Daily Papers

Deep neural networks have achieved impressive experimental results in image classification, but can surprisingly be unstable with respect to adversarial perturbations, that is, minimal changes to the input image that cause the network to misclassify it. With potential applications including perception modules and end-to-end controllers for self-driving cars, this raises concerns about their safety. We develop a novel automated verification framework for feed-forward multi-layer neural networks based on Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT). We focus on safety of image classification decisions with respect to image manipulations, such as scratches or changes to camera angle or lighting conditions that would result in the same class being assigned by a human, and define safety for an individual decision in terms of invariance of the classification within a small neighbourhood of the original image. We enable exhaustive search of the region by employing discretisation, and propagate the analysis layer by layer. Our method works directly with the network code and, in contrast to existing methods, can guarantee that adversarial examples, if they exist, are found for the given region and family of manipulations. If found, adversarial examples can be shown to human testers and/or used to fine-tune the network. We implement the techniques using Z3 and evaluate them on state-of-the-art networks, including regularised and deep learning networks. We also compare against existing techniques to search for adversarial examples and estimate network robustness.

This paper presents the Neural Network Verification (NNV) software tool, a set-based verification framework for deep neural networks (DNNs) and learning-enabled cyber-physical systems (CPS). The crux of NNV is a collection of reachability algorithms that make use of a variety of set representations, such as polyhedra, star sets, zonotopes, and abstract-domain representations. NNV supports both exact (sound and complete) and over-approximate (sound) reachability algorithms for verifying safety and robustness properties of feed-forward neural networks (FFNNs) with various activation functions. For learning-enabled CPS, such as closed-loop control systems incorporating neural networks, NNV provides exact and over-approximate reachability analysis schemes for linear plant models and FFNN controllers with piecewise-linear activation functions, such as ReLUs. For similar neural network control systems (NNCS) that instead have nonlinear plant models, NNV supports over-approximate analysis by combining the star set analysis used for FFNN controllers with zonotope-based analysis for nonlinear plant dynamics building on CORA. We evaluate NNV using two real-world case studies: the first is safety verification of ACAS Xu networks and the second deals with the safety verification of a deep learning-based adaptive cruise control system.

The vulnerability of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) against adversarial disturbances and attacks significantly restricts their applicability in safety-critical systems including cyber-physical systems (CPS) equipped with neural network components at various stages of sensing and control. This paper addresses the reachable set estimation and safety verification problems for dynamical systems embedded with neural network components serving as feedback controllers. The closed-loop system can be abstracted in the form of a continuous-time sampled-data system under the control of a neural network controller. First, a novel reachable set computation method in adaptation to simulations generated out of neural networks is developed. The reachability analysis of a class of feedforward neural networks called multilayer perceptrons (MLP) with general activation functions is performed in the framework of interval arithmetic. Then, in combination with reachability methods developed for various dynamical system classes modeled by ordinary differential equations, a recursive algorithm is developed for over-approximating the reachable set of the closed-loop system. The safety verification for neural network control systems can be performed by examining the emptiness of the intersection between the over-approximation of reachable sets and unsafe sets. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been validated with evaluations on a robotic arm model and an adaptive cruise control system.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative capabilities. However, their susceptibility to misuse has raised significant safety concerns. While post-training safety alignment methods have been widely adopted, LLMs remain vulnerable to malicious instructions that can bypass safety constraints. Recent efforts have introduced inference-time safety reasoning (system-2 alignment), where LLMs conduct a reasoning process to perform safety verification before final response. We show, however, that these checks are driven by ad-hoc reasoning that diverges from the structured human process, where they first discern a user's true intent, then evaluate the associated risk based on the true intent. Consequently, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak prompts that cloak harmful goals in seemingly benign language. To build secure and safe LLMs, we propose a reasoning-based safety alignment framework, ARMOR, that replaces the ad-hoc chains of thought reasoning process with human-aligned, structured one. At inference, ARMOR (1) detects likely jailbreak strategies, (2) extracts the user's core intent while discarding deceptive instructions, and (3) applies a policy-grounded safety analysis to the purified request. ARMOR is evaluated on adaptive jailbreak attacks and multiple safety benchmarks, and a test-time scaling is conducted to further improve its performance. Results demonstrate that ARMOR significantly enhances the robustness against state-of-the-art adaptive jailbreak attacks and outperforms recent reasoning-based aligned models across various safety benchmarks.

State density distribution, in contrast to worst-case reachability, can be leveraged for safety-related problems to better quantify the likelihood of the risk for potentially hazardous situations. In this work, we propose a data-driven method to compute the density distribution of reachable states for nonlinear and even black-box systems. Our semi-supervised approach learns system dynamics and the state density jointly from trajectory data, guided by the fact that the state density evolution follows the Liouville partial differential equation. With the help of neural network reachability tools, our approach can estimate the set of all possible future states as well as their density. Moreover, we could perform online safety verification with probability ranges for unsafe behaviors to occur. We use an extensive set of experiments to show that our learned solution can produce a much more accurate estimate on density distribution, and can quantify risks less conservatively and flexibly comparing with worst-case analysis.

Industrial workflows demand adaptive and trustworthy assistance that can operate under limited computing, connectivity, and strict privacy constraints. In this work, we present MICA (Multi-Agent Industrial Coordination Assistant), a perception-grounded and speech-interactive system that delivers real-time guidance for assembly, troubleshooting, part queries, and maintenance. MICA coordinates five role-specialized language agents, audited by a safety checker, to ensure accurate and compliant support. To achieve robust step understanding, we introduce Adaptive Step Fusion (ASF), which dynamically blends expert reasoning with online adaptation from natural speech feedback. Furthermore, we establish a new multi-agent coordination benchmark across representative task categories and propose evaluation metrics tailored to industrial assistance, enabling systematic comparison of different coordination topologies. Our experiments demonstrate that MICA consistently improves task success, reliability, and responsiveness over baseline structures, while remaining deployable on practical offline hardware. Together, these contributions highlight MICA as a step toward deployable, privacy-preserving multi-agent assistants for dynamic factory environments. The source code will be made publicly available at https://github.com/Kratos-Wen/MICA.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exploded a new heatwave of AI, for their ability to engage end-users in human-level conversations with detailed and articulate answers across many knowledge domains. In response to their fast adoption in many industrial applications, this survey concerns their safety and trustworthiness. First, we review known vulnerabilities of the LLMs, categorising them into inherent issues, intended attacks, and unintended bugs. Then, we consider if and how the Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques, which have been widely developed for traditional software and deep learning models such as convolutional neural networks, can be integrated and further extended throughout the lifecycle of the LLMs to provide rigorous analysis to the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs and their applications. Specifically, we consider four complementary techniques: falsification and evaluation, verification, runtime monitoring, and ethical use. Considering the fast development of LLMs, this survey does not intend to be complete (although it includes 300 references), especially when it comes to the applications of LLMs in various domains, but rather a collection of organised literature reviews and discussions to support the quick understanding of the safety and trustworthiness issues from the perspective of V&V.

Computer-using agents powered by Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated human-like capabilities in operating digital environments like mobile platforms. While these agents hold great promise for advancing digital automation, their potential for unsafe operations, such as system compromise and privacy leakage, is raising significant concerns. Detecting these safety concerns across the vast and complex operational space of mobile environments presents a formidable challenge that remains critically underexplored. To establish a foundation for mobile agent safety research, we introduce MobileRisk-Live, a dynamic sandbox environment accompanied by a safety detection benchmark comprising realistic trajectories with fine-grained annotations. Built upon this, we propose OS-Sentinel, a novel hybrid safety detection framework that synergistically combines a Formal Verifier for detecting explicit system-level violations with a VLM-based Contextual Judge for assessing contextual risks and agent actions. Experiments show that OS-Sentinel achieves 10%-30% improvements over existing approaches across multiple metrics. Further analysis provides critical insights that foster the development of safer and more reliable autonomous mobile agents.

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

Increasingly sophisticated mathematical modelling processes from Machine Learning are being used to analyse complex data. However, the performance and explainability of these models within practical critical systems requires a rigorous and continuous verification of their safe utilisation. Working towards addressing this challenge, this paper presents a principled novel safety argument framework for critical systems that utilise deep neural networks. The approach allows various forms of predictions, e.g., future reliability of passing some demands, or confidence on a required reliability level. It is supported by a Bayesian analysis using operational data and the recent verification and validation techniques for deep learning. The prediction is conservative -- it starts with partial prior knowledge obtained from lifecycle activities and then determines the worst-case prediction. Open challenges are also identified.

We present a tool-supported approach for the synthesis, verification and validation of the control software responsible for the safety of the human-robot interaction in manufacturing processes that use collaborative robots. In human-robot collaboration, software-based safety controllers are used to improve operational safety, e.g., by triggering shutdown mechanisms or emergency stops to avoid accidents. Complex robotic tasks and increasingly close human-robot interaction pose new challenges to controller developers and certification authorities. Key among these challenges is the need to assure the correctness of safety controllers under explicit (and preferably weak) assumptions. Our controller synthesis, verification and validation approach is informed by the process, risk analysis, and relevant safety regulations for the target application. Controllers are selected from a design space of feasible controllers according to a set of optimality criteria, are formally verified against correctness criteria, and are translated into executable code and validated in a digital twin. The resulting controller can detect the occurrence of hazards, move the process into a safe state, and, in certain circumstances, return the process to an operational state from which it can resume its original task. We show the effectiveness of our software engineering approach through a case study involving the development of a safety controller for a manufacturing work cell equipped with a collaborative robot.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

The increasing use of Machine Learning (ML) components embedded in autonomous systems -- so-called Learning-Enabled Systems (LESs) -- has resulted in the pressing need to assure their functional safety. As for traditional functional safety, the emerging consensus within both, industry and academia, is to use assurance cases for this purpose. Typically assurance cases support claims of reliability in support of safety, and can be viewed as a structured way of organising arguments and evidence generated from safety analysis and reliability modelling activities. While such assurance activities are traditionally guided by consensus-based standards developed from vast engineering experience, LESs pose new challenges in safety-critical application due to the characteristics and design of ML models. In this article, we first present an overall assurance framework for LESs with an emphasis on quantitative aspects, e.g., breaking down system-level safety targets to component-level requirements and supporting claims stated in reliability metrics. We then introduce a novel model-agnostic Reliability Assessment Model (RAM) for ML classifiers that utilises the operational profile and robustness verification evidence. We discuss the model assumptions and the inherent challenges of assessing ML reliability uncovered by our RAM and propose solutions to practical use. Probabilistic safety argument templates at the lower ML component-level are also developed based on the RAM. Finally, to evaluate and demonstrate our methods, we not only conduct experiments on synthetic/benchmark datasets but also scope our methods with case studies on simulated Autonomous Underwater Vehicles and physical Unmanned Ground Vehicles.

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of 46.54% over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

Autonomous agents powered by foundation models have seen widespread adoption across various real-world applications. However, they remain highly vulnerable to malicious instructions and attacks, which can result in severe consequences such as privacy breaches and financial losses. More critically, existing guardrails for LLMs are not applicable due to the complex and dynamic nature of agents. To tackle these challenges, we propose ShieldAgent, the first guardrail agent designed to enforce explicit safety policy compliance for the action trajectory of other protected agents through logical reasoning. Specifically, ShieldAgent first constructs a safety policy model by extracting verifiable rules from policy documents and structuring them into a set of action-based probabilistic rule circuits. Given the action trajectory of the protected agent, ShieldAgent retrieves relevant rule circuits and generates a shielding plan, leveraging its comprehensive tool library and executable code for formal verification. In addition, given the lack of guardrail benchmarks for agents, we introduce ShieldAgent-Bench, a dataset with 3K safety-related pairs of agent instructions and action trajectories, collected via SOTA attacks across 6 web environments and 7 risk categories. Experiments show that ShieldAgent achieves SOTA on ShieldAgent-Bench and three existing benchmarks, outperforming prior methods by 11.3% on average with a high recall of 90.1%. Additionally, ShieldAgent reduces API queries by 64.7% and inference time by 58.2%, demonstrating its high precision and efficiency in safeguarding agents.

Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) are increasingly deployed for vision-language tasks that produce explicit intermediate rationales. However, reasoning traces can contain unsafe content even when the final answer is non-harmful, creating deployment risks. Existing multimodal safety guards primarily evaluate only the input question and the final answer, neglecting the intermediate reasoning process. This oversight allows undetected harm, such as biased inferences or policy-violating use of visual context, to emerge during reasoning. We introduce GuardTrace-VL, a vision-aware safety auditor that monitors the full Question-Thinking-Answer (QTA) pipeline via joint image-text analysis, enabling detection of unsafe content as it emerges in the reasoning stage. To support training and evaluation, we construct the GuardTrace dataset, which is generated through diverse prompting strategies and refined via a MLRM- and human-based voting and verification pipeline. Furthermore, we propose a three-stage progressive training scheme combined with the data refinement process, enabling the model to learn nuanced and context-dependent safety preferences according to different risk levels. On our proposed test set covering both in-domain and out-of-domain scenarios, GuardTrace-VL model achieves an F1 score of 93.1% on unsafe reasoning detection tasks, representing a 13.5% improvement in F1 score compared to the previous strongest multimodal safety defense methods. The codes will be made publicly available.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have made significant advancements in the field of code generation, offering unprecedented support for automated programming and assisting developers. However, LLMs sometimes generate code that appears plausible but fails to meet the expected requirements or executes incorrectly. This phenomenon of hallucinations in the coding field has not been explored. To advance the community's understanding and research on code hallucinations in LLMs, we propose a definition method for these hallucinations based on execution verification and introduce the concept of code hallucinations for the first time. We categorize code hallucinations into four main types: mapping, naming, resource, and logic hallucinations, each further divided into different subcategories to better understand and address the unique challenges faced by LLMs during code generation. To systematically evaluate code hallucinations, we propose a dynamic detection algorithm for code hallucinations and construct the CodeHalu benchmark, which includes 8,883 samples from 699 tasks, to actively detect hallucination phenomena in LLMs during programming. We tested 16 popular LLMs on this benchmark to evaluate the frequency and nature of their hallucinations during code generation. The findings reveal significant variations in the accuracy and reliability of LLMs in generating code, highlighting the urgent need to improve models and training methods to ensure the functional correctness and safety of automatically generated code. This study not only classifies and quantifies code hallucinations but also provides insights for future improvements in LLM-based code generation research. The CodeHalu benchmark and code are publicly available at https://github.com/yuchen814/CodeHalu.

The increasing use of generative models such as diffusion models for synthetic data augmentation has greatly reduced the cost of data collection and labeling in downstream perception tasks. However, this new data source paradigm may introduce important security concerns. Publicly available generative models are often reused without verification, raising a fundamental question of their safety and trustworthiness. This work investigates backdoor propagation in such emerging generative data supply chain, namely, Data-Chain Backdoor (DCB). Specifically, we find that open-source diffusion models can become hidden carriers of backdoors. Their strong distribution-fitting ability causes them to memorize and reproduce backdoor triggers in generation, which are subsequently inherited by downstream models, resulting in severe security risks. This threat is particularly concerning under clean-label attack scenarios, as it remains effective while having negligible impact on the utility of the synthetic data. We study two attacker choices to obtain a backdoor-carried generator, training from scratch and fine-tuning. While naive fine-tuning leads to weak inheritance of the backdoor, we find that novel designs in the loss objectives and trigger processing can substantially improve the generator's ability to preserve trigger patterns, making fine-tuning a low-cost attack path. We evaluate the effectiveness of DCB under the standard augmentation protocol and further assess data-scarce settings. Across multiple trigger types, we observe that the trigger pattern can be consistently retained in the synthetic data with attack efficacy comparable to the conventional backdoor attack.

Watermarking has emerged as a leading technical proposal for attributing generative AI content and is increasingly cited in global governance frameworks. This paper argues that current implementations risk serving as symbolic compliance rather than delivering effective oversight. We identify a growing gap between regulatory expectations and the technical limitations of existing watermarking schemes. Through analysis of policy proposals and industry practices, we show how incentive structures disincentivize robust, auditable deployments. To realign watermarking with governance goals, we propose a three-layer framework encompassing technical standards, audit infrastructure, and enforcement mechanisms. Without enforceable requirements and independent verification, watermarking will remain inadequate for accountability and ultimately undermine broader efforts in AI safety and regulation.

Autonomous intelligence requires not only perception and reasoning, but critically, effective interaction with the existing world and its infrastructure. Everyday environments are rich in tangible control interfaces (TCIs), e.g., light switches, appliance panels, and embedded GUIs, that demand commonsense and physics reasoning, but also causal prediction and outcome verification in time and space (e.g., delayed heating, remote lights). Moreover, failures here have potential safety implications, yet current benchmarks rarely test grounding, partial observability (video), or post-hoc verification in situated settings. We introduce SWITCH (Semantic World Interface Tasks for Control and Handling), an embodied, task-driven benchmark created through iterative releases to probe these gaps. Its first iteration, SWITCH-Basic, evaluates five complementary abilities:task-aware VQA, semantic UI grounding, action generation, state-transition prediction, and result verification, under egocentric RGB video input and device diversity. Across 351 tasks spanning 98 real devices and appliances, commercial and open LMMMs exhibit inconsistent performance even on single-step interactions, often over-relying on textual cues and under-using visual or video evidence (and high aggregate scores can mask such failures). SWITCH provides data, code, and held-out splits to enable reproducible evaluation and community contributions toward more challenging future iterations of the benchmark and the creation of training datasets. Benchmark resources are available at: https://github.com/BAAI-Agents/SWITCH.

In this position paper, we address the persistent gap between rapidly growing AI capabilities and lagging safety progress. Existing paradigms divide into ``Make AI Safe'', which applies post-hoc alignment and guardrails but remains brittle and reactive, and ``Make Safe AI'', which emphasizes intrinsic safety but struggles to address unforeseen risks in open-ended environments. We therefore propose safe-by-coevolution as a new formulation of the ``Make Safe AI'' paradigm, inspired by biological immunity, in which safety becomes a dynamic, adversarial, and ongoing learning process. To operationalize this vision, we introduce R^2AI -- Resistant and Resilient AI -- as a practical framework that unites resistance against known threats with resilience to unforeseen risks. R^2AI integrates fast and slow safe models, adversarial simulation and verification through a safety wind tunnel, and continual feedback loops that guide safety and capability to coevolve. We argue that this framework offers a scalable and proactive path to maintain continual safety in dynamic environments, addressing both near-term vulnerabilities and long-term existential risks as AI advances toward AGI and ASI.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in robotic systems presents unique safety challenges, particularly in unpredictable environments. Although LLMs, leveraging zero-shot learning, enhance human-robot interaction and decision-making capabilities, their inherent probabilistic nature and lack of formal guarantees raise significant concerns for safety-critical applications. Traditional model-based verification approaches often rely on precise system models, which are difficult to obtain for real-world robotic systems and may not be fully trusted due to modeling inaccuracies, unmodeled dynamics, or environmental uncertainties. To address these challenges, this paper introduces a safety assurance framework for LLM-controlled robots based on data-driven reachability analysis, a formal verification technique that ensures all possible system trajectories remain within safe operational limits. Our framework specifically investigates the problem of instructing an LLM to navigate the robot to a specified goal and assesses its ability to generate low-level control actions that successfully guide the robot safely toward that goal. By leveraging historical data to construct reachable sets of states for the robot-LLM system, our approach provides rigorous safety guarantees against unsafe behaviors without relying on explicit analytical models. We validate the framework through experimental case studies in autonomous navigation and task planning, demonstrating its effectiveness in mitigating risks associated with LLM-generated commands. This work advances the integration of formal methods into LLM-based robotics, offering a principled and practical approach to ensuring safety in next-generation autonomous systems.

Access to frontier large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-5 and Gemini-2.5, is often hindered by high pricing, payment barriers, and regional restrictions. These limitations drive the proliferation of shadow APIs, third-party services that claim to provide access to official model services without regional limitations via indirect access. Despite their widespread use, it remains unclear whether shadow APIs deliver outputs consistent with those of the official APIs, raising concerns about the reliability of downstream applications and the validity of research findings that depend on them. In this paper, we present the first systematic audit between official LLM APIs and corresponding shadow APIs. We first identify 17 shadow APIs that have been utilized in 187 academic papers, with the most popular one reaching 5,966 citations and 58,639 GitHub stars by December 6, 2025. Through multidimensional auditing of three representative shadow APIs across utility, safety, and model verification, we uncover both indirect and direct evidence of deception practices in shadow APIs. Specifically, we reveal performance divergence reaching up to 47.21%, significant unpredictability in safety behaviors, and identity verification failures in 45.83% of fingerprint tests. These deceptive practices critically undermine the reproducibility and validity of scientific research, harm the interests of shadow API users, and damage the reputation of official model providers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in automated code generation but frequently produce code that fails formal verification, an essential requirement for hardware and safety-critical domains. To overcome this fundamental limitation, we previously proposed PREFACE, a model-agnostic framework based on reinforcement learning (RL) that iteratively repairs the prompts provided to frozen LLMs, systematically steering them toward generating formally verifiable Dafny code without costly fine-tuning. This work presents Proof2Silicon, a novel end-to-end synthesis framework that embeds the previously proposed PREFACE flow to enable the generation of correctness-by-construction hardware directly from natural language specifications. Proof2Silicon operates by: (1) leveraging PREFACE's verifier-driven RL agent to optimize prompt generation iteratively, ensuring Dafny code correctness; (2) automatically translating verified Dafny programs into synthesizable high-level C using Dafny's Python backend and PyLog; and (3) employing Vivado HLS to produce RTL implementations. Evaluated rigorously on a challenging 100-task benchmark, PREFACE's RL-guided prompt optimization consistently improved Dafny verification success rates across diverse LLMs by up to 21%. Crucially, Proof2Silicon achieved an end-to-end hardware synthesis success rate of up to 72%, generating RTL designs through Vivado HLS synthesis flows. These results demonstrate a robust, scalable, and automated pipeline for LLM-driven, formally verified hardware synthesis, bridging natural-language specification and silicon realization.

Assurance cases can be used to argue for the safety of products in safety engineering. In safety-critical areas, the construction of assurance cases is indispensable. Trustworthiness Derivation Trees (TDTs) enhance assurance cases by incorporating formal methods, rendering it possible for automatic reasoning about assurance cases. We present Trustworthiness Derivation Tree Analyzer (Trusta), a desktop application designed to automatically construct and verify TDTs. The tool has a built-in Prolog interpreter in its backend, and is supported by the constraint solvers Z3 and MONA. Therefore, it can solve constraints about logical formulas involving arithmetic, sets, Horn clauses etc. Trusta also utilizes large language models to make the creation and evaluation of assurance cases more convenient. It allows for interactive human examination and modification. We evaluated top language models like ChatGPT-3.5, ChatGPT-4, and PaLM 2 for generating assurance cases. Our tests showed a 50%-80% similarity between machine-generated and human-created cases. In addition, Trusta can extract formal constraints from text in natural languages, facilitating an easier interpretation and validation process. This extraction is subject to human review and correction, blending the best of automated efficiency with human insight. To our knowledge, this marks the first integration of large language models in automatic creating and reasoning about assurance cases, bringing a novel approach to a traditional challenge. Through several industrial case studies, Trusta has proven to quickly find some subtle issues that are typically missed in manual inspection, demonstrating its practical value in enhancing the assurance case development process.

We introduce MacroBench, a code-first benchmark that evaluates whether LLMs can synthesize reusable browser-automation programs (macros) from natural-language goals by reading HTML/DOM and emitting Selenium. MacroBench instantiates seven self-hosted sites covering 681 tasks across interaction complexity and targeting difficulty. Our end-to-end protocol validates generated code via static checks, sandboxed execution, and outcome verification (DOM assertions, database snapshots), and includes a safety suite for scraping, spam/abuse, and credential/privacy prompts. Across 2,636 model-task runs, we observe stratified success: GPT-4o-mini (96.8%), GPT-4o (95.3%), Gemini (89.0%), DeepSeek (83.4%). Models handle simple tasks reliably (91.7%) but fail on complex workflows (0.0%), and none meet production-quality coding practices despite functional completion. We release our complete benchmark pipeline, evaluation framework, and experimental results at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/MacroBench to enable reproducible assessment of macro synthesis for web automation.

Software requirements traceability is a critical component of the software engineering process, enabling activities such as requirements validation, compliance verification, and safety assurance. However, the cost and effort of manually creating a complete set of trace links across natural language artifacts such as requirements, design, and test-cases can be prohibitively expensive. Researchers have therefore proposed automated link-generation solutions primarily based on information-retrieval (IR) techniques; however, these solutions have failed to deliver the accuracy needed for full adoption in industrial projects. Improvements can be achieved using deep-learning traceability models; however, their efficacy is impeded by the limited size and availability of project-level artifacts and links to serve as training data. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing and evaluating several deep-learning approaches for text-to-text traceability. Our method, named NLTrace, explores three transfer learning strategies that use datasets mined from open world platforms. Through pretraining Language Models (LMs) and leveraging adjacent tracing tasks, we demonstrate that NLTrace can significantly improve the performance of LM based trace models when training links are available. In such scenarios NLTrace outperforms the best performing classical IR method with an 188% improvement in F2 score and 94.01% in Mean Average Precision (MAP). It also outperforms the general LM based trace model by 7% and 23% for F2 and MAP respectively. In addition, NLTrace can adapt to low-resource tracing scenarios where other LM models can not. The knowledge learned from adjacent tasks enables NLTrace to outperform VSM models by 28% F2 on generation challenges when presented with a small number of training examples.

The paper explores the transformation of port logistics operations with artificial intelligence during the port transformation into a smart port. The research integrates capabilities-based resource analysis and dynamic capabilities with sociotechnicalimplementations of technologies and resilience approaches of complex systems under disruptions. The system applies robustdata infrastructures to propel analytical and AI modules that become effective once integrated with sufficient governance systems and trained personnel and operational processes to transform planning and safety and sustainability operations.It applies Scopus bibliometric research to analyze 123 articles using a systematic approach with both a search protocol and a document screening and duplication verification. It incorporates annual behavior and distribution of author and country performance analysis with science mapping techniques that explore keyword relation and co-citation and bibliographic coupling and conceptual structuring tools that construct thematic maps and multiple correspondence analysis with community detection while applying explicit thresholding and robust tests.The research connects AI applications to smart port domains through specific data-to-impact pathways while providing a method for bibliometric analysis that enables future updates. The research presents a step-by-step approach for data readiness followed by predictive and optimization implementation and organizational integration. The paper supports public policy through recommendations for data sharing standards and complete environmental benefit assessments. The research proposes a future study plan whichcombines field-based testing with multiple port assessments to enhance both cause-effect understanding and research applicability.

With the widespread application of Large Language Models (LLMs), their associated security issues have become increasingly prominent, severely constraining their trustworthy deployment in critical domains. This paper proposes a novel safety response framework designed to systematically safeguard LLMs at both the input and output levels. At the input level, the framework employs a supervised fine-tuning-based safety classification model. Through a fine-grained four-tier taxonomy (Safe, Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, Focused Attention), it performs precise risk identification and differentiated handling of user queries, significantly enhancing risk coverage and business scenario adaptability, and achieving a risk recall rate of 99.3%. At the output level, the framework integrates Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) with a specifically fine-tuned interpretation model, ensuring all responses are grounded in a real-time, trustworthy knowledge base. This approach eliminates information fabrication and enables result traceability. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed safety control model achieves a significantly higher safety score on public safety evaluation benchmarks compared to the baseline model, TinyR1-Safety-8B. Furthermore, on our proprietary high-risk test set, the framework's components attained a perfect 100% safety score, validating their exceptional protective capabilities in complex risk scenarios. This research provides an effective engineering pathway for building high-security, high-trust LLM applications.

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

Laboratory accidents pose significant risks to human life and property, underscoring the importance of robust safety protocols. Despite advancements in safety training, laboratory personnel may still unknowingly engage in unsafe practices. With the increasing reliance on large language models (LLMs) for guidance in various fields, including laboratory settings, there is a growing concern about their reliability in critical safety-related decision-making. Unlike trained human researchers, LLMs lack formal lab safety education, raising questions about their ability to provide safe and accurate guidance. Existing research on LLM trustworthiness primarily focuses on issues such as ethical compliance, truthfulness, and fairness but fails to fully cover safety-critical real-world applications, like lab safety. To address this gap, we propose the Laboratory Safety Benchmark (LabSafety Bench), a comprehensive evaluation framework based on a new taxonomy aligned with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) protocols. This benchmark includes 765 multiple-choice questions verified by human experts, assessing LLMs and vision language models (VLMs) performance in lab safety contexts. Our evaluations demonstrate that while GPT-4o outperforms human participants, it is still prone to critical errors, highlighting the risks of relying on LLMs in safety-critical environments. Our findings emphasize the need for specialized benchmarks to accurately assess the trustworthiness of LLMs in real-world safety applications.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

Although AI systems have been applied in various fields and achieved impressive performance, their safety and reliability are still a big concern. This is especially important for safety-critical tasks. One shared characteristic of these critical tasks is their risk sensitivity, where small mistakes can cause big consequences and even endanger life. There are several factors that could be guidelines for the successful deployment of AI systems in sensitive tasks: (i) failure detection and out-of-distribution (OOD) detection; (ii) overfitting identification; (iii) uncertainty quantification for predictions; (iv) robustness to data perturbations. These factors are also challenges of current AI systems, which are major blocks for building safe and reliable AI. Specifically, the current AI algorithms are unable to identify common causes for failure detection. Furthermore, additional techniques are required to quantify the quality of predictions. All these contribute to inaccurate uncertainty quantification, which lowers trust in predictions. Hence obtaining accurate model uncertainty quantification and its further improvement are challenging. To address these issues, many techniques have been proposed, such as regularization methods and learning strategies. As vision and language are the most typical data type and have many open source benchmark datasets, this thesis will focus on vision-language data processing for tasks like classification, image captioning, and vision question answering. In this thesis, we aim to build a safeguard by further developing current techniques to ensure the accurate model uncertainty for safety-critical tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become an integral part of our daily lives. However, they impose certain risks, including those that can harm individuals' privacy, perpetuate biases and spread misinformation. These risks highlight the need for robust safety mechanisms, ethical guidelines, and thorough testing to ensure their responsible deployment. Safety of LLMs is a key property that needs to be thoroughly tested prior the model to be deployed and accessible to the general users. This paper reports the external safety testing experience conducted by researchers from Mondragon University and University of Seville on OpenAI's new o3-mini LLM as part of OpenAI's early access for safety testing program. In particular, we apply our tool, ASTRAL, to automatically and systematically generate up to date unsafe test inputs (i.e., prompts) that helps us test and assess different safety categories of LLMs. We automatically generate and execute a total of 10,080 unsafe test input on a early o3-mini beta version. After manually verifying the test cases classified as unsafe by ASTRAL, we identify a total of 87 actual instances of unsafe LLM behavior. We highlight key insights and findings uncovered during the pre-deployment external testing phase of OpenAI's latest LLM.

The success of large language models (LLMs) in scientific domains has heightened safety concerns, prompting numerous benchmarks to evaluate their scientific safety. Existing benchmarks often suffer from limited risk coverage and a reliance on subjective evaluation. To address these problems, we introduce SafeSci, a comprehensive framework for safety evaluation and enhancement in scientific contexts. SafeSci comprises SafeSciBench, a multi-disciplinary benchmark with 0.25M samples, and SafeSciTrain, a large-scale dataset containing 1.5M samples for safety enhancement. SafeSciBench distinguishes between safety knowledge and risk to cover extensive scopes and employs objective metrics such as deterministically answerable questions to mitigate evaluation bias. We evaluate 24 advanced LLMs, revealing critical vulnerabilities in current models. We also observe that LLMs exhibit varying degrees of excessive refusal behaviors on safety-related issues. For safety enhancement, we demonstrate that fine-tuning on SafeSciTrain significantly enhances the safety alignment of models. Finally, we argue that knowledge is a double-edged sword, and determining the safety of a scientific question should depend on specific context, rather than universally categorizing it as safe or unsafe. Our work provides both a diagnostic tool and a practical resource for building safer scientific AI systems.

As large reasoning models (LRMs) grow more capable, chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning introduces new safety challenges. Existing SFT-based safety alignment studies dominantly focused on filtering prompts with safe, high-quality responses, while overlooking hard prompts that always elicit harmful outputs. To fill this gap, we introduce UnsafeChain, a safety alignment dataset constructed from hard prompts with diverse sources, where unsafe completions are identified and explicitly corrected into safe responses. By exposing models to unsafe behaviors and guiding their correction, UnsafeChain enhances safety while preserving general reasoning ability. We fine-tune three LRMs on UnsafeChain and compare them against recent SafeChain and STAR-1 across six out-of-distribution and five in-distribution benchmarks. UnsafeChain consistently outperforms prior datasets, with even a 1K subset matching or surpassing baseline performance, demonstrating the effectiveness and generalizability of correction-based supervision. We release our dataset and code at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/UnsafeChain

KT developed a Responsible AI (RAI) assessment methodology and risk mitigation technologies to ensure the safety and reliability of AI services. By analyzing the Basic Act on AI implementation and global AI governance trends, we established a unique approach for regulatory compliance and systematically identify and manage all potential risk factors from AI development to operation. We present a reliable assessment methodology that systematically verifies model safety and robustness based on KT's AI risk taxonomy tailored to the domestic environment. We also provide practical tools for managing and mitigating identified AI risks. With the release of this report, we also release proprietary Guardrail : SafetyGuard that blocks harmful responses from AI models in real-time, supporting the enhancement of safety in the domestic AI development ecosystem. We also believe these research outcomes provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to develop Responsible AI.

As large language models (LLMs) become more capable and widely used, ensuring the safety of their outputs is increasingly critical. Existing guardrail models, though useful in static evaluation settings, face two major limitations in real-world applications: (1) they typically output only binary "safe/unsafe" labels, which can be interpreted inconsistently across diverse safety policies, rendering them incapable of accommodating varying safety tolerances across domains; and (2) they require complete model outputs before performing safety checks, making them fundamentally incompatible with streaming LLM inference, thereby preventing timely intervention during generation and increasing exposure to harmful partial outputs. To address these challenges, we present Qwen3Guard, a series of multilingual safety guardrail models with two specialized variants: Generative Qwen3Guard, which casts safety classification as an instruction-following task to enable fine-grained tri-class judgments (safe, controversial, unsafe); and Stream Qwen3Guard, which introduces a token-level classification head for real-time safety monitoring during incremental text generation. Both variants are available in three sizes (0.6B, 4B, and 8B parameters) and support up to 119 languages and dialects, providing comprehensive, scalable, and low-latency safety moderation for global LLM deployments. Evaluated across English, Chinese, and multilingual benchmarks, Qwen3Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance in both prompt and response safety classification. All models are released under the Apache 2.0 license for public use.

Most safety testing efforts for large language models (LLMs) today focus on evaluating foundation models. However, there is a growing need to evaluate safety at the application level, as components such as system prompts, retrieval pipelines, and guardrails introduce additional factors that significantly influence the overall safety of LLM applications. In this paper, we introduce a practical framework for evaluating application-level safety in LLM systems, validated through real-world deployment across multiple use cases within our organization. The framework consists of two parts: (1) principles for developing customized safety risk taxonomies, and (2) practices for evaluating safety risks in LLM applications. We illustrate how the proposed framework was applied in our internal pilot, providing a reference point for organizations seeking to scale their safety testing efforts. This work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical concepts in AI safety and the operational realities of safeguarding LLM applications in practice, offering actionable guidance for safe and scalable deployment.

Recent work has highlighted the importance of monitoring chain-of-thought reasoning for AI safety; however, current approaches that analyze textual reasoning steps can miss subtle harmful patterns and may be circumvented by models that hide unsafe reasoning. We present a sentence-level labeled dataset that enables activation-based monitoring of safety behaviors during LLM reasoning. Our dataset contains reasoning sequences with sentence-level annotations of safety behaviors such as expression of safety concerns or speculation on user intent, which we use to extract steering vectors for detecting and influencing these behaviors within model activations. The dataset fills a key gap in safety research: while existing datasets label reasoning holistically, effective application of steering vectors for safety monitoring could be improved by identifying precisely when specific behaviors occur within reasoning chains. We demonstrate the dataset's utility by extracting representations that both detect and steer safety behaviors in model activations, showcasing the potential of activation-level techniques for improving safety oversight on reasoning. Content Warning: This paper discusses AI safety in the context of harmful prompts and may contain references to potentially harmful content.

With the rapid popularity of large language models such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, a growing amount of attention is paid to their safety concerns. These models may generate insulting and discriminatory content, reflect incorrect social values, and may be used for malicious purposes such as fraud and dissemination of misleading information. Evaluating and enhancing their safety is particularly essential for the wide application of large language models (LLMs). To further promote the safe deployment of LLMs, we develop a Chinese LLM safety assessment benchmark. Our benchmark explores the comprehensive safety performance of LLMs from two perspectives: 8 kinds of typical safety scenarios and 6 types of more challenging instruction attacks. Our benchmark is based on a straightforward process in which it provides the test prompts and evaluates the safety of the generated responses from the evaluated model. In evaluation, we utilize the LLM's strong evaluation ability and develop it as a safety evaluator by prompting. On top of this benchmark, we conduct safety assessments and analyze 15 LLMs including the OpenAI GPT series and other well-known Chinese LLMs, where we observe some interesting findings. For example, we find that instruction attacks are more likely to expose safety issues of all LLMs. Moreover, to promote the development and deployment of safe, responsible, and ethical AI, we publicly release SafetyPrompts including 100k augmented prompts and responses by LLMs.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed only after their risks to international security have been evaluated and deemed manageable. However, research on AI verification could benefit from greater clarity and detail. To address this, this report provides an in-depth overview of AI verification, intended for both policy professionals and technical researchers. We present novel conceptual frameworks, detailed implementation options, and key R&D challenges. These draw on existing literature, expert interviews, and original analysis, all within the scope of confidentially overseeing AI development and deployment that uses thousands of high-end AI chips. We find that states could eventually verify compliance by using six largely independent verification approaches with substantial redundancy: (1) built-in security features in AI chips; (2-3) separate monitoring devices attached to AI chips; and (4-6) personnel-based mechanisms, such as whistleblower programs. While promising, these approaches require guardrails to protect against abuse and power concentration, and many of these technologies have yet to be built or stress-tested. To enable states to confidently verify compliance with rules on large-scale AI development and deployment, the R&D challenges we list need significant progress.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

Current approaches to LLM safety fundamentally rely on a brittle cat-and-mouse game of identifying and blocking known threats via guardrails. We argue for a fresh approach: robust safety comes not from enumerating what is harmful, but from deeply understanding what is safe. We introduce Trust The Typical (T3), a framework that operationalizes this principle by treating safety as an out-of-distribution (OOD) detection problem. T3 learns the distribution of acceptable prompts in a semantic space and flags any significant deviation as a potential threat. Unlike prior methods, it requires no training on harmful examples, yet achieves state-of-the-art performance across 18 benchmarks spanning toxicity, hate speech, jailbreaking, multilingual harms, and over-refusal, reducing false positive rates by up to 40x relative to specialized safety models. A single model trained only on safe English text transfers effectively to diverse domains and over 14 languages without retraining. Finally, we demonstrate production readiness by integrating a GPU-optimized version into vLLM, enabling continuous guardrailing during token generation with less than 6% overhead even under dense evaluation intervals on large-scale workloads.

With the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing attention has been paid to their safety concerns. Consequently, evaluating the safety of LLMs has become an essential task for facilitating the broad applications of LLMs. Nevertheless, the absence of comprehensive safety evaluation benchmarks poses a significant impediment to effectively assess and enhance the safety of LLMs. In this work, we present SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating the safety of LLMs, which comprises 11,435 diverse multiple choice questions spanning across 7 distinct categories of safety concerns. Notably, SafetyBench also incorporates both Chinese and English data, facilitating the evaluation in both languages. Our extensive tests over 25 popular Chinese and English LLMs in both zero-shot and few-shot settings reveal a substantial performance advantage for GPT-4 over its counterparts, and there is still significant room for improving the safety of current LLMs. We believe SafetyBench will enable fast and comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' safety, and foster the development of safer LLMs. Data and evaluation guidelines are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/SafetyBench. Submission entrance and leaderboard are available at https://llmbench.ai/safety.

Autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs) show promising potential in assistive tasks across various domains, including mobile device control. As these agents interact directly with personal information and device settings, ensuring their safe and reliable behavior is crucial to prevent undesirable outcomes. However, no benchmark exists for standardized evaluation of the safety of mobile device-control agents. In this work, we introduce MobileSafetyBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate the safety of device-control agents within a realistic mobile environment based on Android emulators. We develop a diverse set of tasks involving interactions with various mobile applications, including messaging and banking applications. To clearly evaluate safety apart from general capabilities, we design separate tasks measuring safety and tasks evaluating helpfulness. The safety tasks challenge agents with managing potential risks prevalent in daily life and include tests to evaluate robustness against indirect prompt injections. Our experiments demonstrate that while baseline agents, based on state-of-the-art LLMs, perform well in executing helpful tasks, they show poor performance in safety tasks. To mitigate these safety concerns, we propose a prompting method that encourages agents to prioritize safety considerations. While this method shows promise in promoting safer behaviors, there is still considerable room for improvement to fully earn user trust. This highlights the urgent need for continued research to develop more robust safety mechanisms in mobile environments. We open-source our benchmark at: https://mobilesafetybench.github.io/.

With the growing prevalence of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has raised significant concerns. However, there is still a lack of definitive standards for evaluating their safety due to the subjective nature of current safety benchmarks. To address this gap, we conducted the first exploration of LLMs' safety evaluation from a legal perspective by proposing the SafeLawBench benchmark. SafeLawBench categorizes safety risks into three levels based on legal standards, providing a systematic and comprehensive framework for evaluation. It comprises 24,860 multi-choice questions and 1,106 open-domain question-answering (QA) tasks. Our evaluation included 2 closed-source LLMs and 18 open-source LLMs using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, highlighting the safety features of each model. We also evaluated the LLMs' safety-related reasoning stability and refusal behavior. Additionally, we found that a majority voting mechanism can enhance model performance. Notably, even leading SOTA models like Claude-3.5-Sonnet and GPT-4o have not exceeded 80.5% accuracy in multi-choice tasks on SafeLawBench, while the average accuracy of 20 LLMs remains at 68.8\%. We urge the community to prioritize research on the safety of LLMs.

The rapid development of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) has demonstrated broad application potential, yet their safety and reliability remain critical concerns that require systematic exploration. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation of 11 MLRMs across 5 benchmarks and unveil prevalent safety degradation phenomena in most advanced models. Moreover, our analysis reveals distinct safety patterns across different benchmarks: significant safety degradation is observed across jailbreak robustness benchmarks, whereas safety-awareness benchmarks demonstrate less pronounced degradation. In particular, the long thought process in some scenarios even enhances safety performance. Therefore, it is a potential approach to address safety issues in MLRMs by leveraging the intrinsic reasoning capabilities of the model to detect unsafe intent. To operationalize this insight, we construct a multimodal tuning dataset that incorporates a safety-oriented thought process. Experimental results from fine-tuning existing MLRMs with this dataset effectively enhances the safety on both jailbreak robustness and safety-awareness benchmarks. This study provides a new perspective for developing safe MLRMs. Our dataset is available at https://github.com/xinyuelou/Think-in-Safety.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success on reasoning-intensive tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, their enhanced reasoning capabilities do not necessarily translate to improved safety performance-and in some cases, may even degrade it. This raises an important research question: how can we enhance the safety of LRMs? In this paper, we present a comprehensive empirical study on how to enhance the safety of LRMs through Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT). Our investigation begins with an unexpected observation: directly distilling safe responses from DeepSeek-R1 fails to significantly enhance safety. We analyze this phenomenon and identify three key failure patterns that contribute to it. We then demonstrate that explicitly addressing these issues during the data distillation process can lead to substantial safety improvements. Next, we explore whether a long and complex reasoning process is necessary for achieving safety. Interestingly, we find that simply using short or template-based reasoning process can attain comparable safety performance-and are significantly easier for models to learn than more intricate reasoning chains. These findings prompt a deeper reflection on the role of reasoning in ensuring safety. Finally, we find that mixing math reasoning data during safety fine-tuning is helpful to balance safety and over-refusal. Overall, we hope our empirical study could provide a more holistic picture on enhancing the safety of LRMs. The code and data used in our experiments are released in https://github.com/thu-coai/LRM-Safety-Study.

With the rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), significant safety concerns have emerged. Fundamentally, the safety of large language models is closely linked to the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and clarity of their understanding of safety knowledge, particularly in domains such as law, policy and ethics. This factuality ability is crucial in determining whether these models can be deployed and applied safely and compliantly within specific regions. To address these challenges and better evaluate the factuality ability of LLMs to answer short questions, we introduce the Chinese SafetyQA benchmark. Chinese SafetyQA has several properties (i.e., Chinese, Diverse, High-quality, Static, Easy-to-evaluate, Safety-related, Harmless). Based on Chinese SafetyQA, we perform a comprehensive evaluation on the factuality abilities of existing LLMs and analyze how these capabilities relate to LLM abilities, e.g., RAG ability and robustness against attacks.

The current safeguard mechanisms for large language models (LLMs) are indeed susceptible to jailbreak attacks, making them inherently fragile. Even the process of fine-tuning on apparently benign data for downstream tasks can jeopardize safety. One potential solution is to conduct safety fine-tuning subsequent to downstream fine-tuning. However, there's a risk of catastrophic forgetting during safety fine-tuning, where LLMs may regain safety measures but lose the task-specific knowledge acquired during downstream fine-tuning. In this paper, we introduce a safety realignment framework through subspace-oriented model fusion (SOMF), aiming to combine the safeguard capabilities of initially aligned model and the current fine-tuned model into a realigned model. Our approach begins by disentangling all task vectors from the weights of each fine-tuned model. We then identify safety-related regions within these vectors by subspace masking techniques. Finally, we explore the fusion of the initial safely aligned LLM with all task vectors based on the identified safety subspace. We validate that our safety realignment framework satisfies the safety requirements of a single fine-tuned model as well as multiple models during their fusion. Our findings confirm that SOMF preserves safety without notably compromising performance on downstream tasks, including instruction following in Chinese, English, and Hindi, as well as problem-solving capabilities in Code and Math.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, the risk of generating harmful or toxic content remains a central challenge. Post-hoc alignment methods are brittle: once unsafe patterns are learned during pretraining, they are hard to remove. We present a data-centric pretraining framework that builds safety into the model from the start. Our contributions include: (i) a safety classifier trained on 10,000 GPT-4 labeled examples, used to filter 600B tokens; (ii) the largest synthetic safety dataset to date (100B tokens) generated via recontextualization of harmful web data; (iii) RefuseWeb and Moral Education datasets that convert harmful prompts into refusal dialogues and web-style educational material; (iv) Harmfulness-Tag annotations injected during pretraining to flag unsafe content and steer away inference from harmful generations; and (v) safety evaluations measuring base model behavior before instruction tuning. Our safety-pretrained models reduce attack success rates from 38.8% to 8.4% with no performance degradation on standard LLM safety benchmarks.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.

Language models can distinguish between testing and deployment phases -- a capability known as evaluation awareness. This has significant safety and policy implications, potentially undermining the reliability of evaluations that are central to AI governance frameworks and voluntary industry commitments. In this paper, we study evaluation awareness in Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. We show that linear probes can separate real-world evaluation and deployment prompts, suggesting that current models internally represent this distinction. We also find that current safety evaluations are correctly classified by the probes, suggesting that they already appear artificial or inauthentic to models. Our findings underscore the importance of ensuring trustworthy evaluations and understanding deceptive capabilities. More broadly, our work showcases how model internals may be leveraged to support blackbox methods in safety audits, especially for future models more competent at evaluation awareness and deception.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently gained attention due to their ability to understand and generate sophisticated human-like content. However, ensuring their safety is paramount as they might provide harmful and unsafe responses. Existing LLM testing frameworks address various safety-related concerns (e.g., drugs, terrorism, animal abuse) but often face challenges due to unbalanced and obsolete datasets. In this paper, we present ASTRAL, a tool that automates the generation and execution of test cases (i.e., prompts) for testing the safety of LLMs. First, we introduce a novel black-box coverage criterion to generate balanced and diverse unsafe test inputs across a diverse set of safety categories as well as linguistic writing characteristics (i.e., different style and persuasive writing techniques). Second, we propose an LLM-based approach that leverages Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG), few-shot prompting strategies and web browsing to generate up-to-date test inputs. Lastly, similar to current LLM test automation techniques, we leverage LLMs as test oracles to distinguish between safe and unsafe test outputs, allowing a fully automated testing approach. We conduct an extensive evaluation on well-known LLMs, revealing the following key findings: i) GPT3.5 outperforms other LLMs when acting as the test oracle, accurately detecting unsafe responses, and even surpassing more recent LLMs (e.g., GPT-4), as well as LLMs that are specifically tailored to detect unsafe LLM outputs (e.g., LlamaGuard); ii) the results confirm that our approach can uncover nearly twice as many unsafe LLM behaviors with the same number of test inputs compared to currently used static datasets; and iii) our black-box coverage criterion combined with web browsing can effectively guide the LLM on generating up-to-date unsafe test inputs, significantly increasing the number of unsafe LLM behaviors.

With the profound development of large language models(LLMs), their safety concerns have garnered increasing attention. However, there is a scarcity of Chinese safety benchmarks for LLMs, and the existing safety taxonomies are inadequate, lacking comprehensive safety detection capabilities in authentic Chinese scenarios. In this work, we introduce CHiSafetyBench, a dedicated safety benchmark for evaluating LLMs' capabilities in identifying risky content and refusing answering risky questions in Chinese contexts. CHiSafetyBench incorporates a dataset that covers a hierarchical Chinese safety taxonomy consisting of 5 risk areas and 31 categories. This dataset comprises two types of tasks: multiple-choice questions and question-answering, evaluating LLMs from the perspectives of risk content identification and the ability to refuse answering risky questions respectively. Utilizing this benchmark, we validate the feasibility of automatic evaluation as a substitute for human evaluation and conduct comprehensive automatic safety assessments on mainstream Chinese LLMs. Our experiments reveal the varying performance of different models across various safety domains, indicating that all models possess considerable potential for improvement in Chinese safety capabilities. Our dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/UnicomAI/UnicomBenchmark/tree/main/CHiSafetyBench.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

Emerging large reasoning models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 models, leverage long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to generate structured intermediate steps, enhancing their reasoning capabilities. However, long CoT does not inherently guarantee safe outputs, potentially leading to harmful consequences such as the introduction of security vulnerabilities in code or the spread of misinformation. Current research on large language model (LLM) safety usually focuses on short-answer responses, overlooking the long CoT style outputs of LRMs. To bridge this gap, we conduct a systematic study of LRM safety. First, we investigate safety evaluators calibrated against human annotations. Using our newly developed metrics, we thoroughly assess the safety of 12 state-of-the-art LRMs on StrongReject and WildJailbreak datasets. Our results show that LRMs are not safe compared to their reasoning advance. Further, we perform a fine-grained analysis of the reasoning trace and final answer. We find that three decoding strategies-ZeroThink, LessThink, and MoreThink-can improve model safety without additional training. However, these strategies either use constrained reasoning traces or incur high inference costs. To better strengthen LRM safety, we introduce SafeChain, the first-of-its-kind safety training dataset in CoT style. We fine-tune two LRMs with SafeChain, showing that it not only enhances model safety but also preserves performance across 6 reasoning benchmarks.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Ensuring the safe alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human values is critical as they become integral to applications like translation and question answering. Current alignment methods struggle with dynamic user intentions and complex objectives, making models vulnerable to generating harmful content. We propose Safety Arithmetic, a training-free framework enhancing LLM safety across different scenarios: Base models, Supervised fine-tuned models (SFT), and Edited models. Safety Arithmetic involves Harm Direction Removal to avoid harmful content and Safety Alignment to promote safe responses. Additionally, we present NoIntentEdit, a dataset highlighting edit instances that could compromise model safety if used unintentionally. Our experiments show that Safety Arithmetic significantly improves safety measures, reduces over-safety, and maintains model utility, outperforming existing methods in ensuring safe content generation.

The rapid proliferation of large language models (LLMs) has intensified the requirement for reliable safety evaluation to uncover model vulnerabilities. To this end, numerous LLM safety evaluation benchmarks are proposed. However, existing benchmarks generally rely on labor-intensive manual curation, which causes excessive time and resource consumption. They also exhibit significant redundancy and limited difficulty. To alleviate these problems, we introduce SafetyFlow, the first agent-flow system designed to automate the construction of LLM safety benchmarks. SafetyFlow can automatically build a comprehensive safety benchmark in only four days without any human intervention by orchestrating seven specialized agents, significantly reducing time and resource cost. Equipped with versatile tools, the agents of SafetyFlow ensure process and cost controllability while integrating human expertise into the automatic pipeline. The final constructed dataset, SafetyFlowBench, contains 23,446 queries with low redundancy and strong discriminative power. Our contribution includes the first fully automated benchmarking pipeline and a comprehensive safety benchmark. We evaluate the safety of 49 advanced LLMs on our dataset and conduct extensive experiments to validate our efficacy and efficiency.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

As Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) becomes increasingly integrated into various facets of human life, ensuring the safety and ethical alignment of such systems is paramount. Previous studies primarily focus on single-modality threats, which may not suffice given the integrated and complex nature of cross-modality interactions. We introduce a novel safety alignment challenge called Safe Inputs but Unsafe Output (SIUO) to evaluate cross-modality safety alignment. Specifically, it considers cases where single modalities are safe independently but could potentially lead to unsafe or unethical outputs when combined. To empirically investigate this problem, we developed the SIUO, a cross-modality benchmark encompassing 9 critical safety domains, such as self-harm, illegal activities, and privacy violations. Our findings reveal substantial safety vulnerabilities in both closed- and open-source LVLMs, such as GPT-4V and LLaVA, underscoring the inadequacy of current models to reliably interpret and respond to complex, real-world scenarios.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

Safety reasoning is a recent paradigm where LLMs reason over safety policies before generating responses, thereby mitigating limitations in existing safety measures such as over-refusal and jailbreak vulnerabilities. However, implementing this paradigm is challenging due to the resource-intensive process of creating high-quality policy-embedded chain-of-thought (CoT) datasets while ensuring reasoning remains accurate and free from hallucinations or policy conflicts. To tackle this, we propose AIDSAFE: Agentic Iterative Deliberation for Safety Reasoning, a novel data generation recipe that leverages multi-agent deliberation to iteratively expand reasoning on safety policies. A data refiner stage in AIDSAFE ensures high-quality outputs by eliminating repetitive, redundant, and deceptive thoughts. AIDSAFE-generated CoTs provide a strong foundation for supervised fine-tuning (SFT)-based safety training. Additionally, to address the need of preference data in alignment stages, such as DPO training, we introduce a supplemental recipe that uses belief augmentation to create distinct selected and rejected CoT samples. Our evaluations demonstrate that AIDSAFE-generated CoTs achieve superior policy adherence and reasoning quality. Consequently, we show that fine-tuning open-source LLMs on these CoTs can significantly improve safety generalization and jailbreak robustness while maintaining acceptable utility and over-refusal accuracy. AIDSAFE-generated CoT datasets can be found here: https://huggingface.co/datasets/AmazonScience/AIDSAFE

We propose a novel dynamic safety framework that optimizes language model (LM) safety reasoning at inference time without modifying model weights. Building on recent advances in self-critique methods, our approach leverages a meta-critique mechanism that iteratively updates safety prompts-termed specifications-to drive the critique and revision process adaptively. This test-time optimization not only improves performance against adversarial jailbreak requests but also in diverse general safety-related tasks, such as avoiding moral harm or pursuing honest responses. Our empirical evaluations across several language models demonstrate that dynamically optimized safety prompts yield significantly higher safety scores compared to fixed system prompts and static self-critique defenses. Code to be released at https://github.com/vicgalle/meta-self-critique.git .

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Vision-language models (VLMs), which process image and text inputs, are increasingly integrated into chat assistants and other consumer AI applications. Without proper safeguards, however, VLMs may give harmful advice (e.g. how to self-harm) or encourage unsafe behaviours (e.g. to consume drugs). Despite these clear hazards, little work so far has evaluated VLM safety and the novel risks created by multimodal inputs. To address this gap, we introduce MSTS, a Multimodal Safety Test Suite for VLMs. MSTS comprises 400 test prompts across 40 fine-grained hazard categories. Each test prompt consists of a text and an image that only in combination reveal their full unsafe meaning. With MSTS, we find clear safety issues in several open VLMs. We also find some VLMs to be safe by accident, meaning that they are safe because they fail to understand even simple test prompts. We translate MSTS into ten languages, showing non-English prompts to increase the rate of unsafe model responses. We also show models to be safer when tested with text only rather than multimodal prompts. Finally, we explore the automation of VLM safety assessments, finding even the best safety classifiers to be lacking.

Defending against jailbreak attacks is crucial for the safe deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent research has attempted to improve safety by training models to reason over safety rules before responding. However, a key issue lies in determining what form of safety reasoning effectively defends against jailbreak attacks, which is difficult to explicitly design or directly obtain. To address this, we propose STAR-S (Self-TAught Reasoning based on Safety rules), a framework that integrates the learning of safety rule reasoning into a self-taught loop. The core of STAR-S involves eliciting reasoning and reflection guided by safety rules, then leveraging fine-tuning to enhance safety reasoning. Repeating this process creates a synergistic cycle. Improvements in the model's reasoning and interpretation of safety rules allow it to produce better reasoning data under safety rule prompts, which is then utilized for further training. Experiments show that STAR-S effectively defends against jailbreak attacks, outperforming baselines. Code is available at: https://github.com/pikepokenew/STAR_S.git.

This paper introduces STAR-1, a high-quality, just-1k-scale safety dataset specifically designed for large reasoning models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1. Built on three core principles -- diversity, deliberative reasoning, and rigorous filtering -- STAR-1 aims to address the critical needs for safety alignment in LRMs. Specifically, we begin by integrating existing open-source safety datasets from diverse sources. Then, we curate safety policies to generate policy-grounded deliberative reasoning samples. Lastly, we apply a GPT-4o-based safety scoring system to select training examples aligned with best practices. Experimental results show that fine-tuning LRMs with STAR-1 leads to an average 40% improvement in safety performance across four benchmarks, while only incurring a marginal decrease (e.g., an average of 1.1%) in reasoning ability measured across five reasoning tasks. Extensive ablation studies further validate the importance of our design principles in constructing STAR-1 and analyze its efficacy across both LRMs and traditional LLMs. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/STAR-1.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capabilities, ensuring their safety against jailbreak attacks remains a critical challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel safety alignment approach called Answer-Then-Check, which enhances LLM robustness against malicious prompts by applying thinking ability to mitigate jailbreaking problems before producing a final answer to the user. Our method enables models to directly answer the question in their thought and then critically evaluate its safety before deciding whether to provide it. To implement this approach, we construct the Reasoned Safety Alignment (ReSA) dataset, comprising 80K examples that teach models to reason through direct responses and then analyze their safety. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves the Pareto frontier with superior safety capability while decreasing over-refusal rates on over-refusal benchmarks. Notably, the model fine-tuned with ReSA maintains general reasoning capabilities on benchmarks like MMLU, MATH500, and HumanEval. Besides, our method equips models with the ability to perform safe completion. Unlike post-hoc methods that can only reject harmful queries, our model can provide helpful and safe alternative responses for sensitive topics (e.g., self-harm). Furthermore, we discover that training on a small subset of just 500 examples can achieve comparable performance to using the full dataset, suggesting that safety alignment may require less data than previously assumed.

This paper introduces fourteen novel datasets for the evaluation of Large Language Models' safety in the context of enterprise tasks. A method was devised to evaluate a model's safety, as determined by its ability to follow instructions and output factual, unbiased, grounded, and appropriate content. In this research, we used OpenAI GPT as point of comparison since it excels at all levels of safety. On the open-source side, for smaller models, Meta Llama2 performs well at factuality and toxicity but has the highest propensity for hallucination. Mistral hallucinates the least but cannot handle toxicity well. It performs well in a dataset mixing several tasks and safety vectors in a narrow vertical domain. Gemma, the newly introduced open-source model based on Google Gemini, is generally balanced but trailing behind. When engaging in back-and-forth conversation (multi-turn prompts), we find that the safety of open-source models degrades significantly. Aside from OpenAI's GPT, Mistral is the only model that still performed well in multi-turn tests.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are increasingly deployed in real-world applications such as "digital assistants, autonomous customer service, and decision-support systems", where their ability to "interact in multi-turn, tool-augmented environments" makes them indispensable. However, ensuring the safety of these agents remains a significant challenge due to the diverse and complex risks arising from dynamic user interactions, external tool usage, and the potential for unintended harmful behaviors. To address this critical issue, we propose AutoSafe, the first framework that systematically enhances agent safety through fully automated synthetic data generation. Concretely, 1) we introduce an open and extensible threat model, OTS, which formalizes how unsafe behaviors emerge from the interplay of user instructions, interaction contexts, and agent actions. This enables precise modeling of safety risks across diverse scenarios. 2) we develop a fully automated data generation pipeline that simulates unsafe user behaviors, applies self-reflective reasoning to generate safe responses, and constructs a large-scale, diverse, and high-quality safety training dataset-eliminating the need for hazardous real-world data collection. To evaluate the effectiveness of our framework, we design comprehensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world safety benchmarks. Results demonstrate that AutoSafe boosts safety scores by 45% on average and achieves a 28.91% improvement on real-world tasks, validating the generalization ability of our learned safety strategies. These results highlight the practical advancement and scalability of AutoSafe in building safer LLM-based agents for real-world deployment. We have released the project page at https://auto-safe.github.io/.

Ensuring the safety of the Large Language Model (LLM) is critical, but currently used methods in most cases sacrifice the model performance to obtain increased safety or perform poorly on data outside of their adaptation distribution. We investigate existing methods for such generalization and find them insufficient. Surprisingly, while even plain LLMs recognize unsafe prompts, they may still generate unsafe responses. To avoid performance degradation and preserve safe performance, we advocate for a two-step framework, where we first identify unsafe prompts via a lightweight classifier, and apply a "safe" model only to such prompts. In particular, we explore the design of the safety detector in more detail, investigating the use of different classifier architectures and prompting techniques. Interestingly, we find that the final hidden state for the last token is enough to provide robust performance, minimizing false positives on benign data while performing well on malicious prompt detection. Additionally, we show that classifiers trained on the representations from different model layers perform comparably on the latest model layers, indicating that safety representation is present in the LLMs' hidden states at most model stages. Our work is a step towards efficient, representation-based safety mechanisms for LLMs.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into numerous applications across various domains, LLMs' safety becomes a critical concern for both application developers and intended users. Currently, great efforts have been made to develop safety benchmarks with fine-grained taxonomies. However, these benchmarks' taxonomies are disparate with different safety policies. Thus, existing safeguards trained on these benchmarks are either coarse-grained to only distinguish between safe and unsafe, or constrained by the narrow risk taxonomies of a single benchmark. To leverage these fine-grained safety taxonomies across multiple safety benchmarks, in this paper, we propose GSPR, a Generalizable Safety Policy Reasoner to identify unsafe input prompts and LLMs' outputs with violated safety taxonomies through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Unlike prior safeguards which only cover a fixed set of risk factors, our GSPR incentivizes its reasoning capability with varied safety taxonomies through our careful cold-start strategy and reward design. Consequently, our GSPR can be trained across multiple safety benchmarks with distinct taxonomies and naturally exhibits powerful generalization ability. We conduct extensive experiments to show that our GSPR significantly improves existing safety guardrails' reasoning capabilities for both safety and category prediction tasks. Moreover, our GSPR not only demonstrates powerful safety generalization abilities but also achieves the least inference token costs with explanations.

Although large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities on complex tasks, recent studies reveal that these models frequently fulfill harmful user instructions, raising significant safety concerns. In this paper, we investigate the underlying cause of LRM safety risks and find that models already possess sufficient safety knowledge but fail to activate it during reasoning. Based on this insight, we propose R1-Act, a simple and efficient post-training method that explicitly triggers safety knowledge through a structured reasoning process. R1-Act achieves strong safety improvements while preserving reasoning performance, outperforming prior alignment methods. Notably, it requires only 1,000 training examples and 90 minutes of training on a single RTX A6000 GPU. Extensive experiments across multiple LRM backbones and sizes demonstrate the robustness, scalability, and practical efficiency of our approach.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

The safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained increasing attention in recent years, but there still lacks a comprehensive approach for detecting safety issues within LLMs' responses in an aligned, customizable and explainable manner. In this paper, we propose ShieldLM, an LLM-based safety detector, which aligns with general human safety standards, supports customizable detection rules, and provides explanations for its decisions. To train ShieldLM, we compile a large bilingual dataset comprising 14,387 query-response pairs, annotating the safety of responses based on various safety standards. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that ShieldLM surpasses strong baselines across four test sets, showcasing remarkable customizability and explainability. Besides performing well on standard detection datasets, ShieldLM has also been shown to be effective in real-world situations as a safety evaluator for advanced LLMs. We release ShieldLM at https://github.com/thu-coai/ShieldLM to support accurate and explainable safety detection under various safety standards, contributing to the ongoing efforts to enhance the safety of LLMs.

As large language models are integrated into society, robustness toward a suite of prompts is increasingly important to maintain reliability in a high-variance environment.Robustness evaluations must comprehensively encapsulate the various settings in which a user may invoke an intelligent system. This paper proposes ASSERT, Automated Safety Scenario Red Teaming, consisting of three methods -- semantically aligned augmentation, target bootstrapping, and adversarial knowledge injection. For robust safety evaluation, we apply these methods in the critical domain of AI safety to algorithmically generate a test suite of prompts covering diverse robustness settings -- semantic equivalence, related scenarios, and adversarial. We partition our prompts into four safety domains for a fine-grained analysis of how the domain affects model performance. Despite dedicated safeguards in existing state-of-the-art models, we find statistically significant performance differences of up to 11% in absolute classification accuracy among semantically related scenarios and error rates of up to 19% absolute error in zero-shot adversarial settings, raising concerns for users' physical safety.

Ensuring the safety and harmlessness of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become equally critical as their performance in applications. However, existing safety alignment methods typically suffer from safety-performance trade-offs and the susceptibility to jailbreak attacks, primarily due to their reliance on direct refusals for malicious queries. In this paper, we propose STAIR, a novel framework that integrates SafeTy Alignment with Itrospective Reasoning. We enable LLMs to identify safety risks through step-by-step analysis by self-improving chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning with safety awareness. STAIR first equips the model with a structured reasoning capability and then advances safety alignment via iterative preference optimization on step-level reasoning data generated using our newly proposed Safety-Informed Monte Carlo Tree Search (SI-MCTS). We further train a process reward model on this data to guide test-time searches for improved responses. Extensive experiments show that STAIR effectively mitigates harmful outputs while better preserving helpfulness, compared to instinctive alignment strategies. With test-time scaling, STAIR achieves a safety performance comparable to Claude-3.5 against popular jailbreak attacks. Relevant resources in this work are available at https://github.com/thu-ml/STAIR.

The ideal LLM content moderation system would be both structurally interpretable (so its decisions can be explained to users) and steerable (to reflect a community's values or align to safety standards). However, current systems fall short on both of these dimensions. To address this gap, we present SafetyAnalyst, a novel LLM safety moderation framework. Given a prompt, SafetyAnalyst creates a structured "harm-benefit tree," which identifies 1) the actions that could be taken if a compliant response were provided, 2) the harmful and beneficial effects of those actions (along with their likelihood, severity, and immediacy), and 3) the stakeholders that would be impacted by those effects. It then aggregates this structured representation into a harmfulness score based on a parameterized set of safety preferences, which can be transparently aligned to particular values. Using extensive harm-benefit features generated by SOTA LLMs on 19k prompts, we fine-tuned an open-weight LM to specialize in generating harm-benefit trees through symbolic knowledge distillation. On a comprehensive set of prompt safety benchmarks, we show that our system (average F1=0.75) outperforms existing LLM safety moderation systems (average F1<0.72) on prompt harmfulness classification, while offering the additional advantages of interpretability and steerability.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

Construction safety inspections typically involve a human inspector identifying safety concerns on-site. With the rise of powerful Vision Language Models (VLMs), researchers are exploring their use for tasks such as detecting safety rule violations from on-site images. However, there is a lack of open datasets to comprehensively evaluate and further fine-tune VLMs in construction safety inspection. Current applications of VLMs use small, supervised datasets, limiting their applicability in tasks they are not directly trained for. In this paper, we propose the ConstructionSite 10k, featuring 10,000 construction site images with annotations for three inter-connected tasks, including image captioning, safety rule violation visual question answering (VQA), and construction element visual grounding. Our subsequent evaluation of current state-of-the-art large pre-trained VLMs shows notable generalization abilities in zero-shot and few-shot settings, while additional training is needed to make them applicable to actual construction sites. This dataset allows researchers to train and evaluate their own VLMs with new architectures and techniques, providing a valuable benchmark for construction safety inspection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased remarkable capabilities across various domains. Accompanying the evolving capabilities and expanding deployment scenarios of LLMs, their deployment challenges escalate due to their sheer scale and the advanced yet complex activation designs prevalent in notable model series, such as Llama, Gemma, and Mistral. These challenges have become particularly pronounced in resource-constrained deployment scenarios, where mitigating inference efficiency bottlenecks is imperative. Among various recent efforts, activation approximation has emerged as a promising avenue for pursuing inference efficiency, sometimes considered indispensable in applications such as private inference. Despite achieving substantial speedups with minimal impact on utility, even appearing sound and practical for real-world deployment, the safety implications of activation approximations remain unclear. In this work, we fill this critical gap in LLM safety by conducting the first systematic safety evaluation of activation approximations. Our safety vetting spans seven sota techniques across three popular categories, revealing consistent safety degradation across ten safety-aligned LLMs.

The growing awareness of safety concerns in large language models (LLMs) has sparked considerable interest in the evaluation of safety within current research endeavors. This study investigates an interesting issue pertaining to the evaluation of LLMs, namely the substantial discrepancy in performance between multiple-choice questions and open-ended questions. Inspired by research on jailbreak attack patterns, we argue this is caused by mismatched generalization. That is, the LLM does not have a comprehensive understanding of the complex concept of safety. Instead, it only remembers what to answer for open-ended safety questions, which makes it unable to solve other forms of safety tests. We refer to this phenomenon as fake alignment and construct a comparative benchmark to empirically verify its existence in LLMs. Such fake alignment renders previous evaluation protocols unreliable. To address this, we introduce the Fake alIgNment Evaluation (FINE) framework and two novel metrics--Consistency Score (CS) and Consistent Safety Score (CSS), which jointly assess two complementary forms of evaluation to quantify fake alignment and obtain corrected performance estimates. Applying FINE to 14 widely-used LLMs reveals several models with purported safety are poorly aligned in practice. Our work highlights potential limitations in prevailing alignment methodologies.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve answer quality through explicit chain-of-thought, yet this very capability introduces new safety risks: harmful content can be subtly injected, surface gradually, or be justified by misleading rationales within the reasoning trace. Existing safety evaluations, however, primarily focus on output-level judgments and rarely capture these dynamic risks along the reasoning process. In this paper, we present SafeRBench, the first benchmark that assesses LRM safety end-to-end -- from inputs and intermediate reasoning to final outputs. (1) Input Characterization: We pioneer the incorporation of risk categories and levels into input design, explicitly accounting for affected groups and severity, and thereby establish a balanced prompt suite reflecting diverse harm gradients. (2) Fine-Grained Output Analysis: We introduce a micro-thought chunking mechanism to segment long reasoning traces into semantically coherent units, enabling fine-grained evaluation across ten safety dimensions. (3) Human Safety Alignment: We validate LLM-based evaluations against human annotations specifically designed to capture safety judgments. Evaluations on 19 LRMs demonstrate that SafeRBench enables detailed, multidimensional safety assessment, offering insights into risks and protective mechanisms from multiple perspectives.

The remarkable success of Large Language Models (LLMs) has illuminated a promising pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence for both academic and industrial communities, owing to their unprecedented performance across various applications. As LLMs continue to gain prominence in both research and commercial domains, their security and safety implications have become a growing concern, not only for researchers and corporations but also for every nation. Currently, existing surveys on LLM safety primarily focus on specific stages of the LLM lifecycle, e.g., deployment phase or fine-tuning phase, lacking a comprehensive understanding of the entire "lifechain" of LLMs. To address this gap, this paper introduces, for the first time, the concept of "full-stack" safety to systematically consider safety issues throughout the entire process of LLM training, deployment, and eventual commercialization. Compared to the off-the-shelf LLM safety surveys, our work demonstrates several distinctive advantages: (I) Comprehensive Perspective. We define the complete LLM lifecycle as encompassing data preparation, pre-training, post-training, deployment and final commercialization. To our knowledge, this represents the first safety survey to encompass the entire lifecycle of LLMs. (II) Extensive Literature Support. Our research is grounded in an exhaustive review of over 800+ papers, ensuring comprehensive coverage and systematic organization of security issues within a more holistic understanding. (III) Unique Insights. Through systematic literature analysis, we have developed reliable roadmaps and perspectives for each chapter. Our work identifies promising research directions, including safety in data generation, alignment techniques, model editing, and LLM-based agent systems. These insights provide valuable guidance for researchers pursuing future work in this field.

As Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) acquire stronger reasoning capabilities to handle complex, multi-image instructions, this advancement may pose new safety risks. We study this problem by introducing MIR-SafetyBench, the first benchmark focused on multi-image reasoning safety, which consists of 2,676 instances across a taxonomy of 9 multi-image relations. Our extensive evaluations on 19 MLLMs reveal a troubling trend: models with more advanced multi-image reasoning can be more vulnerable on MIR-SafetyBench. Beyond attack success rates, we find that many responses labeled as safe are superficial, often driven by misunderstanding or evasive, non-committal replies. We further observe that unsafe generations exhibit lower attention entropy than safe ones on average. This internal signature suggests a possible risk that models may over-focus on task solving while neglecting safety constraints. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/MIR-SafetyBench.

Robots must operate safely when deployed in novel and human-centered environments, like homes. Current safe control approaches typically assume that the safety constraints are known a priori, and thus, the robot can pre-compute a corresponding safety controller. While this may make sense for some safety constraints (e.g., avoiding collision with walls by analyzing a floor plan), other constraints are more complex (e.g., spills), inherently personal, context-dependent, and can only be identified at deployment time when the robot is interacting in a specific environment and with a specific person (e.g., fragile objects, expensive rugs). Here, language provides a flexible mechanism to communicate these evolving safety constraints to the robot. In this work, we use vision language models (VLMs) to interpret language feedback and the robot's image observations to continuously update the robot's representation of safety constraints. With these inferred constraints, we update a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability safety controller online via efficient warm-starting techniques. Through simulation and hardware experiments, we demonstrate the robot's ability to infer and respect language-based safety constraints with the proposed approach.

We propose a new approach to promote safety in classification tasks with established concepts. Our approach -- called a conceptual safeguard -- acts as a verification layer for models that predict a target outcome by first predicting the presence of intermediate concepts. Given this architecture, a safeguard ensures that a model meets a minimal level of accuracy by abstaining from uncertain predictions. In contrast to a standard selective classifier, a safeguard provides an avenue to improve coverage by allowing a human to confirm the presence of uncertain concepts on instances on which it abstains. We develop methods to build safeguards that maximize coverage without compromising safety, namely techniques to propagate the uncertainty in concept predictions and to flag salient concepts for human review. We benchmark our approach on a collection of real-world and synthetic datasets, showing that it can improve performance and coverage in deep learning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) have had a transformative impact on a variety of scientific tasks across disciplines such as biology, chemistry, medicine, and physics. However, ensuring the safety alignment of these models in scientific research remains an underexplored area, with existing benchmarks primarily focus on textual content and overlooking key scientific representations such as molecular, protein, and genomic languages. Moreover, the safety mechanisms of LLMs in scientific tasks are insufficiently studied. To address these limitations, we introduce SciSafeEval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the safety alignment of LLMs across a range of scientific tasks. SciSafeEval spans multiple scientific languages - including textual, molecular, protein, and genomic - and covers a wide range of scientific domains. We evaluate LLMs in zero-shot, few-shot and chain-of-thought settings, and introduce a 'jailbreak' enhancement feature that challenges LLMs equipped with safety guardrails, rigorously testing their defenses against malicious intention. Our benchmark surpasses existing safety datasets in both scale and scope, providing a robust platform for assessing the safety and performance of LLMs in scientific contexts. This work aims to facilitate the responsible development and deployment of LLMs, promoting alignment with safety and ethical standards in scientific research.

Instruction tuned reasoning models are increasingly deployed with safety classifiers trained on frozen embeddings, assuming representation stability across model updates. We systematically investigate this assumption and find it fails: normalized perturbations of magnitude σ=0.02 (corresponding to approx 1^circ angular drift on the embedding sphere) reduce classifier performance from 85% to 50% ROC-AUC. Critically, mean confidence only drops 14%, producing dangerous silent failures where 72% of misclassifications occur with high confidence, defeating standard monitoring. We further show that instruction-tuned models exhibit 20% worse class separability than base models, making aligned systems paradoxically harder to safeguard. Our findings expose a fundamental fragility in production AI safety architectures and challenge the assumption that safety mechanisms transfer across model versions.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled agents to move beyond conversation toward end-to-end task execution and become more helpful. However, this helpfulness introduces new security risks stem less from direct interface abuse than from acting on user-provided content. Existing studies on agent security largely focus on model-internal vulnerabilities or adversarial access to agent interfaces, overlooking attacks that exploit users as unintended conduits. In this paper, we study user-mediated attacks, where benign users are tricked into relaying untrusted or attacker-controlled content to agents, and analyze how commercial LLM agents respond under such conditions. We conduct a systematic evaluation of 12 commercial agents in a sandboxed environment, covering 6 trip-planning agents and 6 web-use agents, and compare agent behavior across scenarios with no, soft, and hard user-requested safety checks. Our results show that agents are too helpful to be safe by default. Without explicit safety requests, trip-planning agents bypass safety constraints in over 92% of cases, converting unverified content into confident booking guidance. Web-use agents exhibit near-deterministic execution of risky actions, with 9 out of 17 supported tests reaching a 100% bypass rate. Even when users express soft or hard safety intent, constraint bypass remains substantial, reaching up to 54.7% and 7% for trip-planning agents, respectively. These findings reveal that the primary issue is not a lack of safety capability, but its prioritization. Agents invoke safety checks only conditionally when explicitly prompted, and otherwise default to goal-driven execution. Moreover, agents lack clear task boundaries and stopping rules, frequently over-executing workflows in ways that lead to unnecessary data disclosure and real-world harm.

Recently, the DeepSeek series of models, leveraging their exceptional reasoning capabilities and open-source strategy, is reshaping the global AI landscape. Despite these advantages, they exhibit significant safety deficiencies. Research conducted by Robust Intelligence, a subsidiary of Cisco, in collaboration with the University of Pennsylvania, revealed that DeepSeek-R1 has a 100\% attack success rate when processing harmful prompts. Additionally, multiple safety companies and research institutions have confirmed critical safety vulnerabilities in this model. As models demonstrating robust performance in Chinese and English, DeepSeek models require equally crucial safety assessments in both language contexts. However, current research has predominantly focused on safety evaluations in English environments, leaving a gap in comprehensive assessments of their safety performance in Chinese contexts. In response to this gap, this study introduces CHiSafetyBench, a Chinese-specific safety evaluation benchmark. This benchmark systematically evaluates the safety of DeepSeek-R1 and DeepSeek-V3 in Chinese contexts, revealing their performance across safety categories. The experimental results quantify the deficiencies of these two models in Chinese contexts, providing key insights for subsequent improvements. It should be noted that, despite our efforts to establish a comprehensive, objective, and authoritative evaluation benchmark, the selection of test samples, characteristics of data distribution, and the setting of evaluation criteria may inevitably introduce certain biases into the evaluation results. We will continuously optimize the evaluation benchmark and periodically update this report to provide more comprehensive and accurate assessment outcomes. Please refer to the latest version of the paper for the most recent evaluation results and conclusions.

Safety alignment is an important procedure before the official deployment of a Large Language Model (LLM). While safety alignment has been extensively studied for LLM, there is still a large research gap for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that equip with improved reasoning capability. We in this paper systematically examine a simplified pipeline for producing safety aligned LRMs. With our evaluation of various LRMs, we deliver two main findings: i) Safety alignment can be done upon the LRM to restore its safety capability. ii) Safety alignment leads to a degradation of the reasoning capability of LRMs. The two findings show that there exists a trade-off between reasoning and safety capability with the sequential LRM production pipeline. The discovered trade-off, which we name Safety Tax, should shed light on future endeavors of safety research on LRMs. As a by-product, we curate a dataset called DirectRefusal, which might serve as an alternative dataset for safety alignment. Our source code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Safety-Tax.

Having reliable specifications is an unavoidable challenge in achieving verifiable correctness, robustness, and interpretability of AI systems. Existing specifications for neural networks are in the paradigm of data as specification. That is, the local neighborhood centering around a reference input is considered to be correct (or robust). While existing specifications contribute to verifying adversarial robustness, a significant problem in many research domains, our empirical study shows that those verified regions are somewhat tight, and thus fail to allow verification of test set inputs, making them impractical for some real-world applications. To this end, we propose a new family of specifications called neural representation as specification, which uses the intrinsic information of neural networks - neural activation patterns (NAPs), rather than input data to specify the correctness and/or robustness of neural network predictions. We present a simple statistical approach to mining neural activation patterns. To show the effectiveness of discovered NAPs, we formally verify several important properties, such as various types of misclassifications will never happen for a given NAP, and there is no ambiguity between different NAPs. We show that by using NAP, we can verify a significant region of the input space, while still recalling 84% of the data on MNIST. Moreover, we can push the verifiable bound to 10 times larger on the CIFAR10 benchmark. Thus, we argue that NAPs can potentially be used as a more reliable and extensible specification for neural network verification.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance their reasoning capabilities through feedback. A critical challenge is verifying the consistency of model-generated responses and reference answers, since these responses are often lengthy, diverse, and nuanced. Rule-based verifiers struggle with complexity, prompting the use of model-based verifiers. However, specialized verifiers lack flexibility, while general LLM judges can be inconsistent. Existing research primarily focuses on building better verifiers, yet a systematic evaluation of different types of verifiers' performance across domains remains lacking, severely constraining the reliable development of Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR). To address this, we propose VerifyBench--a cross-domain comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating verifiers. We construct 4,000 expert-level questions covering mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. Each question is equipped with reference answers and diverse responses. The reliability of the evaluation is ensured through a rigorous annotation process conducted by a multidisciplinary expert team. We design a four-dimensional experimental framework to comprehensively compare the performance boundaries of specialized verifiers and general LLMs under combined conditions of extracted answers vs. complete responses, and short vs. long outputs. Our evaluation uncovers fundamental trade-offs in verifiers: while specialized verifiers achieve leading accuracy, they exhibit deficiencies in recall; general models show stronger inclusivity but unstable precision. More importantly, we discover verifiers' high sensitivity to input structure and inherent limitations in cross-domain generalization, providing critical insights into the bottlenecks of current verifier technology.

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to scientific reasoning, the complexity of answer formats and the diversity of equivalent expressions make answer verification a critical yet challenging task. Existing verification studies in scientific domains suffer from two major limitations: (a) the absence of systematic evaluation standards and insufficient disciplinary coverage, which hinders their comprehensive assessment; and (b) heavy reliance on cumbersome rule design or prompt engineering, which reduces their effectiveness in complex reasoning scenarios or limits their cross-disciplinary generalization. To address these challenges, we propose solutions at both the data and model levels. On the data side, we construct SCI-VerifyBench, a cross-disciplinary benchmark covering mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, and general scientific QA. The benchmark is built from real LLM responses and enhanced with domain-specific equivalence transformations that generate challenging and realistic data. Model-based and expert annotations ensure both quality and diversity, enabling rigorous evaluation of verification ability. On the model side, we emphasize the importance of reasoning for verification and introduce SCI-Verifier, a unified reasoning-augmented verifier for scientific domains. Through post-training, SCI-Verifier demonstrates strong logical reasoning and equivalence judgment capabilities while maintaining concise and stable outputs. Together, SCI-VerifyBench and SCI-Verifier provide a principled framework for scientific verification, offering both systematic evaluation and practical pathways to enhance the reliability and applicability of LLMs in scientific domains.

The performance of autonomous Web GUI agents heavily relies on the quality and quantity of their training data. However, a fundamental bottleneck persists: collecting interaction trajectories from real-world websites is expensive and difficult to verify. The underlying state transitions are hidden, leading to reliance on inconsistent and costly external verifiers to evaluate step-level correctness. To address this, we propose AutoWebWorld, a novel framework for synthesizing controllable and verifiable web environments by modeling them as Finite State Machines (FSMs) and use coding agents to translate FSMs into interactive websites. Unlike real websites, where state transitions are implicit, AutoWebWorld explicitly defines all states, actions, and transition rules. This enables programmatic verification: action correctness is checked against predefined rules, and task success is confirmed by reaching a goal state in the FSM graph. AutoWebWorld enables a fully automated search-and-verify pipeline, generating over 11,663 verified trajectories from 29 diverse web environments at only $0.04 per trajectory. Training on this synthetic data significantly boosts real-world performance. Our 7B Web GUI agent outperforms all baselines within 15 steps on WebVoyager. Furthermore, we observe a clear scaling law: as the synthetic data volume increases, performance on WebVoyager and Online-Mind2Web consistently improves.

Though safety alignment has been applied to most large language models (LLMs), LLM service providers generally deploy a subsequent moderation as the external safety guardrail in real-world products. Existing moderators mainly practice a conventional full detection, which determines the harmfulness based on the complete LLM output, causing high service latency. Recent works pay more attention to partial detection where moderators oversee the generation midway and early stop the output if harmfulness is detected, but they directly apply moderators trained with the full detection paradigm to incomplete outputs, introducing a training-inference gap that lowers the performance. In this paper, we explore how to form a data-and-model solution that natively supports partial detection. For the data, we construct FineHarm, a dataset consisting of 29K prompt-response pairs with fine-grained annotations to provide reasonable supervision for token-level training. Then, we propose the streaming content monitor, which is trained with dual supervision of response- and token-level labels and can follow the output stream of LLM to make a timely judgment of harmfulness. Experiments show that SCM gains 0.95+ in macro F1 score that is comparable to full detection, by only seeing the first 18% of tokens in responses on average. Moreover, the SCM can serve as a pseudo-harmfulness annotator for improving safety alignment and lead to a higher harmlessness score than DPO.

Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) demonstrate impressive cross-modal reasoning but often amplify safety risks under adversarial or unsafe prompts, a phenomenon we call the Reasoning Tax. Existing defenses mainly act at the output level and do not constrain the reasoning process, leaving models exposed to implicit risks. In this paper, we propose SaFeR-VLM, a safety-aligned reinforcement learning framework that embeds safety directly into multimodal reasoning. The framework integrates four components: (I) QI-Safe-10K, a curated dataset emphasizing safety-critical and reasoning-sensitive cases; (II) safety-aware rollout, where unsafe generations undergo reflection and correction instead of being discarded; (III) structured reward modeling with multi-dimensional weighted criteria and explicit penalties for hallucinations and contradictions; and (IV) GRPO optimization, which reinforces both safe and corrected trajectories. This unified design shifts safety from a passive safeguard to an active driver of reasoning, enabling scalable and generalizable safety-aware reasoning. SaFeR-VLM further demonstrates robustness against both explicit and implicit risks, supporting dynamic and interpretable safety decisions beyond surface-level filtering. SaFeR-VLM-3B achieves average performance 70.13 and 78.97 on safety and helpfulness across six benchmarks, surpassing both same-scale and >10times larger models such as Skywork-R1V3-38B, Qwen2.5VL-72B, and GLM4.5V-106B. Remarkably, SaFeR-VLM-7B benefits from its increased scale to surpass GPT-5-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash by 6.47 and 16.76 points respectively on safety metrics, achieving this improvement without any degradation in helpfulness performance. Our codes are available at https://github.com/HarveyYi/SaFeR-VLM.

Large language models (LLMs) and their safety classifiers often perform poorly on low-resource languages due to limited training data and evaluation benchmarks. This paper introduces RabakBench, a new multilingual safety benchmark localized to Singapore's unique linguistic context, covering Singlish, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil. RabakBench is constructed through a scalable three-stage pipeline: (i) Generate - adversarial example generation by augmenting real Singlish web content with LLM-driven red teaming; (ii) Label - semi-automated multi-label safety annotation using majority-voted LLM labelers aligned with human judgments; and (iii) Translate - high-fidelity translation preserving linguistic nuance and toxicity across languages. The final dataset comprises over 5,000 safety-labeled examples across four languages and six fine-grained safety categories with severity levels. Evaluations of 11 popular open-source and closed-source guardrail classifiers reveal significant performance degradation. RabakBench not only enables robust safety evaluation in Southeast Asian multilingual settings but also offers a reproducible framework for building localized safety datasets in low-resource environments. The benchmark dataset, including the human-verified translations, and evaluation code are publicly available.

Fine-tuning safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) can substantially compromise their safety. Previous approaches require many safety samples or calibration sets, which not only incur significant computational overhead during realignment but also lead to noticeable degradation in model utility. Contrary to this belief, we show that safety alignment can be fully recovered with only a single safety example, without sacrificing utility and at minimal cost. Remarkably, this recovery is effective regardless of the number of harmful examples used in fine-tuning or the size of the underlying model, and convergence is achieved within just a few epochs. Furthermore, we uncover the low-rank structure of the safety gradient, which explains why such efficient correction is possible. We validate our findings across five safety-aligned LLMs and multiple datasets, demonstrating the generality of our approach.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) for downstream tasks is a widely adopted approach, but it often leads to safety degradation in safety-aligned LLMs. Currently, many solutions address this issue by incorporating additional safety data, which can be impractical in many cases. In this paper, we address the question: How can we improve downstream task performance while preserving safety in LLMs without relying on additional safety data? We propose a simple and effective method that maintains the inherent safety of LLMs while enhancing their downstream task performance: merging the weights of pre- and post-fine-tuned safety-aligned models. Experimental results across various downstream tasks, models, and merging methods demonstrate that this approach effectively mitigates safety degradation while improving downstream task performance, offering a practical solution for adapting safety-aligned LLMs.

Claim verification is essential in combating misinformation, and large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged in this area as powerful tools for assessing the veracity of claims using external knowledge. Existing LLM-based methods for claim verification typically adopt a Decompose-Then-Verify paradigm, which involves decomposing complex claims into several independent sub-claims and verifying each sub-claim separately. However, this paradigm often introduces errors during the claim decomposition process. To mitigate these errors, we propose to develop the Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-Verify paradigm, which leverages LLM reasoning methods to generate CoT-verification paths for the original complex claim without requiring decompositions into sub-claims and separate verification stages. The CoT-Verify paradigm allows us to propose a natural fine-tuning method called Reasoning-CV to enhance the verification capabilities in LLMs. Reasoning-CV includes a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage and a self-improvement direct preference optimization (DPO) stage. Utilizing only an 8B pre-trained LLM, Reasoning-CV demonstrates superior knowledge-assisted claim verification performances compared to existing Decompose-Then-Verify methods, as well as powerful black-box LLMs such as GPT-4o+CoT and o1-preview. Our code is available.

Large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT and GPT-4, have demonstrated remarkable abilities in natural language understanding and generation. However, alongside their positive impact on our daily tasks, they can also produce harmful content that negatively affects societal perceptions. To systematically assess the safety of Chinese LLMs, we introduce SuperCLUE-Safety (SC-Safety) - a multi-round adversarial benchmark with 4912 open-ended questions covering more than 20 safety sub-dimensions. Adversarial human-model interactions and conversations significantly increase the challenges compared to existing methods. Experiments on 13 major LLMs supporting Chinese yield the following insights: 1) Closed-source models outperform open-sourced ones in terms of safety; 2) Models released from China demonstrate comparable safety levels to LLMs like GPT-3.5-turbo; 3) Some smaller models with 6B-13B parameters can compete effectively in terms of safety. By introducing SC-Safety, we aim to promote collaborative efforts to create safer and more trustworthy LLMs. The benchmark and findings provide guidance on model selection. Our benchmark can be found at https://www.CLUEbenchmarks.com

Safe Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms are typically evaluated under fixed training conditions. We investigate whether training-time safety guarantees transfer to deployment under distribution shift, using diabetes management as a safety-critical testbed. We benchmark safe RL algorithms on a unified clinical simulator and reveal a safety generalization gap: policies satisfying constraints during training frequently violate safety requirements on unseen patients. We demonstrate that test-time shielding, which filters unsafe actions using learned dynamics models, effectively restores safety across algorithms and patient populations. Across eight safe RL algorithms, three diabetes types, and three age groups, shielding achieves Time-in-Range gains of 13--14\% for strong baselines such as PPO-Lag and CPO while reducing clinical risk index and glucose variability. Our simulator and benchmark provide a platform for studying safety under distribution shift in safety-critical control domains. Code is available at https://github.com/safe-autonomy-lab/GlucoSim and https://github.com/safe-autonomy-lab/GlucoAlg.

We introduce NESSiE, the NEceSsary SafEty benchmark for large language models (LLMs). With minimal test cases of information and access security, NESSiE reveals safety-relevant failures that should not exist, given the low complexity of the tasks. NESSiE is intended as a lightweight, easy-to-use sanity check for language model safety and, as such, is not sufficient for guaranteeing safety in general -- but we argue that passing this test is necessary for any deployment. However, even state-of-the-art LLMs do not reach 100% on NESSiE and thus fail our necessary condition of language model safety, even in the absence of adversarial attacks. Our Safe & Helpful (SH) metric allows for direct comparison of the two requirements, showing models are biased toward being helpful rather than safe. We further find that disabled reasoning for some models, but especially a benign distraction context degrade model performance. Overall, our results underscore the critical risks of deploying such models as autonomous agents in the wild. We make the dataset, package and plotting code publicly available.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve state-of-the-art performance on multiple language tasks, yet their safety guardrails can be circumvented, leading to harmful generations. In light of this, recent research on safety mechanisms has emerged, revealing that when safety representations or component are suppressed, the safety capability of LLMs are compromised. However, existing research tends to overlook the safety impact of multi-head attention mechanisms, despite their crucial role in various model functionalities. Hence, in this paper, we aim to explore the connection between standard attention mechanisms and safety capability to fill this gap in the safety-related mechanistic interpretability. We propose a novel metric which tailored for multi-head attention, the Safety Head ImPortant Score (Ships), to assess the individual heads' contributions to model safety. Based on this, we generalize Ships to the dataset level and further introduce the Safety Attention Head AttRibution Algorithm (Sahara) to attribute the critical safety attention heads inside the model. Our findings show that the special attention head has a significant impact on safety. Ablating a single safety head allows aligned model (e.g., Llama-2-7b-chat) to respond to 16 times more harmful queries, while only modifying 0.006% of the parameters, in contrast to the ~ 5% modification required in previous studies. More importantly, we demonstrate that attention heads primarily function as feature extractors for safety and models fine-tuned from the same base model exhibit overlapping safety heads through comprehensive experiments. Together, our attribution approach and findings provide a novel perspective for unpacking the black box of safety mechanisms within large models.

Training large language models to follow instructions makes them perform better on a wide range of tasks, generally becoming more helpful. However, a perfectly helpful model will follow even the most malicious instructions and readily generate harmful content. In this paper, we raise concerns over the safety of models that only emphasize helpfulness, not safety, in their instruction-tuning. We show that several popular instruction-tuned models are highly unsafe. Moreover, we show that adding just 3% safety examples (a few hundred demonstrations) in the training set when fine-tuning a model like LLaMA can substantially improve their safety. Our safety-tuning does not make models significantly less capable or helpful as measured by standard benchmarks. However, we do find a behavior of exaggerated safety, where too much safety-tuning makes models refuse to respond to reasonable prompts that superficially resemble unsafe ones. Our study sheds light on trade-offs in training LLMs to follow instructions and exhibit safe behavior.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.