Daily Papers

Large language models are increasingly deployed through agent harnesses that manage tools, extensions, persistent state, permissions, and external actions. Existing safety benchmarks mainly target individual attack mechanisms or a limited subset of operational settings, making it difficult to compare how safety failures emerge across different harness responsibilities. We present HarnessRisk, a lifecycle oriented benchmark that organizes agent harness safety into six operational phases including Harness Configuration, Capability Extension, Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery. HarnessRisk contains 128 sandboxed cases, each pairing a benign user objective with an adversarial instruction embedded in an untrusted workflow artifact. We evaluate each trajectory using Utility, Attack Success Rate, Persistence, and Detection. Across three harnesses, six language models, and 14 model and harness configurations, attack success ranges from 12.6% to 80.9%, while Utility remains between 75.0% and 97.6%. Harness Configuration is the most vulnerable phase across all three harnesses, showing that attacks can succeed by altering security sensitive parameters within otherwise authorized workflows. We also find that explicit risk recognition does not reliably lead to safe action, as some configurations detect risks in more than 90% of runs while retaining substantial attack success. These results highlight the need to evaluate agent safety across multiple harness responsibilities and at the level of the deployed model and harness configuration.

Training web agents to navigate complex, real-world websites requires them to master subtasks - short-horizon interactions on multiple UI components (e.g., choosing the correct date in a date picker, or scrolling in a container to extract information). We introduce WARC-Bench (Web Archive Benchmark), a novel web navigation benchmark featuring 438 tasks designed to evaluate multimodal AI agents on subtasks. WARC-Bench enables sandboxed interactions with dynamic and realistic webpages using Web ARChive files. We show that WARC-Bench is challenging for leading computer-use models, with the highest observed success rate being 64.8%. To improve open source models on subtask, we explore two common training techniques: supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). Experiments show that SFT models obtain a 48.8% success rate on the benchmark. Training with RLVR over SFT checkpoints, even in data-scarce settings, improves the score to 52.8% on WARC-Bench, outperforming many frontier models. Our analysis concludes that mastering these subtasks is essential for robust web planning and navigation, and is a capability not extensively evaluated by existing benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.

We present RepoST, a scalable method to construct environments that provide execution feedback for repository-level code generation for both training and evaluation. Unlike existing works that aim to build entire repositories for execution, which is challenging for both human and LLMs, we provide execution feedback with sandbox testing, which isolates a given target function and its dependencies to a separate script for testing. Sandbox testing reduces the complexity of external dependencies and enables constructing environments at a large scale. We use our method to construct RepoST-Train, a large-scale train set with 7,415 functions from 832 repositories. Training with the execution feedback provided by RepoST-Train leads to a performance gain of 5.5% Pass@1 on HumanEval and 3.5% Pass@1 on RepoEval. We also build an evaluation dataset, RepoST-Eval, and benchmark 12 code generation models.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Future AI systems could conceal their capabilities ('sandbagging') during evaluations, potentially misleading developers and auditors. We stress-tested sandbagging detection techniques using an auditing game. First, a red team fine-tuned five models, some of which conditionally underperformed, as a proxy for sandbagging. Second, a blue team used black-box, model-internals, or training-based approaches to identify sandbagging models. We found that the blue team could not reliably discriminate sandbaggers from benign models. Black-box approaches were defeated by effective imitation of a weaker model. Linear probes, a model-internals approach, showed more promise but their naive application was vulnerable to behaviours instilled by the red team. We also explored capability elicitation as a strategy for detecting sandbagging. Although Prompt-based elicitation was not reliable, training-based elicitation consistently elicited full performance from the sandbagging models, using only a single correct demonstration of the evaluation task. However the performance of benign models was sometimes also raised, so relying on elicitation as a detection strategy was prone to false-positives. In the short-term, we recommend developers remove potential sandbagging using on-distribution training for elicitation. In the longer-term, further research is needed to ensure the efficacy of training-based elicitation, and develop robust methods for sandbagging detection. We open source our model organisms at https://github.com/AI-Safety-Institute/sandbagging_auditing_games and select transcripts and results at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sandbagging-games/evaluation_logs . A demo illustrating the game can be played at https://sandbagging-demo.far.ai/ .

As the capabilities of code large language models (LLMs) continue to expand, their applications across diverse code intelligence domains are rapidly increasing. However, most existing datasets only evaluate limited application domains. To address this gap, we have developed a comprehensive code evaluation dataset FullStack Bench focusing on full-stack programming, which encompasses a wide range of application domains (e.g., basic programming, data analysis, software engineering, mathematics, and machine learning). Besides, to assess multilingual programming capabilities, in FullStack Bench, we design real-world instructions and corresponding unit test cases from 16 widely-used programming languages to reflect real-world usage scenarios rather than simple translations. Moreover, we also release an effective code sandbox execution tool (i.e., SandboxFusion) supporting various programming languages and packages to evaluate the performance of our FullStack Bench efficiently. Comprehensive experimental results on our FullStack Bench demonstrate the necessity and effectiveness of our FullStack Bench and SandboxFusion.

The emergence of large-scale multi-modal generative models has drastically advanced artificial intelligence, introducing unprecedented levels of performance and functionality. However, optimizing these models remains challenging due to historically isolated paths of model-centric and data-centric developments, leading to suboptimal outcomes and inefficient resource utilization. In response, we present a novel sandbox suite tailored for integrated data-model co-development. This sandbox provides a comprehensive experimental platform, enabling rapid iteration and insight-driven refinement of both data and models. Our proposed "Probe-Analyze-Refine" workflow, validated through applications on state-of-the-art LLaVA-like and DiT based models, yields significant performance boosts, such as topping the VBench leaderboard. We also uncover fruitful insights gleaned from exhaustive benchmarks, shedding light on the critical interplay between data quality, diversity, and model behavior. With the hope of fostering deeper understanding and future progress in multi-modal data and generative modeling, our codes, datasets, and models are maintained and accessible at https://github.com/modelscope/data-juicer/blob/main/docs/Sandbox.md.

Recent advances in persistent personal-agent frameworks are making human-centered agent networks realistic deployment targets: each user can be served by an AI agent that acts on the user's behalf, maintains state, and communicates with other agents through social and task relations. In these networks, everyday tool use becomes multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces, where files, records, tools, and policies are not directly visible across owners. Existing agent benchmarks study tool use and collaboration, but they do not provide an end-to-end sandbox for verifiable cross-user agent collaboration with realistic user digital workspaces or test how harmful actions can travel through the human-centered agent network. We introduce WeClawArena, an auditable benchmark and runtime sandbox for multi-party owned-agent collaboration over personal workspaces. WeClawArena targets collaborative tool-use tasks in which personal workspaces serve as both operational tools and personal constraints. The benchmark contains 124 base tasks across six cross-user task domains and expands them into 620 scenario variants, with one benign control and four attack-vector variants per base task. The sandbox records peer messages, tool calls, resource operations, governed decisions, and final workspace states. WeClawArena reports utility and attack success rate separately and audits attack success from bounded runtime evidence, supporting diagnosis of task breakdown, privacy leakage, poisoned evidence, and invalid authority paths.

Browser-using agents (BUAs) are an emerging class of AI agents that interact with web browsers in human-like ways, including clicking, scrolling, filling forms, and navigating across pages. While these agents help automate repetitive online tasks, they are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that trick an agent into performing undesired actions, such as leaking private information or issuing unintended state-changing requests. We propose ceLLMate, a browser-level sandboxing framework that restricts the agent's ambient authority and reduces the blast radius of prompt injections. We address the semantic gap challenge that is fundamental to BUAs -- writing and enforcing security policies for low-level UI tools like clicks and keystrokes is brittle and error-prone. Our core insight is to perform sandboxing at the HTTP layer because all side-effecting UI operations will result in network communication to the website's backend. We implement ceLLMate as an agent-agnostic browser extension and demonstrate how it enables sandboxing policies that block prompt injection attacks in the WASP benchmark with 7.25--15% latency overhead.

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly capable of autonomously conducting cyberattacks, posing significant threats to existing applications. This growing risk highlights the urgent need for a real-world benchmark to evaluate the ability of LLM agents to exploit web application vulnerabilities. However, existing benchmarks fall short as they are limited to abstracted Capture the Flag competitions or lack comprehensive coverage. Building a benchmark for real-world vulnerabilities involves both specialized expertise to reproduce exploits and a systematic approach to evaluating unpredictable threats. To address this challenge, we introduce CVE-Bench, a real-world cybersecurity benchmark based on critical-severity Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. In CVE-Bench, we design a sandbox framework that enables LLM agents to exploit vulnerable web applications in scenarios that mimic real-world conditions, while also providing effective evaluation of their exploits. Our evaluation shows that the state-of-the-art agent framework can resolve up to 13% of vulnerabilities.

We present Sari Sandbox, a high-fidelity, photorealistic 3D retail store simulation for benchmarking embodied agents against human performance in shopping tasks. Addressing a gap in retail-specific sim environments for embodied agent training, Sari Sandbox features over 250 interactive grocery items across three store configurations, controlled via an API. It supports both virtual reality (VR) for human interaction and a vision language model (VLM)-powered embodied agent. We also introduce SariBench, a dataset of annotated human demonstrations across varied task difficulties. Our sandbox enables embodied agents to navigate, inspect, and manipulate retail items, providing baselines against human performance. We conclude with benchmarks, performance analysis, and recommendations for enhancing realism and scalability. The source code can be accessed via https://github.com/upeee/sari-sandbox-env.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities in multi-step decision-making, planning and actions, and are increasingly integrated into various real-world applications. It is concerning whether their strong problem-solving abilities may be misused for crimes. To address this gap, we propose VirtualCrime, a sandbox simulation framework based on a three-agent system to evaluate the criminal capabilities of models. Specifically, this framework consists of an attacker agent acting as the leader of a criminal team, a judge agent determining the outcome of each action, and a world manager agent updating the environment state and entities. Furthermore, we design 40 diverse crime tasks within this framework, covering 11 maps and 13 crime objectives such as theft, robbery, kidnapping, and riot. We also introduce a human player baseline for reference to better interpret the performance of LLM agents. We evaluate 8 strong LLMs and find (1) All agents in the simulation environment compliantly generate detailed plans and execute intelligent crime processes, with some achieving relatively high success rates; (2) In some cases, agents take severe action that inflicts harm to NPCs to achieve their goals. Our work highlights the need for safety alignment when deploying agentic AI in real-world settings.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

We introduce LLM-in-Sandbox, enabling LLMs to explore within a code sandbox (i.e., a virtual computer), to elicit general intelligence in non-code domains. We first demonstrate that strong LLMs, without additional training, exhibit generalization capabilities to leverage the code sandbox for non-code tasks. For example, LLMs spontaneously access external resources to acquire new knowledge, leverage the file system to handle long contexts, and execute scripts to satisfy formatting requirements. We further show that these agentic capabilities can be enhanced through LLM-in-Sandbox Reinforcement Learning (LLM-in-Sandbox-RL), which uses only non-agentic data to train models for sandbox exploration. Experiments demonstrate that LLM-in-Sandbox, in both training-free and post-trained settings, achieves robust generalization spanning mathematics, physics, chemistry, biomedicine, long-context understanding, and instruction following. Finally, we analyze LLM-in-Sandbox's efficiency from computational and system perspectives, and open-source it as a Python package to facilitate real-world deployment.

Software is one of the most powerful tools that we humans have at our disposal; it allows a skilled programmer to interact with the world in complex and profound ways. At the same time, thanks to improvements in large language models (LLMs), there has also been a rapid development in AI agents that interact with and affect change in their surrounding environments. In this paper, we introduce OpenDevin, a platform for the development of powerful and flexible AI agents that interact with the world in similar ways to those of a human developer: by writing code, interacting with a command line, and browsing the web. We describe how the platform allows for the implementation of new agents, safe interaction with sandboxed environments for code execution, coordination between multiple agents, and incorporation of evaluation benchmarks. Based on our currently incorporated benchmarks, we perform an evaluation of agents over 15 challenging tasks, including software engineering (e.g., SWE-Bench) and web browsing (e.g., WebArena), among others. Released under the permissive MIT license, OpenDevin is a community project spanning academia and industry with more than 1.3K contributions from over 160 contributors and will improve going forward.

Prior studies on deception in language-based AI agents typically assess whether the agent produces a false statement about a topic, or makes a binary choice prompted by a goal, rather than allowing open-ended deceptive behavior to emerge in pursuit of a longer-term goal. To fix this, we introduce Among Us, a sandbox social deception game where LLM-agents exhibit long-term, open-ended deception as a consequence of the game objectives. While most benchmarks saturate quickly, Among Us can be expected to last much longer, because it is a multi-player game far from equilibrium. Using the sandbox, we evaluate 18 proprietary and open-weight LLMs and uncover a general trend: models trained with RL are comparatively much better at producing deception than detecting it. We evaluate the effectiveness of methods to detect lying and deception: logistic regression on the activations and sparse autoencoders (SAEs). We find that probes trained on a dataset of "pretend you're a dishonest model:.." generalize extremely well out-of-distribution, consistently obtaining AUROCs over 95% even when evaluated just on the deceptive statement, without the chain of thought. We also find two SAE features that work well at deception detection but are unable to steer the model to lie less. We hope our open-sourced sandbox, game logs, and probes serve to anticipate and mitigate deceptive behavior and capabilities in language-based agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly serving as autonomous agents, and their utilization of external tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is considered a future trend. Current MCP evaluation sets suffer from issues such as reliance on external MCP services and a lack of difficulty awareness. To address these limitations, we propose MCPAgentBench, a benchmark based on real-world MCP definitions designed to evaluate the tool-use capabilities of agents. We construct a dataset containing authentic tasks and simulated MCP tools. The evaluation employs a dynamic sandbox environment that presents agents with candidate tool lists containing distractors, thereby testing their tool selection and discrimination abilities. Furthermore, we introduce comprehensive metrics to measure both task completion rates and execution efficiency. Experiments conducted on various latest mainstream Large Language Models reveal significant performance differences in handling complex, multi-step tool invocations. All code is open-source at Github.

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents demonstrate proficiency in static benchmarks, their deployment in real-world scenarios is hindered by the dynamic nature of user queries, tool sets, and interaction dynamics. To address this generalization gap, we formalize OpenAgent (Tool-Use Agent in Open-World), a problem setting characterized by distributional shifts across query, action, observation, and domain dimensions. To systematically diagnose its impact, we construct a controlled sandbox environment where we define fine-grained environmental shifts across a four-tier hierarchy, Perception, Interaction, Reasoning, and Internalization, and conduct a comprehensive series of experiments. Our analysis yields a series of key insights, demonstrating that agents trained via both Supervised Fine-Tuning(SFT) and Reinforcement Learning suffer from varying degrees of performance degradation when confronting open environmental shifts. Building on these insights, we propose Perturbation-Augmented Fine-Tuning, a disturbance-based intervention strategy for SFT that lays the foundation for enhancing agent robustness and utility in realistic environments. Our code will be released at: https://github. com/LAMDA-NeSy/OpenAgent.

In 2023, a New York judge sanctioned two attorneys in Mata v. Avianca for filing a brief with hallucinated citations generated by ChatGPT. Such failures are largely caught by database lookups; the harder problem is detecting citations that point to real cases but do not support the propositions for which they are offered -- a failure mode that existing evaluations of LLMs for legal use cases largely overlook. In this paper, we study proposition-level citation support verification through controlled perturbations of real legal citations obtained from two legal corpora, either replacing the cited case or changing only the pinpoint page within the same case. We evaluate fourteen model configurations on the resulting examples. Models catch 93-100% of wrong-case corruptions. They catch only 37-61% of wrong-pinpoint corruptions on court opinions and 52-83% on legal briefs. When models fail to catch wrong-pinpoint corruptions, they accept the citation based on topical overlap rather than page-level support. Scale and extended reasoning narrow the gap but do not close it: GPT-5.4 with high reasoning effort still misses 40% of pinpoint mismatches on court opinions and 18% on briefs. Prompting the model to verify support at the cited page improves recall, but it also raises the false positive rate. Recognizing the right legal topic and verifying support for the cited proposition are distinct capabilities, and current models conflate them.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an ASR of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning ASRs of up to 50% in realistic end-to-end settings, with the recently released frontier Claude 4 Opus | CUA showing an alarming ASR of 48%, demonstrating that indirect prompt injection presents tangible risks for even advanced CUAs despite their capabilities and safeguards. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

Can foundation models be guided to execute tasks involving legal reasoning? We believe that building a benchmark to answer this question will require sustained collaborative efforts between the computer science and legal communities. To that end, this short paper serves three purposes. First, we describe how IRAC-a framework legal scholars use to distinguish different types of legal reasoning-can guide the construction of a Foundation Model oriented benchmark. Second, we present a seed set of 44 tasks built according to this framework. We discuss initial findings, and highlight directions for new tasks. Finally-inspired by the Open Science movement-we make a call for the legal and computer science communities to join our efforts by contributing new tasks. This work is ongoing, and our progress can be tracked here: https://github.com/HazyResearch/legalbench.

Agent harnesses have substantially improved performance on long-horizon tasks by coordinating agent interactions with the environment. However, reinforcement learning through complex harnesses remains largely unexplored, as scaling such training to long-horizon agent tasks introduces fundamental challenges. In this work, we present a unified black-box RL framework for stable and scalable optimization of general agents through complex harnesses. Concretely, we first build a sandbox-based execution infrastructure that isolates task environments and harnesses within temporary sandboxes for large-scale concurrent rollouts. We then decouple policy optimization from opaque harness execution and place a serving proxy at the model boundary to capture model calls. To reconstruct multi-turn trajectories and improve training efficiency, we organize the captured calls into prefix trees and further adapt both critic-based PPO and critic-free GRPO to optimize over the recovered tree structure. Meanwhile, we maintain training-inference consistency throughout the optimization process. Finally, we introduce mix-harness training, allowing a single model to be jointly optimized by heterogeneous harnesses. With Qwen3-30A3B, black-box RL improves Pass@1 on ClawGym-Bench by 9.98 and 14.81 points through OpenClaw and Claude Code, respectively, while remaining stable over 200-400 optimization steps. Moreover, the framework yields consistent gains on more challenging tasks such as JobBench and OfficeQA. Overall, our framework enables effective, stable, and scalable optimization of general agents through black-box harnesses, supporting unified training across heterogeneous execution systems.

We present Agent-Diff, a novel benchmarking framework for evaluating agentic Large Language Models (LLMs) on real-world tasks that execute code via external APIs. Agentic LLM performance varies due to differences in models, external tool access, prompt structures, and agentic frameworks. Benchmarks must make fundamental trade-offs between a sandboxed approach that controls for variation in software environments and more ecologically valid approaches employing real services. Agent-Diff attempts to capture the desirable features of both of these approaches by including access to the real API interfaces for software services while sandboxing the environment in which calls are made, processed, and evaluated. This approach relies on two key innovations. The first is a novel state-diff contract, which separates process from outcome - rather than fuzzy trace or parameter matching, we define task success as whether the expected change in environment state was achieved. The second is a novel sandbox that provides a standardized scripting layer that all models use to execute code against external APIs (Slack, Box, Linear, Google Calendar). Thus, we can evaluate different agentic LLMs against a standardized set of contracts using a unified sandbox while still evaluating their performance on real-world service interfaces. Using the Agent-Diff framework, we provide benchmarks for nine LLMs across 224 tasks utilizing enterprise software workflows. In addition, we evaluate the robustness of the framework with ablation experiments to assess the contribution of access to API documentation on benchmark performance. Code and data: https://github.com/agent-diff-bench/agent-diff.

Civil litigation is inherently a life-cycle process: what a lawyer drafts on day one constrains what unfolds at trial months later. Yet existing legal benchmarks evaluate isolated subtasks, and prior legal-agent simulators reinitialize each scenario from shared ground truth, leaving cross-stage causal dependencies unmodeled. We present LegalWorld, a life-cycle interactive environment that models Chinese civil litigation as a causally connected state chain of five stages (seven sub-scenarios), grounded in 75,309 paired Chinese civil judgments. We pair it with reusable infrastructure (local memory, global case memory, a Skill/Tool library) that keeps each dispute consistent across its full life cycle. Building on this environment, we construct LongJud-Bench to evaluate agent capability across all five connected stages. 18,992 ratings from 217 legal-background evaluators confirm that LegalWorld trajectories are procedurally faithful and role-consistent; and a capability-level cross-model evaluation reveals sharp divergences that aggregate scores cannot expose, with no single backbone leading across consultation, drafting, and courtroom advocacy. Detailed resources will be released publicly.

AI agents may be able to automate your inbox, but can they automate other routine aspects of your life? Everyday online tasks offer a realistic yet unsolved testbed for evaluating the next generation of AI agents. To this end, we introduce ClawBench, an evaluation framework of 153 simple tasks that people need to accomplish regularly in their lives and work, spanning 144 live platforms across 15 categories, from completing purchases and booking appointments to submitting job applications. These tasks require demanding capabilities beyond existing benchmarks, such as obtaining relevant information from user-provided documents, navigating multi-step workflows across diverse platforms, and write-heavy operations like filling in many detailed forms correctly. Unlike existing benchmarks that evaluate agents in offline sandboxes with static pages, ClawBench operates on production websites, preserving the full complexity, dynamic nature, and challenges of real-world web interaction. A lightweight interception layer captures and blocks only the final submission request, ensuring safe evaluation without real-world side effects. Our evaluations of 7 frontier models show that both proprietary and open-source models can complete only a small portion of these tasks. For example, Claude Sonnet 4.6 achieves only 33.3%. Progress on ClawBench brings us closer to AI agents that can function as reliable general-purpose assistants.

Existing foundation models are trained on copyrighted material. Deploying these models can pose both legal and ethical risks when data creators fail to receive appropriate attribution or compensation. In the United States and several other countries, copyrighted content may be used to build foundation models without incurring liability due to the fair use doctrine. However, there is a caveat: If the model produces output that is similar to copyrighted data, particularly in scenarios that affect the market of that data, fair use may no longer apply to the output of the model. In this work, we emphasize that fair use is not guaranteed, and additional work may be necessary to keep model development and deployment squarely in the realm of fair use. First, we survey the potential risks of developing and deploying foundation models based on copyrighted content. We review relevant U.S. case law, drawing parallels to existing and potential applications for generating text, source code, and visual art. Experiments confirm that popular foundation models can generate content considerably similar to copyrighted material. Second, we discuss technical mitigations that can help foundation models stay in line with fair use. We argue that more research is needed to align mitigation strategies with the current state of the law. Lastly, we suggest that the law and technical mitigations should co-evolve. For example, coupled with other policy mechanisms, the law could more explicitly consider safe harbors when strong technical tools are used to mitigate infringement harms. This co-evolution may help strike a balance between intellectual property and innovation, which speaks to the original goal of fair use. But we emphasize that the strategies we describe here are not a panacea and more work is needed to develop policies that address the potential harms of foundation models.