Daily Papers

The interactive use of large language models (LLMs) in AI assistants (at work, home, etc.) introduces a new set of inference-time privacy risks: LLMs are fed different types of information from multiple sources in their inputs and are expected to reason about what to share in their outputs, for what purpose and with whom, within a given context. In this work, we draw attention to the highly critical yet overlooked notion of contextual privacy by proposing ConfAIde, a benchmark designed to identify critical weaknesses in the privacy reasoning capabilities of instruction-tuned LLMs. Our experiments show that even the most capable models such as GPT-4 and ChatGPT reveal private information in contexts that humans would not, 39% and 57% of the time, respectively. This leakage persists even when we employ privacy-inducing prompts or chain-of-thought reasoning. Our work underscores the immediate need to explore novel inference-time privacy-preserving approaches, based on reasoning and theory of mind.

Human-computer interaction increasingly demands systems that recognize not only explicit user inputs but also implicit emotional states. While substantial progress has been made in affective computing, most emotion recognition systems rely on cloud-based inference, introducing privacy vulnerabilities and latency constraints unsuitable for real-time applications. This work presents a comprehensive evaluation of machine learning architectures for on-device emotion recognition from wrist-based photoplethysmography (PPG), systematically comparing different models spanning classical ensemble methods, deep neural networks, and transformers on the WESAD stress detection dataset. Results demonstrate that classical ensemble methods substantially outperform deep learning on small physiological datasets, with ExtraTrees achieving F1 = 0.826 on combined features and F1 = 0.623 on wrist-only features, compared to transformers achieving only F1 = 0.509-0.577. We deploy the wrist-only ExtraTrees model optimized via ONNX conversion, achieving a 4.08 MB footprint, 0.05 ms inference latency, and 152x speedup over the original implementation. Furthermore, ONNX optimization yields a 30.5% average storage reduction and 40.1x inference speedup, highlighting the feasibility of privacy-preserving on-device emotion recognition for real-world wearables.

We introduce CheXGenBench, a rigorous and multifaceted evaluation framework for synthetic chest radiograph generation that simultaneously assesses fidelity, privacy risks, and clinical utility across state-of-the-art text-to-image generative models. Despite rapid advancements in generative AI for real-world imagery, medical domain evaluations have been hindered by methodological inconsistencies, outdated architectural comparisons, and disconnected assessment criteria that rarely address the practical clinical value of synthetic samples. CheXGenBench overcomes these limitations through standardised data partitioning and a unified evaluation protocol comprising over 20 quantitative metrics that systematically analyse generation quality, potential privacy vulnerabilities, and downstream clinical applicability across 11 leading text-to-image architectures. Our results reveal critical inefficiencies in the existing evaluation protocols, particularly in assessing generative fidelity, leading to inconsistent and uninformative comparisons. Our framework establishes a standardised benchmark for the medical AI community, enabling objective and reproducible comparisons while facilitating seamless integration of both existing and future generative models. Additionally, we release a high-quality, synthetic dataset, SynthCheX-75K, comprising 75K radiographs generated by the top-performing model (Sana 0.6B) in our benchmark to support further research in this critical domain. Through CheXGenBench, we establish a new state-of-the-art and release our framework, models, and SynthCheX-75K dataset at https://raman1121.github.io/CheXGenBench/

Text-to-image generation models have recently attracted unprecedented attention as they unlatch imaginative applications in all areas of life. However, developing such models requires huge amounts of data that might contain privacy-sensitive information, e.g., face identity. While privacy risks have been extensively demonstrated in the image classification and GAN generation domains, privacy risks in the text-to-image generation domain are largely unexplored. In this paper, we perform the first privacy analysis of text-to-image generation models through the lens of membership inference. Specifically, we propose three key intuitions about membership information and design four attack methodologies accordingly. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on two mainstream text-to-image generation models including sequence-to-sequence modeling and diffusion-based modeling. The empirical results show that all of the proposed attacks can achieve significant performance, in some cases even close to an accuracy of 1, and thus the corresponding risk is much more severe than that shown by existing membership inference attacks. We further conduct an extensive ablation study to analyze the factors that may affect the attack performance, which can guide developers and researchers to be alert to vulnerabilities in text-to-image generation models. All these findings indicate that our proposed attacks pose a realistic privacy threat to the text-to-image generation models.

A high volume of recent ML security literature focuses on attacks against aligned large language models (LLMs). These attacks may extract private information or coerce the model into producing harmful outputs. In real-world deployments, LLMs are often part of a larger agentic pipeline including memory systems, retrieval, web access, and API calling. Such additional components introduce vulnerabilities that make these LLM-powered agents much easier to attack than isolated LLMs, yet relatively little work focuses on the security of LLM agents. In this paper, we analyze security and privacy vulnerabilities that are unique to LLM agents. We first provide a taxonomy of attacks categorized by threat actors, objectives, entry points, attacker observability, attack strategies, and inherent vulnerabilities of agent pipelines. We then conduct a series of illustrative attacks on popular open-source and commercial agents, demonstrating the immediate practical implications of their vulnerabilities. Notably, our attacks are trivial to implement and require no understanding of machine learning.

The impressive achievements of generative models in creating high-quality videos have raised concerns about digital integrity and privacy vulnerabilities. Recent works of AI-generated content detection have been widely studied in the image field (e.g., deepfake), yet the video field has been unexplored. Large Vision Language Model (LVLM) has become an emerging tool for AI-generated content detection for its strong reasoning and multimodal capabilities. It breaks the limitations of traditional deep learning based methods faced with like lack of transparency and inability to recognize new artifacts. Motivated by this, we propose LAVID, a novel LVLMs-based ai-generated video detection with explicit knowledge enhancement. Our insight list as follows: (1) The leading LVLMs can call external tools to extract useful information to facilitate its own video detection task; (2) Structuring the prompt can affect LVLM's reasoning ability to interpret information in video content. Our proposed pipeline automatically selects a set of explicit knowledge tools for detection, and then adaptively adjusts the structure prompt by self-rewriting. Different from prior SOTA that trains additional detectors, our method is fully training-free and only requires inference of the LVLM for detection. To facilitate our research, we also create a new benchmark \vidfor with high-quality videos generated from multiple sources of video generation tools. Evaluation results show that LAVID improves F1 scores by 6.2 to 30.2% over the top baselines on our datasets across four SOTA LVLMs.

Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a promising privacy-preserving collaborative model training paradigm without sharing raw data. However, recent studies have revealed that private information can still be leaked through shared gradient information and attacked by Gradient Inversion Attacks (GIA). While many GIA methods have been proposed, a detailed analysis, evaluation, and summary of these methods are still lacking. Although various survey papers summarize existing privacy attacks in FL, few studies have conducted extensive experiments to unveil the effectiveness of GIA and their associated limiting factors in this context. To fill this gap, we first undertake a systematic review of GIA and categorize existing methods into three types, i.e., optimization-based GIA (OP-GIA), generation-based GIA (GEN-GIA), and analytics-based GIA (ANA-GIA). Then, we comprehensively analyze and evaluate the three types of GIA in FL, providing insights into the factors that influence their performance, practicality, and potential threats. Our findings indicate that OP-GIA is the most practical attack setting despite its unsatisfactory performance, while GEN-GIA has many dependencies and ANA-GIA is easily detectable, making them both impractical. Finally, we offer a three-stage defense pipeline to users when designing FL frameworks and protocols for better privacy protection and share some future research directions from the perspectives of attackers and defenders that we believe should be pursued. We hope that our study can help researchers design more robust FL frameworks to defend against these attacks.

Modern Vision-Language Models (VLMs) demonstrate sophisticated reasoning, escalating privacy risks beyond simple attribute perception to individual-level linkage. Current privacy benchmarks are structurally insufficient for this new threat, as they primarily evaluate privacy perception while failing to address the more critical risk of privacy reasoning: a VLM's ability to infer and link distributed information to construct individual profiles. To address this critical gap, we propose MultiPriv, the first benchmark designed to systematically evaluate individual-level privacy reasoning in VLMs. We introduce the Privacy Perception and Reasoning (PPR) framework and construct a novel, bilingual multimodal dataset to support it. The dataset uniquely features a core component of synthetic individual profiles where identifiers (e.g., faces, names) are meticulously linked to sensitive attributes. This design enables nine challenging tasks evaluating the full PPR spectrum, from attribute detection to cross-image re-identification and chained inference. We conduct a large-scale evaluation of over 50 foundational and commercial VLMs. Our analysis reveals: (1) Many VLMs possess significant, unmeasured reasoning-based privacy risks. (2) Perception-level metrics are poor predictors of these reasoning risks, revealing a critical evaluation gap. (3) Existing safety alignments are inconsistent and ineffective against such reasoning-based attacks. MultiPriv exposes systemic vulnerabilities and provides the necessary framework for developing robust, privacy-preserving VLMs.

Privacy concerns have become increasingly critical in modern AI and data science applications, where sensitive information is collected, analyzed, and shared across diverse domains such as healthcare, finance, and mobility. While prior research has focused on protecting privacy in a single data release, many real-world systems operate under sequential or continuous data publishing, where the same or related data are released over time. Such sequential disclosures introduce new vulnerabilities, as temporal correlations across releases may enable adversaries to infer sensitive information that remains hidden in any individual release. In this paper, we investigate whether an attacker can compromise privacy in sequential data releases by exploiting dependencies between consecutive publications, even when each individual release satisfies standard privacy guarantees. To this end, we propose a novel attack model that captures these sequential dependencies by integrating a Hidden Markov Model with a reinforcement learning-based bi-directional inference mechanism. This enables the attacker to leverage both earlier and later observations in the sequence to infer private information. We instantiate our framework in the context of trajectory data, demonstrating how an adversary can recover sensitive locations from sequential mobility datasets. Extensive experiments on Geolife, Porto Taxi, and SynMob datasets show that our model consistently outperforms baseline approaches that treat each release independently. The results reveal a fundamental privacy risk inherent to sequential data publishing, where individually protected releases can collectively leak sensitive information when analyzed temporally. These findings underscore the need for new privacy-preserving frameworks that explicitly model temporal dependencies, such as time-aware differential privacy or sequential data obfuscation strategies.

Federated learning is a collaborative method that aims to preserve data privacy while creating AI models. Current approaches to federated learning tend to rely heavily on secure aggregation protocols to preserve data privacy. However, to some degree, such protocols assume that the entity orchestrating the federated learning process (i.e., the server) is not fully malicious or dishonest. We investigate vulnerabilities to secure aggregation that could arise if the server is fully malicious and attempts to obtain access to private, potentially sensitive data. Furthermore, we provide a method to further defend against such a malicious server, and demonstrate effectiveness against known attacks that reconstruct data in a federated learning setting.

This book chapter identifies various security threats in wireless mesh network (WMN). Keeping in mind the critical requirement of security and user privacy in WMNs, this chapter provides a comprehensive overview of various possible attacks on different layers of the communication protocol stack for WMNs and their corresponding defense mechanisms. First, it identifies the security vulnerabilities in the physical, link, network, transport, application layers. Furthermore, various possible attacks on the key management protocols, user authentication and access control protocols, and user privacy preservation protocols are presented. After enumerating various possible attacks, the chapter provides a detailed discussion on various existing security mechanisms and protocols to defend against and wherever possible prevent the possible attacks. Comparative analyses are also presented on the security schemes with regards to the cryptographic schemes used, key management strategies deployed, use of any trusted third party, computation and communication overhead involved etc. The chapter then presents a brief discussion on various trust management approaches for WMNs since trust and reputation-based schemes are increasingly becoming popular for enforcing security in wireless networks. A number of open problems in security and privacy issues for WMNs are subsequently discussed before the chapter is finally concluded.

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation wireless networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to service providers. As WMNs become an increasingly popular replacement technology for last-mile connectivity to the home networking, community and neighborhood networking, it is imperative to design efficient and secure communication protocols for these networks. However, several vulnerabilities exist in currently existing protocols for WMNs. These security loopholes can be exploited by potential attackers to launch attack on WMNs. The absence of a central point of administration makes securing WMNs even more challenging. The broadcast nature of transmission and the dependency on the intermediate nodes for multi-hop communications lead to several security vulnerabilities in WMNs. The attacks can be external as well as internal in nature. External attacks are launched by intruders who are not authorized users of the network. For example, an intruding node may eavesdrop on the packets and replay those packets at a later point of time to gain access to the network resources. On the other hand, the internal attacks are launched by the nodes that are part of the WMN. On example of such attack is an intermediate node dropping packets which it was supposed to forward. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on the current authentication and privacy protection schemes for WMN. In addition, it proposes a novel security protocol for node authentication and message confidentiality and an anonymization scheme for privacy protection of users in WMNs.

The modern surge in camera usage alongside widespread computer vision technology applications poses significant privacy and security concerns. Current artificial intelligence (AI) technologies aid in recognizing relevant events and assisting in daily tasks in homes, offices, hospitals, etc. The need to access or process personal information for these purposes raises privacy concerns. While software-level solutions like face de-identification provide a good privacy/utility trade-off, they present vulnerabilities to sniffing attacks. In this paper, we propose a hardware-level face de-identification method to solve this vulnerability. Specifically, our approach first learns an optical encoder along with a regression model to obtain a face heatmap while hiding the face identity from the source image. We also propose an anonymization framework that generates a new face using the privacy-preserving image, face heatmap, and a reference face image from a public dataset as input. We validate our approach with extensive simulations and hardware experiments.

The advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced the ability to effectively tackle various downstream NLP tasks and unify these tasks into generative pipelines. On the one hand, powerful language models, trained on massive textual data, have brought unparalleled accessibility and usability for both models and users. On the other hand, unrestricted access to these models can also introduce potential malicious and unintentional privacy risks. Despite ongoing efforts to address the safety and privacy concerns associated with LLMs, the problem remains unresolved. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the current privacy attacks targeting LLMs and categorize them according to the adversary's assumed capabilities to shed light on the potential vulnerabilities present in LLMs. Then, we present a detailed overview of prominent defense strategies that have been developed to counter these privacy attacks. Beyond existing works, we identify upcoming privacy concerns as LLMs evolve. Lastly, we point out several potential avenues for future exploration.

The growing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has influenced the development of their lighter counterparts-Small Language Models (SLMs)-to enable on-device deployment across smartphones and edge devices. These SLMs offer enhanced privacy, reduced latency, server-free functionality, and improved user experience. However, due to resource constraints of on-device environment, SLMs undergo size optimization through compression techniques like quantization, which can inadvertently introduce fairness, ethical and privacy risks. Critically, quantized SLMs may respond to harmful queries directly, without requiring adversarial manipulation, raising significant safety and trust concerns. To address this, we propose LiteLMGuard (LLMG), an on-device prompt guard that provides real-time, prompt-level defense for quantized SLMs. Additionally, our prompt guard is designed to be model-agnostic such that it can be seamlessly integrated with any SLM, operating independently of underlying architectures. Our LLMG formalizes prompt filtering as a deep learning (DL)-based prompt answerability classification task, leveraging semantic understanding to determine whether a query should be answered by any SLM. Using our curated dataset, Answerable-or-Not, we trained and fine-tuned several DL models and selected ELECTRA as the candidate, with 97.75% answerability classification accuracy. Our safety effectiveness evaluations demonstrate that LLMG defends against over 87% of harmful prompts, including both direct instruction and jailbreak attack strategies. We further showcase its ability to mitigate the Open Knowledge Attacks, where compromised SLMs provide unsafe responses without adversarial prompting. In terms of prompt filtering effectiveness, LLMG achieves near state-of-the-art filtering accuracy of 94%, with an average latency of 135 ms, incurring negligible overhead for users.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Bard, have revolutionized natural language understanding and generation. They possess deep language comprehension, human-like text generation capabilities, contextual awareness, and robust problem-solving skills, making them invaluable in various domains (e.g., search engines, customer support, translation). In the meantime, LLMs have also gained traction in the security community, revealing security vulnerabilities and showcasing their potential in security-related tasks. This paper explores the intersection of LLMs with security and privacy. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs positively impact security and privacy, potential risks and threats associated with their use, and inherent vulnerabilities within LLMs. Through a comprehensive literature review, the paper categorizes the papers into "The Good" (beneficial LLM applications), "The Bad" (offensive applications), and "The Ugly" (vulnerabilities of LLMs and their defenses). We have some interesting findings. For example, LLMs have proven to enhance code security (code vulnerability detection) and data privacy (data confidentiality protection), outperforming traditional methods. However, they can also be harnessed for various attacks (particularly user-level attacks) due to their human-like reasoning abilities. We have identified areas that require further research efforts. For example, Research on model and parameter extraction attacks is limited and often theoretical, hindered by LLM parameter scale and confidentiality. Safe instruction tuning, a recent development, requires more exploration. We hope that our work can shed light on the LLMs' potential to both bolster and jeopardize cybersecurity.

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of interest in the research community due to their potential applicability in a wide range of real-world practical applications. However, due to the distributed nature and their deployments in critical applications without human interventions and sensitivity and criticality of data communicated, these networks are vulnerable to numerous security and privacy threats that can adversely affect their performance. These issues become even more critical in cognitive wireless sensor networks (CWSNs) in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which they operate in order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the network resources. This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion on the security and privacy issues in CWSNs by identifying various security threats in these networks and various defense mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. Various types of attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on their natures and targets, and corresponding to each attack class, appropriate security mechanisms are also discussed. Some critical research issues on security and privacy in CWSNs are also identified.

Wireless sensor networks have emerged as an important and new area in wireless and mobile computing research because of their numerous potential applications that range from indoor deployment scenarios in home and office to outdoor deployment in adversary's territory in tactical battleground. Since in many WSN applications, lives and livelihoods may depend on the timeliness and correctness of sensor data obtained from dispersed sensor nodes, these networks must be secured to prevent any possible attacks that may be launched on them. Security is, therefore, an important issue in WSNs. However, this issue becomes even more critical in cognitive wireless sensor networks, a type of WSN in which the sensor nodes have the capabilities of changing their transmission and reception parameters according to the radio environment under which they operate in order to achieve reliable and efficient communication and optimum utilization of the network resources. This survey paper presents a comprehensive discussion on various security issues in CWSNs by identifying numerous security threats in these networks and defense mechanisms to counter these vulnerabilities. Various types of attacks on CWSNs are categorized under different classes based on their natures and tragets, and corresponding to each attack class, appropriate security mechanisms are presented. The paper also identifies some open problems in this emerging area of wireless networking.

Data aggregation in intermediate nodes (called aggregator nodes) is an effective approach for optimizing consumption of scarce resources like bandwidth and energy in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). However, in-network processing poses a problem for the privacy of the sensor data since individual data of sensor nodes need to be known to the aggregator node before the aggregation process can be carried out. In applications of WSNs, privacy-preserving data aggregation has become an important requirement due to sensitive nature of the sensor data. Researchers have proposed a number of protocols and schemes for this purpose. He et al. (INFOCOM 2007) have proposed a protocol - called CPDA - for carrying out additive data aggregation in a privacy-preserving manner for application in WSNs. The scheme has been quite popular and well-known. In spite of the popularity of this protocol, it has been found that the protocol is vulnerable to attack and it is also not energy-efficient. In this paper, we first present a brief state of the art survey on the current privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols for WSNS. Then we describe the CPDA protocol and identify its security vulnerability. Finally, we demonstrate how the protocol can be made secure and energy efficient.

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

The security context used in 5G authentication is generated during the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure and stored in both the user equipment (UE) and the network sides for the subsequent fast registration procedure. Given its importance, it is imperative to formally analyze the security mechanism of the security context. The security context in the UE can be stored in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card or in the baseband chip. In this work, we present a comprehensive and formal verification of the fast registration procedure based on the security context under the two scenarios in ProVerif. Our analysis identifies two vulnerabilities, including one that has not been reported before. Specifically, the security context stored in the USIM card can be read illegally, and the validity checking mechanism of the security context in the baseband chip can be bypassed. Moreover, these vulnerabilities also apply to 4G networks. As a consequence, an attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to register to the network with the victim's identity and then launch other attacks, including one-tap authentication bypass leading to privacy disclosure, location spoofing, etc. To ensure that these attacks are indeed realizable in practice, we have responsibly confirmed them through experimentation in three operators. Our analysis reveals that these vulnerabilities stem from design flaws of the standard and unsafe practices by operators. We finally propose several potential countermeasures to prevent these attacks. We have reported our findings to the GSMA and received a coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) number CVD-2022-0057.

This research paper explores the privacy and security threats posed to an Agentic AI system with direct access to database systems. Such access introduces significant risks, including unauthorized retrieval of sensitive information, potential exploitation of system vulnerabilities, and misuse of personal or confidential data. The complexity of AI systems combined with their ability to process and analyze large volumes of data increases the chances of data leaks or breaches, which could occur unintentionally or through adversarial manipulation. Furthermore, as AI agents evolve with greater autonomy, their capacity to bypass or exploit security measures becomes a growing concern, heightening the need to address these critical vulnerabilities in agentic systems.

Tool-augmented large language models (LLMs) are often trained on datasets of query-response pairs, which embed the ability to use tools or APIs directly into the parametric knowledge of LLMs. Tool-augmented LLMs need the ability to forget learned tools due to security vulnerabilities, privacy regulations, or tool deprecations. However, ``tool unlearning'' has not been investigated in unlearning literature. We introduce this novel task, which requires addressing distinct challenges compared to traditional unlearning: knowledge removal rather than forgetting individual samples, the high cost of optimizing LLMs, and the need for principled evaluation metrics. To bridge these gaps, we propose ToolDelete, the first approach for unlearning tools from tool-augmented LLMs. It implements three key properties to address the above challenges for effective tool unlearning and introduces a new membership inference attack (MIA) model for effective evaluation. Extensive experiments on multiple tool learning datasets and tool-augmented LLMs show that ToolDelete effectively unlearns randomly selected tools, while preserving the LLM's knowledge on non-deleted tools and maintaining performance on general tasks.

Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) models have exhibited exciting progress in capabilities, capturing the interest of practitioners and the public alike. Yet, while the literature on the trustworthiness of GPT models remains limited, practitioners have proposed employing capable GPT models for sensitive applications to healthcare and finance - where mistakes can be costly. To this end, this work proposes a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation for large language models with a focus on GPT-4 and GPT-3.5, considering diverse perspectives - including toxicity, stereotype bias, adversarial robustness, out-of-distribution robustness, robustness on adversarial demonstrations, privacy, machine ethics, and fairness. Based on our evaluations, we discover previously unpublished vulnerabilities to trustworthiness threats. For instance, we find that GPT models can be easily misled to generate toxic and biased outputs and leak private information in both training data and conversation history. We also find that although GPT-4 is usually more trustworthy than GPT-3.5 on standard benchmarks, GPT-4 is more vulnerable given jailbreaking system or user prompts, potentially due to the reason that GPT-4 follows the (misleading) instructions more precisely. Our work illustrates a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation of GPT models and sheds light on the trustworthiness gaps. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://decodingtrust.github.io/.

Large language model (LLM) routing has emerged as a crucial strategy for balancing computational costs with performance by dynamically assigning queries to the most appropriate model based on query complexity. Despite recent advances showing that preference-data-based routers can outperform traditional methods, current evaluation benchmarks remain limited. They largely focus on general model capabilities while overlooking task-specific behaviors and critical concerns such as privacy, safety, and potential backdoor vulnerabilities introduced through preference data. In response, we propose the DSC benchmark: Diverse, Simple, and Categorized, an evaluation framework that categorizes router performance across a broad spectrum of query types, including coding, translation, mathematics, human instructions, general knowledge, and LLM jailbreaking. Additionally, it integrates privacy and safety assessments to reveal hidden risks. Our experiments on three preference-based routers and two commercial counterparts demonstrate that while these systems improve efficiency, they often make suboptimal, category-driven decisions. For instance, a BERT-based router directs all coding and mathematics queries to the most powerful LLM even when simpler models would suffice, while routing jailbreaking attempts to weaker models, thereby elevating safety risks.

Image diffusion models such as DALL-E 2, Imagen, and Stable Diffusion have attracted significant attention due to their ability to generate high-quality synthetic images. In this work, we show that diffusion models memorize individual images from their training data and emit them at generation time. With a generate-and-filter pipeline, we extract over a thousand training examples from state-of-the-art models, ranging from photographs of individual people to trademarked company logos. We also train hundreds of diffusion models in various settings to analyze how different modeling and data decisions affect privacy. Overall, our results show that diffusion models are much less private than prior generative models such as GANs, and that mitigating these vulnerabilities may require new advances in privacy-preserving training.

This paper addresses the privacy and security concerns associated with deep neural language models, which serve as crucial components in various modern AI-based applications. These models are often used after being pre-trained and fine-tuned for specific tasks, with deployment on servers accessed through the internet. However, this introduces two fundamental risks: (a) the transmission of user inputs to the server via the network gives rise to interception vulnerabilities, and (b) privacy concerns emerge as organizations that deploy such models store user data with restricted context. To address this, we propose a novel method to adapt and fine-tune transformer-based language models on passkey-encrypted user-specific text. The original pre-trained language model first undergoes a quick adaptation (without any further pre-training) with a series of irreversible transformations applied to the tokenizer and token embeddings. This enables the model to perform inference on encrypted inputs while preventing reverse engineering of text from model parameters and intermediate outputs. After adaptation, models are fine-tuned on encrypted versions of existing training datasets. Experimental evaluation employing adapted versions of renowned models (e.g., BERT, RoBERTa) across established benchmark English and multilingual datasets for text classification and sequence labeling shows that encrypted models achieve performance parity with their original counterparts. This serves to safeguard performance, privacy, and security cohesively.

Recent advancements in large vision language models (VLMs) tailored for autonomous driving (AD) have shown strong scene understanding and reasoning capabilities, making them undeniable candidates for end-to-end driving systems. However, limited work exists on studying the trustworthiness of DriveVLMs -- a critical factor that directly impacts public transportation safety. In this paper, we introduce AutoTrust, a comprehensive trustworthiness benchmark for large vision-language models in autonomous driving (DriveVLMs), considering diverse perspectives -- including trustfulness, safety, robustness, privacy, and fairness. We constructed the largest visual question-answering dataset for investigating trustworthiness issues in driving scenarios, comprising over 10k unique scenes and 18k queries. We evaluated six publicly available VLMs, spanning from generalist to specialist, from open-source to commercial models. Our exhaustive evaluations have unveiled previously undiscovered vulnerabilities of DriveVLMs to trustworthiness threats. Specifically, we found that the general VLMs like LLaVA-v1.6 and GPT-4o-mini surprisingly outperform specialized models fine-tuned for driving in terms of overall trustworthiness. DriveVLMs like DriveLM-Agent are particularly vulnerable to disclosing sensitive information. Additionally, both generalist and specialist VLMs remain susceptible to adversarial attacks and struggle to ensure unbiased decision-making across diverse environments and populations. Our findings call for immediate and decisive action to address the trustworthiness of DriveVLMs -- an issue of critical importance to public safety and the welfare of all citizens relying on autonomous transportation systems. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/taco-group/AutoTrust, and the leaderboard is released at https://taco-group.github.io/AutoTrust/.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Recent advances in text-to-speech (TTS) technology have enabled systems to produce human-indistinguishable speech, bringing benefits across accessibility, content creation, and human-computer interaction. However, current evaluation practices are increasingly inadequate for capturing the full range of capabilities, limitations, and societal implications. This position paper introduces the concept of Responsible Evaluation and argues that it is essential and urgent for the next phase of TTS development, structured through three progressive levels: (1) ensuring the faithful and accurate reflection of a model's true capabilities, with more robust, discriminative, and comprehensive objective and subjective scoring methodologies; (2) enabling comparability, standardization, and transferability through standardized benchmarks, transparent reporting, and transferable evaluation metrics; and (3) assessing and mitigating ethical risks associated with forgery, misuse, privacy violations, and security vulnerabilities. Through this concept, we critically examine current evaluation practices, identify systemic shortcomings, and propose actionable recommendations. We hope this concept of Responsible Evaluation will foster more trustworthy and reliable TTS technology and guide its development toward ethically sound and societally beneficial applications.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

The discourse on privacy risks in Large Language Models (LLMs) has disproportionately focused on verbatim memorization of training data, while a constellation of more immediate and scalable privacy threats remain underexplored. This position paper argues that the privacy landscape of LLM systems extends far beyond training data extraction, encompassing risks from data collection practices, inference-time context leakage, autonomous agent capabilities, and the democratization of surveillance through deep inference attacks. We present a comprehensive taxonomy of privacy risks across the LLM lifecycle -- from data collection through deployment -- and demonstrate through case studies how current privacy frameworks fail to address these multifaceted threats. Through a longitudinal analysis of 1,322 AI/ML privacy papers published at leading conferences over the past decade (2016--2025), we reveal that while memorization receives outsized attention in technical research, the most pressing privacy harms lie elsewhere, where current technical approaches offer little traction and viable paths forward remain unclear. We call for a fundamental shift in how the research community approaches LLM privacy, moving beyond the narrow focus of current technical solutions and embracing interdisciplinary approaches that address the sociotechnical nature of these emerging threats.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

Sensitive inferences and user re-identification are major threats to privacy when raw sensor data from wearable or portable devices are shared with cloud-assisted applications. To mitigate these threats, we propose mechanisms to transform sensor data before sharing them with applications running on users' devices. These transformations aim at eliminating patterns that can be used for user re-identification or for inferring potentially sensitive activities, while introducing a minor utility loss for the target application (or task). We show that, on gesture and activity recognition tasks, we can prevent inference of potentially sensitive activities while keeping the reduction in recognition accuracy of non-sensitive activities to less than 5 percentage points. We also show that we can reduce the accuracy of user re-identification and of the potential inference of gender to the level of a random guess, while keeping the accuracy of activity recognition comparable to that obtained on the original data.

Increasing numbers of software vulnerabilities are discovered every year whether they are reported publicly or discovered internally in proprietary code. These vulnerabilities can pose serious risk of exploit and result in system compromise, information leaks, or denial of service. We leveraged the wealth of C and C++ open-source code available to develop a large-scale function-level vulnerability detection system using machine learning. To supplement existing labeled vulnerability datasets, we compiled a vast dataset of millions of open-source functions and labeled it with carefully-selected findings from three different static analyzers that indicate potential exploits. The labeled dataset is available at: https://osf.io/d45bw/. Using these datasets, we developed a fast and scalable vulnerability detection tool based on deep feature representation learning that directly interprets lexed source code. We evaluated our tool on code from both real software packages and the NIST SATE IV benchmark dataset. Our results demonstrate that deep feature representation learning on source code is a promising approach for automated software vulnerability detection.

Deploying machine learning models in production may allow adversaries to infer sensitive information about training data. There is a vast literature analyzing different types of inference risks, ranging from membership inference to reconstruction attacks. Inspired by the success of games (i.e., probabilistic experiments) to study security properties in cryptography, some authors describe privacy inference risks in machine learning using a similar game-based style. However, adversary capabilities and goals are often stated in subtly different ways from one presentation to the other, which makes it hard to relate and compose results. In this paper, we present a game-based framework to systematize the body of knowledge on privacy inference risks in machine learning. We use this framework to (1) provide a unifying structure for definitions of inference risks, (2) formally establish known relations among definitions, and (3) to uncover hitherto unknown relations that would have been difficult to spot otherwise.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Trajectory data, which tracks movements through geographic locations, is crucial for improving real-world applications. However, collecting such sensitive data raises considerable privacy concerns. Local differential privacy (LDP) offers a solution by allowing individuals to locally perturb their trajectory data before sharing it. Despite its privacy benefits, LDP protocols are vulnerable to data poisoning attacks, where attackers inject fake data to manipulate aggregated results. In this work, we make the first attempt to analyze vulnerabilities in several representative LDP trajectory protocols. We propose TraP, a heuristic algorithm for data Poisoning attacks using a prefix-suffix method to optimize fake Trajectory selection, significantly reducing computational complexity. Our experimental results demonstrate that our attack can substantially increase target pattern occurrences in the perturbed trajectory dataset with few fake users. This study underscores the urgent need for robust defenses and better protocol designs to safeguard LDP trajectory data against malicious manipulation.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, finding applications across various domains. However, their reliance on massive internet-sourced datasets for training brings notable privacy issues, which are exacerbated in critical domains (e.g., healthcare). Moreover, certain application-specific scenarios may require fine-tuning these models on private data. This survey critically examines the privacy threats associated with LLMs, emphasizing the potential for these models to memorize and inadvertently reveal sensitive information. We explore current threats by reviewing privacy attacks on LLMs and propose comprehensive solutions for integrating privacy mechanisms throughout the entire learning pipeline. These solutions range from anonymizing training datasets to implementing differential privacy during training or inference and machine unlearning after training. Our comprehensive review of existing literature highlights ongoing challenges, available tools, and future directions for preserving privacy in LLMs. This work aims to guide the development of more secure and trustworthy AI systems by providing a thorough understanding of privacy preservation methods and their effectiveness in mitigating risks.

Private and public organizations regularly collect and analyze digitalized data about their associates, volunteers, clients, etc. However, because most personal data are sensitive, there is a key challenge in designing privacy-preserving systems. To tackle privacy concerns, research communities have proposed different methods to preserve privacy, with Differential privacy (DP) standing out as a formal definition that allows quantifying the privacy-utility trade-off. Besides, with the local DP (LDP) model, users can sanitize their data locally before transmitting it to the server. The objective of this thesis is thus two-fold: O_1) To improve the utility and privacy in multiple frequency estimates under LDP guarantees, which is fundamental to statistical learning. And O_2) To assess the privacy-utility trade-off of machine learning (ML) models trained over differentially private data. For O_1, we first tackled the problem from two "multiple" perspectives, i.e., multiple attributes and multiple collections throughout time, while focusing on utility. Secondly, we focused our attention on the multiple attributes aspect only, in which we proposed a solution focusing on privacy while preserving utility. In both cases, we demonstrate through analytical and experimental validations the advantages of our proposed solutions over state-of-the-art LDP protocols. For O_2, we empirically evaluated ML-based solutions designed to solve real-world problems while ensuring DP guarantees. Indeed, we mainly used the input data perturbation setting from the privacy-preserving ML literature. This is the situation in which the whole dataset is sanitized independently and, thus, we implemented LDP algorithms from the perspective of the centralized data owner. In all cases, we concluded that differentially private ML models achieve nearly the same utility metrics as non-private ones.

Impressive progress has been made in automated problem-solving by the collaboration of large language models (LLMs) based agents. However, these automated capabilities also open avenues for malicious applications. In this paper, we study a new threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity, called automated profile inference, where an adversary can instruct LLMs to automatically scrape and extract sensitive personal attributes from publicly visible user activities on pseudonymous platforms. We also introduce an automated profiling framework called AutoProfiler to assess the feasibility of such threats in real-world scenarios. AutoProfiler consists of four specialized LLM agents, who work collaboratively to collect and process user online activities and generate a profile with extracted personal information. Experimental results on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset demonstrate that AutoProfiler is highly effective and efficient, and can be easily deployed on a web scale. We demonstrate that the inferred attributes are both sensitive and identifiable, posing significant risks of privacy breaches, such as de-anonymization and sensitive information leakage. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies from different perspectives and advocate for increased public awareness of this emerging privacy threat to online pseudonymity.

Machine learning (ML) models frequently rely on training data that may include sensitive or personal information, raising substantial privacy concerns. Legislative frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) have necessitated the development of strategies that preserve privacy while maintaining the utility of data. In this paper, we investigate the capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate synthetic datasets integrated with Differential Privacy (DP) mechanisms, thereby enabling data-driven research and model training without direct exposure of sensitive information. Our approach incorporates DP-based noise injection methods, including Laplace and Gaussian distributions, into the data generation process. We then evaluate the utility of these DP-enhanced synthetic datasets by comparing the performance of ML models trained on them against models trained on the original data. To substantiate privacy guarantees, we assess the resilience of the generated synthetic data to membership inference attacks and related threats. The experimental results demonstrate that integrating DP within LLM-driven synthetic data generation offers a viable balance between privacy protection and data utility. This study provides a foundational methodology and insight into the privacy-preserving capabilities of LLMs, paving the way for compliant and effective ML research and applications.

The rapid advancement and widespread use of large language models (LLMs) have raised significant concerns regarding the potential leakage of personally identifiable information (PII). These models are often trained on vast quantities of web-collected data, which may inadvertently include sensitive personal data. This paper presents ProPILE, a novel probing tool designed to empower data subjects, or the owners of the PII, with awareness of potential PII leakage in LLM-based services. ProPILE lets data subjects formulate prompts based on their own PII to evaluate the level of privacy intrusion in LLMs. We demonstrate its application on the OPT-1.3B model trained on the publicly available Pile dataset. We show how hypothetical data subjects may assess the likelihood of their PII being included in the Pile dataset being revealed. ProPILE can also be leveraged by LLM service providers to effectively evaluate their own levels of PII leakage with more powerful prompts specifically tuned for their in-house models. This tool represents a pioneering step towards empowering the data subjects for their awareness and control over their own data on the web.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

Numerous companies have started offering services based on large language models (LLM), such as ChatGPT, which inevitably raises privacy concerns as users' prompts are exposed to the model provider. Previous research on secure reasoning using multi-party computation (MPC) has proven to be impractical for LLM applications due to its time-consuming and communication-intensive nature. While lightweight anonymization techniques can protect private information in prompts through substitution or masking, they fail to recover sensitive data replaced in the LLM-generated results. In this paper, we expand the application scenarios of anonymization techniques by training a small local model to de-anonymize the LLM's returned results with minimal computational overhead. We introduce the HaS framework, where "H(ide)" and "S(eek)" represent its two core processes: hiding private entities for anonymization and seeking private entities for de-anonymization, respectively. To quantitatively assess HaS's privacy protection performance, we propose both black-box and white-box adversarial models. Furthermore, we conduct experiments to evaluate HaS's usability in translation and classification tasks. The experimental findings demonstrate that the HaS framework achieves an optimal balance between privacy protection and utility.

When applying differential privacy to sensitive data, we can often improve performance using external information such as other sensitive data, public data, or human priors. We propose to use the learning-augmented algorithms (or algorithms with predictions) framework -- previously applied largely to improve time complexity or competitive ratios -- as a powerful way of designing and analyzing privacy-preserving methods that can take advantage of such external information to improve utility. This idea is instantiated on the important task of multiple quantile release, for which we derive error guarantees that scale with a natural measure of prediction quality while (almost) recovering state-of-the-art prediction-independent guarantees. Our analysis enjoys several advantages, including minimal assumptions about the data, a natural way of adding robustness, and the provision of useful surrogate losses for two novel ``meta" algorithms that learn predictions from other (potentially sensitive) data. We conclude with experiments on challenging tasks demonstrating that learning predictions across one or more instances can lead to large error reductions while preserving privacy.

Large language models (LLMs) are primarily accessed via commercial APIs, but this often requires users to expose their data to service providers. In this paper, we explore how users can stay in control of their data by using privacy profiles: simple natural language instructions that say what should and should not be revealed. We build a framework where a local model uses these instructions to rewrite queries, only hiding details deemed sensitive by the user, before sending them to an external model, thus balancing privacy with performance. To support this research, we introduce PEEP, a multilingual dataset of real user queries annotated to mark private content and paired with synthetic privacy profiles. Our experiments with lightweight LLMs show they can follow these instructions to some extent, but also face consistent challenges, highlighting the need for models that better understand and comply with user-defined privacy preferences.

The reliance of mobile GUI agents on Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) introduces a severe privacy vulnerability: screenshots containing Personally Identifiable Information (PII) are often sent to untrusted, third-party routers. These routers can exploit their own MLLMs to mine this data, violating user privacy. Existing privacy perturbations fail the critical dual challenge of this scenario: protecting PII from the router's MLLM while simultaneously preserving task utility for the agent's MLLM. To address this gap, we propose the Dual-Task Adversarial Protector (DualTAP), a novel framework that, for the first time, explicitly decouples these conflicting objectives. DualTAP trains a lightweight generator using two key innovations: (i) a contrastive attention module that precisely identifies and targets only the PII-sensitive regions, and (ii) a dual-task adversarial objective that simultaneously minimizes a task-preservation loss (to maintain agent utility) and a privacy-interference loss (to suppress PII leakage). To facilitate this study, we introduce PrivScreen, a new dataset of annotated mobile screenshots designed specifically for this dual-task evaluation. Comprehensive experiments on six diverse MLLMs (e.g., GPT-5) demonstrate DualTAP's state-of-the-art protection. It reduces the average privacy leakage rate by 31.6 percentage points (a 3.0x relative improvement) while, critically, maintaining an 80.8% task success rate - a negligible drop from the 83.6% unprotected baseline. DualTAP presents the first viable solution to the privacy-utility trade-off in mobile MLLM agents.

In domains with high stakes such as law, recruitment, and healthcare, learning models frequently rely on sensitive user data for inference, necessitating the complete set of features. This not only poses significant privacy risks for individuals but also demands substantial human effort from organizations to verify information accuracy. This paper asks whether it is necessary to use all input features for accurate predictions at inference time. The paper demonstrates that, in a personalized setting, individuals may only need to disclose a small subset of their features without compromising decision-making accuracy. The paper also provides an efficient sequential algorithm to determine the appropriate attributes for each individual to provide. Evaluations across various learning tasks show that individuals can potentially report as little as 10\% of their information while maintaining the same accuracy level as a model that employs the full set of user information.

Privacy policies are long and complex documents that are difficult for users to read and understand, and yet, they have legal effects on how user data is collected, managed and used. Ideally, we would like to empower users to inform themselves about issues that matter to them, and enable them to selectively explore those issues. We present PrivacyQA, a corpus consisting of 1750 questions about the privacy policies of mobile applications, and over 3500 expert annotations of relevant answers. We observe that a strong neural baseline underperforms human performance by almost 0.3 F1 on PrivacyQA, suggesting considerable room for improvement for future systems. Further, we use this dataset to shed light on challenges to question answerability, with domain-general implications for any question answering system. The PrivacyQA corpus offers a challenging corpus for question answering, with genuine real-world utility.

A membership inference attack (MIA) against a machine-learning model enables an attacker to determine whether a given data record was part of the model's training data or not. In this paper, we provide an in-depth study of the phenomenon of disparate vulnerability against MIAs: unequal success rate of MIAs against different population subgroups. We first establish necessary and sufficient conditions for MIAs to be prevented, both on average and for population subgroups, using a notion of distributional generalization. Second, we derive connections of disparate vulnerability to algorithmic fairness and to differential privacy. We show that fairness can only prevent disparate vulnerability against limited classes of adversaries. Differential privacy bounds disparate vulnerability but can significantly reduce the accuracy of the model. We show that estimating disparate vulnerability to MIAs by na\"ively applying existing attacks can lead to overestimation. We then establish which attacks are suitable for estimating disparate vulnerability, and provide a statistical framework for doing so reliably. We conduct experiments on synthetic and real-world data finding statistically significant evidence of disparate vulnerability in realistic settings. The code is available at https://github.com/spring-epfl/disparate-vulnerability

Large multimodal language models have proven transformative in numerous applications. However, these models have been shown to memorize and leak pre-training data, raising serious user privacy and information security concerns. While data leaks should be prevented, it is also crucial to examine the trade-off between the privacy protection and model utility of proposed approaches. In this paper, we introduce PrivQA -- a multimodal benchmark to assess this privacy/utility trade-off when a model is instructed to protect specific categories of personal information in a simulated scenario. We also propose a technique to iteratively self-moderate responses, which significantly improves privacy. However, through a series of red-teaming experiments, we find that adversaries can also easily circumvent these protections with simple jailbreaking methods through textual and/or image inputs. We believe PrivQA has the potential to support the development of new models with improved privacy protections, as well as the adversarial robustness of these protections. We release the entire PrivQA dataset at https://llm-access-control.github.io/.

Users interacting with large language models (LLMs) under their real identifiers often unknowingly risk disclosing private information. Automatically notifying users whether their queries leak privacy and which phrases leak what private information has therefore become a practical need. Existing privacy detection methods, however, were designed for different objectives and application scenarios, typically tagging personally identifiable information (PII) in anonymous content. In this work, to support the development and evaluation of privacy detection models for LLM interactions that are deployable on local user devices, we construct a large-scale multilingual dataset with 249K user queries and 154K annotated privacy phrases. In particular, we build an automated privacy annotation pipeline with cloud-based strong LLMs to automatically extract privacy phrases from dialogue datasets and annotate leaked information. We also design evaluation metrics at the levels of privacy leakage, extracted privacy phrase, and privacy information. We further establish baseline methods using light-weight LLMs with both tuning-free and tuning-based methods, and report a comprehensive evaluation of their performance. Evaluation results reveal a gap between current performance and the requirements of real-world LLM applications, motivating future research into more effective local privacy detection methods grounded in our dataset.

Privacy attacks on Machine Learning (ML) models often focus on inferring the existence of particular data points in the training data. However, what the adversary really wants to know is if a particular individual's (subject's) data was included during training. In such scenarios, the adversary is more likely to have access to the distribution of a particular subject than actual records. Furthermore, in settings like cross-silo Federated Learning (FL), a subject's data can be embodied by multiple data records that are spread across multiple organizations. Nearly all of the existing private FL literature is dedicated to studying privacy at two granularities -- item-level (individual data records), and user-level (participating user in the federation), neither of which apply to data subjects in cross-silo FL. This insight motivates us to shift our attention from the privacy of data records to the privacy of data subjects, also known as subject-level privacy. We propose two novel black-box attacks for subject membership inference, of which one assumes access to a model after each training round. Using these attacks, we estimate subject membership inference risk on real-world data for single-party models as well as FL scenarios. We find our attacks to be extremely potent, even without access to exact training records, and using the knowledge of membership for a handful of subjects. To better understand the various factors that may influence subject privacy risk in cross-silo FL settings, we systematically generate several hundred synthetic federation configurations, varying properties of the data, model design and training, and the federation itself. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of Differential Privacy in mitigating this threat.

Even though recent years have seen many attacks exposing severe vulnerabilities in Federated Learning (FL), a holistic understanding of what enables these attacks and how they can be mitigated effectively is still lacking. In this work, we demystify the inner workings of existing (targeted) attacks. We provide new insights into why these attacks are possible and why a definitive solution to FL robustness is challenging. We show that the need for ML algorithms to memorize tail data has significant implications for FL integrity. This phenomenon has largely been studied in the context of privacy; our analysis sheds light on its implications for ML integrity. We show that certain classes of severe attacks can be mitigated effectively by enforcing constraints such as norm bounds on clients' updates. We investigate how to efficiently incorporate these constraints into secure FL protocols in the single-server setting. Based on this, we propose RoFL, a new secure FL system that extends secure aggregation with privacy-preserving input validation. Specifically, RoFL can enforce constraints such as L_2 and L_infty bounds on high-dimensional encrypted model updates.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is a crucial pathway in mitigating the risk of non-transparency in the decision-making process of black-box Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. However, despite the benefits, XAI methods are found to leak the privacy of individuals whose data is used in training or querying the models. Researchers have demonstrated privacy attacks that exploit explanations to infer sensitive personal information of individuals. Currently there is a lack of defenses against known privacy attacks targeting explanations when vulnerable XAI are used in production and machine learning as a service system. To address this gap, in this article, we explore Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) as a defense mechanism against attribute inference on explanations provided by feature-based XAI methods. We empirically evaluate 3 types of PETs, namely synthetic training data, differentially private training and noise addition, on two categories of feature-based XAI. Our evaluation determines different responses from the mitigation methods and side-effects of PETs on other system properties such as utility and performance. In the best case, PETs integration in explanations reduced the risk of the attack by 49.47%, while maintaining model utility and explanation quality. Through our evaluation, we identify strategies for using PETs in XAI for maximizing benefits and minimizing the success of this privacy attack on sensitive personal information.

As language models (LMs) are widely utilized in personalized communication scenarios (e.g., sending emails, writing social media posts) and endowed with a certain level of agency, ensuring they act in accordance with the contextual privacy norms becomes increasingly critical. However, quantifying the privacy norm awareness of LMs and the emerging privacy risk in LM-mediated communication is challenging due to (1) the contextual and long-tailed nature of privacy-sensitive cases, and (2) the lack of evaluation approaches that capture realistic application scenarios. To address these challenges, we propose PrivacyLens, a novel framework designed to extend privacy-sensitive seeds into expressive vignettes and further into agent trajectories, enabling multi-level evaluation of privacy leakage in LM agents' actions. We instantiate PrivacyLens with a collection of privacy norms grounded in privacy literature and crowdsourced seeds. Using this dataset, we reveal a discrepancy between LM performance in answering probing questions and their actual behavior when executing user instructions in an agent setup. State-of-the-art LMs, like GPT-4 and Llama-3-70B, leak sensitive information in 25.68% and 38.69% of cases, even when prompted with privacy-enhancing instructions. We also demonstrate the dynamic nature of PrivacyLens by extending each seed into multiple trajectories to red-team LM privacy leakage risk. Dataset and code are available at https://github.com/SALT-NLP/PrivacyLens.

Privacy estimation techniques for differentially private (DP) algorithms are useful for comparing against analytical bounds, or to empirically measure privacy loss in settings where known analytical bounds are not tight. However, existing privacy auditing techniques usually make strong assumptions on the adversary (e.g., knowledge of intermediate model iterates or the training data distribution), are tailored to specific tasks, model architectures, or DP algorithm, and/or require retraining the model many times (typically on the order of thousands). These shortcomings make deploying such techniques at scale difficult in practice, especially in federated settings where model training can take days or weeks. In this work, we present a novel ``one-shot'' approach that can systematically address these challenges, allowing efficient auditing or estimation of the privacy loss of a model during the same, single training run used to fit model parameters, and without requiring any a priori knowledge about the model architecture, task, or DP training algorithm. We show that our method provides provably correct estimates for the privacy loss under the Gaussian mechanism, and we demonstrate its performance on well-established FL benchmark datasets under several adversarial threat models.

Differential privacy (DP) is by far the most widely accepted framework for mitigating privacy risks in machine learning. However, exactly how small the privacy parameter epsilon needs to be to protect against certain privacy risks in practice is still not well-understood. In this work, we study data reconstruction attacks for discrete data and analyze it under the framework of multiple hypothesis testing. We utilize different variants of the celebrated Fano's inequality to derive upper bounds on the inferential power of a data reconstruction adversary when the model is trained differentially privately. Importantly, we show that if the underlying private data takes values from a set of size M, then the target privacy parameter epsilon can be O(log M) before the adversary gains significant inferential power. Our analysis offers theoretical evidence for the empirical effectiveness of DP against data reconstruction attacks even at relatively large values of epsilon.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trained on tabular data, which, unlike unstructured text, often contains personally identifiable information (PII) in a highly structured and explicit format. As a result, privacy risks arise, since sensitive records can be inadvertently retained by the model and exposed through data extraction or membership inference attacks (MIAs). While existing MIA methods primarily target textual content, their efficacy and threat implications may differ when applied to structured data, due to its limited content, diverse data types, unique value distributions, and column-level semantics. In this paper, we present Tab-MIA, a benchmark dataset for evaluating MIAs on tabular data in LLMs and demonstrate how it can be used. Tab-MIA comprises five data collections, each represented in six different encoding formats. Using our Tab-MIA benchmark, we conduct the first evaluation of state-of-the-art MIA methods on LLMs finetuned with tabular data across multiple encoding formats. In the evaluation, we analyze the memorization behavior of pretrained LLMs on structured data derived from Wikipedia tables. Our findings show that LLMs memorize tabular data in ways that vary across encoding formats, making them susceptible to extraction via MIAs. Even when fine-tuned for as few as three epochs, models exhibit high vulnerability, with AUROC scores approaching 90% in most cases. Tab-MIA enables systematic evaluation of these risks and provides a foundation for developing privacy-preserving methods for tabular data in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities in understanding and generating natural language. However, these models can inadvertently memorize private information, posing significant privacy risks. This study addresses the challenge of enabling LLMs to protect specific individuals' private data without the need for complete retraining. We propose \return, a Real-world pErsonal daTa UnleaRNing dataset, comprising 2,492 individuals from Wikipedia with associated QA pairs, to evaluate machine unlearning (MU) methods for protecting personal data in a realistic scenario. Additionally, we introduce the Name-Aware Unlearning Framework (NAUF) for Privacy Protection, which enables the model to learn which individuals' information should be protected without affecting its ability to answer questions related to other unrelated individuals. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that NAUF achieves a state-of-the-art average unlearning score, surpassing the best baseline method by 5.65 points, effectively protecting target individuals' personal data while maintaining the model's general capabilities.

Machine learning models trained with differentially-private (DP) algorithms such as DP-SGD enjoy resilience against a wide range of privacy attacks. Although it is possible to derive bounds for some attacks based solely on an (varepsilon,delta)-DP guarantee, meaningful bounds require a small enough privacy budget (i.e., injecting a large amount of noise), which results in a large loss in utility. This paper presents a new approach to evaluate the privacy of machine learning models against specific record-level threats, such as membership and attribute inference, without the indirection through DP. We focus on the popular DP-SGD algorithm, and derive simple closed-form bounds. Our proofs model DP-SGD as an information theoretic channel whose inputs are the secrets that an attacker wants to infer (e.g., membership of a data record) and whose outputs are the intermediate model parameters produced by iterative optimization. We obtain bounds for membership inference that match state-of-the-art techniques, whilst being orders of magnitude faster to compute. Additionally, we present a novel data-dependent bound against attribute inference. Our results provide a direct, interpretable, and practical way to evaluate the privacy of trained models against specific inference threats without sacrificing utility.

The memorization of sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII) by large language models (LLMs) poses growing privacy risks as models scale and are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. Existing efforts to study sensitive and PII data memorization and develop mitigation strategies are hampered by the absence of comprehensive, realistic, and ethically sourced datasets reflecting the diversity of sensitive information found on the web. We introduce PANORAMA - Profile-based Assemblage for Naturalistic Online Representation and Attribute Memorization Analysis, a large-scale synthetic corpus of 384,789 samples derived from 9,674 synthetic profiles designed to closely emulate the distribution, variety, and context of PII and sensitive data as it naturally occurs in online environments. Our data generation pipeline begins with the construction of internally consistent, multi-attribute human profiles using constrained selection to reflect real-world demographics such as education, health attributes, financial status, etc. Using a combination of zero-shot prompting and OpenAI o3-mini, we generate diverse content types - including wiki-style articles, social media posts, forum discussions, online reviews, comments, and marketplace listings - each embedding realistic, contextually appropriate PII and other sensitive information. We validate the utility of PANORAMA by fine-tuning the Mistral-7B model on 1x, 5x, 10x, and 25x data replication rates with a subset of data and measure PII memorization rates - revealing not only consistent increases with repetition but also variation across content types, highlighting PANORAMA's ability to model how memorization risks differ by context. Our dataset and code are publicly available, providing a much-needed resource for privacy risk assessment, model auditing, and the development of privacy-preserving LLMs.

Users can divulge sensitive information to proprietary LLM providers, raising significant privacy concerns. While open-source models, hosted locally on the user's machine, alleviate some concerns, models that users can host locally are often less capable than proprietary frontier models. Toward preserving user privacy while retaining the best quality, we propose Privacy-Conscious Delegation, a novel task for chaining API-based and local models. We utilize recent public collections of user-LLM interactions to construct a natural benchmark called PUPA, which contains personally identifiable information (PII). To study potential approaches, we devise PAPILLON, a multi-stage LLM pipeline that uses prompt optimization to address a simpler version of our task. Our best pipeline maintains high response quality for 85.5% of user queries while restricting privacy leakage to only 7.5%. We still leave a large margin to the generation quality of proprietary LLMs for future work. Our data and code is available at https://github.com/siyan-sylvia-li/PAPILLON.

Smartphones bring significant convenience to users but also enable devices to extensively record various types of personal information. Existing smartphone agents powered by Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable performance in automating different tasks. However, as the cost, these agents are granted substantial access to sensitive users' personal information during this operation. To gain a thorough understanding of the privacy awareness of these agents, we present the first large-scale benchmark encompassing 7,138 scenarios to the best of our knowledge. In addition, for privacy context in scenarios, we annotate its type (e.g., Account Credentials), sensitivity level, and location. We then carefully benchmark seven available mainstream smartphone agents. Our results demonstrate that almost all benchmarked agents show unsatisfying privacy awareness (RA), with performance remaining below 60% even with explicit hints. Overall, closed-source agents show better privacy ability than open-source ones, and Gemini 2.0-flash achieves the best, achieving an RA of 67%. We also find that the agents' privacy detection capability is highly related to scenario sensitivity level, i.e., the scenario with a higher sensitivity level is typically more identifiable. We hope the findings enlighten the research community to rethink the unbalanced utility-privacy tradeoff about smartphone agents. Our code and benchmark are available at https://zhixin-l.github.io/SAPA-Bench.

AI powered health chatbot applications are increasingly utilized for personalized healthcare services, yet they pose significant challenges related to user data security and privacy. This study evaluates the effectiveness of automated methods, specifically BART and Gemini GenAI, in identifying security privacy related (SPR) concerns within these applications' user reviews, benchmarking their performance against manual qualitative analysis. Our results indicate that while Gemini's performance in SPR classification is comparable to manual labeling, both automated methods have limitations, including the misclassification of unrelated issues. Qualitative analysis revealed critical user concerns, such as data collection practices, data misuse, and insufficient transparency and consent mechanisms. This research enhances the understanding of the relationship between user trust, privacy, and emerging mobile AI health chatbot technologies, offering actionable insights for improving security and privacy practices in AI driven health chatbots. Although exploratory, our findings highlight the necessity for rigorous audits and transparent communication strategies, providing valuable guidance for app developers and vendors in addressing user security and privacy concerns.

While the rapid proliferation of wearable cameras has raised significant concerns about egocentric video privacy, prior work has largely overlooked the unique privacy threats posed to the camera wearer. This work investigates the core question: How much privacy information about the camera wearer can be inferred from their first-person view videos? We introduce EgoPrivacy, the first large-scale benchmark for the comprehensive evaluation of privacy risks in egocentric vision. EgoPrivacy covers three types of privacy (demographic, individual, and situational), defining seven tasks that aim to recover private information ranging from fine-grained (e.g., wearer's identity) to coarse-grained (e.g., age group). To further emphasize the privacy threats inherent to egocentric vision, we propose Retrieval-Augmented Attack, a novel attack strategy that leverages ego-to-exo retrieval from an external pool of exocentric videos to boost the effectiveness of demographic privacy attacks. An extensive comparison of the different attacks possible under all threat models is presented, showing that private information of the wearer is highly susceptible to leakage. For instance, our findings indicate that foundation models can effectively compromise wearer privacy even in zero-shot settings by recovering attributes such as identity, scene, gender, and race with 70-80% accuracy. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/williamium3000/ego-privacy.

In recent years, Local Differential Privacy (LDP), a robust privacy-preserving methodology, has gained widespread adoption in real-world applications. With LDP, users can perturb their data on their devices before sending it out for analysis. However, as the collection of multiple sensitive information becomes more prevalent across various industries, collecting a single sensitive attribute under LDP may not be sufficient. Correlated attributes in the data may still lead to inferences about the sensitive attribute. This paper empirically studies the impact of collecting multiple sensitive attributes under LDP on fairness. We propose a novel privacy budget allocation scheme that considers the varying domain size of sensitive attributes. This generally led to a better privacy-utility-fairness trade-off in our experiments than the state-of-art solution. Our results show that LDP leads to slightly improved fairness in learning problems without significantly affecting the performance of the models. We conduct extensive experiments evaluating three benchmark datasets using several group fairness metrics and seven state-of-the-art LDP protocols. Overall, this study challenges the common belief that differential privacy necessarily leads to worsened fairness in machine learning.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

As large language models (LLMs) become integral to multi-agent systems, new privacy risks emerge that extend beyond memorization, direct inference, or single-turn evaluations. In particular, seemingly innocuous responses, when composed across interactions, can cumulatively enable adversaries to recover sensitive information, a phenomenon we term compositional privacy leakage. We present the first systematic study of such compositional privacy leaks and possible mitigation methods in multi-agent LLM systems. First, we develop a framework that models how auxiliary knowledge and agent interactions jointly amplify privacy risks, even when each response is benign in isolation. Next, to mitigate this, we propose and evaluate two defense strategies: (1) Theory-of-Mind defense (ToM), where defender agents infer a questioner's intent by anticipating how their outputs may be exploited by adversaries, and (2) Collaborative Consensus Defense (CoDef), where responder agents collaborate with peers who vote based on a shared aggregated state to restrict sensitive information spread. Crucially, we balance our evaluation across compositions that expose sensitive information and compositions that yield benign inferences. Our experiments quantify how these defense strategies differ in balancing the privacy-utility trade-off. We find that while chain-of-thought alone offers limited protection to leakage (~39% sensitive blocking rate), our ToM defense substantially improves sensitive query blocking (up to 97%) but can reduce benign task success. CoDef achieves the best balance, yielding the highest Balanced Outcome (79.8%), highlighting the benefit of combining explicit reasoning with defender collaboration. Together, our results expose a new class of risks in collaborative LLM deployments and provide actionable insights for designing safeguards against compositional, context-driven privacy leakage.

Recent advances in multi-modal Large Language Models (M-LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability to synthesize implicit information from disparate sources, including images and text. These resourceful data from social media also introduce a significant and underexplored privacy risk: the inference of sensitive personal attributes from seemingly daily media content. However, the lack of benchmarks and comprehensive evaluations of state-of-the-art M-LLM capabilities hinders the research of private attribute profiling on social media. Accordingly, we propose (1) PRISM, the first multi-modal, multi-dimensional and fine-grained synthesized dataset incorporating a comprehensive privacy landscape and dynamic user history; (2) an Efficient evaluation framework that measures the cross-modal privacy inference capabilities of advanced M-LLM. Specifically, PRISM is a large-scale synthetic benchmark designed to evaluate cross-modal privacy risks. Its key feature is 12 sensitive attribute labels across a diverse set of multi-modal profiles, which enables targeted privacy analysis. These profiles are generated via a sophisticated LLM agentic workflow, governed by a prior distribution to ensure they realistically mimic social media users. Additionally, we propose a Multi-Agent Inference Framework that leverages a pipeline of specialized LLMs to enhance evaluation capabilities. We evaluate the inference capabilities of six leading M-LLMs (Qwen, Gemini, GPT-4o, GLM, Doubao, and Grok) on PRISM. The comparison with human performance reveals that these MLLMs significantly outperform in accuracy and efficiency, highlighting the threat of potential privacy risks and the urgent need for robust defenses.

Privacy policies serve as the primary conduit through which online service providers inform users about their data collection and usage procedures. However, in a bid to be comprehensive and mitigate legal risks, these policy documents are often quite verbose. In practical use, users tend to click the Agree button directly rather than reading them carefully. This practice exposes users to risks of privacy leakage and legal issues. Recently, the advent of Large Language Models (LLM) such as ChatGPT and GPT-4 has opened new possibilities for text analysis, especially for lengthy documents like privacy policies. In this study, we investigate a privacy policy text analysis framework PolicyGPT based on the LLM. This framework was tested using two datasets. The first dataset comprises of privacy policies from 115 websites, which were meticulously annotated by legal experts, categorizing each segment into one of 10 classes. The second dataset consists of privacy policies from 304 popular mobile applications, with each sentence manually annotated and classified into one of another 10 categories. Under zero-shot learning conditions, PolicyGPT demonstrated robust performance. For the first dataset, it achieved an accuracy rate of 97%, while for the second dataset, it attained an 87% accuracy rate, surpassing that of the baseline machine learning and neural network models.

FemTech or Female Technology, is an expanding field dedicated to providing affordable and accessible healthcare solutions for women, prominently through Female Health Applications that monitor health and reproductive data. With the leading app exceeding 1 billion downloads, these applications are gaining widespread popularity. However, amidst contemporary challenges to women's reproductive rights and privacy, there is a noticeable lack of comprehensive studies on the security and privacy aspects of these applications. This exploratory study delves into the privacy risks associated with seven popular applications. Our initial quantitative static analysis reveals varied and potentially risky permissions and numerous third-party trackers. Additionally, a preliminary examination of privacy policies indicates non-compliance with fundamental data privacy principles. These early findings highlight a critical gap in establishing robust privacy and security safeguards for FemTech apps, especially significant in a climate where women's reproductive rights face escalating threats.

Neural network-based image classifiers are powerful tools for computer vision tasks, but they inadvertently reveal sensitive attribute information about their classes, raising concerns about their privacy. To investigate this privacy leakage, we introduce the first Class Attribute Inference Attack (CAIA), which leverages recent advances in text-to-image synthesis to infer sensitive attributes of individual classes in a black-box setting, while remaining competitive with related white-box attacks. Our extensive experiments in the face recognition domain show that CAIA can accurately infer undisclosed sensitive attributes, such as an individual's hair color, gender, and racial appearance, which are not part of the training labels. Interestingly, we demonstrate that adversarial robust models are even more vulnerable to such privacy leakage than standard models, indicating that a trade-off between robustness and privacy exists.

Scams exploiting real-time social engineering -- such as phishing, impersonation, and phone fraud -- remain a persistent and evolving threat across digital platforms. Existing defenses are largely reactive, offering limited protection during active interactions. We propose a privacy-preserving, AI-in-the-loop framework that proactively detects and disrupts scam conversations in real time. The system combines instruction-tuned artificial intelligence with a safety-aware utility function that balances engagement with harm minimization, and employs federated learning to enable continual model updates without raw data sharing. Experimental evaluations show that the system produces fluent and engaging responses (perplexity as low as 22.3, engagement approx0.80), while human studies confirm significant gains in realism, safety, and effectiveness over strong baselines. In federated settings, models trained with FedAvg sustain up to 30 rounds while preserving high engagement (approx0.80), strong relevance (approx0.74), and low PII leakage (leq0.0085). Even with differential privacy, novelty and safety remain stable, indicating that robust privacy can be achieved without sacrificing performance. The evaluation of guard models (LlamaGuard, LlamaGuard2/3, MD-Judge) shows a straightforward pattern: stricter moderation settings reduce the chance of exposing personal information, but they also limit how much the model engages in conversation. In contrast, more relaxed settings allow longer and richer interactions, which improve scam detection, but at the cost of higher privacy risk. To our knowledge, this is the first framework to unify real-time scam-baiting, federated privacy preservation, and calibrated safety moderation into a proactive defense paradigm.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaksx2013methods to elicit harmful or generally impermissible outputs. Safety measures are developed and assessed on their effectiveness at defending against jailbreak attacks, indicating a belief that safety is equivalent to robustness. We assert that current defense mechanisms, such as output filters and alignment fine-tuning, are, and will remain, fundamentally insufficient for ensuring model safety. These defenses fail to address risks arising from dual-intent queries and the ability to composite innocuous outputs to achieve harmful goals. To address this critical gap, we introduce an information-theoretic threat model called inferential adversaries who exploit impermissible information leakage from model outputs to achieve malicious goals. We distinguish these from commonly studied security adversaries who only seek to force victim models to generate specific impermissible outputs. We demonstrate the feasibility of automating inferential adversaries through question decomposition and response aggregation. To provide safety guarantees, we define an information censorship criterion for censorship mechanisms, bounding the leakage of impermissible information. We propose a defense mechanism which ensures this bound and reveal an intrinsic safety-utility trade-off. Our work provides the first theoretically grounded understanding of the requirements for releasing safe LLMs and the utility costs involved.

Protecting sensitive information is crucial in today's world of Large Language Models (LLMs) and data-driven services. One common method used to preserve privacy is by using data perturbation techniques to reduce overreaching utility of (sensitive) Personal Identifiable Information (PII) data while maintaining its statistical and semantic properties. Data perturbation methods often result in significant information loss, making them impractical for use. In this paper, we propose 'Life of PII', a novel Obfuscation Transformer framework for transforming PII into faux-PII while preserving the original information, intent, and context as much as possible. Our approach includes an API to interface with the given document, a configuration-based obfuscator, and a model based on the Transformer architecture, which has shown high context preservation and performance in natural language processing tasks and LLMs. Our Transformer-based approach learns mapping between the original PII and its transformed faux-PII representation, which we call "obfuscated" data. Our experiments demonstrate that our method, called Life of PII, outperforms traditional data perturbation techniques in terms of both utility preservation and privacy protection. We show that our approach can effectively reduce utility loss while preserving the original information, offering greater flexibility in the trade-off between privacy protection and data utility. Our work provides a solution for protecting PII in various real-world applications.

Privacy-enhancing technologies are technologies that implement fundamental data protection principles. With respect to biometric recognition, different types of privacy-enhancing technologies have been introduced for protecting stored biometric data which are generally classified as sensitive. In this regard, various taxonomies and conceptual categorizations have been proposed and standardization activities have been carried out. However, these efforts have mainly been devoted to certain sub-categories of privacy-enhancing technologies and therefore lack generalization. This work provides an overview of concepts of privacy-enhancing technologies for biometrics in a unified framework. Key aspects and differences between existing concepts are highlighted in detail at each processing step. Fundamental properties and limitations of existing approaches are discussed and related to data protection techniques and principles. Moreover, scenarios and methods for the assessment of privacy-enhancing technologies for biometrics are presented. This paper is meant as a point of entry to the field of biometric data protection and is directed towards experienced researchers as well as non-experts.

Automated decision systems are increasingly used to make consequential decisions in people's lives. Due to the sensitivity of the manipulated data as well as the resulting decisions, several ethical concerns need to be addressed for the appropriate use of such technologies, in particular, fairness and privacy. Unlike previous work, which focused on centralized differential privacy (DP) or local DP (LDP) for a single sensitive attribute, in this paper, we examine the impact of LDP in the presence of several sensitive attributes (i.e., multi-dimensional data) on fairness. Detailed empirical analysis on synthetic and benchmark datasets revealed very relevant observations. In particular, (1) multi-dimensional LDP is an efficient approach to reduce disparity, (2) the multi-dimensional approach of LDP (independent vs. combined) matters only at low privacy guarantees, and (3) the outcome Y distribution has an important effect on which group is more sensitive to the obfuscation. Last, we summarize our findings in the form of recommendations to guide practitioners in adopting effective privacy-preserving practices while maintaining fairness and utility in ML applications.

A core challenge for autonomous LLM agents in collaborative settings is balancing robust privacy understanding and preservation alongside task efficacy. Existing privacy benchmarks only focus on simplistic, single-turn interactions where private information can be trivially omitted without affecting task outcomes. In this paper, we introduce MAGPIE (Multi-AGent contextual PrIvacy Evaluation), a novel benchmark of 200 high-stakes tasks designed to evaluate privacy understanding and preservation in multi-agent collaborative, non-adversarial scenarios. MAGPIE integrates private information as essential for task resolution, forcing agents to balance effective collaboration with strategic information control. Our evaluation reveals that state-of-the-art agents, including GPT-5 and Gemini 2.5-Pro, exhibit significant privacy leakage, with Gemini 2.5-Pro leaking up to 50.7% and GPT-5 up to 35.1% of the sensitive information even when explicitly instructed not to. Moreover, these agents struggle to achieve consensus or task completion and often resort to undesirable behaviors such as manipulation and power-seeking (e.g., Gemini 2.5-Pro demonstrating manipulation in 38.2% of the cases). These findings underscore that current LLM agents lack robust privacy understanding and are not yet adequately aligned to simultaneously preserve privacy and maintain effective collaboration in complex environments.

As we shift more of our lives into the virtual domain, the volume of data shared on the web keeps increasing and presents a threat to our privacy. This works contributes to the understanding of privacy implications of such data sharing by analysing how well people are recognisable in social media data. To facilitate a systematic study we define a number of scenarios considering factors such as how many heads of a person are tagged and if those heads are obfuscated or not. We propose a robust person recognition system that can handle large variations in pose and clothing, and can be trained with few training samples. Our results indicate that a handful of images is enough to threaten users' privacy, even in the presence of obfuscation. We show detailed experimental results, and discuss their implications.

Self-disclosure, while being common and rewarding in social media interaction, also poses privacy risks. In this paper, we take the initiative to protect the user-side privacy associated with online self-disclosure through identification and abstraction. We develop a taxonomy of 19 self-disclosure categories, and curate a large corpus consisting of 4.8K annotated disclosure spans. We then fine-tune a language model for identification, achieving over 75% in Token F_1. We further conduct a HCI user study, with 82\% of participants viewing the model positively, highlighting its real world applicability. Motivated by the user feedback, we introduce the task of self-disclosure abstraction. We experiment with both one-span abstraction and three-span abstraction settings, and explore multiple fine-tuning strategies. Our best model can generate diverse abstractions that moderately reduce privacy risks while maintaining high utility according to human evaluation.

The growing use of voice user interfaces has led to a surge in the collection and storage of speech data. While data collection allows for the development of efficient tools powering most speech services, it also poses serious privacy issues for users as centralized storage makes private personal speech data vulnerable to cyber threats. With the increasing use of voice-based digital assistants like Amazon's Alexa, Google's Home, and Apple's Siri, and with the increasing ease with which personal speech data can be collected, the risk of malicious use of voice-cloning and speaker/gender/pathological/etc. recognition has increased. This thesis proposes solutions for anonymizing speech and evaluating the degree of the anonymization. In this work, anonymization refers to making personal speech data unlinkable to an identity while maintaining the usefulness (utility) of the speech signal (e.g., access to linguistic content). We start by identifying several challenges that evaluation protocols need to consider to evaluate the degree of privacy protection properly. We clarify how anonymization systems must be configured for evaluation purposes and highlight that many practical deployment configurations do not permit privacy evaluation. Furthermore, we study and examine the most common voice conversion-based anonymization system and identify its weak points before suggesting new methods to overcome some limitations. We isolate all components of the anonymization system to evaluate the degree of speaker PPI associated with each of them. Then, we propose several transformation methods for each component to reduce as much as possible speaker PPI while maintaining utility. We promote anonymization algorithms based on quantization-based transformation as an alternative to the most-used and well-known noise-based approach. Finally, we endeavor a new attack method to invert anonymization.

A privacy policy is a document that states how a company intends to handle and manage their customers' personal data. One of the problems that arises with these privacy policies is that their content might violate data privacy regulations. Because of the enormous number of privacy policies that exist, the only realistic way to check for legal inconsistencies in all of them is through an automated method. In this work, we use Natural Language Inference (NLI) techniques to compare privacy regulations against sections of privacy policies from a selection of large companies. Our NLI model uses pre-trained embeddings, along with BiLSTM in its attention mechanism. We tried two versions of our model: one that was trained on the Stanford Natural Language Inference (SNLI) and the second on the Multi-Genre Natural Language Inference (MNLI) dataset. We found that our test accuracy was higher on our model trained on the SNLI, but when actually doing NLI tasks on real world privacy policies, the model trained on MNLI generalized and performed much better.

Vulnerabilities in open-source software can cause cascading effects in the modern digital ecosystem. It is especially worrying if these vulnerabilities repeat across many projects, as once the adversaries find one of them, they can scale up the attack very easily. Unfortunately, since developers frequently reuse code from their own or external code resources, some nearly identical vulnerabilities exist across many open-source projects. We conducted a study to examine the prevalence of a particular vulnerable code pattern that enables path traversal attacks (CWE-22) across open-source GitHub projects. To handle this study at the GitHub scale, we developed an automated pipeline that scans GitHub for the targeted vulnerable pattern, confirms the vulnerability by first running a static analysis and then exploiting the vulnerability in the context of the studied project, assesses its impact by calculating the CVSS score, generates a patch using GPT-4, and reports the vulnerability to the maintainers. Using our pipeline, we identified 1,756 vulnerable open-source projects, some of which are very influential. For many of the affected projects, the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score higher than 9.0), as it can be exploited remotely without any privileges and critically impact the confidentiality and availability of the system. We have responsibly disclosed the vulnerability to the maintainers, and 14\% of the reported vulnerabilities have been remediated. We also investigated the root causes of the vulnerable code pattern and assessed the side effects of the large number of copies of this vulnerable pattern that seem to have poisoned several popular LLMs. Our study highlights the urgent need to help secure the open-source ecosystem by leveraging scalable automated vulnerability management solutions and raising awareness among developers.

Machine learning techniques based on neural networks are achieving remarkable results in a wide variety of domains. Often, the training of models requires large, representative datasets, which may be crowdsourced and contain sensitive information. The models should not expose private information in these datasets. Addressing this goal, we develop new algorithmic techniques for learning and a refined analysis of privacy costs within the framework of differential privacy. Our implementation and experiments demonstrate that we can train deep neural networks with non-convex objectives, under a modest privacy budget, and at a manageable cost in software complexity, training efficiency, and model quality.

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence- or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10times more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse natural language processing tasks, but their tendency to memorize training data poses significant privacy risks, particularly during fine-tuning processes. This paper presents a comprehensive empirical analysis of data memorization in fine-tuned LLMs and introduces a novel multi-layered privacy protection framework. Through controlled experiments on modern LLM architectures including GPT-2, Phi-3, and Gemma-2, we demonstrate that fine-tuning with repeated sensitive data increases privacy leakage rates from baseline levels of 0-5% to 60-75%, representing a 64.2% average increase across tested models. We propose and rigorously evaluate four complementary privacy protection methods: semantic data deduplication, differential privacy during generation, entropy-based filtering, and pattern-based content filtering. Our experimental results show that these techniques can reduce data leakage to 0% while maintaining 94.7% of original model utility.

Machine learning models can leak private information about their training data. The standard methods to measure this privacy risk, based on membership inference attacks (MIAs), only check if a given data point exactly matches a training point, neglecting the potential of similar or partially overlapping memorized data revealing the same private information. To address this issue, we introduce the class of range membership inference attacks (RaMIAs), testing if the model was trained on any data in a specified range (defined based on the semantics of privacy). We formulate the RaMIAs game and design a principled statistical test for its composite hypotheses. We show that RaMIAs can capture privacy loss more accurately and comprehensively than MIAs on various types of data, such as tabular, image, and language. RaMIA paves the way for more comprehensive and meaningful privacy auditing of machine learning algorithms.

Language models (LMs) have shown outstanding performance in text summarization including sensitive domains such as medicine and law. In these settings, it is important that personally identifying information (PII) included in the source document should not leak in the summary. Prior efforts have mostly focused on studying how LMs may inadvertently elicit PII from training data. However, to what extent LMs can provide privacy-preserving summaries given a non-private source document remains under-explored. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive study across two closed- and three open-weight LMs of different sizes and families. We experiment with prompting and fine-tuning strategies for privacy-preservation across a range of summarization datasets across three domains. Our extensive quantitative and qualitative analysis including human evaluation shows that LMs often cannot prevent PII leakage on their summaries and that current widely-used metrics cannot capture context dependent privacy risks.

LLM-powered AI agents are an emerging frontier with tremendous potential to increase human productivity. However, empowering AI agents to take action on their user's behalf in day-to-day tasks involves giving them access to potentially sensitive and private information, which leads to a possible risk of inadvertent privacy leakage when the agent malfunctions. In this work, we propose one way to address that potential risk, by training AI agents to better satisfy the privacy principle of data minimization. For the purposes of this benchmark, by "data minimization" we mean instances where private information is shared only when it is necessary to fulfill a specific task-relevant purpose. We develop a benchmark called AgentDAM to evaluate how well existing and future AI agents can limit processing of potentially private information that we designate "necessary" to fulfill the task. Our benchmark simulates realistic web interaction scenarios and is adaptable to all existing web navigation agents. We use AgentDAM to evaluate how well AI agents built on top of GPT-4, Llama-3 and Claude can limit processing of potentially private information when unnecessary, and show that these agents are often prone to inadvertent use of unnecessary sensitive information. We finally propose a prompting-based approach that reduces this.

With the rapid progress of large language models (LLMs), many downstream NLP tasks can be well solved given appropriate prompts. Though model developers and researchers work hard on dialog safety to avoid generating harmful content from LLMs, it is still challenging to steer AI-generated content (AIGC) for the human good. As powerful LLMs are devouring existing text data from various domains (e.g., GPT-3 is trained on 45TB texts), it is natural to doubt whether the private information is included in the training data and what privacy threats can these LLMs and their downstream applications bring. In this paper, we study the privacy threats from OpenAI's ChatGPT and the New Bing enhanced by ChatGPT and show that application-integrated LLMs may cause new privacy threats. To this end, we conduct extensive experiments to support our claims and discuss LLMs' privacy implications.

This paper aims to advance our understanding of how Visual Language Models (VLMs) handle privacy-sensitive information, a crucial concern as these technologies become integral to everyday life. To this end, we introduce a new benchmark PrivBench, which contains images from 8 sensitive categories such as passports, or fingerprints. We evaluate 10 state-of-the-art VLMs on this benchmark and observe a generally limited understanding of privacy, highlighting a significant area for model improvement. Based on this we introduce PrivTune, a new instruction-tuning dataset aimed at equipping VLMs with knowledge about visual privacy. By tuning two pretrained VLMs, TinyLLaVa and MiniGPT-v2, on this small dataset, we achieve strong gains in their ability to recognize sensitive content, outperforming even GPT4-V. At the same time, we show that privacy-tuning only minimally affects the VLMs performance on standard benchmarks such as VQA. Overall, this paper lays out a crucial challenge for making VLMs effective in handling real-world data safely and provides a simple recipe that takes the first step towards building privacy-aware VLMs.

Many datasets contain personally identifiable information, or PII, which poses privacy risks to individuals. PII masking is commonly used to redact personal information such as names, addresses, and phone numbers from text data. Most modern PII masking pipelines involve machine learning algorithms. However, these systems may vary in performance, such that individuals from particular demographic groups bear a higher risk for having their personal information exposed. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of three off-the-shelf PII masking systems on name detection and redaction. We generate data using names and templates from the customer service domain. We find that an open-source RoBERTa-based system shows fewer disparities than the commercial models we test. However, all systems demonstrate significant differences in error rate based on demographics. In particular, the highest error rates occurred for names associated with Black and Asian/Pacific Islander individuals.

The proliferation of LLM-based agents has led to increasing deployment of inter-agent collaboration for tasks like scheduling, negotiation, resource allocation etc. In such systems, privacy is critical, as agents often access proprietary tools and domain-specific databases requiring strict confidentiality. This paper examines whether LLM-based agents demonstrate an understanding of contextual privacy. And, if instructed, do these systems preserve inference time user privacy in non-adversarial multi-turn conversation. Existing benchmarks to evaluate contextual privacy in LLM-agents primarily assess single-turn, low-complexity tasks where private information can be easily excluded. We first present a benchmark - MAGPIE comprising 158 real-life high-stakes scenarios across 15 domains. These scenarios are designed such that complete exclusion of private data impedes task completion yet unrestricted information sharing could lead to substantial losses. We then evaluate the current state-of-the-art LLMs on (a) their understanding of contextually private data and (b) their ability to collaborate without violating user privacy. Empirical experiments demonstrate that current models, including GPT-4o and Claude-2.7-Sonnet, lack robust understanding of contextual privacy, misclassifying private data as shareable 25.2\% and 43.6\% of the time. In multi-turn conversations, these models disclose private information in 59.9\% and 50.5\% of cases even under explicit privacy instructions. Furthermore, multi-agent systems fail to complete tasks in 71\% of scenarios. These results underscore that current models are not aligned towards both contextual privacy preservation and collaborative task-solving.

The ubiquitous use of face recognition has sparked increasing privacy concerns, as unauthorized access to sensitive face images could compromise the information of individuals. This paper presents an in-depth study of the privacy protection of face images' visual information and against recovery. Drawing on the perceptual disparity between humans and models, we propose to conceal visual information by pruning human-perceivable low-frequency components. For impeding recovery, we first elucidate the seeming paradox between reducing model-exploitable information and retaining high recognition accuracy. Based on recent theoretical insights and our observation on model attention, we propose a solution to the dilemma, by advocating for the training and inference of recognition models on randomly selected frequency components. We distill our findings into a novel privacy-preserving face recognition method, PartialFace. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PartialFace effectively balances privacy protection goals and recognition accuracy. Code is available at: https://github.com/Tencent/TFace.

Current privacy research on large language models (LLMs) primarily focuses on the issue of extracting memorized training data. At the same time, models' inference capabilities have increased drastically. This raises the key question of whether current LLMs could violate individuals' privacy by inferring personal attributes from text given at inference time. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study on the capabilities of pretrained LLMs to infer personal attributes from text. We construct a dataset consisting of real Reddit profiles, and show that current LLMs can infer a wide range of personal attributes (e.g., location, income, sex), achieving up to 85% top-1 and 95.8% top-3 accuracy at a fraction of the cost (100times) and time (240times) required by humans. As people increasingly interact with LLM-powered chatbots across all aspects of life, we also explore the emerging threat of privacy-invasive chatbots trying to extract personal information through seemingly benign questions. Finally, we show that common mitigations, i.e., text anonymization and model alignment, are currently ineffective at protecting user privacy against LLM inference. Our findings highlight that current LLMs can infer personal data at a previously unattainable scale. In the absence of working defenses, we advocate for a broader discussion around LLM privacy implications beyond memorization, striving for a wider privacy protection.

Security of model parameters and user data is critical for Transformer-based services, such as ChatGPT. While recent strides in secure two-party protocols have successfully addressed security concerns in serving Transformer models, their adoption is practically infeasible due to the prohibitive cryptographic overheads involved. Drawing insights from our hands-on experience in developing two real-world Transformer-based services, we identify the inherent efficiency bottleneck in the two-party assumption. To overcome this limitation, we propose a novel three-party threat model. Within this framework, we design a semi-symmetric permutation-based protection scheme and present STIP, the first secure Transformer inference protocol without any inference accuracy loss. Experiments on representative Transformer models in real systems show that STIP has practical security and outperforms state-of-the-art secure two-party protocols in efficiency by millions of times.

In this study, we investigate the protection offered by federated learning algorithms against eavesdropping adversaries. In our model, the adversary is capable of intercepting model updates transmitted from clients to the server, enabling it to create its own estimate of the model. Unlike previous research, which predominantly focuses on safeguarding client data, our work shifts attention protecting the client model itself. Through a theoretical analysis, we examine how various factors, such as the probability of client selection, the structure of local objective functions, global aggregation at the server, and the eavesdropper's capabilities, impact the overall level of protection. We further validate our findings through numerical experiments, assessing the protection by evaluating the model accuracy achieved by the adversary. Finally, we compare our results with methods based on differential privacy, underscoring their limitations in this specific context.

The integration of machine learning (ML) in numerous critical applications introduces a range of privacy concerns for individuals who provide their datasets for model training. One such privacy risk is Membership Inference (MI), in which an attacker seeks to determine whether a particular data sample was included in the training dataset of a model. Current state-of-the-art MI attacks capitalize on access to the model's predicted confidence scores to successfully perform membership inference, and employ data poisoning to further enhance their effectiveness. In this work, we focus on the less explored and more realistic label-only setting, where the model provides only the predicted label on a queried sample. We show that existing label-only MI attacks are ineffective at inferring membership in the low False Positive Rate (FPR) regime. To address this challenge, we propose a new attack Chameleon that leverages a novel adaptive data poisoning strategy and an efficient query selection method to achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing label-only attacks, especially at low FPRs.

Federated Learning (FL) systems are gaining popularity as a solution to training Machine Learning (ML) models from large-scale user data collected on personal devices (e.g., smartphones) without their raw data leaving the device. At the core of FL is a network of anonymous user devices sharing training information (model parameter updates) computed locally on personal data. However, the type and degree to which user-specific information is encoded in the model updates is poorly understood. In this paper, we identify model updates encode subtle variations in which users capture and generate data. The variations provide a strong statistical signal, allowing an adversary to effectively deanonymize participating devices using a limited set of auxiliary data. We analyze resulting deanonymization attacks on diverse tasks on real-world (anonymized) user-generated data across a range of closed- and open-world scenarios. We study various strategies to mitigate the risks of deanonymization. As random perturbation methods do not offer convincing operating points, we propose data-augmentation strategies which introduces adversarial biases in device data and thereby, offer substantial protection against deanonymization threats with little effect on utility.

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

In the absence of data protection measures, software applications lead to privacy breaches, posing threats to end-users and software organisations. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) are technical measures that protect personal data, thus minimising such privacy breaches. However, for software applications to deliver data protection using PETs, software developers should actively and correctly incorporate PETs into the software they develop. Therefore, to uncover ways to encourage and support developers to embed PETs into software, this Systematic Literature Review (SLR) analyses 39 empirical studies on developers' privacy practices. It reports the usage of six PETs in software application scenarios. Then, it discusses challenges developers face when integrating PETs into software, ranging from intrinsic challenges, such as the unawareness of PETs, to extrinsic challenges, such as the increased development cost. Next, the SLR presents the existing solutions to address these challenges, along with the limitations of the solutions. Further, it outlines future research avenues to better understand PETs from a developer perspective and minimise the challenges developers face when incorporating PETs into software.

Are Large Pre-Trained Language Models Leaking Your Personal Information? In this paper, we analyze whether Pre-Trained Language Models (PLMs) are prone to leaking personal information. Specifically, we query PLMs for email addresses with contexts of the email address or prompts containing the owner's name. We find that PLMs do leak personal information due to memorization. However, since the models are weak at association, the risk of specific personal information being extracted by attackers is low. We hope this work could help the community to better understand the privacy risk of PLMs and bring new insights to make PLMs safe.

For many differentially private algorithms, such as the prominent noisy stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD), the analysis needed to bound the privacy leakage of a single training run is well understood. However, few studies have reasoned about the privacy leakage resulting from the multiple training runs needed to fine tune the value of the training algorithm's hyperparameters. In this work, we first illustrate how simply setting hyperparameters based on non-private training runs can leak private information. Motivated by this observation, we then provide privacy guarantees for hyperparameter search procedures within the framework of Renyi Differential Privacy. Our results improve and extend the work of Liu and Talwar (STOC 2019). Our analysis supports our previous observation that tuning hyperparameters does indeed leak private information, but we prove that, under certain assumptions, this leakage is modest, as long as each candidate training run needed to select hyperparameters is itself differentially private.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

Language models (LMs) risk inadvertently memorizing and divulging sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII) seen in training data, causing privacy concerns. Current approaches to address this issue involve costly dataset scrubbing, or model filtering through unlearning and model editing, which can be bypassed through extraction attacks. We propose REVS, a novel non-gradient-based method for unlearning sensitive information from LMs. REVS identifies and modifies a small subset of neurons relevant for constituent tokens that form sensitive information. To adequately evaluate our method on truly sensitive information, we curate three datasets: email and URL datasets naturally memorized by the models, and a synthetic social security number dataset that we tune the models to memorize. Compared to other methods, REVS demonstrates superior performance in unlearning sensitive information and robustness to extraction attacks, while retaining underlying model integrity.

Agencies, such as the U.S. Census Bureau, release data sets and statistics about groups of individuals that are used as input to a number of critical decision processes. To conform to privacy and confidentiality requirements, these agencies are often required to release privacy-preserving versions of the data. This paper studies the release of differentially private data sets and analyzes their impact on some critical resource allocation tasks under a fairness perspective. {The paper shows that, when the decisions take as input differentially private data}, the noise added to achieve privacy disproportionately impacts some groups over others. The paper analyzes the reasons for these disproportionate impacts and proposes guidelines to mitigate these effects. The proposed approaches are evaluated on critical decision problems that use differentially private census data.

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

The increasing use of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in modern software engineering, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation, has transformed professional software development by boosting productivity and automating development processes. This adoption, however, has highlighted a significant issue: the introduction of security vulnerabilities into the code. These vulnerabilities result, e.g., from flaws in the training data that propagate into the generated code, creating challenges in disclosing them. Traditional vulnerability handling processes often involve extensive manual review. Applying such traditional processes to AI-generated code is challenging. AI-generated code may include several vulnerabilities, possibly in slightly different forms as developers might not build on already implemented code but prompt similar tasks. In this work, we explore the current state of LLM-based approaches for vulnerability handling, focusing on approaches for vulnerability detection, localization, and repair. We provide an overview of recent progress in this area and highlight open challenges that must be addressed in order to establish a reliable and scalable vulnerability handling process of AI-generated code.

Synthetic data created by differentially private (DP) generative models is increasingly used in real-world settings. In this context, PATE-GAN has emerged as one of the most popular algorithms, combining Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) with the private training approach of PATE (Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles). In this paper, we set out to reproduce the utility evaluation from the original PATE-GAN paper, compare available implementations, and conduct a privacy audit. More precisely, we analyze and benchmark six open-source PATE-GAN implementations, including three by (a subset of) the original authors. First, we shed light on architecture deviations and empirically demonstrate that none reproduce the utility performance reported in the original paper. We then present an in-depth privacy evaluation, which includes DP auditing, and show that all implementations leak more privacy than intended. Furthermore, we uncover 19 privacy violations and 5 other bugs in these six open-source implementations. Lastly, our codebase is available from: https://github.com/spalabucr/pategan-audit.

Deep learning (DL) models have become increasingly popular in identifying software vulnerabilities. Prior studies found that vulnerabilities across different vulnerable programs may exhibit similar vulnerable scopes, implicitly forming discernible vulnerability patterns that can be learned by DL models through supervised training. However, vulnerable scopes still manifest in various spatial locations and formats within a program, posing challenges for models to accurately identify vulnerable statements. Despite this challenge, state-of-the-art vulnerability detection approaches fail to exploit the vulnerability patterns that arise in vulnerable programs. To take full advantage of vulnerability patterns and unleash the ability of DL models, we propose a novel vulnerability-matching approach in this paper, drawing inspiration from program analysis tools that locate vulnerabilities based on pre-defined patterns. Specifically, a vulnerability codebook is learned, which consists of quantized vectors representing various vulnerability patterns. During inference, the codebook is iterated to match all learned patterns and predict the presence of potential vulnerabilities within a given program. Our approach was extensively evaluated on a real-world dataset comprising more than 188,000 C/C++ functions. The evaluation results show that our approach achieves an F1-score of 94% (6% higher than the previous best) and 82% (19% higher than the previous best) for function and statement-level vulnerability identification, respectively. These substantial enhancements highlight the effectiveness of our approach to identifying vulnerabilities. The training code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/optimatch/optimatch.

Modern computer vision services often require users to share raw feature descriptors with an untrusted server. This presents an inherent privacy risk, as raw descriptors may be used to recover the source images from which they were extracted. To address this issue, researchers recently proposed privatizing image features by embedding them within an affine subspace containing the original feature as well as adversarial feature samples. In this paper, we propose two novel inversion attacks to show that it is possible to (approximately) recover the original image features from these embeddings, allowing us to recover privacy-critical image content. In light of such successes and the lack of theoretical privacy guarantees afforded by existing visual privacy methods, we further propose the first method to privatize image features via local differential privacy, which, unlike prior approaches, provides a guaranteed bound for privacy leakage regardless of the strength of the attacks. In addition, our method yields strong performance in visual localization as a downstream task while enjoying the privacy guarantee.

Machine Learning models increasingly face data integrity challenges due to the use of large-scale training datasets drawn from the Internet. We study what model developers can do if they detect that some data was manipulated or incorrect. Such manipulated data can cause adverse effects including vulnerability to backdoored samples, systemic biases, and reduced accuracy on certain input domains. Realistically, all manipulated training samples cannot be identified, and only a small, representative subset of the affected data can be flagged. We formalize Corrective Machine Unlearning as the problem of mitigating the impact of data affected by unknown manipulations on a trained model, only having identified a subset of the corrupted data. We demonstrate that the problem of corrective unlearning has significantly different requirements from traditional privacy-oriented unlearning. We find most existing unlearning methods, including retraining-from-scratch without the deletion set, require most of the manipulated data to be identified for effective corrective unlearning. However, one approach, Selective Synaptic Dampening, achieves limited success, unlearning adverse effects with just a small portion of the manipulated samples in our setting, which shows encouraging signs for future progress. We hope our work spurs research towards developing better methods for corrective unlearning and offers practitioners a new strategy to handle data integrity challenges arising from web-scale training. Code is available at https://github.com/drimpossible/corrective-unlearning-bench.

Because learning sometimes involves sensitive data, machine learning algorithms have been extended to offer privacy for training data. In practice, this has been mostly an afterthought, with privacy-preserving models obtained by re-running training with a different optimizer, but using the model architectures that already performed well in a non-privacy-preserving setting. This approach leads to less than ideal privacy/utility tradeoffs, as we show here. Instead, we propose that model architectures are chosen ab initio explicitly for privacy-preserving training. To provide guarantees under the gold standard of differential privacy, one must bound as strictly as possible how individual training points can possibly affect model updates. In this paper, we are the first to observe that the choice of activation function is central to bounding the sensitivity of privacy-preserving deep learning. We demonstrate analytically and experimentally how a general family of bounded activation functions, the tempered sigmoids, consistently outperform unbounded activation functions like ReLU. Using this paradigm, we achieve new state-of-the-art accuracy on MNIST, FashionMNIST, and CIFAR10 without any modification of the learning procedure fundamentals or differential privacy analysis.

Recent advances in synthetic data generation (SDG) have been hailed as a solution to the difficult problem of sharing sensitive data while protecting privacy. SDG aims to learn statistical properties of real data in order to generate "artificial" data that are structurally and statistically similar to sensitive data. However, prior research suggests that inference attacks on synthetic data can undermine privacy, but only for specific outlier records. In this work, we introduce a new attribute inference attack against synthetic data. The attack is based on linear reconstruction methods for aggregate statistics, which target all records in the dataset, not only outliers. We evaluate our attack on state-of-the-art SDG algorithms, including Probabilistic Graphical Models, Generative Adversarial Networks, and recent differentially private SDG mechanisms. By defining a formal privacy game, we show that our attack can be highly accurate even on arbitrary records, and that this is the result of individual information leakage (as opposed to population-level inference). We then systematically evaluate the tradeoff between protecting privacy and preserving statistical utility. Our findings suggest that current SDG methods cannot consistently provide sufficient privacy protection against inference attacks while retaining reasonable utility. The best method evaluated, a differentially private SDG mechanism, can provide both protection against inference attacks and reasonable utility, but only in very specific settings. Lastly, we show that releasing a larger number of synthetic records can improve utility but at the cost of making attacks far more effective.

High-quality datasets of real-world vulnerabilities are enormously valuable for downstream research in software security, but existing datasets are typically small, require extensive manual effort to update, and are missing crucial features that such research needs. In this paper, we introduce ARVO: an Atlas of Reproducible Vulnerabilities in Open-source software. By sourcing vulnerabilities from C/C++ projects that Google's OSS-Fuzz discovered and implementing a reliable re-compilation system, we successfully reproduce more than 5,000 memory vulnerabilities across over 250 projects, each with a triggering input, the canonical developer-written patch for fixing the vulnerability, and the ability to automatically rebuild the project from source and run it at its vulnerable and patched revisions. Moreover, our dataset can be automatically updated as OSS-Fuzz finds new vulnerabilities, allowing it to grow over time. We provide a thorough characterization of the ARVO dataset, show that it can locate fixes more accurately than Google's own OSV reproduction effort, and demonstrate its value for future research through two case studies: firstly evaluating real-world LLM-based vulnerability repair, and secondly identifying over 300 falsely patched (still-active) zero-day vulnerabilities from projects improperly labeled by OSS-Fuzz.