Daily Papers

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

High-fidelity social simulation is pivotal for addressing complex Web societal challenges, yet it demands agents capable of authentically replicating the dynamic spectrum of human interaction. Current LLM-based multi-agent frameworks, however, predominantly adhere to static interaction topologies, failing to capture the fluid oscillation between cooperative knowledge synthesis and competitive critical reasoning seen in real-world scenarios. This rigidity often leads to unrealistic ``groupthink'' or unproductive deadlocks, undermining the credibility of simulations for decision support. To bridge this gap, we propose BEACOF, a belief-driven adaptive collaboration framework inspired by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). By modeling social interaction as a dynamic game of incomplete information, BEACOF rigorously addresses the circular dependency between collaboration type selection and capability estimation. Agents iteratively refine probabilistic beliefs about peer capabilities and autonomously modulate their collaboration strategy, thereby ensuring sequentially rational decisions under uncertainty. Validated across adversarial (judicial), open-ended (social) and mixed (medical) scenarios, BEACOF prevents coordination failures and fosters robust convergence toward high-quality solutions, demonstrating superior potential for reliable social simulation. Source codes and datasets are publicly released at: https://github.com/WUT-IDEA/BEACOF.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Large language models can shift human beliefs across high-stakes domains, but most persuasion studies rely on pre/post belief change. These endpoint measures identify whether persuasion occurred, yet miss where and how beliefs moved within a dialogue. We present PERSUASIONTRACE, a framework for studying persuasion in human-LLM interaction. Built on a web-based experimental platform, PERSUASIONTRACE contributes a tool for multi-turn persuasion studies and a process-level evaluation protocol: it records multi-turn belief reports from human or simulated targets of persuasion, annotates persuader turns with rhetorical dimensions (logos/pathos/ethos), and evaluates simulators by fidelity to real human belief dynamics. Using this framework, we find that human targets group into two clusters of multi-turn belief updates and exhibit susceptibility to rhetorical strategies, and that LLMs are persuasive across generic and personalized topics, text and audio modalities, and multi-turn interactions. Prior work has chiefly used vanilla-prompted LLMs to simulate human targets, but we show that these simulators fail to replicate human belief dynamics. We introduce a Bayesian-network simulated target that maintains an explicit latent belief state over time so each persuader message yields cognitively realistic belief updates. In human-likeness evaluation, our Bayesian target scores near a human reference (81 vs 80), while baseline LLM targets score substantially lower (64). PERSUASIONTRACE reframes persuasion evaluation from endpoint movement alone to process fidelity, providing a stronger basis for scientific analysis and safer optimization of persuasive systems.

This paper focuses on the task of hallucination detection, which aims to determine the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements. To address this problem, a popular class of methods utilize the LLM's self-consistencies in its beliefs in a set of logically related augmented statements generated by the LLM, which does not require external knowledge databases and can work with both white-box and black-box LLMs. However, in many existing approaches, the augmented statements tend to be very monotone and unstructured, which makes it difficult to integrate meaningful information from the LLM beliefs in these statements. Also, many methods work with the binarized version of the LLM's belief, instead of the continuous version, which significantly loses information. To overcome these limitations, in this paper, we propose Belief Tree Propagation (BTProp), a probabilistic framework for LLM hallucination detection. BTProp introduces a belief tree of logically related statements by recursively decomposing a parent statement into child statements with three decomposition strategies, and builds a hidden Markov tree model to integrate the LLM's belief scores in these statements in a principled way. Experiment results show that our method improves baselines by 3%-9% (evaluated by AUROC and AUC-PR) on multiple hallucination detection benchmarks. Code is available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/BTProp.

Reliable probability estimation is of crucial importance in many real-world applications where there is inherent (aleatoric) uncertainty. Probability-estimation models are trained on observed outcomes (e.g. whether it has rained or not, or whether a patient has died or not), because the ground-truth probabilities of the events of interest are typically unknown. The problem is therefore analogous to binary classification, with the difference that the objective is to estimate probabilities rather than predicting the specific outcome. This work investigates probability estimation from high-dimensional data using deep neural networks. There exist several methods to improve the probabilities generated by these models but they mostly focus on model (epistemic) uncertainty. For problems with inherent uncertainty, it is challenging to evaluate performance without access to ground-truth probabilities. To address this, we build a synthetic dataset to study and compare different computable metrics. We evaluate existing methods on the synthetic data as well as on three real-world probability estimation tasks, all of which involve inherent uncertainty: precipitation forecasting from radar images, predicting cancer patient survival from histopathology images, and predicting car crashes from dashcam videos. We also give a theoretical analysis of a model for high-dimensional probability estimation which reproduces several of the phenomena evinced in our experiments. Finally, we propose a new method for probability estimation using neural networks, which modifies the training process to promote output probabilities that are consistent with empirical probabilities computed from the data. The method outperforms existing approaches on most metrics on the simulated as well as real-world data.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Artificial intelligence commonly refers to the science and engineering of artificial systems that can carry out tasks generally associated with requiring aspects of human intelligence, such as playing games, translating languages, and driving cars. In recent years, there have been exciting advances in learning-based, data-driven approaches towards AI, and machine learning and deep learning have enabled computer systems to perceive the world in unprecedented ways. Reinforcement learning has enabled breakthroughs in complex games such as Go and challenging robotics tasks such as quadrupedal locomotion. A key aspect of intelligence is to not only make predictions, but reason about the uncertainty in these predictions, and to consider this uncertainty when making decisions. This is what this manuscript on "Probabilistic Artificial Intelligence" is about. The first part covers probabilistic approaches to machine learning. We discuss the differentiation between "epistemic" uncertainty due to lack of data and "aleatoric" uncertainty, which is irreducible and stems, e.g., from noisy observations and outcomes. We discuss concrete approaches towards probabilistic inference and modern approaches to efficient approximate inference. The second part of the manuscript is about taking uncertainty into account in sequential decision tasks. We consider active learning and Bayesian optimization -- approaches that collect data by proposing experiments that are informative for reducing the epistemic uncertainty. We then consider reinforcement learning and modern deep RL approaches that use neural network function approximation. We close by discussing modern approaches in model-based RL, which harness epistemic and aleatoric uncertainty to guide exploration, while also reasoning about safety.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

We define a probabilistic programming language for Gaussian random variables with a first-class exact conditioning construct. We give operational, denotational and equational semantics for this language, establishing convenient properties like exchangeability of conditions. Conditioning on equality of continuous random variables is nontrivial, as the exact observation may have probability zero; this is Borel's paradox. Using categorical formulations of conditional probability, we show that the good properties of our language are not particular to Gaussians, but can be derived from universal properties, thus generalizing to wider settings. We define the Cond construction, which internalizes conditioning as a morphism, providing general compositional semantics for probabilistic programming with exact conditioning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

The framework of reinforcement learning or optimal control provides a mathematical formalization of intelligent decision making that is powerful and broadly applicable. While the general form of the reinforcement learning problem enables effective reasoning about uncertainty, the connection between reinforcement learning and inference in probabilistic models is not immediately obvious. However, such a connection has considerable value when it comes to algorithm design: formalizing a problem as probabilistic inference in principle allows us to bring to bear a wide array of approximate inference tools, extend the model in flexible and powerful ways, and reason about compositionality and partial observability. In this article, we will discuss how a generalization of the reinforcement learning or optimal control problem, which is sometimes termed maximum entropy reinforcement learning, is equivalent to exact probabilistic inference in the case of deterministic dynamics, and variational inference in the case of stochastic dynamics. We will present a detailed derivation of this framework, overview prior work that has drawn on this and related ideas to propose new reinforcement learning and control algorithms, and describe perspectives on future research.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

Uncertainty quantification has received increasing attention in machine learning in the recent past. In particular, a distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty has been found useful in this regard. The latter refers to the learner's (lack of) knowledge and appears to be especially difficult to measure and quantify. In this paper, we analyse a recent proposal based on the idea of a second-order learner, which yields predictions in the form of distributions over probability distributions. While standard (first-order) learners can be trained to predict accurate probabilities, namely by minimising suitable loss functions on sample data, we show that loss minimisation does not work for second-order predictors: The loss functions proposed for inducing such predictors do not incentivise the learner to represent its epistemic uncertainty in a faithful way.

Predictive models often need to work with incomplete information in real-world tasks. Consequently, they must provide reliable probability or confidence estimation, especially in large-scale decision-making and planning tasks. Current large language models (LLMs) are insufficient for accurate estimations, but they can generate relevant factors that may affect the probabilities, produce coarse-grained probabilities when the information is more complete, and help determine which factors are relevant to specific downstream contexts. In this paper, we make use of these capabilities of LLMs to provide a significantly more accurate probabilistic estimation. We propose BIRD, a novel probabilistic inference framework that aligns a Bayesian network with LLM abductions and then estimates more accurate probabilities in a deduction step. We show BIRD provides reliable probability estimations that are 30% better than those provided directly by LLM baselines. These estimates further contribute to better and more trustworthy decision making.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

Epistemic Uncertainty is a measure of the lack of knowledge of a learner which diminishes with more evidence. While existing work focuses on using the variance of the Bayesian posterior due to parameter uncertainty as a measure of epistemic uncertainty, we argue that this does not capture the part of lack of knowledge induced by model misspecification. We discuss how the excess risk, which is the gap between the generalization error of a predictor and the Bayes predictor, is a sound measure of epistemic uncertainty which captures the effect of model misspecification. We thus propose a principled framework for directly estimating the excess risk by learning a secondary predictor for the generalization error and subtracting an estimate of aleatoric uncertainty, i.e., intrinsic unpredictability. We discuss the merits of this novel measure of epistemic uncertainty, and highlight how it differs from variance-based measures of epistemic uncertainty and addresses its major pitfall. Our framework, Direct Epistemic Uncertainty Prediction (DEUP) is particularly interesting in interactive learning environments, where the learner is allowed to acquire novel examples in each round. Through a wide set of experiments, we illustrate how existing methods in sequential model optimization can be improved with epistemic uncertainty estimates from DEUP, and how DEUP can be used to drive exploration in reinforcement learning. We also evaluate the quality of uncertainty estimates from DEUP for probabilistic image classification and predicting synergies of drug combinations.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Probabilistic model checking is a technique for formal automated reasoning about software or hardware systems that operate in the context of uncertainty or stochasticity. It builds upon ideas and techniques from a diverse range of fields, from logic, automata and graph theory, to optimisation, numerical methods and control. In recent years, probabilistic model checking has also been extended to integrate ideas from game theory, notably using models such as stochastic games and solution concepts such as equilibria, to formally verify the interaction of multiple rational agents with distinct objectives. This provides a means to reason flexibly about agents acting in either an adversarial or a collaborative fashion, and opens up opportunities to tackle new problems within, for example, artificial intelligence, robotics and autonomous systems. In this paper, we summarise some of the advances in this area, and highlight applications for which they have already been used. We discuss how the strengths of probabilistic model checking apply, or have the potential to apply, to the multi-agent setting and outline some of the key challenges required to make further progress in this field.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Language models (LM) are capable of remarkably complex linguistic tasks; however, numerical reasoning is an area in which they frequently struggle. An important but rarely evaluated form of reasoning is understanding probability distributions. In this paper, we focus on evaluating the probabilistic reasoning capabilities of LMs using idealized and real-world statistical distributions. We perform a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art LMs on three tasks: estimating percentiles, drawing samples, and calculating probabilities. We evaluate three ways to provide context to LMs 1) anchoring examples from within a distribution or family of distributions, 2) real-world context, 3) summary statistics on which to base a Normal approximation. Models can make inferences about distributions, and can be further aided by the incorporation of real-world context, example shots and simplified assumptions, even if these assumptions are incorrect or misspecified. To conduct this work, we developed a comprehensive benchmark distribution dataset with associated question-answer pairs that we will release publicly.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

Probabilistic forecasting estimates the likelihood of uncertain future events. To improve LLM forecasting, existing methods typically learn from binary outcomes to output verbalized forecasts. However, while aggregated human forecasts contain rich information in both the crowd probability estimate and the degree of agreement among forecasters, how to utilize these signals remains underexplored. To address this, we propose the Beta-Bernoulli Calibrator (BBC), which converts an initial point estimate forecast from any model into a distribution over event likelihood, using supervision from both binary outcomes and human forecasts. BBC models event likelihood p sim Beta(α, β) and outcome y sim Bernoulli(p), with the mean as the calibrated point forecast and the variance as the epistemic uncertainty. Our results show that BBC generally provides better calibrated and more accurate forecasts than both traditional post-hoc calibration methods and models fine-tuned specifically for forecasting, while remaining lightweight and having good generalization. We also show that the epistemic uncertainty captured by BBC is a more reliable predictor of forecasting error than verbalized confidence.

Probabilistic circuits (PCs) are models that allow exact and tractable probabilistic inference. In contrast to neural networks, they are often assumed to be well-calibrated and robust to out-of-distribution (OOD) data. In this paper, we show that PCs are in fact not robust to OOD data, i.e., they don't know what they don't know. We then show how this challenge can be overcome by model uncertainty quantification. To this end, we propose tractable dropout inference (TDI), an inference procedure to estimate uncertainty by deriving an analytical solution to Monte Carlo dropout (MCD) through variance propagation. Unlike MCD in neural networks, which comes at the cost of multiple network evaluations, TDI provides tractable sampling-free uncertainty estimates in a single forward pass. TDI improves the robustness of PCs to distribution shift and OOD data, demonstrated through a series of experiments evaluating the classification confidence and uncertainty estimates on real-world data.

We present a state-of-the-art model for fine-grained probability estimation of propositions conditioned on context. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities, particularly on well-defined tasks with complete information. However, LLMs continue to struggle with making accurate and well-calibrated probabilistic predictions under uncertainty or partial information. While incorporating uncertainty into model predictions often boosts performance, obtaining reliable estimates of that uncertainty remains understudied. In particular, LLM probability estimates tend to be coarse and biased towards more frequent numbers. Through a combination of human and synthetic data creation and assessment, scaling to larger models, and better supervision, we propose a set of strong and precise probability estimation models. We conduct systematic evaluations across tasks that rely on conditional probability estimation and show that our approach consistently outperforms existing fine-tuned and prompting-based methods by a large margin.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

Multi-class classification methods that produce sets of probabilistic classifiers, such as ensemble learning methods, are able to model aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. Aleatoric uncertainty is then typically quantified via the Bayes error, and epistemic uncertainty via the size of the set. In this paper, we extend the notion of calibration, which is commonly used to evaluate the validity of the aleatoric uncertainty representation of a single probabilistic classifier, to assess the validity of an epistemic uncertainty representation obtained by sets of probabilistic classifiers. Broadly speaking, we call a set of probabilistic classifiers calibrated if one can find a calibrated convex combination of these classifiers. To evaluate this notion of calibration, we propose a novel nonparametric calibration test that generalizes an existing test for single probabilistic classifiers to the case of sets of probabilistic classifiers. Making use of this test, we empirically show that ensembles of deep neural networks are often not well calibrated.

Probabilistic Circuits (PCs) are a general and unified computational framework for tractable probabilistic models that support efficient computation of various inference tasks (e.g., computing marginal probabilities). Towards enabling such reasoning capabilities in complex real-world tasks, Liu et al. (2022) propose to distill knowledge (through latent variable assignments) from less tractable but more expressive deep generative models. However, it is still unclear what factors make this distillation work well. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically discover that the performance of a PC can exceed that of its teacher model. Therefore, instead of performing distillation from the most expressive deep generative model, we study what properties the teacher model and the PC should have in order to achieve good distillation performance. This leads to a generic algorithmic improvement as well as other data-type-specific ones over the existing latent variable distillation pipeline. Empirically, we outperform SoTA TPMs by a large margin on challenging image modeling benchmarks. In particular, on ImageNet32, PCs achieve 4.06 bits-per-dimension, which is only 0.34 behind variational diffusion models (Kingma et al., 2021).

Popular approaches for quantifying predictive uncertainty in deep neural networks often involve distributions over weights or multiple models, for instance via Markov Chain sampling, ensembling, or Monte Carlo dropout. These techniques usually incur overhead by having to train multiple model instances or do not produce very diverse predictions. This comprehensive and extensive survey aims to familiarize the reader with an alternative class of models based on the concept of Evidential Deep Learning: For unfamiliar data, they aim to admit "what they don't know", and fall back onto a prior belief. Furthermore, they allow uncertainty estimation in a single model and forward pass by parameterizing distributions over distributions. This survey recapitulates existing works, focusing on the implementation in a classification setting, before surveying the application of the same paradigm to regression. We also reflect on the strengths and weaknesses compared to other existing methods and provide the most fundamental derivations using a unified notation to aid future research.

Real-world decision-making, from tax compliance assessment to medical diagnosis, requires aggregating multiple noisy and potentially contradictory evidence sources. Existing approaches either lack explicit uncertainty quantification (neural aggregation methods) or rely on manually engineered discrete predicates (probabilistic logic frameworks), limiting scalability to unstructured data. We introduce Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a framework that transforms Variational Autoencoder (VAE) latent posteriors into soft likelihood factors for Sum-Product Network (SPN) inference, enabling tractable probabilistic reasoning over unstructured evidence while preserving calibrated uncertainty estimates. We instantiate LPF as LPF-SPN (structured factor-based inference) and LPF-Learned (end-to-end learned aggregation), enabling a principled comparison between explicit probabilistic reasoning and learned aggregation under a shared uncertainty representation. Across eight domains (seven synthetic and the FEVER benchmark), LPF-SPN achieves high accuracy (up to 97.8%), low calibration error (ECE 1.4%), and strong probabilistic fit, substantially outperforming evidential deep learning, LLMs and graph-based baselines over 15 random seeds. Contributions: (1) A framework bridging latent uncertainty representations with structured probabilistic reasoning. (2) Dual architectures enabling controlled comparison of reasoning paradigms. (3) Reproducible training methodology with seed selection. (4) Evaluation against EDL, BERT, R-GCN, and large language model baselines. (5) Cross-domain validation. (6) Formal guarantees in a companion paper.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

We propose a stronger formulation of RL on top of RWKV-style recurrent sequence models, in which the fixed-size recurrent state is explicitly interpreted as a belief state rather than an opaque hidden vector. Instead of conditioning policy and value on a single summary h_t, we maintain a compact uncertainty-aware state b_t = (μ_t, Σ_t) derived from RWKV-style recurrent statistics and let control depend on both memory and uncertainty. This design targets a key weakness of plain fixed-state policies in partially observed settings: they may store evidence, but not necessarily confidence. We present the method, a theoretical program, and a pilot RL experiment with hidden episode-level observation noise together with a test-time noise sweep. The pilot shows that belief-state policies nearly match the best recurrent baseline overall while slightly improving return on the hardest in-distribution regime and under a held-out noise shift. Additional ablations show that this simple belief readout is currently stronger than two more structured extensions, namely gated memory control and privileged belief targets, underscoring the need for richer benchmarks.

As Generative AI becomes a key component in physics education, a significant ethical challenge has emerged: the tendency of students to anthropomorphize Large Language Models (LLMs), treating them as authoritative "oracles" that retrieve fixed facts from an internal database. However, LLMs operate fundamentally as probabilistic engines. This paper describes the design and implementation of a didactic activity, a reduced version of the "20 Questions" game, aimed at making this stochastic nature directly observable. Unlike a human player who fixes a target object at the start of the game, students discover that the model generates answers based solely on local coherence with the interaction history. By utilizing functionalities such as re-sampling and history rewinding, students act as experimenters, observing how identical interaction histories can yield diverging narrative paths. We discuss how mapping these behaviors to familiar physics concepts provides the epistemic scaffolding necessary to promote informed skepticism, framing the verification of AI outputs not merely as a compliance rule, but as a technical necessity derived from the system's probabilistic nature.

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

Bayesian inference provides principled uncertainty quantification but is often limited by challenges of prior elicitation, likelihood misspecification, and computational burden. The martingale posterior (MGP, Fong et al., 2023) offers an alternative, replacing prior-likelihood elicitation with a predictive rule - namely, a sequence of one-step-ahead predictive distributions - for forward data generation. The utility of MGPs depends on the choice of predictive rule, yet the literature has offered few compelling examples. Foundation transformers are well-suited here, as their autoregressive generation mirrors this forward simulation and their general-purpose design enables rich predictive modeling. We introduce TabMGP, an MGP built on TabPFN, a transformer foundation model that is currently state-of-the-art for tabular data. TabMGP produces credible sets with near-nominal coverage and often outperforms both existing MGP constructions and standard Bayes.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

We introduce Probabilistic Dependent Type Systems (PDTS) via a functional language based on a subsystem of intuitionistic type theory including dependent sums and products, which is expanded to include stochastic functions. We provide a sampling-based semantics for the language based on non-deterministic beta reduction. Further, we derive a probabilistic logic from the PDTS introduced as a direct result of the Curry-Howard isomorphism. The probabilistic logic derived is shown to provide a universal representation for finite discrete distributions.

Higher-order probabilistic programming languages allow programmers to write sophisticated models in machine learning and statistics in a succinct and structured way, but step outside the standard measure-theoretic formalization of probability theory. Programs may use both higher-order functions and continuous distributions, or even define a probability distribution on functions. But standard probability theory does not handle higher-order functions well: the category of measurable spaces is not cartesian closed. Here we introduce quasi-Borel spaces. We show that these spaces: form a new formalization of probability theory replacing measurable spaces; form a cartesian closed category and so support higher-order functions; form a well-pointed category and so support good proof principles for equational reasoning; and support continuous probability distributions. We demonstrate the use of quasi-Borel spaces for higher-order functions and probability by: showing that a well-known construction of probability theory involving random functions gains a cleaner expression; and generalizing de Finetti's theorem, that is a crucial theorem in probability theory, to quasi-Borel spaces.

From the Bayesian perspective, the category of conditional probabilities (a variant of the Kleisli category of the Giry monad, whose objects are measurable spaces and arrows are Markov kernels) gives a nice framework for conceptualization and analysis of many aspects of machine learning. Using categorical methods, we construct models for parametric and nonparametric Bayesian reasoning on function spaces, thus providing a basis for the supervised learning problem. In particular, stochastic processes are arrows to these function spaces which serve as prior probabilities. The resulting inference maps can often be analytically constructed in this symmetric monoidal weakly closed category. We also show how to view general stochastic processes using functor categories and demonstrate the Kalman filter as an archetype for the hidden Markov model.

The field of Explainable AI (XAI) is seeking to shed light on the inner workings of complex AI models and uncover the rationale behind their decisions. One of the models gaining attention are probabilistic circuits (PCs), which are a general and unified framework for tractable probabilistic models that support efficient computation of various probabilistic queries. Probabilistic circuits guarantee inference that is polynomial in the size of the circuit. In this paper, we improve the explainability of probabilistic circuits by computing a comprehensible, readable logical theory that covers the high-density regions generated by a PC. To achieve this, pruning approaches based on generative significance are used in a new method called PUTPUT (Probabilistic circuit Understanding Through Pruning Underlying logical Theories). The method is applied to a real world use case where music playlists are automatically generated and expressed as readable (database) queries. Evaluation shows that this approach can effectively produce a comprehensible logical theory that describes the high-density regions of a PC and outperforms state of the art methods when exploring the performance-comprehensibility trade-off.

We present the Bayesian Linguistic Forecaster (BLF), an agentic system for binary forecasting that achieves state-of-the-art performance on the ForecastBench benchmark. The system is built on three ideas. (1) Linguistic belief state: a semi-structured representation combining numerical probability estimates with natural-language evidence summaries, updated by the LLM at each step of an iterative tool-use loop. This contrasts with the common approach of appending all retrieved evidence to an ever-growing, unstructured context. (2) Hierarchical multi-trial aggregation: running K independent trials and combining them using logit-space averaging shrinkage with a data-dependent prior. (3) Hierarchical calibration: Platt scaling with a hierarchical prior, which avoids over-shrinking extreme predictions for sources with skewed base rates. On 400 questions from the ForecastBench leaderboard, BLF outperforms all the top public methods, including Cassi, GPT-5, Grok~4.20, and Foresight-32B. Careful ablation studies, using mixed effects analysis to control for question variability (which accounts for 62\% of the variance in performance), reveals that all 3 components contribute to the overall gains, but some components matter more than others, depending on the base LLM, and the setting (e.g.\ with or without a crowd prior). All our experiments are based on a robust back-testing framework which we develop, which has a leakage rate below 1.5\%, and may be of independent interest.

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

Physics is based on probabilities as fundamental entities of a mathematical description. Expectation values of observables are computed according to the classical statistical rule. The overall probability distribution for one world covers all times. The quantum formalism arises once one focuses on the evolution of the time-local probabilistic information. Wave functions or the density matrix allow the formulation of a general linear evolution law for classical statistics. The quantum formalism for classical statistics is a powerful tool which allows us to implement for generalized Ising models the momentum observable with the associated Fourier representation. The association of operators to observables permits the computation of expectation values in terms of the density matrix by the usual quantum rule. We show that probabilistic cellular automata are quantum systems in a formulation with discrete time steps and real wave functions. With a complex structure the evolution operator for automata can be expressed in terms of a Hamiltonian involving fermionic creation and annihilation operators. The time-local probabilistic information amounts to a subsystem of the overall probabilistic system which is correlated with its environment consisting of the past and future. Such subsystems typically involve probabilistic observables for which only a probability distribution for their possible measurement values is available. Incomplete statistics does not permit to compute classical correlation functions for arbitrary subsystem-observables. Bell's inequalities are not generally applicable.

Researchers in explainable artificial intelligence have developed numerous methods for helping users understand the predictions of complex supervised learning models. By contrast, explaining the uncertainty of model outputs has received relatively little attention. We adapt the popular Shapley value framework to explain various types of predictive uncertainty, quantifying each feature's contribution to the conditional entropy of individual model outputs. We consider games with modified characteristic functions and find deep connections between the resulting Shapley values and fundamental quantities from information theory and conditional independence testing. We outline inference procedures for finite sample error rate control with provable guarantees, and implement efficient algorithms that perform well in a range of experiments on real and simulated data. Our method has applications to covariate shift detection, active learning, feature selection, and active feature-value acquisition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

We present a modular semantic account of Bayesian inference algorithms for probabilistic programming languages, as used in data science and machine learning. Sophisticated inference algorithms are often explained in terms of composition of smaller parts. However, neither their theoretical justification nor their implementation reflects this modularity. We show how to conceptualise and analyse such inference algorithms as manipulating intermediate representations of probabilistic programs using higher-order functions and inductive types, and their denotational semantics. Semantic accounts of continuous distributions use measurable spaces. However, our use of higher-order functions presents a substantial technical difficulty: it is impossible to define a measurable space structure over the collection of measurable functions between arbitrary measurable spaces that is compatible with standard operations on those functions, such as function application. We overcome this difficulty using quasi-Borel spaces, a recently proposed mathematical structure that supports both function spaces and continuous distributions. We define a class of semantic structures for representing probabilistic programs, and semantic validity criteria for transformations of these representations in terms of distribution preservation. We develop a collection of building blocks for composing representations. We use these building blocks to validate common inference algorithms such as Sequential Monte Carlo and Markov Chain Monte Carlo. To emphasize the connection between the semantic manipulation and its traditional measure theoretic origins, we use Kock's synthetic measure theory. We demonstrate its usefulness by proving a quasi-Borel counterpart to the Metropolis-Hastings-Green theorem.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

Large language models perform near-Bayesian inference yet violate permutation invariance on exchangeable data. We resolve this by showing transformers minimize expected conditional description length (cross-entropy) over orderings, E_pi[ell(Y mid Gamma_pi(X))], which admits a Kolmogorov-complexity interpretation up to additive constants, rather than the permutation-invariant description length ell(Y mid X). This makes them Bayesian in expectation, not in realization. We derive (i) a Quantified Martingale Violation bound showing order-induced deviations scale as O(log n) with constants; (ii) the Expectation-level Decompression Law linking information budgets to reliability for Bernoulli predicates; and (iii) deployable planners (B2T/RoH/ISR) for answer/abstain decisions. Empirically, permutation dispersion follows a+bln n (Qwen2-7B b approx 0.377, Llama-3.1-8B b approx 0.147); permutation mixtures improve ground-truth likelihood/accuracy; and randomized dose-response shows hallucinations drop by sim 0.13 per additional nat. A pre-specified audit with a fixed ISR=1.0 achieves near-0\% hallucinations via calibrated refusal at 24\% abstention. The framework turns hallucinations into predictable compression failures and enables principled information budgeting.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

Linguistic cues such as "I believe" and "probably" offer an intuitive interface for communicating confidence, yet a generalisable, principled calibration framework for linguistic confidence expressions remains underexplored. In particular, co-occurring linguistic cues, contextual variation, and subjective audience interpretation pose unique challenges. We therefore model linguistic confidence as a distribution over plausible perceived probability values that a statement is correct, capturing interpretation variability that scalar representations discard. Within this distributional framework, we introduce faithfulness as a complementary evaluation dimension and present Faithfulness Divergence (FD), an information-theoretic metric quantifying the surprise induced in audience beliefs upon truth revelation. Building on these foundations, we present Retrieval-Augmented Linguistic Calibration (RALC), a lightweight post-hoc pipeline that propagates calibrated confidence signals back into natural language via retrieval-augmented rewriting. Across three QA benchmarks and five LLM families, RALC improves in-domain faithfulness and calibration up to 66% and 58%, respectively, outperforming black-box and grey-box calibration baselines.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

A Neural Process (NP) estimates a stochastic process implicitly defined with neural networks given a stream of data, rather than pre-specifying priors already known, such as Gaussian processes. An ideal NP would learn everything from data without any inductive biases, but in practice, we often restrict the class of stochastic processes for the ease of estimation. One such restriction is the use of a finite-dimensional latent variable accounting for the uncertainty in the functions drawn from NPs. Some recent works show that this can be improved with more "data-driven" source of uncertainty such as bootstrapping. In this work, we take a different approach based on the martingale posterior, a recently developed alternative to Bayesian inference. For the martingale posterior, instead of specifying prior-likelihood pairs, a predictive distribution for future data is specified. Under specific conditions on the predictive distribution, it can be shown that the uncertainty in the generated future data actually corresponds to the uncertainty of the implicitly defined Bayesian posteriors. Based on this result, instead of assuming any form of the latent variables, we equip a NP with a predictive distribution implicitly defined with neural networks and use the corresponding martingale posteriors as the source of uncertainty. The resulting model, which we name as Martingale Posterior Neural Process (MPNP), is demonstrated to outperform baselines on various tasks.

Eliciting information to reduce uncertainty about a latent entity is a critical task in many application domains, e.g., assessing individual student learning outcomes, diagnosing underlying diseases, or learning user preferences. Though natural language is a powerful medium for this purpose, large language models (LLMs) and existing fine-tuning algorithms lack mechanisms for strategically gathering information to refine their own understanding of the latent entity. To harness the generalization power and world knowledge of LLMs in developing effective information-gathering strategies, we propose an adaptive elicitation framework that actively reduces uncertainty on the latent entity. Since probabilistic modeling of an abstract latent entity is difficult, our framework adopts a predictive view of uncertainty, using a meta-learned language model to simulate future observations and enable scalable uncertainty quantification over complex natural language. Through autoregressive forward simulation, our model quantifies how new questions reduce epistemic uncertainty, enabling the development of sophisticated information-gathering strategies to choose the most informative next queries. In experiments on the 20 questions game, dynamic opinion polling, and adaptive student assessment, our method consistently outperforms baselines in identifying critical unknowns and improving downstream predictions, illustrating the promise of strategic information gathering in natural language settings.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

How does language inform our downstream thinking? In particular, how do humans make meaning from language -- and how can we leverage a theory of linguistic meaning to build machines that think in more human-like ways? In this paper, we propose rational meaning construction, a computational framework for language-informed thinking that combines neural models of language with probabilistic models for rational inference. We frame linguistic meaning as a context-sensitive mapping from natural language into a probabilistic language of thought (PLoT) -- a general-purpose symbolic substrate for probabilistic, generative world modeling. Our architecture integrates two powerful computational tools that have not previously come together: we model thinking with probabilistic programs, an expressive representation for flexible commonsense reasoning; and we model meaning construction with large language models (LLMs), which support broad-coverage translation from natural language utterances to code expressions in a probabilistic programming language. We illustrate our framework in action through examples covering four core domains from cognitive science: probabilistic reasoning, logical and relational reasoning, visual and physical reasoning, and social reasoning about agents and their plans. In each, we show that LLMs can generate context-sensitive translations that capture pragmatically-appropriate linguistic meanings, while Bayesian inference with the generated programs supports coherent and robust commonsense reasoning. We extend our framework to integrate cognitively-motivated symbolic modules to provide a unified commonsense thinking interface from language. Finally, we explore how language can drive the construction of world models themselves.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are predominantly governed by probabilistic frameworks in which the sum of outcome probabilities is constrained to unity. This architectural limitation, often imposed by Softmax layers, leads to a collapse of uncertainty that makes it difficult to differentiate between epistemic uncertainty, paradox, and vagueness. We present an empirical investigation of the application of Neutrosophic Logic, a framework that treats Truth (T), Indeterminacy (I), and Falsity (F) as three independent dimensions, to model epistemic states in LLMs. We conducted experiments on a family of four OpenAI GPT models across five linguistic phenomena: logical paradoxes, epistemic ignorance, vagueness, ethical contradictions, and future contingencies, under three prompting strategies: neutrosophic, probabilistic, and entropy-derived. Our findings reveal that the neutrosophic approach, by allowing T+I+F > 1, a state we term hyper-truth, provides a richer representation of a model's internal state. In 35% of evaluations, hyper-truth emerged spontaneously, predominantly under ethical contradiction and logical paradox. We demonstrate that this approach preserves truth values in fuzzy contexts and offers a robust method for identifying and quantifying internal model conflict. We conclude that the integration of neutrosophic evaluation layers is a critical step toward more transparent, reliable, and ethically aware AI systems.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) predict through human-interpretable concepts, but they typically output point concept probabilities that conflate epistemic uncertainty (reducible model underspecification) with aleatoric uncertainty (irreducible input ambiguity). This makes concept-level uncertainty hard to interpret and, more importantly, hard to act upon. We introduce CREDENCE (Credal Ensemble Concept Estimation), a CBM framework that decomposes concept uncertainty by construction. CREDENCE represents each concept as a credal prediction (a probability interval), derives epistemic uncertainty from disagreement across diverse concept heads, and estimates aleatoric uncertainty via a dedicated ambiguity output trained to match annotator disagreement when available. The resulting signals support prescriptive decisions: automate low-uncertainty cases, prioritize data collection for high-epistemic cases, route high-aleatoric cases to human review, and abstain when both are high. Across several tasks, we show that epistemic uncertainty is positively associated with prediction errors, whereas aleatoric uncertainty closely tracks annotator disagreement, providing guidance beyond error correlation. Our implementation is available at the following link: https://github.com/Tankiit/Credal_Sets/tree/ensemble-credal-cbm

Interpretable models are designed to make decisions in a human-interpretable manner. Representatively, Concept Bottleneck Models (CBM) follow a two-step process of concept prediction and class prediction based on the predicted concepts. CBM provides explanations with high-level concepts derived from concept predictions; thus, reliable concept predictions are important for trustworthiness. In this study, we address the ambiguity issue that can harm reliability. While the existence of a concept can often be ambiguous in the data, CBM predicts concepts deterministically without considering this ambiguity. To provide a reliable interpretation against this ambiguity, we propose Probabilistic Concept Bottleneck Models (ProbCBM). By leveraging probabilistic concept embeddings, ProbCBM models uncertainty in concept prediction and provides explanations based on the concept and its corresponding uncertainty. This uncertainty enhances the reliability of the explanations. Furthermore, as class uncertainty is derived from concept uncertainty in ProbCBM, we can explain class uncertainty by means of concept uncertainty. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ejkim47/prob-cbm.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Understanding and predicting how social beliefs evolve in response to events -- from policy changes to scientific breakthroughs -- remains a fundamental challenge in social science. Given LLMs' commonsense knowledge and social intelligence, we ask: Can LLMs model the dynamics of social beliefs following social events? In this work, we introduce the concept of the Social World Model (SWM), a general framework designed to capture how social beliefs evolve in response to major events. SWM learns state-transition functions for social beliefs by mining temporal patterns in social data and optimizing the evidence lower bound, without the need for explicit human annotations linking events to belief shifts, or for expensive census data. To evaluate SWM, we introduce a benchmark, SWM-bench, derived from real-world prediction markets, specifically Kalshi and Polymarket. SWM-bench includes over 12k data points for social belief prediction tasks spanning diverse domains such as politics, finance, and cryptocurrency. Our experimental results show that SWM significantly outperforms time-series foundation models, achieving state-of-the-art results on Kalshi data and demonstrating competitive performance on Polymarket data, while offering interpretable insights into the underlying mechanisms of social belief dynamics.

We propose a method for jointly inferring labels across a collection of data samples, where each sample consists of an observation and a prior belief about the label. By implicitly assuming the existence of a generative model for which a differentiable predictor is the posterior, we derive a training objective that allows learning under weak beliefs. This formulation unifies various machine learning settings; the weak beliefs can come in the form of noisy or incomplete labels, likelihoods given by a different prediction mechanism on auxiliary input, or common-sense priors reflecting knowledge about the structure of the problem at hand. We demonstrate the proposed algorithms on diverse problems: classification with negative training examples, learning from rankings, weakly and self-supervised aerial imagery segmentation, co-segmentation of video frames, and coarsely supervised text classification.

Prompted models have demonstrated impressive few-shot learning abilities. Repeated interactions at test-time with a single model, or the composition of multiple models together, further expands capabilities. These compositions are probabilistic models, and may be expressed in the language of graphical models with random variables whose values are complex data types such as strings. Cases with control flow and dynamic structure require techniques from probabilistic programming, which allow implementing disparate model structures and inference strategies in a unified language. We formalize several existing techniques from this perspective, including scratchpads / chain of thought, verifiers, STaR, selection-inference, and tool use. We refer to the resulting programs as language model cascades.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

There are two major types of uncertainty one can model. Aleatoric uncertainty captures noise inherent in the observations. On the other hand, epistemic uncertainty accounts for uncertainty in the model -- uncertainty which can be explained away given enough data. Traditionally it has been difficult to model epistemic uncertainty in computer vision, but with new Bayesian deep learning tools this is now possible. We study the benefits of modeling epistemic vs. aleatoric uncertainty in Bayesian deep learning models for vision tasks. For this we present a Bayesian deep learning framework combining input-dependent aleatoric uncertainty together with epistemic uncertainty. We study models under the framework with per-pixel semantic segmentation and depth regression tasks. Further, our explicit uncertainty formulation leads to new loss functions for these tasks, which can be interpreted as learned attenuation. This makes the loss more robust to noisy data, also giving new state-of-the-art results on segmentation and depth regression benchmarks.

The aim of this paper is to present an elementary computable theory of probability, random variables and stochastic processes. The probability theory is baed on existing approaches using valuations and lower integrals. Various approaches to random variables are discussed, including the approach based on completions in a Polish space. We apply the theory to the study of stochastic dynamical systems in discrete-time, and give a brief exposition of the Wiener process as a foundation for stochastic differential equations. The theory is based within the framework of type-two effectivity, so has an explicit direct link with Turing computation, and is expressed in a system of computable types and operations, so has a clean mathematical description.

Vision-language models (VLMs) embed aligned image-text pairs into a joint space but often rely on deterministic embeddings, assuming a one-to-one correspondence between images and texts. This oversimplifies real-world relationships, which are inherently many-to-many, with multiple captions describing a single image and vice versa. We introduce Probabilistic Language-Image Pre-training (ProLIP), the first probabilistic VLM pre-trained on a billion-scale image-text dataset using only probabilistic objectives, achieving a strong zero-shot capability (e.g., 74.6% ImageNet zero-shot accuracy with ViT-B/16). ProLIP efficiently estimates uncertainty by an "uncertainty token" without extra parameters. We also introduce a novel inclusion loss that enforces distributional inclusion relationships between image-text pairs and between original and masked inputs. Experiments demonstrate that, by leveraging uncertainty estimates, ProLIP benefits downstream tasks and aligns with intuitive notions of uncertainty, e.g., shorter texts being more uncertain and more general inputs including specific ones. Utilizing text uncertainties, we further improve ImageNet accuracy from 74.6% to 75.8% (under a few-shot setting), supporting the practical advantages of our probabilistic approach. The code is available at https://github.com/naver-ai/prolip

Contrastively trained encoders have recently been proven to invert the data-generating process: they encode each input, e.g., an image, into the true latent vector that generated the image (Zimmermann et al., 2021). However, real-world observations often have inherent ambiguities. For instance, images may be blurred or only show a 2D view of a 3D object, so multiple latents could have generated them. This makes the true posterior for the latent vector probabilistic with heteroscedastic uncertainty. In this setup, we extend the common InfoNCE objective and encoders to predict latent distributions instead of points. We prove that these distributions recover the correct posteriors of the data-generating process, including its level of aleatoric uncertainty, up to a rotation of the latent space. In addition to providing calibrated uncertainty estimates, these posteriors allow the computation of credible intervals in image retrieval. They comprise images with the same latent as a given query, subject to its uncertainty. Code is available at https://github.com/mkirchhof/Probabilistic_Contrastive_Learning

We introduce the Probabilistic Worldbuilding Model (PWM), a new fully-symbolic Bayesian model of semantic parsing and reasoning, as a first step in a research program toward more domain- and task-general NLU and AI. Humans create internal mental models of their observations which greatly aid in their ability to understand and reason about a large variety of problems. In PWM, the meanings of sentences, acquired facts about the world, and intermediate steps in reasoning are all expressed in a human-readable formal language, with the design goal of interpretability. PWM is Bayesian, designed specifically to be able to generalize to new domains and new tasks. We derive and implement an inference algorithm that reads sentences by parsing and abducing updates to its latent world model that capture the semantics of those sentences, and evaluate it on two out-of-domain question-answering datasets: (1) ProofWriter and (2) a new dataset we call FictionalGeoQA, designed to be more representative of real language but still simple enough to focus on evaluating reasoning ability, while being robust against heuristics. Our method outperforms baselines on both, thereby demonstrating its value as a proof-of-concept.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

Probabilistic forecasting is crucial to decision-making under uncertainty about future weather. The dominant approach is to use an ensemble of forecasts to represent and quantify uncertainty in operational numerical weather prediction. However, generating ensembles is computationally costly. In this paper, we propose to generate ensemble forecasts at scale by leveraging recent advances in generative artificial intelligence. Our approach learns a data-driven probabilistic diffusion model from the 5-member ensemble GEFS reforecast dataset. The model can then be sampled efficiently to produce realistic weather forecasts, conditioned on a few members of the operational GEFS forecasting system. The generated ensembles have similar predictive skill as the full GEFS 31-member ensemble, evaluated against ERA5 reanalysis, and emulate well the statistics of large physics-based ensembles. We also apply the same methodology to developing a diffusion model for generative post-processing: the model directly learns to correct biases present in the emulated forecasting system by leveraging reanalysis data as labels during training. Ensembles from this generative post-processing model show greater reliability and accuracy, particularly in extreme event classification. In general, they are more reliable and forecast the probability of extreme weather more accurately than the GEFS operational ensemble. Our models achieve these results at less than 1/10th of the computational cost incurred by the operational GEFS system.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

We study the problem of nonepisodic reinforcement learning (RL) for nonlinear dynamical systems, where the system dynamics are unknown and the RL agent has to learn from a single trajectory, i.e., without resets. We propose Nonepisodic Optimistic RL (NeoRL), an approach based on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. NeoRL uses well-calibrated probabilistic models and plans optimistically w.r.t. the epistemic uncertainty about the unknown dynamics. Under continuity and bounded energy assumptions on the system, we provide a first-of-its-kind regret bound of O(Gamma_T T) for general nonlinear systems with Gaussian process dynamics. We compare NeoRL to other baselines on several deep RL environments and empirically demonstrate that NeoRL achieves the optimal average cost while incurring the least regret.

Uncertainty quantification (UQ) is a critical aspect of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, particularly in high-risk domains such as healthcare, autonomous systems, and financial technology, where decision-making processes must account for uncertainty. This review explores the evolution of uncertainty quantification techniques in AI, distinguishing between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties, and discusses the mathematical foundations and methods used to quantify these uncertainties. We provide an overview of advanced techniques, including probabilistic methods, ensemble learning, sampling-based approaches, and generative models, while also highlighting hybrid approaches that integrate domain-specific knowledge. Furthermore, we examine the diverse applications of UQ across various fields, emphasizing its impact on decision-making, predictive accuracy, and system robustness. The review also addresses key challenges such as scalability, efficiency, and integration with explainable AI, and outlines future directions for research in this rapidly developing area. Through this comprehensive survey, we aim to provide a deeper understanding of UQ's role in enhancing the reliability, safety, and trustworthiness of AI systems.

Reliable estimation of predictive uncertainty is crucial for machine learning applications, particularly in high-stakes scenarios where hedging against risks is essential. Despite its significance, there is no universal agreement on how to best quantify predictive uncertainty. In this work, we revisit core concepts to propose a framework for information-theoretic measures of predictive uncertainty. Our proposed framework categorizes predictive uncertainty measures according to two factors: (I) The predicting model (II) The approximation of the true predictive distribution. Examining all possible combinations of these two factors, we derive a set of predictive uncertainty measures that includes both known and newly introduced ones. We extensively evaluate these measures across a broad set of tasks, identifying conditions under which certain measures excel. Our findings show the importance of aligning the choice of uncertainty measure with the predicting model on in-distribution (ID) data, the limitations of epistemic uncertainty measures for out-of-distribution (OOD) data, and that the disentanglement between measures varies substantially between ID and OOD data. Together, these insights provide a more comprehensive understanding of predictive uncertainty measures, revealing their implicit assumptions and relationships.

Sequential Bayesian inference can be used for continual learning to prevent catastrophic forgetting of past tasks and provide an informative prior when learning new tasks. We revisit sequential Bayesian inference and test whether having access to the true posterior is guaranteed to prevent catastrophic forgetting in Bayesian neural networks. To do this we perform sequential Bayesian inference using Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. We propagate the posterior as a prior for new tasks by fitting a density estimator on Hamiltonian Monte Carlo samples. We find that this approach fails to prevent catastrophic forgetting demonstrating the difficulty in performing sequential Bayesian inference in neural networks. From there we study simple analytical examples of sequential Bayesian inference and CL and highlight the issue of model misspecification which can lead to sub-optimal continual learning performance despite exact inference. Furthermore, we discuss how task data imbalances can cause forgetting. From these limitations, we argue that we need probabilistic models of the continual learning generative process rather than relying on sequential Bayesian inference over Bayesian neural network weights. In this vein, we also propose a simple baseline called Prototypical Bayesian Continual Learning, which is competitive with state-of-the-art Bayesian continual learning methods on class incremental continual learning vision benchmarks.

Continuous latent variables (LVs) are a key ingredient of many generative models, as they allow modelling expressive mixtures with an uncountable number of components. In contrast, probabilistic circuits (PCs) are hierarchical discrete mixtures represented as computational graphs composed of input, sum and product units. Unlike continuous LV models, PCs provide tractable inference but are limited to discrete LVs with categorical (i.e. unordered) states. We bridge these model classes by introducing probabilistic integral circuits (PICs), a new language of computational graphs that extends PCs with integral units representing continuous LVs. In the first place, PICs are symbolic computational graphs and are fully tractable in simple cases where analytical integration is possible. In practice, we parameterise PICs with light-weight neural nets delivering an intractable hierarchical continuous mixture that can be approximated arbitrarily well with large PCs using numerical quadrature. On several distribution estimation benchmarks, we show that such PIC-approximating PCs systematically outperform PCs commonly learned via expectation-maximization or SGD.

Forecasting time series data is a critical area of research with applications spanning from stock prices to early epidemic prediction. While numerous statistical and machine learning methods have been proposed, real-life prediction problems often require hybrid solutions that bridge classical forecasting approaches and modern neural network models. In this study, we introduce the Probabilistic AutoRegressive Neural Networks (PARNN), capable of handling complex time series data exhibiting non-stationarity, nonlinearity, non-seasonality, long-range dependence, and chaotic patterns. PARNN is constructed by improving autoregressive neural networks (ARNN) using autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) feedback error, combining the explainability, scalability, and "white-box-like" prediction behavior of both models. Notably, the PARNN model provides uncertainty quantification through prediction intervals, setting it apart from advanced deep learning tools. Through comprehensive computational experiments, we evaluate the performance of PARNN against standard statistical, machine learning, and deep learning models, including Transformers, NBeats, and DeepAR. Diverse real-world datasets from macroeconomics, tourism, epidemiology, and other domains are employed for short-term, medium-term, and long-term forecasting evaluations. Our results demonstrate the superiority of PARNN across various forecast horizons, surpassing the state-of-the-art forecasters. The proposed PARNN model offers a valuable hybrid solution for accurate long-range forecasting. By effectively capturing the complexities present in time series data, it outperforms existing methods in terms of accuracy and reliability. The ability to quantify uncertainty through prediction intervals further enhances the model's usefulness in decision-making processes.

Probabilistic circuits (PCs) are a tractable representation of probability distributions allowing for exact and efficient computation of likelihoods and marginals. There has been significant recent progress on improving the scale and expressiveness of PCs. However, PC training performance plateaus as model size increases. We discover that most capacity in existing large PC structures is wasted: fully-connected parameter layers are only sparsely used. We propose two operations: pruning and growing, that exploit the sparsity of PC structures. Specifically, the pruning operation removes unimportant sub-networks of the PC for model compression and comes with theoretical guarantees. The growing operation increases model capacity by increasing the size of the latent space. By alternatingly applying pruning and growing, we increase the capacity that is meaningfully used, allowing us to significantly scale up PC learning. Empirically, our learner achieves state-of-the-art likelihoods on MNIST-family image datasets and on Penn Tree Bank language data compared to other PC learners and less tractable deep generative models such as flow-based models and variational autoencoders (VAEs).

In the past couple of years, various approaches to representing and quantifying different types of predictive uncertainty in machine learning, notably in the setting of classification, have been proposed on the basis of second-order probability distributions, i.e., predictions in the form of distributions on probability distributions. A completely conclusive solution has not yet been found, however, as shown by recent criticisms of commonly used uncertainty measures associated with second-order distributions, identifying undesirable theoretical properties of these measures. In light of these criticisms, we propose a set of formal criteria that meaningful uncertainty measures for predictive uncertainty based on second-order distributions should obey. Moreover, we provide a general framework for developing uncertainty measures to account for these criteria, and offer an instantiation based on the Wasserstein distance, for which we prove that all criteria are satisfied.

Generating functions, which are widely used in combinatorics and probability theory, encode function values into the coefficients of a polynomial. In this paper, we explore their use as a tractable probabilistic model, and propose probabilistic generating circuits (PGCs) for their efficient representation. PGCs are strictly more expressive efficient than many existing tractable probabilistic models, including determinantal point processes (DPPs), probabilistic circuits (PCs) such as sum-product networks, and tractable graphical models. We contend that PGCs are not just a theoretical framework that unifies vastly different existing models, but also show great potential in modeling realistic data. We exhibit a simple class of PGCs that are not trivially subsumed by simple combinations of PCs and DPPs, and obtain competitive performance on a suite of density estimation benchmarks. We also highlight PGCs' connection to the theory of strongly Rayleigh distributions.

We formalize a transfinite Phi process that treats all possibility embeddings as operators on structured state spaces including complete lattices, Banach and Hilbert spaces, and orthomodular lattices. We prove a determinization lemma showing that lifting to sets or distributions yields a deterministic global dynamic, an ordinal stabilization theorem sending operator transforms to the fixed subspace by stage omega under normal spectral contraction, and a product of Riesz projections theorem for commuting layers. We establish a compositionality law for lifted maps, show closure of Phi packings, and present a quantitative application to sensory depletion that models tissue removal as a projection and derives strict decreases in the attainable fixed point under minimal monotonicity and positivity assumptions. We also state measurable conditions for probabilistic lifts, give explicit non normal and non commuting counterexamples, and provide finite dimensional and stochastic witnesses together with per theorem scope tables and a small reproducible code appendix.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

While Bayesian inference provides a principled framework for reasoning under uncertainty, its widespread adoption is limited by the intractability of exact posterior computation, necessitating the use of approximate inference. However, existing methods are often computationally expensive, or demand costly retraining when priors change, limiting their utility, particularly in sequential inference problems such as real-time sensor fusion. To address these challenges, we introduce the Distribution Transformer -- a novel architecture that can learn arbitrary distribution-to-distribution mappings. Our method can be trained to map a prior to the corresponding posterior, conditioned on some dataset -- thus performing approximate Bayesian inference. Our novel architecture represents a prior distribution as a (universally-approximating) Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), and transforms it into a GMM representation of the posterior. The components of the GMM attend to each other via self-attention, and to the datapoints via cross-attention. We demonstrate that Distribution Transformers both maintain flexibility to vary the prior, and significantly reduces computation times-from minutes to milliseconds-while achieving log-likelihood performance on par with or superior to existing approximate inference methods across tasks such as sequential inference, quantum system parameter inference, and Gaussian Process predictive posterior inference with hyperpriors.

We introduce DeepProbLog, a probabilistic logic programming language that incorporates deep learning by means of neural predicates. We show how existing inference and learning techniques can be adapted for the new language. Our experiments demonstrate that DeepProbLog supports both symbolic and subsymbolic representations and inference, 1) program induction, 2) probabilistic (logic) programming, and 3) (deep) learning from examples. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to propose a framework where general-purpose neural networks and expressive probabilistic-logical modeling and reasoning are integrated in a way that exploits the full expressiveness and strengths of both worlds and can be trained end-to-end based on examples.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

Modern machine learning methods including deep learning have achieved great success in predictive accuracy for supervised learning tasks, but may still fall short in giving useful estimates of their predictive {\em uncertainty}. Quantifying uncertainty is especially critical in real-world settings, which often involve input distributions that are shifted from the training distribution due to a variety of factors including sample bias and non-stationarity. In such settings, well calibrated uncertainty estimates convey information about when a model's output should (or should not) be trusted. Many probabilistic deep learning methods, including Bayesian-and non-Bayesian methods, have been proposed in the literature for quantifying predictive uncertainty, but to our knowledge there has not previously been a rigorous large-scale empirical comparison of these methods under dataset shift. We present a large-scale benchmark of existing state-of-the-art methods on classification problems and investigate the effect of dataset shift on accuracy and calibration. We find that traditional post-hoc calibration does indeed fall short, as do several other previous methods. However, some methods that marginalize over models give surprisingly strong results across a broad spectrum of tasks.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can produce surprisingly sophisticated estimates of their own uncertainty. However, it remains unclear to what extent this expressed confidence is tied to the reasoning, knowledge, or decision making of the model. To test this, we introduce RiskEval: a framework designed to evaluate whether models adjust their abstention policies in response to varying error penalties. Our evaluation of several frontier models reveals a critical dissociation: models are neither cost-aware when articulating their verbal confidence, nor strategically responsive when deciding whether to engage or abstain under high-penalty conditions. Even when extreme penalties render frequent abstention the mathematically optimal strategy, models almost never abstain, resulting in utility collapse. This indicates that calibrated verbal confidence scores may not be sufficient to create trustworthy and interpretable AI systems, as current models lack the strategic agency to convert uncertainty signals into optimal and risk-sensitive decisions.

Accurately predicting the future would be an important milestone in the capabilities of artificial intelligence. However, research on the ability of large language models to provide probabilistic predictions about future events remains nascent. To empirically test this ability, we enrolled OpenAI's state-of-the-art large language model, GPT-4, in a three-month forecasting tournament hosted on the Metaculus platform. The tournament, running from July to October 2023, attracted 843 participants and covered diverse topics including Big Tech, U.S. politics, viral outbreaks, and the Ukraine conflict. Focusing on binary forecasts, we show that GPT-4's probabilistic forecasts are significantly less accurate than the median human-crowd forecasts. We find that GPT-4's forecasts did not significantly differ from the no-information forecasting strategy of assigning a 50% probability to every question. We explore a potential explanation, that GPT-4 might be predisposed to predict probabilities close to the midpoint of the scale, but our data do not support this hypothesis. Overall, we find that GPT-4 significantly underperforms in real-world predictive tasks compared to median human-crowd forecasts. A potential explanation for this underperformance is that in real-world forecasting tournaments, the true answers are genuinely unknown at the time of prediction; unlike in other benchmark tasks like professional exams or time series forecasting, where strong performance may at least partly be due to the answers being memorized from the training data. This makes real-world forecasting tournaments an ideal environment for testing the generalized reasoning and prediction capabilities of artificial intelligence going forward.

The ability to acknowledge the inevitable uncertainty in their knowledge and reasoning is a prerequisite for AI systems to be truly truthful and reliable. In this paper, we present a taxonomy of uncertainty specific to vision-language AI systems, distinguishing between epistemic uncertainty (arising from a lack of information) and aleatoric uncertainty (due to inherent unpredictability), and further explore finer categories within. Based on this taxonomy, we synthesize a benchmark dataset, CertainlyUncertain, featuring 178K visual question answering (VQA) samples as contrastive pairs. This is achieved by 1) inpainting images to make previously answerable questions into unanswerable ones; and 2) using image captions to prompt large language models for both answerable and unanswerable questions. Additionally, we introduce a new metric confidence-weighted accuracy, that is well correlated with both accuracy and calibration error, to address the shortcomings of existing metrics.

Recent work has sought to quantify large language model uncertainty to facilitate model control and modulate user trust. Previous works focus on measures of uncertainty that are theoretically grounded or reflect the average overt behavior of the model. In this work, we investigate a variety of uncertainty measures, in order to identify measures that correlate with human group-level uncertainty. We find that Bayesian measures and a variation on entropy measures, top-k entropy, tend to agree with human behavior as a function of model size. We find that some strong measures decrease in human-similarity with model size, but, by multiple linear regression, we find that combining multiple uncertainty measures provide comparable human-alignment with reduced size-dependency.

Deterministic inference is a comforting ideal in classical software: the same program on the same input should always produce the same output. As large language models move into real-world deployment, this ideal has been imported wholesale into inference stacks. Recent work from the Thinking Machines Lab has presented a detailed analysis of nondeterminism in LLM inference, showing how batch-invariant kernels and deterministic attention can enforce bitwise-identical outputs, positioning deterministic inference as a prerequisite for reproducibility and enterprise reliability. In this paper, we take the opposite stance. We argue that, for LLMs, deterministic inference kills. It kills the ability to model uncertainty, suppresses emergent abilities, collapses reasoning into a single brittle path, and weakens safety alignment by hiding tail risks. LLMs implement conditional distributions over outputs, not fixed functions. Collapsing these distributions to a single canonical completion may appear reassuring, but it systematically conceals properties central to artificial cognition. We instead advocate Stochastic CHAOS, treating distributional variability as a signal to be measured and controlled. Empirically, we show that deterministic inference is systematically misleading. Single-sample deterministic evaluation underestimates both capability and fragility, masking failure probability under paraphrases and noise. Phase-like transitions associated with emergent abilities disappear under greedy decoding. Multi-path reasoning degrades when forced onto deterministic backbones, reducing accuracy and diagnostic insight. Finally, deterministic evaluation underestimates safety risk by hiding rare but dangerous behaviors that appear only under multi-sample evaluation.

Understanding the world and explaining it with scientific theories is a central aspiration of artificial intelligence research. Proposing theories, designing experiments to test them, and then revising them based on data are fundamental to scientific discovery. Despite the significant promise of LLM-based scientific agents, no benchmarks systematically test LLM's ability to propose scientific models, collect experimental data, and revise them in light of new data. We introduce BoxingGym, a benchmark with 10 environments for systematically evaluating both experimental design (e.g. collecting data to test a scientific theory) and model discovery (e.g. proposing and revising scientific theories). To enable tractable and quantitative evaluation, we implement each environment as a generative probabilistic model with which a scientific agent can run interactive experiments. These probabilistic models are drawn from various real-world scientific domains ranging from psychology to ecology. To quantitatively evaluate a scientific agent's ability to collect informative experimental data, we compute the expected information gain (EIG), an information-theoretic quantity which measures how much an experiment reduces uncertainty about the parameters of a generative model. A good scientific theory is a concise and predictive explanation. Therefore, to quantitatively evaluate model discovery, we ask a scientific agent to explain their model and then assess whether this explanation enables another scientific agent to make reliable predictions about this environment. In addition to this explanation-based evaluation, we compute standard model evaluation metrics such as prediction errors. We find that current LLMs, such as GPT-4o, struggle with both experimental design and model discovery. We find that augmenting the LLM-based agent with an explicit statistical model does not reliably improve these results.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

A desired closure property in Bayesian probability is that an updated posterior distribution be in the same class of distributions --- say Gaussians --- as the prior distribution. When the updating takes place via a statistical model, one calls the class of prior distributions the `conjugate priors' of the model. This paper gives (1) an abstract formulation of this notion of conjugate prior, using channels, in a graphical language, (2) a simple abstract proof that such conjugate priors yield Bayesian inversions, and (3) a logical description of conjugate priors that highlights the required closure of the priors under updating. The theory is illustrated with several standard examples, also covering multiple updating.

Despite increasingly fluent, relevant, and coherent language generation, major gaps remain between how humans and machines use language. We argue that a key dimension that is missing from our understanding of language models (LMs) is the model's ability to interpret and generate expressions of uncertainty. Whether it be the weatherperson announcing a chance of rain or a doctor giving a diagnosis, information is often not black-and-white and expressions of uncertainty provide nuance to support human-decision making. The increasing deployment of LMs in the wild motivates us to investigate whether LMs are capable of interpreting expressions of uncertainty and how LMs' behaviors change when learning to emit their own expressions of uncertainty. When injecting expressions of uncertainty into prompts (e.g., "I think the answer is..."), we discover that GPT3's generations vary upwards of 80% in accuracy based on the expression used. We analyze the linguistic characteristics of these expressions and find a drop in accuracy when naturalistic expressions of certainty are present. We find similar effects when teaching models to emit their own expressions of uncertainty, where model calibration suffers when teaching models to emit certainty rather than uncertainty. Together, these results highlight the challenges of building LMs that interpret and generate trustworthy expressions of uncertainty.

Before taking actions in an environment with more than one intelligent agent, an autonomous agent may benefit from reasoning about the other agents and utilizing a notion of a guarantee or confidence about the behavior of the system. In this article, we propose a novel multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm CAMMARL, which involves modeling the actions of other agents in different situations in the form of confident sets, i.e., sets containing their true actions with a high probability. We then use these estimates to inform an agent's decision-making. For estimating such sets, we use the concept of conformal predictions, by means of which, we not only obtain an estimate of the most probable outcome but get to quantify the operable uncertainty as well. For instance, we can predict a set that provably covers the true predictions with high probabilities (e.g., 95%). Through several experiments in two fully cooperative multi-agent tasks, we show that CAMMARL elevates the capabilities of an autonomous agent in MARL by modeling conformal prediction sets over the behavior of other agents in the environment and utilizing such estimates to enhance its policy learning.

In Online Continual Learning (OCL) a learning system receives a stream of data and sequentially performs prediction and training steps. Important challenges in OCL are concerned with automatic adaptation to the particular non-stationary structure of the data, and with quantification of predictive uncertainty. Motivated by these challenges we introduce a probabilistic Bayesian online learning model by using a (possibly pretrained) neural representation and a state space model over the linear predictor weights. Non-stationarity over the linear predictor weights is modelled using a parameter drift transition density, parametrized by a coefficient that quantifies forgetting. Inference in the model is implemented with efficient Kalman filter recursions which track the posterior distribution over the linear weights, while online SGD updates over the transition dynamics coefficient allows to adapt to the non-stationarity seen in data. While the framework is developed assuming a linear Gaussian model, we also extend it to deal with classification problems and for fine-tuning the deep learning representation. In a set of experiments in multi-class classification using data sets such as CIFAR-100 and CLOC we demonstrate the predictive ability of the model and its flexibility to capture non-stationarity.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Probabilistic Circuits (PCs) are a unified framework for tractable probabilistic models that support efficient computation of various probabilistic queries (e.g., marginal probabilities). One key challenge is to scale PCs to model large and high-dimensional real-world datasets: we observe that as the number of parameters in PCs increases, their performance immediately plateaus. This phenomenon suggests that the existing optimizers fail to exploit the full expressive power of large PCs. We propose to overcome such bottleneck by latent variable distillation: we leverage the less tractable but more expressive deep generative models to provide extra supervision over the latent variables of PCs. Specifically, we extract information from Transformer-based generative models to assign values to latent variables of PCs, providing guidance to PC optimizers. Experiments on both image and language modeling benchmarks (e.g., ImageNet and WikiText-2) show that latent variable distillation substantially boosts the performance of large PCs compared to their counterparts without latent variable distillation. In particular, on the image modeling benchmarks, PCs achieve competitive performance against some of the widely-used deep generative models, including variational autoencoders and flow-based models, opening up new avenues for tractable generative modeling.

To maintain user trust, large language models (LLMs) should signal low confidence on examples where they are incorrect, instead of misleading the user. The standard approach of estimating confidence is to use the softmax probabilities of these models, but as of November 2023, state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4 and Claude-v1.3 do not provide access to these probabilities. We first study eliciting confidence linguistically -- asking an LLM for its confidence in its answer -- which performs reasonably (80.5% AUC on GPT-4 averaged across 12 question-answering datasets -- 7% above a random baseline) but leaves room for improvement. We then explore using a surrogate confidence model -- using a model where we do have probabilities to evaluate the original model's confidence in a given question. Surprisingly, even though these probabilities come from a different and often weaker model, this method leads to higher AUC than linguistic confidences on 9 out of 12 datasets. Our best method composing linguistic confidences and surrogate model probabilities gives state-of-the-art confidence estimates on all 12 datasets (84.6% average AUC on GPT-4).