Daily Papers

Self-consistency assumes the most frequent answer among sampled reasoning traces is the most reliable, but this can fail in causal reasoning: samples often repeat the same confounding error, and votes fragment across multiple valid answers, letting an invalid answer win despite a valid minority trace. We introduce CALVER (Causal Axiom-Level VERification), a training-free symbolic verifier that scores structured traces against Pearl's causal criteria, including -separation, backdoor adjustment, and intervention, and selects the highest-scoring candidate without consulting a reference answer. On CLEAR find-one-valid queries that admit multiple graph-valid answers, CALVER reaches 42.1% where plurality, a reward model, an LLM judge, and model confidence remain near 30% on identical frozen pools. Scaling the judge to 72B does not close the gap. In an audited clean-core subset, 11 of 21 graph-valid CALVER selections differ from the benchmark's listed answer while still satisfying the requested predicate. The advantage widens with the sampling budget and reproduces across ten published Bayesian networks, a second model family, and settings where the model must build the graph from text. CALVER also improves thresholded average-treatment-effect decisions against exact ground truth, generalizes to logic under a truth-table checker, and scores each candidate in milliseconds on CPU. CALVER needs only a causal structure, supplied outright or built from the text; wherever that holds, selection can aggregate via causal validity.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

Multi-agent LLM systems are often expected to improve as team size increases, yet the scaling behavior may depend on task structure. Our central contribution is to introduce Steiner's taxonomy of group tasks as a framework for analyzing multi-agent LLM scaling and focusing the analysis on disjunctive and compensatory tasks. We model independently sampled agents as conditionally independent given the item, which yields their large-team limits: plurality voting converges to the model's modal answer, and averaging converges to the model's item-level bias. Across selected representative benchmarks, 13 open-weight models, and teams of up to 30 agents, we find qualitatively different scaling behavior. On disjunctive tasks, the probability that at least one agent is correct grows by 5-20 points with team size, but plurality voting over agents that answer directly realises almost none of this potential, as the model predicts to within 0.5 points on average. Multi-round revision raises accuracy considerably, yet the gain is nearly the same with one peer as with 29. In contrast, scaling provides little benefit on Fermi estimation, despite its natural suitability for aggregation: item-level biases shared across the samples of a model account for about 87% of the squared error, so averaging reduces error by only about 6%. Combining model families helps on Fermi estimation but does not surpass the strongest member on disjunctive tasks. These results show that task structure, together with the mechanism combining member outputs, is a fundamental determinant of team scaling.

Multi-agent debate, where teams of LLMs iteratively exchange rationales and vote on answers, is widely deployed under the assumption that peer review filters hallucinations. Yet the failure dynamics of homogeneous debate remain poorly understood, therefore we report findings from a controlled empirical study of teams of N{=}10 homogeneous agents (Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, Ministral-3-8B) across R{=}3 debate rounds on two high-difficulty benchmarks (GSM-Hard and MMLU-Hard). We compare peer debate against isolated self-correction and a stochastic noise control that injects rationales from unrelated problems. We decompose debate failure into three model-dependent pathways: sycophantic conformity, where agents uncritically adopt majority answers (modal adoption up to 85.5%); contextual fragility, where peer rationales destabilize previously correct reasoning (vulnerability rate up to 70.0%); and consensus collapse, where plurality voting discards correct answers already present in the generation pool (oracle gap up to 32.3 percentage points). Ablations over communication density (K in {2,4,9}) and sampling temperature (T in {0.4, 0.7}) show that conformity reaches high levels at minimal peer exposure (K{=}2) and intensifies with greater initial diversity. Across all configurations, debate consumes 2.1-3.4times more tokens (up to 28,631 tokens per problem) than self-correction for equal or lower accuracy. Our results indicate that, within the 7-8B parameter class, homogeneous teams without structured roles do not benefit from unguided peer exchange, and that isolated self-correction consistently offers a more favorable cost-accuracy tradeoff.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

Voting over multiple LLM responses is a common primitive in test-time scaling and ensemble inference. Collecting more responses can expand the candidate pool and increase the chance that a correct answer is discovered. Under a fixed call budget, a discovered answer still needs to accumulate enough support within the remaining calls to become the final plurality winner, creating a discovery-to-decision gap. In this work, we characterize this gap through the realized vote state and remaining call budget. We derive a sharp recoverability threshold and show that, as sampling proceeds, the observed candidate set can only expand while the set of reachable endpoint winners can only contract, inducing a candidate-level conversion window. Under a specified iid response law, the same state yields exact finite-horizon endpoint probabilities. We further show that merging wrong-answer identities preserves single-call correctness and cannot improve plurality accuracy, and that the effect of redistributing wrong-answer probability depends on the realized vote state. Singleton reachability yields a gold-free exact locking certificate. For a known answer universe, its first trigger is the earliest prefix at which all admissible continuations yield the same fixed-budget output. Empirically, most discovered-but-unselected correct answers lose reachability only after discovery. In a controlled Word16 study, input permutation improves raw-plurality accuracy by 21.1 points with essentially unchanged single-call correctness. Exact locking saves 28-30% of calls at a 16-call budget while preserving every fixed-budget output.

Majority voting over multiple LLM attempts improves mathematical reasoning, but correlated errors limit the effective sample size. A natural fix is to assign different reasoning strategies to different voters. The approach, Diverse Prompt Mixer, is tested on the AIMO 3 competition: 3 models, 23+ experiments, 50 IMO-level problems, one H100 80 GB, 5-hour limit. Every prompt-level intervention fails. High-temperature sampling already decorrelates errors; weaker strategies reduce accuracy more than they reduce correlation. Across an 8-point capability gap at equal N=8 and every optimization tested, model capability dominates. The gap between the best majority-vote score (42/50) and pass@20 (~45.5) is selection loss, not prompt loss. A verifier-based selector could close it. Prompt engineering cannot.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

Recent debates raised concerns that language models may favor certain viewpoints. But what if the solution is not to aim for a 'view from nowhere' but rather to leverage different viewpoints? We introduce Plurals, a system and Python library for pluralistic AI deliberation. Plurals consists of Agents (LLMs, optionally with personas) which deliberate within customizable Structures, with Moderators overseeing deliberation. Plurals is a generator of simulated social ensembles. Plurals integrates with government datasets to create nationally representative personas, includes deliberation templates inspired by deliberative democracy, and allows users to customize both information-sharing structures and deliberation behavior within Structures. Six case studies demonstrate fidelity to theoretical constructs and efficacy. Three randomized experiments show simulated focus groups produced output resonant with an online sample of the relevant audiences (chosen over zero-shot generation in 75% of trials). Plurals is both a paradigm and a concrete system for pluralistic AI. The Plurals library is available at https://github.com/josh-ashkinaze/plurals and will be continually updated.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

Citizens' assemblies are a form of democratic innovation in which a randomly selected panel of constituents deliberates on questions of public interest. We study a novel goal for the selection of panel members: maximizing the entropy of the distribution over possible panels. We design algorithms that sample from maximum-entropy distributions, potentially subject to constraints on the individual selection probabilities. We investigate the properties of these algorithms theoretically, including in terms of their resistance to manipulation and transparency. We benchmark our algorithms on a large set of real assembly lotteries in terms of their intersectional diversity and the probability of satisfying unseen representation constraints, and we obtain favorable results on both measures. We deploy one of our algorithms on a website for citizens' assembly practitioners.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has significantly enhanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but its reliance on expensive human-labeled data or complex reward models severely limits scalability. While existing self-feedback methods aim to address this problem, they are constrained by the capabilities of a single model, which can lead to overconfidence in incorrect answers, reward hacking, and even training collapse. To this end, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Coevolutionary Collective Feedback (RLCCF), a novel RL framework that enables multi-model collaborative evolution without external supervision. Specifically, RLCCF optimizes the ability of a model collective by maximizing its Collective Consistency (CC), which jointly trains a diverse ensemble of LLMs and provides reward signals by voting on collective outputs. Moreover, each model's vote is weighted by its Self-Consistency (SC) score, ensuring that more confident models contribute more to the collective decision. Benefiting from the diverse output distributions and complementary abilities of multiple LLMs, RLCCF enables the model collective to continuously enhance its reasoning ability through coevolution. Experiments on four mainstream open-source LLMs across four mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our framework yields significant performance gains, achieving an average relative improvement of 16.72\% in accuracy. Notably, RLCCF not only improves the performance of individual models but also enhances the group's majority-voting accuracy by 4.51\%, demonstrating its ability to extend the collective capability boundary of the model collective.