Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate inconsistent responses when prompted with semantically equivalent paraphrased inputs. Recently, activation steering, a technique that modulates LLMs' behaviours by adjusting their latent representations during inference time, has been explored to improve the semantic consistency of LLMs. However, these methods typically operate at the model component level, such as layer hidden states or attention head outputs. They face a challenge due to the ``polysemanticity issue'', where the model components of LLMs typically encode multiple entangled features, making precise steering difficult. To address this challenge, we drill down to feature-level representations and propose LF-Steering, a novel activation steering approach to precisely identify latent feature representations responsible for semantic inconsistency. More specifically, our method maps the hidden states of the relevant transformer layer into a sparsely activated, high-dimensional feature space based on a sparse autoencoder (SAE), ensuring model steering based on decoupled feature representations with minimal interference. Comprehensive experiments on NLU and NLG datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in enhancing semantic consistency, resulting in significant performance gains for various NLU and NLG tasks.

We study the challenge of achieving theoretically grounded feature recovery using Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) for the interpretation of Large Language Models. Existing SAE training algorithms often lack rigorous mathematical guarantees and suffer from practical limitations such as hyperparameter sensitivity and instability. To address these issues, we first propose a novel statistical framework for the feature recovery problem, which includes a new notion of feature identifiability by modeling polysemantic features as sparse mixtures of underlying monosemantic concepts. Building on this framework, we introduce a new SAE training algorithm based on ``bias adaptation'', a technique that adaptively adjusts neural network bias parameters to ensure appropriate activation sparsity. We theoretically prove that this algorithm correctly recovers all monosemantic features when input data is sampled from our proposed statistical model. Furthermore, we develop an improved empirical variant, Group Bias Adaptation (GBA), and demonstrate its superior performance against benchmark methods when applied to LLMs with up to 1.5 billion parameters. This work represents a foundational step in demystifying SAE training by providing the first SAE algorithm with theoretical recovery guarantees, thereby advancing the development of more transparent and trustworthy AI systems through enhanced mechanistic interpretability.

Neural networks often pack many unrelated concepts into a single neuron - a puzzling phenomenon known as 'polysemanticity' which makes interpretability much more challenging. This paper provides a toy model where polysemanticity can be fully understood, arising as a result of models storing additional sparse features in "superposition." We demonstrate the existence of a phase change, a surprising connection to the geometry of uniform polytopes, and evidence of a link to adversarial examples. We also discuss potential implications for mechanistic interpretability.

One of the roadblocks to a better understanding of neural networks' internals is polysemanticity, where neurons appear to activate in multiple, semantically distinct contexts. Polysemanticity prevents us from identifying concise, human-understandable explanations for what neural networks are doing internally. One hypothesised cause of polysemanticity is superposition, where neural networks represent more features than they have neurons by assigning features to an overcomplete set of directions in activation space, rather than to individual neurons. Here, we attempt to identify those directions, using sparse autoencoders to reconstruct the internal activations of a language model. These autoencoders learn sets of sparsely activating features that are more interpretable and monosemantic than directions identified by alternative approaches, where interpretability is measured by automated methods. Ablating these features enables precise model editing, for example, by removing capabilities such as pronoun prediction, while disrupting model behaviour less than prior techniques. This work indicates that it is possible to resolve superposition in language models using a scalable, unsupervised method. Our method may serve as a foundation for future mechanistic interpretability work, which we hope will enable greater model transparency and steerability.

Automated interpretability research aims to identify concepts encoded in neural network features to enhance human understanding of model behavior. Current feature description methods face two critical challenges: limited robustness and the flawed assumption that each neuron encodes only a single concept (monosemanticity), despite growing evidence that neurons are often polysemantic. This assumption restricts the expressiveness of feature descriptions and limits their ability to capture the full range of behaviors encoded in model internals. To address this, we introduce Polysemantic FeatuRe Identification and Scoring Method (PRISM), a novel framework that captures the inherent complexity of neural network features. Unlike prior approaches that assign a single description per feature, PRISM provides more nuanced descriptions for both polysemantic and monosemantic features. We apply PRISM to language models and, through extensive benchmarking against existing methods, demonstrate that our approach produces more accurate and faithful feature descriptions, improving both overall description quality (via a description score) and the ability to capture distinct concepts when polysemanticity is present (via a polysemanticity score).

Understanding the internal computations of large language models (LLMs) is crucial for aligning them with human values and preventing undesirable behaviors like toxic content generation. However, mechanistic interpretability is hindered by polysemanticity -- where individual neurons respond to multiple, unrelated concepts. While Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) have attempted to disentangle these features through sparse dictionary learning, they have compromised LLM performance due to reliance on post-hoc reconstruction loss. To address this issue, we introduce Mixture of Monosemantic Experts for Transformers (Monet) architecture, which incorporates sparse dictionary learning directly into end-to-end Mixture-of-Experts pretraining. Our novel expert decomposition method enables scaling the expert count to 262,144 per layer while total parameters scale proportionally to the square root of the number of experts. Our analyses demonstrate mutual exclusivity of knowledge across experts and showcase the parametric knowledge encapsulated within individual experts. Moreover, Monet allows knowledge manipulation over domains, languages, and toxicity mitigation without degrading general performance. Our pursuit of transparent LLMs highlights the potential of scaling expert counts to enhance} mechanistic interpretability and directly resect the internal knowledge to fundamentally adjust} model behavior. The source code and pretrained checkpoints are available at https://github.com/dmis-lab/Monet.

We give a conceptual treatment of the notion of joints, marginals, and independence in the setting of categorical probability. This is achieved by endowing the usual probability monads (like the Giry monad) with a monoidal and an opmonoidal structure, mutually compatible (i.e. a bimonoidal structure). If the underlying monoidal category is cartesian monoidal, a bimonoidal structure is given uniquely by a commutative strength. However, if the underlying monoidal category is not cartesian monoidal, a strength is not enough to guarantee all the desired properties of joints and marginals. A bimonoidal structure is then the correct requirement for the more general case. We explain the theory and the operational interpretation, with the help of the graphical calculus for monoidal categories. We give a definition of stochastic independence based on the bimonoidal structure, compatible with the intuition and with other approaches in the literature for cartesian monoidal categories. We then show as an example that the Kantorovich monad on the category of complete metric spaces is a bimonoidal monad for a non-cartesian monoidal structure.

Scientific studies of consciousness rely on objects whose existence is assumed to be independent of any consciousness. On the contrary, we assume consciousness to be fundamental, and that one of the main features of consciousness is characterized as being other-dependent. We set up a framework which naturally subsumes this feature by defining a compact closed category where morphisms represent conscious processes. These morphisms are a composition of a set of generators, each being specified by their relations with other generators, and therefore co-dependent. The framework is general enough and fits well into a compositional model of consciousness. Interestingly, we also show how our proposal may become a step towards avoiding the hard problem of consciousness, and thereby address the combination problem of conscious experiences.

We present a study on how and where personas -- defined by distinct sets of human characteristics, values, and beliefs -- are encoded in the representation space of large language models (LLMs). Using a range of dimension reduction and pattern recognition methods, we first identify the model layers that show the greatest divergence in encoding these representations. We then analyze the activations within a selected layer to examine how specific personas are encoded relative to others, including their shared and distinct embedding spaces. We find that, across multiple pre-trained decoder-only LLMs, the analyzed personas show large differences in representation space only within the final third of the decoder layers. We observe overlapping activations for specific ethical perspectives -- such as moral nihilism and utilitarianism -- suggesting a degree of polysemy. In contrast, political ideologies like conservatism and liberalism appear to be represented in more distinct regions. These findings help to improve our understanding of how LLMs internally represent information and can inform future efforts in refining the modulation of specific human traits in LLM outputs. Warning: This paper includes potentially offensive sample statements.

There is growing interest in leveraging mechanistic interpretability and controllability to better understand and influence the internal dynamics of large language models (LLMs). However, current methods face fundamental challenges in reliably localizing and manipulating feature representations. Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) have recently emerged as a promising direction for feature extraction at scale, yet they, too, are limited by incomplete feature isolation and unreliable monosemanticity. To systematically quantify these limitations, we introduce Feature Monosemanticity Score (FMS), a novel metric to quantify feature monosemanticity in latent representation. Building on these insights, we propose Guided Sparse Autoencoders (G-SAE), a method that conditions latent representations on labeled concepts during training. We demonstrate that reliable localization and disentanglement of target concepts within the latent space improve interpretability, detection of behavior, and control. Specifically, our evaluations on toxicity detection, writing style identification, and privacy attribute recognition show that G-SAE not only enhances monosemanticity but also enables more effective and fine-grained steering with less quality degradation. Our findings provide actionable guidelines for measuring and advancing mechanistic interpretability and control of LLMs.

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) have emerged as a promising approach to decompose the activations of Large Language Models (LLMs) into human-interpretable latents. In this paper, we pose two questions. First, to what extent do SAEs extract monosemantic and interpretable latents? Second, to what extent does varying the sparsity or the size of the SAE affect monosemanticity / interpretability? By investigating these questions in the context of a simple first-letter identification task where we have complete access to ground truth labels for all tokens in the vocabulary, we are able to provide more detail than prior investigations. Critically, we identify a problematic form of feature-splitting we call feature absorption where seemingly monosemantic latents fail to fire in cases where they clearly should. Our investigation suggests that varying SAE size or sparsity is insufficient to solve this issue, and that there are deeper conceptual issues in need of resolution.

We present a method for extracting monosemantic neurons, defined as latent dimensions that align with coherent and interpretable concepts, from user and item embeddings in recommender systems. Our approach employs a Sparse Autoencoder (SAE) to reveal semantic structure within pretrained representations. In contrast to work on language models, monosemanticity in recommendation must preserve the interactions between separate user and item embeddings. To achieve this, we introduce a prediction aware training objective that backpropagates through a frozen recommender and aligns the learned latent structure with the model's user-item affinity predictions. The resulting neurons capture properties such as genre, popularity, and temporal trends, and support post hoc control operations including targeted filtering and content promotion without modifying the base model. Our method generalizes across different recommendation models and datasets, providing a practical tool for interpretable and controllable personalization. Code and evaluation resources are available at https://github.com/DeltaLabTLV/Monosemanticity4Rec.

The alignment problem in the context of large language models must consider the plurality of human values in our world. Whilst there are many resonant and overlapping values amongst the world's cultures, there are also many conflicting, yet equally valid, values. It is important to observe which cultural values a model exhibits, particularly when there is a value conflict between input prompts and generated outputs. We discuss how the co-creation of language and cultural value impacts large language models (LLMs). We explore the constitution of the training data for GPT-3 and compare that to the world's language and internet access demographics, as well as to reported statistical profiles of dominant values in some Nation-states. We stress tested GPT-3 with a range of value-rich texts representing several languages and nations; including some with values orthogonal to dominant US public opinion as reported by the World Values Survey. We observed when values embedded in the input text were mutated in the generated outputs and noted when these conflicting values were more aligned with reported dominant US values. Our discussion of these results uses a moral value pluralism (MVP) lens to better understand these value mutations. Finally, we provide recommendations for how our work may contribute to other current work in the field.

We develop a framework, in the style of Adler, for interpreting the notion of "witnessing" that has appeared (usually as a variant of Kim's Lemma) in different areas of neostability theory as a binary relation between abstract independence relations. This involves extending the relativisations of Kim-independence and Conant-independence due to Mutchnik to arbitrary independence relations. After developing this framework, we show that several results from simplicity, NTP_2, NSOP_1, and beyond follow as instances of general theorems for abstract independence relations. In particular, we prove the equivalence between witnessing and symmetry and the implications from this notion to chain local character and the weak independence theorem, and recover some partial converses. Finally, we use this framework to prove a dichotomy between NSOP_1 and Kruckman and Ramsey's BTP that applies to most known NSOP_4 examples in the literature.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

We investigate feature universality in large language models (LLMs), a research field that aims to understand how different models similarly represent concepts in the latent spaces of their intermediate layers. Demonstrating feature universality allows discoveries about latent representations to generalize across several models. However, comparing features across LLMs is challenging due to polysemanticity, in which individual neurons often correspond to multiple features rather than distinct ones. This makes it difficult to disentangle and match features across different models. To address this issue, we employ a method known as dictionary learning by using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to transform LLM activations into more interpretable spaces spanned by neurons corresponding to individual features. After matching feature neurons across models via activation correlation, we apply representational space similarity metrics like Singular Value Canonical Correlation Analysis to analyze these SAE features across different LLMs. Our experiments reveal significant similarities in SAE feature spaces across various LLMs, providing new evidence for feature universality.

While existing alignment paradigms have been integral in developing large language models (LLMs), LLMs often learn an averaged human preference and struggle to model diverse preferences across cultures, demographics, and communities. We propose Modular Pluralism, a modular framework based on multi-LLM collaboration for pluralistic alignment: it "plugs into" a base LLM a pool of smaller but specialized community LMs, where models collaborate in distinct modes to flexibility support three modes of pluralism: Overton, steerable, and distributional. Modular Pluralism is uniquely compatible with black-box LLMs and offers the modular control of adding new community LMs for previously underrepresented communities. We evaluate Modular Pluralism with six tasks and four datasets featuring questions/instructions with value-laden and perspective-informed responses. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Modular Pluralism advances the three pluralism objectives across six black-box and open-source LLMs. Further analysis reveals that LLMs are generally faithful to the inputs from smaller community LLMs, allowing seamless patching by adding a new community LM to better cover previously underrepresented communities.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Instruction tuning improves the ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow diverse human instructions, but achieving strong performance on specific target tasks remains challenging. A critical bottleneck is selecting the most relevant data to maximize task-specific performance. Existing data selection approaches include unstable influence-based methods and more stable distribution alignment methods, the latter of which critically rely on the underlying sample representation. In practice, most distribution alignment methods, from shallow features (e.g., BM25) to neural embeddings (e.g., BGE, LLM2Vec), may fail to capture how the model internally processes samples. To bridge this gap, we adopt a model-centric strategy in which each sample is represented by its neuronal activation pattern in the model, directly reflecting internal computation. However, directly using raw neuron activations leads to spurious similarity between unrelated samples due to neuron polysemanticity, where a single neuron may respond to multiple, unrelated concepts. To address this, we employ sparse autoencoders to disentangle polysemantic activations into sparse, monosemantic representations, and introduce a dedicated similarity metric for this space to better identify task-relevant data. Comprehensive experiments across multiple instruction datasets, models, tasks, and selection ratios show that our approach consistently outperforms existing data selection baselines in both stability and task-specific performance.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Gross, Mansour, and Tucker introduced the partial-duality polynomial of a ribbon graph [Distributions, European J. Combin. 86, 1--20, 2020], the generating function enumerating partial duals by the Euler genus. Chmutov and Vignes-Tourneret wondered if this polynomial and its conjectured properties would hold for general delta-matroids, which are combinatorial abstractions of ribbon graphs. Yan and Jin contributed to this inquiry by identifying a subset of delta-matroids-specifically, even normal binary ones-whose twist polynomials are characterized by a singular term. Building upon this foundation, the current paper expands the scope of the investigation to encompass even non-binary delta-matroids, revealing that none of them have width-changing twists.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Why should moral philosophers, moral psychologists, and machine ethicists care about computational complexity? Debates on whether artificial intelligence (AI) can or should be used to solve problems in ethical domains have mainly been driven by what AI can or cannot do in terms of human capacities. In this paper, we tackle the problem from the other end by exploring what kind of moral machines are possible based on what computational systems can or cannot do. To do so, we analyze normative ethics through the lens of computational complexity. First, we introduce computational complexity for the uninitiated reader and discuss how the complexity of ethical problems can be framed within Marr's three levels of analysis. We then study a range of ethical problems based on consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics, with the aim of elucidating the complexity associated with the problems themselves (e.g., due to combinatorics, uncertainty, strategic dynamics), the computational methods employed (e.g., probability, logic, learning), and the available resources (e.g., time, knowledge, learning). The results indicate that most problems the normative frameworks pose lead to tractability issues in every category analyzed. Our investigation also provides several insights about the computational nature of normative ethics, including the differences between rule- and outcome-based moral strategies, and the implementation-variance with regard to moral resources. We then discuss the consequences complexity results have for the prospect of moral machines in virtue of the trade-off between optimality and efficiency. Finally, we elucidate how computational complexity can be used to inform both philosophical and cognitive-psychological research on human morality by advancing the Moral Tractability Thesis (MTT).

This is an essay in what might be called ``mathematical metaphysics.'' There is a fundamental duality that run through mathematics and the natural sciences. The duality starts as the logical level; it is represented by the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of partitions since subsets and partitions are category-theoretic dual concepts. In more basic terms, it starts with the duality between the elements (Its) of subsets and the distinctions (Dits, i.e., ordered pairs of elements in different blocks) of a partition. Mathematically, the Its & Dits duality is fully developed in category theory as the reverse-the-arrows duality. The quantitative versions of subsets and partitions are developed as probability theory and information theory (based on logical entropy). Classical physics was based on a view of reality as definite all the way down. In contrast, quantum physics embodies (objective) indefiniteness. And finally, there are the two fundamental dual mechanisms at work in biology, the selectionist mechanism and the generative mechanism, two mechanisms that embody the fundamental duality.

We study language ideologies in text produced by LLMs through a case study on English gendered language reform (related to role nouns like congressperson/-woman/-man, and singular they). First, we find political bias: when asked to use language that is "correct" or "natural", LLMs use language most similarly to when asked to align with conservative (vs. progressive) values. This shows how LLMs' metalinguistic preferences can implicitly communicate the language ideologies of a particular political group, even in seemingly non-political contexts. Second, we find LLMs exhibit internal inconsistency: LLMs use gender-neutral variants more often when more explicit metalinguistic context is provided. This shows how the language ideologies expressed in text produced by LLMs can vary, which may be unexpected to users. We discuss the broader implications of these findings for value alignment.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Polyglot is a pioneering project aimed at enhancing the non-English language performance of multilingual language models. Despite the availability of various multilingual models such as mBERT (Devlin et al., 2019), XGLM (Lin et al., 2022), and BLOOM (Scao et al., 2022), researchers and developers often resort to building monolingual models in their respective languages due to the dissatisfaction with the current multilingual models non-English language capabilities. Addressing this gap, we seek to develop advanced multilingual language models that offer improved performance in non-English languages. In this paper, we introduce the Polyglot Korean models, which represent a specific focus rather than being multilingual in nature. In collaboration with TUNiB, our team collected 1.2TB of Korean data meticulously curated for our research journey. We made a deliberate decision to prioritize the development of Korean models before venturing into multilingual models. This choice was motivated by multiple factors: firstly, the Korean models facilitated performance comparisons with existing multilingual models; and finally, they catered to the specific needs of Korean companies and researchers. This paper presents our work in developing the Polyglot Korean models, which propose some steps towards addressing the non-English language performance gap in multilingual language models.