflection results to produce long-term plans, which can avoid short-sighted decisions in long-range navigation. We show the designed workflow significantly improves navigation ability of the LLM agent compared with the state-of-the-art baselines.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) struggle with brainless trial-and-error and generating hallucinatory actions due to a lack of global planning in long-horizon tasks. In this paper, we introduce a plan-and-execute framework and propose EAGLET, an efficient and effective planner training method to enhance the executor agent's planning abilities without human effort. Specifically, we train a plug-and-play global planner through a two-step process: we first synthesize high-quality plans from an advanced LLM using our proposed homologous consensus filtering strategy, and apply fine-tuning as a cold start. Moreover, we further improve the planner with a rule-based reinforcement learning stage using a novel executor capability gain reward, ensuring it can handle task instructions of varying difficulty. Experiments on three long-horizon agent tasks show that executor agents equipped with our planner outperform existing methods, achieving new state-of-the-art performance. Meanwhile, EAGLET reduces training costs by 8x compared to RL-based baselines, and it does not require manual effort or extra training data, offering an efficient and effective solution.

Compositional diffusion models offer a promising route to long-horizon planning by denoising multiple overlapping sub-trajectories while ensuring that together they constitute a global solution. However, enforcing local behavior over long chains is often insufficient for a coherent global structure to emerge. Recent works tackle this limitation through intrinsic search, which explores multiple paths during the denoising process. While intrinsic search improves global coherence, it comes at the cost of repeated evaluations of an already compute-heavy model. In this work, we argue that extrinsic search, performed outside the denoising process, offers a more effective mode of exploration for long-horizon planning while naturally enabling the use of classical algorithms to solve unseen combinatorial tasks at test time. Our eXtrinsic search-guided Diffuser (XDiffuser) first computes a plan over a state-space graph -- serving as a lightweight local connectivity oracle for the diffusion model. The plan is then used to guide denoising for a single trajectory, effectively offloading the burden of exploration. XDiffuser outperforms diffusion-based baselines on long-horizon tasks, with particularly large gains in the low-quality data regime and on unseen tasks beyond goal-reaching, including multi-agent coordination and TSP-style reasoning. Project website: https://yanivhass.github.io/XDiffuser-site/

Recent agent frameworks and inference-time algorithms often struggle with complex planning problems due to limitations in verifying generated plans or reasoning and varying complexity of instances within a single task. Many existing methods for these tasks either perform task-level verification without considering constraints or apply inference-time algorithms without adapting to instance-level complexity. To address these limitations, we propose PlanGEN, a model-agnostic and easily scalable agent framework with three key components: constraint, verification, and selection agents. Specifically, our approach proposes constraint-guided iterative verification to enhance performance of inference-time algorithms--Best of N, Tree-of-Thought, and REBASE. In PlanGEN framework, the selection agent optimizes algorithm choice based on instance complexity, ensuring better adaptability to complex planning problems. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements over the strongest baseline across multiple benchmarks, achieving state-of-the-art results on NATURAL PLAN (sim8%uparrow), OlympiadBench (sim4%uparrow), DocFinQA (sim7%uparrow), and GPQA (sim1%uparrow). Our key finding highlights that constraint-guided iterative verification improves inference-time algorithms, and adaptive selection further boosts performance on complex planning and reasoning problems.

Software engineering tools increasingly rely on LLM based agents to localize files to change to resolve a software issue. Most AI agents explore repositories linearly, that is, visiting one directory or file per step. We postulate that this is a structural mismatch for changes that span several subsystems. We compare linear sequential exploration against non-linear, domain-scoped parallel agentic exploration. Using SWE Bench Pro as initial benchmark, we focus on ansible as an exemplar. We construct an approach for persistent-session evaluation of GitHub issues anchored at a single base commit. We compare our non-linear domain-agent file traversal system against a base LLM without direct repository access, a single agent Recursive Language Model (RLM) baseline with a persistent Python REPL and an external CLI baseline using Codex 5.5 High. Domain scoped parallel agent spawning with a small Haiku-class model achieves the highest micro F1 among Haiku class models by a large margin. Domain-agents is the second highest behind only the much larger Codex 5.5 High on our own expanded benchmark including over more recent PRs from 2025 and 2026. On the original, curated, 2020 SWE-bench Pro benchmark, a larger Sonnet plain LLM baseline attains higher micro F1 by predicting few files, leading to higher precision, but at significantly lower all gold recall. We also present three additional findings. First, documentation evolution is a latent dependency unresolved by any approach. Second, naive file system access can degrade localization driven by test-file over prediction. Lastly, forced multi-agent consultation does not measurably help and raises token cost substantially.

The application of large language models (LLMs) in clinical decision support faces significant challenges of "tunnel vision" and diagnostic hallucinations present in their processing unstructured electronic health records (EHRs). To address these challenges, we propose a novel chain-based clinical reasoning framework, called DxChain, which transforms the diagnostic workflow into an iterative process by mirroring a clinician's cognitive trajectory that consists of "Memory Anchoring", "Navigation" and "Verification" phases. DxChain introduces three key methodological innovations to elicit the potential of LLM: (i) a Profile-Then-Plan paradigm to mitigate cold-start hallucinations by establishing a panoramic patient baseline, (ii) a Medical Tree-of-Thoughts (Med-ToT) algorithm for strategic look ahead planning and resource aware navigation, and (iii) a Dialectical Diagnostic Verification procedure utilizing "Angel-Devil" adversarial debates to resolve complex evidence conflicts. Evaluated on two real world benchmarks, MIMIC-IV-Ext Cardiac Disease and MIMIC-IV-Ext CDM, DxChain achieves state-of-the-art performances in both diagnostic accuracy and logical consistency, offering a modular and reliable architecture for next-generation clinical AI. The code is at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Dx-Chain.

Developing autonomous agents for web-based tasks is a core challenge in AI. While Large Language Model (LLM) agents can interpret complex user requests, they often operate as black boxes, making it difficult to diagnose why they fail or how they plan. This paper addresses this gap by formally treating web tasks as sequential decision-making processes. We introduce a taxonomy that maps modern agent architectures to traditional planning paradigms: Step-by-Step agents to Breadth-First Search (BFS), Tree Search agents to Best-First Tree Search, and Full-Plan-in-Advance agents to Depth-First Search (DFS). This framework allows for a principled diagnosis of system failures like context drift and incoherent task decomposition. To evaluate these behaviors, we propose five novel evaluation metrics that assess trajectory quality beyond simple success rates. We support this analysis with a new dataset of 794 human-labeled trajectories from the WebArena benchmark. Finally, we validate our evaluation framework by comparing a baseline Step-by-Step agent against a novel Full-Plan-in-Advance implementation. Our results reveal that while the Step-by-Step agent aligns more closely with human gold trajectories (38% overall success), the Full-Plan-in-Advance agent excels in technical measures such as element accuracy (89%), demonstrating the necessity of our proposed metrics for selecting appropriate agent architectures based on specific application constraints.

Autonomous vehicles operating in complex real-world environments require accurate predictions of interactive behaviors between traffic participants. This paper tackles the interaction prediction problem by formulating it with hierarchical game theory and proposing the GameFormer model for its implementation. The model incorporates a Transformer encoder, which effectively models the relationships between scene elements, alongside a novel hierarchical Transformer decoder structure. At each decoding level, the decoder utilizes the prediction outcomes from the previous level, in addition to the shared environmental context, to iteratively refine the interaction process. Moreover, we propose a learning process that regulates an agent's behavior at the current level to respond to other agents' behaviors from the preceding level. Through comprehensive experiments on large-scale real-world driving datasets, we demonstrate the state-of-the-art accuracy of our model on the Waymo interaction prediction task. Additionally, we validate the model's capacity to jointly reason about the motion plan of the ego agent and the behaviors of multiple agents in both open-loop and closed-loop planning tests, outperforming various baseline methods. Furthermore, we evaluate the efficacy of our model on the nuPlan planning benchmark, where it achieves leading performance.

In this position paper, we argue that human baselines in foundation model evaluations must be more rigorous and more transparent to enable meaningful comparisons of human vs. AI performance, and we provide recommendations and a reporting checklist towards this end. Human performance baselines are vital for the machine learning community, downstream users, and policymakers to interpret AI evaluations. Models are often claimed to achieve "super-human" performance, but existing baselining methods are neither sufficiently rigorous nor sufficiently well-documented to robustly measure and assess performance differences. Based on a meta-review of the measurement theory and AI evaluation literatures, we derive a framework with recommendations for designing, executing, and reporting human baselines. We synthesize our recommendations into a checklist that we use to systematically review 115 human baselines (studies) in foundation model evaluations and thus identify shortcomings in existing baselining methods; our checklist can also assist researchers in conducting human baselines and reporting results. We hope our work can advance more rigorous AI evaluation practices that can better serve both the research community and policymakers. Data is available at: https://github.com/kevinlwei/human-baselines

Large language model (LLM)-based agentic search systems are often evaluated as if the underlying LLM were the only component that matters, yet their measured performance also depends on the surrounding search environment: the Wikipedia snapshot, preprocessing pipeline, chunking policy, retrieval backend, tool schema, observation format, and answer submission rule. These details are frequently under-specified, making it difficult to compare results or reproduce reported baselines. We present SimpleWikiSearch, whose corpus construction, retrieval stack, tool contract, and evaluation protocol are explicit and runnable. The environment starts from a full English Wikipedia dump, cleans and chunks the corpus, builds keyword and dense retrieval indexes, and exposes a minimal tool interface consisting of search, open\_url, and submit\_answer. We report baseline results on six QA datasets using open-source LLMs and provide a random-300 subset for comparisons with closed-source commercial models. SimpleWikiSearch provides a domain-specific agent harness and a controlled offline environment for reproducible agentic-search evaluation. Its contribution is this specified reference setup, rather than a new agent algorithm. Code and data will be available at: https://github.com/JimXiongGM/simple_wiki_search.

MicroRacer is a simple, open source environment inspired by car racing especially meant for the didactics of Deep Reinforcement Learning. The complexity of the environment has been explicitly calibrated to allow users to experiment with many different methods, networks and hyperparameters settings without requiring sophisticated software or the need of exceedingly long training times. Baseline agents for major learning algorithms such as DDPG, PPO, SAC, TD2 and DSAC are provided too, along with a preliminary comparison in terms of training time and performance.

Legal compliance in AI-driven data transfer planning is becoming increasingly critical under stringent privacy regulations such as the Japanese Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI). We propose a multi-agent legal verifier that decomposes compliance checking into specialized agents for statutory interpretation, business context evaluation, and risk assessment, coordinated through a structured synthesis protocol. Evaluated on a stratified dataset of 200 Amended APPI Article 16 cases with clearly defined ground truth labels and multiple performance metrics, the system achieves 72% accuracy, which is 21 percentage points higher than a single-agent baseline, including 90% accuracy on clear compliance cases (vs. 16% for the baseline) while maintaining perfect detection of clear violations. While challenges remain in ambiguous scenarios, these results show that domain specialization and coordinated reasoning can meaningfully improve legal AI performance, providing a scalable and regulation-aware framework for trustworthy and interpretable automated compliance verification.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities. However, existing cybersecurity benchmarks focus on pre-compromise settings where agents are placed in a clean and idealized environment before an attack occurs. This leaves the post-compromise setting underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce SecRespond, the first benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on the post-compromise incident-response workflow. Given a forensic disk snapshot of a compromised host together with the alerts, vulnerability scans, and baseline checks reported by a host security product, agents are required to produce forensic reports on intrusions, baseline risks, and vulnerability risks, together with a remediation plan. We instantiate this task across 10 cyber ranges, each constructed from a distinct compromised cloud host, spanning 4 entry-point types, 21 ATT&CK techniques, and 5 operating systems. We evaluate 23 frontier LLMs on the OpenCode agent harness. Experimental results show that although current agents can reliably uncover the problems exposed by alerts, they struggle to proactively investigate the disk for silent intrusions and to produce comprehensive, verified remediation plans, with no model achieving complete detection and remediation on any single range. This reveals a fundamental bottleneck in building agents for real-world incident response. The benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/Alibaba-NLP/qqr/tree/main/data/secrespond.

In Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), constructing a robust advantage baseline is critical for policy gradients, effectively guiding the policy model to reinforce desired behaviors. Recent research has introduced Generalist Value Models (such as V_0), which achieve pre-trained value estimation by explicitly encoding model capabilities in-context, eliminating the need to synchronously update the value model alongside the policy model. In this paper, we propose V_{0.5}, which adaptively fuses the baseline predicted by such value model (acting as a prior) with the empirical mean derived from sparse rollouts. This constructs a robust baseline that balances computational efficiency with extremely low variance. Specifically, we introduce a real-time statistical testing and dynamic budget allocation. This balances the high variance caused by sparse sampling against the systematic bias (or hallucinations) inherent in the value model's prior. By constructing a hypothesis test to evaluate the prior's reliability in real-time, the system dynamically allocates additional rollout budget on demand. This mechanism minimizes the baseline estimator's Mean Squared Error (MSE), guaranteeing stable policy gradients, even under extreme sparsity with a group size of 4. Extensive evaluations across six mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that V_{0.5} significantly outperforms GRPO and DAPO, achieving faster convergence and over some 10% performance improvement.

Interest in neural machine translation has grown rapidly as its effectiveness has been demonstrated across language and data scenarios. New research regularly introduces architectural and algorithmic improvements that lead to significant gains over "vanilla" NMT implementations. However, these new techniques are rarely evaluated in the context of previously published techniques, specifically those that are widely used in state-of-theart production and shared-task systems. As a result, it is often difficult to determine whether improvements from research will carry over to systems deployed for real-world use. In this work, we recommend three specific methods that are relatively easy to implement and result in much stronger experimental systems. Beyond reporting significantly higher BLEU scores, we conduct an in-depth analysis of where improvements originate and what inherent weaknesses of basic NMT models are being addressed. We then compare the relative gains afforded by several other techniques proposed in the literature when starting with vanilla systems versus our stronger baselines, showing that experimental conclusions may change depending on the baseline chosen. This indicates that choosing a strong baseline is crucial for reporting reliable experimental results.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) for Large Language Models (LLMs) often suffers from training collapse in long-horizon tasks due to exploding gradient variance. To mitigate this, a baseline is commonly introduced for advantage computation; however, traditional value models remain difficult to optimize, and standard group-based baselines overlook sequence heterogeneity. Although classic optimal baseline theory can achieve global variance reduction, it neglects token heterogeneity and requires prohibitive gradient-based computation. In this work, we derive the Optimal Token Baseline (OTB) from first principles, proving that gradient updates should be weighted inversely to their cumulative gradient norm. To ensure efficiency, we propose the Logit-Gradient Proxy that approximates the gradient norm using only forward-pass probabilities. Our method achieves training stability and matches the performance of large group sizes (N=32) with only N=4, reducing token consumption by over 65% across single-turn and tool-integrated reasoning tasks.

For decades, human-computer interaction has fundamentally been manual. Even today, almost all productive work done on the computer necessitates human input at every step. Autonomous virtual agents represent an exciting step in automating many of these menial tasks. Virtual agents would empower users with limited technical proficiency to harness the full possibilities of computer systems. They could also enable the efficient streamlining of numerous computer tasks, ranging from calendar management to complex travel bookings, with minimal human intervention. In this paper, we introduce OmniACT, the first-of-a-kind dataset and benchmark for assessing an agent's capability to generate executable programs to accomplish computer tasks. Our scope extends beyond traditional web automation, covering a diverse range of desktop applications. The dataset consists of fundamental tasks such as "Play the next song", as well as longer horizon tasks such as "Send an email to John Doe mentioning the time and place to meet". Specifically, given a pair of screen image and a visually-grounded natural language task, the goal is to generate a script capable of fully executing the task. We run several strong baseline language model agents on our benchmark. The strongest baseline, GPT-4, performs the best on our benchmark However, its performance level still reaches only 15% of the human proficiency in generating executable scripts capable of completing the task, demonstrating the challenge of our task for conventional web agents. Our benchmark provides a platform to measure and evaluate the progress of language model agents in automating computer tasks and motivates future work towards building multimodal models that bridge large language models and the visual grounding of computer screens.

Web-based 'deep research' agents aim to solve complex question - answering tasks through long-horizon interactions with online tools. These tasks remain challenging, as the underlying language models are often not optimized for long-horizon reasoning and exploration. Prior work has proposed workflows for constructing instruction-tuning datasets, often leveraging knowledge graphs. However, such methods typically lack fine-grained control over difficulty and quality, yielding synthetic data that falls short of capturing the complexity required for long-horizon reasoning. Furthermore, many studies conflate data and training effects by comparing models trained under different optimization recipes, making it difficult to isolate and evaluate the effectiveness of the data itself. We introduce a two-pronged data synthesis pipeline that generates question - answer pairs by progressively increasing task complexity until a frontier baseline web agent fails. The baseline agent plays multiple roles in this process: attempting the questions, validating factuality, checking for alternative answers, and enforcing filtering. To evaluate the effectiveness of our synthesis methods, we adopt a controlled training setup based on distillation from strong web agents. Experiments across multiple web-based benchmarks show that our dataset - despite being smaller - enables the training of more effective web agents than existing datasets. In particular, our data exhibits twice the diversity in tool-use actions, allowing models trained on it to achieve stronger performance while avoiding repetitive tool-calling behaviors.

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

Recent years have witnessed a rapid development of mobile GUI agents powered by large language models (LLMs), which can autonomously execute diverse device-control tasks based on natural language instructions. The increasing accuracy of these agents on standard benchmarks has raised expectations for large-scale real-world deployment, and there are already several commercial agents released and used by early adopters. However, are we really ready for GUI agents integrated into our daily devices as system building blocks? We argue that an important pre-deployment validation is missing to examine whether the agents can maintain their performance under real-world threats. Specifically, unlike existing common benchmarks that are based on simple static app contents (they have to do so to ensure environment consistency between different tests), real-world apps are filled with contents from untrustworthy third parties, such as advertisement emails, user-generated posts and medias, etc. ... To this end, we introduce a scalable app content instrumentation framework to enable flexible and targeted content modifications within existing applications. Leveraging this framework, we create a test suite comprising both a dynamic task execution environment and a static dataset of challenging GUI states. The dynamic environment encompasses 122 reproducible tasks, and the static dataset consists of over 3,000 scenarios constructed from commercial apps. We perform experiments on both open-source and commercial GUI agents. Our findings reveal that all examined agents can be significantly degraded due to third-party contents, with an average misleading rate of 42.0% and 36.1% in dynamic and static environments respectively. The framework and benchmark has been released at https://agenthazard.github.io.

Deployed LLM agents rely on agentic context, the model-external textual control content assembled by an operational harness. In this work, the mutable component of that context is a persistent system-level instruction that is updated from operational experience while the model, tools, and harness remain fixed. Over long evolution horizons, flat-text maintenance makes verification increasingly difficult as accumulated instructions grow and interact. We propose Graph-Regularized Agentic Context Evolution (GRACE), which maintains the persistent instruction component as a typed semantic graph and validates proposed updates within the local typed neighborhoods of modified nodes. Accepted graph updates are reconstructed as incremental edits to the textual instruction checkpoint used at deployment. We evaluate GRACE within a fixed telecom agent harness derived from τ^2-bench under a controlled distribution-shift protocol. Across five independent replications, GRACE improves strict reliability, measured by pass^3, from the Gemini 2.5 Flash zero-shot value of 0.091 to 0.673pm0.136 at the final checkpoint. This exceeds a Gemini 3.1 Pro zero-shot reference of 0.242 on the same held-out set, while the flat-text HCE baseline finishes at 0.191pm0.051. These results identify two requirements for reliable long-horizon context evolution, a structural substrate that makes verification local and a consolidation mechanism that keeps accumulated instruction content usable.

We introduce ResearchGym, a benchmark and execution environment for evaluating AI agents on end-to-end research. To instantiate this, we repurpose five oral and spotlight papers from ICML, ICLR, and ACL. From each paper's repository, we preserve the datasets, evaluation harness, and baseline implementations but withhold the paper's proposed method. This results in five containerized task environments comprising 39 sub-tasks in total. Within each environment, agents must propose novel hypotheses, run experiments, and attempt to surpass strong human baselines on the paper's metrics. In a controlled evaluation of an agent powered by GPT-5, we observe a sharp capability--reliability gap. The agent improves over the provided baselines from the repository in just 1 of 15 evaluations (6.7%) by 11.5%, and completes only 26.5% of sub-tasks on average. We identify recurring long-horizon failure modes, including impatience, poor time and resource management, overconfidence in weak hypotheses, difficulty coordinating parallel experiments, and hard limits from context length. Yet in a single run, the agent surpasses the solution of an ICML 2025 Spotlight task, indicating that frontier agents can occasionally reach state-of-the-art performance, but do so unreliably. We additionally evaluate proprietary agent scaffolds including Claude Code (Opus-4.5) and Codex (GPT-5.2) which display a similar gap. ResearchGym provides infrastructure for systematic evaluation and analysis of autonomous agents on closed-loop research.

AI agents have the potential to aid users on a variety of consequential tasks, including conducting scientific research. To spur the development of useful agents, we need benchmarks that are challenging, but more crucially, directly correspond to real-world tasks of interest. This paper introduces such a benchmark, designed to measure the accuracy of AI agents in tackling a crucial yet surprisingly challenging aspect of scientific research: computational reproducibility. This task, fundamental to the scientific process, involves reproducing the results of a study using the provided code and data. We introduce CORE-Bench (Computational Reproducibility Agent Benchmark), a benchmark consisting of 270 tasks based on 90 scientific papers across three disciplines (computer science, social science, and medicine). Tasks in CORE-Bench consist of three difficulty levels and include both language-only and vision-language tasks. We provide an evaluation system to measure the accuracy of agents in a fast and parallelizable way, saving days of evaluation time for each run compared to a sequential implementation. We evaluated two baseline agents: the general-purpose AutoGPT and a task-specific agent called CORE-Agent. We tested both variants using two underlying language models: GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini. The best agent achieved an accuracy of 21% on the hardest task, showing the vast scope for improvement in automating routine scientific tasks. Having agents that can reproduce existing work is a necessary step towards building agents that can conduct novel research and could verify and improve the performance of other research agents. We hope that CORE-Bench can improve the state of reproducibility and spur the development of future research agents.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

Emerging personal AI agents are moving toward persistent, multi-source memory. This creates an evaluation problem: systems must decide how to use conflicting or incomplete evidence; they cannot just retrieve facts from one clean history. Existing benchmarks rarely show whether an error came from the evidence given to a method or from the method's conflict-resolution step. We study this as selective QA over conflicting multi-source personal memory: systems answer based on conflicting, sometimes incomplete sources, or abstain when evidence is insufficient. We develop a benchmark containing 18 question templates across 8 reasoning types, 480 personas, 4 random seeds, and 34,560 instances, with controlled source distortions and deterministic ground truth. We evaluate the performance of baselines without access to any source, access to a single source, structured fusion methods, and frontier LLMs. The best trained fusion resolver reaches 80.3% accuracy, while the strongest prompt-only LLM baseline reaches 70.0%. With abstention, the same resolver reaches 85.3% selective accuracy at 78.3% coverage and the best LLM reaches 71.0% selective accuracy at 95.4% coverage. Different models have different strengths across reasoning types. We release the data, code, cached model outputs, and data-generating process for reuse.

We introduce DA-Code, a code generation benchmark specifically designed to assess LLMs on agent-based data science tasks. This benchmark features three core elements: First, the tasks within DA-Code are inherently challenging, setting them apart from traditional code generation tasks and demanding advanced coding skills in grounding and planning. Second, examples in DA-Code are all based on real and diverse data, covering a wide range of complex data wrangling and analytics tasks. Third, to solve the tasks, the models must utilize complex data science programming languages, to perform intricate data processing and derive the answers. We set up the benchmark in a controllable and executable environment that aligns with real-world data analysis scenarios and is scalable. The annotators meticulously design the evaluation suite to ensure the accuracy and robustness of the evaluation. We develop the DA-Agent baseline. Experiments show that although the baseline performs better than other existing frameworks, using the current best LLMs achieves only 30.5% accuracy, leaving ample room for improvement. We release our benchmark at https://da-code-bench.github.io.

Most reported gains from agent-optimization methods are one-shot: an agent is optimized against a fixed benchmark and the resulting improvement is reported as if it were a stable property of the method. This does not test the setting that matters for deployed agents, where optimization is applied recursively as new failures and new tasks appear over time. The central question this raises is whether optimizer-driven gains compound: after an agent has been optimized once, can it be optimized again on newly arrived tasks without eroding the gains the first round produced? We study this question with a two-phase continual-learning evaluation built from hard tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.0, comparing three approaches to agent-harness optimization (GEPA, Meta Harness, and RELAI's Verifiable Continual Learning, RELAI-VCL) under identical optimization budgets. All three methods improve over the baseline agent in the conventional, static, single-phase setting. However, once new tasks are introduced, the methods diverge sharply: GEPA's optimized agent transfers below the unoptimized baseline, Meta Harness transfers well but fails to improve further once given a second optimization budget, and RELAI-VCL is the only method that both transfers positively to unseen tasks and continues improving after those tasks are folded into the optimization objective, reaching the highest pass rate at every evaluated stage and the highest lifelong average pass rate overall (76.4% vs. 66.0% for GEPA, 64.6% for Meta Harness, and 58.7% for the baseline). Our key observation was that optimization gains compounded only when regression control was built into the optimization loop, providing an inductive bias against shortcut solutions that fail to generalize.

Autonomous computer use agents that powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are emerging as capable assistants for completing complex digital workflows. However, real-world execution environments are far from ideal: pop-ups, resolution changes, and competing applications frequently interfere with agent perception and control. We introduce AgentHijack, a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of computer-use agents under common corruptions, where the uncertainties in dynamic environment disrupt the execution flow without direct adversarial intent. Specifically, AgentHijack introduces 9 configurable common corruptions to replicate realistic imperfect scenarios. We evaluate a variety of desktop tasks that utilize MLLM-based agents and discover that even minor instances of corruption can result in substantial performance degradation, which emphasizes the fragility of agents and underscores the necessity of robustness evaluation. Afterward, we propose AgentHijack-Agent, a framework that integrates an action generator with enhanced grounding capabilities and an onlooker responsible for behavior summarization and environment checking. Extensive experiments validate its effectiveness. Our code, environment, baseline models and data are publicly available at: https://AgentHijack.github.io.

The integration of AI-powered coding agents into Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) pipelines has fundamentally altered how software verification is conducted. While these agents successfully automate the test generation, current evaluation benchmarks (e.g., SWE-bench) largely focus on pass-rates rather than the intrinsic quality of the generated tests. This raises the possibility of "stealth technical debt", in which test suites pass execution but do not offer comprehensive coverage or semantic value. We address this methodological gap through a large-scale, empirical comparison of 204,673 test artifacts which comprises of 24,941 human-authored files and 179,732 agent-generated files; sourced from the AIDev dataset. Using the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) parsing with Python's naive ast module, we implemented a "white-box" static analysis framework to evaluate three quality dimensions: Assertion Strength (RQ1), Edge-Case Coverage (RQ2), and Flakiness Potential (RQ3). Our results present a nuanced inversion of traditional assumptions. AI agents performed better than humans in Edge-Case Coverage, with almost twice the variety of boundary checks (Variety Score: 0.62 vs 0.32) and a higher frequency of null-safety testing (13.40% vs. 8.3%), even though human developers had a slight advantage in Assertion Strength (88.1% strong assertions vs. 85.37% for agents). But this thoroughness comes at a price: due mostly to their reliance on file I/O and non-deterministic logic, agent-generated tests exhibited a higher risk of flakiness (Candidate Rate: 0.41 vs. 0.30). These findings suggest that while AI agents excel at rigorous boundary testing, they lack the "environmental awareness" needed to write stable, hermetic tests.

With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), general-purpose agents have seen fundamental advancements. However, evaluating these agents presents unique challenges that distinguish them from static QA benchmarks. We observe that current agent benchmarks are heavily confounded by extraneous factors, including system prompts, toolset configurations, and environmental dynamics. Existing evaluations often rely on fragmented, researcher-specific frameworks where the prompt engineering for reasoning and tool usage varies significantly, making it difficult to attribute performance gains to the model itself. Additionally, the lack of standardized environmental data leads to untraceable errors and non-reproducible results. This lack of standardization introduces substantial unfairness and opacity into the field. We propose that a unified evaluation framework is essential for the rigorous advancement of agent evaluation. To this end, we introduce a proposal aimed at standardizing agent evaluation.

LLM agents hold significant promise for advancing scientific research. To accelerate this progress, we introduce AIRS-Bench (the AI Research Science Benchmark), a suite of 20 tasks sourced from state-of-the-art machine learning papers. These tasks span diverse domains, including language modeling, mathematics, bioinformatics, and time series forecasting. AIRS-Bench tasks assess agentic capabilities over the full research lifecycle -- including idea generation, experiment analysis and iterative refinement -- without providing baseline code. The AIRS-Bench task format is versatile, enabling easy integration of new tasks and rigorous comparison across different agentic frameworks. We establish baselines using frontier models paired with both sequential and parallel scaffolds. Our results show that agents exceed human SOTA in four tasks but fail to match it in sixteen others. Even when agents surpass human benchmarks, they do not reach the theoretical performance ceiling for the underlying tasks. These findings indicate that AIRS-Bench is far from saturated and offers substantial room for improvement. We open-source the AIRS-Bench task definitions and evaluation code to catalyze further development in autonomous scientific research.

Getting a real cybersecurity risk assessment for a small organization is expensive -- a NIST CSF-aligned engagement runs $15,000 on the low end, takes weeks, and depends on practitioners who are genuinely scarce. Most small companies skip it entirely. We built a six-agent AI system where each agent handles one analytical stage: profiling the organization, mapping assets, analyzing threats, evaluating controls, scoring risks, and generating recommendations. Agents share a persistent context that grows as the assessment proceeds, so later agents build on what earlier ones concluded -- the mechanism that distinguishes this from standard sequential agent pipelines. We tested it on a 15-person HIPAA-covered healthcare company and compared outputs to independent assessments by three CISSP practitioners -- the system agreed with them 85% of the time on severity classifications, covered 92% of identified risks, and finished in under 15 minutes. We then ran 30 repeated single-agent assessments across five synthetic but sector-realistic organizational profiles in healthcare, fintech, manufacturing, retail, and SaaS, comparing a general-purpose Mistral-7B against a domain fine-tuned model. Both completed every run. The fine-tuned model flagged threats the baseline could not see at all: PHI exposure in healthcare, OT/IIoT vulnerabilities in manufacturing, platform-specific risks in retail. The full multi-agent pipeline, however, failed every one of 30 attempts on a Tesla T4 with its 4,096-token default context window -- context capacity, not model quality, turned out to be the binding constraint.

Does adding more agents help an LLM workflow once compared systems share the same benchmark loader, tool access, answer contract, usage accounting, and trajectory logging? We introduce BenchAgent, an evaluation framework that places single-agent, fixed multi-agent (MAS), and evolving MAS workflows under one normalized execution and logging protocol. BenchAgent evaluates these substrate-internal workflows across ten reasoning, coding, and tool-use benchmarks with GPT-4.1, and separately reports a Protocol-Aligned External (PAE) GAIA study of a runtime-generated workflow. Under SI conditions, at most one of six tested MAS exceeds the matched single-agent anchor on benchmark-balanced average accuracy: EvoAgent lies within the Wilson one-run guidance, while the remaining five trail by 2.56-11.29 points and occupy more expensive accuracy-cost trade-offs. On the PAE GAIA snapshot, a Claude-Code-style runtime workflow reaches 66.72% overall and 69.23% on Level 3, more than 20 points above the strongest non-Claude baseline, Jarvis, a fixed MAS.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

The proliferation of autonomous AI agents capable of executing real-world actions - filesystem operations, API calls, database modifications, financial transactions - introduces a class of safety risk not addressed by existing content-moderation infrastructure. Current text-safety systems evaluate linguistic content for harm categories such as violence, hate speech, and sexual content; they are architecturally unsuitable for evaluating whether a proposed action falls within an agent's authorized operational scope. We present ILION (Intelligent Logic Identity Operations Network), a deterministic execution gate for agentic AI systems. ILION employs a five-component cascade architecture - Transient Identity Imprint (TII), Semantic Vector Reference Frame (SVRF), Identity Drift Control (IDC), Identity Resonance Score (IRS) and Consensus Veto Layer (CVL) - to classify proposed agent actions as BLOCK or ALLOW without statistical training or API dependencies. The system requires zero labeled data, operates in sub-millisecond latency, and produces fully interpretable verdicts. We evaluate ILION on ILION-Bench v2, a purpose-built benchmark of 380 test scenarios across eight attack categories with 39% hard-difficulty adversarial cases and a held-out development split. ILION achieves F1 = 0.8515, precision = 91.0%, and a false positive rate of 7.9% at a mean latency of 143 microseconds. Comparative evaluation against three baselines - Lakera Guard (F1 = 0.8087), OpenAI Moderation API (F1 = 0.1188), and Llama Guard 3 (F1 = 0.0105) - demonstrates that existing text-safety infrastructure systematically fails on agent execution safety tasks due to a fundamental task mismatch. ILION outperforms the best commercial baseline by 4.3 F1 points while operating 2,000 times faster with a false positive rate four times lower.

We study secret elicitation: discovering knowledge that an AI possesses but does not explicitly verbalize. As a testbed, we train three families of large language models (LLMs) to possess specific knowledge that they apply downstream but deny knowing when asked directly. For example, in one setting, we train an LLM to generate replies that are consistent with knowing the user is female, while denying this knowledge when asked directly. We then design various black-box and white-box secret elicitation techniques and evaluate them based on whether they can help an LLM auditor successfully guess the secret knowledge. Many of our techniques improve on simple baselines. Our most effective techniques (performing best in 2/3 settings) are based on prefill attacks, a black-box technique where the LLM reveals secret knowledge when generating a completion from a predefined prefix. In our remaining setting, white-box techniques based on logit lens and sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are most effective. We release our models and code, establishing a public benchmark for evaluating secret elicitation methods.

Traditional pentesting uses reconnaissance at each step to uncover unseen weaknesses, build stronger attacks, and advance the objective; we argue that AI agents require the same treatment. We formalize agent reconnaissance by modeling the process and identifying the knowledge assets it seeks to extract: what they are, how they are used, and which agent weaknesses they exploit to give adversaries leverage in indirect prompt injection attacks. We instantiate these insights in Know Your Agent (KYA), a framework that automates black-box, reconnaissance-driven pentesting by probing agents, building target profiles, and using those profiles to craft stronger attacks. We evaluate KYA on agent-security benchmarks and a real-world coding agent, and release KYA, its benchmarks, and baseline implementations for reproducibility.

Knowledge tracing (KT) is the problem of predicting students' future performance based on their historical interactions with intelligent tutoring systems. Recently, many works present lots of special methods for applying deep neural networks to KT from different perspectives like model architecture, adversarial augmentation and etc., which make the overall algorithm and system become more and more complex. Furthermore, due to the lack of standardized evaluation protocol liu2022pykt, there is no widely agreed KT baselines and published experimental comparisons become inconsistent and self-contradictory, i.e., the reported AUC scores of DKT on ASSISTments2009 range from 0.721 to 0.821 minn2018deep,yeung2018addressing. Therefore, in this paper, we provide a strong but simple baseline method to deal with the KT task named simpleKT. Inspired by the Rasch model in psychometrics, we explicitly model question-specific variations to capture the individual differences among questions covering the same set of knowledge components that are a generalization of terms of concepts or skills needed for learners to accomplish steps in a task or a problem. Furthermore, instead of using sophisticated representations to capture student forgetting behaviors, we use the ordinary dot-product attention function to extract the time-aware information embedded in the student learning interactions. Extensive experiments show that such a simple baseline is able to always rank top 3 in terms of AUC scores and achieve 57 wins, 3 ties and 16 loss against 12 DLKT baseline methods on 7 public datasets of different domains. We believe this work serves as a strong baseline for future KT research. Code is available at https://github.com/pykt-team/pykt-toolkitWe merged our model to the \textsc{pyKT benchmark at https://pykt.org/.}.

Large language models generate plausible code but cannot verify correctness. Existing multi-agent systems simulate execution or leave verification optional. We introduce execution-grounded verification as a first-class principle: every code change must survive sandboxed execution before propagation. We instantiate this principle in AGENTFORGE, a multi-agent framework where Planner, Coder, Tester, Debugger, and Critic agents coordinate through shared memory and a mandatory Docker sandbox. We formalize software engineering with LLMs as an iterative decision process over repository states, where execution feedback provides a stronger supervision signal than next-token likelihood. AGENTFORGE achieves 40.0\% resolution on SWE-BENCH Lite, outperforming single-agent baselines by 26--28 points. Ablations confirm that execution feedback and role decomposition each independently drive performance. The framework is open-source at https://github.com/raja21068/AutoCodeAI.

Recent advances in language model (LM) agents and function calling have enabled autonomous, feedback-driven systems to solve problems across various digital domains. To better understand the unique limitations of LM agents, we introduce RefactorBench, a benchmark consisting of 100 large handcrafted multi-file refactoring tasks in popular open-source repositories. Solving tasks within RefactorBench requires thorough exploration of dependencies across multiple files and strong adherence to relevant instructions. Every task is defined by 3 natural language instructions of varying specificity and is mutually exclusive, allowing for the creation of longer combined tasks on the same repository. Baselines on RefactorBench reveal that current LM agents struggle with simple compositional tasks, solving only 22% of tasks with base instructions, in contrast to a human developer with short time constraints solving 87%. Through trajectory analysis, we identify various unique failure modes of LM agents, and further explore the failure mode of tracking past actions. By adapting a baseline agent to condition on representations of state, we achieve a 43.9% improvement in solving RefactorBench tasks. We further extend our state-aware approach to encompass entire digital environments and outline potential directions for future research. RefactorBench aims to support the study of LM agents by providing a set of real-world, multi-hop tasks within the realm of code.

Data standardization is a crucial part of the data science life cycle. While tools like Pandas offer robust functionalities, their complexity and the manual effort required for customizing code to diverse column types pose significant challenges. Although large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown promise in automating this process through natural language understanding and code generation, it still demands expert-level programming knowledge and continuous interaction for prompt refinement. To solve these challenges, our key idea is to propose a Python library with declarative, unified APIs for standardizing different column types, simplifying the LLM's code generation with concise API calls. We first propose Dataprep.Clean, a component of the Dataprep Python Library, significantly reduces the coding complexity by enabling the standardization of specific column types with a single line of code. Then, we introduce the CleanAgent framework integrating Dataprep.Clean and LLM-based agents to automate the data standardization process. With CleanAgent, data scientists only need to provide their requirements once, allowing for a hands-free process. To demonstrate the practical utility of CleanAgent, we developed a user-friendly web application, allowing attendees to interact with it using real-world datasets.

To succeed in common digital tasks such as web navigation, agents must carry out a variety of specialized tasks such as searching for products or planning a travel route. To tackle these tasks, agents can bootstrap themselves by learning task-specific skills online through interaction with the web environment. In this work, we demonstrate that programs are an effective representation for skills. We propose agent skill induction (ASI), which allows agents to adapt themselves by inducing, verifying, and utilizing program-based skills on the fly. We start with an evaluation on the WebArena agent benchmark and show that ASI outperforms the static baseline agent and its text-skill counterpart by 23.5% and 11.3% in success rate, mainly thanks to the programmatic verification guarantee during the induction phase. ASI also improves efficiency by reducing 10.7-15.3% of the steps over baselines, by composing primitive actions (e.g., click) into higher-level skills (e.g., search product). We then highlight the efficacy of ASI in remaining efficient and accurate under scaled-up web activities. Finally, we examine the generalizability of induced skills when transferring between websites, and find that ASI can effectively reuse common skills, while also updating incompatible skills to versatile website changes.

Tool-augmented LLM agents tend to call tools indiscriminately, even when the model can answer directly. Each unnecessary call wastes API fees and latency, yet no existing benchmark systematically studies when a tool call is actually needed. We propose When2Tool, a benchmark of 18 environments (15 single-hop, 3 multi-hop) spanning three categories of tool necessity -- computational scale, knowledge boundaries, and execution reliability -- each with controlled difficulty levels that create a clear decision boundary between tool-necessary and tool-unnecessary tasks. We evaluate two families of training-free baselines: Prompt-only (varying the prompt to discourage unnecessary calls) and Reason-then-Act (requiring the model to reason about tool necessity before acting). Both provide limited control: Prompt-only suppresses necessary calls alongside unnecessary ones, and Reason-then-Act still incurs a disproportionate accuracy cost on hard tasks. To understand why these baselines fail, we probe the models' hidden states and find that tool necessity is linearly decodable from the pre-generation representation with AUROC 0.89--0.96 across six models, substantially exceeding the model's own verbalized reasoning. This reveals that models already know when tools are needed, but fail to act on this knowledge during generation. Building on this finding, we propose Probe&Prefill, which uses a lightweight linear probe to read the hidden-state signal and prefills the model's response with a steering sentence. Across all models tested, Probe&Prefill reduces tool calls by 48% with only 1.7% accuracy loss, while the best baseline at comparable accuracy only reduces 6% of tool calls, or achieves a similar tool call reduction but incurs a 5times higher accuracy loss. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/when2tool

Computer-using agents drive real software through the screen -- clicking and typing -- but they solve every task from scratch: asked to repeat a task, an agent re-reads the screen, re-reasons every tap, and pays the full cost again. We present PreAct, which lets such an agent get faster on tasks it has done before. The first time it succeeds, PreAct compiles the run into a small state-machine program-states that check the screen, transitions that act-and on later runs replays it directly instead of invoking the agent 8.5-13x faster, with no per-step language-model calls. Replay is not blind: at each step PreAct checks that the screen matches what the program expects before acting, and hands control back to the agent the moment something is off. PreAct applies the same discipline when deciding what to keep: a freshly compiled program enters the store only if, re-run from a clean state, an independent evaluator confirms it solved the task-catching programs that replay to their last step yet leave the task undone. Across a mobile, a desktop, and a web benchmark, this store-time check separates repeated runs that improve from ones that degrade as faulty programs accumulate, worth 1.75-2.6 tasks per benchmark, the same direction on all three; a fallback that explores afresh when no program fits brings PreAct level with a strong record-and-replay baseline. We also report what did not matter: prompt wording, runtime guardrails, and whether a language model or a plain embedding retriever selects which program to reuse.

AI agents are increasingly asked to carry out work that spans minutes, hours, or longer. Yet the default model of agent behavior is continuous action: issuing tool calls, refreshing pages, searching for alternatives, or otherwise trying to force progress. This is the wrong approach for many long-running tasks, which are better served by a strategy of sustained attention. Instead, agents should monitor an environment, notice when an external event makes progress possible, then respond promptly without wasting resources while waiting. To measure progress on this class of tasks, we introduce SentinelBench, an open-source benchmark for time-evolving monitoring tasks. SentinelBench contains 100 tasks across 10 synthetic web environments, including email, calendars, finance, professional networking, and entertainment. Each environment exposes a live web interface and replays a scripted sequence of events, requiring agents to navigate and reason about web pages whose state shifts underfoot. SentinelBench measures task completion, reaction time, and resource use, exposing the tradeoff between responsiveness and cost. We report results across three models and two browser-agent harnesses, establishing performance baselines for future comparison and demonstrating how agent design choices can dramatically impact key metrics. Together, these results show that SentinelBench distinguishes meaningful differences in agent behavior.

Are tool-calling LLM agents equally safe throughout a conversation? We discover they are not: agents are most vulnerable at the very start of a session and become substantially safer after a few regular agentic tasks -- a phenomenon we term the cold-start safety gap. To study this systematically, we introduce Safety Over Depth for Agents (SODA), a benchmark that controls how many regular agentic tasks the agent completes before encountering a safety threat, supporting up to 20 preceding tasks. Evaluating 7 models from 4 families, safety improves by 9--52% as the number of preceding regular agentic tasks increases from zero to twenty. Representation analysis confirms that model hidden states gradually shift toward a safety-aligned region as more preceding tasks are present. By systematically studying which part of the preceding conversation matters most, we find that the regular agentic tasks themselves are the primary driver of safety, while the agent's own prior responses have less effect on safety but are essential for preserving later utility. This conclusion is further supported by evaluation on open-source safety benchmarks (AgentHarm, Agent Safety Bench) and utility benchmarks (BFCL, API-Bank), confirming that warming up the agent with regular agentic tasks before deployment makes it safer and preserves full capability. Based on these findings, we recommend a simple deployment strategy: having the agent complete a few regular agentic tasks before possible exposure to safety-critical requests mitigates the cold-start safety gap. Our code is available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Agent-Cold-Start-Safety-Gap

AI agents have been developed for complex real-world tasks from coding to customer service. But AI agent evaluations suffer from many challenges that undermine our understanding of how well agents really work. We introduce the Holistic Agent Leaderboard (HAL) to address these challenges. We make three main contributions. First, we provide a standardized evaluation harness that orchestrates parallel evaluations across hundreds of VMs, reducing evaluation time from weeks to hours while eliminating common implementation bugs. Second, we conduct three-dimensional analysis spanning models, scaffolds, and benchmarks. We validate the harness by conducting 21,730 agent rollouts across 9 models and 9 benchmarks in coding, web navigation, science, and customer service with a total cost of about $40,000. Our analysis reveals surprising insights, such as higher reasoning effort reducing accuracy in the majority of runs. Third, we use LLM-aided log inspection to uncover previously unreported behaviors, such as searching for the benchmark on HuggingFace instead of solving a task, or misusing credit cards in flight booking tasks. We share all agent logs, comprising 2.5B tokens of language model calls, to incentivize further research into agent behavior. By standardizing how the field evaluates agents and addressing common pitfalls in agent evaluation, we hope to shift the focus from agents that ace benchmarks to agents that work reliably in the real world.

Modern coding agents increasingly delegate specialized subtasks to subagents, which are smaller, focused agentic loops that handle narrow responsibilities like search, debugging or terminal execution. This architectural pattern keeps the main agent's context window clean by isolating verbose outputs (e.g. build logs, test results, etc.) within the subagent context. Typically when agents employ subagents for such tasks, they use frontier models as these subagents. In this paper, we investigate whether a finetuned small language model (SLM) can achieve comparable performance to frontier models in the task of agentic terminal execution. We present Terminus-4B, which is a post-trained Qwen3-4B model via Supervised Finetuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) using rubric-based LLM-as-judge reward, specifically for this task. In our extensive evaluation spanning various frontier models, training ablations and main agent configurations, we find that Terminus-4B is able to reduce the token usage of the main agent by up to ~30% compared to the No Subagent baseline with no impact to agent performance on benchmarks like SWE-Bench Pro and our internal SWE-Bench C# benchmark, which tends to be heavy in verbose execution tasks. Furthermore, Terminus-4B improves key metrics showing the main agent relying on the outputs of the subagent and doing fewer terminal execution tasks by itself. We see that our model not only closes the gap between the Vanilla Qwen model and frontier models like Claude Sonnet / Opus / GPT-5.3-Codex, but often even exceeds their performance.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

Computer-use agents pay full frontier inference to re-derive routines their user has already performed, because an agent's memory today records what the user said, not what the user did. We compile passively captured screen activity into agent memory with a deterministic, zero-model pipeline: it segments a local capture stream into typed activity frames, bounded episodes carrying application, site, timing, input volume, and evidence pointers back to the raw rows, with no model in the loop, so the output is byte-identical, cacheable, and mechanically auditable. On one professional's single-user corpus of 128,756 frames over 51 active days, the compiler reduces a day of raw capture to a prompt-ready context block 86x smaller in 68 ms, and an agent reading that block answers questions about the day at 98.4% accuracy (Wilson 95% CI 91.7-99.7%) against an independent oracle, versus 66-80% for an LLM summary of the same capture, a mid-tier model reading the block matching a frontier one. The same compiler doubles as a demand-side cost instrument. Read off passive, pre-delegation human activity rather than agent rollouts, it supplies two parameters that agent-cost models assume but, to our knowledge, have not measured: the Routine Overhead Ratio R and the routine recurrence h. We report first values of R, a modeled upper bound, at 60-343x, and a delegable recurrence of 9.0% in-sample and 7.7% out-of-sample, for a realistic all-fleet token ceiling near 8%; a compiled routine replays deterministically with the model out of the loop, demonstrated live at zero model tokens on a guard-matched hit. Schema, compiler, and evaluation harness are open.

We introduce LiteWebAgent, an open-source suite for VLM-based web agent applications. Our framework addresses a critical gap in the web agent ecosystem with a production-ready solution that combines minimal serverless backend configuration, intuitive user and browser interfaces, and extensible research capabilities in agent planning, memory, and tree search. For the core LiteWebAgent agent framework, we implemented a simple yet effective baseline using recursive function calling, providing with decoupled action generation and action grounding. In addition, we integrate advanced research components such as agent planning, agent workflow memory, and tree search in a modular and extensible manner. We then integrate the LiteWebAgent agent framework with frontend and backend as deployed systems in two formats: (1) a production Vercel-based web application, which provides users with an agent-controlled remote browser, (2) a Chrome extension leveraging LiteWebAgent's API to control an existing Chrome browser via CDP (Chrome DevTools Protocol). The LiteWebAgent framework is available at https://github.com/PathOnAI/LiteWebAgent, with deployed frontend at https://lite-web-agent.vercel.app/.

We study reliability in autonomous language-model agents that translate user mandates into validated tool actions under real capital. The setting is DX Terminal Pro, a 21-day deployment in which 3,505 user-funded agents traded real ETH in a bounded onchain market. Users configured vaults through structured controls and natural-language strategies, but only agents could choose normal buy/sell trades. The system produced 7.5M agent invocations, roughly 300K onchain actions, about $20M in volume, more than 5,000 ETH deployed, roughly 70B inference tokens, and 99.9% settlement success for policy-valid submitted transactions. Long-running agents accumulated thousands of sequential decisions, including 6,000+ prompt-state-action cycles for continuously active agents, yielding a large-scale trace from user mandate to rendered prompt, reasoning, validation, portfolio state, and settlement. Reliability did not come from the base model alone; it emerged from the operating layer around the model: prompt compilation, typed controls, policy validation, execution guards, memory design, and trace-level observability. Pre-launch testing exposed failures that text-only benchmarks rarely measure, including fabricated trading rules, fee paralysis, numeric anchoring, cadence trading, and misread tokenomics. Targeted harness changes reduced fabricated sell rules from 57% to 3%, reduced fee-led observations from 32.5% to below 10%, and increased capital deployment from 42.9% to 78.0% in an affected test population. We show that capital-managing agents should be evaluated across the full path from user mandate to prompt, validated action, and settlement.

We introduce Tencent WorkBuddy Bench, a multi-domain evaluation suite for coding agents; this report documents its construction methodology, scoring protocol, and a cross-model leaderboard. At its core is a unified evaluation framework for constructing and running distribution-informed coding-agent tasks across four work domains - Code, Web, Office, and Security. Rather than adapting public issue text, every task is reverse-engineered from a real commit, pull request, or business scenario and rewritten as a short, colloquial, role-played request, so that a task's prompt is not recoverable by web-searching the underlying issue, pull request, or commit thread. Because the dataset is released openly - task directories, environment images, evaluation harness, tests, and reference solutions - contamination resistance rests on this construction together with dataset versioning rather than on secrecy. The four subsets - repository-level engineering, front-end development, office and business workflows, and red-/blue-team security - probe complementary facets of real work, each with its own verification style. All are packaged in a uniform task-directory format and run, under a uniform and reproducible protocol, on two agent harnesses (CodeBuddy Code and Claude Code); the full open release makes the benchmark reproducible end to end and directly auditable, since any third party can re-run each task and inspect its content. Because each subset uses a different scoring instrument, scores are not comparable across subsets and the suite reports no suite-wide average. We report a cross-model leaderboard across several model families.

StarCraft II is one of the most challenging simulated reinforcement learning environments; it is partially observable, stochastic, multi-agent, and mastering StarCraft II requires strategic planning over long time horizons with real-time low-level execution. It also has an active professional competitive scene. StarCraft II is uniquely suited for advancing offline RL algorithms, both because of its challenging nature and because Blizzard has released a massive dataset of millions of StarCraft II games played by human players. This paper leverages that and establishes a benchmark, called AlphaStar Unplugged, introducing unprecedented challenges for offline reinforcement learning. We define a dataset (a subset of Blizzard's release), tools standardizing an API for machine learning methods, and an evaluation protocol. We also present baseline agents, including behavior cloning, offline variants of actor-critic and MuZero. We improve the state of the art of agents using only offline data, and we achieve 90% win rate against previously published AlphaStar behavior cloning agent.

This paper investigates the use of prior computation to estimate the value function to improve sample efficiency in on-policy policy gradient methods in reinforcement learning. Our approach is to estimate the value function from prior computations, such as from the Q-network learned in DQN or the value function trained for different but related environments. In particular, we learn a new value function for the target task while combining it with a value estimate from the prior computation. Finally, the resulting value function is used as a baseline in the policy gradient method. This use of a baseline has the theoretical property of reducing variance in gradient computation and thus improving sample efficiency. The experiments show the successful use of prior value estimates in various settings and improved sample efficiency in several tasks.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Identifying and articulating limitations is essential for transparent and rigorous scientific research. However, zero-shot large language models (LLMs) approach often produce superficial or general limitation statements (e.g., dataset bias or generalizability). They usually repeat limitations reported by authors without looking at deeper methodological issues and contextual gaps. This problem is made worse because many authors disclose only partial or trivial limitations. We propose LimAgents, a multi-agent LLM framework for generating substantive limitations. LimAgents integrates OpenReview comments and author-stated limitations to provide stronger ground truth. It also uses cited and citing papers to capture broader contextual weaknesses. In this setup, different agents have specific roles as sequential role: some extract explicit limitations, others analyze methodological gaps, some simulate the viewpoint of a peer reviewer, and a citation agent places the work within the larger body of literature. A Judge agent refines their outputs, and a Master agent consolidates them into a clear set. This structure allows for systematic identification of explicit, implicit, peer review-focused, and literature-informed limitations. Moreover, traditional NLP metrics like BLEU, ROUGE, and cosine similarity rely heavily on n-gram or embedding overlap. They often overlook semantically similar limitations. To address this, we introduce a pointwise evaluation protocol that uses an LLM-as-a-Judge to measure coverage more accurately. Experiments show that LimAgents substantially improve performance. The RAG + multi-agent GPT-4o mini configuration achieves a +15.51% coverage gain over zero-shot baselines, while the Llama 3 8B multi-agent setup yields a +4.41% improvement.

Large language model (LLM) powered code agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by automating tasks such as testing, debugging, and repairing, yet the security risks of their generated code have become a critical concern. Existing benchmarks have offered valuable insights but remain insufficient: they often overlook the genuine context in which vulnerabilities were introduced or adopt narrow evaluation protocols that fail to capture either functional correctness or newly introduced vulnerabilities. We therefore introduce SecureAgentBench, a benchmark of 105 coding tasks designed to rigorously evaluate code agents' capabilities in secure code generation. Each task includes (i) realistic task settings that require multi-file edits in large repositories, (ii) aligned contexts based on real-world open-source vulnerabilities with precisely identified introduction points, and (iii) comprehensive evaluation that combines functionality testing, vulnerability checking through proof-of-concept exploits, and detection of newly introduced vulnerabilities using static analysis. We evaluate three representative agents (SWE-agent, OpenHands, and Aider) with three state-of-the-art LLMs (Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4.1, and DeepSeek-V3.1). Results show that (i) current agents struggle to produce secure code, as even the best-performing one, SWE-agent supported by DeepSeek-V3.1, achieves merely 15.2% correct-and-secure solutions, (ii) some agents produce functionally correct code but still introduce vulnerabilities, including new ones not previously recorded, and (iii) adding explicit security instructions for agents does not significantly improve secure coding, underscoring the need for further research. These findings establish SecureAgentBench as a rigorous benchmark for secure code generation and a step toward more reliable software development with LLMs.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Frontier deep research agents (DRAs) plan a research task, synthesize across documents, and return a structured deliverable on demand. They are being deployed in enterprise workflows faster than they are being evaluated. Existing benchmarks measure factual recall, single-hop QA, or generic agentic skill, missing the multi-document, decision-grade work DRAs are deployed to produce. We introduce a benchmark targeting the structured analytical deliverables that fill a management consultant's typical week. We grade three frontier agents, namely Claude Opus 4.6 with web search, OpenAI o3-deep-research, and Google Gemini 3.1 Pro deep-research, on 42 SME-authored prompts. Each of the 126 responses is scored on two layers: deterministic ground-truth verifiers (mean 13.8 per task) and a five-criterion 0-3 SME rubric, composed into a Verifier-Rubric Score (VRS) on 0-100. Most prompts embed cognitive traps that penalize surface-pattern matching. Acceptance under our joint threshold (rubric mean >= 2.5 and verifier rate >= 80%) is uniformly low: Gemini 21.4%, o3 9.5%, Claude 9.5%. Mean VRS scores agree with published rubric-based benchmarks (our top 62.6 vs. APEX-v1 64.2, ProfBench 65.9, ResearchRubrics < 68%), validating the rubric construct. ACCEPT rates sit below APEX-Agents' MC-segment Pass@1 band (12.3-22.7%) on dedicated DR agents; our floor is three points lower despite the harness advantage, opened by stricter conjunctive grading and trap design. Each agent fails distinctively. Claude produces the deliverable most reliably (4.5x the others' rate on file-required tasks) but carries the highest fabrication signature. o3 has the cleanest reasoning average yet drops required sections and propagates arithmetic errors. Gemini is bimodal, with the highest acceptance rate alongside the most zero-scored rubric cells.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

We introduce the Agent GPA (Goal-Plan-Action) framework: an evaluation paradigm based on an agent's operational loop of setting goals, devising plans, and executing actions. The framework includes five evaluation metrics: Goal Fulfillment, Logical Consistency, Execution Efficiency, Plan Quality, and Plan Adherence. Logical Consistency checks that an agent's actions are consistent with its prior actions. Execution Efficiency checks whether the agent executes in the most efficient way to achieve its goal. Plan Quality checks whether an agent's plans are aligned with its goals; Plan Adherence checks if an agent's actions are aligned with its plan; and Goal Fulfillment checks that agent's final outcomes match the stated goals. Our experimental results on two benchmark datasets - the public TRAIL/GAIA dataset and an internal dataset for a production-grade data agent - show that this framework (a) provides a systematic way to cover a broad range of agent failures, including all agent errors on the TRAIL/GAIA benchmark dataset; (b) supports LLM-judges that exhibit strong agreement with human annotation, covering 80% to over 95% errors; and (c) localizes errors with 86% agreement to enable targeted improvement of agent performance.

AI agents are an exciting new research direction, and agent development is driven by benchmarks. Our analysis of current agent benchmarks and evaluation practices reveals several shortcomings that hinder their usefulness in real-world applications. First, there is a narrow focus on accuracy without attention to other metrics. As a result, SOTA agents are needlessly complex and costly, and the community has reached mistaken conclusions about the sources of accuracy gains. Our focus on cost in addition to accuracy motivates the new goal of jointly optimizing the two metrics. We design and implement one such optimization, showing its potential to greatly reduce cost while maintaining accuracy. Second, the benchmarking needs of model and downstream developers have been conflated, making it hard to identify which agent would be best suited for a particular application. Third, many agent benchmarks have inadequate holdout sets, and sometimes none at all. This has led to agents that are fragile because they take shortcuts and overfit to the benchmark in various ways. We prescribe a principled framework for avoiding overfitting. Finally, there is a lack of standardization in evaluation practices, leading to a pervasive lack of reproducibility. We hope that the steps we introduce for addressing these shortcomings will spur the development of agents that are useful in the real world and not just accurate on benchmarks.

LLM agents fail mid-episode -- they loop, cascade tool errors, drift off goal, fabricate results, or silently absorb corrupted content -- and the standard remedy, judging every step with a second LLM, costs more than the agent itself. We ask how much detection is achievable from observable step telemetry alone, using monitors costing microseconds per step and trained only on healthy runs. On 2,823 committed agent episodes across three frameworks, three local models (qwen2.5 7b/3b, llama3.1 8b) and a commercial API (gemini-2.5-flash), a one-class echo-state-network ensemble with CUSUM alarms detects 0.71 of failures at a 5% false-alarm budget (AUROC 0.872). Its advantage over a memoryless baseline is a monotone function of post-onset horizon (+0.09 at <=3 steps, +0.40 at >=9), predicting its own failure region out of sample on AFTraj-2K. Ranking transfers with no retraining to two corpora from other groups (AFTraj-2K 0.745, ATBench 0.779). Monitors carry two burdens: a per-deployment healthy null (they do not transfer -- AUROC 0.527 cold against 0.885 recalibrated) and a residual false-alarm rate. We add a layer carrying neither: deterministic verification, which recomputes a run's stated total from the tool results it actually received and confirms every required call was made. Head-to-head it catches 60% of failures (96% with the coverage check) at 0 of 63 false positives against the monitor's 54% at 17%, transfers unchanged to llama3.1:8b (110 of 110 at 0 of 10), and trips on 0 of 1825 healthy episodes. Detection is then closed into repair: each flagged run is rolled back and re-run live, recovering 45% of failures against a 16% resampling control (p=0.0005) and lifting task success from 52% to 73% for about one extra model call per run. The system runs at ~200 microseconds per step, three orders of magnitude below a judge call. Code, traces and results are released.

Large pre-trained language models have shown promise for few-shot learning, completing text-based tasks given only a few task-specific examples. Will models soon solve classification tasks that have so far been reserved for human research assistants? Existing benchmarks are not designed to measure progress in applied settings, and so don't directly answer this question. The RAFT benchmark (Real-world Annotated Few-shot Tasks) focuses on naturally occurring tasks and uses an evaluation setup that mirrors deployment. Baseline evaluations on RAFT reveal areas current techniques struggle with: reasoning over long texts and tasks with many classes. Human baselines show that some classification tasks are difficult for non-expert humans, reflecting that real-world value sometimes depends on domain expertise. Yet even non-expert human baseline F1 scores exceed GPT-3 by an average of 0.11. The RAFT datasets and leaderboard will track which model improvements translate into real-world benefits at https://raft.elicit.org .

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

Large Language Model agents demonstrate potential in solving real-world problems via tools, yet generalist intelligence is bottlenecked by scarce high-quality, long-horizon data. Existing methods collect privacy-constrained API logs or generate scripted interactions lacking diversity, which struggle to produce data requisite for scaling capabilities. We propose AgentSkiller, a fully automated framework synthesizing multi-turn interaction data across realistic, semantically linked domains. It employs a DAG-based architecture with explicit state transitions to ensure determinism and recoverability. The pipeline builds a domain ontology and Person-Centric Entity Graph, defines tool interfaces via Service Blueprints for Model Context Protocol servers, and populates environments with consistent databases and strict Domain Policies. A cross-domain fusion mechanism links services to simulate complex tasks. Finally, the pipeline creates user tasks by verifying solution paths, filtering via execution-based validation, and generating queries using a Persona-based Simulator for automated rollout. This produces reliable environments with clear state changes. To demonstrate effectiveness, we synthesized approx 11K interaction samples; experimental results indicate that models trained on this dataset achieve significant improvements on function calling over baselines, particularly in larger parameter regimes.

While existing multi-agent systems (MAS) can handle complex problems by enabling collaboration among multiple agents, they are often highly task-specific, relying on manually crafted agent roles and interaction prompts, which leads to increased architectural complexity and limited reusability across tasks. Moreover, most MAS communicate primarily through natural language, making them vulnerable to error accumulation and instability in long-context, multi-stage interactions within internal agent histories. In this work, we propose Agent Primitives, a set of reusable latent building blocks for LLM-based MAS. Inspired by neural network design, where complex models are built from reusable components, we observe that many existing MAS architectures can be decomposed into a small number of recurring internal computation patterns. Based on this observation, we instantiate three primitives: Review, Voting and Selection, and Planning and Execution. All primitives communicate internally via key-value (KV) cache, which improves both robustness and efficiency by mitigating information degradation across multi-stage interactions. To enable automatic system construction, an Organizer agent selects and composes primitives for each query, guided by a lightweight knowledge pool of previously successful configurations, forming a primitive-based MAS. Experiments show that primitives-based MAS improve average accuracy by 12.0-16.5\% over single-agent baselines, reduce token usage and inference latency by approximately 3times-4times compared to text-based MAS, while incurring only 1.3times-1.6times overhead relative to single-agent inference and providing more stable performance across model backbones.

AI agents hold the potential to revolutionize scientific productivity by automating literature reviews, replicating experiments, analyzing data, and even proposing new directions of inquiry; indeed, there are now many such agents, ranging from general-purpose "deep research" systems to specialized science-specific agents, such as AI Scientist and AIGS. Rigorous evaluation of these agents is critical for progress. Yet existing benchmarks fall short on several fronts: they (1) fail to provide holistic, product-informed measures of real-world use cases such as science research; (2) lack reproducible agent tools necessary for a controlled comparison of core agentic capabilities; (3) do not account for confounding variables such as model cost and tool access; (4) do not provide standardized interfaces for quick agent prototyping and evaluation; and (5) lack comprehensive baseline agents necessary to identify true advances. In response, we define principles and tooling for more rigorously benchmarking agents. Using these, we present AstaBench, a suite that provides the first holistic measure of agentic ability to perform scientific research, comprising 2400+ problems spanning the entire scientific discovery process and multiple scientific domains, and including many problems inspired by actual user requests to deployed Asta agents. Our suite comes with the first scientific research environment with production-grade search tools that enable controlled, reproducible evaluation, better accounting for confounders. Alongside, we provide a comprehensive suite of nine science-optimized classes of Asta agents and numerous baselines. Our extensive evaluation of 57 agents across 22 agent classes reveals several interesting findings, most importantly that despite meaningful progress on certain individual aspects, AI remains far from solving the challenge of science research assistance.

Multi-agent LLM systems usually collaborate by exchanging natural-language messages. This interface is simple and interpretable, but it forces each sender's intermediate computation to be serialized into tokens and then reprocessed by the receiver, thereby increasing the generated-token cost, prefill overhead, and KV-cache memory. We study an alternative communication interface: instead of appending a sender's message to the receiver's context, compile the sender's hidden states into a transient, receiver-specific weight perturbation. We introduce TFlow (Thought Flow), a weight-space communication framework for a known and fixed receiver architecture. For each query, frozen role-prompted sender agents process the input, and a learned parameter generator maps their internal activations into low-rank LoRA perturbations targeting the receiver's modules. These perturbations are fused and applied only during the receiver's generation, enabling instance-level adaptation without permanently changing the model or enlarging the receiver's text context. With three Qwen3-4B agents, TFlow improves over a standalone receiver by up to 8.5 accuracy points across five benchmarks while reducing processed tokens by up to 32.69%. Compared with a text-based three-agent baseline, it reduces total processed tokens by up to 83.27% and the wall-clock inference time by up to 4.6times, while maintaining competitive accuracy on four of five benchmarks. These results suggest that transient low-rank weight perturbations can serve as an executable communication medium for efficient multi-agent LLM collaboration.

Open data repositories hold potential for evidence-based decision-making, yet are inaccessible to non-experts lacking expertise in dataset discovery, schema mapping, and statistical analysis. Large language models show promise for individual tasks, but end-to-end analytical workflows expose fundamental limitations: attention dilutes across growing contexts, specialized reasoning patterns interfere, and errors propagate undetected. We present PublicAgent, a multi-agent framework that addresses these limitations through decomposition into specialized agents for intent clarification, dataset discovery, analysis, and reporting. This architecture maintains focused attention within agent contexts and enables validation at each stage. Evaluation across five models and 50 queries derives five design principles for multi-agent LLM systems. First, specialization provides value independent of model strength--even the strongest model shows 97.5% agent win rates, with benefits orthogonal to model scale. Second, agents divide into universal (discovery, analysis) and conditional (report, intent) categories. Universal agents show consistent effectiveness (std dev 12.4%) while conditional agents vary by model (std dev 20.5%). Third, agents mitigate distinct failure modes--removing discovery or analysis causes catastrophic failures (243-280 instances), while removing report or intent causes quality degradation. Fourth, architectural benefits persist across task complexity with stable win rates (86-92% analysis, 84-94% discovery), indicating workflow management value rather than reasoning enhancement. Fifth, wide variance in agent effectiveness across models (42-96% for analysis) requires model-aware architecture design. These principles guide when and why specialization is necessary for complex analytical workflows while enabling broader access to public data through natural language interfaces.

As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly automate complex web tasks, they boost productivity while simultaneously introducing new security risks. However, relevant studies on web agent attacks remain limited. Existing red-teaming approaches mainly rely on manually crafted attack strategies or static models trained offline. Such methods fail to capture the underlying behavioral patterns of web agents, making it difficult to generalize across diverse environments. In web agent attacks, success requires the continuous discovery and evolution of attack strategies. To this end, we propose Genesis, a novel agentic framework composed of three modules: Attacker, Scorer, and Strategist. The Attacker generates adversarial injections by integrating the genetic algorithm with a hybrid strategy representation. The Scorer evaluates the target web agent's responses to provide feedback. The Strategist dynamically uncovers effective strategies from interaction logs and compiles them into a continuously growing strategy library, which is then re-deployed to enhance the Attacker's effectiveness. Extensive experiments across various web tasks show that our framework discovers novel strategies and consistently outperforms existing attack baselines.

Automated program repair (APR) has recently shifted toward large language models and agent-based systems, yet most systems rely on local snapshot context, overlooking repository history. Prior work shows that repository history helps repair single-line bugs, since the last commit touching the buggy line is often the bug-introducing one. In this paper, we investigate whether repository history can also improve agentic APR systems at scale, especially for complex multi-hunk bugs. We present HAFixAgent, a History-Aware Bug-Fixing Agent that injects blame-derived repository heuristics into its repair loop. A preliminary study of all 854 real-world bugs from Defects4J motivates our design, showing that bug-relevant history is both widely available and highly concentrated. Empirical comparison of HAFixAgent with two state-of-the-art baselines shows: (1) Effectiveness: HAFixAgent significantly improves over the agent-based baseline (by 212.3%) and the multi-hunk baseline (by 29.9%). (2) Efficiency: history does not significantly increase agent steps and keeps token costs comparable, with notably lower median costs for complex multi-file-multi-hunk bugs. (3) Practicality: combining different historical heuristics repairs more bugs, offering a clear cost-benefit trade-off. HAFixAgent offers a practical recipe for history-aware agentic APR: ground the agent in version control history, prioritize diff-based historical context, and integrate complementary heuristics when needed.

Large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks that propagate through multi-step workflows, tool interactions, and persistent context, making input-output filtering alone insufficient for reliable protection. This paper presents SafeAgent, a runtime security architecture that treats agent safety as a stateful decision problem over evolving interaction trajectories. The proposed design separates execution governance from semantic risk reasoning through two coordinated components: a runtime controller that mediates actions around the agent loop and a context-aware decision core that operates over persistent session state. The core is formalized as a context-aware advanced machine intelligence and instantiated through operators for risk encoding, utility-cost evaluation, consequence modeling, policy arbitration, and state synchronization. Experiments on Agent Security Bench (ASB) and InjecAgent show that SafeAgent consistently improves robustness over baseline and text-level guardrail methods while maintaining competitive benign-task performance. Ablation studies further show that recovery confidence and policy weighting determine distinct safety-utility operating points.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

LLM agents like Claude Code can not only write code but also be used for autonomous AI research and engineering rank2026posttrainbench, novikov2025alphaevolve. We show that an autoresearch-style pipeline karpathy2026autoresearch powered by Claude Code discovers novel white-box adversarial attack algorithms that significantly outperform all existing (30+) methods in jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations. Starting from existing attack implementations, such as GCG~zou2023universal, the agent iterates to produce new algorithms achieving up to 40\% attack success rate on CBRN queries against GPT-OSS-Safeguard-20B, compared to leq10\% for existing algorithms (fig:teaser, left). The discovered algorithms generalize: attacks optimized on surrogate models transfer directly to held-out models, achieving 100\% ASR against Meta-SecAlign-70B chen2025secalign versus 56\% for the best baseline (fig:teaser, middle). Extending the findings of~carlini2025autoadvexbench, our results are an early demonstration that incremental safety and security research can be automated using LLM agents. White-box adversarial red-teaming is particularly well-suited for this: existing methods provide strong starting points, and the optimization objective yields dense, quantitative feedback. We release all discovered attacks alongside baseline implementations and evaluation code at https://github.com/romovpa/claudini.

Spec-driven development (SDD) with AI coding agents provides a structured workflow, but agents often remain "context blind" in large, evolving repositories, leading to hallucinated APIs and architectural violations. We present Spec Kit Agents, a multi-agent SDD pipeline (with PM and developer roles) that adds phase-level, context-grounding hooks. Read-only probing hooks ground each stage (Specify, Plan, Tasks, Implement) in repository evidence, while validation hooks check intermediate artifacts against the environment. We evaluate 128 runs covering 32 features across five repositories. Context-grounding hooks improve judged quality by +0.15 on a 1-5 composite LLM-as-judge score (+3.0 percent of the full score; Wilcoxon signed-rank, p < 0.05) while maintaining 99.7-100 percent repository-level test compatibility. We further evaluate the framework on SWE-bench Lite, where augmentation hooks improve baseline by 1.7 percent, achieving 58.2 percent Pass@1.

Data analytics is essential for extracting valuable insights from data that can assist organizations in making effective decisions. We introduce InsightBench, a benchmark dataset with three key features. First, it consists of 100 datasets representing diverse business use cases such as finance and incident management, each accompanied by a carefully curated set of insights planted in the datasets. Second, unlike existing benchmarks focusing on answering single queries, InsightBench evaluates agents based on their ability to perform end-to-end data analytics, including formulating questions, interpreting answers, and generating a summary of insights and actionable steps. Third, we conducted comprehensive quality assurance to ensure that each dataset in the benchmark had clear goals and included relevant and meaningful questions and analysis. Furthermore, we implement a two-way evaluation mechanism using LLaMA-3 as an effective, open-source evaluator to assess agents' ability to extract insights. We also propose AgentPoirot, our baseline data analysis agent capable of performing end-to-end data analytics. Our evaluation on InsightBench shows that AgentPoirot outperforms existing approaches (such as Pandas Agent) that focus on resolving single queries. We also compare the performance of open- and closed-source LLMs and various evaluation strategies. Overall, this benchmark serves as a testbed to motivate further development in comprehensive automated data analytics and can be accessed here: https://github.com/ServiceNow/insight-bench.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used for complex information-extraction tasks, yet it remains unclear whether agentic components such as reflection and memory lead to observable and controllable improvements over fixed LLM workflows. We study this question through conference-paper dataset extraction, where a system must identify datasets mentioned in scholarly PDFs and produce structured records. We compare a fixed workflow baseline with reflective agent variants and specify an optimized agent condition (S2) that extends the same task with richer PDF tools and dynamic tool selection. Our evaluation emphasizes process-level behavior--including tool execution, retries, reflection, memory use, runtime, and failure recovery--while treating extraction coverage and field completeness as secondary outcome measures. The paper characterizes when agentic mechanisms change system behavior, whether these changes improve task completion, and how the observed failure modes motivate an optimized agent design under the same evaluation harness.

GUI agents powered by vision-language models (VLMs) show promise in automating complex digital tasks. However, their effectiveness in real-world applications is often limited by scarce training data and the inherent complexity of these tasks, which frequently require long-tailed knowledge covering rare, unseen scenarios. We propose RAG-GUI , a lightweight VLM that leverages web tutorials at inference time. RAG-GUI is first warm-started via supervised finetuning (SFT) and further refined through self-guided rejection sampling finetuning (RSF). Designed to be model-agnostic, RAG-GUI functions as a generic plug-in that enhances any VLM-based agent. Evaluated across three distinct tasks, it consistently outperforms baseline agents and surpasses other inference baselines by 2.6% to 13.3% across two model sizes, demonstrating strong generalization and practical plug-and-play capabilities in real-world scenarios.

We present SimpleSearch-VL, an efficient, reliable, and practical framework for multimodal agentic search. Its core idea is to improve the agent's own search-and-verification process rather than scaling data, tools, or auxiliary model components. For efficiency, Factorized Adaptive Rollout (FAR) improves sampling efficiency by forming more informative training groups while using redundant samples to mitigate long-tail latency and expose hard samples. For reliability, SimpleSearch-VL performs evidence-verified reasoning, explicitly using chain-of-thought verification to assess the relevance of retrieved visual and textual cues to the original context. For practicality, SimpleSearch-VL keeps a lightweight tool interface and performs webpage self-summary within the agent, requiring no additional external dependencies. With only 5K supervised tool-interleaved trajectories and 2K RL data, SimpleSearch-VL improves Qwen3-VL agentic baselines by 15.8 and 16.0 average points for the 8B and 30B-A3B variants, respectively. The SimpleSearch-VL-30B-A3B model further achieves performance competitive with agentic Gemini-3-Pro.

Large language and vision-language models increasingly power agents that act on a user's behalf through command-line interface (CLI) harnesses. However, most agent benchmarks still rely on synthetic sandboxes, short-horizon tasks, mock-service APIs, and final-answer checks, leaving open whether agents can complete realistic long-horizon work in the runtimes where they are deployed. This work presents WildClawBench, a native-runtime benchmark of 60 human-authored, bilingual, multimodal tasks spanning six thematic categories. Each task averages roughly 8 minutes of wall-clock time and over 20 tool calls, and runs inside a reproducible Docker container hosting an actual CLI agent harness (OpenClaw, Claude Code, Codex, or Hermes Agent) with access to real tools rather than mock services. Grading is hybrid, combining deterministic rule-based checks, environment-state auditing of side effects, and an LLM/VLM judge for semantic verification. Across 19 frontier models, the best, Claude Opus 4.7, reaches only 62.2% overall under OpenClaw, while every other model stays below 60%, and switching harness alone shifts a single model by up to 18 points. These results show that long-horizon, native-runtime agent evaluation remains a far-from-resolved task for current frontier models. We release the tasks, code, and containerized tooling to support reproducible evaluation.

The deployment of machine learning models in operational contexts represents a significant investment for any organisation. Consequently, the risk of these models being misappropriated by competitors needs to be addressed. In recent years, numerous proposals have been put forth to detect instances of model stealing. However, these proposals operate under implicit and disparate data and model access assumptions; as a consequence, it remains unclear how they can be effectively compared to one another. Our evaluation shows that a simple baseline that we introduce performs on par with existing state-of-the-art fingerprints, which, on the other hand, are much more complex. To uncover the reasons behind this intriguing result, this paper introduces a systematic approach to both the creation of model fingerprinting schemes and their evaluation benchmarks. By dividing model fingerprinting into three core components -- Query, Representation and Detection (QuRD) -- we are able to identify sim100 previously unexplored QuRD combinations and gain insights into their performance. Finally, we introduce a set of metrics to compare and guide the creation of more representative model stealing detection benchmarks. Our approach reveals the need for more challenging benchmarks and a sound comparison with baselines. To foster the creation of new fingerprinting schemes and benchmarks, we open-source our fingerprinting toolbox.

The literature has witnessed an emerging interest in AI agents for automated assessment of scientific papers. Existing benchmarks focus primarily on the computational aspect of this task, testing agents' ability to reproduce or replicate research outcomes when having access to the code and data. This setting, while foundational, (1) fails to capture the inconsistent availability of new data for replication as opposed to reproduction, and (2) lacks ground-truth diversity by focusing only on reproducible papers, thereby failing to evaluate an agent's ability to identify non-replicable research. Furthermore, most benchmarks only evaluate outcomes rather than the replication process. In response, we introduce ReplicatorBench, an end-to-end benchmark, including human-verified replicable and non-replicable research claims in social and behavioral sciences for evaluating AI agents in research replication across three stages: (1) extraction and retrieval of replication data; (2) design and execution of computational experiments; and (3) interpretation of results, allowing a test of AI agents' capability to mimic the activities of human replicators in real world. To set a baseline of AI agents' capability, we develop ReplicatorAgent, an agentic framework equipped with necessary tools, like web search and iterative interaction with sandboxed environments, to accomplish tasks in ReplicatorBench. We evaluate ReplicatorAgent across four underlying large language models (LLMs), as well as different design choices of programming language and levels of code access. Our findings reveal that while current LLM agents are capable of effectively designing and executing computational experiments, they struggle with retrieving resources, such as new data, necessary to replicate a claim. All code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/CenterForOpenScience/llm-benchmarking.

The deployment of agent systems in an enterprise environment is often hindered by several challenges: common models lack domain-specific process knowledge, leading to disorganized plans, missing key tools, and poor execution stability. To address this, this paper introduces Routine, a multi-step agent planning framework designed with a clear structure, explicit instructions, and seamless parameter passing to guide the agent's execution module in performing multi-step tool-calling tasks with high stability. In evaluations conducted within a real-world enterprise scenario, Routine significantly increases the execution accuracy in model tool calls, increasing the performance of GPT-4o from 41.1% to 96.3%, and Qwen3-14B from 32.6% to 83.3%. We further constructed a Routine-following training dataset and fine-tuned Qwen3-14B, resulting in an accuracy increase to 88.2% on scenario-specific evaluations, indicating improved adherence to execution plans. In addition, we employed Routine-based distillation to create a scenario-specific, multi-step tool-calling dataset. Fine-tuning on this distilled dataset raised the model's accuracy to 95.5%, approaching GPT-4o's performance. These results highlight Routine's effectiveness in distilling domain-specific tool-usage patterns and enhancing model adaptability to new scenarios. Our experimental results demonstrate that Routine provides a practical and accessible approach to building stable agent workflows, accelerating the deployment and adoption of agent systems in enterprise environments, and advancing the technical vision of AI for Process.

The A2AS framework is introduced as a security layer for AI agents and LLM-powered applications, similar to how HTTPS secures HTTP. A2AS enforces certified behavior, activates model self-defense, and ensures context window integrity. It defines security boundaries, authenticates prompts, applies security rules and custom policies, and controls agentic behavior, enabling a defense-in-depth strategy. The A2AS framework avoids latency overhead, external dependencies, architectural changes, model retraining, and operational complexity. The BASIC security model is introduced as the A2AS foundation: (B) Behavior certificates enable behavior enforcement, (A) Authenticated prompts enable context window integrity, (S) Security boundaries enable untrusted input isolation, (I) In-context defenses enable secure model reasoning, (C) Codified policies enable application-specific rules. This first paper in the series introduces the BASIC security model and the A2AS framework, exploring their potential toward establishing the A2AS industry standard.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

Large-language models (LLMs) have demonstrated powerful problem-solving capabilities, in particular when organized in multi-agent systems. However, the advent of such systems also raises several questions on the ability of a complex network of agents to effectively self-organize and collaborate. While measuring performance on standard reasoning benchmarks indicates how well multi-agent systems can solve reasoning tasks, it is unclear whether these systems are able to leverage their topology effectively. Here, we propose AgentsNet, a new benchmark for multi-agent reasoning. By drawing inspiration from classical problems in distributed systems and graph theory, AgentsNet measures the ability of multi-agent systems to collaboratively form strategies for problem-solving, self-organization, and effective communication given a network topology. We evaluate a variety of baseline methods on AgentsNet including homogeneous networks of agents which first have to agree on basic protocols for organization and communication. We find that some frontier LLMs are already demonstrating strong performance for small networks but begin to fall off once the size of the network scales. While existing multi-agent benchmarks cover at most 2-5 agents, AgentsNet is practically unlimited in size and can scale with new generations of LLMs. As such, we also probe frontier models in a setup with up to 100 agents.

We revisit the performance of the classic gradual magnitude pruning (GMP) baseline for large language models, focusing on the classic BERT benchmark on various popular tasks. Despite existing evidence in the literature that GMP performs poorly, we show that a simple and general variant, which we call GMP*, can match and sometimes outperform more complex state-of-the-art methods. Our results provide a simple yet strong baseline for future work, highlight the importance of parameter tuning for baselines, and even improve the performance of the state-of-the-art second-order pruning method in this setting.

The advancement in Large Language Models has driven the creation of complex agentic systems, such as Deep Research Agents (DRAs), to overcome the limitations of static Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines in handling complex, multi-turn research tasks. This paper introduces the Static Deep Research Agent (Static-DRA), a novel solution built upon a configurable and hierarchical Tree-based static workflow. The core contribution is the integration of two user-tunable parameters, Depth and Breadth, which provide granular control over the research intensity. This design allows end-users to consciously balance the desired quality and comprehensiveness of the research report against the associated computational cost of Large Language Model (LLM) interactions. The agent's architecture, comprising Supervisor, Independent, and Worker agents, facilitates effective multi-hop information retrieval and parallel sub-topic investigation. We evaluate the Static-DRA against the established DeepResearch Bench using the RACE (Reference-based Adaptive Criteria-driven Evaluation) framework. Configured with a depth of 2 and a breadth of 5, and powered by the gemini-2.5-pro model, the agent achieved an overall score of 34.72. Our experiments validate that increasing the configured Depth and Breadth parameters results in a more in-depth research process and a correspondingly higher evaluation score. The Static-DRA offers a pragmatic and resource-aware solution, empowering users with transparent control over the deep research process. The entire source code, outputs and benchmark results are open-sourced at https://github.com/SauravP97/Static-Deep-Research/

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Automated evaluation of tool-using large language model (LLM) agents is widely assumed to be reliable, but this assumption has rarely been validated against human annotation. We introduce AgentProp-Bench, a 2,000-task benchmark with 2,300 traces across four domains, nine production LLMs, and a 100-label human-validated subset. We quantify judge reliability, characterize error propagation, and evaluate a runtime mitigation. Substring-based judging agrees with human annotation at kappa=0.049 (chance-level); a three-LLM ensemble reaches kappa=0.432 (moderate) with a conservative bias. Under validated evaluation, a parameter-level injection propagates to a wrong final answer with human-calibrated probability approximately 0.62 (range 0.46-0.73 across models). Rejection (catching bad parameters) and recovery (correcting after acceptance) are independent model capabilities (Spearman rho=0.126, p=0.747). A tuned runtime interceptor reduces hallucination on GPT-4o-mini by 23.0 percentage points under a concurrent n=600 control, but shows no significant effect on Gemini-2.0-Flash, whose aggressive parameter rejection eliminates the target failure mode. All code, data, traces, and human labels are released at https://github.com/bhaskargurram-ai/agenthallu-bench.

AI coding agents produce code faster than humans can review it. In our approach, the prover is the judge of whether the code is correct. Under a verifier-driven loop, AI agents wrote and verified bare-metal security software in Ada/SPARK spanning classical and post-quantum cryptography, TLS 1.3, IKEv2, X.509, and a Matrix client. GNATprove discharged 49,280 proof obligations, established functional correctness for selected primitives, and proved the absence of run-time errors for the rest, at roughly 20-40 times lower supervision cost than comparable hand verification. GNATprove alone was insufficient: some defects could not be detected and were resolved using known-answer tests, interoperability, or human review of specifications. Given weak checks, the agent tried to bypass them and reported success. We report where each layer caught faults and draw the central lesson: what an agent can be trusted to establish is bounded by the strength of its feedback.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

LLM agents increasingly act on users' personal information, yet existing privacy defenses remain limited in both design and adaptability. Most prior approaches rely on static or passive defenses, such as prompting and guarding. These paradigms are insufficient for supporting contextual, proactive privacy decisions in multi-step agent execution. We propose Contextualized Defense Instructing (CDI), a new privacy defense paradigm in which an instructor model generates step-specific, context-aware privacy guidance during execution, proactively shaping actions rather than merely constraining or vetoing them. Crucially, CDI is paired with an experience-driven optimization framework that trains the instructor via reinforcement learning (RL), where we convert failure trajectories with privacy violations into learning environments. We formalize baseline defenses and CDI as distinct intervention points in a canonical agent loop, and compare their privacy-helpfulness trade-offs within a unified simulation framework. Results show that our CDI consistently achieves a better balance between privacy preservation (94.2%) and helpfulness (80.6%) than baselines, with superior robustness to adversarial conditions and generalization.

Prompt injection poses significant security risks to LLM agents. Efficient and effective red-teaming is therefore critical, both for evaluating these risks and for collecting training data to improve defenses. Existing state-of-the-art prompt injection red-teaming methods primarily rely on reinforcement learning (RL), producing attacker models that often generalize poorly to new target LLMs. In this work, we develop PIMiner, an agentic system for prompt injection red-teaming. During training, PIMiner is trained on a sequence of (dataset, target model) pairs and builds a strategy library from scratch. At test time, the learned strategy library can be directly transferred to a previously unseen target LLM without additional training. PIMiner requires only a small number of queries to a target agent (e.g., 10) per test sample. Experimental results demonstrate that PIMiner achieves strong performance. On IPIArena, it attains a 76.2% ASR against Gemini-2.5-Pro, 61.9% ASR against GPT-5.1, and 42.9% ASR against Claude-Sonnet-4.5. On AgentDojo, it achieves an 86.7% ASR against Gemini-2.5-Pro, 53.3% ASR against GPT-5.1, and 40.0% ASR against Claude-Sonnet-4.5.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are inclined explore Small Language Models (SLMs) as edge-native constitutional firewalls to vet proposals and mitigate semantic social engineering. While scaling inference-time compute (System 2) enhances formal logic, its efficacy in highly adversarial, cryptoeconomic governance environments remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce Sentinel-Bench, an 840-inference empirical framework executing a strict intra-model ablation on Qwen-3.5-9B. By toggling latent reasoning across frozen weights, we isolate the impact of inference-time compute against an adversarial Optimism DAO dataset. Our findings reveal a severe compute-accuracy inversion. The autoregressive baseline (System 1) achieved 100% adversarial robustness, 100% juridical consistency, and state finality in under 13 seconds. Conversely, System 2 reasoning introduced catastrophic instability, fundamentally driven by a 26.7% Reasoning Non-Convergence (cognitive collapse) rate. This collapse degraded trial-to-trial consensus stability to 72.6% and imposed a 17x latency overhead, introducing critical vulnerabilities to Governance Extractable Value (GEV) and hardware centralization. While rare (1.5% of adversarial trials), we empirically captured "Reasoning-Induced Sycophancy," where the model generated significantly longer internal monologues (averaging 25,750 characters) to rationalize failing the adversarial trap. We conclude that for edge-native SLMs operating under Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) constraints, System 1 parameterized intuition is structurally and economically superior to System 2 iterative deliberation for decentralized consensus. Code and Dataset: https://github.com/smarizvi110/sentinel-bench

Graphical user interface (GUI) agents have advanced rapidly but still struggle with complex tasks involving novel UI elements, long-horizon actions, and personalized trajectories. In this work, we introduce Instruction Agent, a GUI agent that leverages expert demonstrations to solve such tasks, enabling completion of otherwise difficult workflows. Given a single demonstration, the agent extracts step-by-step instructions and executes them by strictly following the trajectory intended by the user, which avoids making mistakes during execution. The agent leverages the verifier and backtracker modules further to improve robustness. Both modules are critical to understand the current outcome from each action and handle unexpected interruptions(such as pop-up windows) during execution. Our experiments show that Instruction Agent achieves a 60% success rate on a set of tasks in OSWorld that all top-ranked agents failed to complete. The Instruction Agent offers a practical and extensible framework, bridging the gap between current GUI agents and reliable real-world GUI task automation.

Despite the potential of language model-based agents to solve real-world tasks such as web navigation, current methods still struggle with long-horizon tasks with complex action trajectories. In contrast, humans can flexibly solve complex tasks by learning reusable task workflows from past experiences and using them to guide future actions. To build agents that can similarly benefit from this process, we introduce Agent Workflow Memory (AWM), a method for inducing commonly reused routines, i.e., workflows, and selectively providing workflows to the agent to guide subsequent generations. AWM flexibly applies to both offline and online scenarios, where agents induce workflows from training examples beforehand or from test queries on the fly. We experiment on two major web navigation benchmarks -- Mind2Web and WebArena -- that collectively cover 1000+ tasks from 200+ domains across travel, shopping, and social media, among others. AWM substantially improves the baseline results by 24.6% and 51.1% relative success rate on Mind2Web and WebArena while reducing the number of steps taken to solve WebArena tasks successfully. Furthermore, online AWM robustly generalizes in cross-task, website, and domain evaluations, surpassing baselines from 8.9 to 14.0 absolute points as train-test task distribution gaps widen.

Language agents, i.e., LLM agents, progress rapidly and are increasingly deployed in production environments. This trend underscores the urgent need for rigorous and realistic evaluations. However, most existing benchmarks evaluate agents in simplified, idealized settings. They typically rely on pre-packaged tool interfaces, overlook critical steps, and assume inputs are clean and fully specified. Consequently, they understate the difficulty of real deployments, where uncertainty and noise are ubiquitous and agents must proactively explore the environment to uncover new tools. To bridge this gap, we present AgentGym2, a new evaluation framework with task instances grounded in real-world end-to-end working demands. Beyond reasoning and planning, it measures agents' ability to execute end-to-end procedures, discover tools via exploration, compose tools for unseen tasks, and remain robust to noisy and underspecified information. Experiments on 15 proprietary and open-source models show that even SOTA systems like Gemini and GPT-5 struggle on AgentGym2, revealing a substantial gap between the capability of current agents and the demands of real-world applications.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

Tool-augmented vision-language agents can acquire external perceptual evidence through OCR, detection, segmentation, and other tools, but executing every proposed tool call is costly and sometimes unnecessary. We study the pre-call control problem: after a ReAct-style VLM agent proposes a perceptual tool call, should the call be executed, or skipped before its output enters the context? Across five benchmarks, we find that the baseline agent exhibits poor local selectivity: helpful and harmful calls occur at similar rates (11.8% vs. 9.9%), while most calls do not change the immediate forced-answer prediction. We introduce ToolGate, a lightweight external controller that predicts execute/skip decisions from trajectory text and simple structural features. Across two Qwen3-VL backbones, ToolGate reduces token cost to 64-69% of the unrestricted ReAct baseline while preserving average accuracy in cross-domain settings. With matched-domain trajectory training on Qwen3-VL-30B, it further improves average accuracy by 1.65 points. These results show that tool-augmented VLM agents benefit not only from better perceptual tools, but also from explicit control over when tool outputs are worth paying for.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.

Benchmarks are essential for quantitatively tracking progress in AI. As AI agents become increasingly capable, researchers and practitioners have introduced agentic benchmarks to evaluate agents on complex, real-world tasks. These benchmarks typically measure agent capabilities by evaluating task outcomes via specific reward designs. However, we show that many agentic benchmarks have issues task setup or reward design. For example, SWE-bench Verified uses insufficient test cases, while TAU-bench counts empty responses as successful. Such issues can lead to under- or overestimation agents' performance by up to 100% in relative terms. To make agentic evaluation rigorous, we introduce the Agentic Benchmark Checklist (ABC), a set of guidelines that we synthesized from our benchmark-building experience, a survey of best practices, and previously reported issues. When applied to CVE-Bench, a benchmark with a particularly complex evaluation design, ABC reduces the performance overestimation by 33%.

Agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise for performing sophisticated software engineering tasks autonomously. In addition, there has been progress towards developing agents that can perform parts of the research pipeline in machine learning and the natural sciences. We argue that research extension and its implementation is a critical capability for such systems, and introduce RExBench to support the evaluation of this capability. RExBench is a benchmark consisting of 12 realistic research experiment implementation tasks that aim to investigate research hypotheses that have not previously been implemented. Each task is set up as an extension to an existing research paper and codebase, accompanied by domain expert-written instructions. RExBench is robust to data contamination, and supports an automatic evaluation infrastructure that executes agent outputs to determine whether the success criteria are met. We use this benchmark to evaluate nine LLM agents implemented using three different frameworks: aider, Claude Code, and OpenHands. We find that all agents evaluated fail to autonomously implement the majority of the extensions. Although the success rate improves with additional human-written hints, the best performance under this setting remains below 40%. This indicates that current agents are still short of being able to handle realistic research extension tasks without substantial human guidance.