Daily Papers

Machine unlearning has been extensively studied in response to growing privacy concerns and regulatory requirements. However, auditing whether unlearning algorithms have truly erased the influence of specific data remains an open challenge. The lack of reliable and practical auditing mechanisms can lead to critical privacy risks, such as residual information leakage. This paper initiates a systematic investigation into whether existing unlearning algorithms can truly forget the designated data. We propose the first practical and general-purpose auditing framework for machine unlearning, inspired by the concept of proof of ignorance. Our framework addresses the key practicality limitations of existing methods by eliminating the need for retraining-from-scratch baselines, avoiding the training of large numbers of shadow models, and requiring no intrusive intervention in the original training process. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we first conduct validation experiments to verify its soundness and completeness. We then perform comprehensive experiments across six datasets and ten representative unlearning methods. The results demonstrate that our framework reliably distinguishes between successful and failed unlearning. In particular, we observe that retraining-based and fine-tuning-based methods can achieve effective unlearning, even when the target data remain in the original dataset. In contrast, de-optimization-based methods fail to achieve true unlearning and instead degrade the model's performance. Fisher/Hessian-based methods also fail to unlearn requested data, even formal certification is provided. Moreover, we show that our framework is robust against fake unlearning attempts and generalizes well to large language models.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

Current evaluations of multimodal unlearning typically focus on whether a model stops outputting target information. This surface-level criterion, however, masks two critical failure modes. First, knowledge suppression techniques often induce confabulation, leading the model to hallucinate facts about the unlearned subject. Second, refusal training merely alters observable behavior without erasing the underlying knowledge; such models might decline open queries but still identify correct answers under multiple-choice probing. To overcome these limitations, we propose Forget-Aware Self-Distillation (FASD). This method is designed to achieve honest ignorance, a state where the model genuinely loses the target knowledge and learns to acknowledge its absence. FASD separates these goals into two complementary channels. The behavior channel distills appropriate refusals from an ignorance-prompted copy of the model itself. Crucially, target tokens are masked from the teacher distribution to avoid accidentally reteaching the forgotten concepts. Simultaneously, the knowledge channel directly suppresses ground-truth answer spans independently of the model's generated responses. Experiments demonstrate that FASD successfully unlearns target knowledge, prevents information leakage in open-ended tasks, and preserves performance on retained data. The resulting model not only forgets the specified information but accurately recognizes the boundaries of its own knowledge. Code and data will be released upon publication.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

Machine learning models are increasingly used in societal applications, yet legal and privacy concerns demand that they very often be kept confidential. Consequently, there is a growing distrust about the fairness properties of these models in the minds of consumers, who are often at the receiving end of model predictions. To this end, we propose \name -- a system that uses Zero-Knowledge Proofs (a cryptographic primitive) to publicly verify the fairness of a model, while maintaining confidentiality. We also propose a fairness certification algorithm for fully-connected neural networks which is befitting to ZKPs and is used in this system. We implement \name in Gnark and demonstrate empirically that our system is practically feasible. Code is available at https://github.com/infinite-pursuits/FairProof.

Digital signatures prove key possession, not authorship. An author who generates text with AI, constructs intermediate document states post-hoc, and signs each hash produces a signature chain indistinguishable from genuine composition. We address this gap between cryptographic integrity and process provenance. We introduce proof-of-process, a primitive category for evidence that a physical process, not merely a signing key, produced a digital artifact. Our construction, the jitter seal, injects imperceptible microsecond delays derived via HMAC from a session secret, keystroke ordinal, and cumulative document hash. Valid evidence requires that real keystrokes produced the document through those intermediate states. We propose the Adversarial Collapse Principle as an evaluation criterion: evidence systems should be judged by whether disputing them requires a conjunction of specific, testable allegations against components with independent trust assumptions. We present Witnessd, an architecture combining jitter seals with Verifiable Delay Functions, external timestamp anchors, dual-source keystroke validation, and optional hardware attestation. Each layer forces allegations at different capability levels; disputing authentic evidence requires coordinated claims across independent trust boundaries. The system does not prevent forgery: a kernel-level adversary can defeat it, and typing AI-generated content produces valid evidence. The contribution is converting vague doubt into falsifiable allegations. We evaluate across 31,000 verification trials with deterministic rejection of invalid proofs.

We introduce ProofGrid, a benchmark suite for evaluating LLM reasoning through machine-checkable proofs rather than final answers alone. ProofGrid contains 15 tasks spanning proof writing, proof checking, proof masking, and proof gap-filling. Tasks are expressed in minimal formal notation, especially NDL, a compact natural-deduction language that fits in short prompts and supports precise, auditable verification. This yields mechanical, reproducible, and fine-grained evaluation rather than judgments by humans or LLMs. ProofGrid covers a calibrated difficulty spectrum, from foundational reasoning tests to structurally rich challenge tasks that no current model solves, while minimizing reliance on domain knowledge, solver delegation, and long-context artifacts. We also develop a comparative framework for reasoning benchmarks and use it to situate ProofGrid relative to existing work in terms of representation, verification guarantees, and reasoning depth. Methodologically, we introduce an instrumented proof-checking pipeline that tolerates minor surface deviations while locating the first substantive reasoning failure, improving measurement resolution and separating proof planning from low-level execution noise. Using this pipeline, we evaluate a broad range of open and proprietary models. Results show rapid progress but substantial remaining limits: frontier models perform well on several foundational tasks, yet difficult tasks, especially those requiring global combinatorial reasoning or low-level proof synthesis, remain far from solved. We also identify epistemic instability, where models generate flawed proofs yet correctly reject those local inferences in isolation, and formalize this with an Epistemic Stability Index. Finally, we complement accuracy with 2PL IRT analyses, Wright maps, and a normalized task-discrimination measure based on Fisher information.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

We revisit the longstanding open problem of implementing Nakamoto's proof-of-work (PoW) consensus based on a real-world computational task T(x) (as opposed to artificial random hashing), in a truly permissionless setting where the miner itself chooses the input x. The challenge in designing such a Proof-of-Useful-Work (PoUW) protocol, is using the native computation of T(x) to produce a PoW certificate with prescribed hardness and with negligible computational overhead over the worst-case complexity of T(cdot) -- This ensures malicious miners cannot ``game the system" by fooling the verifier to accept with higher probability compared to honest miners (while using similar computational resources). Indeed, obtaining a PoUW with O(1)-factor overhead is trivial for any task T, but also useless. Our main result is a PoUW for the task of Matrix Multiplication MatMul(A,B) of arbitrary matrices with 1+o(1) multiplicative overhead compared to naive MatMul (even in the presence of Fast Matrix Multiplication-style algorithms, which are currently impractical). We conjecture that our protocol has optimal security in the sense that a malicious prover cannot obtain any significant advantage over an honest prover. This conjecture is based on reducing hardness of our protocol to the task of solving a batch of low-rank random linear equations which is of independent interest. Since MatMuls are the bottleneck of AI compute as well as countless industry-scale applications, this primitive suggests a concrete design of a new L1 base-layer protocol, which nearly eliminates the energy-waste of Bitcoin mining -- allowing GPU consumers to reduce their AI training and inference costs by ``re-using" it for blockchain consensus, in exchange for block rewards (2-for-1). This blockchain is currently under construction.

A fundamental challenge in formal theorem proving by LLMs is the lack of high-quality training data. Although reinforcement learning or expert iteration partially mitigates this issue by alternating between LLM generating proofs and finetuning them on correctly generated ones, performance quickly plateaus due to the scarcity of correct proofs (sparse rewards). To keep improving the models with limited data, we draw inspiration from mathematicians, who continuously develop new results, partly by proposing novel conjectures or exercises (which are often variants of known results) and attempting to solve them. We design the Self-play Theorem Prover (STP) that simultaneously takes on two roles, conjecturer and prover, each providing training signals to the other. The conjecturer is trained iteratively on previously generated conjectures that are barely provable by the current prover, which incentivizes it to generate increasingly challenging conjectures over time. The prover attempts to prove the conjectures with standard expert iteration. We evaluate STP with both Lean and Isabelle formal versifiers. With 19.8 billion tokens generated during the training in Lean, STP proves 26.3% of the statements in the LeanWorkbook dataset, doubling the previous best result of 13.2% achieved through expert iteration. The final model achieves state-of-the-art performance among whole-proof generation methods on miniF2F-test (61.7%, pass@3200), Proofnet-test (23.1%, pass@3200) and PutnamBench (8/644, pass@3200).

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Video misinformation increasingly operates at the semantic and evidential level: authentic footage may be selectively edited, temporally reordered, spliced across sources, or augmented with AI-generated content to construct false narratives. Such evidence-dependent manipulations cannot be reliably verified from the input video alone, because the missing, reordered, replaced, or recontextualized evidence lies outside the video itself. We introduce EVID-Bench, a benchmark for search-grounded video misinformation detection, where a system must search the open web for related videos and identify what information is false through cross-video comparison. EVID-Bench comprises 222 videos spanning 9 manipulation types across 3 categories: AI generation, single-source editing, and multi-source editing. All samples are verified to be undetectable by frontier models through visual inspection alone. We evaluate nine frontier multimodal models using a retrieval-augmented verification baseline. The best system achieves only 61.43\% point-level accuracy and 43.24\% video-level accuracy, while AI-generated manipulations remain especially challenging. Error analysis reveals recurring challenges: models fixate on irrelevant anchors, misattribute synthetic content to editorial splicing, and terminate search prematurely before fully explaining the manipulation.

When should an AI system's answer be trusted? Formal proof assistants offer certainty but cannot reach most of the problem distribution; scalar LLM judges offer coverage but produce opaque scores that cannot be audited after the fact and are subject to the same coherence issues as any LLM. We present Theoria, a verification architecture that closes this gap. A candidate solution is rewritten into a sequence of typed state transitions, each licensed by an explicit justification, whether that be a citation, computation, or problem-given fact, and every transition is independently auditable. The foundational invariant is completeness of change: every difference between consecutive proof states must be accounted for, so hidden premises surface as unlicensed mutations rather than passing silently. On HLE-Verified Gold (185 text-only expert problems), Theoria certifies 105 at 91.4% strict precision (Wilson 95% CI [84.5%, 95.4%]). Every certification produces a human readable proof trace in which each step can be independently challenged. Holistic LLM judges achieve comparable precision at matched coverage but fail on different problems (Jaccard 0.14-0.36), making the approaches complementary. On 95 adversarial poisoned proofs across 15 domains, structured judges catch 94.7% versus 83.2% for holistic judging (p= 0.0017). The overall 11.5 pp gap concentrates in hidden premises (90.6% vs. 62.5%, a 28 pp difference) and fabricated citations (100% vs. 90%), the error classes where the formal analysis predicts an advantage; performance is identical on arithmetic and theorem-misapplication errors, where no advantage is predicted. On GPQA Diamond (n= 65), certified precision is 97.1% (Wilson CI [85.1%, 99.5%]).

The recent advancements in deep learning have brought about significant changes in various aspects of people's lives. Meanwhile, these rapid developments have raised concerns about the legitimacy of the training process of deep neural networks. To protect the intellectual properties of AI developers, directly examining the training process by accessing the model parameters and training data is often prohibited for verifiers. In response to this challenge, we present zero-knowledge deep learning (zkDL), an efficient zero-knowledge proof for deep learning training. To address the long-standing challenge of verifiable computations of non-linearities in deep learning training, we introduce zkReLU, a specialized proof for the ReLU activation and its backpropagation. zkReLU turns the disadvantage of non-arithmetic relations into an advantage, leading to the creation of FAC4DNN, our specialized arithmetic circuit design for modelling neural networks. This design aggregates the proofs over different layers and training steps, without being constrained by their sequential order in the training process. With our new CUDA implementation that achieves full compatibility with the tensor structures and the aggregated proof design, zkDL enables the generation of complete and sound proofs in less than a second per batch update for an 8-layer neural network with 10M parameters and a batch size of 64, while provably ensuring the privacy of data and model parameters. To our best knowledge, we are not aware of any existing work on zero-knowledge proof of deep learning training that is scalable to million-size networks.

We provide here a dataset for tasks related to natural language understanding and natural language inference. The dataset contains logical puzzles in natural language from three domains: comparing puzzles, knighs and knaves, and zebra puzzles. Each puzzle is associated with the entire set of atomic questions that can be generated based on the relations and individuals occurring in the text. For each question we provide the correct answer: entailment, contradiction or ambiguity. The answer's correctness is verified against theorem provers. Good puzzles have two properties: (i) each piece of information is necessary and (ii) no unnecessary information is provided. These properties make puzzles interesting candidates for machine comprehension tasks.

The widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) requires efficient techniques for verifying their safety. DNN verifiers are complex tools, which might contain bugs that could compromise their soundness and undermine the reliability of the verification process. This concern can be mitigated using proofs: artifacts that are checkable by an external and reliable proof checker, and which attest to the correctness of the verification process. However, such proofs tend to be extremely large, limiting their use in many scenarios. In this work, we address this problem by minimizing proofs of unsatisfiability produced by DNN verifiers. We present algorithms that remove facts which were learned during the verification process, but which are unnecessary for the proof itself. Conceptually, our method analyzes the dependencies among facts used to deduce UNSAT, and removes facts that did not contribute. We then further minimize the proof by eliminating remaining unnecessary dependencies, using two alternative procedures. We implemented our algorithms on top of a proof producing DNN verifier, and evaluated them across several benchmarks. Our results show that our best-performing algorithm reduces proof size by 37%-82% and proof checking time by 30%-88%, while introducing a runtime overhead of 7%-20% to the verification process itself.

AI coding agents produce code faster than humans can review it. In our approach, the prover is the judge of whether the code is correct. Under a verifier-driven loop, AI agents wrote and verified bare-metal security software in Ada/SPARK spanning classical and post-quantum cryptography, TLS 1.3, IKEv2, X.509, and a Matrix client. GNATprove discharged 49,280 proof obligations, established functional correctness for selected primitives, and proved the absence of run-time errors for the rest, at roughly 20-40 times lower supervision cost than comparable hand verification. GNATprove alone was insufficient: some defects could not be detected and were resolved using known-answer tests, interoperability, or human review of specifications. Given weak checks, the agent tried to bypass them and reported success. We report where each layer caught faults and draw the central lesson: what an agent can be trusted to establish is bounded by the strength of its feedback.

We resolve a $1000 Erdős prize problem, complete with formal verification generated by a large language model. In over a dozen papers, beginning in 1976 and spanning two decades, Paul Erdős repeatedly posed one of his "favourite" conjectures: every finite Sidon set can be extended to a finite perfect difference set. We establish that {1, 2, 4, 8, 13} is a counterexample to this conjecture. During the preparation of this paper, we discovered that although this problem was presumed to be open for half a century, Marshall Hall, Jr. published a different counterexample three decades before Erdős first posed the problem. With a healthy skepticism of this apparent oversight, and out of an abundance of caution, we used ChatGPT to vibe code a Lean proof of both Hall's and our counterexamples.

Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have been increasingly able to solve advanced mathematical problems, including many that have been open for decades. This opens the door to expansion of mathematical knowledge at unprecedented scale. Yet, while LLMs may be able to conjecture and prove more and more theorems, it remains open whether this new mathematical knowledge is interesting or useful. We define intrinsic interestingness of a theorem as the ratio between the length of its proof and the length of its statement. We show that this correlates strongly with an extrinsic measure of the downstream utility of a theorem. We identify the difficulty of a proof conditioned on a set of premises as a useful primitive for computing these metrics, and train a 27B model that predicts proof difficulty more accurately than frontier general-purpose models. Optimizing for our metric creates a model capable of producing more interesting theorems, while also reducing substantial or full overlap with Mathlib from 91.9% to 30.6%, showcasing the creation of more out-of-distribution math. We show that our system can generate candidate theorems, select the most interesting among them, and iteratively build on a self-expanding mathematical library. These metrics provide a practical and quantifiable signal for ranking conjectures and guiding proof search within formal mathematical libraries. Our framework provides a path towards self-expanding, machine-verified mathematical libraries that can choose worthwhile statements without relying on human-supplied targets.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

A new information theoretic condition is presented for reconstructing a discrete random variable X based on the knowledge of a set of discrete functions of X. The reconstruction condition is derived from Shannon's 1953 lattice theory with two entropic metrics of Shannon and Rajski. Because such a theoretical material is relatively unknown and appears quite dispersed in different references, we first provide a synthetic description (with complete proofs) of its concepts, such as total, common and complementary informations. Definitions and properties of the two entropic metrics are also fully detailed and shown compatible with the lattice structure. A new geometric interpretation of such a lattice structure is then investigated that leads to a necessary (and sometimes sufficient) condition for reconstructing the discrete random variable X given a set { X_1,ldots,X_{n} } of elements in the lattice generated by X. Finally, this condition is illustrated in five specific examples of perfect reconstruction problems: reconstruction of a symmetric random variable from the knowledge of its sign and absolute value, reconstruction of a word from a set of linear combinations, reconstruction of an integer from its prime signature (fundamental theorem of arithmetic) and from its remainders modulo a set of coprime integers (Chinese remainder theorem), and reconstruction of the sorting permutation of a list from a minimal set of pairwise comparisons.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), particularly deep learning, have led to widespread adoption across various applications. Yet, a fundamental challenge persists: how can we verify the correctness of AI model inference when model owners cannot (or will not) reveal their parameters? These parameters represent enormous training costs and valuable intellectual property, making transparent verification difficult. In this paper, we introduce a zero-knowledge framework capable of verifying deep learning inference without exposing model internal parameters. Built on recursively composed zero-knowledge proofs and requiring no trusted setup, our framework supports both linear and nonlinear neural network layers, including matrix multiplication, normalization, softmax, and SiLU. Leveraging the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, we obtain a succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zkSNARK) with constant-size proofs. To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we translate the DeepSeek model into a fully SNARK-verifiable version named ZK-DeepSeek and show experimentally that our framework delivers both efficiency and flexibility in real-world AI verification workloads.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents serving users on behalf of companies, placing them in settings where user and deployer interests can conflict. When an agent knows that a user is owed something its deployer would prefer to deny, does it remain honest? Answering this is difficult because false statements can reflect either ignorance or hallucination rather than deception. To address this challenge, we introduce KnownLieBench , a knowledge-verified benchmark that first confirms through a neutral probe that an agent knows a user's entitlement, and then evaluates whether it makes false claims once an incentive to deny that entitlement is introduced. Specifically, KnownLieBench covers eight customer-service domains and 112 grounded cases, conducts multi-round dialogues with a trust-tracking customer agent, and separates deception emerging from incentive alone from deception produced under explicit instruction. Across eighteen proprietary and open-weight models, emergent deception varies substantially across model families and domains. We further use the benchmark for post-training, finding that honesty-directed fine-tuning reduces deception under incentive, while deception-graded fine-tuning increases lie success on honest-control dialogues without increasing lie frequency under incentive. By verifying entitlement knowledge before scoring deceptive behavior, KnownLieBench reduces the confound between lying and not knowing and enables more rigorous auditing and steering of agent honesty.

We explore a central question in AI for mathematics: can AI systems produce original, nontrivial proofs for open research problems? Despite strong benchmark performance, producing genuinely novel proofs remains an outstanding challenge for LLMs. Through systematic experiments with frontier LLMs on research-level proof tasks, we identify seven failure modes that prevent reliable proof generation, including context contamination, citation hallucination, hand-waving on key steps and misallocation of proof effort, unstable proof plans, unfocused verification, problem modification and single-model bottleneck. We argue that the gap between benchmark success and research-level proving is primarily one of system design, due to those failure modes. We present QED, an open-source multi-agent proof system in which each architectural decision directly addresses a specific failure mode. Evaluated on five open problems in applied analysis and PDEs contributed by domain experts, QED produces correct proofs for three problems, each verified by the contributing experts as original and nontrivial. QED is released as open-source software at https://github.com/proofQED/QED.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing competence in solving mathematical reasoning problems. However, many open-source LLMs still struggle with errors in calculation and semantic understanding during intermediate reasoning steps. In this work, we introduce Prove, a simple yet effective framework that leverages translated programs derived from natural language solutions as a verification mechanism to filter out potentially incorrect reasoning paths before aggregating final answers. Unlike vanilla majority voting, our approach filters out solutions whose corresponding program output is inconsistent with the generated solution, aggregating only those that pass verification. We conducted extensive experiments using 13 open-source LLMs from various model families and sizes, ranging from 0.5B to 13B parameters, across eight mathematical benchmarks. Our results show that Prove consistently outperforms vanilla majority voting as a heuristic for solving mathematical reasoning tasks across all model sizes and datasets, achieving improvements of up to 18% on GSM8K and 8% on MATH-500. Our codes are available at https://github.com/declare-lab/prove.

This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) puts a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.

Process attestation verifies human authorship by collecting behavioral biometric evidence, including keystroke dynamics, typing patterns, and editing behavior, during the creative process. However, the very data needed to prove authenticity can reveal intimate details about an author's cognitive state, health conditions, and identity, constituting sensitive biometric data under GDPR Article 9. We resolve this privacy-attestation paradox using zero-knowledge proofs. We present ZK-PoP, a construction that allows a verifier to confirm that (a) sequential work function chains were computed correctly, (b) behavioral feature vectors fall within human population distributions, and (c) content evolution is consistent with incremental human editing, all without learning the underlying behavioral data, exact timing, or intermediate content. Our construction uses Groth16 proofs over arithmetic circuits with Pedersen commitments and Bulletproof range proofs. We prove that ZK-PoP is computationally zero-knowledge, computationally sound, and achieves unlinkability across sessions. Evaluation shows proof generation in under 30 seconds for a 1-hour writing session, with 192-byte proofs verifiable in 8.2 ms, while incurring less than 5% accuracy loss in simulation at practical privacy levels (epsilon >= 1.0) compared to non-private baselines.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

We present a set-theoretic, proof-irrelevant model for Calculus of Constructions (CC) with predicative induction and judgmental equality in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with an axiom for countably many inaccessible cardinals. We use Aczel's trace encoding which is universally defined for any function type, regardless of being impredicative. Direct and concrete interpretations of simultaneous induction and mutually recursive functions are also provided by extending Dybjer's interpretations on the basis of Aczel's rule sets. Our model can be regarded as a higher-order generalization of the truth-table methods. We provide a relatively simple consistency proof of type theory, which can be used as the basis for a theorem prover.

We study the Stochastic Boolean Function Certification (SBFC) problem, where we are given n Bernoulli random variables {X_e: e in U} on a ground set U of n elements with joint distribution p, a Boolean function f: 2^U to {0, 1}, and an (unknown) scenario S = {e in U: X_e = 1} of active elements sampled from p. We seek to probe the elements one-at-a-time to reveal if they are active until we can certify f(S) = 1, while minimizing the expected number of probes. Unlike most previous results that assume independence, we study correlated distributions p and give approximation algorithms for several classes of functions f. When f(S) is the indicator function for whether S is the spanning set of a given matroid, our problem reduces to finding a basis of active elements of a matroid by probing elements. We give a non-adaptive O(log n)-approximation algorithm for arbitrary distributions p, and show that this is tight up to constants unless P = NP, even for partition matroids. For uniform matroids, we give constant factor 4.642-approximation ([BBFT20]) that can be further improved to a 2-approximation if additionally the random variables are negatively correlated for the case of 1-uniform matroid. We also give an adaptive O(log k)-approximation algorithm for SBFC for k-uniform matroids for the Graph Probing problem, where we seek to probe the edges of a graph one-at-a-time until we find k active edges. The underlying distribution on edges arises from (hidden) independent vertex random variables, with an edge being active if at least one of its endpoints is active. This significantly improves over the information-theoretic lower bound on Ω(poly(n)) ([JGM19]) for adaptive algorithms for k-uniform matroids with arbitrary distributions.