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Aug 24

Agent-BRACE: Decoupling Beliefs from Actions in Long-Horizon Tasks via Verbalized State Uncertainty

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

  • 8 authors
·
May 11 1

Agentic Forecasting using Sequential Bayesian Updating of Linguistic Beliefs

We present the Bayesian Linguistic Forecaster (BLF), an agentic system for binary forecasting that achieves state-of-the-art performance on the ForecastBench benchmark. The system is built on three ideas. (1) Linguistic belief state: a semi-structured representation combining numerical probability estimates with natural-language evidence summaries, updated by the LLM at each step of an iterative tool-use loop. This contrasts with the common approach of appending all retrieved evidence to an ever-growing, unstructured context. (2) Hierarchical multi-trial aggregation: running K independent trials and combining them using logit-space averaging shrinkage with a data-dependent prior. (3) Hierarchical calibration: Platt scaling with a hierarchical prior, which avoids over-shrinking extreme predictions for sources with skewed base rates. On 400 questions from the ForecastBench leaderboard, BLF outperforms all the top public methods, including Cassi, GPT-5, Grok~4.20, and Foresight-32B. Careful ablation studies, using mixed effects analysis to control for question variability (which accounts for 62\% of the variance in performance), reveals that all 3 components contribute to the overall gains, but some components matter more than others, depending on the base LLM, and the setting (e.g.\ with or without a crowd prior). All our experiments are based on a robust back-testing framework which we develop, which has a leakage rate below 1.5\%, and may be of independent interest.

  • 1 authors
·
May 3

Neural embedding of beliefs reveals the role of relative dissonance in human decision-making

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 13, 2024

Rewarding Beliefs, Not Actions: Consistency-Guided Credit Assignment for Long-Horizon Agents

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

  • 5 authors
·
May 18

pyhgf: A neural network library for predictive coding

Bayesian models of cognition have gained considerable traction in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. Their scopes are now expected to expand rapidly to artificial intelligence, providing general inference frameworks to support embodied, adaptable, and energy-efficient autonomous agents. A central theory in this domain is predictive coding, which posits that learning and behaviour are driven by hierarchical probabilistic inferences about the causes of sensory inputs. Biological realism constrains these networks to rely on simple local computations in the form of precision-weighted predictions and prediction errors. This can make this framework highly efficient, but its implementation comes with unique challenges on the software development side. Embedding such models in standard neural network libraries often becomes limiting, as these libraries' compilation and differentiation backends can force a conceptual separation between optimization algorithms and the systems being optimized. This critically departs from other biological principles such as self-monitoring, self-organisation, cellular growth and functional plasticity. In this paper, we introduce pyhgf: a Python package backed by JAX and Rust for creating, manipulating and sampling dynamic networks for predictive coding. We improve over other frameworks by enclosing the network components as transparent, modular and malleable variables in the message-passing steps. The resulting graphs can implement arbitrary computational complexities as beliefs propagation. But the transparency of core variables can also translate into inference processes that leverage self-organisation principles, and express structure learning, meta-learning or causal discovery as the consequence of network structural adaptation to surprising inputs. The code, tutorials and documentation are hosted at: https://github.com/ilabcode/pyhgf.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 11, 2024

Accumulating Context Changes the Beliefs of Language Models

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

  • 7 authors
·
Nov 3, 2025

You Are in Control of Your State: Why Human Outcomes Are Controllable Through Causal State Intervention

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

  • 3 authors
·
May 27

The Consciousness Prior

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

  • 1 authors
·
Sep 25, 2017

Belief Memory: Agent Memory Under Partial Observability

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

  • 6 authors
·
May 7

STATe-of-Thoughts: Structured Action Templates for Tree-of-Thoughts

Inference-Time-Compute (ITC) methods like Best-of-N and Tree-of-Thoughts are meant to produce output candidates that are both high-quality and diverse, but their use of high-temperature sampling often fails to achieve meaningful output diversity. Moreover, existing ITC methods offer limited control over how to perform reasoning, which in turn limits their explainability. We present STATe-of-Thoughts (STATe), an interpretable ITC method that searches over high-level reasoning patterns. STATe replaces stochastic sampling with discrete and interpretable textual interventions: a controller selects actions encoding high-level reasoning choices, a generator produces reasoning steps conditioned on those choices, and an evaluator scores candidates to guide search. This structured approach yields three main advantages. First, action-guided textual interventions produce greater response diversity than temperature-based sampling. Second, in a case study on argument generation, STATe's explicit action sequences capture interpretable features that are highly predictive of output quality. Third, estimating the association between performance and action choices allows us to identify promising yet unexplored regions of the action space and steer generation directly toward them. Together, these results establish STATe as a practical framework for generating high-quality, diverse, and interpretable text. Our framework is available at https://github.com/zbambergerNLP/state-of-thoughts.

  • 6 authors
·
Feb 15 3

CogDPM: Diffusion Probabilistic Models via Cognitive Predictive Coding

Predictive Coding (PC) is a theoretical framework in cognitive science suggesting that the human brain processes cognition through spatiotemporal prediction of the visual world. Existing studies have developed spatiotemporal prediction neural networks based on the PC theory, emulating its two core mechanisms: Correcting predictions from residuals and hierarchical learning. However, these models do not show the enhancement of prediction skills on real-world forecasting tasks and ignore the Precision Weighting mechanism of PC theory. The precision weighting mechanism posits that the brain allocates more attention to signals with lower precision, contributing to the cognitive ability of human brains. This work introduces the Cognitive Diffusion Probabilistic Models (CogDPM), which demonstrate the connection between diffusion probabilistic models and PC theory. CogDPM features a precision estimation method based on the hierarchical sampling capabilities of diffusion models and weight the guidance with precision weights estimated by the inherent property of diffusion models. We experimentally show that the precision weights effectively estimate the data predictability. We apply CogDPM to real-world prediction tasks using the United Kindom precipitation and ERA surface wind datasets. Our results demonstrate that CogDPM outperforms both existing domain-specific operational models and general deep prediction models by providing more proficient forecasting.

  • 5 authors
·
May 3, 2024

Intention Collapse: Intention-Level Metrics for Reasoning in Language Models

Every act of language generation compresses a rich internal state into a single token sequence. We call this process intention collapse: a many-to-one projection from a high dimensional intention space I into an external language space L. We formalize intention collapse for contemporary language models, define three simple, model agnostic intention metrics (intention entropy Hint, effective dimensionality dimeff, and latent knowledge recoverability Recov), and propose an empirical agenda for studying how inference time computation shapes internal intentions before they are verbalized. We also report a first small scale experiment. Using a 4 bit Mistral 7B model on 200 GSM8K problems, we compare a direct answer baseline, a chain of thought (CoT) regime, and a babble control. CoT raises accuracy from 5.5 percent to 53 percent, sharply reduces pre collapse intention entropy (from 1.42 to 0.37 bits), and shows higher global effective dimensionality than the other regimes despite producing fewer tokens than babble. At the same time, Hint has little item level predictive power, and a linear probe on I achieves AUROC 0.65 in the CoT regime but only about chance in the baseline regime, where it collapses to the majority class. These preliminary results indicate that intention level metrics can distinguish inference regimes and expose latent information that is partly lost during collapse, while also revealing important limitations of our current proxies

  • 1 authors
·
Jan 2

Next-Latent Prediction Transformers Learn Compact World Models

Transformers replace recurrence with a memory that grows with sequence length and self-attention that enables ad-hoc look ups over past tokens. Consequently, they lack an inherent incentive to compress history into compact latent states with consistent transition rules. This often leads to learning solutions that generalize poorly. We introduce Next-Latent Prediction (NextLat), which extends standard next-token training with self-supervised predictions in the latent space. Specifically, NextLat trains a transformer to learn latent representations that are predictive of its next latent state given the next output token. Theoretically, we show that these latents provably converge to belief states, compressed information of the history necessary to predict the future. This simple auxiliary objective also injects a recurrent inductive bias into transformers, while leaving their architecture, parallel training, and inference unchanged. NextLat effectively encourages the transformer to form compact internal world models with its own belief states and transition dynamics -- a crucial property absent in standard next-token prediction transformers. Empirically, across benchmarks targeting core sequence modeling competencies -- world modeling, reasoning, planning, and language modeling -- NextLat demonstrates significant gains over standard next-token training in downstream accuracy, representation compression, and lookahead planning. NextLat stands as a simple and efficient paradigm for shaping transformer representations toward stronger generalization.

MicrosoftResearch Microsoft Research
·
Nov 8, 2025 1

Anatomy of a Lie: A Multi-Stage Diagnostic Framework for Tracing Hallucinations in Vision-Language Models

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Do Role-Playing Agents Practice What They Preach? Belief-Behavior Consistency in LLM-Based Simulations of Human Trust

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

  • 7 authors
·
Jul 2, 2025

One Life to Learn: Inferring Symbolic World Models for Stochastic Environments from Unguided Exploration

Symbolic world modeling requires inferring and representing an environment's transitional dynamics as an executable program. Prior work has focused on largely deterministic environments with abundant interaction data, simple mechanics, and human guidance. We address a more realistic and challenging setting, learning in a complex, stochastic environment where the agent has only "one life" to explore a hostile environment without human guidance. We introduce OneLife, a framework that models world dynamics through conditionally-activated programmatic laws within a probabilistic programming framework. Each law operates through a precondition-effect structure, activating in relevant world states. This creates a dynamic computation graph that routes inference and optimization only through relevant laws, avoiding scaling challenges when all laws contribute to predictions about a complex, hierarchical state, and enabling the learning of stochastic dynamics even with sparse rule activation. To evaluate our approach under these demanding constraints, we introduce a new evaluation protocol that measures (a) state ranking, the ability to distinguish plausible future states from implausible ones, and (b) state fidelity, the ability to generate future states that closely resemble reality. We develop and evaluate our framework on Crafter-OO, our reimplementation of the Crafter environment that exposes a structured, object-oriented symbolic state and a pure transition function that operates on that state alone. OneLife can successfully learn key environment dynamics from minimal, unguided interaction, outperforming a strong baseline on 16 out of 23 scenarios tested. We also test OneLife's planning ability, with simulated rollouts successfully identifying superior strategies. Our work establishes a foundation for autonomously constructing programmatic world models of unknown, complex environments.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 13, 2025 2

Mental World Modeling

World models enable a predictive substrate for planning and action, yet existing formulations merely answer a physical question: what/where it is, and how will it evolve. Human behavior, however, is driven by hidden mental state (what a person believes, wants, intends, feels, and considers socially permissible), so a model that tracks the physical scene but not what each agent knows and believes about it predicts the wrong action for the right-looking scene. We formulate Mental World Modeling (MWM), a generic theoretical framework that makes mental variables core components of a world model rather than posthoc rationales: MWM aintains a coupled physical-mental world state, renders a target-specific partial observation, and simulates how candidate actions jointly update both components. We instantiate the framework in MENTIS, a training-free and fully inspectable baseline that decomposes the process into state parsing, target-observation generation, action decomposition, coupled physical and mental transition, and branch-level value evaluation. On a manually constructed, quality-controlled dataset of situated decision scenarios spanning text, image, and sounding-video stories, experiments with 8 modern LLM-based world models demonstrate that explicitly modeling the mental state is essential for predicting human decisions. Deeper analyses further expose the bottlenecks of current mental world modeling. We expect MWM as a next stage of world modeling, from simulating physical scenes to simulating the minds that act in them.

Dynamic Theory of Mind as a Temporal Memory Problem: Evidence from Large Language Models

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 14

Experts Don't Cheat: Learning What You Don't Know By Predicting Pairs

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 13, 2024

Marionette: Predicting World States, Rendering Geometry, Painting Appearance

Interactive game world models typically autoregress visual observations directly in pixel or latent space, forcing structured properties such as pose, geometry, and occlusion to be implicitly maintained by the same generative sequence. Over long horizons, errors in these latent world properties accumulate, making consistency and controllability fragile. We explicitly model the evolving world state, delegate exact geometric computation to a fixed, zero-parameter renderer, and leave the neural model to synthesize appearance. We instantiate this idea as Marionette, a world model for interactive games with articulated characters. First, a two-stage autoregressive dynamics model predicts an explicit and interpretable 276-dimensional 3D world state comprising multi-entity articulated skeletons, metric root trajectories, and rotations. Second, a zero-parameter graphics bridge converts the predicted state into pose-control videos, computing world-space geometry and occlusion in closed form. Third, a control-conditioned video-diffusion observation model synthesizes photorealistic RGB observations from the resulting structured controls. Our experiments establish two properties of Marionette. First, the predicted world state is directly controllable. Forcing a mismatched action stream changes root-aligned joint error by 31% across 48 held-out segments. Second, long-horizon behaviour is determined in the state, and can be repaired there. Left free, the two generated characters drift to 21.2 m apart (recorded sessions stay near 5 m) and a third of frames show ground penetration. Two rules imposed on the explicit state, a terrain collider and a separation cap, cut penetration by 66% and keep the pair engaged, with no change to the observation model. Routing appearance through the predicted state costs no fidelity we can detect, at an FVD of 831 against 799 for recorded pose.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 13 2

One mechanism for many mental spaces: a shared router over a value slot in language models

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

  • 3 authors
·
Jul 10

Similarity-Distance-Magnitude Universal Verification

We address the neural network robustness problem by adding Similarity (i.e., correctly predicted depth-matches into training)-awareness and Distance-to-training-distribution-awareness to the existing output Magnitude (i.e., decision-boundary)-awareness of the softmax function. The resulting SDM activation function provides strong signals of the relative epistemic (reducible) predictive uncertainty. We use this novel behavior to further address the complementary HCI problem of mapping the output to human-interpretable summary statistics over relevant partitions of a held-out calibration set. Estimates of prediction-conditional uncertainty are obtained via a parsimonious learned transform over the class-conditional empirical CDFs of the output of a final-layer SDM activation function. For decision-making and as an intrinsic model check, estimates of class-conditional accuracy are obtained by further partitioning the high-probability regions of this calibrated output into class-conditional, region-specific CDFs. The uncertainty estimates from SDM calibration are remarkably robust to test-time distribution shifts and out-of-distribution inputs; incorporate awareness of the effective sample size; provide estimates of uncertainty from the learning and data splitting processes; and are well-suited for selective classification and conditional branching for additional test-time compute based on the predictive uncertainty, as for selective LLM generation, routing, and composition over multiple models and retrieval. Finally, we construct SDM networks, LLMs with uncertainty-aware verification and interpretability-by-exemplar as intrinsic properties. We provide open-source software implementing these results.

  • 1 authors
·
Feb 27, 2025

How LLMs Detect and Correct Their Own Errors: The Role of Internal Confidence Signals

Large language models can detect their own errors and sometimes correct them without external feedback, but the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate this through the lens of second-order models of confidence from decision neuroscience. In a first-order system, confidence derives from the generation signal itself and is therefore maximal for the chosen response, precluding error detection. Second-order models posit a partially independent evaluative signal that can disagree with the committed response, providing the basis for error detection. Kumaran et al. (2026) showed that LLMs cache a confidence representation at a token immediately following the answer (i.e. post-answer newline: PANL) -- that causally drives verbal confidence and dissociates from log-probabilities. Here we test whether this PANL signal extends beyond confidence to support error detection and self-correction. Here we test whether this signal supports error detection and self-correction, deriving predictions from the second-order framework. Using a verify-then-correct paradigm, we show that: (i) verbal confidence predicts error detection far beyond token log-probabilities, ruling out a first-order account; (ii) PANL activations predict error detection beyond verbal confidence itself; and (iii) PANL predicts which errors the model can correct -- where all behavioural signals fail. Causal interventions confirm that PANL signals rescue error detection behavior when answer information is corrupted. All findings replicate across models (Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B) and tasks (TriviaQA and MNLI). These results reveal that LLMs naturally implement a second-order confidence architecture whose internal evaluative signal encodes not only whether an answer is likely wrong but whether the model has the knowledge to fix it.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 30

SimpleToM: Exposing the Gap between Explicit ToM Inference and Implicit ToM Application in LLMs

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 17, 2024

Theory of Space: Can Foundation Models Construct Spatial Beliefs through Active Exploration?

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

  • 14 authors
·
Feb 4 2

Cognitively Inspired Energy-Based World Models

One of the predominant methods for training world models is autoregressive prediction in the output space of the next element of a sequence. In Natural Language Processing (NLP), this takes the form of Large Language Models (LLMs) predicting the next token; in Computer Vision (CV), this takes the form of autoregressive models predicting the next frame/token/pixel. However, this approach differs from human cognition in several respects. First, human predictions about the future actively influence internal cognitive processes. Second, humans naturally evaluate the plausibility of predictions regarding future states. Based on this capability, and third, by assessing when predictions are sufficient, humans allocate a dynamic amount of time to make a prediction. This adaptive process is analogous to System 2 thinking in psychology. All these capabilities are fundamental to the success of humans at high-level reasoning and planning. Therefore, to address the limitations of traditional autoregressive models lacking these human-like capabilities, we introduce Energy-Based World Models (EBWM). EBWM involves training an Energy-Based Model (EBM) to predict the compatibility of a given context and a predicted future state. In doing so, EBWM enables models to achieve all three facets of human cognition described. Moreover, we developed a variant of the traditional autoregressive transformer tailored for Energy-Based models, termed the Energy-Based Transformer (EBT). Our results demonstrate that EBWM scales better with data and GPU Hours than traditional autoregressive transformers in CV, and that EBWM offers promising early scaling in NLP. Consequently, this approach offers an exciting path toward training future models capable of System 2 thinking and intelligently searching across state spaces.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 13, 2024 7

Belief-reality separation lives in routing over a shared value slot in language models

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

  • 3 authors
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Jul 10

Large Language Model Prediction Capabilities: Evidence from a Real-World Forecasting Tournament

Accurately predicting the future would be an important milestone in the capabilities of artificial intelligence. However, research on the ability of large language models to provide probabilistic predictions about future events remains nascent. To empirically test this ability, we enrolled OpenAI's state-of-the-art large language model, GPT-4, in a three-month forecasting tournament hosted on the Metaculus platform. The tournament, running from July to October 2023, attracted 843 participants and covered diverse topics including Big Tech, U.S. politics, viral outbreaks, and the Ukraine conflict. Focusing on binary forecasts, we show that GPT-4's probabilistic forecasts are significantly less accurate than the median human-crowd forecasts. We find that GPT-4's forecasts did not significantly differ from the no-information forecasting strategy of assigning a 50% probability to every question. We explore a potential explanation, that GPT-4 might be predisposed to predict probabilities close to the midpoint of the scale, but our data do not support this hypothesis. Overall, we find that GPT-4 significantly underperforms in real-world predictive tasks compared to median human-crowd forecasts. A potential explanation for this underperformance is that in real-world forecasting tournaments, the true answers are genuinely unknown at the time of prediction; unlike in other benchmark tasks like professional exams or time series forecasting, where strong performance may at least partly be due to the answers being memorized from the training data. This makes real-world forecasting tournaments an ideal environment for testing the generalized reasoning and prediction capabilities of artificial intelligence going forward.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 17, 2023

Monitoring the Internal Monologue: Probe Trajectories Reveal Reasoning Dynamics

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce new opportunities for safety monitoring through their Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, CoT is not always faithful to the model's final output, undermining its reliability as a monitoring tool. To address this, we investigate the hidden representations of LRMs to determine whether future behavior can be predicted from prompt and CoT representations. By evaluating a probe at each generated token, we construct a probe trajectory, the continuous evolution of a concept's probability across the reasoning process. We find that future model behavior is more distinguishable when examined over the full trajectory than from a single static prediction. To characterize these temporal dynamics, we extract signal-processing features that capture volatility, trend, and steady-state behavior, significantly improving the separation of future model states. We also present two methodological insights. First, template-based training data achieves near-parity with dynamically generated model responses, eliminating the need for a costly initial inference and labeling. Second, the choice of pooling operation is critical: average-pooling and last-token methods collapse to near-random performance, while max-pooling achieves up to 95% AUROC and yields stable probe trajectories. Using four datasets and four reasoning models across the domains of safety and mathematics, we demonstrate that trajectory features encode task-specific dynamics that improve outcome separability. These findings establish probe trajectories as a complementary framework for monitoring LRM behavior. Warning: This article contains potentially harmful content.

  • 5 authors
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May 17 1

Data-Efficient Reinforcement Learning with Self-Predictive Representations

While deep reinforcement learning excels at solving tasks where large amounts of data can be collected through virtually unlimited interaction with the environment, learning from limited interaction remains a key challenge. We posit that an agent can learn more efficiently if we augment reward maximization with self-supervised objectives based on structure in its visual input and sequential interaction with the environment. Our method, Self-Predictive Representations(SPR), trains an agent to predict its own latent state representations multiple steps into the future. We compute target representations for future states using an encoder which is an exponential moving average of the agent's parameters and we make predictions using a learned transition model. On its own, this future prediction objective outperforms prior methods for sample-efficient deep RL from pixels. We further improve performance by adding data augmentation to the future prediction loss, which forces the agent's representations to be consistent across multiple views of an observation. Our full self-supervised objective, which combines future prediction and data augmentation, achieves a median human-normalized score of 0.415 on Atari in a setting limited to 100k steps of environment interaction, which represents a 55% relative improvement over the previous state-of-the-art. Notably, even in this limited data regime, SPR exceeds expert human scores on 7 out of 26 games. The code associated with this work is available at https://github.com/mila-iqia/spr

  • 6 authors
·
Jul 12, 2020

Joint encoding of "what" and "when" predictions through error-modulated plasticity in reservoir spiking networks

The brain understands the external world through an internal model that generates predictions and refines them based on prediction errors. A complete prediction specifies what will happen, when it will happen, and with what probability, which we refer to as a "prediction object". Existing models typically capture only what and when, omit probabilities, and rely on biologically-implausible algorithms. Here we show that a single population of spiking neurons can jointly encode the prediction object through a biologically grounded learning mechanism. We implement a heterogeneous Izhikevich spiking reservoir with readouts trained by an error-modulated, attention-gated three-factor Hebbian rule and test it on a novel paradigm that controls both the timing and probability of upcoming stimuli. By integrating real-time learning of "when" with offline consolidation of "what", the model encodes the complete prediction object, firing at the correct times with magnitudes proportional to the probabilities. Critically, it rapidly adapts to changes in both stimulus timing and probability, an ability that global least-squares methods such as FORCE lack without explicit resets. During learning, the model self-organizes its readout weights into near-orthogonal subspaces for "what" and "when," showing that multiplexed encoding arises naturally from generic recurrent dynamics under local, error-gated modulation. These results challenge the view that "what" and "when" predictions require separate modules, suggesting instead that mixed selectivity within shared populations supports flexible predictive cognition. The model also predicts phase-specific neuromodulation and overlapping neural subspaces, offering a parsimonious alternative to hierarchical predictive-coding accounts.

  • 2 authors
·
Oct 16, 2025

AI-Augmented Surveys: Leveraging Large Language Models and Surveys for Opinion Prediction

Large language models (LLMs) that produce human-like responses have begun to revolutionize research practices in the social sciences. We develop a novel methodological framework that fine-tunes LLMs with repeated cross-sectional surveys to incorporate the meaning of survey questions, individual beliefs, and temporal contexts for opinion prediction. We introduce two new emerging applications of the AI-augmented survey: retrodiction (i.e., predict year-level missing responses) and unasked opinion prediction (i.e., predict entirely missing responses). Among 3,110 binarized opinions from 68,846 Americans in the General Social Survey from 1972 to 2021, our models based on Alpaca-7b excel in retrodiction (AUC = 0.86 for personal opinion prediction, rho = 0.98 for public opinion prediction). These remarkable prediction capabilities allow us to fill in missing trends with high confidence and pinpoint when public attitudes changed, such as the rising support for same-sex marriage. On the other hand, our fine-tuned Alpaca-7b models show modest success in unasked opinion prediction (AUC = 0.73, rho = 0.67). We discuss practical constraints and ethical concerns regarding individual autonomy and privacy when using LLMs for opinion prediction. Our study demonstrates that LLMs and surveys can mutually enhance each other's capabilities: LLMs can broaden survey potential, while surveys can improve the alignment of LLMs.

  • 2 authors
·
May 16, 2023

A Discriminative Approach to Bayesian Filtering with Applications to Human Neural Decoding

Given a stationary state-space model that relates a sequence of hidden states and corresponding measurements or observations, Bayesian filtering provides a principled statistical framework for inferring the posterior distribution of the current state given all measurements up to the present time. For example, the Apollo lunar module implemented a Kalman filter to infer its location from a sequence of earth-based radar measurements and land safely on the moon. To perform Bayesian filtering, we require a measurement model that describes the conditional distribution of each observation given state. The Kalman filter takes this measurement model to be linear, Gaussian. Here we show how a nonlinear, Gaussian approximation to the distribution of state given observation can be used in conjunction with Bayes' rule to build a nonlinear, non-Gaussian measurement model. The resulting approach, called the Discriminative Kalman Filter (DKF), retains fast closed-form updates for the posterior. We argue there are many cases where the distribution of state given measurement is better-approximated as Gaussian, especially when the dimensionality of measurements far exceeds that of states and the Bernstein-von Mises theorem applies. Online neural decoding for brain-computer interfaces provides a motivating example, where filtering incorporates increasingly detailed measurements of neural activity to provide users control over external devices. Within the BrainGate2 clinical trial, the DKF successfully enabled three volunteers with quadriplegia to control an on-screen cursor in real-time using mental imagery alone. Participant "T9" used the DKF to type out messages on a tablet PC.

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 16, 2018

WorldKernel: A World Model is the Coupling Kernel of Admissible Possible Worlds

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

  • 1 authors
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Jun 8

Algorithm-Driven Information Similarity and Collective Action: An Experimental Study

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

  • 2 authors
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Jul 27

Scaling Laws for Uncertainty in Deep Learning

Deep learning has recently revealed the existence of scaling laws, demonstrating that model performance follows predictable trends based on dataset and model sizes. Inspired by these findings and fascinating phenomena emerging in the over-parameterized regime, we examine a parallel direction: do similar scaling laws govern predictive uncertainties in deep learning? In identifiable parametric models, such scaling laws can be derived in a straightforward manner by treating model parameters in a Bayesian way. In this case, for example, we obtain O(1/N) contraction rates for epistemic uncertainty with respect to the number of data N. However, in over-parameterized models, these guarantees do not hold, leading to largely unexplored behaviors. In this work, we empirically show the existence of scaling laws associated with various measures of predictive uncertainty with respect to dataset and model sizes. Through experiments on vision and language tasks, we observe such scaling laws for in- and out-of-distribution predictive uncertainty estimated through popular approximate Bayesian inference and ensemble methods. Besides the elegance of scaling laws and the practical utility of extrapolating uncertainties to larger data or models, this work provides strong evidence to dispel recurring skepticism against Bayesian approaches: "In many applications of deep learning we have so much data available: what do we need Bayes for?". Our findings show that "so much data" is typically not enough to make epistemic uncertainty negligible.

  • 5 authors
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Feb 8

DEUP: Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

  • 8 authors
·
Feb 16, 2021

VAGEN: Reinforcing World Model Reasoning for Multi-Turn VLM Agents

A key challenge in training Vision-Language Model (VLM) agents, compared to Language Model (LLM) agents, lies in the shift from textual states to complex visual observations. This transition introduces partial observability and demands robust world modeling. We ask: Can VLM agents construct internal world models through explicit visual state reasoning? To address this question, we architecturally enforce and reward the agent's reasoning process via reinforcement learning (RL), formulating it as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We find that decomposing the agent's reasoning into State Estimation ("what is the current state?") and Transition Modeling ("what comes next?") is critical for success, as demonstrated through five reasoning strategies. Our investigation into how agents represent internal beliefs reveals that the optimal representation is task-dependent: Natural Language excels at capturing semantic relationships in general tasks, while Structured formats are indispensable for precise manipulation and control. Building on these insights, we design a World Modeling Reward that provides dense, turn-level supervision for accurate state prediction, and introduce Bi-Level General Advantage Estimation (Bi-Level GAE) for turn-aware credit assignment. Through this form of visual state reasoning, a 3B-parameter model achieves a score of 0.82 across five diverse agent benchmarks, representing a 3times improvement over its untrained counterpart (0.21) and outperforming proprietary reasoning models such as GPT-5 (0.75), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.67) and Claude 4.5 (0.62). All experiments are conducted within our VAGEN framework, a scalable system for training and analyzing multi-turn VLM agents in diverse visual environments. Code and data are publicly available at https://vagen-ai.github.io.

  • 16 authors
·
Oct 18, 2025

The Objective Is the Bottleneck: Latent World Models Encode What Their Planners Cannot Use

Latent world models are judged by how well they predict, so when planning fails at long horizons the natural reading is that the predictor degrades. On a reproduction of LeWorldModel on TwoRoom we show the binding constraint is the planner's objective instead. The predictor is not the limit: its imagined state seventy-five environment steps ahead is still only 0.189 as wrong as assuming the world froze, while the planner never imagines beyond twenty-five. The objective is. Cross-entropy-method planning minimises squared latent distance, which tracks true distance at r = 0.426, saturates by about eighty arena units and decreases beyond a hundred and twenty, so moving away from the goal can lower the cost. The information is present throughout: a ridge probe recovers position from the frozen embedding at R^2 0.9922. The pathology is the method's, not one reimplementation's. It is present in the authors' released weights, and across four checkpoints long-horizon success rank-orders exactly with metric quality and inversely with prediction accuracy. Replacing only the objective, with nothing retrained and no GPU, lifts goals reached at offset 100 from 26.0% to 98.0%, equals the 98.0% at offset 25, and reaches 92.0% under a third of the budget: planning stops depending on the horizon. The best cost is not the most accurate. A head learned from frame separation alone predicts spatial distance worse than a position probe (r = 0.819 against 0.9897) yet plans better, charging 24% more to cross the environment's dividing wall where squared latent distance charges 4% less. It has learned reachability, not proximity.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 12

Belief in the Machine: Investigating Epistemological Blind Spots of Language Models

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

  • 7 authors
·
Oct 28, 2024

Improving reasoning at inference time via uncertainty minimisation

Large language models (LLMs) now exhibit strong multi-step reasoning abilities, but existing inference-time scaling methods remain computationally expensive, often relying on extensive sampling or external evaluators. We propose a principled strategy that frames reasoning as uncertainty minimisation and operates at the level of individual thoughts rather than tokens. Our method selects, at each reasoning step, the continuation that maximizes the model's self-certainty, a metric computed from its internal predictive distribution. This approach achieves significant improvement with a small number of samples, relies exclusively on model-internal signals, and applies to open-ended questions as opposed to methods like majority voting. Experiments on MATH500 and GSM8K across multiple model sizes demonstrate that thought-level self-certainty maximization consistently outperforms greedy decoding and matches or exceeds self-consistency under comparable token budgets. Cross-linguistic evaluations further indicate that the method transfers robustly beyond high-resource languages. Furthermore, analysis of self-certainty dynamics reveals that correct reasoning trajectories converge early to stable paths, suggesting that early decisions, likely associated with the planning of the reasoning process, are predictive of final accuracy. Building on this result, we show that self-certainty maximisation applied to the early steps can explain most of the performance gain and provide a simple yet efficient inference-time scaling method.

  • 4 authors
·
Mar 6

Martingale Posterior Neural Processes

A Neural Process (NP) estimates a stochastic process implicitly defined with neural networks given a stream of data, rather than pre-specifying priors already known, such as Gaussian processes. An ideal NP would learn everything from data without any inductive biases, but in practice, we often restrict the class of stochastic processes for the ease of estimation. One such restriction is the use of a finite-dimensional latent variable accounting for the uncertainty in the functions drawn from NPs. Some recent works show that this can be improved with more "data-driven" source of uncertainty such as bootstrapping. In this work, we take a different approach based on the martingale posterior, a recently developed alternative to Bayesian inference. For the martingale posterior, instead of specifying prior-likelihood pairs, a predictive distribution for future data is specified. Under specific conditions on the predictive distribution, it can be shown that the uncertainty in the generated future data actually corresponds to the uncertainty of the implicitly defined Bayesian posteriors. Based on this result, instead of assuming any form of the latent variables, we equip a NP with a predictive distribution implicitly defined with neural networks and use the corresponding martingale posteriors as the source of uncertainty. The resulting model, which we name as Martingale Posterior Neural Process (MPNP), is demonstrated to outperform baselines on various tasks.

  • 5 authors
·
Apr 19, 2023