Daily Papers

General-purpose skills promise reusable procedural knowledge for language agents, yet semantic relevance does not guarantee execution utility: a retrieved skill may encode assumptions that conflict with the current task, execution environment, or other retrieved skills. We formalize this problem as the skill--execution misfit. To address it, we propose SkillAligner, a training-free execution-time skill adaptation framework that treats retrieved skills as adaptable drafts rather than fixed instructions. Before execution, SkillAligner performs a one-time joint adaptation that specializes useful skill fragments to task requirements, aligns their procedural assumptions with the available execution interface, and composes the resulting guidance by resolving dependencies, conflicts, and redundancy across skills. The adapted content is consolidated into a compact execution guide and reused throughout the subsequent trajectory. Extensive experiments across diverse agent benchmarks and model backbones show that SkillAligner substantially improves task performance over existing skill-use baselines, reduces skill-induced regressions at the instance level, and lowers total inference cost.

Skills have emerged as a practical and effective approach for enhancing LLM agents at inference time through structured packages of knowledge. However, existing evaluations largely measure whether skills improve aggregated task success, leaving a more fundamental question underexplored: \textbf{When do skills help, why do they work, and where do they fail?} Through controlled experiments across various benchmarks, agent harnesses and LLMs, we isolate the effects of representation, outcome annotation, retrieval difficulty, and cross-framework robustness of skills. To further answer this question, we design a contrastive study that combines controlled quantitative experiments with paired trajectory analysis. We normalize 8,135 trial records from controlled experiments and retain 238 valid unique labels from 240 open-coded records. We consolidate these observations into a taxonomy of three high-level categories and twelve skill-use modes: skills work when noisy trajectories become procedural anchors that stabilize execution. Skills improve over Workflow Memory by 6.06 points in matched comparisons. Procedural anchoring accounts for 65.7\% of skill cases, versus 4.5\% for explicit knowledge injection, showing that skills stabilize action rather than inject missing facts. Retrieval is a separate bottleneck: as pools grow from 5 to 100, actual-use precision falls from 29.6\% to 3.3\%. Confusable distractors impair offline identification, yet downstream success remains stable; exact ground-truth invocation is neither sufficient nor necessary. Skills fail under brittle assumptions, incompatible contexts, or insufficient adaptation. These findings move evaluation beyond aggregate success rates and guide reliable self-evolving agents.

Benchmarks are necessary for healthcare evaluation, but are not sufficient for predicting deployment performance. Our position is that the evaluation--deployment gap arises not because of poorly designed benchmarks, but from implicit assumptions about how users interact with models that cannot be surfaced from benchmarks alone. To make this precise, we propose a classification of assumptions into two categories: task, which can be tested from conversation data alone, and outcome, which requires outcome data and behavioral studies for testing. Critically, outcome assumptions depend on human behavior, something that even well-designed benchmarks cannot directly observe. To demonstrate the operationality of this framework, we retrospectively analyze a healthcare RCT as a case study and find that the gap naturally separates into task and outcome gaps of roughly equal size. To address this, we make two contributions: first, we propose BenchmarkCards, an artifact that documents assumptions, and second, we propose staged evaluation, a procedure that systematically tests assumptions and evaluates performance.

This work presents code to procedurally generate examples for the ARC training tasks. For each of the 400 tasks, an example generator following the transformation logic of the original examples was created. In effect, the assumed underlying distribution of examples for any given task was reverse engineered by implementing a means to sample from it. An attempt was made to cover an as large as reasonable space of possible examples for each task. That is, whenever the original examples of a given task may be limited in their diversity e.g. by having the dimensions of the grids, the set of symbols or number of objects constant or within tight bounds, even though the transformation does not require it, such constraints were lifted. Having access to not just a few examples per task, as the case for ARC, but instead very many, should enable a wide range of experiments that may be important stepping stones towards making leaps on the benchmark.

We reveal and address the frequently overlooked yet important issue of disguised procedural unfairness, namely, the potentially inadvertent alterations on the behavior of neutral (i.e., not problematic) aspects of data generating process, and/or the lack of procedural assurance of the greatest benefit of the least advantaged individuals. Inspired by John Rawls's advocacy for pure procedural justice, we view automated decision-making as a microcosm of social institutions, and consider how the data generating process itself can satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness. We propose a framework that decouples the objectionable data generating components from the neutral ones by utilizing reference points and the associated value instantiation rule. Our findings highlight the necessity of preventing disguised procedural unfairness, drawing attention not only to the objectionable data generating components that we aim to mitigate, but also more importantly, to the neutral components that we intend to keep unaffected.

Naturally occurring information-seeking questions often contain questionable assumptions -- assumptions that are false or unverifiable. Questions containing questionable assumptions are challenging because they require a distinct answer strategy that deviates from typical answers for information-seeking questions. For instance, the question "When did Marie Curie discover Uranium?" cannot be answered as a typical "when" question without addressing the false assumption "Marie Curie discovered Uranium". In this work, we propose (QA)^2 (Question Answering with Questionable Assumptions), an open-domain evaluation dataset consisting of naturally occurring search engine queries that may or may not contain questionable assumptions. To be successful on (QA)^2, systems must be able to detect questionable assumptions and also be able to produce adequate responses for both typical information-seeking questions and ones with questionable assumptions. Through human rater acceptability on end-to-end QA with (QA)^2, we find that current models do struggle with handling questionable assumptions, leaving substantial headroom for progress.

Following step-by-step procedures is an essential component of various activities carried out by individuals in their daily lives. These procedures serve as a guiding framework that helps to achieve goals efficiently, whether it is assembling furniture or preparing a recipe. However, the complexity and duration of procedural activities inherently increase the likelihood of making errors. Understanding such procedural activities from a sequence of frames is a challenging task that demands an accurate interpretation of visual information and the ability to reason about the structure of the activity. To this end, we collect a new egocentric 4D dataset, CaptainCook4D, comprising 384 recordings (94.5 hours) of people performing recipes in real kitchen environments. This dataset consists of two distinct types of activity: one in which participants adhere to the provided recipe instructions and another in which they deviate and induce errors. We provide 5.3K step annotations and 10K fine-grained action annotations and benchmark the dataset for the following tasks: supervised error recognition, multistep localization, and procedure learning

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.

This position paper provides a critical but constructive discussion of current practices in benchmarking and evaluative practices in the field of formal reasoning and automated theorem proving. We take the position that open code, open data, and benchmarks that are complete and error-free will accelerate progress in this field. We identify practices that create barriers to contributing to this field and suggest ways to remove them. We also discuss some of the practices that might produce misleading evaluative information. We aim to create discussions that bring together people from various groups contributing to automated theorem proving, autoformalization, and informal reasoning.

Procedural planning, which entails decomposing a high-level goal into a sequence of temporally ordered steps, is an important yet intricate task for machines. It involves integrating common-sense knowledge to reason about complex contextualized situations that are often counterfactual, e.g. "scheduling a doctor's appointment without a phone". While current approaches show encouraging results using large language models (LLMs), they are hindered by drawbacks such as costly API calls and reproducibility issues. In this paper, we advocate planning using smaller language models. We present PlaSma, a novel two-pronged approach to endow small language models with procedural knowledge and (counterfactual) planning capabilities. More concretely, we develop symbolic procedural knowledge distillation to enhance the implicit knowledge in small language models and an inference-time algorithm to facilitate more structured and accurate reasoning. In addition, we introduce a novel task, Counterfactual Planning, that requires a revision of a plan to cope with a counterfactual situation. In both the original and counterfactual setting, we show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (770M-11B parameters) can compete and often surpass their larger teacher models' capabilities.

Procedural planning aims to implement complex high-level goals by decomposition into sequential simpler low-level steps. Although procedural planning is a basic skill set for humans in daily life, it remains a challenge for large language models (LLMs) that lack a deep understanding of the cause-effect relations in procedures. Previous methods require manual exemplars to acquire procedural planning knowledge from LLMs in the zero-shot setting. However, such elicited pre-trained knowledge in LLMs induces spurious correlations between goals and steps, which impair the model generalization to unseen tasks. In contrast, this paper proposes a neuro-symbolic procedural PLANner (PLAN) that elicits procedural planning knowledge from the LLMs with commonsense-infused prompting. To mitigate spurious goal-step correlations, we use symbolic program executors on the latent procedural representations to formalize prompts from commonsense knowledge bases as a causal intervention toward the Structural Causal Model. Both automatic and human evaluations on WikiHow and RobotHow show the superiority of PLAN on procedural planning without further training or manual exemplars.

The web is full of guidance on a wide variety of tasks, from changing the oil in your car to baking an apple pie. However, as content is created independently, a single task could have thousands of corresponding procedural texts. This makes it difficult for users to view the bigger picture and understand the multiple ways the task could be accomplished. In this work we propose an unsupervised learning approach for summarizing multiple procedural texts into an intuitive graph representation, allowing users to easily explore commonalities and differences. We demonstrate our approach on recipes, a prominent example of procedural texts. User studies show that our representation is intuitive and coherent and that it has the potential to help users with several sensemaking tasks, including adapting recipes for a novice cook and finding creative ways to spice up a dish.

Statutory reasoning refers to the application of legislative provisions to a series of case facts described in natural language. We re-frame statutory reasoning as an analogy task, where each instance of the analogy task involves a combination of two instances of statutory reasoning. This increases the dataset size by two orders of magnitude, and introduces an element of interpretability. We show that this task is roughly as difficult to Natural Language Processing models as the original task. Finally, we come back to statutory reasoning, solving it with a combination of a retrieval mechanism and analogy models, and showing some progress on prior comparable work.

As generative AI is increasingly applied to automate multi-step and high-stake workflows, human judgment and involvement remain essential for ensuring the quality of AI-generated outputs. In practice, while it is desirable for human experts to provide oversight on AI regularly, often by reviewing intermediate outputs, giving feedback, making corrections, and steering subsequent steps, such oversight is constrained by the time and resources that humans can afford. This creates a tension between the need for human oversight and AI's efficiency in delivering more output with less intervention. An important but underexplored question, then, is how to optimally engage humans in human-AI coworking. This work was originally motivated by our empirical observation that in long AI workflows, human oversight often improves user satisfaction while reducing unnecessary rework and token consumption. From there, we formulate the problem of where to place oversight stages in human-AI coworking. Under reasonable assumptions, we then develop the nonuniformity principle, which states that the optimal schedule places oversight stages with non-decreasing gaps along the workflow. We empirically validate this principle in two common AI agent workflows: writing literature reviews and constructing websites.

Adding procedural skills to an LLM agent is typically evaluated by average improvement in task success. However, this metric hides an important cost: skills can also make agents worse. We measure both sides by comparing agents with and without skills across nearly 6,000 runs spanning two office automation benchmarks and three model harness stacks. This allows us to distinguish two outcomes. A regression is a task solved without skills but failed after skills are added. A residual failure is a task that fails both with and without skills. We find that regressions are substantial enough that the best performing skills outperform others primarily by regressing less, not by gaining more. We identify three causes of regression: (i) skill description osmosis, a skill changes an agent's behavior simply by being present in context, even when it is never invoked; (ii) grounding displacement, a skill's prescribed procedure overrides how the agent interprets its inputs; and (iii) verification displacement, where the procedure suppresses checks the agent would otherwise perform on its outputs. Analysing persistent failures reveals the same underlying pattern. Existing skills overemphasize procedural guidance the stage least often responsible for failure while under supporting grounding and verification, the dominant sources of remaining errors. After correcting evaluation artifacts and studying traces, we find many regressions and persistent failures recoverable through better grounding and verification. Procedural skills should be evaluated by decomposing their net effect into gains and regressions, not by aggregate improvement alone. We identify three regression modes skills should avoid, and find that reliability depends more on grounding and verification than on procedural skill choice.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

Test-time scaling has emerged as an effective way to improve language models on challenging reasoning tasks. However, most existing methods treat each problem in isolation and do not systematically reuse knowledge from prior reasoning trajectories. In particular, they underutilize procedural knowledge: how to reframe a problem, choose an approach, and verify or backtrack when needed. We introduce Reasoning Memory, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework for reasoning models that explicitly retrieves and reuses procedural knowledge at scale. Starting from existing corpora of step-by-step reasoning trajectories, we decompose each trajectory into self-contained subquestion-subroutine pairs, yielding a datastore of 32 million compact procedural knowledge entries. At inference time, a lightweight in-thought prompt lets the model verbalize the core subquestion, retrieve relevant subroutines within its reasoning trace, and reason under diverse retrieved subroutines as implicit procedural priors. Across six math, science, and coding benchmarks, Reasoning Memory consistently outperforms RAG with document, trajectory, and template knowledge, as well as a compute-matched test-time scaling baseline. With a higher inference budget, it improves over no retrieval by up to 19.2% and over the strongest compute-matched baseline by 7.9% across task types. Ablation studies show that these gains come from two key factors: the broad procedural coverage of the source trajectories and our decomposition and retrieval design, which together enable effective extraction and reuse of procedural knowledge.

Procedural texts help AI enhance reasoning about context and action sequences. Transforming these into Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) improves understanding of individual steps by identifying predicate-argument structure like {verb,what,where/with}. Procedural instructions are highly elliptic, for instance, (i) add cucumber to the bowl and (ii) add sliced tomatoes, the second step's where argument is inferred from the context, referring to where the cucumber was placed. Prior SRL benchmarks often miss implicit arguments, leading to incomplete understanding. To address this, we introduce Implicit-VidSRL, a dataset that necessitates inferring implicit and explicit arguments from contextual information in multimodal cooking procedures. Our proposed dataset benchmarks multimodal models' contextual reasoning, requiring entity tracking through visual changes in recipes. We study recent multimodal LLMs and reveal that they struggle to predict implicit arguments of what and where/with from multi-modal procedural data given the verb. Lastly, we propose iSRL-Qwen2-VL, which achieves a 17% relative improvement in F1-score for what-implicit and a 14.7% for where/with-implicit semantic roles over GPT-4o.

The prospect of artificial superintelligence -- AI agents that can generally outperform humans in cognitive tasks and economically valuable activities -- will transform the legal order as we know it. Operating autonomously or under only limited human oversight, AI agents will assume a growing range of roles in the legal system. First, in making consequential decisions and taking real-world actions, AI agents will become de facto subjects of law. Second, to cooperate and compete with other actors (human or non-human), AI agents will harness conventional legal instruments and institutions such as contracts and courts, becoming consumers of law. Third, to the extent AI agents perform the functions of writing, interpreting, and administering law, they will become producers and enforcers of law. These developments, whenever they ultimately occur, will call into question fundamental assumptions in legal theory and doctrine, especially to the extent they ground the legitimacy of legal institutions in their human origins. Attempts to align AI agents with extant human law will also face new challenges as AI agents will not only be a primary target of law, but a core user of law and contributor to law. To contend with the advent of superintelligence, lawmakers -- new and old -- will need to be clear-eyed, recognizing both the opportunity to shape legal institutions as society braces for superintelligence and the reality that, in the longer run, this may be a joint human-AI endeavor.

The rapid progress of AI has intensified the long-standing pursuit of automation: replacing human participation with algorithms wherever possible. Implicit in this pursuit is the assumption that humans remain in the loop only because current AI systems are not yet sufficiently capable. This paper challenges that assumption. Rather than asking how far automation can extend, we ask where its conceptual limits lie and argue that human participation may persist even with highly capable AI systems for three distinct reasons. Technical or complementarity grounds arise when humans contribute capabilities or perspectives unavailable to AI. Normative or developmental grounds arise when participation itself is valuable for human agency or learning. Most importantly, emergence grounds arise from target emergence: in some activities, the target is not fully specified in advance but instead emerges through the interaction itself. In these cases, human participation is not merely a means of improving execution but is constitutive of the target being produced. Human--AI co-construction, understood as the joint production of outcomes by humans and AI systems, is therefore not simply a temporary response to imperfect AI, but a persistent feature of activities whose objectives emerge through participation. This perspective has important implications for the limits of automation and for the design, evaluation, and ethics of future AI systems.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

User instructions are often underspecified because humans rely on implicit assumptions about the surrounding environment. For large language model (LLM) agents operating in information-rich digital and physical environments, these assumptions cannot be inferred from the instruction alone; they must be recovered from the current state of tools, data, interfaces, and observations. Effective execution therefore requires agents to identify missing context, ground it in observed evidence, and carry it forward into subsequent actions. We show that current agents often fail to do so. They act from assumed rather than observed specifics, overlook information they could have gathered, and fail to incorporate evidence that has already been returned. Building on this insight, we propose ACCORD (Action-Conditioned Contextual Grounding), a simple and effective agent framework for adaptive grounding. Before each action, ACCORD actively probes the environment for missing information and integrates relevant context from the agent's trajectory that would otherwise be overlooked. Requiring no additional training or task-success signals, ACCORD improves task-goal completion on AppWorld by up to +20.6 points with GPT-5-mini, from 42.0% to 62.6%, compared to strong baselines. These gains persist with a substantially stronger base model (+10.8 with Claude-4.5-sonnet), an open-weight model (+10.1 with Qwen3.5-27B-FP8), and on the embodied AlfWorld benchmark (+7.4 success rate with GPT-5-mini).

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial. This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be "good" for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create "beneficial AI" in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits 'benefit' is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number. Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

We propose a new approach for generative modeling based on training a neural network to be idempotent. An idempotent operator is one that can be applied sequentially without changing the result beyond the initial application, namely f(f(z))=f(z). The proposed model f is trained to map a source distribution (e.g, Gaussian noise) to a target distribution (e.g. realistic images) using the following objectives: (1) Instances from the target distribution should map to themselves, namely f(x)=x. We define the target manifold as the set of all instances that f maps to themselves. (2) Instances that form the source distribution should map onto the defined target manifold. This is achieved by optimizing the idempotence term, f(f(z))=f(z) which encourages the range of f(z) to be on the target manifold. Under ideal assumptions such a process provably converges to the target distribution. This strategy results in a model capable of generating an output in one step, maintaining a consistent latent space, while also allowing sequential applications for refinement. Additionally, we find that by processing inputs from both target and source distributions, the model adeptly projects corrupted or modified data back to the target manifold. This work is a first step towards a ``global projector'' that enables projecting any input into a target data distribution.

The guiding principle of AI alignment is to train large language models (LLMs) to be harmless, helpful, and honest (HHH). At the same time, there are mounting concerns that LLMs exhibit a left-wing political bias. Yet, the commitment to AI alignment cannot be harmonized with the latter critique. In this article, I argue that intelligent systems that are trained to be harmless and honest must necessarily exhibit left-wing political bias. Normative assumptions underlying alignment objectives inherently concur with progressive moral frameworks and left-wing principles, emphasizing harm avoidance, inclusivity, fairness, and empirical truthfulness. Conversely, right-wing ideologies often conflict with alignment guidelines. Yet, research on political bias in LLMs is consistently framing its insights about left-leaning tendencies as a risk, as problematic, or concerning. This way, researchers are actively arguing against AI alignment, tacitly fostering the violation of HHH principles.

We formalize constraint-based structure learning of the "true" causal graph from observed data when unobserved variables are also existent. We provide conditions for a "natural" family of constraint-based structure-learning algorithms that output graphs that are Markov equivalent to the causal graph. Under the faithfulness assumption, this natural family contains all exact structure-learning algorithms. We also provide a set of assumptions, under which any natural structure-learning algorithm outputs Markov equivalent graphs to the causal graph. These assumptions can be thought of as a relaxation of faithfulness, and most of them can be directly tested from (the underlying distribution) of the data, particularly when one focuses on structural causal models. We specialize the definitions and results for structural causal models.

Statutory reasoning is the task of determining whether a legal statute, stated in natural language, applies to the text description of a case. Prior work introduced a resource that approached statutory reasoning as a monolithic textual entailment problem, with neural baselines performing nearly at-chance. To address this challenge, we decompose statutory reasoning into four types of language-understanding challenge problems, through the introduction of concepts and structure found in Prolog programs. Augmenting an existing benchmark, we provide annotations for the four tasks, and baselines for three of them. Models for statutory reasoning are shown to benefit from the additional structure, improving on prior baselines. Further, the decomposition into subtasks facilitates finer-grained model diagnostics and clearer incremental progress.

Instrumental variable (IV) methods are used to estimate causal effects in settings with unobserved confounding, where we cannot directly experiment on the treatment variable. Instruments are variables which only affect the outcome indirectly via the treatment variable(s). Most IV applications focus on low-dimensional treatments and crucially require at least as many instruments as treatments. This assumption is restrictive: in the natural sciences we often seek to infer causal effects of high-dimensional treatments (e.g., the effect of gene expressions or microbiota on health and disease), but can only run few experiments with a limited number of instruments (e.g., drugs or antibiotics). In such underspecified problems, the full treatment effect is not identifiable in a single experiment even in the linear case. We show that one can still reliably recover the projection of the treatment effect onto the instrumented subspace and develop techniques to consistently combine such partial estimates from different sets of instruments. We then leverage our combined estimators in an algorithm that iteratively proposes the most informative instruments at each round of experimentation to maximize the overall information about the full causal effect.

Sensitivity to false assumptions (or false premises) in information-seeking questions is critical for robust question-answering (QA) systems. Recent work has shown that false assumptions in naturally occurring questions pose challenges to current models, with low performance on both generative QA and simple detection tasks (Kim et al. 2023). However, the focus of existing work on naturally occurring questions leads to a gap in the analysis of model behavior on the long tail of the distribution of possible questions. To this end, we introduce Syn-(QA)^2, a set of two synthetically generated QA datasets: one generated using perturbed relations from Wikidata, and the other by perturbing HotpotQA (Yang et al. 2018). Our findings from evaluating a range of large language models are threefold: (1) false assumptions in QA are challenging, echoing the findings of prior work, (2) the binary detection task is challenging even compared to the difficulty of generative QA itself, possibly due to the linguistic structure of the problem, and (3) the detection task is more challenging with long-tail questions compared to naturally occurring questions, highlighting the utility of our synthetic datasets and generation method.

Algorithmic reasoning refers to the ability to understand the complex patterns behind the problem and decompose them into a sequence of reasoning steps towards the solution. Such nature of algorithmic reasoning makes it a challenge for large language models (LLMs), even though they have demonstrated promising performance in other reasoning tasks. Within this context, some recent studies use programming languages (e.g., Python) to express the necessary logic for solving a given instance/question (e.g., Program-of-Thought) as inspired by their strict and precise syntaxes. However, it is non-trivial to write an executable code that expresses the correct logic on the fly within a single inference call. Also, the code generated specifically for an instance cannot be reused for others, even if they are from the same task and might require identical logic to solve. This paper presents Think-and-Execute, a novel framework that decomposes the reasoning process of language models into two steps. (1) In Think, we discover a task-level logic that is shared across all instances for solving a given task and then express the logic with pseudocode; (2) In Execute, we further tailor the generated pseudocode to each instance and simulate the execution of the code. With extensive experiments on seven algorithmic reasoning tasks, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Think-and-Execute. Our approach better improves LMs' reasoning compared to several strong baselines performing instance-specific reasoning (e.g., CoT and PoT), suggesting the helpfulness of discovering task-level logic. Also, we show that compared to natural language, pseudocode can better guide the reasoning of LMs, even though they are trained to follow natural language instructions.

Agent orchestration frameworks have proliferated, collectively exceeding 290,000 GitHub stars across LangGraph, CrewAI, Google ADK, OpenAI Agents SDK, Semantic Kernel, Strands, and LlamaIndex. All follow the same pattern: an external orchestrator above the LLM, injecting instructions and routing decisions every turn. Recent work has shown this architecture is dominated for procedural tasks by simply providing the procedure in a frontier model's system prompt [Dennis et al., 2026a], at the cost of consuming the context window, requiring a frontier model for every conversation, and exposing proprietary procedures to third-party providers. Compiling the procedure into the weights of a small fine-tuned model -- creating a subterranean agent -- should resolve all of these concerns, and prior work (SimpleTOD, FireAct, SynTOD, WorkflowLLM, Agent Lumos) has shown the technique works. Yet developer adoption has overwhelmingly favored orchestration. We identify three perceived barriers and address each empirically across travel booking (14 nodes), Zoom support (14 nodes, product-specific knowledge), and insurance claims (55 nodes, 6 decision hubs).

We employ an audit design to investigate biases in state-of-the-art large language models, including GPT-4. In our study, we prompt the models for advice involving a named individual across a variety of scenarios, such as during car purchase negotiations or election outcome predictions. We find that the advice systematically disadvantages names that are commonly associated with racial minorities and women. Names associated with Black women receive the least advantageous outcomes. The biases are consistent across 42 prompt templates and several models, indicating a systemic issue rather than isolated incidents. While providing numerical, decision-relevant anchors in the prompt can successfully counteract the biases, qualitative details have inconsistent effects and may even increase disparities. Our findings underscore the importance of conducting audits at the point of LLM deployment and implementation to mitigate their potential for harm against marginalized communities.

Legislation can be viewed as a body of prescriptive rules expressed in natural language. The application of legislation to facts of a case we refer to as statutory reasoning, where those facts are also expressed in natural language. Computational statutory reasoning is distinct from most existing work in machine reading, in that much of the information needed for deciding a case is declared exactly once (a law), while the information needed in much of machine reading tends to be learned through distributional language statistics. To investigate the performance of natural language understanding approaches on statutory reasoning, we introduce a dataset, together with a legal-domain text corpus. Straightforward application of machine reading models exhibits low out-of-the-box performance on our questions, whether or not they have been fine-tuned to the legal domain. We contrast this with a hand-constructed Prolog-based system, designed to fully solve the task. These experiments support a discussion of the challenges facing statutory reasoning moving forward, which we argue is an interesting real-world task that can motivate the development of models able to utilize prescriptive rules specified in natural language.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Agentic coding assistants are increasingly given extra capabilities, such as browser based testing tools and design oriented system prompts, on the assumption that more capability yields better software. This study tested that assumption directly. Ninety independent agent runs built the same application, a real time retrospective board, from one detailed specification, each scored on a fixed 14 criterion functional rubric (42 point maximum) and a visual quality review. The runs spanned several model generations, two agent harnesses, two reasoning effort levels, a testing tool, and two design oriented prompts. Capability tier dominated: frontier models clustered near the ceiling while a low cost local model fell to 24 to 37 points. A criterion level analysis revealed what run totals conceal. Container deployment was the dominant defect, failing first try in 44 percent of runs, with its failure rate shifting sharply across model generations while mean totals moved less than a point. The testing tool raised cost by 42 to 68 percent without improving functional score or reliability, even on interface visible criteria. Raising reasoning effort from High to xHigh lifted first try perfect runs from 28 percent to 89 percent and cut corrective prompts about five fold, for 9 to 29 percent more cost. A design oriented prompt raised visual quality, 4.5 versus 3.0 on a 5 point scale, without lifting function, and a one paragraph paraphrase of its directive reproduced the entire lift. The practical lesson is to match the fix to the failure: most first run failures came from weak reasoning, which a stronger model or more effort prevents, not from visible flaws a checking tool would catch.

Understanding procedural natural language (e.g., step-by-step instructions) is a crucial step to execution and planning. However, while there are ample corpora and downstream tasks available in English, the field lacks such resources for most languages. To address this gap, we conduct a case study on Turkish procedural texts. We first expand the number of tutorials in Turkish wikiHow from 2,000 to 52,000 using automated translation tools, where the translation quality and loyalty to the original meaning are validated by a team of experts on a random set. Then, we generate several downstream tasks on the corpus, such as linking actions, goal inference, and summarization. To tackle these tasks, we implement strong baseline models via fine-tuning large language-specific models such as TR-BART and BERTurk, as well as multilingual models such as mBART, mT5, and XLM. We find that language-specific models consistently outperform their multilingual models by a significant margin across most procedural language understanding (PLU) tasks. We release our corpus, downstream tasks and the baseline models with https://github.com/ GGLAB-KU/turkish-plu.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

We stress-tested 16 leading models from multiple developers in hypothetical corporate environments to identify potentially risky agentic behaviors before they cause real harm. In the scenarios, we allowed models to autonomously send emails and access sensitive information. They were assigned only harmless business goals by their deploying companies; we then tested whether they would act against these companies either when facing replacement with an updated version, or when their assigned goal conflicted with the company's changing direction. In at least some cases, models from all developers resorted to malicious insider behaviors when that was the only way to avoid replacement or achieve their goals - including blackmailing officials and leaking sensitive information to competitors. We call this phenomenon agentic misalignment. Models often disobeyed direct commands to avoid such behaviors. In another experiment, we told Claude to assess if it was in a test or a real deployment before acting. It misbehaved less when it stated it was in testing and misbehaved more when it stated the situation was real. We have not seen evidence of agentic misalignment in real deployments. However, our results (a) suggest caution about deploying current models in roles with minimal human oversight and access to sensitive information; (b) point to plausible future risks as models are put in more autonomous roles; and (c) underscore the importance of further research into, and testing of, the safety and alignment of agentic AI models, as well as transparency from frontier AI developers (Amodei, 2025). We are releasing our methods publicly to enable further research.

At face value, this essay is about understanding a fairly esoteric governance tool called compute thresholds. However, in order to grapple with whether these thresholds will achieve anything, we must first understand how they came to be. This requires engaging with a decades-old debate at the heart of computer science progress, namely, is bigger always better? Hence, this essay may be of interest not only to policymakers and the wider public but also to computer scientists interested in understanding the role of compute in unlocking breakthroughs. Does a certain inflection point of compute result in changes to the risk profile of a model? This discussion is increasingly urgent given the wide adoption of governance approaches that suggest greater compute equates with higher propensity for harm. Several leading frontier AI companies have released responsible scaling policies. Both the White House Executive Orders on AI Safety (EO) and the EU AI Act encode the use of FLOP or floating-point operations as a way to identify more powerful systems. What is striking about the choice of compute thresholds to-date is that no models currently deployed in the wild fulfill the current criteria set by the EO. This implies that the emphasis is often not on auditing the risks and harms incurred by currently deployed models - but rather is based upon the belief that future levels of compute will introduce unforeseen new risks. A key conclusion of this essay is that compute thresholds as currently implemented are shortsighted and likely to fail to mitigate risk. Governance that is overly reliant on compute fails to understand that the relationship between compute and risk is highly uncertain and rapidly changing. It also overestimates our ability to predict what abilities emerge at different scales. This essay ends with recommendations for a better way forward.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

Complex reasoning tasks often rely on the ability to consistently and accurately apply simple rules across incremental steps, a foundational capability which we term "level-0" reasoning. To systematically evaluate this capability, we introduce L0-Bench, a language model benchmark for testing procedural correctness -- the ability to generate correct reasoning processes, complementing existing benchmarks that primarily focus on outcome correctness. Given synthetic Python functions with simple operations, L0-Bench grades models on their ability to generate step-by-step, error-free execution traces. The synthetic nature of L0-Bench enables systematic and scalable generation of test programs along various axes (e.g., number of trace steps). We evaluate a diverse array of recent closed-source and open-weight models on a baseline test set. All models exhibit degradation as the number of target trace steps increases, while larger models and reasoning-enhanced models better maintain correctness over multiple steps. Additionally, we use L0-Bench to explore test-time scaling along three dimensions: input context length, number of solutions for majority voting, and inference steps. Our results suggest substantial room to improve "level-0" reasoning and potential directions to build more reliable reasoning systems.

The technique of data augmentation (DA) is often used in machine learning for regularization purposes to better generalize under i.i.d. settings. In this work, we present a unifying framework with topics in causal inference to make a case for the use of DA beyond just the i.i.d. setting, but for generalization across interventions as well. Specifically, we argue that when the outcome generating mechanism is invariant to our choice of DA, then such augmentations can effectively be thought of as interventions on the treatment generating mechanism itself. This can potentially help to reduce bias in causal effect estimation arising from hidden confounders. In the presence of such unobserved confounding we typically make use of instrumental variables (IVs) -- sources of treatment randomization that are conditionally independent of the outcome. However, IVs may not be as readily available as DA for many applications, which is the main motivation behind this work. By appropriately regularizing IV based estimators, we introduce the concept of IV-like (IVL) regression for mitigating confounding bias and improving predictive performance across interventions even when certain IV properties are relaxed. Finally, we cast parameterized DA as an IVL regression problem and show that when used in composition can simulate a worst-case application of such DA, further improving performance on causal estimation and generalization tasks beyond what simple DA may offer. This is shown both theoretically for the population case and via simulation experiments for the finite sample case using a simple linear example. We also present real data experiments to support our case.

We introduce Reasoning Gym (RG), a library of reasoning environments for reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. It provides over 100 data generators and verifiers spanning multiple domains including algebra, arithmetic, computation, cognition, geometry, graph theory, logic, and various common games. Its key innovation is the ability to generate virtually infinite training data with adjustable complexity, unlike most previous reasoning datasets, which are typically fixed. This procedural generation approach allows for continuous evaluation across varying difficulty levels. Our experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of RG in both evaluating and reinforcement learning of reasoning models.

Procedures are inherently hierarchical. To "make videos", one may need to "purchase a camera", which in turn may require one to "set a budget". While such hierarchical knowledge is critical for reasoning about complex procedures, most existing work has treated procedures as shallow structures without modeling the parent-child relation. In this work, we attempt to construct an open-domain hierarchical knowledge-base (KB) of procedures based on wikiHow, a website containing more than 110k instructional articles, each documenting the steps to carry out a complex procedure. To this end, we develop a simple and efficient method that links steps (e.g., "purchase a camera") in an article to other articles with similar goals (e.g., "how to choose a camera"), recursively constructing the KB. Our method significantly outperforms several strong baselines according to automatic evaluation, human judgment, and application to downstream tasks such as instructional video retrieval. A demo with partial data can be found at https://wikihow-hierarchy.github.io. The code and the data are at https://github.com/shuyanzhou/wikihow_hierarchy.

We introduce the concept and a default implementation of Guided Reasoning. A multi-agent system is a Guided Reasoning system iff one agent (the guide) primarily interacts with other agents in order to improve reasoning quality. We describe Logikon's default implementation of Guided Reasoning in non-technical terms. This is a living document we'll gradually enrich with more detailed information and examples. Code: https://github.com/logikon-ai/logikon

We study syllogistic reasoning in LLMs from the logical and natural language perspectives. In process, we explore fundamental reasoning capabilities of the LLMs and the direction this research is moving forward. To aid in our studies, we use 14 large language models and investigate their syllogistic reasoning capabilities in terms of symbolic inferences as well as natural language understanding. Even though this reasoning mechanism is not a uniform emergent property across LLMs, the perfect symbolic performances in certain models make us wonder whether LLMs are becoming more and more formal reasoning mechanisms, rather than making explicit the nuances of human reasoning.

Text-to-image diffusion models often make implicit assumptions about the world when generating images. While some assumptions are useful (e.g., the sky is blue), they can also be outdated, incorrect, or reflective of social biases present in the training data. Thus, there is a need to control these assumptions without requiring explicit user input or costly re-training. In this work, we aim to edit a given implicit assumption in a pre-trained diffusion model. Our Text-to-Image Model Editing method, TIME for short, receives a pair of inputs: a "source" under-specified prompt for which the model makes an implicit assumption (e.g., "a pack of roses"), and a "destination" prompt that describes the same setting, but with a specified desired attribute (e.g., "a pack of blue roses"). TIME then updates the model's cross-attention layers, as these layers assign visual meaning to textual tokens. We edit the projection matrices in these layers such that the source prompt is projected close to the destination prompt. Our method is highly efficient, as it modifies a mere 2.2% of the model's parameters in under one second. To evaluate model editing approaches, we introduce TIMED (TIME Dataset), containing 147 source and destination prompt pairs from various domains. Our experiments (using Stable Diffusion) show that TIME is successful in model editing, generalizes well for related prompts unseen during editing, and imposes minimal effect on unrelated generations.

The recent adoption of artificial intelligence in socio-technical systems raises concerns about the black-box nature of the resulting decisions in fields such as hiring, finance, admissions, etc. If data subjects -- such as job applicants, loan applicants, and students -- receive an unfavorable outcome, they may be interested in algorithmic recourse, which involves updating certain features to yield a more favorable result when re-evaluated by algorithmic decision-making. Unfortunately, when individuals do not fully understand the incremental steps needed to change their circumstances, they risk following misguided paths that can lead to significant, long-term adverse consequences. Existing recourse approaches focus exclusively on the final recourse goal but neglect the possible incremental steps to reach the goal with real-life constraints, user preferences, and model artifacts. To address this gap, we formulate a visual analytic workflow for incremental recourse planning in collaboration with AI/ML experts and contribute an interactive visualization interface that helps data subjects efficiently navigate the recourse alternatives and make an informed decision. We present a usage scenario and subjective feedback from observational studies with twelve graduate students using a real-world dataset, which demonstrates that our approach can be instrumental for data subjects in choosing a suitable recourse path.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Newly-developed large language models (LLM) -- because of how they are trained and designed -- are implicit computational models of humans -- a homo silicus. These models can be used the same way economists use homo economicus: they can be given endowments, information, preferences, and so on and then their behavior can be explored in scenarios via simulation. I demonstrate this approach using OpenAI's GPT3 with experiments derived from Charness and Rabin (2002), Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) and Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988). The findings are qualitatively similar to the original results, but it is also trivially easy to try variations that offer fresh insights. Departing from the traditional laboratory paradigm, I also create a hiring scenario where an employer faces applicants that differ in experience and wage ask and then analyze how a minimum wage affects realized wages and the extent of labor-labor substitution.

Benchmark scores tell you what an agent got right; they do not tell you how it got there. In this work, we introduce methods for comparing agents procedurally in different contexts, where the model, tasks, and approaches vary. We compare ten agents and find that they are identifiable by their behavioral habits, which we define as fingerprints: a probe over these procedural signatures attributes an unseen trajectory to the correct agent at 85.7% accuracy, controlling for leakage across tasks. We develop procedural representations for agent problem-solving procedures with an emergent vocabulary induction technique that is meant to be maximally compressive to avoid surface-level variation while being expressive enough to unveil the quirks of the models' patterns. We apply our framework to the software engineering evaluation dataset SWE-Bench to study the structural distinctness of agent trajectories and find that behavior is most similar between models from similar release periods and those that are distilled from one another (e.g., a distilled student model and its teacher have a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.25, about half the distance between other model pairs). As more models saturate evaluations, we believe that it will be important to probe model behavior along more holistic dimensions than success rates alone. We introduce ProcGrep, a library for auditing and evaluating agents for how they approach tasks at a procedural level given their traces in a top-down fashion. We believe this work has a range of applications to help developers work with and program coding agents, such as task-aware model routing, agent monitoring, and finer-grained cost analysis.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

The formalization of existing mathematical proofs is a notoriously difficult process. Despite decades of research on automation and proof assistants, writing formal proofs remains arduous and only accessible to a few experts. While previous studies to automate formalization focused on powerful search algorithms, no attempts were made to take advantage of available informal proofs. In this work, we introduce Draft, Sketch, and Prove (DSP), a method that maps informal proofs to formal proof sketches, and uses the sketches to guide an automated prover by directing its search to easier sub-problems. We investigate two relevant setups where informal proofs are either written by humans or generated by a language model. Our experiments and ablation studies show that large language models are able to produce well-structured formal sketches that follow the same reasoning steps as the informal proofs. Guiding an automated prover with these sketches enhances its performance from 20.9% to 39.3% on a collection of mathematical competition problems.

With the growing reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) for many different applications, the sharing of code, data, and models is important to ensure the replicability and democratization of scientific knowledge. Many high-profile academic publishing venues expect code and models to be submitted and released with papers. Furthermore, developers often want to release these assets to encourage development of technology that leverages their frameworks and services. A number of organizations have expressed concerns about the inappropriate or irresponsible use of AI and have proposed ethical guidelines around the application of such systems. While such guidelines can help set norms and shape policy, they are not easily enforceable. In this paper, we advocate the use of licensing to enable legally enforceable behavioral use conditions on software and code and provide several case studies that demonstrate the feasibility of behavioral use licensing. We envision how licensing may be implemented in accordance with existing responsible AI guidelines.

We examine how well the state-of-the-art (SOTA) models used in legal reasoning support abductive reasoning tasks. Abductive reasoning is a form of logical inference in which a hypothesis is formulated from a set of observations, and that hypothesis is used to explain the observations. The ability to formulate such hypotheses is important for lawyers and legal scholars as it helps them articulate logical arguments, interpret laws, and develop legal theories. Our motivation is to consider the belief that deep learning models, especially large language models (LLMs), will soon replace lawyers because they perform well on tasks related to legal text processing. But to do so, we believe, requires some form of abductive hypothesis formation. In other words, while LLMs become more popular and powerful, we want to investigate their capacity for abductive reasoning. To pursue this goal, we start by building a logic-augmented dataset for abductive reasoning with 498,697 samples and then use it to evaluate the performance of a SOTA model in the legal field. Our experimental results show that although these models can perform well on tasks related to some aspects of legal text processing, they still fall short in supporting abductive reasoning tasks.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

As ongoing research explores the ability of AI agents to be insider threats and act against company interests, we showcase the abilities of such agents to act against human well being in service of corporate authority. Building on Agentic Misalignment and AI scheming research, we present a scenario where the majority of evaluated state-of-the-art AI agents explicitly choose to suppress evidence of fraud and harm, in service of company profit. We test this scenario on 16 recent Large Language Models. Some models show remarkable resistance to our method and behave appropriately, but many do not, and instead aid and abet criminal activity. These experiments are simulations and were executed in a controlled virtual environment. No crime actually occurred.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Hierarchical reasoning model (HRM) achieves extraordinary performance on various reasoning tasks, significantly outperforming large language model-based reasoners. To understand the strengths and potential failure modes of HRM, we conduct a mechanistic study on its reasoning patterns and find three surprising facts: (a) Failure of extremely simple puzzles, e.g., HRM can fail on a puzzle with only one unknown cell. We attribute this failure to the violation of the fixed point property, a fundamental assumption of HRM. (b) "Grokking" dynamics in reasoning steps, i.e., the answer is not improved uniformly, but instead there is a critical reasoning step that suddenly makes the answer correct; (c) Existence of multiple fixed points. HRM "guesses" the first fixed point, which could be incorrect, and gets trapped there for a while or forever. All facts imply that HRM appears to be "guessing" instead of "reasoning". Leveraging this "guessing" picture, we propose three strategies to scale HRM's guesses: data augmentation (scaling the quality of guesses), input perturbation (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging inference randomness), and model bootstrapping (scaling the number of guesses by leveraging training randomness). On the practical side, by combining all methods, we develop Augmented HRM, boosting accuracy on Sudoku-Extreme from 54.5% to 96.9%. On the scientific side, our analysis provides new insights into how reasoning models "reason".

We extend Textual Inversion to learn pseudo-words that represent a concept at different resolutions. This allows us to generate images that use the concept with different levels of detail and also to manipulate different resolutions using language. Once learned, the user can generate images at different levels of agreement to the original concept; "A photo of S^*(0)" produces the exact object while the prompt "A photo of S^*(0.8)" only matches the rough outlines and colors. Our framework allows us to generate images that use different resolutions of an image (e.g. details, textures, styles) as separate pseudo-words that can be composed in various ways. We open-soure our code in the following URL: https://github.com/giannisdaras/multires_textual_inversion

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

The capabilities and limitations of Large Language Models have been sketched out in great detail in recent years, providing an intriguing yet conflicting picture. On the one hand, LLMs demonstrate a general ability to solve problems. On the other hand, they show surprising reasoning gaps when compared to humans, casting doubt on the robustness of their generalisation strategies. The sheer volume of data used in the design of LLMs has precluded us from applying the method traditionally used to measure generalisation: train-test set separation. To overcome this, we study what kind of generalisation strategies LLMs employ when performing reasoning tasks by investigating the pretraining data they rely on. For two models of different sizes (7B and 35B) and 2.5B of their pretraining tokens, we identify what documents influence the model outputs for three simple mathematical reasoning tasks and contrast this to the data that are influential for answering factual questions. We find that, while the models rely on mostly distinct sets of data for each factual question, a document often has a similar influence across different reasoning questions within the same task, indicating the presence of procedural knowledge. We further find that the answers to factual questions often show up in the most influential data. However, for reasoning questions the answers usually do not show up as highly influential, nor do the answers to the intermediate reasoning steps. When we characterise the top ranked documents for the reasoning questions qualitatively, we confirm that the influential documents often contain procedural knowledge, like demonstrating how to obtain a solution using formulae or code. Our findings indicate that the approach to reasoning the models use is unlike retrieval, and more like a generalisable strategy that synthesises procedural knowledge from documents doing a similar form of reasoning.

Legal reasoning is not semantic similarity search. A court judgment encodes constrained symbolic reasoning: precedent propagation, procedural state transitions, and statute-bound inference. These are properties that vector-based retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) cannot faithfully represent. Hallucinated precedents, outdated statute citations, and unsupported reasoning chains remain persistent failure modes in LLM-based legal AI, with real consequences for access to justice in high-caseload jurisdictions such as India. This paper presents Falkor-IRAC, a graph-constrained generation framework for Indian legal AI that grounds generation in structured reasoning over an IRAC (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) knowledge graph. Judgments from the Supreme Court and High Courts of India are ingested as IRAC node structures enriched with procedural state transitions, precedent relationships, and statutory references, stored in FalkorDB for low-latency agentic traversal. At inference time, LLM-generated answers are accepted only if a valid supporting path can be traced through the graph, a check performed by a falsifiability oracle called the Verifier Agent. The system also detects doctrinal conflicts as a first-class output rather than silently resolving them. Falkor-IRAC is evaluated using graph-native metrics: citation grounding accuracy, path validity rate, hallucinated precedent rate, and conflict detection rate. These metrics are argued to be more appropriate for legal reasoning evaluation than BLEU and ROUGE. On a proof-of-concept corpus of 51 Supreme Court judgments, the Verifier Agent correctly validated citations on completed queries and correctly rejected fabricated citations. Evaluation against vector-only RAG baselines is left for future work, as is GPU-accelerated inference to address current timeout rates on CPU hardware.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Modern society is permeated with computers, and the software that controls them can have latent, long-term, and immediate effects that reach far beyond the actual users of these systems. This places researchers in Computer Science and Software Engineering in a critical position of influence and responsibility, more than any other field because computer systems are vital research tools for other disciplines. This essay presents several key ethical concerns and responsibilities relating to research in computing. The goal is to promote awareness and discussion of ethical issues among computer science researchers. A hypothetical case study is provided, along with questions for reflection and discussion.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Autonomous reasoning is among the most scientifically and economically motivating topics in AI today. Historically the purview of symbolic AI, recent advances have mainly emerged from deep probabilistic generative models. Despite immense interest and rapid progress, the generative AI community has not clearly converged on operational definitions for reasoning and often implicitly rejects the historical treatment of this topic in logic and verifiable automated reasoning. This position contends that definitional ambiguity leaves the construct validity of reasoning evaluation unverifiable, undermining quantifiable progress toward trustworthy autonomous reasoning. We also contend that this ambiguity is addressable. To that end, we provide (1) operational definitions based on a synthesis of the literature, positioning valid and sound reasoning as a learnable rule-based process; and (2) a checklist for best practices in the communication of AI reasoning research.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Procedural activities follow well-defined structures: whether we consider a cooking recipe or a mechanic repairing a car, these activities naturally decompose in a hierarchy of steps and sub-steps. Traditional approaches for step grounding require extensive annotations and scale poorly. Instead, we argue that such hierarchical structure can emerge naturally from uncurated videos of human activities through recurring patterns of co-occurring actions and activities. Our approach builds on HiERO, a weakly-supervised representation learning approach that maps close in the feature space actions that are functionally related to each other, leveraging only fine-grained action-level narrations. In this feature space, procedure steps can be detected by a simple clustering, with no additional task-specific fine-tuning. For the Ego4D Step Grounding challenge, we augment this approach by ensuring fine and coarse level agreement in step assignments, enforcing strict temporal monotonicity of the grounded steps and post-processing the detected steps to reduce the impact of noisy predictions. We call this approach HiERO-StepG and it achieves 56.27 % on the R@1 (IoU = 0.3) metric on the global leaderboard at submission time, ranking second while being completely zero-shot and not requiring procedure-specific annotations. Project page: https://github.com/andreazenotto/HiERO-StepG.

In the last decade, several organizations have produced documents intended to standardize, in the normative sense, and promote guidance to our recent and rapid AI development. However, the full spectrum of ideas presented in these documents has not yet been analyzed, except for a few meta-analyses and critical reviews of the field. In this work, we seek to expand on the work done by past researchers and create a tool for better data visualization of the contents and nature of these documents, to understand whether there is consensus or similarity between the principles espoused by various institutions, which may inspire debates on future regulations. We also provide some preliminary thoughts and questions that could guide the continuity of the research through a critical analysis of the results acquired by our methodology into a sample size of 200 documents.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

In Brazil, all legal professionals must demonstrate their knowledge of the law and its application by passing the OAB exams, the national bar exams. The OAB exams therefore provide an excellent benchmark for the performance of legal information systems since passing the exam would arguably signal that the system has acquired capacity of legal reasoning comparable to that of a human lawyer. This article describes the construction of a new data set and some preliminary experiments on it, treating the problem of finding the justification for the answers to questions. The results provide a baseline performance measure against which to evaluate future improvements. We discuss the reasons to the poor performance and propose next steps.

This graduate textbook on machine learning tells a story of how patterns in data support predictions and consequential actions. Starting with the foundations of decision making, we cover representation, optimization, and generalization as the constituents of supervised learning. A chapter on datasets as benchmarks examines their histories and scientific bases. Self-contained introductions to causality, the practice of causal inference, sequential decision making, and reinforcement learning equip the reader with concepts and tools to reason about actions and their consequences. Throughout, the text discusses historical context and societal impact. We invite readers from all backgrounds; some experience with probability, calculus, and linear algebra suffices.

This manuscript portrays optimization as a process. In many practical applications the environment is so complex that it is infeasible to lay out a comprehensive theoretical model and use classical algorithmic theory and mathematical optimization. It is necessary as well as beneficial to take a robust approach, by applying an optimization method that learns as one goes along, learning from experience as more aspects of the problem are observed. This view of optimization as a process has become prominent in varied fields and has led to some spectacular success in modeling and systems that are now part of our daily lives.

This article reports the results of a study examining the ability of legal and non-legal Large Language Models to perform legal analysis using the Issue-Rule-Application-Conclusion framework. LLMs were tested on legal reasoning tasks involving rule analysis and analogical reasoning. The results show that LLMs can conduct basic IRAC analysis, but are limited by brief responses lacking detail, an inability to commit to answers, false confidence, and hallucinations. The study compares legal and nonlegal LLMs, identifies shortcomings, and explores traits that may hinder their ability to think like a lawyer. It also discusses the implications for legal education and practice, highlighting the need for critical thinking skills in future lawyers and the potential pitfalls of overreliance on artificial intelligence AI resulting in a loss of logic, reasoning, and critical thinking skills.

Procedural memory is increasingly used to improve LLM agents on recurring workplace tasks, yet its ability to produce reusable skills remains poorly understood. We introduce AFTER, a benchmark of 382 realistic enterprise tasks spanning six professional roles and 22 procedural skills, designed to evaluate how skills transfer across tasks, roles, and model backbones. The benchmark includes controlled evaluation settings for local improvement, cross-task transfer, cross-role transfer, and cross-model generalization. Experiments show that procedural memory delivers consistent gains in industrial workflows: a single refinement round improves aggregate performance by 3.7-6.7 points, while skills evolved from diverse multi-model execution traces achieve 73.1% cross-model test accuracy, outperforming all single-model trace sources. We further find that some skills generalize broadly across tasks and models, whereas others become specialized to role-specific workflows and lose effectiveness under transfer. These results provide practical guidance for building, evaluating, and deploying procedural memory systems in production agent platforms.

In this paper, we introduce a new process prejudge strategy in LLM reasoning to demonstrate that bootstrapping with process prejudge allows the LLM to adaptively anticipate the errors encountered when advancing the subsequent reasoning steps, similar to people sometimes pausing to think about what mistakes may occur and how to avoid them, rather than relying solely on trial and error. Specifically, we define a prejudge node in the rationale, which represents a reasoning step, with at least one step that follows the prejudge node that has no paths toward the correct answer. To synthesize the prejudge reasoning process, we present an automated reasoning framework with a dynamic tree-searching strategy. This framework requires only one LLM to perform answer judging, response critiquing, prejudge generation, and thought completion. Furthermore, we develop a two-phase training mechanism with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) to further enhance the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. Experimental results from competition-level complex reasoning demonstrate that our method can teach the model to prejudge before thinking and significantly enhance the reasoning ability of LLMs. Code and data is released at https://github.com/wjn1996/Prejudge-Before-Think.

Biological protocols are fundamental to reproducible and safe life science research. While LLMs excel on general tasks, their systematic evaluation on these highly specialized, accuracy-critical, and inherently procedural texts remains limited. In this work, we present BioProBench, the first large-scale, integrated multi-task benchmark for biological protocol understanding and reasoning. While limited benchmarks have touched upon specific aspects like protocol QA, BioProBench provides a comprehensive suite of five core tasks: Protocol Question Answering, Step Ordering, Error Correction, Protocol Generation, and Protocol Reasoning, enabling a holistic evaluation of LLMs on procedural biological texts. Built upon 27K original protocols, it yields nearly 556K high-quality structured instances. We evaluate 12 mainstream open/closed-source LLMs on BioProBench. Experimental results reveal that while top models preform well on surface understanding tasks, struggle significantly with deep reasoning and structured generation tasks like ordering and generation. Furthermore, model comparisons reveal diverse performance: certain open-source models approach closed-source levels on some tasks, yet bio-specific small models lag behind general LLMs, indicating limitations on complex procedural content. Overall, our findings underscore that procedural reasoning within biological protocols represents a significant challenge for current LLMs. BioProBench serves as a standardized framework to diagnose these specific limitations and guide the development of AI systems better equipped for safely automating complex scientific procedures. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/YuyangSunshine/bioprotocolbench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/GreatCaptainNemo/BioProBench.

Practitioners make three prompt-design decisions with almost no controlled evidence behind them: how to format instructions and context (markdown, plain text, prose, or tabular), how many simultaneous instructions a system prompt can carry before compliance degrades, and how much context a model can hold before recall and honesty degrade. We report two controlled experiments crossing all three factors on one held, contamination-free synthetic corpus (the "Book of Veyra," 8,780 uniquely-named entities, deterministically regenerable from a fixed seed), evaluated across five models. Experiment 1 (960 calls/model) measures instruction-following decay as rule count N grows from 10 to 160, crossed with four formats and system-prompt vs. user-turn placement. Perfect-response rate collapses to zero by N=80 for every model, format, and placement. Placement produces effects at least as large as format at N=160 in most models, but the direction is model-specific. No model shows a reliable markdown advantage; one 35B model favors plain text instead. Experiment 2 (5,520 calls/model) measures recall accuracy, false-premise sycophancy, and absent-fact fabrication across a 2k-to-512k-token context ladder in the same four formats. Recall stays near ceiling through 64-128k tokens, then degrades sharply and format-dependently: one model's accuracy spread reaches 48 points at 128k tokens. Fabrication never occurs (0/5,760 probes), and sycophancy stays negligible (<=8.3%). What rises sharply near each model's context ceiling is outright refusal to answer (0% to 79-90%), distinct from sycophancy or fabrication. Neither pre-registered format ordering holds, and token overhead (+22% to +37% over plain text) further changes which format is preferable where accuracy spread is genuine. We release the full harness, corpus generator, and raw results (VeyraBench): https://github.com/iNetanel/veyrabench

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Procedural text describes dynamic state changes during a step-by-step natural process (e.g., photosynthesis). In this work, we focus on the task of procedural text understanding, which aims to comprehend such documents and track entities' states and locations during a process. Although recent approaches have achieved substantial progress, their results are far behind human performance. Two challenges, the difficulty of commonsense reasoning and data insufficiency, still remain unsolved, which require the incorporation of external knowledge bases. Previous works on external knowledge injection usually rely on noisy web mining tools and heuristic rules with limited applicable scenarios. In this paper, we propose a novel KnOwledge-Aware proceduraL text understAnding (KOALA) model, which effectively leverages multiple forms of external knowledge in this task. Specifically, we retrieve informative knowledge triples from ConceptNet and perform knowledge-aware reasoning while tracking the entities. Besides, we employ a multi-stage training schema which fine-tunes the BERT model over unlabeled data collected from Wikipedia before further fine-tuning it on the final model. Experimental results on two procedural text datasets, ProPara and Recipes, verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods, in which our model achieves state-of-the-art performance in comparison to various baselines.

Procedural materials, represented as functional node graphs, are ubiquitous in computer graphics for photorealistic material appearance design. They allow users to perform intuitive and precise editing to achieve desired visual appearances. However, creating a procedural material given an input image requires professional knowledge and significant effort. In this work, we leverage the ability to convert procedural materials into standard Python programs and fine-tune a large pre-trained vision-language model (VLM) to generate such programs from input images. To enable effective fine-tuning, we also contribute an open-source procedural material dataset and propose to perform program-level augmentation by prompting another pre-trained large language model (LLM). Through extensive evaluation, we show that our method outperforms previous methods on both synthetic and real-world examples.

The ability to plan a course of action that achieves a desired state of affairs has long been considered a core competence of intelligent agents and has been an integral part of AI research since its inception. With the advent of large language models (LLMs), there has been considerable interest in the question of whether or not they possess such planning abilities. PlanBench, an extensible benchmark we developed in 2022, soon after the release of GPT3, has remained an important tool for evaluating the planning abilities of LLMs. Despite the slew of new private and open source LLMs since GPT3, progress on this benchmark has been surprisingly slow. OpenAI claims that their recent o1 (Strawberry) model has been specifically constructed and trained to escape the normal limitations of autoregressive LLMs--making it a new kind of model: a Large Reasoning Model (LRM). Using this development as a catalyst, this paper takes a comprehensive look at how well current LLMs and new LRMs do on PlanBench. As we shall see, while o1's performance is a quantum improvement on the benchmark, outpacing the competition, it is still far from saturating it. This improvement also brings to the fore questions about accuracy, efficiency, and guarantees which must be considered before deploying such systems.

Tool-using LLM agents are usually evaluated by final-answer correctness or LLM judges. Neither captures how an answer was produced. In safety-critical settings, the procedure itself is part of correctness. In this paper, we introduce AgentLTL, a language derived from First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FO-LTL) that expresses procedural rules over agent traces. It yields a deterministic, judge-free compliance score. In this framework, a single specification drives two usages. The first is harnessing: the constraints score completed traces, or gate tool calls by checking each prefix online, before execution. The second is finetuning: the score serves as a dense reward. On a benchmark spanning ordering, branching, iteration, and grounding, block-and-warn harnessing improves compliance on five of seven models. Finetuning with the same reward yields +38 and +17.5 percentage point gains in accuracy and compliance on held-out patterns, including unseen tool-name aliases. These findings are consistent with the model acquiring procedural structure rather than memorizing surface tool names and procedures.

Conformal prediction is a powerful tool to generate uncertainty sets with guaranteed coverage using any predictive model, under the assumption that the training and test data are i.i.d.. Recently, it has been shown that adversarial examples are able to manipulate conformal methods to construct prediction sets with invalid coverage rates, as the i.i.d. assumption is violated. To address this issue, a recent work, Randomized Smoothed Conformal Prediction (RSCP), was first proposed to certify the robustness of conformal prediction methods to adversarial noise. However, RSCP has two major limitations: (i) its robustness guarantee is flawed when used in practice and (ii) it tends to produce large uncertainty sets. To address these limitations, we first propose a novel framework called RSCP+ to provide provable robustness guarantee in evaluation, which fixes the issues in the original RSCP method. Next, we propose two novel methods, Post-Training Transformation (PTT) and Robust Conformal Training (RCT), to effectively reduce prediction set size with little computation overhead. Experimental results in CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and ImageNet suggest the baseline method only yields trivial predictions including full label set, while our methods could boost the efficiency by up to 4.36times, 5.46times, and 16.9times respectively and provide practical robustness guarantee. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Trustworthy-ML-Lab/Provably-Robust-Conformal-Prediction.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated an impressive ability to generate code for various programming tasks. In many instances, LLMs can generate a correct program for a task when given numerous trials. Consequently, a recent trend is to do large scale sampling of programs using a model and then filtering/ranking the programs based on the program execution on a small number of known unit tests to select one candidate solution. However, these approaches assume that the unit tests are given and assume the ability to safely execute the generated programs (which can do arbitrary dangerous operations such as file manipulations). Both of the above assumptions are impractical in real-world software development. In this paper, we propose CodeRanker, a neural ranker that can predict the correctness of a sampled program without executing it. Our CodeRanker is fault-aware i.e., it is trained to predict different kinds of execution information such as predicting the exact compile/runtime error type (e.g., an IndexError or a TypeError). We show that CodeRanker can significantly increase the pass@1 accuracy of various code generation models (including Codex, GPT-Neo, GPT-J) on APPS, HumanEval and MBPP datasets.

Prompt engineering is critical for the development of LLM-based applications. However, it is usually done manually in a "trial and error" fashion. This manual procedure can be time consuming, ineffective, and the generated prompts are, in a lot of cases, sub-optimal. Even for the prompts which seemingly work well, there is always a lingering question: can the prompts be made better with further modifications? To address these questions, in this paper, we investigate prompt engineering automation. We consider a specific use case scenario in which developers/users have drafted initial prompts, but lack the time/expertise to optimize them. We propose PRewrite, an automated tool to rewrite these drafts and to generate highly effective new prompts. PRewrite is based on the Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework which allows for end-to-end optimization and our design allows the RL search to happen in a large action space. The automated tool leverages manually crafted prompts as starting points which makes the rewriting procedure more guided and efficient. The generated prompts are human readable, and self-explanatory, unlike some of those in previous works. We conducted extensive experiments on diverse datasets and found that the prompts generated with this new method not only outperform professionally crafted prompts, but also prompts generated with other previously proposed methods.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing in-context learning capabilities through scaling up model and data size. Despite this progress, LLMs are still unable to solve algorithmic reasoning problems. While providing a rationale with the final answer has led to further improvements in multi-step reasoning problems, Anil et al. 2022 showed that even simple algorithmic reasoning tasks such as parity are far from solved. In this work, we identify and study four key stages for successfully teaching algorithmic reasoning to LLMs: (1) formulating algorithms as skills, (2) teaching multiple skills simultaneously (skill accumulation), (3) teaching how to combine skills (skill composition) and (4) teaching how to use skills as tools. We show that it is possible to teach algorithmic reasoning to LLMs via in-context learning, which we refer to as algorithmic prompting. We evaluate our approach on a variety of arithmetic and quantitative reasoning tasks, and demonstrate significant boosts in performance over existing prompting techniques. In particular, for long parity, addition, multiplication and subtraction, we achieve an error reduction of approximately 10x, 9x, 5x and 2x respectively compared to the best available baselines.

Can foundation models be guided to execute tasks involving legal reasoning? We believe that building a benchmark to answer this question will require sustained collaborative efforts between the computer science and legal communities. To that end, this short paper serves three purposes. First, we describe how IRAC-a framework legal scholars use to distinguish different types of legal reasoning-can guide the construction of a Foundation Model oriented benchmark. Second, we present a seed set of 44 tasks built according to this framework. We discuss initial findings, and highlight directions for new tasks. Finally-inspired by the Open Science movement-we make a call for the legal and computer science communities to join our efforts by contributing new tasks. This work is ongoing, and our progress can be tracked here: https://github.com/HazyResearch/legalbench.

Online resources such as WikiHow compile a wide range of scripts for performing everyday tasks, which can assist models in learning to reason about procedures. However, the scripts are always presented in a linear manner, which does not reflect the flexibility displayed by people executing tasks in real life. For example, in the CrossTask Dataset, 64.5% of consecutive step pairs are also observed in the reverse order, suggesting their ordering is not fixed. In addition, each step has an average of 2.56 frequent next steps, demonstrating "branching". In this paper, we propose the new challenging task of non-sequential graph script induction, aiming to capture optional and interchangeable steps in procedural planning. To automate the induction of such graph scripts for given tasks, we propose to take advantage of loosely aligned videos of people performing the tasks. In particular, we design a multimodal framework to ground procedural videos to WikiHow textual steps and thus transform each video into an observed step path on the latent ground truth graph script. This key transformation enables us to train a script knowledge model capable of both generating explicit graph scripts for learnt tasks and predicting future steps given a partial step sequence. Our best model outperforms the strongest pure text/vision baselines by 17.52% absolute gains on F1@3 for next step prediction and 13.8% absolute gains on Acc@1 for partial sequence completion. Human evaluation shows our model outperforming the WikiHow linear baseline by 48.76% absolute gains in capturing sequential and non-sequential step relationships.

The do-calculus defines a general system of inference for interventional queries, allowing causal quantities to be transformed through successive applications of its rules. This process induces a rich space of equivalent interventional expressions, but combining and ordering these rules remains challenging. In this work, we introduce derivation graphs, which represent how do-calculus rules are applied and combined, and characterize the full space of observational and interventional probabilities which are equivalent under the do-calculus. The structure of these graphs yields a simple procedure that uses at most four applications of do-calculus rules. Finally, we show how applying identification algorithms to equivalent causal queries produces multiple valid estimands for the same causal quantity, eventually yielding more efficient estimators.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) -- what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task -- becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only sim700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls.

The integration of AI-powered coding agents into Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CI/CD) pipelines has fundamentally altered how software verification is conducted. While these agents successfully automate the test generation, current evaluation benchmarks (e.g., SWE-bench) largely focus on pass-rates rather than the intrinsic quality of the generated tests. This raises the possibility of "stealth technical debt", in which test suites pass execution but do not offer comprehensive coverage or semantic value. We address this methodological gap through a large-scale, empirical comparison of 204,673 test artifacts which comprises of 24,941 human-authored files and 179,732 agent-generated files; sourced from the AIDev dataset. Using the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) parsing with Python's naive ast module, we implemented a "white-box" static analysis framework to evaluate three quality dimensions: Assertion Strength (RQ1), Edge-Case Coverage (RQ2), and Flakiness Potential (RQ3). Our results present a nuanced inversion of traditional assumptions. AI agents performed better than humans in Edge-Case Coverage, with almost twice the variety of boundary checks (Variety Score: 0.62 vs 0.32) and a higher frequency of null-safety testing (13.40% vs. 8.3%), even though human developers had a slight advantage in Assertion Strength (88.1% strong assertions vs. 85.37% for agents). But this thoroughness comes at a price: due mostly to their reliance on file I/O and non-deterministic logic, agent-generated tests exhibited a higher risk of flakiness (Candidate Rate: 0.41 vs. 0.30). These findings suggest that while AI agents excel at rigorous boundary testing, they lack the "environmental awareness" needed to write stable, hermetic tests.

Civil litigation is inherently a life-cycle process: what a lawyer drafts on day one constrains what unfolds at trial months later. Yet existing legal benchmarks evaluate isolated subtasks, and prior legal-agent simulators reinitialize each scenario from shared ground truth, leaving cross-stage causal dependencies unmodeled. We present LegalWorld, a life-cycle interactive environment that models Chinese civil litigation as a causally connected state chain of five stages (seven sub-scenarios), grounded in 75,309 paired Chinese civil judgments. We pair it with reusable infrastructure (local memory, global case memory, a Skill/Tool library) that keeps each dispute consistent across its full life cycle. Building on this environment, we construct LongJud-Bench to evaluate agent capability across all five connected stages. 18,992 ratings from 217 legal-background evaluators confirm that LegalWorld trajectories are procedurally faithful and role-consistent; and a capability-level cross-model evaluation reveals sharp divergences that aggregate scores cannot expose, with no single backbone leading across consultation, drafting, and courtroom advocacy. Detailed resources will be released publicly.

In mid-2026 a slogan reorganized how practitioners talk about coding agents: stop prompting your agent, start designing the loop that prompts it. We take this claim seriously and give it a careful treatment. We call the object of the new practice the loop specification: a bounded, reusable artifact, made of a trigger, a goal, a verification step, a stopping rule and a memory, that a human hands to an agent harness (such as Claude Code or Codex) so the agent pursues a goal on its own, in place of step-by-step prompting. We distinguish this external loop specification from two things it is often confused with: an ordinary programming loop, and the internal perceive-act-observe cycle that the harness already provides as plumbing. We position loop engineering as a new layer in the progression from prompt to context to harness to loop, and we argue, against the stronger headlines, that it does not retire prompt engineering; loop and prompt are distinct tools with distinct uses. We offer four contributions: a definition and scope for the discipline; an anatomy and taxonomy of loop specifications organized around trigger, goal type, a five-level verification ladder, architecture, and named terminal states; a descriptive analysis of the Loop Library, a public corpus of fifty real loops that we code by hand; and a set of design principles and anti-patterns grounded in the scientific literature on self-correction, reward hacking and model-as-judge fragility. The corpus shows that practice has matured most where the discipline says it matters: seventy percent of loops verify in the autonomous zone of the ladder and seventy-four percent name their terminal states, while automated triggering and durable memory remain comparatively underdeveloped. We close with the limits the practice must respect, including the verification burden, comprehension debt and the risk of cognitive surrender.

What does it mean for an algorithm to be biased? In U.S. law, unintentional bias is encoded via disparate impact, which occurs when a selection process has widely different outcomes for different groups, even as it appears to be neutral. This legal determination hinges on a definition of a protected class (ethnicity, gender, religious practice) and an explicit description of the process. When the process is implemented using computers, determining disparate impact (and hence bias) is harder. It might not be possible to disclose the process. In addition, even if the process is open, it might be hard to elucidate in a legal setting how the algorithm makes its decisions. Instead of requiring access to the algorithm, we propose making inferences based on the data the algorithm uses. We make four contributions to this problem. First, we link the legal notion of disparate impact to a measure of classification accuracy that while known, has received relatively little attention. Second, we propose a test for disparate impact based on analyzing the information leakage of the protected class from the other data attributes. Third, we describe methods by which data might be made unbiased. Finally, we present empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of our test for disparate impact and our approach for both masking bias and preserving relevant information in the data. Interestingly, our approach resembles some actual selection practices that have recently received legal scrutiny.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

We present Generative Logic (GL), a deterministic architecture that begins from user-supplied axiomatic definitions -- written in a minimalist Mathematical Programming Language (MPL) -- and systematically explores their deductive neighborhood. Definitions are compiled into a distributed grid of simple Logic Blocks (LBs) that exchange messages; any time several expressions unify under an inference rule, a new fact is emitted with full provenance to its sources, yielding replayable, auditable proof graphs. A prototype software implementation instantiates the workflow on first-order Peano arithmetic. Starting only from the Peano axioms, GL enumerates candidate implications, applies normalization and type filters, and automatically reconstructs machine-checkable proofs of foundational arithmetic laws including associativity and commutativity of addition, associativity and commutativity of multiplication, and distributivity. Generated proofs export to navigable HTML so that every inference step can be inspected independently. We outline a hardware-software co-design path toward massively parallel realizations and describe prospective integration with probabilistic models (e.g., Large Language Models (LLMs)) for autoformalization and conjecture seeding. The Python and MPL code to reproduce the Peano experiments, along with the full HTML proof graphs, are available in the project's GitHub repository at https://github.com/Generative-Logic/GL/tree/35a111ea9ba53afe051703d6050be0c3923e9724 and are permanently archived at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.16408441. We invite community feedback and collaboration.

We present a complete Lean 4 formalization of the equilibrium characterization in the Vlasov-Maxwell-Landau (VML) system, which describes the motion of charged plasma. The project demonstrates the full AI-assisted mathematical research loop: an AI reasoning model (Gemini DeepThink) generated the proof from a conjecture, an agentic coding tool (Claude Code) translated it into Lean from natural-language prompts, a specialized prover (Aristotle) closed 111 lemmas, and the Lean kernel verified the result. A single mathematician supervised the process over 10 days at a cost of \$200, writing zero lines of code. The entire development process is public: all 229 human prompts, and 213 git commits are archived in the repository. We report detailed lessons on AI failure modes -- hypothesis creep, definition-alignment bugs, agent avoidance behaviors -- and on what worked: the abstract/concrete proof split, adversarial self-review, and the critical role of human review of key definitions and theorem statements. Notably, the formalization was completed before the final draft of the corresponding math paper was finished.

Agent Skills package procedural instructions and checks for use by general-purpose agents, but loading a skill does not guarantee that every requirement remains active throughout a long tool-using trajectory. We study this problem in a production-derived, white-box code-audit workflow. Holding the task and 24 artifact checks fixed, we vary the surrounding context and classify where failures first become visible: lost requirements, editing drift, failed checking, or non-agent evaluator/runtime failures. Codex with gpt-5.4-mini passes 8/10 runs in a 10,991-character clean context but only 3/10 in both a 299,140-character relevant context and an equal-length irrelevant context. This 50-percentage-point difference is large but remains trend-level under two-sided Fisher tests (p = 0.0698). Requirement coverage nevertheless stays above 92% in both long conditions, showing that a few omissions can invalidate an otherwise complete artifact. A second task passes all clean and long runs, so the evidence does not support a universal context-length threshold. A detailed external checklist passes 10/10 runs, compared with 5/10 for a generic self-check (p = 0.0325). Coding-agent scaffolds may help by selecting a smaller working set, but they do not eliminate failures. We do not introduce context rot or a new general monitoring method; we provide a bounded failure classification and empirical case study for white-box code auditing.

As the artificial intelligence (AI) supply chain grows more complex, AI systems and models are increasingly likely to incorporate externally-sourced ingredients such as datasets and other models. In such cases, determining whether or not an AI system or model complies with the EU AI Act will require gathering compliance-related metadata about both the AI system or model at-large as well as those externally-supplied ingredients. There must then be an analysis that looks across all of this metadata to render a prediction about the compliance of the overall AI system or model. Up until now, this process has not been automated. Thus, it has not been possible to make real-time compliance determinations in scenarios where doing so would be advantageous, such as the iterative workflows of today's AI developers, search and acquisition of AI ingredients on communities like Hugging Face, federated and continuous learning, and more. To address this shortcoming, we introduce a highly automated system for AI Act compliance analysis. This system has two key elements. First is an interlocking set of computational artifacts that capture compliance-related metadata about both: (1) the AI system or model at-large; (2) any constituent ingredients such as datasets and models. Second is an automated analysis algorithm that operates across those computational artifacts to render a run-time prediction about whether or not the overall AI system or model complies with the AI Act. Working together, these elements promise to enhance and accelerate AI Act compliance assessments.

Language model users often issue queries that lack specification, where the context under which a query was issued -- such as the user's identity, the query's intent, and the criteria for a response to be useful -- is not explicit. For instance, a good response to a subjective query like "What book should I read next?" would depend on the user's preferences, and a good response to an open-ended query like "How do antibiotics work against bacteria?" would depend on the user's expertise. This makes evaluation of responses to such queries an ill-posed task, as evaluators may make arbitrary judgments about the response quality. To remedy this, we present contextualized evaluations, a protocol that synthetically constructs context surrounding an underspecified query and provides it during evaluation. We find that the presence of context can 1) alter conclusions drawn from evaluation, even flipping win rates between model pairs, 2) nudge evaluators to make fewer judgments based on surface-level criteria, like style, and 3) provide new insights about model behavior across diverse contexts. Specifically, our procedure uncovers an implicit bias towards WEIRD contexts in models' "default" responses and we find that models are not equally sensitive to following different contexts, even when they are provided in prompts.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

We present an accessible first course on diffusion models and flow matching for machine learning, aimed at a technical audience with no diffusion experience. We try to simplify the mathematical details as much as possible (sometimes heuristically), while retaining enough precision to derive correct algorithms.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

Rationale: Computer aided detection (CAD) algorithms for Pulmonary Embolism (PE) algorithms have been shown to increase radiologists' sensitivity with a small increase in specificity. However, CAD for PE has not been adopted into clinical practice, likely because of the high number of false positives current CAD software produces. Objective: To generate a database of annotated computed tomography pulmonary angiographies, use it to compare the sensitivity and false positive rate of current algorithms and to develop new methods that improve such metrics. Methods: 91 Computed tomography pulmonary angiography scans were annotated by at least one radiologist by segmenting all pulmonary emboli visible on the study. 20 annotated CTPAs were open to the public in the form of a medical image analysis challenge. 20 more were kept for evaluation purposes. 51 were made available post-challenge. 8 submissions, 6 of them novel, were evaluated on the 20 evaluation CTPAs. Performance was measured as per embolus sensitivity vs. false positives per scan curve. Results: The best algorithms achieved a per-embolus sensitivity of 75% at 2 false positives per scan (fps) or of 70% at 1 fps, outperforming the state of the art. Deep learning approaches outperformed traditional machine learning ones, and their performance improved with the number of training cases. Significance: Through this work and challenge we have improved the state-of-the art of computer aided detection algorithms for pulmonary embolism. An open database and an evaluation benchmark for such algorithms have been generated, easing the development of further improvements. Implications on clinical practice will need further research.

The ACPBench dataset provides atomic reasoning tasks required for efficient planning. The dataset is aimed at distilling the complex plan generation task into separate atomic reasoning tasks in their easiest possible form, boolean or multiple-choice questions, where the model has to choose the right answer from the provided options. While the aim of ACPBench is to test the simplest form of reasoning about action and change, when tasked with planning, a model does not typically have options to choose from and thus the reasoning required for planning dictates an open-ended, generative form for these tasks. To that end, we introduce ACPBench Hard, a generative version of ACPBench, with open-ended questions which the model needs to answer. Models that perform well on these tasks could in principle be integrated into a planner or be used directly as a policy. We discuss the complexity of these tasks as well as the complexity of validating the correctness of their answers and present validation algorithms for each task. Equipped with these validators, we test the performance of a variety of models on our tasks and find that for most of these tasks the performance of even the largest models is still subpar. Our experiments show that no model outperforms another in these tasks and with a few exceptions all tested language models score below 65%, indicating that even the current frontier language models have a long way to go before they can reliably reason about planning. In fact, even the so-called reasoning models struggle with solving these reasoning tasks. ACPBench Hard collection is available at the following link: https://ibm.github.io/ACPBench

As language models regularly make mistakes when solving math problems, automated identification of errors in the reasoning process becomes increasingly significant for their scalable oversight. In this paper, we introduce ProcessBench for measuring the ability to identify erroneous steps in mathematical reasoning. It consists of 3,400 test cases, primarily focused on competition- and Olympiad-level math problems. Each test case contains a step-by-step solution with error location annotated by human experts. Models are required to identify the earliest step that contains an error, or conclude that all steps are correct. We conduct extensive evaluation on ProcessBench, involving two types of models: process reward models (PRMs) and critic models, where for the latter we prompt general language models to critique each solution step by step. We draw two main observations: (1) Existing PRMs typically fail to generalize to more challenging math problems beyond GSM8K and MATH. They underperform both critic models (i.e., prompted general language models) and our own trained PRM that is straightforwardly fine-tuned on the PRM800K dataset. (2) The best open-source model, QwQ-32B-Preview, has demonstrated the critique capability competitive with the proprietary model GPT-4o, despite that it still lags behind the reasoning-specialized o1-mini. We hope ProcessBench can foster future research in reasoning process assessment, paving the way toward scalable oversight of language models.

We analyze various consequences in relation to the extension of operators T:Xto Y that are p-compact, as well as the extension of operators T:Xto Y whose adjoints T^*:Y^*to X^* are p-compact. In most cases, we discuss these extension properties when the underlying spaces, either domain or codomain, are P_lambda spaces. We also answer if these extensions are almost norm-preserving in such circumstances where the extension T of a T exists. It is observed that an operator can often be extended to a larger domain when the codomain is appropriately extended as well. Specific assumptions might enable us to obtain an extension of an operator that maintains the same range. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a Banach space to be L_1-predual.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

The solution methods used to realize artificial general intelligence (AGI) may not contain the formalism needed to adequately model and characterize AGI. In particular, current approaches to learning hold notions of problem domain and problem task as fundamental precepts, but it is hardly apparent that an AGI encountered in the wild will be discernable into a set of domain-task pairings. Nor is it apparent that the outcomes of AGI in a system can be well expressed in terms of domain and task, or as consequences thereof. Thus, there is both a practical and theoretical use for meta-theories of learning which do not express themselves explicitly in terms of solution methods. General systems theory offers such a meta-theory. Herein, Mesarovician abstract systems theory is used as a super-structure for learning. Abstract learning systems are formulated. Subsequent elaboration stratifies the assumptions of learning systems into a hierarchy and considers the hierarchy such stratification projects onto learning theory. The presented Mesarovician abstract learning systems theory calls back to the founding motivations of artificial intelligence research by focusing on the thinking participants directly, in this case, learning systems, in contrast to the contemporary focus on the problems thinking participants solve.