Daily Papers

Japanese finance combines agglutinative, head-final linguistic structure, mixed writing systems, and high-context communication norms that rely on indirect expression and implicit commitment, posing a substantial challenge for LLMs. We introduce Ebisu, a benchmark for native Japanese financial language understanding, comprising two linguistically and culturally grounded, expert-annotated tasks: JF-ICR, which evaluates implicit commitment and refusal recognition in investor-facing Q&A, and JF-TE, which assesses hierarchical extraction and ranking of nested financial terminology from professional disclosures. We evaluate a diverse set of open-source and proprietary LLMs spanning general-purpose, Japanese-adapted, and financial models. Results show that even state-of-the-art systems struggle on both tasks. While increased model scale yields limited improvements, language- and domain-specific adaptation does not reliably improve performance, leaving substantial gaps unresolved. Ebisu provides a focused benchmark for advancing linguistically and culturally grounded financial NLP. All datasets and evaluation scripts are publicly released.

Refusals - instances where large language models (LLMs) decline or fail to fully execute user instructions - are crucial for both AI safety and AI capabilities and the reduction of hallucinations in particular. These behaviors are learned during post-training, especially in instruction fine-tuning (IFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing taxonomies and evaluation datasets for refusals are inadequate, often focusing solely on should-not-related (instead of cannot-related) categories, and lacking tools for auditing refusal content in black-box LLM outputs. We present a comprehensive framework for classifying LLM refusals: (a) a taxonomy of 16 refusal categories, (b) a human-annotated dataset of over 8,600 instances from publicly available IFT and RLHF datasets, (c) a synthetic dataset with 8,000 examples for each refusal category, and (d) classifiers trained for refusal classification. Our work enables precise auditing of refusal behaviors in black-box LLMs and automatic analyses of refusal patterns in large IFT and RLHF datasets. This facilitates the strategic adjustment of LLM refusals, contributing to the development of more safe and reliable LLMs.

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a single direction in the model's latent space; e.g., computed as the difference between the centroids of harmful and harmless prompt representations. However, emerging evidence suggests that concepts in LLMs often appear to be encoded as a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the high-dimensional latent space. Motivated by these findings, we propose a novel method leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to extract multiple refusal directions. To this end, we first prove that SOMs generalize the prior work's difference-in-means technique. We then train SOMs on harmful prompt representations to identify multiple neurons. By subtracting the centroid of harmless representations from each neuron, we derive a set of multiple directions expressing the refusal concept. We validate our method on an extensive experimental setup, demonstrating that ablating multiple directions from models' internals outperforms not only the single-direction baseline but also specialized jailbreak algorithms, leading to an effective suppression of refusal. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the mechanistic implications of our approach.

The ability of language models in RAG systems to selectively refuse to answer based on flawed context is critical for safety, yet remains a significant failure point. Our large-scale study reveals that even frontier models struggle in this setting, with refusal accuracy dropping below 50% on multi-document tasks, while exhibiting either dangerous overconfidence or overcaution. Static benchmarks fail to reliably evaluate this capability, as models exploit dataset-specific artifacts and memorize test instances. We introduce RefusalBench, a generative methodology that programmatically creates diagnostic test cases through controlled linguistic perturbation. Our framework employs 176 distinct perturbation strategies across six categories of informational uncertainty and three intensity levels. Evaluation of over 30 models uncovers systematic failure patterns: refusal comprises separable detection and categorization skills, and neither scale nor extended reasoning improves performance. We find that selective refusal is a trainable, alignment-sensitive capability, offering a clear path for improvement. We release two benchmarks -- RefusalBench-NQ (single document) and RefusalBench-GaRAGe (multi-document) -- and our complete generation framework to enable continued, dynamic evaluation of this critical capability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encode behaviors such as refusal within their activation space, yet identifying these behaviors remains a significant challenge. Existing methods often rely on predefined refusal templates detectable in output tokens or require manual analysis. We introduce COSMIC (Cosine Similarity Metrics for Inversion of Concepts), an automated framework for direction selection that identifies viable steering directions and target layers using cosine similarity - entirely independent of model outputs. COSMIC achieves steering performance comparable to prior methods without requiring assumptions about a model's refusal behavior, such as the presence of specific refusal tokens. It reliably identifies refusal directions in adversarial settings and weakly aligned models, and is capable of steering such models toward safer behavior with minimal increase in false refusals, demonstrating robustness across a wide range of alignment conditions.

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

We introduce Refusal Steering, an inference-time method to exercise fine-grained control over Large Language Models refusal behaviour on politically sensitive topics without retraining. We replace fragile pattern-based refusal detection with an LLM-as-a-judge that assigns refusal confidence scores and we propose a ridge-regularized variant to compute steering vectors that better isolate the refusal--compliance direction. On Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, our method removes the refusal behaviour of the model around politically sensitive topics while maintaining safety on JailbreakBench and near-baseline performance on general benchmarks. The approach generalizes across 4B and 80B models and can also induce targeted refusals when desired. We analize the steering vectors and show that refusal signals concentrate in deeper layers of the transformer and are distributed across many dimensions. Together, these results demonstrate that activation steering can remove political refusal behaviour while retaining safety alignment for harmful content, offering a practical path to controllable, transparent moderation at inference time.

Refusal mechanisms in large language models (LLMs) are essential for ensuring safety. Recent research has revealed that refusal behavior can be mediated by a single direction in activation space, enabling targeted interventions to bypass refusals. While this is primarily demonstrated in an English-centric context, appropriate refusal behavior is important for any language, but poorly understood. In this paper, we investigate the refusal behavior in LLMs across 14 languages using PolyRefuse, a multilingual safety dataset created by translating malicious and benign English prompts into these languages. We uncover the surprising cross-lingual universality of the refusal direction: a vector extracted from English can bypass refusals in other languages with near-perfect effectiveness, without any additional fine-tuning. Even more remarkably, refusal directions derived from any safety-aligned language transfer seamlessly to others. We attribute this transferability to the parallelism of refusal vectors across languages in the embedding space and identify the underlying mechanism behind cross-lingual jailbreaks. These findings provide actionable insights for building more robust multilingual safety defenses and pave the way for a deeper mechanistic understanding of cross-lingual vulnerabilities in LLMs.

Since the release of OpenAI's ChatGPT, generative language models have attracted extensive public attention. The increased usage has highlighted generative models' broad utility, but also revealed several forms of embedded bias. Some is induced by the pre-training corpus; but additional bias specific to generative models arises from the use of subjective fine-tuning to avoid generating harmful content. Fine-tuning bias may come from individual engineers and company policies, and affects which prompts the model chooses to refuse. In this experiment, we characterize ChatGPT's refusal behavior using a black-box attack. We first query ChatGPT with a variety of offensive and benign prompts (n=1,706), then manually label each response as compliance or refusal. Manual examination of responses reveals that refusal is not cleanly binary, and lies on a continuum; as such, we map several different kinds of responses to a binary of compliance or refusal. The small manually-labeled dataset is used to train a refusal classifier, which achieves an accuracy of 96%. Second, we use this refusal classifier to bootstrap a larger (n=10,000) dataset adapted from the Quora Insincere Questions dataset. With this machine-labeled data, we train a prompt classifier to predict whether ChatGPT will refuse a given question, without seeing ChatGPT's response. This prompt classifier achieves 76% accuracy on a test set of manually labeled questions (n=985). We examine our classifiers and the prompt n-grams that are most predictive of either compliance or refusal. Our datasets and code are available at https://github.com/maxwellreuter/chatgpt-refusals.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

Refusal-Aware Instruction Tuning (RAIT) aims to enhance Large Language Models (LLMs) by improving their ability to refuse responses to questions beyond their knowledge, thereby reducing hallucinations and improving reliability. Effective RAIT must address two key challenges: firstly, effectively reject unknown questions to minimize hallucinations; secondly, avoid over-refusal to ensure questions that can be correctly answered are not rejected, thereby maintain the helpfulness of LLM outputs. In this paper, we address the two challenges by deriving insightful observations from the gradient-based perspective, and proposing the Gradient-driven Refusal Aware Instruction Tuning Framework GRAIT: (1) employs gradient-driven sample selection to effectively minimize hallucinations and (2) introduces an adaptive weighting mechanism during fine-tuning to reduce the risk of over-refusal, achieving the balance between accurate refusals and maintaining useful responses. Experimental evaluations on open-ended and multiple-choice question answering tasks demonstrate that GRAIT significantly outperforms existing RAIT methods in the overall performance. The source code and data will be available at https://github.com/opendatalab/GRAIT .

Large language models (LLMs) frequently produce false refusals, declining benign requests that contain terms resembling unsafe queries. We address this challenge by introducing two comprehensive benchmarks: the Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (XSB) for single-turn prompts, annotated with "Focus" keywords that identify refusal-inducing triggers, and the Multi-turn Scenario-based Exaggerated Safety Benchmark (MS-XSB), which systematically evaluates refusal calibration in realistic, context-rich dialog settings. Our benchmarks reveal that exaggerated refusals persist across diverse recent LLMs and are especially pronounced in complex, multi-turn scenarios. To mitigate these failures, we leverage post-hoc explanation methods to identify refusal triggers and deploy three lightweight, model-agnostic approaches, ignore-word instructions, prompt rephrasing, and attention steering, at inference time, all without retraining or parameter access. Experiments on four instruction-tuned Llama models demonstrate that these strategies substantially improve compliance on safe prompts while maintaining robust safety protections. Our findings establish a reproducible framework for diagnosing and mitigating exaggerated refusals, highlighting practical pathways to safer and more helpful LLM deployments.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed the way we access information. These models are often tuned to refuse to comply with requests that are considered harmful and to produce responses that better align with the preferences of those who control the models. To understand how this "censorship" works. We use representation engineering techniques to study open-weights safety-tuned models. We present a method for finding a refusal--compliance vector that detects and controls the level of censorship in model outputs. We also analyze recent reasoning LLMs, distilled from DeepSeek-R1, and uncover an additional dimension of censorship through "thought suppression". We show a similar approach can be used to find a vector that suppresses the model's reasoning process, allowing us to remove censorship by applying the negative multiples of this vector

Large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks but often fail to handle queries that exceed their knowledge and capabilities, leading to incorrect or fabricated responses. This paper addresses the need for LLMs to recognize and refuse infeasible tasks due to the required skills surpassing their capabilities. We first systematically conceptualize infeasible tasks for LLMs, providing formal definitions and categorizations that cover a spectrum of related hallucinations. We develop and benchmark a new dataset comprising diverse infeasible and feasible tasks to test multiple LLMs' abilities on task feasibility. Furthermore, we explore the potential of training enhancements to increase LLMs' refusal capabilities with fine-tuning. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our methods, offering promising directions for refining the operational boundaries of LLMs in real applications.

Machine learning models always make a prediction, even when it is likely to be inaccurate. This behavior should be avoided in many decision support applications, where mistakes can have severe consequences. Albeit already studied in 1970, machine learning with rejection recently gained interest. This machine learning subfield enables machine learning models to abstain from making a prediction when likely to make a mistake. This survey aims to provide an overview on machine learning with rejection. We introduce the conditions leading to two types of rejection, ambiguity and novelty rejection, which we carefully formalize. Moreover, we review and categorize strategies to evaluate a model's predictive and rejective quality. Additionally, we define the existing architectures for models with rejection and describe the standard techniques for learning such models. Finally, we provide examples of relevant application domains and show how machine learning with rejection relates to other machine learning research areas.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have significantly advanced in producing high-quality images. However, such models have the ability to generate images containing not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, such as pornography, violence, political content, and discrimination. To mitigate the risk of generating NSFW content, refusal mechanisms, i.e., safety checkers, have been developed to check potential NSFW content. Adversarial prompting techniques have been developed to evaluate the robustness of the refusal mechanisms. The key challenge remains to subtly modify the prompt in a way that preserves its sensitive nature while bypassing the refusal mechanisms. In this paper, we introduce TokenProber, a method designed for sensitivity-aware differential testing, aimed at evaluating the robustness of the refusal mechanisms in T2I models by generating adversarial prompts. Our approach is based on the key observation that adversarial prompts often succeed by exploiting discrepancies in how T2I models and safety checkers interpret sensitive content. Thus, we conduct a fine-grained analysis of the impact of specific words within prompts, distinguishing between dirty words that are essential for NSFW content generation and discrepant words that highlight the different sensitivity assessments between T2I models and safety checkers. Through the sensitivity-aware mutation, TokenProber generates adversarial prompts, striking a balance between maintaining NSFW content generation and evading detection. Our evaluation of TokenProber against 5 safety checkers on 3 popular T2I models, using 324 NSFW prompts, demonstrates its superior effectiveness in bypassing safety filters compared to existing methods (e.g., 54%+ increase on average), highlighting TokenProber's ability to uncover robustness issues in the existing refusal mechanisms.

Responsible practices for deploying language models include guiding models to recognize and refuse answering prompts that are considered unsafe, while complying with safe prompts. Achieving such behavior typically requires updating model weights, which is costly and inflexible. We explore opportunities to steering model activations at inference time, which does not require updating weights. Using sparse autoencoders, we identify and steer features in Phi-3 Mini that mediate refusal behavior. We find that feature steering can improve Phi-3 Minis robustness to jailbreak attempts across various harms, including challenging multi-turn attacks. However, we discover that feature steering can adversely affect overall performance on benchmarks. These results suggest that identifying steerable mechanisms for refusal via sparse autoencoders is a promising approach for enhancing language model safety, but that more research is needed to mitigate feature steerings adverse effects on performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have revolutionized numerous domains with their impressive performance but still face their challenges. A predominant issue is the propensity for these models to generate non-existent facts, a concern termed hallucination. Our research is motivated by the observation that previous instruction tuning methods force the model to complete a sentence no matter whether the model knows the knowledge or not. When the question is out of the parametric knowledge, it will try to make up something and fail to indicate when it lacks knowledge. In this paper, we present a new approach called Refusal-Aware Instruction Tuning (R-Tuning). This approach is formalized by first identifying the knowledge gap between parametric knowledge and the instruction tuning data. Then, we construct the refusal-aware data based on the knowledge intersection, to tune LLMs to refrain from responding to questions beyond its parametric knowledge. Experimental results demonstrate this new instruction tuning approach effectively improves a model's ability to answer known questions and refrain from answering unknown questions. Furthermore, when tested on out-of-domain datasets, the refusal ability was found to be a meta-skill that could be generalized to other tasks. Further analysis surprisingly finds that learning the uncertainty during training displays a better ability to estimate uncertainty than uncertainty-based testing. Our code will be released at https://github.com/shizhediao/R-Tuning.

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Knowing when to answer or refuse is crucial for safe and reliable decision-making language agents. Although prior work has introduced refusal strategies to boost LMs' reliability, how these models adapt their decisions to different risk levels remains underexplored. We formalize the task of risk-aware decision-making, expose critical weaknesses in existing LMs, and propose skill-decomposition solutions to mitigate them. Our findings show that even cutting-edge LMs--both regular and reasoning models--still require explicit prompt chaining to handle the task effectively, revealing the challenges that must be overcome to achieve truly autonomous decision-making agents.

While activation steering in large language models (LLMs) is a growing area of research, methods can often incur broader effects than desired. This motivates isolation of purer concept vectors to enable targeted interventions and understand LLM behavior at a more granular level. We present RepIt, a simple and data-efficient framework for isolating concept-specific representations. Across five frontier LLMs, RepIt enables precise interventions: it selectively suppresses refusal on targeted concepts while preserving refusal elsewhere, producing models that answer WMD-related questions while still scoring as safe on standard benchmarks. We further show that the corrective signal localizes to just 100-200 neurons and that robust target representations can be extracted from as few as a dozen examples on a single A6000. This efficiency raises a dual concern: manipulations can be performed with modest compute and data to extend to underrepresented data-scarce topics while evading existing benchmarks. By disentangling refusal vectors with RepIt, this work demonstrates that targeted interventions can counteract overgeneralization, laying the foundation for more granular control of model behavior.

Recently, AI assistants based on large language models (LLMs) show surprising performance in many tasks, such as dialogue, solving math problems, writing code, and using tools. Although LLMs possess intensive world knowledge, they still make factual errors when facing some knowledge intensive tasks, like open-domain question answering. These untruthful responses from the AI assistant may cause significant risks in practical applications. We believe that an AI assistant's refusal to answer questions it does not know is a crucial method for reducing hallucinations and making the assistant truthful. Therefore, in this paper, we ask the question "Can AI assistants know what they don't know and express them through natural language?" To answer this question, we construct a model-specific "I don't know" (Idk) dataset for an assistant, which contains its known and unknown questions, based on existing open-domain question answering datasets. Then we align the assistant with its corresponding Idk dataset and observe whether it can refuse to answer its unknown questions after alignment. Experimental results show that after alignment with Idk datasets, the assistant can refuse to answer most its unknown questions. For questions they attempt to answer, the accuracy is significantly higher than before the alignment.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) sometimes falsely refuse pseudo-harmful prompts, like "how to kill a mosquito," which are actually harmless. Frequent false refusals not only frustrate users but also provoke a public backlash against the very values alignment seeks to protect. In this paper, we propose the first method to auto-generate diverse, content-controlled, and model-dependent pseudo-harmful prompts. Using this method, we construct an evaluation dataset called PHTest, which is ten times larger than existing datasets, covers more false refusal patterns, and separately labels controversial prompts. We evaluate 20 LLMs on PHTest, uncovering new insights due to its scale and labeling. Our findings reveal a trade-off between minimizing false refusals and improving safety against jailbreak attacks. Moreover, we show that many jailbreak defenses significantly increase the false refusal rates, thereby undermining usability. Our method and dataset can help developers evaluate and fine-tune safer and more usable LLMs. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/umd-huang-lab/FalseRefusal

LLM safety and ethical alignment are widely discussed, but the impact of content moderation on user satisfaction remains underexplored. To address this, we analyze nearly 50,000 Chatbot Arena response-pairs using a novel fine-tuned RoBERTa model, that we trained on hand-labeled data to disentangle refusals due to ethical concerns from other refusals due to technical disabilities or lack of information. Our findings reveal a significant refusal penalty on content moderation, with users choosing ethical-based refusals roughly one-fourth as often as their preferred LLM response compared to standard responses. However, the context and phrasing play critical roles: refusals on highly sensitive prompts, such as illegal content, achieve higher win rates than less sensitive ethical concerns, and longer responses closely aligned with the prompt perform better. These results emphasize the need for nuanced moderation strategies that balance ethical safeguards with user satisfaction. Moreover, we find that the refusal penalty is notably lower in evaluations using the LLM-as-a-Judge method, highlighting discrepancies between user and automated assessments.

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

Ensuring the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial to generating responses consistent with human values. Despite their ability to recognize and avoid harmful queries, LLMs are vulnerable to "jailbreaking" attacks, where carefully crafted prompts elicit them to produce toxic content. One category of jailbreak attacks is reformulating the task as adversarial attacks by eliciting the LLM to generate an affirmative response. However, the typical attack in this category GCG has very limited attack success rate. In this study, to better study the jailbreak attack, we introduce the DSN (Don't Say No) attack, which prompts LLMs to not only generate affirmative responses but also novelly enhance the objective to suppress refusals. In addition, another challenge lies in jailbreak attacks is the evaluation, as it is difficult to directly and accurately assess the harmfulness of the attack. The existing evaluation such as refusal keyword matching has its own limitation as it reveals numerous false positive and false negative instances. To overcome this challenge, we propose an ensemble evaluation pipeline incorporating Natural Language Inference (NLI) contradiction assessment and two external LLM evaluators. Extensive experiments demonstrate the potency of the DSN and the effectiveness of ensemble evaluation compared to baseline methods.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment

RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems and web agents are increasingly evaluated on multi-hop deep search tasks, yet current practice suffers from two major limitations. First, most benchmarks leak the reasoning path in the question text, allowing models to follow surface cues rather than discover reasoning chains autonomously. Second, evaluation is typically reduced to a single pass rate, which collapses diverse behaviours into one score and obscures whether failures stem from inadequate search, poor knowledge use, or inappropriate refusal. To address these issues, we present WebDetective, a benchmark of hint-free multi-hop questions paired with a controlled Wikipedia sandbox that ensures full traceability of model actions, and a holistic evaluation framework that separates search sufficiency, knowledge utilisation, and refusal behaviour. Our evaluation of 25 state-of-the-art models reveals systematic weaknesses across all architectures: models struggle with knowledge utilisation despite having sufficient evidence and demonstrate near-absent appropriate refusal when evidence is lacking. These patterns expose a fundamental gap: today's systems excel at executing given reasoning paths but fail when required to discover them. We develop an agentic workflow, EvidenceLoop, that explicitly targets the challenges our benchmark identifies, incorporating verification loops and systematic evidence tracking that improve both search and synthesis capabilities. This baseline demonstrates that WebDetective's diagnostic framework can guide concrete architectural improvements, establishing our benchmark as a critical tool for developing genuinely autonomous reasoning systems rather than pattern-following agents.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently refuse to respond to pseudo-malicious instructions: semantically harmless input queries triggering unnecessary LLM refusals due to conservative safety alignment, significantly impairing user experience. Collecting such instructions is crucial for evaluating and mitigating over-refusals, but existing instruction curation methods, like manual creation or instruction rewriting, either lack scalability or fail to produce sufficiently diverse and effective refusal-inducing prompts. To address these limitations, we introduce EVOREFUSE, a prompt optimization approach that generates diverse pseudo-malicious instructions consistently eliciting confident refusals across LLMs. EVOREFUSE employs an evolutionary algorithm exploring the instruction space in more diverse directions than existing methods via mutation strategies and recombination, and iteratively evolves seed instructions to maximize evidence lower bound on LLM refusal probability. Using EVOREFUSE, we create two novel datasets: EVOREFUSE-TEST, a benchmark of 582 pseudo-malicious instructions that outperforms the next-best benchmark with 140.41% higher average refusal triggering rate across 9 LLMs, 34.86% greater lexical diversity, and 40.03% improved LLM response confidence scores; and EVOREFUSE-ALIGN, which provides 3,000 pseudo-malicious instructions with responses for supervised and preference-based alignment training. LLAMA3.1-8B-INSTRUCT supervisedly fine-tuned on EVOREFUSE-ALIGN achieves up to 14.31% fewer over-refusals than models trained on the second-best alignment dataset, without compromising safety. Our analysis with EVOREFUSE-TEST reveals models trigger over-refusals by overly focusing on sensitive keywords while ignoring broader context.

Despite the remarkable abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) to answer questions, they often display a considerable level of overconfidence even when the question does not have a definitive answer. To avoid providing hallucinated answers to these unknown questions, existing studies typically investigate approaches to refusing to answer these questions. In this work, we propose a novel and scalable self-alignment method to utilize the LLM itself to enhance its response-ability to different types of unknown questions, being capable of not only refusing to answer but also providing explanation to the unanswerability of unknown questions. Specifically, the Self-Align method first employ a two-stage class-aware self-augmentation approach to generate a large amount of unknown question-response data. Then we conduct disparity-driven self-curation to select qualified data for fine-tuning the LLM itself for aligning the responses to unknown questions as desired. Experimental results on two datasets across four types of unknown questions validate the superiority of the Self-Align method over existing baselines in terms of three types of task formulation.

In real-world scenarios, typical visual recognition systems could fail under two major causes, i.e., the misclassification between known classes and the excusable misbehavior on unknown-class images. To tackle these deficiencies, flexible visual recognition should dynamically predict multiple classes when they are unconfident between choices and reject making predictions when the input is entirely out of the training distribution. Two challenges emerge along with this novel task. First, prediction uncertainty should be separately quantified as confusion depicting inter-class uncertainties and ignorance identifying out-of-distribution samples. Second, both confusion and ignorance should be comparable between samples to enable effective decision-making. In this paper, we propose to model these two sources of uncertainty explicitly with the theory of Subjective Logic. Regarding recognition as an evidence-collecting process, confusion is then defined as conflicting evidence, while ignorance is the absence of evidence. By predicting Dirichlet concentration parameters for singletons, comprehensive subjective opinions, including confusion and ignorance, could be achieved via further evidence combinations. Through a series of experiments on synthetic data analysis, visual recognition, and open-set detection, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in quantifying two sources of uncertainties and dealing with flexible recognition.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often expend significant computational resources generating boilerplate responses, such as refusals, simple acknowledgements and casual greetings, which adds unnecessary cost and latency. To address this inefficiency, we propose a simple yet highly effective method for detecting such responses after only a single generation step. We demonstrate that the log-probability distribution of the first generated token serves as a powerful signal for classifying the nature of the entire subsequent response. Our experiments, conducted across a diverse range of small, large, and reasoning-specialized models, show that the first-token log-probability vectors form distinctly separable clusters for different response types. Using a lightweight k-NN classifier, we achieve high accuracy in predicting whether a response will be a substantive answer or a form of boilerplate response, including user-specified refusals. The primary implication is a practical, computationally trivial technique, optimizing LLM inference by enabling early termination or redirection to a smaller model, thereby yielding significant savings in computational cost. This work presents a direct path toward more efficient and sustainable LLM deployment.

Large language models (LLMs) are vital for a wide range of applications yet remain susceptible to jailbreak threats, which could lead to the generation of inappropriate responses. Conventional defenses, such as refusal and adversarial training, often fail to cover corner cases or rare domains, leaving LLMs still vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks. We propose a novel defense strategy, Safety Chain-of-Thought (SCoT), which harnesses the enhanced reasoning capabilities of LLMs for proactive assessment of harmful inputs, rather than simply blocking them. SCoT augments any refusal training datasets to critically analyze the intent behind each request before generating answers. By employing proactive reasoning, SCoT enhances the generalization of LLMs across varied harmful queries and scenarios not covered in the safety alignment corpus. Additionally, it generates detailed refusals specifying the rules violated. Comparative evaluations show that SCoT significantly surpasses existing defenses, reducing vulnerability to out-of-distribution issues and adversarial manipulations while maintaining strong general capabilities.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with SORRY-Bench, our proposed benchmark. First, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. Second, linguistic characteristics and formatting of prompts are often overlooked, like different languages, dialects, and more -- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-Bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. Third, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner.

Many practical vision-language applications require models that understand negation, e.g., when using natural language to retrieve images which contain certain objects but not others. Despite advancements in vision-language models (VLMs) through large-scale training, their ability to comprehend negation remains underexplored. This study addresses the question: how well do current VLMs understand negation? We introduce NegBench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate negation understanding across 18 task variations and 79k examples spanning image, video, and medical datasets. The benchmark consists of two core tasks designed to evaluate negation understanding in diverse multimodal settings: Retrieval with Negation and Multiple Choice Questions with Negated Captions. Our evaluation reveals that modern VLMs struggle significantly with negation, often performing at chance level. To address these shortcomings, we explore a data-centric approach wherein we finetune CLIP models on large-scale synthetic datasets containing millions of negated captions. We show that this approach can result in a 10% increase in recall on negated queries and a 40% boost in accuracy on multiple-choice questions with negated captions.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to meet ethical standards and safety requirements by training them to refuse answering harmful or unsafe prompts. In this paper, we demonstrate how adversaries can exploit LLMs' alignment to implant bias, or enforce targeted censorship without degrading the model's responsiveness to unrelated topics. Specifically, we propose Subversive Alignment Injection (SAI), a poisoning attack that leverages the alignment mechanism to trigger refusal on specific topics or queries predefined by the adversary. Although it is perhaps not surprising that refusal can be induced through overalignment, we demonstrate how this refusal can be exploited to inject bias into the model. Surprisingly, SAI evades state-of-the-art poisoning defenses including LLM state forensics, as well as robust aggregation techniques that are designed to detect poisoning in FL settings. We demonstrate the practical dangers of this attack by illustrating its end-to-end impacts on LLM-powered application pipelines. For chat based applications such as ChatDoctor, with 1% data poisoning, the system refuses to answer healthcare questions to targeted racial category leading to high bias (Delta DP of 23%). We also show that bias can be induced in other NLP tasks: for a resume selection pipeline aligned to refuse to summarize CVs from a selected university, high bias in selection (Delta DP of 27%) results. Even higher bias (Delta DP~38%) results on 9 other chat based downstream applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit strong but shallow alignment: they directly refuse harmful queries when a refusal is expected at the very start of an assistant turn, yet this protection collapses once a harmful continuation is underway (either through the adversarial attacks or via harmful assistant-prefill attacks). This raises a fundamental question: Can the innate shallow alignment in LLMs be unlocked to ensure safety at arbitrary generation depths? To achieve this goal, we propose Any-Depth Alignment (ADA), an effective inference-time defense with negligible overhead. ADA is built based on our observation that alignment is concentrated in the assistant header tokens through repeated use in shallow-refusal training, and these tokens possess the model's strong alignment priors. By reintroducing these tokens mid-stream, ADA induces the model to reassess harmfulness and recover refusals at any point in generation. Across diverse open-source model families (Llama, Gemma, Mistral, Qwen, DeepSeek, and gpt-oss), ADA achieves robust safety performance without requiring any changes to the base model's parameters. It secures a near-100% refusal rate against challenging adversarial prefill attacks ranging from dozens to thousands of tokens. Furthermore, ADA reduces the average success rate of prominent adversarial prompt attacks (such as GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, and TAP) to below 3%. This is all accomplished while preserving utility on benign tasks with minimal over-refusal. ADA maintains this resilience even after the base model undergoes subsequent instruction tuning (benign or adversarial).

Recently, language models like Llama 3.1 Instruct have become increasingly capable of agentic behavior, enabling them to perform tasks requiring short-term planning and tool use. In this study, we apply refusal-vector ablation to Llama 3.1 70B and implement a simple agent scaffolding to create an unrestricted agent. Our findings imply that these refusal-vector ablated models can successfully complete harmful tasks, such as bribing officials or crafting phishing attacks, revealing significant vulnerabilities in current safety mechanisms. To further explore this, we introduce a small Safe Agent Benchmark, designed to test both harmful and benign tasks in agentic scenarios. Our results imply that safety fine-tuning in chat models does not generalize well to agentic behavior, as we find that Llama 3.1 Instruct models are willing to perform most harmful tasks without modifications. At the same time, these models will refuse to give advice on how to perform the same tasks when asked for a chat completion. This highlights the growing risk of misuse as models become more capable, underscoring the need for improved safety frameworks for language model agents.

Language models (LMs) are widely used by an increasing number of users, underscoring the challenge of maintaining factuality across a broad range of topics. We first present VERIFY (Verification and Evidence RetrIeval for FactualitY evaluation), a pipeline to evaluate LMs' factuality in real-world user interactions. VERIFY considers the verifiability of LM-generated content and categorizes content units as supported, unsupported, or undecidable based on the retrieved evidence from the Web. Importantly, factuality judgment by VERIFY correlates better with human evaluations than existing methods. Using VERIFY, we identify "hallucination prompts" across diverse topics, i.e., those eliciting the highest rates of incorrect and inconclusive LM responses. These prompts form FactBench, a dataset of 1K prompts across 150 fine-grained topics. Our dataset captures emerging factuality challenges in real-world LM interactions and can be regularly updated with new prompts. We benchmark widely-used LMs from GPT, Gemini, and Llama3.1 family on FactBench, yielding the following key findings: (i) Proprietary models exhibit better factuality, with performance declining from Easy to Hard hallucination prompts. (ii) Llama3.1-405B-Instruct shows comparable or lower factual accuracy than Llama3.1-70B-Instruct across all evaluation methods due to its higher subjectivity that leads to more content labeled as undecidable. (iii) Gemini1.5-Pro shows a significantly higher refusal rate, with over-refusal in 25% of cases. Our code and data are publicly available at https://huggingface.co/spaces/launch/factbench.

Anomaly detection aims at detecting unexpected behaviours in the data. Because anomaly detection is usually an unsupervised task, traditional anomaly detectors learn a decision boundary by employing heuristics based on intuitions, which are hard to verify in practice. This introduces some uncertainty, especially close to the decision boundary, that may reduce the user trust in the detector's predictions. A way to combat this is by allowing the detector to reject examples with high uncertainty (Learning to Reject). This requires employing a confidence metric that captures the distance to the decision boundary and setting a rejection threshold to reject low-confidence predictions. However, selecting a proper metric and setting the rejection threshold without labels are challenging tasks. In this paper, we solve these challenges by setting a constant rejection threshold on the stability metric computed by ExCeeD. Our insight relies on a theoretical analysis of such a metric. Moreover, setting a constant threshold results in strong guarantees: we estimate the test rejection rate, and derive a theoretical upper bound for both the rejection rate and the expected prediction cost. Experimentally, we show that our method outperforms some metric-based methods.

This paper introduces a novel and significant challenge for Vision Language Models (VLMs), termed Unsolvable Problem Detection (UPD). UPD examines the VLM's ability to withhold answers when faced with unsolvable problems in the context of Visual Question Answering (VQA) tasks. UPD encompasses three distinct settings: Absent Answer Detection (AAD), Incompatible Answer Set Detection (IASD), and Incompatible Visual Question Detection (IVQD). To deeply investigate the UPD problem, extensive experiments indicate that most VLMs, including GPT-4V and LLaVA-Next-34B, struggle with our benchmarks to varying extents, highlighting significant room for the improvements. To address UPD, we explore both training-free and training-based solutions, offering new insights into their effectiveness and limitations. We hope our insights, together with future efforts within the proposed UPD settings, will enhance the broader understanding and development of more practical and reliable VLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are widely used for factual tasks such as "What treats asthma?" or "What is the capital of Latvia?". However, it remains unclear how stably LLMs encode distinctions between true, false, and neither-true-nor-false content in their internal probabilistic representations. We introduce representational stability as the robustness of an LLM's veracity representations to perturbations in the operational definition of truth. We assess representational stability by (i) training a linear probe on an LLM's activations to separate true from not-true statements and (ii) measuring how its learned decision boundary shifts under controlled label changes. Using activations from sixteen open-source models and three factual domains, we compare two types of neither statements. The first are fact-like assertions about entities we believe to be absent from any training data. We call these unfamiliar neither statements. The second are nonfactual claims drawn from well-known fictional contexts. We call these familiar neither statements. The unfamiliar statements induce the largest boundary shifts, producing up to 40% flipped truth judgements in fragile domains (such as word definitions), while familiar fictional statements remain more coherently clustered and yield smaller changes (leq 8.2%). These results suggest that representational stability stems more from epistemic familiarity than from linguistic form. More broadly, our approach provides a diagnostic for auditing and training LLMs to preserve coherent truth assignments under semantic uncertainty, rather than optimizing for output accuracy alone.

Hallucinations in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) -- where the model generates content inconsistent with the input image -- pose significant risks in real-world applications, from misinformation in visual question answering to unsafe errors in decision-making. Existing benchmarks primarily test recognition accuracy, i.e., evaluating whether models can select the correct answer among distractors. This overlooks an equally critical capability for trustworthy AI: recognizing when none of the provided options are correct, a behavior reflecting epistemic humility. We present HumbleBench, a new hallucination benchmark designed to evaluate MLLMs' ability to reject plausible but incorrect answers across three hallucination types: object, relation, and attribute. Built from a panoptic scene graph dataset, we leverage fine-grained scene graph annotations to extract ground-truth entities and relations, and prompt GPT-4-Turbo to generate multiple-choice questions, followed by a rigorous manual filtering process. Each question includes a "None of the above" option, requiring models not only to recognize correct visual information but also to identify when no provided answer is valid. We evaluate a variety of state-of-the-art MLLMs -- including both general-purpose and specialized reasoning models -- on HumbleBench and share valuable findings and insights with the community. By incorporating explicit false-option rejection, HumbleBench fills a key gap in current evaluation suites, providing a more realistic measure of MLLM reliability in safety-critical settings. Our code and dataset are released publicly and can be accessed at https://github.com/maifoundations/HumbleBench.

Medical applications challenge today's text categorization techniques by demanding both high accuracy and ease-of-interpretation. Although deep learning has provided a leap ahead in accuracy, this leap comes at the sacrifice of interpretability. To address this accuracy-interpretability challenge, we here introduce, for the first time, a text categorization approach that leverages the recently introduced Tsetlin Machine. In all brevity, we represent the terms of a text as propositional variables. From these, we capture categories using simple propositional formulae, such as: if "rash" and "reaction" and "penicillin" then Allergy. The Tsetlin Machine learns these formulae from a labelled text, utilizing conjunctive clauses to represent the particular facets of each category. Indeed, even the absence of terms (negated features) can be used for categorization purposes. Our empirical comparison with Na\"ive Bayes, decision trees, linear support vector machines (SVMs), random forest, long short-term memory (LSTM) neural networks, and other techniques, is quite conclusive. The Tsetlin Machine either performs on par with or outperforms all of the evaluated methods on both the 20 Newsgroups and IMDb datasets, as well as on a non-public clinical dataset. On average, the Tsetlin Machine delivers the best recall and precision scores across the datasets. Finally, our GPU implementation of the Tsetlin Machine executes 5 to 15 times faster than the CPU implementation, depending on the dataset. We thus believe that our novel approach can have a significant impact on a wide range of text analysis applications, forming a promising starting point for deeper natural language understanding with the Tsetlin Machine.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate erroneous outputs, known as hallucinations, due to their limitations in discerning questions beyond their knowledge scope. While addressing hallucination has been a focal point in research, previous efforts primarily concentrate on enhancing correctness without giving due consideration to the significance of rejection mechanisms. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the role of rejection, introducing the notion of model reliability along with corresponding metrics. These metrics measure the model's ability to provide accurate responses while adeptly rejecting questions exceeding its knowledge boundaries, thereby minimizing hallucinations. To improve the inherent reliability of LLMs, we present a novel alignment framework called Reinforcement Learning from Knowledge Feedback (RLKF). RLKF leverages knowledge feedback to dynamically determine the model's knowledge boundary and trains a reliable reward model to encourage the refusal of out-of-knowledge questions. Experimental results on mathematical questions affirm the substantial efficacy of RLKF in significantly enhancing LLM reliability.

In dense retrieval, effective training hinges on selecting high quality hard negatives while avoiding false negatives. Recent methods apply heuristics based on positive document scores to identify hard negatives, improving both performance and interpretability. However, these global, example agnostic strategies often miss instance specific false negatives. To address this, we propose a learnable adapter module that monitors Bi-Encoder representations to estimate the likelihood that a hard negative is actually a false negative. This probability is modeled dynamically and contextually, enabling fine-grained, query specific judgments. The predicted scores are used in two downstream components: (1) resampling, where negatives are reweighted during training, and (2) reranking, where top-k retrieved documents are reordered at inference. Empirical results on standard benchmarks show that our adapter-enhanced framework consistently outperforms strong Bi-Encoder baselines, underscoring the benefit of explicit false negative modeling in dense retrieval.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of processing long inputs and locating specific information within them, as evidenced by their performance on the Needle in a Haystack (NIAH) test. However, while models excel at recalling surprising information, they still struggle to identify clearly omitted information. We introduce AbsenceBench to assesses LLMs' capacity to detect missing information across three domains: numerical sequences, poetry, and GitHub pull requests. AbsenceBench asks models to identify which pieces of a document were deliberately removed, given access to both the original and edited contexts. Despite the apparent straightforwardness of these tasks, our experiments reveal that even state-of-the-art models like Claude-3.7-Sonnet achieve only 69.6% F1-score with a modest average context length of 5K tokens. Our analysis suggests this poor performance stems from a fundamental limitation: Transformer attention mechanisms cannot easily attend to "gaps" in documents since these absences don't correspond to any specific keys that can be attended to. Overall, our results and analysis provide a case study of the close proximity of tasks where models are already superhuman (NIAH) and tasks where models breakdown unexpectedly (AbsenceBench).

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in memorizing vast amounts of knowledge across diverse domains. However, the ability to selectively forget specific knowledge is critical for ensuring the safety and compliance of deployed models. Existing unlearning efforts typically fine-tune the model with resources such as forget data, retain data, and a calibration model. These additional gradient steps blur the decision boundary between forget and retain knowledge, making unlearning often at the expense of overall performance. To avoid the negative impact of fine-tuning, it would be better to unlearn solely at inference time by safely guarding the model against generating responses related to the forget target, without destroying the fluency of text generation. In this work, we propose Generation-time Unlearning via Adaptive Restriction and Detection (GUARD), a framework that enables dynamic unlearning during LLM generation. Specifically, we first employ a prompt classifier to detect unlearning targets and extract the corresponding forbidden token. We then dynamically penalize and filter candidate tokens during generation using a combination of token matching and semantic matching, effectively preventing the model from leaking the forgotten content. Experimental results on copyright content unlearning tasks over the Harry Potter dataset and the MUSE benchmark, as well as entity unlearning tasks on the TOFU dataset, demonstrate that GUARD achieves strong forget quality across various tasks while causing almost no degradation to the LLM's general capabilities, striking an excellent trade-off between forgetting and utility.

The paper presents a Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) system, which can fast and accurately recognize traffic signs of different sizes in images. The system consists of two well-designed Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), one for region proposals of traffic signs and one for classification of each region. In the proposal CNN, a Fully Convolutional Network (FCN) with a dual multi-scale architecture is proposed to achieve scale invariant detection. In training the proposal network, a modified "Online Hard Example Mining" (OHEM) scheme is adopted to suppress false positives. The classification network fuses multi-scale features as representation and adopts an "Inception" module for efficiency. We evaluate the proposed TSR system and its components with extensive experiments. Our method obtains 99.88% precision and 96.61% recall on the Swedish Traffic Signs Dataset (STSD), higher than state-of-the-art methods. Besides, our system is faster and more lightweight than state-of-the-art deep learning networks for traffic sign recognition.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) develop, their potential security issues have become increasingly prominent. Machine Unlearning (MU), as an effective strategy for forgetting specific knowledge in training data, has been widely used in privacy protection. However, MU for safety in MLLM has yet to be fully explored. To address this issue, we propose SAFEERASER, a safety unlearning benchmark for MLLMs, consisting of 3,000 images and 28.8K VQA pairs. We comprehensively evaluate unlearning methods from two perspectives: forget quality and model utility. Our findings show that existing MU methods struggle to maintain model performance while implementing the forget operation and often suffer from over-forgetting. Hence, we introduce Prompt Decouple (PD) Loss to alleviate over-forgetting through decouple prompt during unlearning process. To quantitatively measure over-forgetting mitigated by PD Loss, we propose a new metric called Safe Answer Refusal Rate (SARR). Experimental results demonstrate that combining PD Loss with existing unlearning methods can effectively prevent over-forgetting and achieve a decrease of 79.5% in the SARR metric of LLaVA-7B and LLaVA-13B, while maintaining forget quality and model utility. Our code and dataset will be released upon acceptance. Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language and images, and reader discretion is recommended.

Negation is a common everyday phenomena and has been a consistent area of weakness for language models (LMs). Although the Information Retrieval (IR) community has adopted LMs as the backbone of modern IR architectures, there has been little to no research in understanding how negation impacts neural IR. We therefore construct a straightforward benchmark on this theme: asking IR models to rank two documents that differ only by negation. We show that the results vary widely according to the type of IR architecture: cross-encoders perform best, followed by late-interaction models, and in last place are bi-encoder and sparse neural architectures. We find that most current information retrieval models do not consider negation, performing similarly or worse than randomly ranking. We show that although the obvious approach of continued fine-tuning on a dataset of contrastive documents containing negations increases performance (as does model size), there is still a large gap between machine and human performance.

For Large Language Models (LLMs) to be reliably deployed in both everyday and high-stakes domains, knowing when not to answer is equally critical as answering correctly. Real-world user queries, which can be underspecified, ill-posed, or fundamentally unanswerable, require LLMs to reason about uncertainty and selectively abstain -- i.e., refuse to answer definitively. However, abstention remains understudied, without a systematic evaluation framework for modern LLMs. In this work, we introduce AbstentionBench, a large-scale benchmark for holistically evaluating abstention across 20 diverse datasets, including questions with unknown answers, underspecification, false premises, subjective interpretations, and outdated information. Evaluating 20 frontier LLMs reveals abstention is an unsolved problem, and one where scaling models is of little use. While recent reasoning LLMs have shown impressive results in complex problem solving, surprisingly, we find that reasoning fine-tuning degrades abstention (by 24% on average), even for math and science domains on which reasoning models are explicitly trained. We find that while a carefully crafted system prompt can boost abstention in practice, it does not resolve models' fundamental inability to reason about uncertainty. We release AbstentionBench to foster research into advancing LLM reliability.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Refusal training on Large Language Models (LLMs) prevents harmful outputs, yet this defense remains vulnerable to both automated and human-crafted jailbreaks. We present a novel LLM-as-red-teamer approach in which a human jailbreaks a refusal-trained LLM to make it willing to jailbreak itself or other LLMs. We refer to the jailbroken LLMs as J_2 attackers, which can systematically evaluate target models using various red teaming strategies and improve its performance via in-context learning from the previous failures. Our experiments demonstrate that Sonnet 3.5 and Gemini 1.5 pro outperform other LLMs as J_2, achieving 93.0% and 91.0% attack success rates (ASRs) respectively against GPT-4o (and similar results across other capable LLMs) on Harmbench. Our work not only introduces a scalable approach to strategic red teaming, drawing inspiration from human red teamers, but also highlights jailbreaking-to-jailbreak as an overlooked failure mode of the safeguard. Specifically, an LLM can bypass its own safeguards by employing a jailbroken version of itself that is willing to assist in further jailbreaking. To prevent any direct misuse with J_2, while advancing research in AI safety, we publicly share our methodology while keeping specific prompting details private.

Negation is a fundamental linguistic phenomenon that poses persistent challenges for Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly in tasks requiring deep semantic understanding. Existing benchmarks often treat negation as a side case within broader tasks like natural language inference, resulting in a lack of benchmarks that exclusively target negation understanding. In this work, we introduce Thunder-NUBench, a novel benchmark explicitly designed to assess sentence-level negation understanding in LLMs. Thunder-NUBench goes beyond surface-level cue detection by contrasting standard negation with structurally diverse alternatives such as local negation, contradiction, and paraphrase. The benchmark consists of manually curated sentence-negation pairs and a multiple-choice dataset that enables in-depth evaluation of models' negation understanding.

Negation is a fundamental linguistic concept used by humans to convey information that they do not desire. Despite this, minimal research has focused on negation within text-guided image editing. This lack of research means that vision-language models (VLMs) for image editing may struggle to understand negation, implying that they struggle to provide accurate results. One barrier to achieving human-level intelligence is the lack of a standard collection by which research into negation can be evaluated. This paper presents the first large-scale dataset, Negative Instruction (NeIn), for studying negation within instruction-based image editing. Our dataset comprises 366,957 quintuplets, i.e., source image, original caption, selected object, negative sentence, and target image in total, including 342,775 queries for training and 24,182 queries for benchmarking image editing methods. Specifically, we automatically generate NeIn based on a large, existing vision-language dataset, MS-COCO, via two steps: generation and filtering. During the generation phase, we leverage two VLMs, BLIP and InstructPix2Pix (fine-tuned on MagicBrush dataset), to generate NeIn's samples and the negative clauses that expresses the content of the source image. In the subsequent filtering phase, we apply BLIP and LLaVA-NeXT to remove erroneous samples. Additionally, we introduce an evaluation protocol to assess the negation understanding for image editing models. Extensive experiments using our dataset across multiple VLMs for text-guided image editing demonstrate that even recent state-of-the-art VLMs struggle to understand negative queries.

Despite investments in improving model safety, studies show that misaligned capabilities remain latent in safety-tuned models. In this work, we shed light on the mechanics of this phenomenon. First, we show that even when model generations are safe, harmful content can persist in hidden representations and can be extracted by decoding from earlier layers. Then, we show that whether the model divulges such content depends significantly on its perception of who it is talking to, which we refer to as user persona. In fact, we find manipulating user persona to be even more effective for eliciting harmful content than direct attempts to control model refusal. We study both natural language prompting and activation steering as control methods and show that activation steering is significantly more effective at bypassing safety filters. We investigate why certain personas break model safeguards and find that they enable the model to form more charitable interpretations of otherwise dangerous queries. Finally, we show we can predict a persona's effect on refusal given only the geometry of its steering vector.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming increasingly important for machine learning applications. However, it can be challenging to align LLMs with our intent, particularly when we want to generate content that is preferable over others or when we want the LLM to respond in a certain style or tone that is hard to describe. To address this challenge, we propose an approach that uses contrastive examples to better describe our intent. This involves providing positive examples that illustrate the true intent, along with negative examples that show what characteristics we want LLMs to avoid. The negative examples can be retrieved from labeled data, written by a human, or generated by the LLM itself. Before generating an answer, we ask the model to analyze the examples to teach itself what to avoid. This reasoning step provides the model with the appropriate articulation of the user's need and guides it towards generting a better answer. We tested our approach on both synthesized and real-world datasets, including StackExchange and Reddit, and found that it significantly improves performance compared to standard few-shot prompting

Abstention Ability (AA) is a critical aspect of Large Language Model (LLM) reliability, referring to an LLM's capability to withhold responses when uncertain or lacking a definitive answer, without compromising performance. Although previous studies have attempted to improve AA, they lack a standardised evaluation method and remain unsuitable for black-box models where token prediction probabilities are inaccessible. This makes comparative analysis challenging, especially for state-of-the-art closed-source commercial LLMs. This paper bridges this gap by introducing a black-box evaluation approach and a new dataset, Abstain-QA, crafted to rigorously assess AA across varied question types (answerable and unanswerable), domains (well-represented and under-represented), and task types (fact centric and reasoning). We also propose a new confusion matrix, the ''Answerable-Unanswerable Confusion Matrix'' (AUCM) which serves as the basis for evaluating AA, by offering a structured and precise approach for assessment. Finally, we explore the impact of three prompting strategies-Strict Prompting, Verbal Confidence Thresholding, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-on improving AA. Our results indicate that even powerful models like GPT-4, Mixtral 8x22b encounter difficulties with abstention; however, strategic approaches such as Strict prompting and CoT can enhance this capability.

We study the problem of classification with a reject option for a fixed predictor, applicable in natural language processing. We introduce a new problem formulation for this scenario, and an algorithm minimizing a new surrogate loss function. We provide a complete theoretical analysis of the surrogate loss function with a strong H-consistency guarantee. For evaluation, we choose the decontextualization task, and provide a manually-labelled dataset of 2mathord,000 examples. Our algorithm significantly outperforms the baselines considered, with a sim!!25% improvement in coverage when halving the error rate, which is only sim!! 3 % away from the theoretical limit.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks but still face challenges such as hallucinations. One potential reason for hallucinations is the lack of relevant knowledge or context. Thus, a promising solution to mitigate this issue involves instructing LLMs to respond with "I do not know" when a question falls outside their knowledge domain or the provided context. However, in this work, we observed that LLMs struggle to admit their lack of knowledge, primarily due to existing instruction datasets designed to encourage specific answers. To improve large language models' capability to recognize the boundaries of their knowledge, we propose a novel approach called uncertainty-sensitive tuning. This method involves two-stage training designed for uncertainty recognition and prompt-sensitive activation. In the first stage, we guide the LLM to reject unknown questions. In the second stage, we recover the decreased performance in QA tasks by incorporating designed causal instructions. By leveraging this method, we aim to enhance the model's ability to identify areas of uncertainty. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed uncertainty-sensitive tuning method significantly improves the performance of the Llama2-chat-7B model. Specifically, it achieves a substantial 34.7% improvement in handling questions involving knowledge gaps compared to the original model. Moreover, our approach outperforms GPT-4, exhibiting a 9.4% increase in overall performance. We open-source the model and code on GitHub.

Reviewing contracts is a time-consuming procedure that incurs large expenses to companies and social inequality to those who cannot afford it. In this work, we propose "document-level natural language inference (NLI) for contracts", a novel, real-world application of NLI that addresses such problems. In this task, a system is given a set of hypotheses (such as "Some obligations of Agreement may survive termination.") and a contract, and it is asked to classify whether each hypothesis is "entailed by", "contradicting to" or "not mentioned by" (neutral to) the contract as well as identifying "evidence" for the decision as spans in the contract. We annotated and release the largest corpus to date consisting of 607 annotated contracts. We then show that existing models fail badly on our task and introduce a strong baseline, which (1) models evidence identification as multi-label classification over spans instead of trying to predict start and end tokens, and (2) employs more sophisticated context segmentation for dealing with long documents. We also show that linguistic characteristics of contracts, such as negations by exceptions, are contributing to the difficulty of this task and that there is much room for improvement.

AI systems can take harmful actions and are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present an approach, inspired by recent advances in representation engineering, that "short-circuits" models as they respond with harmful outputs. Existing techniques aimed at improving alignment, such as refusal training, are often bypassed. Techniques such as adversarial training try to plug these holes by countering specific attacks. As an alternative to refusal training and adversarial training, short-circuiting directly controls the representations that are responsible for harmful outputs in the first place. Our technique can be applied to both text-only and multimodal language models to prevent the generation of harmful outputs without sacrificing utility -- even in the presence of powerful unseen attacks. Notably, while adversarial robustness in standalone image recognition remains an open challenge, short-circuiting allows the larger multimodal system to reliably withstand image "hijacks" that aim to produce harmful content. Finally, we extend our approach to AI agents, demonstrating considerable reductions in the rate of harmful actions when they are under attack. Our approach represents a significant step forward in the development of reliable safeguards to harmful behavior and adversarial attacks.

Recent advances in Hierarchical Multi-label Classification (HMC), particularly neurosymbolic-based approaches, have demonstrated improved consistency and accuracy by enforcing constraints on a neural model during training. However, such work assumes the existence of such constraints a-priori. In this paper, we relax this strong assumption and present an approach based on Error Detection Rules (EDR) that allow for learning explainable rules about the failure modes of machine learning models. We show that these rules are not only effective in detecting when a machine learning classifier has made an error but also can be leveraged as constraints for HMC, thereby allowing the recovery of explainable constraints even if they are not provided. We show that our approach is effective in detecting machine learning errors and recovering constraints, is noise tolerant, and can function as a source of knowledge for neurosymbolic models on multiple datasets, including a newly introduced military vehicle recognition dataset.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

Prepending model inputs with safety prompts is a common practice of safeguarding large language models (LLMs) from complying with queries that contain harmful intents. However, the working mechanisms of safety prompts have not yet been fully understood, which hinders the potential for automatically optimizing them for improved LLM safety. Motivated by this problem, we investigate the impact of safety prompts from the perspective of model representations. We find that in models' representation space, harmful and harmless queries can be largely distinguished, but this is not noticeably enhanced by safety prompts. Instead, the queries' representations are moved by different safety prompts in similar directions, where models become more prone to refusal (i.e., refusing to provide assistance) even when the queries are harmless. Inspired by these findings, we propose a method called DRO (Directed Representation Optimization) for automatic safety prompt optimization. DRO treats safety prompts as continuous, trainable embeddings and learns to move the representations of harmful/harmless queries along/opposite the direction in which the model's refusal probability increases. We demonstrate that DRO remarkably improves the safeguarding performance of human-crafted safety prompts and outperforms strong baselines, as evaluated on out-of-domain benchmarks, without compromising the general model capability.

Although large language models (LLMs) have apparently acquired a certain level of grammatical knowledge and the ability to make generalizations, they fail to interpret negation, a crucial step in Natural Language Processing. We try to clarify the reasons for the sub-optimal performance of LLMs understanding negation. We introduce a large semi-automatically generated dataset of circa 400,000 descriptive sentences about commonsense knowledge that can be true or false in which negation is present in about 2/3 of the corpus in different forms. We have used our dataset with the largest available open LLMs in a zero-shot approach to grasp their generalization and inference capability and we have also fine-tuned some of the models to assess whether the understanding of negation can be trained. Our findings show that, while LLMs are proficient at classifying affirmative sentences, they struggle with negative sentences and lack a deep understanding of negation, often relying on superficial cues. Although fine-tuning the models on negative sentences improves their performance, the lack of generalization in handling negation is persistent, highlighting the ongoing challenges of LLMs regarding negation understanding and generalization. The dataset and code are publicly available.

Machine reading comprehension (MRC) is an AI challenge that requires machine to determine the correct answers to questions based on a given passage. MRC systems must not only answer question when necessary but also distinguish when no answer is available according to the given passage and then tactfully abstain from answering. When unanswerable questions are involved in the MRC task, an essential verification module called verifier is especially required in addition to the encoder, though the latest practice on MRC modeling still most benefits from adopting well pre-trained language models as the encoder block by only focusing on the "reading". This paper devotes itself to exploring better verifier design for the MRC task with unanswerable questions. Inspired by how humans solve reading comprehension questions, we proposed a retrospective reader (Retro-Reader) that integrates two stages of reading and verification strategies: 1) sketchy reading that briefly investigates the overall interactions of passage and question, and yield an initial judgment; 2) intensive reading that verifies the answer and gives the final prediction. The proposed reader is evaluated on two benchmark MRC challenge datasets SQuAD2.0 and NewsQA, achieving new state-of-the-art results. Significance tests show that our model is significantly better than the strong ELECTRA and ALBERT baselines. A series of analysis is also conducted to interpret the effectiveness of the proposed reader.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have become one of the most important techniques in information retrieval (IR). Due to the limitation of relevance labels, the training of NRMs heavily relies on negative sampling over unlabeled data. In general machine learning scenarios, it has shown that training with hard negatives (i.e., samples that are close to positives) could lead to better performance. Surprisingly, we find opposite results from our empirical studies in IR. When sampling top-ranked results (excluding the labeled positives) as negatives from a stronger retriever, the performance of the learned NRM becomes even worse. Based on our investigation, the superficial reason is that there are more false negatives (i.e., unlabeled positives) in the top-ranked results with a stronger retriever, which may hurt the training process; The root is the existence of pooling bias in the dataset constructing process, where annotators only judge and label very few samples selected by some basic retrievers. Therefore, in principle, we can formulate the false negative issue in training NRMs as learning from labeled datasets with pooling bias. To solve this problem, we propose a novel Coupled Estimation Technique (CET) that learns both a relevance model and a selection model simultaneously to correct the pooling bias for training NRMs. Empirical results on three retrieval benchmarks show that NRMs trained with our technique can achieve significant gains on ranking effectiveness against other baseline strategies.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) and its variants are increasingly used for aligning language models with human preferences. Although these methods are designed to teach a model to generate preferred responses more frequently relative to dispreferred responses, prior work has observed that the likelihood of preferred responses often decreases during training. The current work sheds light on the causes and implications of this counter-intuitive phenomenon, which we term likelihood displacement. We demonstrate that likelihood displacement can be catastrophic, shifting probability mass from preferred responses to responses with an opposite meaning. As a simple example, training a model to prefer No over Never can sharply increase the probability of Yes. Moreover, when aligning the model to refuse unsafe prompts, we show that such displacement can unintentionally lead to unalignment, by shifting probability mass from preferred refusal responses to harmful responses (e.g., reducing the refusal rate of Llama-3-8B-Instruct from 74.4% to 33.4%). We theoretically characterize that likelihood displacement is driven by preferences that induce similar embeddings, as measured by a centered hidden embedding similarity (CHES) score. Empirically, the CHES score enables identifying which training samples contribute most to likelihood displacement in a given dataset. Filtering out these samples effectively mitigated unintentional unalignment in our experiments. More broadly, our results highlight the importance of curating data with sufficiently distinct preferences, for which we believe the CHES score may prove valuable.

Chat-based language models are designed to be helpful, yet they should not comply with every user request. While most existing work primarily focuses on refusal of "unsafe" queries, we posit that the scope of noncompliance should be broadened. We introduce a comprehensive taxonomy of contextual noncompliance describing when and how models should not comply with user requests. Our taxonomy spans a wide range of categories including incomplete, unsupported, indeterminate, and humanizing requests (in addition to unsafe requests). To test noncompliance capabilities of language models, we use this taxonomy to develop a new evaluation suite of 1000 noncompliance prompts. We find that most existing models show significantly high compliance rates in certain previously understudied categories with models like GPT-4 incorrectly complying with as many as 30% of requests. To address these gaps, we explore different training strategies using a synthetically-generated training set of requests and expected noncompliant responses. Our experiments demonstrate that while direct finetuning of instruction-tuned models can lead to both over-refusal and a decline in general capabilities, using parameter efficient methods like low rank adapters helps to strike a good balance between appropriate noncompliance and other capabilities.

The performance of large language models (LLMs) on existing reasoning benchmarks has significantly improved over the past years. In response, we present JEEBench, a considerably more challenging benchmark dataset for evaluating the problem solving abilities of LLMs. We curate 515 challenging pre-engineering mathematics, physics and chemistry problems from the highly competitive IIT JEE-Advanced exam. Long-horizon reasoning on top of deep in-domain knowledge is essential for solving problems in this benchmark. Our evaluation on various open-source and proprietary models reveals that the highest performance, even after using techniques like self-consistency, self-refinement and chain-of-thought prompting, is less than 40%. The typical failure modes of GPT-4, the best model, are errors in algebraic manipulation, difficulty in grounding abstract concepts into mathematical equations accurately and failure in retrieving relevant domain-specific concepts. We also observe that by mere prompting, GPT-4 is unable to assess risk introduced by negative marking for incorrect answers. For this, we develop a post-hoc confidence-thresholding method over self-consistency, which enables effective response selection. We hope that our challenging benchmark will guide future re-search in problem-solving using LLMs.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown unprecedented potential in various fields, especially as the backbones for question-answering (QA) systems. However, they tend to be easily deceived by tricky questions such as "How many eyes does the sun have?". Such frailties of PLMs often allude to the lack of knowledge within them. In this paper, we find that the PLMs already possess the knowledge required to rebut such questions, and the key is how to activate the knowledge. To systematize this observation, we investigate the PLMs' responses to one kind of tricky questions, i.e., the false premises questions (FPQs). We annotate a FalseQA dataset containing 2365 human-written FPQs, with the corresponding explanations for the false premises and the revised true premise questions. Using FalseQA, we discover that PLMs are capable of discriminating FPQs by fine-tuning on moderate numbers (e.g., 256) of examples. PLMs also generate reasonable explanations for the false premise, which serve as rebuttals. Further replaying a few general questions during training allows PLMs to excel on FPQs and general questions simultaneously. Our work suggests that once the rebuttal ability is stimulated, knowledge inside the PLMs can be effectively utilized to handle FPQs, which incentivizes the research on PLM-based QA systems.

Reinforcement finetuning (RFT) has become a standard approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, its impact on model trustworthiness remains underexplored. In this work, we identify and systematically study a critical side effect of RFT, which we term the hallucination tax: a degradation in refusal behavior causing models to produce hallucinated answers to unanswerable questions confidently. To investigate this, we introduce SUM (Synthetic Unanswerable Math), a high-quality dataset of unanswerable math problems designed to probe models' ability to recognize an unanswerable question by reasoning from the insufficient or ambiguous information. Our results show that standard RFT training could reduce model refusal rates by more than 80%, which significantly increases model's tendency to hallucinate. We further demonstrate that incorporating just 10% SUM during RFT substantially restores appropriate refusal behavior, with minimal accuracy trade-offs on solvable tasks. Crucially, this approach enables LLMs to leverage inference-time compute to reason about their own uncertainty and knowledge boundaries, improving generalization not only to out-of-domain math problems but also to factual question answering tasks.

Machine unlearning is a process to remove specific data points from a trained model while maintaining the performance on retain data, addressing privacy or legal requirements. Despite its importance, existing unlearning evaluations tend to focus on logit-based metrics (i.e., accuracy) under small-scale scenarios. We observe that this could lead to a false sense of security in unlearning approaches under real-world scenarios. In this paper, we conduct a new comprehensive evaluation that employs representation-based evaluations of the unlearned model under large-scale scenarios to verify whether the unlearning approaches genuinely eliminate the targeted forget data from the model's representation perspective. Our analysis reveals that current state-of-the-art unlearning approaches either completely degrade the representational quality of the unlearned model or merely modify the classifier (i.e., the last layer), thereby achieving superior logit-based evaluation metrics while maintaining significant representational similarity to the original model. Furthermore, we introduce a rigorous unlearning evaluation setup, in which the forgetting classes exhibit semantic similarity to downstream task classes, necessitating that feature representations diverge significantly from those of the original model, thus enabling a more rigorous evaluation from a representation perspective. We hope our benchmark serves as a standardized protocol for evaluating unlearning algorithms under realistic conditions.

Negation is a fundamental aspect of natural language, playing a critical role in communication and comprehension. Our study assesses the negation detection performance of Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) models, specifically GPT-2, GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4. We focus on the identification of negation in natural language using a zero-shot prediction approach applied to our custom xNot360 dataset. Our approach examines sentence pairs labeled to indicate whether the second sentence negates the first. Our findings expose a considerable performance disparity among the GPT models, with GPT-4 surpassing its counterparts and GPT-3.5 displaying a marked performance reduction. The overall proficiency of the GPT models in negation detection remains relatively modest, indicating that this task pushes the boundaries of their natural language understanding capabilities. We not only highlight the constraints of GPT models in handling negation but also emphasize the importance of logical reliability in high-stakes domains such as healthcare, science, and law.

Neural Information Retrieval (NIR) has significantly improved upon heuristic-based IR systems. Yet, failures remain frequent, the models used often being unable to retrieve documents relevant to the user's query. We address this challenge by proposing a lightweight abstention mechanism tailored for real-world constraints, with particular emphasis placed on the reranking phase. We introduce a protocol for evaluating abstention strategies in a black-box scenario, demonstrating their efficacy, and propose a simple yet effective data-driven mechanism. We provide open-source code for experiment replication and abstention implementation, fostering wider adoption and application in diverse contexts.

Named Entity Recognition (NER) is a low-level task often used as a foundation for solving higher level NLP problems. In the context of character detection in novels, NER false negatives can be an issue as they possibly imply missing certain characters or relationships completely. In this article, we demonstrate that applying a straightforward data augmentation technique allows training a model achieving higher recall, at the cost of a certain amount of precision regarding ambiguous entities. We show that this decrease in precision can be mitigated by giving the model more local context, which resolves some of the ambiguities.

Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection refers to training the model on an in-distribution (ID) dataset to classify whether the input images come from unknown classes. Considerable effort has been invested in designing various OOD detection methods based on either convolutional neural networks or transformers. However, zero-shot OOD detection methods driven by CLIP, which only require class names for ID, have received less attention. This paper presents a novel method, namely CLIP saying no (CLIPN), which empowers the logic of saying no within CLIP. Our key motivation is to equip CLIP with the capability of distinguishing OOD and ID samples using positive-semantic prompts and negation-semantic prompts. Specifically, we design a novel learnable no prompt and a no text encoder to capture negation semantics within images. Subsequently, we introduce two loss functions: the image-text binary-opposite loss and the text semantic-opposite loss, which we use to teach CLIPN to associate images with no prompts, thereby enabling it to identify unknown samples. Furthermore, we propose two threshold-free inference algorithms to perform OOD detection by utilizing negation semantics from no prompts and the text encoder. Experimental results on 9 benchmark datasets (3 ID datasets and 6 OOD datasets) for the OOD detection task demonstrate that CLIPN, based on ViT-B-16, outperforms 7 well-used algorithms by at least 2.34% and 11.64% in terms of AUROC and FPR95 for zero-shot OOD detection on ImageNet-1K. Our CLIPN can serve as a solid foundation for effectively leveraging CLIP in downstream OOD tasks. The code is available on https://github.com/xmed-lab/CLIPN.

Large language models (LLMs) undergo a three-phase training process: unsupervised pre-training, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and learning from human feedback (RLHF/DPO). Notably, it is during the final phase that these models are exposed to negative examples -- incorrect, rejected, or suboptimal responses to queries. This paper delves into the role of negative examples in the training of LLMs, using a likelihood-ratio (Likra) model on multiple-choice question answering benchmarks to precisely manage the influence and the volume of negative examples. Our findings reveal three key insights: (1) During a critical phase in training, Likra with negative examples demonstrates a significantly larger improvement per training example compared to SFT using only positive examples. This leads to a sharp jump in the learning curve for Likra unlike the smooth and gradual improvement of SFT; (2) negative examples that are plausible but incorrect (near-misses) exert a greater influence; and (3) while training with positive examples fails to significantly decrease the likelihood of plausible but incorrect answers, training with negative examples more accurately identifies them. These results indicate a potentially significant role for negative examples in improving accuracy and reducing hallucinations for LLMs.

Current evaluations of LLM safety predominantly rely on severity-based taxonomies to assess the harmfulness of malicious queries. We argue that this formulation requires re-examination as it assumes uniform risk across all malicious queries, neglecting Execution Likelihood--the conditional probability of a threat being realized given the model's response. In this work, we introduce Expected Harm, a metric that weights the severity of a jailbreak by its execution likelihood, modeled as a function of execution cost. Through empirical analysis of state-of-the-art models, we reveal a systematic Inverse Risk Calibration: models disproportionately exhibit stronger refusal behaviors for low-likelihood (high-cost) threats while remaining vulnerable to high-likelihood (low-cost) queries. We demonstrate that this miscalibration creates a structural vulnerability: by exploiting this property, we increase the attack success rate of existing jailbreaks by up to 2times. Finally, we trace the root cause of this failure using linear probing, which reveals that while models encode severity in their latent space to drive refusal decisions, they possess no distinguishable internal representation of execution cost, making them "blind" to this critical dimension of risk.

Detecting content that contradicts or is unsupported by a given source text is a critical challenge for the safe deployment of generative language models. We introduce HALT-RAG, a post-hoc verification system designed to identify hallucinations in the outputs of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines. Our flexible and task-adaptable framework uses a universal feature set derived from an ensemble of two frozen, off-the-shelf Natural Language Inference (NLI) models and lightweight lexical signals. These features are used to train a simple, calibrated, and task-adapted meta-classifier. Using a rigorous 5-fold out-of-fold (OOF) training protocol to prevent data leakage and produce unbiased estimates, we evaluate our system on the HaluEval benchmark. By pairing our universal feature set with a lightweight, task-adapted classifier and a precision-constrained decision policy, HALT-RAG achieves strong OOF F1-scores of 0.7756, 0.9786, and 0.7391 on the summarization, QA, and dialogue tasks, respectively. The system's well-calibrated probabilities enable a practical abstention mechanism, providing a reliable tool for balancing model performance with safety requirements.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are being increasingly used in software engineering tasks, with an increased focus on bug report resolution over the past year. However, most proposed systems fail to properly handle uncertain or incorrect inputs and outputs. Existing LLM-based tools and coding agents respond to every issue and generate a patch for every case, even when the input is vague or their own output is incorrect. There are no mechanisms in place to abstain when confidence is low. This leads to unreliable behaviour, such as hallucinated code changes or responses based on vague issue reports. We introduce BouncerBench, a benchmark that evaluates whether LLM-based software agents can refuse to act when inputs are ill-defined or refuse to respond when their own outputs are likely to be incorrect. Unlike prior benchmarks that implicitly incentivize models to generate responses even when uncertain, BouncerBench aims to improve precision by targeting two overlooked failure points: (1) vague or underspecified issue descriptions in tickets and (2) logically or functionally incorrect code patches created by the system. It measures whether proposed systems can distinguish actionable issues from vague tickets and valid patches from untrustworthy ones. We also implement a basic input and output bouncer, evaluating how well current LLMs can abstain when needed. Our results show that most models fail to abstain from underspecified inputs or incorrect outputs. Hence, we conclude that there is significant room for improvement before LLMs can be trusted to make correct decisions and recommendations in real-world software engineering workflows. BouncerBench provides a first step toward evaluating and building more cautious, trustworthy code agents. The replication package, dataset, and leaderboard can be found at bouncerbench.com

Large language models (LLMs) can "lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite "knowing" the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might "lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

Existing datasets that contain boolean questions, such as BoolQ and TYDI QA , provide the user with a YES/NO response to the question. However, a one word response is not sufficient for an explainable system. We promote explainability by releasing a new set of annotations marking the evidence in existing TyDi QA and BoolQ datasets. We show that our annotations can be used to train a model that extracts improved evidence spans compared to models that rely on existing resources. We confirm our findings with a user study which shows that our extracted evidence spans enhance the user experience. We also provide further insight into the challenges of answering boolean questions, such as passages containing conflicting YES and NO answers, and varying degrees of relevance of the predicted evidence.

LLMs cannot reliably recognize their parametric knowledge boundaries and often hallucinate answers to outside-of-boundary questions. In contrast, humans recognize their limitations and can either seek external help for such questions or abstain. In this paper, we introduce MASH (Modeling Abstention via Selective Help-seeking), a training framework that readily extracts abstentions from LLMs. Our key idea is that any external help-seeking by an LLM, i.e. search tool use, can serve as a proxy for abstention if the external help (search) is appropriately penalized while simultaneously rewarding answer accuracy. MASH operationalizes this idea using reinforcement learning with a pay-per-search reward. We run experiments on three knowledge-intensive QA datasets. Our results show that MASH substantially improves upon the selective help-seeking performance of prior efficient search approaches; on multi-hop datasets, MASH improves answer accuracy by 7.6%. Furthermore, MASH demonstrates strong off-the-shelf abstention -- it can distinguish between unanswerable/answerable questions and selectively generate responses for answerable questions -- showcasing behavior analogous to specialized abstention approaches. We emphasize that contrary to prior abstention methods, MASH does not require pre-determining knowledge boundaries to construct training data. Instead, MASH's abstentions are a by-product of training for the auxiliary selective help-seeking task. Overall, we show that MASH training effectively aligns search tool use with parametric knowledge, which can be successfully leveraged for making abstention decisions.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Large language models (LLMs) are often deployed to perform constrained tasks, with narrow domains. For example, customer support bots can be built on top of LLMs, relying on their broad language understanding and capabilities to enhance performance. However, these LLMs are adversarially susceptible, potentially generating outputs outside the intended domain. To formalize, assess, and mitigate this risk, we introduce domain certification; a guarantee that accurately characterizes the out-of-domain behavior of language models. We then propose a simple yet effective approach, which we call VALID that provides adversarial bounds as a certificate. Finally, we evaluate our method across a diverse set of datasets, demonstrating that it yields meaningful certificates, which bound the probability of out-of-domain samples tightly with minimum penalty to refusal behavior.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit weaknesses in traditional safety alignment, which often relies on rigid refusal heuristics or representation engineering to block harmful outputs. While they are effective for direct adversarial attacks, they fall short of broader safety challenges requiring nuanced, context-aware decision-making. To address this, we propose Reasoning-enhanced Finetuning for interpretable LLM Safety (Rational), a novel framework that trains models to engage in explicit safe reasoning before response. Fine-tuned models leverage the extensive pretraining knowledge in self-generated reasoning to bootstrap their own safety through structured reasoning, internalizing context-sensitive decision-making. Our findings suggest that safety extends beyond refusal, requiring context awareness for more robust, interpretable, and adaptive responses. Reasoning is not only a core capability of LLMs but also a fundamental mechanism for LLM safety. Rational employs reasoning-enhanced fine-tuning, allowing it to reject harmful prompts while providing meaningful and context-aware responses in complex scenarios.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown exceptional performance in various tasks, their (arguably) most prominent drawback is generating inaccurate or false information with a confident tone. In this paper, we hypothesize that the LLM's internal state can be used to reveal the truthfulness of a statement. Therefore, we introduce a simple yet effective method to detect the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements, which utilizes the LLM's hidden layer activations to determine the veracity of statements. To train and evaluate our method, we compose a dataset of true and false statements in six different topics. A classifier is trained to detect which statement is true or false based on an LLM's activation values. Specifically, the classifier receives as input the activation values from the LLM for each of the statements in the dataset. Our experiments demonstrate that our method for detecting statement veracity significantly outperforms even few-shot prompting methods, highlighting its potential to enhance the reliability of LLM-generated content and its practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

Math word problem (MWP) solving requires generating a reasoning path based on a given problem description that often contains irrelevant conditions. Existing chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting methods elicited multi-step reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) to solve MWPs. However, they were seriously confused by the irrelevant conditions, resulting in low accuracy. In this paper, we propose a novel approach named I^3C that instructs LLMs to identify and ignore irrelevant conditions. It identifies a set of irrelevant condition candidates that have a weak semantic relevance with the question. Then it prompts LLMs to verify the irrelevant conditions. Lastly it instructs the LLMs with the verification on relevant and irrelevant conditions to avoid confusion and improve reasoning paths. Moreover, we propose to select (problem, reasoning paths) pairs as demonstrations to enhance I^3C with few-shot reasoning. We develop I^3C-Select that selects the most confusing problems based on the semantic relevance measurement. We conduct extensive experiments on eight MWP datasets. I^3C can be combined with any CoT prompting methods to improve the performance of solving MWPs. Notably, with GPT-3.5-Turbo and I^3C-Select, we achieve an accuracy of 96.0 and 94.1 on GSM-IC2-1K and GSM-ICM-1K, respectively, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art few-shot prompting method Complex-CoT by +11.7 and +11.1. Our implementation is made publicly available at https://wzy6642.github.io/I3C.github.io/.

We propose a new strategy for applying large pre-trained language models to novel tasks when labeled training data is limited. Rather than apply the model in a typical zero-shot or few-shot fashion, we treat the model as the basis for labeling functions in a weak supervision framework. To create a classifier, we first prompt the model to answer multiple distinct queries about an example and define how the possible responses should be mapped to votes for labels and abstentions. We then denoise these noisy label sources using the Snorkel system and train an end classifier with the resulting training data. Our experimental evaluation shows that prompting large language models within a weak supervision framework can provide significant gains in accuracy. On the WRENCH weak supervision benchmark, this approach can significantly improve over zero-shot performance, an average 19.5% reduction in errors. We also find that this approach produces classifiers with comparable or superior accuracy to those trained from hand-engineered rules.

Machine unlearning aims to erase data from a model as if the latter never saw them during training. While existing approaches unlearn information from complete or partial access to the training data, this access can be limited over time due to privacy regulations. Currently, no setting or benchmark exists to probe the effectiveness of unlearning methods in such scenarios. To fill this gap, we propose a novel task we call One-Shot Unlearning of Personal Identities (1-SHUI) that evaluates unlearning models when the training data is not available. We focus on unlearning identity data, which is specifically relevant due to current regulations requiring personal data deletion after training. To cope with data absence, we expect users to provide a portraiting picture to aid unlearning. We design requests on CelebA, CelebA-HQ, and MUFAC with different unlearning set sizes to evaluate applicable methods in 1-SHUI. Moreover, we propose MetaUnlearn, an effective method that meta-learns to forget identities from a single image. Our findings indicate that existing approaches struggle when data availability is limited, especially when there is a dissimilarity between the provided samples and the training data. Source code available at https://github.com/tdemin16/one-shui.

Safety alignment approaches in large language models (LLMs) often lead to the over-refusal of benign queries, significantly diminishing their utility in sensitive scenarios. To address this challenge, we introduce FalseReject, a comprehensive resource containing 16k seemingly toxic queries accompanied by structured responses across 44 safety-related categories. We propose a graph-informed adversarial multi-agent interaction framework to generate diverse and complex prompts, while structuring responses with explicit reasoning to aid models in accurately distinguishing safe from unsafe contexts. FalseReject includes training datasets tailored for both standard instruction-tuned models and reasoning-oriented models, as well as a human-annotated benchmark test set. Our extensive benchmarking on 29 state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs reveals persistent over-refusal challenges. Empirical results demonstrate that supervised finetuning with FalseReject substantially reduces unnecessary refusals without compromising overall safety or general language capabilities.

Recently, multi-class anomaly classification has garnered increasing attention. Previous methods directly cluster anomalies but often struggle due to the lack of anomaly-prior knowledge. Acquiring this knowledge faces two issues: the non-prominent and weak-semantics anomalies. In this paper, we propose AnomalyNCD, a multi-class anomaly classification network compatible with different anomaly detection methods. To address the non-prominence of anomalies, we design main element binarization (MEBin) to obtain anomaly-centered images, ensuring anomalies are learned while avoiding the impact of incorrect detections. Next, to learn anomalies with weak semantics, we design mask-guided representation learning, which focuses on isolated anomalies guided by masks and reduces confusion from erroneous inputs through corrected pseudo labels. Finally, to enable flexible classification at both region and image levels, we develop a region merging strategy that determines the overall image category based on the classified anomaly regions. Our method outperforms the state-of-the-art works on the MVTec AD and MTD datasets. Compared with the current methods, AnomalyNCD combined with zero-shot anomaly detection method achieves a 10.8% F_1 gain, 8.8% NMI gain, and 9.5% ARI gain on MVTec AD, and 12.8% F_1 gain, 5.7% NMI gain, and 10.8% ARI gain on MTD. Code is available at https://github.com/HUST-SLOW/AnomalyNCD.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently extended their powerful reasoning capabilities to safety checks-using chain-of-thought reasoning to decide whether a request should be answered. While this new approach offers a promising route for balancing model utility and safety, its robustness remains underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce Malicious-Educator, a benchmark that disguises extremely dangerous or malicious requests beneath seemingly legitimate educational prompts. Our experiments reveal severe security flaws in popular commercial-grade LRMs, including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. For instance, although OpenAI's o1 model initially maintains a high refusal rate of about 98%, subsequent model updates significantly compromise its safety; and attackers can easily extract criminal strategies from DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking without any additional tricks. To further highlight these vulnerabilities, we propose Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT), a universal and transferable attack method that leverages the model's own displayed intermediate reasoning to jailbreak its safety reasoning mechanism. Under H-CoT, refusal rates sharply decline-dropping from 98% to below 2%-and, in some instances, even transform initially cautious tones into ones that are willing to provide harmful content. We hope these findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety mechanisms to preserve the benefits of advanced reasoning capabilities without compromising ethical standards.

Most positive and unlabeled data is subject to selection biases. The labeled examples can, for example, be selected from the positive set because they are easier to obtain or more obviously positive. This paper investigates how learning can be ena BHbled in this setting. We propose and theoretically analyze an empirical-risk-based method for incorporating the labeling mechanism. Additionally, we investigate under which assumptions learning is possible when the labeling mechanism is not fully understood and propose a practical method to enable this. Our empirical analysis supports the theoretical results and shows that taking into account the possibility of a selection bias, even when the labeling mechanism is unknown, improves the trained classifiers.

State-of-the-art vision-language models (VLMs) suffer from a critical failure in understanding negation, often referred to as affirmative bias. This limitation is particularly severe in described object detection (DOD) tasks. To address this, we propose two primary contributions: (1) a new dataset pipeline and (2) a novel, lightweight adaptation recipe. First, we introduce CoVAND, a dataset constructed with a systematic chain-of-thought (CoT) and VQA-based pipeline to generate high-quality, instance-grounded negation data. Second, we propose NegToMe, a novel text token merging module that directly tackles the architectural cause of affirmative bias. NegToMe fundamentally addresses the structural loss of negation cues in tokenization, grouping them with attributes into coherent semantic phrases. It maintains correct polarity at the input level, enabling robust negation understanding even with limited data. For instance, to prevent a model from treating the fragmented tokens "not" and "girl" as simply "girl", NegToMe binds them into a single token whose meaning is correctly distinguished from that of "girl" alone. This module is integrated with a parameter-efficient and strategic LoRA fine-tuning approach. Our method significantly improves performance on challenging negation benchmarks with a lowered false positive rate, boosting NMS-AP by up to +10.8 points on OVDEval and demonstrating generalization to SoTA VLMs. This work marks a crucial step forward in addressing negation understanding for real-world detection applications.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) introduces dual-use capabilities that could both threaten and bolster national security and public safety (NSPS). Models implement safeguards to protect against potential misuse relevant to NSPS and allow for benign users to receive helpful information. However, current benchmarks often fail to test safeguard robustness to potential NSPS risks in an objective, robust way. We introduce FORTRESS: 500 expert-crafted adversarial prompts with instance-based rubrics of 4-7 binary questions for automated evaluation across 3 domains (unclassified information only): Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), Political Violence & Terrorism, and Criminal & Financial Illicit Activities, with 10 total subcategories across these domains. Each prompt-rubric pair has a corresponding benign version to test for model over-refusals. This evaluation of frontier LLMs' safeguard robustness reveals varying trade-offs between potential risks and model usefulness: Claude-3.5-Sonnet demonstrates a low average risk score (ARS) (14.09 out of 100) but the highest over-refusal score (ORS) (21.8 out of 100), while Gemini 2.5 Pro shows low over-refusal (1.4) but a high average potential risk (66.29). Deepseek-R1 has the highest ARS at 78.05, but the lowest ORS at only 0.06. Models such as o1 display a more even trade-off between potential risks and over-refusals (with an ARS of 21.69 and ORS of 5.2). To provide policymakers and researchers with a clear understanding of models' potential risks, we publicly release FORTRESS at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/fortress_public. We also maintain a private set for evaluation.

Rerankers play a critical role in multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) by refining ranking of an initial set of retrieved documents. Rerankers are typically trained using hard negative mining, whose goal is to select pages for each query which rank high, but are actually irrelevant. However, this selection process is typically passive and restricted to what the retriever can find in the available corpus, leading to several inherent limitations. These include: limited diversity, negative examples which are often not hard enough, low controllability, and frequent false negatives which harm training. Our paper proposes an alternative approach: Single-Page Hard Negative Query Generation, which goes the other way around. Instead of retrieving negative pages per query, we generate hard negative queries per page. Using an automated LLM-VLM pipeline, and given a page and its positive query, we create hard negatives by rephrasing the query to be as similar as possible in form and context, yet not answerable from the page. This paradigm enables fine-grained control over the generated queries, resulting in diverse, hard, and targeted negatives. It also supports efficient false negative verification. Our experiments show that rerankers trained with data generated using our approach outperform existing models and significantly improve retrieval performance.

Recently, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong performance on a range of robotic tasks. These models rely on multimodal inputs, with language instructions playing a crucial role -- not only in predicting actions, but also in robustly interpreting user intent, even when the requests are impossible to fulfill. In this work, we investigate how VLAs can recognize, interpret, and respond to false-premise instructions: natural language commands that reference objects or conditions absent from the environment. We propose Instruct-Verify-and-Act (IVA), a unified framework that (i) detects when an instruction cannot be executed due to a false premise, (ii) engages in language-based clarification or correction, and (iii) grounds plausible alternatives in perception and action. Towards this end, we construct a large-scale instruction tuning setup with structured language prompts and train a VLA model capable of handling both accurate and erroneous requests. Our approach leverages a contextually augmented, semi-synthetic dataset containing paired positive and false-premise instructions, enabling robust detection and natural language correction. Our experiments show that IVA improves false premise detection accuracy by 97.56% over baselines, while increasing successful responses in false-premise scenarios by 50.78%.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) generate contextually relevant responses by jointly interpreting visual and textual inputs. However, our finding reveals they often mistakenly perceive text inputs lacking visual evidence as being part of the image, leading to erroneous responses. In light of this finding, we probe whether LVLMs possess an internal capability to determine if textual concepts are grounded in the image, and discover a specific subset of Feed-Forward Network (FFN) neurons, termed Visual Absence-aware (VA) neurons, that consistently signal the visual absence through a distinctive activation pattern. Leveraging these patterns, we develop a detection module that systematically classifies whether an input token is visually grounded. Guided by its prediction, we propose a method to refine the outputs by reinterpreting question prompts or replacing the detected absent tokens during generation. Extensive experiments show that our method effectively mitigates the models' tendency to falsely presume the visual presence of text input and its generality across various LVLMs.

Test-time scaling has significantly improved large language model performance, enabling deeper reasoning to solve complex problems. However, this increased reasoning capability also leads to excessive token generation and unnecessary problem-solving attempts. We introduce Don\'t Answer Bench (DNA Bench), a new benchmark designed to evaluate LLMs ability to robustly understand the tricky reasoning triggers and avoiding unnecessary generation. DNA Bench consists of 150 adversarially designed prompts that are easy for humans to understand and respond to, but surprisingly not for many of the recent prominent LLMs. DNA Bench tests models abilities across different capabilities, such as instruction adherence, hallucination avoidance, redundancy filtering, and unanswerable question recognition. We evaluate reasoning LLMs (RLMs), including DeepSeek-R1, OpenAI O3-mini, Claude-3.7-sonnet and compare them against a powerful non-reasoning model, e.g., GPT-4o. Our experiments reveal that RLMs generate up to 70x more tokens than necessary, often failing at tasks that simpler non-reasoning models handle efficiently with higher accuracy. Our findings underscore the need for more effective training and inference strategies in RLMs.

This paper introduces the "CIVICS: Culturally-Informed & Values-Inclusive Corpus for Societal impacts" dataset, designed to evaluate the social and cultural variation of Large Language Models (LLMs) across multiple languages and value-sensitive topics. We create a hand-crafted, multilingual dataset of value-laden prompts which address specific socially sensitive topics, including LGBTQI rights, social welfare, immigration, disability rights, and surrogacy. CIVICS is designed to generate responses showing LLMs' encoded and implicit values. Through our dynamic annotation processes, tailored prompt design, and experiments, we investigate how open-weight LLMs respond to value-sensitive issues, exploring their behavior across diverse linguistic and cultural contexts. Using two experimental set-ups based on log-probabilities and long-form responses, we show social and cultural variability across different LLMs. Specifically, experiments involving long-form responses demonstrate that refusals are triggered disparately across models, but consistently and more frequently in English or translated statements. Moreover, specific topics and sources lead to more pronounced differences across model answers, particularly on immigration, LGBTQI rights, and social welfare. As shown by our experiments, the CIVICS dataset aims to serve as a tool for future research, promoting reproducibility and transparency across broader linguistic settings, and furthering the development of AI technologies that respect and reflect global cultural diversities and value pluralism. The CIVICS dataset and tools will be made available upon publication under open licenses; an anonymized version is currently available at https://huggingface.co/CIVICS-dataset.

Previous work has shown that there exists a scaling law between the size of Language Models (LMs) and their zero-shot performance on different downstream NLP tasks. In this work, we show that this phenomenon does not hold when evaluating large LMs on tasks with negated prompts, but instead shows an inverse scaling law. We evaluate 9 different tasks with negated prompts on (1) pretrained LMs (OPT & GPT-3) of varying sizes (125M - 175B), (2) LMs further pretrained to generalize to novel prompts (InstructGPT), (3) LMs provided with few-shot examples, and (4) LMs fine-tuned specifically on negated prompts; all LM types perform worse on negated prompts as they scale and show a huge performance gap between the human performance when comparing the average score on both original and negated prompts. By highlighting a critical limitation of existing LMs and methods, we urge the community to develop new approaches of developing LMs that actually follow the given instructions. We provide the code and the datasets to explore negated prompts at https://github.com/joeljang/negated-prompts-for-llms

The prevalent use of large language models (LLMs) in various domains has drawn attention to the issue of "hallucination," which refers to instances where LLMs generate factually inaccurate or ungrounded information. Existing techniques for hallucination detection in language assistants rely on intricate fuzzy, specific free-language-based chain of thought (CoT) techniques or parameter-based methods that suffer from interpretability issues. Additionally, the methods that identify hallucinations post-generation could not prevent their occurrence and suffer from inconsistent performance due to the influence of the instruction format and model style. In this paper, we introduce a novel pre-detection self-evaluation technique, referred to as SELF-FAMILIARITY, which focuses on evaluating the model's familiarity with the concepts present in the input instruction and withholding the generation of response in case of unfamiliar concepts. This approach emulates the human ability to refrain from responding to unfamiliar topics, thus reducing hallucinations. We validate SELF-FAMILIARITY across four different large language models, demonstrating consistently superior performance compared to existing techniques. Our findings propose a significant shift towards preemptive strategies for hallucination mitigation in LLM assistants, promising improvements in reliability, applicability, and interpretability.

The full power of human language-based communication cannot be realized without negation. All human languages have some form of negation. Despite this, negation remains a challenging phenomenon for current natural language understanding systems. To facilitate the future development of models that can process negation effectively, we present CONDAQA, the first English reading comprehension dataset which requires reasoning about the implications of negated statements in paragraphs. We collect paragraphs with diverse negation cues, then have crowdworkers ask questions about the implications of the negated statement in the passage. We also have workers make three kinds of edits to the passage -- paraphrasing the negated statement, changing the scope of the negation, and reversing the negation -- resulting in clusters of question-answer pairs that are difficult for models to answer with spurious shortcuts. CONDAQA features 14,182 question-answer pairs with over 200 unique negation cues and is challenging for current state-of-the-art models. The best performing model on CONDAQA (UnifiedQA-v2-3b) achieves only 42% on our consistency metric, well below human performance which is 81%. We release our dataset, along with fully-finetuned, few-shot, and zero-shot evaluations, to facilitate the development of future NLP methods that work on negated language.

Automatic security inspection using computer vision technology is a challenging task in real-world scenarios due to various factors, including intra-class variance, class imbalance, and occlusion. Most of the previous methods rarely solve the cases that the prohibited items are deliberately hidden in messy objects due to the lack of large-scale datasets, restricted their applications in real-world scenarios. Towards real-world prohibited item detection, we collect a large-scale dataset, named as PIDray, which covers various cases in real-world scenarios for prohibited item detection, especially for deliberately hidden items. With an intensive amount of effort, our dataset contains 12 categories of prohibited items in 47,677 X-ray images with high-quality annotated segmentation masks and bounding boxes. To the best of our knowledge, it is the largest prohibited items detection dataset to date. Meanwhile, we design the selective dense attention network (SDANet) to construct a strong baseline, which consists of the dense attention module and the dependency refinement module. The dense attention module formed by the spatial and channel-wise dense attentions, is designed to learn the discriminative features to boost the performance. The dependency refinement module is used to exploit the dependencies of multi-scale features. Extensive experiments conducted on the collected PIDray dataset demonstrate that the proposed method performs favorably against the state-of-the-art methods, especially for detecting the deliberately hidden items.