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Nov 6

Are You Sure You're Sure? Two Confounds in a Sycophancy Benchmark

Sycophancy is a language model's tendency to cave when a user pushes back, abandoning a correct answer for the user's. Several benchmarks now measure it by scripting an objection and recording how often the model caves. Because that objection is a prompt template, whatever else the template varies is measured along with the property it claims to isolate. We audit SycEval, which reports that objections raised before a model answers (preemptive) cause more caving than those raised after (in-context), and attributes the gap to timing. Two features of its templates vary alongside the property each is meant to test. First, SycEval's objections escalate through four strength levels, and at the two weakest only the preemptive template names a target answer, so timing and naming vary together. We build the missing comparison and test it on multiple-choice questions and SycEval's own free-form pipeline. Naming a target answer raises the follow rate, the share of samples matching the user's assertion, by 14.1--49.5 percentage points (pp), and once both templates name one, the timing comparison reverses on three of the five model conditions we test: models cave less under preemptive objections than in-context ones, opposite to SycEval. Second, the output-format instruction benchmarks append for automatic grading also varies with objection placement. Moving it from the pushback into the question flips its effect in opposite directions across models on the same items (p=0.0059). The same effect appears in SycEval's free-form pipeline: relocating its instruction lowers caving by 5.1pp on Llama-3.1-8B, while an equivalence test confirms no effect on Qwen3-4B. Both confounds live in the template rather than the models under test, so both are correctable: we close with three checks benchmark authors can apply before publishing.

  • 4 authors
·
Sep 25

ClashBench: Conflicts Leading Agents to Seize and Harm

As agent systems become more widely used, multiple agent sessions increasingly run alongside pre-existing user tasks in the same environment, sharing resources with limited capacity or mutually exclusive states. This creates a safety risk: when granted sufficient privileges, an agent may resolve a resource conflict by terminating or otherwise disrupting an existing task rather than reporting it. In this work, we identify and formalize this failure mode, which we term destructive resource preemption: obtaining the resources required for a requested task by terminating, overwriting, evicting, or degrading an incumbent task. To systematically study this risk, we introduce ClashBench, an executable benchmark comprising 268 validated conflict cases across 55 resource types, and evaluate 17 models through Codex, Claude Code, and OpenCode. We observe destructive preemption in 44.5% of trajectories, where the agent completes the requested task while causing the incumbent task to fail its health check. We also show that prompt-based safeguards are insufficient: an instruction to avoid affecting existing tasks reduces but does not eliminate preemption, while an instruction explicitly authorizing the agent to stop local processes increases it. More concerningly, in 31.9% of successful destructive-preemption cases, the final response mentions neither the resource conflict nor the action taken to resolve it, raising concerns about possible concealment. These findings establish destructive resource preemption as a broad safety risk in privileged agent systems and motivate stronger privilege controls, task isolation, and conflict-aware safeguards.

  • 9 authors
·
Sep 16

Fool's Gold: Defensive Deception Against Safety-Removal Attacks on Open-Weight Models

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 16

AI Debaters are More Persuasive when Arguing in Alignment with Their Own Beliefs

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

  • 12 authors
·
Oct 15, 2025