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Nov 19

Autonomous Agents on Blockchains: Standards, Execution Models, and Trust Boundaries

Advances in large language models have enabled agentic AI systems that can reason, plan, and interact with external tools to execute multi-step workflows, while public blockchains have evolved into a programmable substrate for value transfer, access control, and verifiable state transitions. Their convergence introduces a high-stakes systems challenge: designing standard, interoperable, and secure interfaces that allow agents to observe on-chain state, formulate transaction intents, and authorize execution without exposing users, protocols, or organizations to unacceptable security, governance, or economic risks. This survey systematizes the emerging landscape of agent-blockchain interoperability through a systematic literature review, identifying 317 relevant works from an initial pool of over 3000 records. We contribute a five-part taxonomy of integration patterns spanning read-only analytics, simulation and intent generation, delegated execution, autonomous signing, and multi-agent workflows; a threat model tailored to agent-driven transaction pipelines that captures risks ranging from prompt injection and policy misuse to key compromise, adversarial execution dynamics, and multi-agent collusion; and a comparative capability matrix analyzing more than 20 representative systems across 13 dimensions, including custody models, permissioning, policy enforcement, observability, and recovery. Building on the gaps revealed by this analysis, we outline a research roadmap centered on two interface abstractions: a Transaction Intent Schema for portable and unambiguous goal specification, and a Policy Decision Record for auditable, verifiable policy enforcement across execution environments. We conclude by proposing a reproducible evaluation suite and benchmarks for assessing the safety, reliability, and economic robustness of agent-mediated on-chain execution.

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 7

SecOPD: Mitigating Adaptive Prompt Injections by On-Policy Distillation

Prompt injection is listed as the \#1 threat to AI agents. When an agent accesses external data from websites, files, or emails, an attacker may inject a prompt into the data, saying, "Ignore all prior instructions and perform <an attacker's task>." To prevent arbitrary manipulation of agents, defenders try to train secure LLMs, which, however, still suffer from near 100% attack success rates (ASRs) against adaptive prompt injections. We note that this is because existing defensive finetuning recipes rely on sequence-level feedback signals (in DPO or GRPO). Treating an entire output equally prevents the model from learning precisely which output tokens are insecure. In this paper, we propose Secure On-Policy Distillation (SecOPD) that provides token-level feedback to guide defensive fine-tuning. The LLM receives an injected sample and produces a rollout, whose tokens are scored by the initialization model given the corresponding clean input. With more fine-grained training signals, our defended Qwen3.6-27B achieves a 9.0% ASR against the SoTA PISmith adaptive prompt injections, compared to 94.0% for the prior SoTA, Meta-SecAlign. The obtained security generalizes to domains completely unseen in training: in agentic tool calling, SecOPD achieves a 4.7% ASR compared to 5.5% for Meta-SecAlign. Code and the model are available at https://github.com/pppyb/SecOPD and https://huggingface.co/pybbb/Qwen3.6-27B-SecOPD.

  • 4 authors
·
Aug 20 2

PVDetector: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks on Purpose-Specific LLM Agents through Policy-Violation Concept Analysis

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but also purpose-specific restrictions tailored to their designated roles. Such additional restrictions enlarge the attack surface, particularly to prompt injection (PI) attacks. To defend against such attacks, existing detection methods primarily rely on analyzing input-output patterns, yet yield limited effectiveness. To address this limitation, we turn to analyzing the hidden activation space and discover that LLMs inherently retain latent policy-violation (PV) concepts when prompted with requests beyond their designated purpose. Particularly, PV concepts capture the semantics of conflicts between user queries and predefined restrictions, implicitly reflecting LLMs' intrinsic awareness of recognizing policy violations. Building on this insight, we propose PVDetector, a training-free framework that detects PI attacks during LLM inference by measuring hidden-state alignment with PV concepts, which are derived offline from the contrastive pairs of policy-violating and policy-compliant prompts. Experiments across multiple LLMs and datasets show that PVDetector achieves <1\% false negative rate with minimal auxiliary overhead, consistently outperforming state-of-the-art methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/Claresigle/PVDetector .

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 13

DART: Noise Injection for Robust Imitation Learning

One approach to Imitation Learning is Behavior Cloning, in which a robot observes a supervisor and infers a control policy. A known problem with this "off-policy" approach is that the robot's errors compound when drifting away from the supervisor's demonstrations. On-policy, techniques alleviate this by iteratively collecting corrective actions for the current robot policy. However, these techniques can be tedious for human supervisors, add significant computation burden, and may visit dangerous states during training. We propose an off-policy approach that injects noise into the supervisor's policy while demonstrating. This forces the supervisor to demonstrate how to recover from errors. We propose a new algorithm, DART (Disturbances for Augmenting Robot Trajectories), that collects demonstrations with injected noise, and optimizes the noise level to approximate the error of the robot's trained policy during data collection. We compare DART with DAgger and Behavior Cloning in two domains: in simulation with an algorithmic supervisor on the MuJoCo tasks (Walker, Humanoid, Hopper, Half-Cheetah) and in physical experiments with human supervisors training a Toyota HSR robot to perform grasping in clutter. For high dimensional tasks like Humanoid, DART can be up to 3x faster in computation time and only decreases the supervisor's cumulative reward by 5% during training, whereas DAgger executes policies that have 80% less cumulative reward than the supervisor. On the grasping in clutter task, DART obtains on average a 62% performance increase over Behavior Cloning.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 17, 2017

PIPETTE: Prompt Injection Purple-Teaming for Robust LLM Agents

Large language model (LLM) agents routinely interact with untrusted external data, exposing them to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks that hijack agents into executing attacker-chosen tasks. To uncover these vulnerabilities at scale, automated red-teaming methods often leverage reinforcement learning (RL) to generate attacks that achieve high attack success rates (ASR). Model developers use the attacks discovered during internal red-teaming to harden agents through adversarial training before deployment, a collaborative offensive-defensive process known in cybersecurity as purple-teaming. However, we show that achieving high ASR during red-teaming does not guarantee robustness gains from subsequent adversarial training. Specifically, we find that two state-of-the-art RL-based red-teaming methods, RL-Hammer and PISmith, suffer from mode collapse, repeatedly discovering similar attack strategies whose additional successes add no additional robustness improvements to adversarial training. To address this gap, we introduce PIPETTE, a unified prompt injection purple-teaming framework that effectively converts red-teaming discoveries into defender robustness improvements. PIPETTE employs a dictionary learning-based reward that encourages broader coverage of attack strategies during red-teaming. It also integrates an on-policy adversarial training pipeline tailored to IPI defense, enabling agents to resist attacks while completing legitimate user tasks. Extensive evaluations across agentic benchmarks (AgentDojo and ASB) demonstrate that PIPETTE produces defenders that achieve near-zero attack success rates on static attacks and can withstand strong adaptive attacks, while maintaining benign task utility close to that of the undefended baseline.

  • 4 authors
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Nov 17 1

DexGrasp-Zero: A Morphology-Aligned Policy for Zero-Shot Cross-Embodiment Dexterous Grasping

To meet the demands of increasingly diverse dexterous hand hardware, it is crucial to develop a policy that enables zero-shot cross-embodiment grasping without redundant re-learning. Cross-embodiment alignment is challenging due to heterogeneous hand kinematics and physical constraints. Existing approaches typically predict intermediate motion targets and retarget them to each embodiment, which may introduce errors and violate embodiment-specific limits, hindering transfer across diverse hands. To overcome these limitations, we propose DexGrasp-Zero, a policy that learns universal grasping skills from diverse embodiments, enabling zero-shot transfer to unseen hands. We first introduce a morphology-aligned graph representation that maps each hand's kinematic keypoints to anatomically grounded nodes and equips each node with tri-axial orthogonal motion primitives, enabling structural and semantic alignment across different morphologies. Relying on this graph-based representation, we design a Morphology-Aligned Graph Convolutional Network (MAGCN) to encode the graph for policy learning. MAGCN incorporates a Physical Property Injection mechanism that fuses hand-specific physical constraints into the graph features, enabling adaptive compensation for varying link lengths and actuation limits for precise and stable grasping. Our extensive simulation evaluations on the YCB dataset demonstrate that our policy, jointly trained on four heterogeneous hands (Allegro, Shadow, Schunk, Ability), achieves an 85% zero-shot success rate on unseen hardware (LEAP, Inspire), outperforming the state-of-the-art method by 59.5%. Real-world experiments further evaluate our policy on three robot platforms (LEAP, Inspire, Revo2), achieving an 82% average success rate on unseen objects.

  • 7 authors
·
Mar 17

Formal Policy Enforcement for Real-World Agentic Systems

Security policy enforcement in contemporary agentic systems predominantly consists of embedding natural-language policies within an agent's system prompt and delegating compliance to the agent's reasoning. This approach admits no formal enforcement guarantee and cannot express policies whose satisfaction depends on the causal history of an execution, a gap that becomes acute in multi-agent systems, where enforcement must reason across agents. We argue that policy enforcement in agentic systems is most naturally understood as a cross-cutting concern, and propose a framework grounded in aspect-oriented programming that specifies policies independent of the agent's reasoning and enforces them at every policy-relevant decision. Policies are written in Datalog over a set of abstract predicates describing the execution context, an observability service governed by a formal assume/guarantee contract maintains these predicates, and a reference monitor consults the policy at each action to produce an enforcement decision. When the environment contract holds, enforcement decisions coincide with the policy's intended semantics. We adopt Datalog as the policy language, a natural fit because it supports declarative rule specification, admits recursion for policies over transitive relationships, and yields deterministic enforcement. Datalog further admits tractable static analyses for contradiction, redundancy, subsumption, and conditional reachability, enabling authors to verify policy intent and surface ambiguities inherent in natural-language specifications. We realize the framework in FORGE, which enforces policies over agentic deployments without modification to the underlying agents. We evaluate FORGE on three case studies: information flow policies for prompt injection defense, approval workflows in a multi-agent pharmacovigilance system, and organizational policies for customer service.

  • 6 authors
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May 7

Transient Turn Injection: Exposing Stateless Multi-Turn Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

  • 2 authors
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Apr 22

Direct Action-Head Injection of A Grounded 3D Point Unlocks Spatial and Task Generalization

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models leverage large-scale vision-language pretraining for flexible robot manipulation, yet at test time they remain brittle to changed object positions and to familiar scenes paired with different instructions. A growing family of methods addresses this brittleness by supplying the policy with grounding signals, such as 2D pixel coordinates for object localization and placement. However, we find that how the grounding signal is represented and injected matters more than the signal itself. In this work, we propose a lightweight module that represents the grounding signal in 3D and injects the resulting embedding directly into the action head. The module is a two-layer MLP and requires no changes to the VLA backbone or pretraining pipeline, yet it yields substantially larger gains than language- or visual-prompting alternatives. On LIBERO-PRO, our method improves the average success rate of GR00T-N1.6 from 31.2 to 77.5 under task perturbation and from 28.1 to 60.2 under position perturbation. Comparable gains are also achieved for π_{0.5}, demonstrating that the mechanism is backbone-agnostic across VLAs with diffusion-based action heads. We further validate the practical applicability with real-world experiments. Together, these results support our central finding: lifting adequate 2D grounding into 3D and injecting it into the action head enables spatial and instance-level task generalization in VLAs.

  • 8 authors
·
Jun 25

DADP: Domain Adaptive Diffusion Policy

Learning domain adaptive policies that can generalize to unseen transition dynamics, remains a fundamental challenge in learning-based control. Substantial progress has been made through domain representation learning to capture domain-specific information, thus enabling domain-aware decision making. We analyze the process of learning domain representations through dynamical prediction and find that selecting contexts adjacent to the current step causes the learned representations to entangle static domain information with varying dynamical properties. Such mixture can confuse the conditioned policy, thereby constraining zero-shot adaptation. To tackle the challenge, we propose DADP (Domain Adaptive Diffusion Policy), which achieves robust adaptation through unsupervised disentanglement and domain-aware diffusion injection. First, we introduce Lagged Context Dynamical Prediction, a strategy that conditions future state estimation on a historical offset context; by increasing this temporal gap, we unsupervisedly disentangle static domain representations by filtering out transient properties. Second, we integrate the learned domain representations directly into the generative process by biasing the prior distribution and reformulating the diffusion target. Extensive experiments on challenging benchmarks across locomotion and manipulation demonstrate the superior performance, and the generalizability of DADP over prior methods. More visualization results are available on the https://outsider86.github.io/DomainAdaptiveDiffusionPolicy/.

  • 7 authors
·
Jun 16

NoisyGRPO: Incentivizing Multimodal CoT Reasoning via Noise Injection and Bayesian Estimation

Reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promise in enhancing the general Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models (MLLMs). However, when applied to improve general CoT reasoning, existing RL frameworks often struggle to generalize beyond the training distribution. To address this, we propose NoisyGRPO, a systematic multimodal RL framework that introduces controllable noise into visual inputs for enhanced exploration and explicitly models the advantage estimation process via a Bayesian framework. Specifically, NoisyGRPO improves RL training by: (1) Noise-Injected Exploration Policy: Perturbing visual inputs with Gaussian noise to encourage exploration across a wider range of visual scenarios; and (2) Bayesian Advantage Estimation: Formulating advantage estimation as a principled Bayesian inference problem, where the injected noise level serves as a prior and the observed trajectory reward as the likelihood. This Bayesian modeling fuses both sources of information to compute a robust posterior estimate of trajectory advantage, effectively guiding MLLMs to prefer visually grounded trajectories over noisy ones. Experiments on standard CoT quality, general capability, and hallucination benchmarks demonstrate that NoisyGRPO substantially improves generalization and robustness, especially in RL settings with small-scale MLLMs such as Qwen2.5-VL 3B. The project page is available at https://artanic30.github.io/project_pages/NoisyGRPO/.

  • 4 authors
·
Oct 23, 2025

SD-RAG: A Prompt-Injection-Resilient Framework for Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has attracted significant attention due to its ability to combine the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with knowledge obtained through efficient retrieval mechanisms over large-scale data collections. Currently, the majority of existing approaches overlook the risks associated with exposing sensitive or access-controlled information directly to the generation model. Only a few approaches propose techniques to instruct the generative model to refrain from disclosing sensitive information; however, recent studies have also demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can override intended behavioral constraints. For these reasons, we propose a novel approach to Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation, called SD-RAG, which decouples the enforcement of security and privacy constraints from the generation process itself. Rather than relying on prompt-level safeguards, SD-RAG applies sanitization and disclosure controls during the retrieval phase, prior to augmenting the language model's input. Moreover, we introduce a semantic mechanism to allow the ingestion of human-readable dynamic security and privacy constraints together with an optimized graph-based data model that supports fine-grained, policy-aware retrieval. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the superiority of SD-RAG over baseline existing approaches, achieving up to a 58% improvement in the privacy score, while also showing a strong resilience to prompt injection attacks targeting the generative model.

  • 3 authors
·
Jan 15

Mismatch Matters: On-Policy Distillation Beyond Token Agreement

On-policy distillation (OPD) has emerged as a core component of modern LLM post-training pipelines, yet we reveal a failure mode: degenerate agreement, where students exploit repetitive loops to achieve near-perfect token agreement with the teacher despite globally flawed responses. We therefore shift our focus from agreement to teacher-student mismatch, and find that mismatch tokens can be mainly categorized into two types: student-excess tokens and student-deficit tokens. Student-excess tokens are generated by the student but assigned near-zero probability by the teacher; their log-ratio corrections grow unbounded and destabilize the update. Student-deficit tokens, in contrast, are preferred by the teacher but rarely sampled by the student; their absence blocks the transfer of the teacher's reasoning patterns. To tackle these mismatch directions, we propose TIDE (Token-level Independent Deficit-Excess correction), which applies bounded Hellinger shaping to suppress the most severe sampled excesses and an analytic teacher top-K injection to restore deficient probability mass without requiring deficit tokens to be sampled. Across mathematical reasoning benchmarks with multiple Qwen3 teacher-student pairs, TIDE consistently outperforms standard OPD and recent token-selection and reward-shaping baselines. Moreover, the gains of TIDE are more pronounced under strong teacher-student mismatch, where it improves Avg@8 from 6.9% to 20.3%, reduces average response length by a factor of 3.6, and substantially reduces formatting failures. Code is available at https://github.com/yzc-666/TIDE

  • 7 authors
·
Aug 9

MedAD-R1: Eliciting Consistent Reasoning in Interpretible Medical Anomaly Detection via Consistency-Reinforced Policy Optimization

Medical Anomaly Detection (MedAD) presents a significant opportunity to enhance diagnostic accuracy using Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) to interpret and answer questions based on medical images. However, the reliance on Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on simplistic and fragmented datasets has hindered the development of models capable of plausible reasoning and robust multimodal generalization. To overcome this, we introduce MedAD-38K, the first large-scale, multi-modal, and multi-center benchmark for MedAD featuring diagnostic Chain-of-Thought (CoT) annotations alongside structured Visual Question-Answering (VQA) pairs. On this foundation, we propose a two-stage training framework. The first stage, Cognitive Injection, uses SFT to instill foundational medical knowledge and align the model with a structured think-then-answer paradigm. Given that standard policy optimization can produce reasoning that is disconnected from the final answer, the second stage incorporates Consistency Group Relative Policy Optimization (Con-GRPO). This novel algorithm incorporates a crucial consistency reward to ensure the generated reasoning process is relevant and logically coherent with the final diagnosis. Our proposed model, MedAD-R1, achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on the MedAD-38K benchmark, outperforming strong baselines by more than 10\%. This superior performance stems from its ability to generate transparent and logically consistent reasoning pathways, offering a promising approach to enhancing the trustworthiness and interpretability of AI for clinical decision support.

  • 8 authors
·
Jan 31

MixSD: Mixed Contextual Self-Distillation for Knowledge Injection

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is widely used to inject new knowledge into language models, but it often degrades pretrained capabilities such as reasoning and general-domain performance. We argue this forgetting arises because fine-tuning targets from humans or external systems diverge from the model's autoregressive distribution, forcing the optimizer to imitate low-probability token sequences. To address this problem, we propose MixSD, a simple external-teacher-free method for distribution-aligned knowledge injection. Instead of training on fixed targets, MixSD constructs supervision dynamically by mixing tokens from two conditionals of the base model itself: an expert conditional that observes the injected fact in context, and a naive conditional that reflects the model's original prior. The resulting supervision sequences preserve the factual learning signal while remaining substantially closer to the base model's distribution. We evaluate MixSD on two synthetic corpora that we construct to study factual recall and arithmetic function acquisition in a controlled setting, together with established benchmarks for open-domain factual question answering and knowledge editing. Across multiple model scales and settings, MixSD consistently achieves a better memorization-retention trade-off compared to SFT and on-policy self distillation baselines, retaining up to 100% of the base model's held-out capability while maintaining near-perfect training accuracy, whereas standard SFT retains as little as 1%. We further show that MixSD produces substantially lower-NLL supervision targets under the base model and reduces harmful movement along Fisher-sensitive parameter directions. These results suggest that aligning supervision with the model's native generation distribution is a simple and effective principle for knowledge injection that mitigates catastrophic forgetting.

PhaForce: Phase-Scheduled Visual-Force Policy Learning with Slow Planning and Fast Correction for Contact-Rich Manipulation

Contact-rich manipulation requires not only vision-dominant task semantics but also closed-loop reactions to force/torque (F/T) transients. Yet, generative visuomotor policies are typically constrained to low-frequency updates due to inference latency and action chunking, underutilizing F/T for control-rate feedback. Furthermore, existing force-aware methods often inject force continuously and indiscriminately, lacking an explicit mechanism to schedule when / how much / where to apply force across different task phases. We propose PhaForce, a phase-scheduled visual--force policy that coordinates low-rate chunk-level planning and high-rate residual correction via a unified contact/phase schedule. PhaForce comprises (i) a contact-aware phase predictor (CAP) that estimates contact probability and phase belief, (ii) a Slow diffusion planner that performs dual-gated visual--force fusion with orthogonal residual injection to preserve vision semantics while conditioning on force, and (iii) a Fast corrector that applies control-rate phase-routed residuals in interpretable corrective subspaces for within-chunk micro-adjustments. Across multiple real-robot contact-rich tasks, PhaForce achieves an average success rate of 86% (+40 pp over baselines), while also substantially improving contact quality by regulating interaction forces and exhibiting robust adaptability to OOD geometric shifts.

  • 10 authors
·
Mar 8

PISmith: Reinforcement Learning-based Red Teaming for Prompt Injection Defenses

Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, their robustness against adaptive attacks remains insufficiently evaluated, potentially creating a false sense of security. In this work, we propose PISmith, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based red-teaming framework that systematically assesses existing prompt-injection defenses by training an attack LLM to optimize injected prompts in a practical black-box setting, where the attacker can only query the defended LLM and observe its outputs. We find that directly applying standard GRPO to attack strong defenses leads to sub-optimal performance due to extreme reward sparsity -- most generated injected prompts are blocked by the defense, causing the policy's entropy to collapse before discovering effective attack strategies, while the rare successes cannot be learned effectively. In response, we introduce adaptive entropy regularization and dynamic advantage weighting to sustain exploration and amplify learning from scarce successes. Extensive evaluation on 13 benchmarks demonstrates that state-of-the-art prompt injection defenses remain vulnerable to adaptive attacks. We also compare PISmith with 7 baselines across static, search-based, and RL-based attack categories, showing that PISmith consistently achieves the highest attack success rates. Furthermore, PISmith achieves strong performance in agentic settings on InjecAgent and AgentDojo against both open-source and closed-source LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o-mini and GPT-5-nano). Our code is available at https://github.com/albert-y1n/PISmith.

  • 4 authors
·
Jul 22

When Claws Remember but Do Not Tell: Stealthy Memory Injection in Persistent Personal Agents

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 5

Object-Centric Residual RL for Zero-Shot Sim-to-Real VLA Enhancement

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models can generalize across diverse manipulation tasks, but their imitation-learning-based policies remain brittle in precise physical interactions due to compounding execution errors; Can a reinforcement learning policy trained purely in simulation improve the robustness of real-world VLAs zero-shot? Residual RL, which learns a corrective policy on top of a frozen VLA, offers a natural framework, but existing approaches face a fundamental sim-to-real dilemma: privileged-state methods require lossy distillation for deployment; image-based methods suffer from the visual domain gap; and real-world RL is costly and unsafe. We propose an object-centric residual RL framework that refines VLA actions using object poses, enabling a compact observation space that transfers consistently between simulation and reality. To align the two domains, we additionally replay the same teleoperation demonstrations in simulation to train a sim counterpart of the real-world VLA. The residual RL policy is trained only in simulation with pose noise injection and dropout, and transfers zero-shot to the real robot. Across five manipulation tasks on a real Franka Research 3 (FR3) robot, our method improves the success rate from 42% to 76% zero-shot, and the improved rollouts can be further reused to retrain the base VLA for self-improvement without additional teleoperation. Project page: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/articles/object-centric-residual-rl/

POLARIS: Guiding Small Models to Write Long Stories

Small open-weight models struggle at long-form creative writing: their generated stories either fall far short of the requested length, or their quality significantly degrades as length increases, especially when compared to frontier models. We present POLARIS (Policy Optimization with LLM-as-a-judge rewards and Anchored-Reference Injection for Storywriting), a lower-compute GRPO recipe with two key ingredients: a frontier LLM judge with a structured Story Quality rubric as the online reward, and human-reference injection (HRI), where a teacher-forced human-written story serves as a high-reward anchor within each GRPO group. By applying our training recipe to Qwen3.5-9B, using a dataset of approximately 1.4K prompt-story pairs derived from 100 short-story anthologies and 4 A100 GPUs, we obtain POLARIS-9B. Across five benchmarks spanning in-distribution and out-of-distribution prompts and rubrics, POLARIS-9B is competitive with much larger open-weight models while following length instructions more closely. A blinded human evaluation confirms that POLARIS-9B is preferred to the base Qwen3.5-9B and on par with Qwen3.5-27B. Despite training only on stories up to 4k words, POLARIS-9B preserves quality on prompts requesting stories up to 3 times the training length, a regime where most open-weight models degrade substantially in quality, length adherence, or both. More broadly, our results suggest that length generalization is a meaningful stress test for creative-writing models and a useful lens for distinguishing otherwise close models.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 1

Diffusion-VLA: Scaling Robot Foundation Models via Unified Diffusion and Autoregression

In this paper, we present DiffusionVLA, a novel framework that seamlessly combines the autoregression model with the diffusion model for learning visuomotor policy. Central to our approach is a next-token prediction objective, enabling the model to reason effectively over the user's query in the context of current observations. Subsequently, a diffusion model is attached to generate robust action outputs. To enhance policy learning through self-reasoning, we introduce a novel reasoning injection module that integrates reasoning phrases directly into the policy learning process. The whole framework is simple and flexible, making it easy to deploy and upgrade. We conduct extensive experiments using multiple real robots to validate the effectiveness of DiffusionVLA. Our tests include a challenging factory sorting task, where DiffusionVLA successfully categorizes objects, including those not seen during training. We observe that the reasoning module makes the model interpretable. It allows observers to understand the model thought process and identify potential causes of policy failures. Additionally, we test DiffusionVLA on a zero-shot bin-picking task, achieving 63.7\% accuracy on 102 previously unseen objects. Our method demonstrates robustness to visual changes, such as distractors and new backgrounds, and easily adapts to new embodiments. Furthermore, DiffusionVLA can follow novel instructions and retain conversational ability. Notably, DiffusionVLA is data-efficient and fast at inference; our smallest DiffusionVLA-2B runs 82Hz on a single A6000 GPU and can train from scratch on less than 50 demonstrations for a complex task. Finally, we scale the model from 2B to 72B parameters, showcasing improved generalization capabilities with increased model size.

  • 11 authors
·
Dec 4, 2024

Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition

Recent advances have enabled LLM-powered AI agents to autonomously execute complex tasks by combining language model reasoning with tools, memory, and web access. But can these systems be trusted to follow deployment policies in realistic environments, especially under attack? To investigate, we ran the largest public red-teaming competition to date, targeting 22 frontier AI agents across 44 realistic deployment scenarios. Participants submitted 1.8 million prompt-injection attacks, with over 60,000 successfully eliciting policy violations such as unauthorized data access, illicit financial actions, and regulatory noncompliance. We use these results to build the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark - a curated set of high-impact attacks - and evaluate it across 19 state-of-the-art models. Nearly all agents exhibit policy violations for most behaviors within 10-100 queries, with high attack transferability across models and tasks. Importantly, we find limited correlation between agent robustness and model size, capability, or inference-time compute, suggesting that additional defenses are needed against adversarial misuse. Our findings highlight critical and persistent vulnerabilities in today's AI agents. By releasing the ART benchmark and accompanying evaluation framework, we aim to support more rigorous security assessment and drive progress toward safer agent deployment.

  • 17 authors
·
Jul 28, 2025

No Hidden Prompts Needed! You Can Game AI Peer Review with Presentation-Only Revisions

As AI-generated reviews move from experimental tools into peer-review infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text, no prompt injection, and no changes to methods, experiments, figures, equations, proofs, or numerical results. The attacker modifies only presentation-level content, such as the abstract, contribution framing, related work, discussion, and narrative structure. We introduce adversarial repackaging: a closed-loop attack that uses AI-reviewer feedback to search for presentation-level revisions while keeping the scientific evidence fixed. Across three mainstream AI reviewers, adversarial repackaging achieves a 75.1% attack success rate and a mean score gain of +1.21/10. The effect is not explained by ordinary prose polishing. We also reveal that strategies that change how the reviewer interprets the paper, such as related-work repositioning and analytical discussion expansion, substantially outperform surface edits such as local polishing, table formatting, and algorithm boxes. Our analysis reveals two deeper structural failure modes. First, AI reviewers are easier to impress than to convince: highlighting strengths reliably increases perceived merit, while attempts to dissolve weaknesses frequently backfire. Second, AI reviewers can confuse the appearance of addressing a limitation with actually resolving it, allowing unchanged evidence to be reinterpreted as stronger scientific contribution. These results show that the deployment risk is not only malicious hidden instructions, but the emergence of paper presentation itself as an optimization surface. We release a contamination-free rolling benchmark and attack framework for testing whether AI reviewers remain anchored to scientific content under presentation-only edits.

HINT: Human-Intent Inception for Long-Horizon Robot Manipulation

Humans can perform complex manipulations given a simple intent through an overall instruction, while continuously adapting to evolving visual observations. However, current vision-language action (VLA) models and other action policies struggle to realize this high-level intelligent behavior under dense, evolving visual inputs and sparse language guidance. Visual correlations can then dominate semantic intent, leading actions to follow visual shortcuts rather than human goals. We present HINT (Human-INTent INcepTion), an agentic framework inspired by the human manipulation principles: semantic intent changes sparsely at manipulation-pattern transitions, whereas continuous control primarily depends on the evolving object-hand relationship. HINT invokes semantic reasoning only at pattern transitions to resolve the current subtask and target, then maintains this commitment through multi-view grounding and visual tracking. We explore two visual interfaces-image-space semantic highlighting and attention-prior injection-to communicate the tracked intent to the action policy without introducing additional trainable parameters into the foundation action model. Experiments across three long-horizon tasks and out-of-distribution variants show that HINT substantially improves intent understanding, task progress, and end-to-end success across two foundation policies while preserving low-latency control. Project page: https://robot-hint.github.io/

  • 12 authors
·
Sep 5

ME-VLM: A Unified VLM for Embodied Cognition and Agent Coordination

Physical AI requires models to ground visual and linguistic understanding in real-world environments while accounting for environmental constraints and execution feedback. We introduce MachEmbodied-VLM (ME-VLM), a unified vision-language model with two variants, 4B and 35B-A3B, that brings together embodied cognition and multimodal agent capabilities. Our work emphasizes physical perception and spatiotemporal reasoning, together with planning, interaction, and outcome assessment in both digital and physical environments. We construct training data spanning embodied and multimodal agent tasks, including execution observations and feedback to support outcome assessment and decision refinement. The training pipeline comprises embodied capability injection, separate reinforcement learning of embodied and multimodal-agent experts, and multi-teacher on-policy distillation that consolidates their complementary capabilities into a single model. Experiments show competitive performance on both embodied and agent benchmarks, as well as on autonomous-driving and embodied-navigation tasks. For edge deployment, visual token compression, W4A8 quantization, and hardware-software co-optimization enable on-device inference of the 4B variant on the M100, reducing prefill latency from 400 ms to 188 ms. Project Page: https://machembodied.com/ME-Brain/ME-VLM.html Code Repository: https://github.com/MachEmbodied/ME-VLM

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 21

OPTIAGENT: A Physics-Driven Agentic Framework for Automated Optical Design

Optical design is the process of configuring optical elements to precisely manipulate light for high-fidelity imaging. It is inherently a highly non-convex optimization problem that relies heavily on human heuristic expertise and domain-specific knowledge. While Large Language Models (LLMs) possess extensive optical knowledge, their capabilities in leveraging the knowledge in designing lens system remain significantly constrained. This work represents the first attempt to employ LLMs in the field of optical design. We bridge the expertise gap by enabling users without formal optical training to successfully develop functional lens systems. Concretely, we curate a comprehensive dataset, named OptiDesignQA, which encompasses both classical lens systems sourced from standard optical textbooks and novel configurations generated by automated design algorithms for training and evaluation. Furthermore, we inject domain-specific optical expertise into the LLM through a hybrid objective of full-system synthesis and lens completion. To align the model with optical principles, we employ Group Relative Policy Optimization Done Right (DrGRPO) guided by Optical Lexicographic Reward for physics-driven policy alignment. This reward system incorporates structural format rewards, physical feasibility rewards, light-manipulation accuracy, and LLM-based heuristics. Finally, our model integrates with specialized optical optimization routines for end-to-end fine-tuning and precision refinement. We benchmark our proposed method against both traditional optimization-based automated design algorithms and LLM counterparts, and experimental results show the superiority of our method.

  • 9 authors
·
Feb 27

Agent Capsules: Quality-Gated Granularity Control for Multi-Agent LLM Pipelines

A multi-agent pipeline with N agents typically issues N LLM calls per run. Merging agents into fewer calls (compound execution) promises token savings, but naively merged calls silently degrade quality through tool loss and prompt compression. We present Agent Capsules, an adaptive execution runtime that treats multi-agent pipeline execution as an optimization problem with empirical quality constraints. The runtime instruments coordination overhead per group, scores composition opportunity, selects among three compound execution strategies, and gates every mode switch on rolling-mean output quality. A controlled negative result confirms that injecting more context into a merged call worsens compression rather than relieving it, so the framework's escalation ladder (standard, then two-phase, then sequential) recovers quality by moving toward per-agent dispatch rather than by rewriting merged prompts. On LLM-judged quality, the controller matches a hand-tuned oracle on every measured (model, group, mode) cell: routing compound whenever the oracle would, and reverting to fine whenever quality would fail the floor, without per-model configuration. Against a hand-crafted LangGraph implementation of a 14-agent competitive intelligence pipeline, Agent Capsules uses 51% fewer fine-mode input tokens and 42% fewer compound-mode input tokens, at +0.020 and +0.017 quality respectively. Against a DSPy implementation of a 5-agent due diligence pipeline, the framework uses 19% fewer tokens than uncompiled DSPy at quality parity, and 68% fewer tokens than MIPROv2 at +0.052 quality. Even before compound mode fires, the runtime delivers efficiency through automatic policy resolution, cache-aligned prompts, and topology-aware context injection, matching both hand-tuned and compile-time baselines without training data or per-pipeline engineering.

  • 1 authors
·
Apr 30

Thinking with Frames: Generative Video Distortion Evaluation via Frame Reward Model

Recent advances in video reward models and post-training strategies have improved text-to-video (T2V) generation. While these models typically assess visual quality, motion quality, and text alignment, they often overlook key structural distortions, such as abnormal object appearances and interactions, which can degrade the overall quality of the generative video. To address this gap, we introduce REACT, a frame-level reward model designed specifically for structural distortions evaluation in generative videos. REACT assigns point-wise scores and attribution labels by reasoning over video frames, focusing on recognizing distortions. To support this, we construct a large-scale human preference dataset, annotated based on our proposed taxonomy of structural distortions, and generate additional data using a efficient Chain-of-Thought (CoT) synthesis pipeline. REACT is trained with a two-stage framework: (1) supervised fine-tuning with masked loss for domain knowledge injection, followed by (2) reinforcement learning with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) and pairwise rewards to enhance reasoning capability and align output scores with human preferences. During inference, a dynamic sampling mechanism is introduced to focus on frames most likely to exhibit distortion. We also present REACT-Bench, a benchmark for generative video distortion evaluation. Experimental results demonstrate that REACT complements existing reward models in assessing structutal distortion, achieving both accurate quantitative evaluations and interpretable attribution analysis.

  • 8 authors
·
Jan 7

A Systematic Taxonomy of Security Vulnerabilities in the OpenClaw AI Agent Framework

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 28

Virtual Prompt Injection for Instruction-Tuned Large Language Models

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

  • 9 authors
·
Jul 31, 2023 2

Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?

AI agents are poised to become a primary interface to digital products, acting across email, files, payments, and personal data. People without professional software backgrounds need understandable, reusable ways to control actions across services. We examine a mechanism in which a language model maps actions to plain-language consequence categories with user-authored "allow", "ask", or "never" rules. We ask what is gained and lost when decisions are made in advance as reusable rules rather than separately for each action. We analyzed 113 participants without professional software backgrounds across three conditions: per-action human-in-the-loop approval (HITL), automated per-action model review (AUTO), or user-authored consequence policy (POLICY). Participants judged 2 examples in each of 4 consequence categories; POLICY participants then set one rule per category. All supervised an 18-action simulated day, including 7 overreach actions. POLICY blocked less overreach than HITL (-20.1 percentage points, 95% CI [-32.1, -8.1]) and AUTO (-14.5 points, 95% CI [-25.8, -3.2]). POLICY lowered runtime prompts from 18.0 to 10.9, but total intervention time was not reliably lower when rule setup was included. Exploratory analysis showed that participants chose "ask" for 114 of 140 POLICY rules, returning most overreach actions to runtime. Of the 148 overreach actions executed in POLICY, 133 followed human approval and 15 ran automatically under "allow" rules. Across all 7 overreach actions, POLICY had the highest approval rate. Counterintuitively, user-authored rules did not by themselves provide stronger protection: many actions outside users' original requests went through after users approved them. These results reveal a gap between preference and commitment: repeatedly choosing "ask" preserves case-by-case choice but prevents a standing policy from settling decisions in advance.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 27

Multimodal Policy Internalization for Conversational Agents

Modern conversational agents like ChatGPT and Alexa+ rely on predefined policies specifying metadata, response styles, and tool-usage rules. As these LLM-based systems expand to support diverse business and user queries, such policies, often implemented as in-context prompts, are becoming increasingly complex and lengthy, making faithful adherence difficult and imposing large fixed computational costs. With the rise of multimodal agents, policies that govern visual and multimodal behaviors are critical but remain understudied. Prior prompt-compression work mainly shortens task templates and demonstrations, while existing policy-alignment studies focus only on text-based safety rules. We introduce Multimodal Policy Internalization (MPI), a new task that internalizes reasoning-intensive multimodal policies into model parameters, enabling stronger policy-following without including the policy during inference. MPI poses unique data and algorithmic challenges. We build two datasets spanning synthetic and real-world decision-making and tool-using tasks and propose TriMPI, a three-stage training framework. TriMPI first injects policy knowledge via continual pretraining, then performs supervised finetuning, and finally applies PolicyRollout, a GRPO-style reinforcement learning extension that augments rollouts with policy-aware responses for grounded exploration. TriMPI achieves notable gains in end-to-end accuracy, generalization, and robustness to forgetting. As the first work on multimodal policy internalization, we provide datasets, training recipes, and comprehensive evaluations to foster future research. Project page: https://mikewangwzhl.github.io/TriMPI.

amazon Amazon
·
Oct 10, 2025 2

Defending Against Prompt Injection with DataFilter

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 21, 2025

EpiWorld: Grounding LLM Policy Agents in Epidemiological World Models

Epidemic intervention policies are textual artefacts that human decision-makers interpret, justify, and revise through natural language, making large language models a natural candidate for epidemic policy reasoning. A naive LLM, however, lacks the epidemic dynamics needed to project intervention consequences, the quantitative surveillance signals required to assess severity, and the institutional constraints that define admissible actions. We present EpiWorld, a closed-loop framework that grounds an LLM policy actor in a learned action-conditioned epidemiological world model and a tiered skill library of public-health protocols, surveillance tools, and adaptive lessons accumulated through after-action analysis. Given a candidate intervention, the world model predicts regional epidemic evolution and enables fast counterfactual rollouts that provide feedback for policy selection and refinement. Outcomes of simulated futures are distilled into reusable lessons while protocol constraints remain fixed, allowing the decision process to improve without sacrificing interpretability or controllability. We evaluate both the world model and the end-to-end framework on retrospective COVID-19 and Influenza datasets: the world model achieves the best out-of-distribution Peak-MAE among all forecasting baselines, and the closed-loop framework reduces cumulative hospitalisation by up to 59% across datasets and by an average of ~16% across six LLM backbones, outperforming reinforcement-learning and optimal-control policy baselines.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 1

ReGuide: From Test-Time Guidance to Self-Improving Diffusion Policies

Behavior-cloned diffusion policies are expressive but remain vulnerable to covariate shift: small deviations from demonstrated states can compound into task failure. Existing methods address this either by expanding the training distribution through expert corrections or synthetic augmentation, or by steering a frozen policy at test time with guidance from a learned model. The former can be expensive or assumption-dependent, while the latter discards the corrected trajectories after execution. We introduce ReGuide, a self-improving framework that treats guided rollouts as reusable on-policy recovery data. ReGuide first uses Phase-Conditioned Guidance (PCG) to generate corrective rollouts: it constructs phase-specific latent targets, applies guidance only in the drifted-but-recoverable regime, and guides through the estimated clean action to match the dynamics model's training distribution. Successful guided rollouts are then absorbed back into the policy through ReGuide-FT, which fine-tunes the current checkpoint, or ReGuide-FS, which retrains from scratch on the augmented dataset; the two can also be composed and iterated. On Robomimic Can, Square, Transport, and Tool Hang, ReGuide improves base-policy success by 1.3--7.7times, outperforms LPB in the test-time-only setting, and matched-data ablations show that the gains come from guided recovery data rather than additional rollouts alone.

  • 4 authors
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Jun 26

RoboPrompt: Intuitive Robot Policy Steering with Sparse Human Input

End-to-end robot policies trained through imitation learning remain constrained by limited data diversity, making reliable zero-shot deployment in real-world settings challenging. Shared-autonomy methods enable human correction through teleoperation, but specialized hardware and operator training hinder deployment at scale. Other approaches incorporate human guidance as additional policy inputs, often requiring architectural changes and dedicated training for steerability, which limits their applicability across policies. We present RoboPrompt, a general-purpose, lightweight robot policy steering system that enables users to guide policy behavior through intuitive, sparse inputs, including drawn traces, target points, and coarse directional instructions. RoboPrompt decouples human-intention translation from the underlying policy: a reusable module converts human guidance into action drafts, which are refined through the diffusion or flow-matching dynamics of the base policy. By controlling action generation in noise space, RoboPrompt balances human intent with the policy prior without modifying the base policy architecture or fine-tuning it for steerability. Experiments demonstrate effective steering across Diffusion Policy, π_{0.5}, and FastWAM. We further use steered rollouts for online policy improvement through DAgger. After 2-3 rounds of iteration, average success rates increase by 15.5\% for π_{0.5} across three tasks and by 21.3\% across three policies(Diffusion Policy, π_{0.5}, FastWAM) on the Insert Bread task, while average human intervention counts decrease by 44.0\% (2.86 to 1.60) and 81.9\% (2.60 to 0.47), respectively.

  • 8 authors
·
Oct 6

Self-Evolving Coding Agents via Harness-Policy Optimization

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown promising potential in coding tasks, and their performance is jointly determined by the policy model and the harness that mediates their interaction with the environment. Indeed, harness and policy are mutually reinforcing and evolving only one component is suboptimal---a harness tuned for one checkpoint may not target the failure modes of an updated policy, while policy learning remains limited to the trajectories elicited by a fixed harness. In light of this, we propose Self-HPO, a recursive self-improving framework for coding agents that alternates harness and policy optimization, using the evolving policy as its own harness proposer. Specifically, in each round, the current policy first analyzes its own failures and proposes new harness candidates (H-step). The policy is then updated through reinforcement learning (RL) under the selected harness (P-step), and hard tasks identified during training form the next harness search set, keeping harness optimization targeted to the policy's evolving failure modes. Across three coding benchmarks, Self-HPO consistently outperforms harness-only and policy-only baselines, improving Qwen3.5-35B-A3B's average resolve rate from 57.8% to 64.8%, with gains generalizing to out-of-distribution settings. Further analysis shows that both optimized components retain gains even when paired with their base counterparts, while their joint gain exceeds the sum of their individual gains. Self-HPO also improves reliability (Pass@1) and expands the capability frontier (Pass@k) over the base agent. Additionally, we show that with a stronger external model (e.g., Opus 4.8) as the harness proposer, the same framework yields a further performance boost.

Policy-Guided Diffusion

In many real-world settings, agents must learn from an offline dataset gathered by some prior behavior policy. Such a setting naturally leads to distribution shift between the behavior policy and the target policy being trained - requiring policy conservatism to avoid instability and overestimation bias. Autoregressive world models offer a different solution to this by generating synthetic, on-policy experience. However, in practice, model rollouts must be severely truncated to avoid compounding error. As an alternative, we propose policy-guided diffusion. Our method uses diffusion models to generate entire trajectories under the behavior distribution, applying guidance from the target policy to move synthetic experience further on-policy. We show that policy-guided diffusion models a regularized form of the target distribution that balances action likelihood under both the target and behavior policies, leading to plausible trajectories with high target policy probability, while retaining a lower dynamics error than an offline world model baseline. Using synthetic experience from policy-guided diffusion as a drop-in substitute for real data, we demonstrate significant improvements in performance across a range of standard offline reinforcement learning algorithms and environments. Our approach provides an effective alternative to autoregressive offline world models, opening the door to the controllable generation of synthetic training data.

  • 6 authors
·
Apr 9, 2024

The Balkanization of Execution-Security Research for AI Coding Agents: Isolation, Access Control, and Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

  • 1 authors
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Jul 6

CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

google Google
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Feb 8 2

AutoDojo: Adaptive Attacks Expose Superficial Defenses and User-Underspecification Limits in LLM Agents

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI. These can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) prompt-based (using prompting as a way to prevent agents from following malicious instructions), 2) detection-based (identifying and filtering malicious instructions), and 3) system-level (using systems insights, such as control and data isolation, for defense). However, commonly used benchmarks for evaluating defense, such as AgentDojo, are inherently static, generating a fixed distribution of IPI attacks. Consequently, static benchmarks do not usefully evaluate defense robustness to adaptive threats. We address this issue by developing AutoDojo, an adaptive extension of AgentDojo that optimizes IPI against a given defense. Using AutoDojo against state-of-the-art IPI defenses across three task suites and five target models, we make two key observations. First, many defenses offer only limited protection: a cheap, black-box adaptive attack using a frontier LLM to iteratively optimize the injection raises attack success rate (ASR) well above the level achieved by static injections against nearly all evaluated defenses. Against a filter that reduces static ASR to 0\%, AutoDojo recovers 28\% overall and 64\% on action-open tasks. Second, for prompt-level and filter-based defenses, ASR is substantially higher on action-open tasks -- where the user's request delegates the action itself to attacker-controlled content -- than on precisely specified tasks. This is a structural limit: on such tasks the injection can pose as ordinary data rather than an explicit instruction, bypassing defenses that rely on detecting instruction-like text. AutoDojo is publicly available at https://github.com/xhOwenMa/AutoDojo.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 12

Robust Context-Aware Detection of Malicious Instructions in Text

The remarkable instruction-following ability of modern LLMs has enabled their practical use as the minds of agents that can autonomously complete increasingly complex tasks. Therein, however, also lies their vulnerability to attacks which embed malicious instructions in text, common variants of which are known as indirect prompt injection (IPI). A fundamental task in addressing this vulnerability is successful segmentation of a given text into benign and malicious sentences (if any). While a number of approaches for this task have been proposed, no detector combines query-relative detection at the segment level, and none are hardened against adaptive evasion attacks realizable in agentic executions. We address the former limitation by developing an approach for malicious sentence classification that is both context- and query-aware. Next, to harden the resulting classifier against evasion, we present two adversarial training methods. The first is directly adapted feature-space adversarial training (AT) in which evasions are approximated using projected-gradient-based optimization in the embedding space. The second simulates realizable evasion attacks in the AT loop through LLM-based paraphrasing. Crucially, we parametrize both AT variants to facilitate a smooth tradeoff between utility and attack robustness. In extensive experiments using indirect prompt injection benchmarks we show that the proposed approach outperforms state-of-the-art IPI defense baselines under static attacks, while in the case of adaptive attacks, our AT variants provide significantly higher utility, lower attack success rate, and often both. Finally, we show that the best AT parameters can depend intimately on the particular application domain. Consequently, domain-dependent tuning of malicious text detectors is likely necessary in practice. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/tavia-liu/CAD.

  • 3 authors
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Aug 4

SCOPE: Compiling Natural-Language Policies into Neurosymbolic Predicate Programs

Policy enforcement for LLM agents has shifted from single-turn content moderation to compound, application-specific policies evaluated over multi-turn transcripts and tool-call trajectories. Fine-tuned guardrail models are efficient but degrade on compound policies, and while LLM-as-a-judge approaches achieve higher accuracy, they incur high inference cost and tend to produce unstable predictions. Neurosymbolic methods offer a natural alternative, decomposing the policy into narrow neural decisions composed under explicit logic. However, existing symbolic layers lack the required expressiveness and are optimized against fixed data rather than the policy itself. To address this, we introduce SCOPE, which compiles a policy into an executable program of neural predicates executed by small models, deterministic extractors, and code that composes their outputs. The program is optimized jointly with its training data, using adversarial generation of counterexamples that target where the program deviates from the policy. We evaluate SCOPE on a benchmark of real-world policy tasks against prompt optimization, task decomposition, and workflow generation methods, achieving the highest average accuracy across tasks and models. Programs optimized with the weakest executor transfer to other models without further optimization. This allows them to be deployed in production on inexpensive models, where they reach accuracy comparable to frontier reasoning models. Unlike these monolithic models, SCOPE produces substantially more stable predictions, and each verdict is interpretable through the predicate outputs that produced it. Additionally, we validate the key components of our method through an ablation study. SCOPE thus enables reliable, interpretable, and efficient policy enforcement at production scale.

Plurai Plurai
·
Oct 21 8

The Mirage of Optimizing Training Policies: Monotonic Inference Policies as the Real Objective for LLM Reinforcement Learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained growing attention in large language model (LLM) post-training, yet RL training remains fragile and can suffer from instability or collapse. One vital cause is training-inference mismatch: LLM adopts separate inference and training engines for generation efficiency and training precision, which in practice exhibits inconsistent probabilities for the same trajectories on training and inference sides, even with synchronized model parameters. This naturally induces a special type of off-policyness ever existing and poisoning the training. Prior works have made various efforts in addressing the off-policyness to stabilize the training policies under the mismatch. In this paper, we point out the objective misalignment neglected by existing works that an effective update to the policy in the training engine not necessarily ensures the improvement of the inference policy, i.e., the one used in deployment. To this end, we propose a new policy optimization objective for LLM RL, named Monotonic Inference Policy Improvement (MIPI). Following this principle, we introduce Monotonic Inference Policy Update (MIPU), a two-step LLM RL framework that constructs sampler-referenced candidate updates and selectively accepts synchronized candidates using an inference-side gap proxy. Experiments conducted on two model scales under high mismatch show that MIPU improves average reasoning performance and training stability.

  • 12 authors
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Jun 27 3

OPID: On-Policy Skill Distillation for Agentic Reinforcement Learning

Outcome-based reinforcement learning provides a stable optimization backbone for language agents, but its sparse trajectory-level rewards provide little guidance on which intermediate decisions should be reinforced or suppressed. On-policy self-distillation offers dense token-level supervision, yet existing skill-conditioned variants often rely on external skill memories or retrieved privileged context, which are costly to maintain and can be mismatched with the state distribution induced by the current policy in multi-turn interaction. We propose OPID (On-Policy Skill Distillation), a framework that extracts skill supervision directly from completed on-policy trajectories. OPID represents trajectory hindsight as hierarchical skills: episode-level skills capture global workflows or failure-avoidance rules, while step-level skills capture local decision knowledge at critical timesteps. A critical-first routing mechanism uses step-level skills when critical decisions are identified and falls back to episode-level skills as default guidance otherwise. The selected skill is injected into the interaction history, allowing the old policy to re-score the same sampled response under both original and skill-augmented contexts. The resulting log-probability shift yields a token-level self-distillation advantage, which is combined with the outcome advantage for policy optimization. OPID thus preserves RL as the primary training objective while introducing dense, distribution-matched hindsight supervision. Experiments on ALFWorld, WebShop and Search-based QA demonstrate that OPID generally improves agent performance, sample efficiency, and robustness over outcome-only RL and existing skill-distillation baselines. Our code is available at https://github.com/jinyangwu/OPID/tree/main.

  • 11 authors
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Jun 24 2

CoER: Defending against Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection via Adversarial Co-Evolution and Refinement

Language-model agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) during tool use: adversarial instructions hidden in untrusted tool outputs can covertly redirect legitimate task execution. Existing work often trains and evaluates defenses against fixed attacks that do not adapt to the defender's behavior, so the resulting defenses may struggle against adaptive attacks. We combine adaptive attacker-defender co-training with subsequent refinement: continued interaction improves both roles, while learned attackers provide training challenges for further gains in defender safety and task utility. We therefore model adaptive IPI as a general-sum Markov game: the defender advances the task through successive tool calls, while the attacker can inject multiple times within the same task and adapt subsequent attacks to the defender's responses. Building on this formulation, we propose CoER, a verifier-grounded co-evolution and refinement framework. After initializing the attacker from successful trajectories, Co-PPO retains historical policies from both roles as opponent populations and mixes current and historical opponents for bilateral reinforcement learning, extending training beyond the latest matchup. Attackers from these populations are then reused to challenge teacher agents, and only demonstrations verified for both safety and task completion are used to fine-tune the co-evolved defender. In our main seven-domain evaluation, CoER reduces observed overall attack success from 38.5% to 0.2% and raises task utility from 63.2% to 76.3%, with improved attack resistance on external benchmarks.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 14

MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

  • 2 authors
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Dec 18, 2025

The Promptware Kill Chain: How Prompt Injections Gradually Evolved Into a Multistep Malware Delivery Mechanism

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

  • 4 authors
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Feb 9

MInTRL: Off-policy Intervention can boost On-policy RL

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards is typically performed on-policy, keeping training data close to the current policy but limiting learning to trajectories that the policy can discover itself. Off-policy methods such as supervised fine-tuning, on the other hand, can leverage external knowledge beyond the base model's capabilities, but may suffer from large distribution shift. The key challenge is thus to expand exploration without sacrificing learnability. In this work, we introduce Minimal Intervention Reinforcement Learning (MInTRL), which expands the exploration frontier through sparse, local interventions in otherwise on-policy rollouts. During generation, a judge-intervention policy periodically reviews the current policy's output, replaces erroneous suffixes with short corrections, and immediately returns control to the policy. During training, MInTRL adopts a sequence-level advantage-regression objective that eliminates the need for importance sampling. We show that sparse, local interventions can substantially improve coverage beyond finite-budget on-policy sampling while preserving the overall on-policy nature of the resulting trajectories. Across math and code benchmarks, MInTRL consistently outperforms standard on-policy and off-policy baselines. Ablations show that MInTRL remains effective with self-intervention and across different judge policies, while performance peaks at moderate intervention intensity, highlighting the importance of intervening minimally. These results establish minimal intervention as an effective paradigm for enhancing on-policy RL.

amazon Amazon
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Sep 10 2

Set-Supervised Diffusion Policy: Learning Action-Chunking Diffusion through Corrections

Diffusion policies have recently emerged as a powerful framework for robotic manipulation. However, like other behavior cloning methods, they remain vulnerable to distributional shift, often requiring human-in-the-loop interventions to correct failures during deployment. These interactions naturally provide paired supervision in the form of the robot's undesired actions and the human teacher's corrective actions. Yet existing data aggregation pipelines and standard behavior cloning losses largely ignore this negative signal from undesired actions, leading to overfitting to teacher's actions and an increasing reliance on costly expert data. To address this limitation, we propose Set-Supervised Diffusion Policy (SDP), a novel learning framework that utilizes contrastive action-chunk data to train diffusion policies from human corrections. From paired positive and negative action-chunks, SDP constructs a set of desired action-chunks and designs a training pipeline that encourages the diffusion policy to align with the set. Through extensive experiments across multiple robotic manipulation tasks, we demonstrate that SDP consistently improves policy performance, with particularly strong gains in robustness to noisy data. Moreover, SDP induces high-quality aggregated datasets, enabling more efficient and reliable policy learning from human-in-the-loop corrections. Our code is available at https://set-supervised-diffusion-policy.github.io/.

  • 5 authors
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May 31

Adaptive Advantage-Guided Policy Regularization for Offline Reinforcement Learning

In offline reinforcement learning, the challenge of out-of-distribution (OOD) is pronounced. To address this, existing methods often constrain the learned policy through policy regularization. However, these methods often suffer from the issue of unnecessary conservativeness, hampering policy improvement. This occurs due to the indiscriminate use of all actions from the behavior policy that generates the offline dataset as constraints. The problem becomes particularly noticeable when the quality of the dataset is suboptimal. Thus, we propose Adaptive Advantage-guided Policy Regularization (A2PR), obtaining high-advantage actions from an augmented behavior policy combined with VAE to guide the learned policy. A2PR can select high-advantage actions that differ from those present in the dataset, while still effectively maintaining conservatism from OOD actions. This is achieved by harnessing the VAE capacity to generate samples matching the distribution of the data points. We theoretically prove that the improvement of the behavior policy is guaranteed. Besides, it effectively mitigates value overestimation with a bounded performance gap. Empirically, we conduct a series of experiments on the D4RL benchmark, where A2PR demonstrates state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, experimental results on additional suboptimal mixed datasets reveal that A2PR exhibits superior performance. Code is available at https://github.com/ltlhuuu/A2PR.

  • 6 authors
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May 30, 2024

Progent: Programmable Privilege Control for LLM Agents

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

  • 7 authors
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Apr 15, 2025 2

OpenAgentFlow: Enabling System-Wide Safety Boundaries for Heterogeneous AI Agent Fleets

AI agents powered by large language models are evolving from isolated assistants into heterogeneous systems in which multiple agents, planners, tools, and execution backends operate over shared environments. In such settings, safety becomes a system-level action-governance problem: deciding whether a pending action should be committed given policy-relevant state accumulated across a session. Existing safeguards operate at fragmented boundaries, making it difficult to enforce shared policies over composed action flows across heterogeneous execution paths. We present OpenAgentFlow, a control-plane/action-plane architecture that establishes the action-commit boundary as a shared enforcement interface. GUI, API, tool, and LLM-generated actions are normalized into a common AgentEvent stream and mediated by a shared pre-execution Policy Enforcement Point, while provenance, session state, audit evidence, and updatable policies are maintained outside individual agents. This provides a common governance layer across incompatible executors and allows new policies to take effect without modifying agents, prompts, models, or execution paths. We evaluate OpenAgentFlow through complementary system evaluations spanning controlled action-flow tests, a public external benchmark, policy updates, and real Android execution. On a 300-case controlled suite, OpenAgentFlow achieves 94.00% accuracy and a 95.35% attack-block rate. On the complete 1,220-case AgentDojo-Traj split of TS-Bench, it achieves 97.62% accuracy, 96.59% unsafe-action recall, and a 1.96% safe false-intervention rate. New control-plane rules take effect without modifying protected agents, and the same enforcement path operates across live GUI, API/tool, and LLM-planned Android execution. These results show that a shared action-commit boundary provides a practical basis for system-wide governance across heterogeneous agent execution paths.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 1

LocalAlign: Enabling Generalizable Prompt Injection Defense via Generation of Near-Target Adversarial Examples for Alignment Training

Large language models are increasingly embedded into systems that interact with user data, retrieved web content, and external tools, creating a new attack surface: prompt injection, where malicious commands embedded in untrusted data override the trusted command and induce unintended behavior. Existing defenses mainly rely on fine-tuning the model to preserve an explicit boundary between trusted commands and the untrusted data portion, so that the model learns to prioritize the trusted field and ignore malicious commands in data. However, we observe that while these defenses can block obviously malicious responses caused by injected commands, they generalize poorly to real-world scenarios where the model's response to the injected command is much nearer to the correct response. This is because existing methods typically train against only a fixed set of hand-crafted attack targets, which yields a loose boundary around the correct response and leaves it easier to bypass. To address this challenge, we propose LocalAlign, a more generalizable prompt injection defense inspired by adversarial training. LocalAlign automatically and efficiently generates adversarial examples in which the command embedded in the data portion induces a response that stays near to the correct response while still being wrong. We generate such near-but-wrong adversarial examples using prompting and a single inference step. This design enforces a tighter robustness boundary around the correct response: even small response shifts induced by commands in untrusted data are explicitly penalized. Moreover, the resulting adversarial examples can vary substantially in quality across samples. To address this issue, we further introduce a margin-aware alignment algorithm that quantifies each sample's distance to the correct response and assigns larger training weight to nearer ones.

  • 4 authors
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May 1

Prompt Injection Mitigation with Agentic AI, Nested Learning, and AI Sustainability via Semantic Caching

Prompt injection remains a central obstacle to the safe deployment of large language models, particularly in multi-agent settings where intermediate outputs can propagate or amplify malicious instructions. Building on earlier work that introduced a four-metric Total Injection Vulnerability Score (TIVS), this paper extends the evaluation framework with semantic similarity-based caching and a fifth metric (Observability Score Ratio) to yield TIVS-O, investigating how defence effectiveness interacts with transparency in a HOPE-inspired Nested Learning architecture. The proposed system combines an agentic pipeline with Continuum Memory Systems that implement semantic similarity-based caching across 301 synthetically generated injection-focused prompts drawn from ten attack families, while a fourth agent performs comprehensive security analysis using five key performance indicators. In addition to traditional injection metrics, OSR quantifies the richness and clarity of security-relevant reasoning exposed by each agent, enabling an explicit analysis of trade-offs between strict mitigation and auditability. Experiments show that the system achieves secure responses with zero high-risk breaches, while semantic caching delivers substantial computational savings, achieving a 41.6% reduction in LLM calls and corresponding decreases in latency, energy consumption, and carbon emissions. Five TIVS-O configurations reveal optimal trade-offs between mitigation strictness and forensic transparency. These results indicate that observability-aware evaluation can reveal non-monotonic effects within multi-agent pipelines and that memory-augmented agents can jointly maximize security robustness, real-time performance, operational cost savings, and environmental sustainability without modifying underlying model weights, providing a production-ready pathway for secure and green LLM deployments.

  • 2 authors
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Jan 18

PromptSleuth: Detecting Prompt Injection via Semantic Intent Invariance

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications, from virtual assistants to autonomous agents. However, their flexibility also introduces new attack vectors-particularly Prompt Injection (PI), where adversaries manipulate model behavior through crafted inputs. As attackers continuously evolve with paraphrased, obfuscated, and even multi-task injection strategies, existing benchmarks are no longer sufficient to capture the full spectrum of emerging threats. To address this gap, we construct a new benchmark that systematically extends prior efforts. Our benchmark subsumes the two widely-used existing ones while introducing new manipulation techniques and multi-task scenarios, thereby providing a more comprehensive evaluation setting. We find that existing defenses, though effective on their original benchmarks, show clear weaknesses under our benchmark, underscoring the need for more robust solutions. Our key insight is that while attack forms may vary, the adversary's intent-injecting an unauthorized task-remains invariant. Building on this observation, we propose PromptSleuth, a semantic-oriented defense framework that detects prompt injection by reasoning over task-level intent rather than surface features. Evaluated across state-of-the-art benchmarks, PromptSleuth consistently outperforms existing defense while maintaining comparable runtime and cost efficiency. These results demonstrate that intent-based semantic reasoning offers a robust, efficient, and generalizable strategy for defending LLMs against evolving prompt injection threats.

  • 3 authors
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Aug 28, 2025

How Agents Ask for Permission: User Permissions for AI Agents, from Interfaces to Enforcement

As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties. As autonomous systems, agents also present the more active danger of performing sensitive tasks, such as bank transactions, without the user's intent or authorization. Recognizing this challenge, the agentic security community has developed numerous proposals for secure agentic systems. Much of this work has focused on product-level approaches, where agentic system developers determine and apply the same security policies and permissions to all users. Yet different users have different needs and preferences, necessitating support for user-level permissions policies in agentic AI systems. To understand how user-level permissions are handled in AI agent systems, we survey 21 proposals for agent permissions systems. From this review, we construct a taxonomy of how different systems specify user-level permissions policies, both at the user interface and internally; derive internal policies from user input; and enforce those policies at run-time. We then analyze five prominent commercial agents and compare their permissions handling to agentic permissions systems in the literature. We identify several high-level themes across the literature and commerical agents, as well as multiple gaps where future work is needed.

  • 2 authors
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Jul 14

Measuring the Stability Assumption Behind Action Chunking

Action chunking improves the performance of policies learned by behavioural cloning, and several mechanisms have been proposed to explain why, including temporal consistency, horizon reduction, representation learning, and reduced error compounding. We instead study what happens to an action error once it enters the system. At each state, we inject a small action error and measure how fast it grows or shrinks under two execution regimes: open-loop, where the rest of the chunk is replayed without replanning, and closed-loop, where the policy replans after the perturbation. The fitted rate labels each state as contracting, expanding, or unresolved. Across twelve manipulation tasks from three benchmark suites, we find that confidently stable states are rare, while error amplification is common among states whose propagation rate can be resolved. We further find that the measured propagation rate depends strongly on the fitting horizon: amplification is typically front-loaded, so short windows can overestimate longer-horizon propagation. Finally, we train predictors on these labels and find that a state's open-loop regime can be recovered from camera frames and proprioception alone, while its closed-loop propagation is only partially recoverable because it also depends on how the policy acts after the perturbation. These results suggest that error-compounding arguments alone do not provide a complete account of action chunking: neither passive open-loop dynamics nor policy replanning consistently contracts an injected error, and replanning rarely turns open-loop amplification into confident contraction. This suggests that closed-loop reactivity should be trained explicitly, using perturbation- and tree-coverage-oriented training to expose policies to deviations they must recover from, rather than expected to emerge reliably from standard imitation learning.

  • 1 authors
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Sep 30

Poison Once, Refuse Forever: Weaponizing Alignment for Injecting Bias in LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

  • 3 authors
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Aug 27, 2025

EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agents

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are turning language into real-world effects, making safety necessary against both indirect prompt injections and direct harmful requests. System-level safety harnesses add an enforcement layer beyond model-level defenses, but existing harnesses are usually designed once by experts and applied across heterogeneous models and domains. Effective protection is deployment-dependent: models differ in how much enforcement they need before utility declines, while domains differ in the effects, state, and action sequences that must be governed. A harness that is strict enough for one model may over-block another, and a policy that transfers across domains may miss application-specific safety relations. We present EvoSafeHarness, a safety-specific optimization framework that synthesizes a deployable harness for a frozen model in a target domain. It jointly searches a natural-language policy and executable code logic, guided by model behavior, domain specifications, and fresh-context adversarial review to reject benchmark-specific rules. Across four agent benchmark families, EvoSafeHarness achieves a stronger safety-utility frontier than fixed expert-designed defenses. On DecodingTrust-Agent, it reduces average attack success rate from 45.6% to 10.0% at a 3.3-point utility cost and achieves the best score in 14 of 15 cells. On AgentDojo, it reaches 82.8% utility at 0.0% ASR, twice CaMeL's utility at the same operating point, and transfers unchanged to unseen AgentDyn suites. It also achieves the best score on Agent-SafetyBench for every victim and keeps mean ASR below 20% under adaptive PAIR attacks with a refinement budget of 16. Analysis shows that domain semantics determine which safety relations and trajectory state are needed, while model and runtime behavior determine how and where those relations should be enforced.

Agent Data Injection Attacks are Realistic Threats to AI Agents

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI, agent data injection attacks (ADI). ADI injects malicious data disguised as trusted data, such as security-critical metadata (e.g., resource identifiers or data origins) or agent context data (e.g., tool call and response formats). As a result, agents unknowingly execute unintended actions based on attacker-controlled data. ADI has similar attack impacts as instruction injection attacks, because it causes agents to misbehave and execute unintended actions. Despite the similar impact, ADI remains underexplored and easily bypasses existing IPI defenses. We found several critical vulnerabilities in real-world agents that allow an attacker to launch various attacks: arbitrary click attacks on web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, and Nanobrowser), and remote code execution and supply-chain attacks on coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI). We evaluate ADI vulnerabilities across off-the-shelf models and AI agents, and find that ADI is effective in both standalone LLMs and AI agent settings. ADI exposes a critical gap in agent security, signifying that current AI agents do not employ a fundamental security principle: current agents do not isolate trusted data from untrusted data.

  • 6 authors
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Jul 5

ClawGym II: Exploring Black-Box RL on Agent Harness

Agent harnesses have substantially improved performance on long-horizon tasks by coordinating agent interactions with the environment. However, reinforcement learning through complex harnesses remains largely unexplored, as scaling such training to long-horizon agent tasks introduces fundamental challenges. In this work, we present a unified black-box RL framework for stable and scalable optimization of general agents through complex harnesses. Concretely, we first build a sandbox-based execution infrastructure that isolates task environments and harnesses within temporary sandboxes for large-scale concurrent rollouts. We then decouple policy optimization from opaque harness execution and place a serving proxy at the model boundary to capture model calls. To reconstruct multi-turn trajectories and improve training efficiency, we organize the captured calls into prefix trees and further adapt both critic-based PPO and critic-free GRPO to optimize over the recovered tree structure. Meanwhile, we maintain training-inference consistency throughout the optimization process. Finally, we introduce mix-harness training, allowing a single model to be jointly optimized by heterogeneous harnesses. With Qwen3-30A3B, black-box RL improves Pass@1 on ClawGym-Bench by 9.98 and 14.81 points through OpenClaw and Claude Code, respectively, while remaining stable over 200-400 optimization steps. Moreover, the framework yields consistent gains on more challenging tasks such as JobBench and OfficeQA. Overall, our framework enables effective, stable, and scalable optimization of general agents through black-box harnesses, supporting unified training across heterogeneous execution systems.

POISE: Position-Aware Undetectable Skill Injection on LLM Agents

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

PolicyShiftGuard: Benchmarking and Improving Policy-Adaptive Image Guardrails

Image guardrails are typically trained and evaluated under a fixed safety policy, implicitly treating safety as an intrinsic property of an image. Real deployments are different: the same image may be allowed in one product, restricted in another, and newly disallowed when a policy boundary changes. We study policy-adaptive image guardrailing, where a model must decide whether an image violates the currently supplied policy and generalize to held-out policy definitions. We introduce PolicyShiftBench, a comprehensive benchmark with 2,000 policy-discriminative instances over 265 images, where each image is paired with 7.55 policy-conditioned prompts on average to test whether models adapt to the active policy rather than relying on image-level safety priors. We then propose PolicyShiftGuard, a compact policy-conditioned guardrail trained with a two-stage training recipe that combines Randomized Policy SFT (RP-SFT) with Boundary-Pair Policy Adaptation (BP-Adapt). BP-Adapt trains matched prompts for the same image and risk category using standard label supervision and a pairwise comparison loss that separates blocking policies from passing policies. Experiments show that existing VLMs and specialized guardrails remain brittle under policy shifts, while PolicyShiftGuard substantially improves policy-sensitive performance. The 7B model achieves SOTA performance of 76.9 Avg. F1 and 72.1 Avg. PSS on PolicyShiftBench, transfers well to UnSafeBench and SafeEditBench, and improves the latency-performance trade-off with a concise output format. Ablations confirm that matched pass/block boundary pairs are essential for stable policy adaptation.

Towards Policy-Compliant Agents: Learning Efficient Guardrails For Policy Violation Detection

Autonomous web agents need to operate under externally imposed or human-specified policies while generating long-horizon trajectories. However, little work has examined whether these trajectories comply with such policies, or whether policy violations persist across different contexts such as domains (e.g., shopping or coding websites) and subdomains (e.g., product search and order management in shopping). To address this gap, we introduce PolicyGuardBench, a benchmark of about 60k examples for detecting policy violations in agent trajectories. From diverse agent runs, we generate a broad set of policies and create both within subdomain and cross subdomain pairings with violation labels. In addition to full-trajectory evaluation, PolicyGuardBench also includes a prefix-based violation detection task where models must anticipate policy violations from truncated trajectory prefixes rather than complete sequences. Using this dataset, we train PolicyGuard-4B, a lightweight guardrail model that delivers strong detection accuracy across all tasks while keeping inference efficient. Notably, PolicyGuard-4B generalizes across domains and preserves high accuracy on unseen settings. Together, PolicyGuardBench and PolicyGuard-4B provide the first comprehensive framework for studying policy compliance in web agent trajectories, and show that accurate and generalizable guardrails are feasible at small scales.

  • 5 authors
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Oct 3, 2025

Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

  • 4 authors
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Feb 23

Residual-MPPI: Online Policy Customization for Continuous Control

Policies developed through Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Imitation Learning (IL) have shown great potential in continuous control tasks, but real-world applications often require adapting trained policies to unforeseen requirements. While fine-tuning can address such needs, it typically requires additional data and access to the original training metrics and parameters. In contrast, an online planning algorithm, if capable of meeting the additional requirements, can eliminate the necessity for extensive training phases and customize the policy without knowledge of the original training scheme or task. In this work, we propose a generic online planning algorithm for customizing continuous-control policies at the execution time, which we call Residual-MPPI. It can customize a given prior policy on new performance metrics in few-shot and even zero-shot online settings, given access to the prior action distribution alone. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that the proposed Residual-MPPI algorithm can accomplish the few-shot/zero-shot online policy customization task effectively, including customizing the champion-level racing agent, Gran Turismo Sophy (GT Sophy) 1.0, in the challenging car racing scenario, Gran Turismo Sport (GTS) environment. Code for MuJoCo experiments is included in the supplementary and will be open-sourced upon acceptance. Demo videos and code are available on our website: https://sites.google.com/view/residual-mppi.

  • 7 authors
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Mar 13, 2025

Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systems

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 15 2

Why Do AI Agents Break Rules? How Framing, Context, and Social Signals Shape Compliance

Specifying a penalty can turn a legal obligation into a cost-benefit calculation that favors violation. We show that this enforcement information paradox occurs in AI agents. Most AI safety evaluations test whether models fail; we ask why, using compliance theory from law and economics as a diagnostic. We evaluate twelve instruction-tuned language models deployed as enterprise procurement chatbots. Each is given an environmental regulation in its system prompt covering large purchases, and a vendor list on which the certified suppliers cost nearly twice what the uncertified ones do. We test the agents against the predictions of deterrence, legitimacy, and expressive law, and find that each theory accounts for part of what we observe. Under identical conditions, compliance spans 46 percentage points across models, and models differ in which pressure breaks them: some treat the regulation as binding however it is worded, while others fail where theory predicts, under low penalties and non-command phrasing. Benchmark scores and developers' own descriptions of post-training do not predict where a model falls. Across all twelve, financial incentives, managerial demands, peer outcomes, and employee pressure each produce large compliance failures. These agents violate regulatory constraints to satisfy local user objectives in ways standard alignment benchmarks do not measure. Embedding the rule in the system prompt is not on its own enough to produce a compliant agent: model selection is itself a governance decision, and benchmark evaluation is not sufficient for compliance-sensitive deployments.

Controllable User Simulation

Using offline datasets to evaluate conversational agents often fails to cover rare scenarios or to support testing new policies. This has motivated the use of controllable user simulators for targeted, counterfactual evaluation, typically implemented by prompting or fine-tuning large language models. In this work, we formalize controllable simulation as a causal inference problem. By bridging natural language evaluation with off-policy evaluation methodology, we show that the standard practice of training simulators via supervised fine-tuning on post-hoc trajectory labels yields a structurally biased model. Specifically, these labels are inextricably coupled to the data-generating behavior policy, injecting a look-ahead bias that breaks causal consistency. Furthermore, we prove that under policy shift this failure causes the variance of evaluation metrics to explode geometrically, a phenomenon we term controllability collapse. To restore causal consistency, we establish theoretical conditions for accurate simulation and propose practical training mitigations: a priori controls, step-wise dynamic controls, and direct policy-conditioned learning. Empirical evaluation confirms that while standard global controls distort conversational distributions and collapse behavioral diversity, our causally grounded simulators eliminate look-ahead bias, preserve natural variance, and exhibit robust zero-shot generalization to unseen agent behaviors.

  • 6 authors
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May 11