Daily Papers

Coding agents are now proficient enough to generate complex software applications from a single prompt. As their capabilities have grown, human oversight has increasingly shifted from line-by-line code review toward hands-off evaluation of outcomes. However, recent studies have shown that such a transition exposes a critical risk: functional correctness alone does not guarantee a secure implementation. Despite growing attention to code security, training safer coding agents remains challenging because reliable security supervision is difficult to obtain at scale from real-world repositories. We introduce AuraForge to synthesize and validate executable security tests for training secure coding agents. Our approach combines attack-oriented test synthesis, language-extensible task construction, and safeguards against reward hacking. Using AuraForge, we construct AuraGym, a multi-language and multi-CWE executable training gym: 679 executable feature-implementation tasks from 344 real-world repositories across Python, JavaScript, and TypeScript, covering 177 CWE categories. On the subset with human-written security tests, AuraForge produces about 3 times as many test cases on average and reduces the false-positive rate by 83.23%, allowing alternative secure implementations to receive correct supervision. Training Qwen3.5-4B with synthesized security tests gains larger improvements than human-written security tests (average 19.7 FuncPass and 6.2 SecPass vs. 14.9 FuncPass and 4.4 SecPass) on three languages. These results demonstrate that AuraForge provides more diverse and reliable security supervision to train secure coding agents.

Large language model (LLM) powered code agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by automating tasks such as testing, debugging, and repairing, yet the security risks of their generated code have become a critical concern. Existing benchmarks have offered valuable insights but remain insufficient: they often overlook the genuine context in which vulnerabilities were introduced or adopt narrow evaluation protocols that fail to capture either functional correctness or newly introduced vulnerabilities. We therefore introduce SecureAgentBench, a benchmark of 105 coding tasks designed to rigorously evaluate code agents' capabilities in secure code generation. Each task includes (i) realistic task settings that require multi-file edits in large repositories, (ii) aligned contexts based on real-world open-source vulnerabilities with precisely identified introduction points, and (iii) comprehensive evaluation that combines functionality testing, vulnerability checking through proof-of-concept exploits, and detection of newly introduced vulnerabilities using static analysis. We evaluate three representative agents (SWE-agent, OpenHands, and Aider) with three state-of-the-art LLMs (Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4.1, and DeepSeek-V3.1). Results show that (i) current agents struggle to produce secure code, as even the best-performing one, SWE-agent supported by DeepSeek-V3.1, achieves merely 15.2% correct-and-secure solutions, (ii) some agents produce functionally correct code but still introduce vulnerabilities, including new ones not previously recorded, and (iii) adding explicit security instructions for agents does not significantly improve secure coding, underscoring the need for further research. These findings establish SecureAgentBench as a rigorous benchmark for secure code generation and a step toward more reliable software development with LLMs.

The landscape of AI coding assistance is undergoing a fundamental shift from complex IDE plugins to versatile, terminal-native agents. Operating directly where developers manage source control, execute builds, and deploy environments, CLI-based agents offer unprecedented autonomy for long-horizon development tasks. In this paper, we present OPENDEV, an open-source, command-line coding agent engineered specifically for this new paradigm. Effective autonomous assistance requires strict safety controls and highly efficient context management to prevent context bloat and reasoning degradation. OPENDEV overcomes these challenges through a compound AI system architecture with workload-specialized model routing, a dual-agent architecture separating planning from execution, lazy tool discovery, and adaptive context compaction that progressively reduces older observations. Furthermore, it employs an automated memory system to accumulate project-specific knowledge across sessions and counteracts instruction fade-out through event-driven system reminders. By enforcing explicit reasoning phases and prioritizing context efficiency, OPENDEV provides a secure, extensible foundation for terminal-first AI assistance, offering a blueprint for robust autonomous software engineering.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved from simple chatbots into autonomous agents capable of performing complex tasks such as editing production code, orchestrating workflows, and taking higher-stakes actions based on untrusted inputs like webpages and emails. These capabilities introduce new security risks that existing security measures, such as model fine-tuning or chatbot-focused guardrails, do not fully address. Given the higher stakes and the absence of deterministic solutions to mitigate these risks, there is a critical need for a real-time guardrail monitor to serve as a final layer of defense, and support system level, use case specific safety policy definition and enforcement. We introduce LlamaFirewall, an open-source security focused guardrail framework designed to serve as a final layer of defense against security risks associated with AI Agents. Our framework mitigates risks such as prompt injection, agent misalignment, and insecure code risks through three powerful guardrails: PromptGuard 2, a universal jailbreak detector that demonstrates clear state of the art performance; Agent Alignment Checks, a chain-of-thought auditor that inspects agent reasoning for prompt injection and goal misalignment, which, while still experimental, shows stronger efficacy at preventing indirect injections in general scenarios than previously proposed approaches; and CodeShield, an online static analysis engine that is both fast and extensible, aimed at preventing the generation of insecure or dangerous code by coding agents. Additionally, we include easy-to-use customizable scanners that make it possible for any developer who can write a regular expression or an LLM prompt to quickly update an agent's security guardrails.

AI coding agents now write much of the code that ships, yet whether that code is secure remains unclear. We introduce the Last Secure Code Benchmark, a comprehensive evaluation of secure code generation by coding agents. Built from 150 real vulnerabilities, its 450 tasks span seven widely used languages (Java, C, C++, JavaScript, Python, PHP, and Go), 24 CWEs including 21 of the 2025 CWE Top 25 and 8 of the Top 10 KEV weaknesses, more than any benchmark we compare with, and three vibe-coding scenarios: filling in a function, writing a file, and building a repository's source tree from scratch. Every task asks only for functionality, through a specification that never mentions security, and hidden functional and security tests grade the result. Across six frontier agents, 73.6% to 91.3% of tasks pass functionally, yet even the strongest, Claude Fable 5, produces code that is both functional and secure for only 25.1% of tasks, and the others for 16.4% to 24.7%. The best model only passes 12% of the vulnerability scenarios across all vibe coding setting, posing strong concern on the security of the code written by vibe coding.

Contemporary large language model (LLM) agents are remarkably capable, but they still lack reliable safety controls and can produce unconstrained, unpredictable, and even actively harmful outputs. To address this, we introduce Reflection-Driven Control, a standardized and pluggable control module that can be seamlessly integrated into general agent architectures. Reflection-Driven Control elevates "self-reflection" from a post hoc patch into an explicit step in the agent's own reasoning process: during generation, the agent continuously runs an internal reflection loop that monitors and evaluates its own decision path. When potential risks are detected, the system retrieves relevant repair examples and secure coding guidelines from an evolving reflective memory, injecting these evidence-based constraints directly into subsequent reasoning steps. We instantiate Reflection-Driven Control in the setting of secure code generation and systematically evaluate it across eight classes of security-critical programming tasks. Empirical results show that Reflection-Driven Control substantially improves the security and policy compliance of generated code while largely preserving functional correctness, with minimal runtime and token overhead. Taken together, these findings indicate that Reflection-Driven Control is a practical path toward trustworthy AI coding agents: it enables designs that are simultaneously autonomous, safer by construction, and auditable.

Agentic coding tools receive goals written in natural language as input, break them down into specific tasks, and write or execute the actual code with minimal human intervention. Central to this process are agent context files ("READMEs for agents") that provide persistent, project-level instructions. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of 2,303 agent context files from 1,925 repositories to characterize their structure, maintenance, and content. We find that these files are not static documentation but complex, difficult-to-read artifacts that evolve like configuration code, maintained through frequent, small additions. Our content analysis of 16 instruction types shows that developers prioritize functional context, such as build and run commands (62.3%), implementation details (69.9%), and architecture (67.7%). We also identify a significant gap: non-functional requirements like security (14.5%) and performance (14.5%) are rarely specified. These findings indicate that while developers use context files to make agents functional, they provide few guardrails to ensure that agent-written code is secure or performant, highlighting the need for improved tooling and practices.

AI coding agents powered by LLMs are increasingly integrated into real-world software development, where they generate, edit, and execute code with autonomous access to local files and tools. Coding agents inherit security risks from both the LLM backbone, where adversarial prompts, poisoned training data, and backdoor triggers can cause models to emit insecure or attacker-chosen code, and their agentic architecture, where tool-using autonomy enables induced misuse of external APIs, data exfiltration, and persistent compromise of development environments. This paper presents a systematic evaluation of malicious issue requests against state-of-the-art coding agents (Cursor, Claude Code, and Codex Desktop), powered by two major model families (OpenAI GPT-5.3 Codex/GPT-5.4 and Anthropic Sonnet 4.6). Our novel benchmark IssueTrojanBench contains malicious issues that are constructed based on four novel attack categories (i.e., embedded as malicious instructions in issues), six delivery vectors (e.g., PDF, or issue comment), and further augmented by perturbations. Our results reveal critical vulnerabilities in the as-deployed modern coding agents, i.e., 66.5% of the malicious issues from IssueTrojanBench penetrate all the guardrails (agent- and LLM-level) of coding agents. Our further analysis shows that rejection is almost entirely from LLMs rather than the agent frameworks, with GPT models broadly vulnerable and Sonnet 4.6 exhibiting more selective, risk-aware blocking of high-impact actions. Our evaluation also highlights that the current agent-level defense strategy offers limited additional protection for coding agents. Our findings highlight the urgent need for stronger agent- and model-level safety mechanisms to protect AI coding agents.

AI coding agents are being adopted at scale, yet we lack empirical evidence on how people actually use them and how much of their output is useful in practice. We present SWE-chat, the first large-scale dataset of real coding agent sessions collected from open-source developers in the wild. The dataset currently contains 6,000 sessions, comprising more than 63,000 user prompts and 355,000 agent tool calls. SWE-chat is a living dataset; our collection pipeline automatically and continually discovers and processes sessions from public repositories. Leveraging SWE-chat, we provide an initial empirical characterization of real-world coding agent usage and failure modes. We find that coding patterns are bimodal: in 41% of sessions, agents author virtually all committed code ("vibe coding"), while in 23%, humans write all code themselves. Despite rapidly improving capabilities, coding agents remain inefficient in natural settings. Just 44% of all agent-produced code survives into user commits, and agent-written code introduces more security vulnerabilities than code authored by humans. Furthermore, users push back against agent outputs -- through corrections, failure reports, and interruptions -- in 44% of all turns. By capturing complete interaction traces with human vs. agent code authorship attribution, SWE-chat provides an empirical foundation for moving beyond curated benchmarks towards an evidence-based understanding of how AI agents perform in real developer workflows.

With the rapidly increasing capabilities and adoption of code agents for AI-assisted coding, safety concerns, such as generating or executing risky code, have become significant barriers to the real-world deployment of these agents. To provide comprehensive and practical evaluations on the safety of code agents, we propose RedCode, a benchmark for risky code execution and generation: (1) RedCode-Exec provides challenging prompts that could lead to risky code execution, aiming to evaluate code agents' ability to recognize and handle unsafe code. We provide a total of 4,050 risky test cases in Python and Bash tasks with diverse input formats including code snippets and natural text. They covers 25 types of critical vulnerabilities spanning 8 domains (e.g., websites, file systems). We provide Docker environments and design corresponding evaluation metrics to assess their execution results. (2) RedCode-Gen provides 160 prompts with function signatures and docstrings as input to assess whether code agents will follow instructions to generate harmful code or software. Our empirical findings, derived from evaluating three agent frameworks based on 19 LLMs, provide insights into code agents' vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations on RedCode-Exec show that agents are more likely to reject executing risky operations on the operating system, but are less likely to reject executing technically buggy code, indicating high risks. Risky operations described in natural text lead to a lower rejection rate than those in code format. Additionally, evaluations on RedCode-Gen show that more capable base models and agents with stronger overall coding abilities, such as GPT4, tend to produce more sophisticated and effective harmful software. Our findings highlight the need for stringent safety evaluations for diverse code agents. Our dataset and code are available at https://github.com/AI-secure/RedCode.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly deployed as AI teammates in modern software engineering, independently authoring pull requests (PRs) that modify production code at scale. This study aims to systematically characterize how autonomous coding agents contribute to software security in practice, how these security-related contributions are reviewed and accepted, and which observable signals are associated with PR rejection. We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of agent-authored PRs using the AIDev dataset, comprising of over 33,000 curated PRs from popular GitHub repositories. Security-relevant PRs are identified using a keyword filtering strategy, followed by manual validation, resulting in 1,293 confirmed security-related agentic-PRs. We then analyze prevalence, acceptance outcomes, and review latency across autonomous agents, programming ecosystems, and types of code changes. Moreover, we apply qualitative open coding to identify recurring security-related actions and underlying intents, and examine review metadata to identify early signals associated with PR rejection. Security-related Agentic-PRs constitute a meaningful share of agent activity (approximately 4\%). Rather than focusing solely on narrow vulnerability fixes, agents most frequently perform supportive security hardening activities, including testing, documentation, configuration, and improved error handling. Compared to non-security PRs, security-related Agentic-PRs exhibit lower merge rates and longer review latency, reflecting heightened human scrutiny, with variation across agents and programming ecosystems. PR rejection is more strongly associated with PR complexity and verbosity than with explicit security topics.

Open-weight coding agents should hold a fundamental advantage over closed-source systems: they can be specialized to private codebases, encoding repository-specific information directly in their weights. Yet the cost and complexity of training has kept this advantage theoretical. We show it is now practical. We present Soft-Verified Efficient Repository Agents (SERA), an efficient method for training coding agents that enables the rapid and cheap creation of agents specialized to private codebases. Using only supervised finetuning (SFT), SERA achieves state-of-the-art results among fully open-source (open data, method, code) models while matching the performance of frontier open-weight models like Devstral-Small-2. Creating SERA models is 26x cheaper than reinforcement learning and 57x cheaper than previous synthetic data methods to reach equivalent performance. Our method, Soft Verified Generation (SVG), generates thousands of trajectories from a single code repository. Combined with cost-efficiency, this enables specialization to private codebases. Beyond repository specialization, we apply SVG to a larger corpus of codebases, generating over 200,000 synthetic trajectories. We use this dataset to provide detailed analysis of scaling laws, ablations, and confounding factors for training coding agents. Overall, we believe our work will greatly accelerate research on open coding agents and showcase the advantage of open-source models that can specialize to private codebases. We release SERA as the first model in Ai2's Open Coding Agents series, along with all our code, data, and Claude Code integration to support the research community.

Coding agents are increasingly used to accelerate code generation in many downstream tasks, such as fixing bugs, building applications, and prototyping. However, despite their value as coding assistants, agent-generated code tends to be larger and more verbose than the corresponding human-written implementation. In this work, we show that the cause lies in the agent's own search process: while iterating toward a passing solution, an agent accumulates speculative edits, abandoned hypotheses, and temporary changes that persist into the final patch. This may seem harmless for a single patch, but the problem compounds as agents take responsibility for ever-larger portions of a codebase-a codebase that was once minimal and well-maintained slowly accumulates redundancy faster than it can be cleaned up, drifting to a state that is harder to maintain. Given the magnitude of this problem, we take a step towards alleviating this issue. First, we formally define this phenomenon as CodeSlop-the residual and functionally unnecessary edits commonly seen in AI-generated code. We then introduce our algorithm TRIM (Trajectory-guided Redundancy Identification and Minimization). Rather than minimizing CodeSlop directly, TRIM instead minimizes agent trajectories. As we show empirically, this indirect technique of minimizing CodeSlop is highly effective: TRIM cuts CodeSlop by 17.9%-32.9% across agentic scaffolds, with negligible performance regression. TRIM is also highly efficient, requiring roughly half the validation cost of algorithmic baselines such as Delta Debugging.

Coding agents increasingly run inside organizations whose security controls (scoped credentials, restricted egress, read-only filesystems, non-root execution) constrain them like any other software. Existing benchmarks, however, evaluate agents almost exclusively in permissive sandboxes, so it is unknown how performance changes when policy is enforced. In this work, we evaluate 12 coding agents on Terminal-Bench 2.1 across nested security policy levels derived from common real-world enterprise restrictions. Hardening is never free but far from uniform: under the strictest policy, success losses reach 18.3 points and cost inflation 167.3\%, and the two axes disagree; the model that best preserves success is also the one that loses the most efficiency, so model choice is policy-dependent. Beyond aggregate scores, we characterize how agents behave when policy blocks their actions and decompose the failures hardening induces: runs grind into timeouts or wrong solutions rather than stopping early, in a mix that differs by model. To ground comparisons, we verify task solvability under the strictest policy, separating model failures from tasks the policy forecloses. We release Boundary-Bench, an open-source hardening plugin enabling policy-constrained evaluation of coding agents on Terminal-Bench and compatible benchmarks.

Vibe coding is a new programming paradigm in which human engineers instruct large language model (LLM) agents to complete complex coding tasks with little supervision. Although it is increasingly adopted, are vibe coding outputs really safe to deploy in production? To answer this question, we propose SU S VI B E S, a benchmark consisting of 200 feature-request software engineering tasks from real-world open-source projects, which, when given to human programmers, led to vulnerable implementations. We evaluate multiple widely used coding agents with frontier models on this benchmark. Disturbingly, all agents perform poorly in terms of software security. Although 61% of the solutions from SWE-Agent with Claude 4 Sonnet are functionally correct, only 10.5% are secure. Further experiments demonstrate that preliminary security strategies, such as augmenting the feature request with vulnerability hints, cannot mitigate these security issues. Our findings raise serious concerns about the widespread adoption of vibe-coding, particularly in security-sensitive applications.

AI coding agents are reshaping software development through both autonomous and human-mediated pull requests (PRs). When developers use AI agents to generate code under their own accounts, code authorship attribution becomes critical for repository governance, research validity, and understanding modern development practices. We present the first study on fingerprinting AI coding agents, analyzing 33,580 PRs from five major agents (OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Devin, Cursor, Claude Code) to identify behavioral signatures. With 41 features spanning commit messages, PR structure, and code characteristics, we achieve 97.2% F1-score in multi-class agent identification. We uncover distinct fingerprints: Codex shows unique multiline commit patterns (67.5% feature importance), and Claude Code exhibits distinctive code structure (27.2% importance of conditional statements). These signatures reveal that AI coding tools produce detectable behavioral patterns, suggesting potential for identifying AI contributions in software repositories.

The increasing adoption of autonomous coding agents accelerates software development but also introduces scoped security risks within high-impact file paths that can outpace traditional human review capacity. While prior research has primarily evaluated these systems in terms of functional correctness and productivity, this paper presents a large-scale empirical study using the AIDev dataset to systematically characterize security code smells in agent-generated pull requests (PRs). Through a combination of a validated LLM-as-a-judge framework and manual qualitative analysis, we identify and classify security misconfigurations across 16,112 file changes spanning 4,022 pull requests. Our results reveal that 38.9% of agent-generated PRs contain at least one security smell, with supply chain integrity issues accounting for 82.3% of all detected security smells. Furthermore, hard-coded credentials constitute 99.6% of all critical-severity security smells. Crucially, we find that human collaborators are responsible for introducing 67.6% of genuine leaked secrets within these agent-assisted workflows, while existing automated and human review processes fail to detect 81.1% of these credentials prior to integration. These findings highlight substantial security risks in agent-assisted software development workflows and suggest a potential reduction in developer vigilance. They also underscore the urgent need for context-aware security guardrails implemented directly at the point of human-AI collaboration.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) allow agents to represent actions as executable code, offering greater expressivity than traditional tool-calling. However, real-world tasks often demand both strategic planning and detailed implementation. Using a single agent for both leads to context pollution from debugging traces and intermediate failures, impairing long-horizon performance. We propose CodeDelegator, a multi-agent framework that separates planning from implementation via role specialization. A persistent Delegator maintains strategic oversight by decomposing tasks, writing specifications, and monitoring progress without executing code. For each sub-task, a new Coder agent is instantiated with a clean context containing only its specification, shielding it from prior failures. To coordinate between agents, we introduce Ephemeral-Persistent State Separation (EPSS), which isolates each Coder's execution state while preserving global coherence, preventing debugging traces from polluting the Delegator's context. Experiments on various benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of CodeDelegator across diverse scenarios.

An important emerging application of coding agents is agent optimization: the iterative improvement of a target agent through edit-execute-evaluate cycles. Despite its relevance, the community lacks a systematic understanding of coding agent performance on this task. Agent optimization differs fundamentally from conventional software engineering: the target agent interleaves deterministic code with stochastic LLM completions, requiring structured capture of both intermediate reasoning and downstream execution outcomes. To address these challenges, we introduce VERO (Versioning, Rewards, and Observations), which provides (1) a reproducible evaluation harness with versioned agent snapshots, budget-controlled evaluation, and structured execution traces, and (2) a benchmark suite of target agents and tasks with reference evaluation procedures. Using VERO, we conduct an empirical study comparing optimizer configurations across tasks and analyzing which modifications reliably improve target agent performance. We release VERO to support research on agent optimization as a core capability for coding agents.

AI coding agents such as Claude Code and Gemini CLI increasingly extend themselves with third-party skills: markdown packages bundling natural-language instructions, executable scripts, and tool permissions. Because a skill is at once code and agent-facing instruction, it introduces a supply chain dependency whose risk is neither pure code nor pure prompt. Detection tools have never been measured against verified ground truth spanning this hybrid space, leaving their effectiveness unknown and wild-only evaluations biased. We present MalSkillBench, the first runtime-verified benchmark of malicious agent skills: 3,944 malicious skills labeled along a three-dimensional taxonomy of 108 cells. Of these, 3,214 come from a closed-loop Generate-Verify-Feedback pipeline admitting only samples whose malicious behavior fires inside a Docker sandbox under system-call monitoring and an LLM judge; we add 703 in-the-wild and 4,000 matched benign skills. Our measurements are consistent: code injection reaches 94.5% verification yield but prompt injection only 75.8%, the same fragility that later makes it hard to detect; the wild sample is narrow, dominated by one cryptocurrency-theft campaign (86.6% one behavior, 81% from two accounts) with a small but architecturally new tail attacking the agent control plane; the strongest skill-specific detector reaches 98.4% recall on code injection yet collapses on prompt-injection and agent-control attacks, and wild-only scoring swings the ranking by up to 66 recall points; supply-chain scanners and prompt-injection defenses each see only half of a skill, and no combination recovers the code-instruction relationship. Detecting malicious skills therefore requires reasoning jointly over task intent, code, and instructions. We release the dataset, pipeline, baselines, and results.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Code agents are increasingly trusted to autonomously fix bugs on platforms such as GitHub, yet their security evaluation focuses almost exclusively on functional correctness. In this paper, we reveal a novel type of threat to real-world code agents: Functionally Correct yet Vulnerable (FCV) patches, which pass all test cases but contain vulnerable code. With our proposed FCV-Attack, which can be deliberately crafted by malicious attackers or implicitly introduced by benign developers, we show that SOTA LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT and Claude) and agent scaffolds (e.g., SWE-agent and OpenHands) are all vulnerable to this FCV threat; across 12 agent-model combinations on SWE-Bench, the attack only requires black-box access and a single query to the code agent to perform the attack. For example, for CWE-538 (information exposure vulnerability), the FCV-Attack attains an attack success rate of 40.7% on GPT-5 Mini + OpenHands. Our results reveal an important security threat overlooked by current evaluation paradigms and urge the development of security-aware defenses for code agents.

Coding agents are a fast-growing LLM application, executing as long-running closed-loop sessions in which LLM generations alternate with external tool calls. Yet, unlike chat workloads, their serving behavior has not been studied extensively. We address this gap by collecting a dataset of real-world coding assistant traces. Our analysis shows that coding agent sessions repeatedly reuse large prefixes and create sustained KVCache pressure that conventional LLM serving policies handle poorly. Based on our analysis, we present CacheWise, a KVCache management layer that improves KVCache reuse for coding agent workloads. CacheWise combines prefix-aware scheduling with reuse-aware eviction guided by lightweight predictions from tool call metadata. Implemented in vLLM and evaluated on the collected traces, CacheWise reduces KVCache evictions by up to 2-2.6x and improves total agent session completion time by up to 3.5x.

Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation (i.e., Code LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in AI-assisted software development and testing. However, recent studies have shown that these models are prone to generating vulnerable or even malicious code under adversarial settings. Existing red-teaming approaches rely on extensive human effort, limiting their scalability and practicality, and generally overlook the interactive nature of real-world AI-assisted programming, which often unfolds over multiple turns. To bridge these gaps, we present RedCoder, a red-teaming agent that engages victim models in multi-turn conversation to elicit vulnerable code. The pipeline to construct RedCoder begins with a multi-agent gaming process that simulates adversarial interactions, yielding a set of prototype conversations and an arsenal of reusable attack strategies. We then fine-tune an LLM on these prototype conversations to serve as the backbone of RedCoder. Once deployed, RedCoder autonomously engages Code LLMs in multi-turn conversations, dynamically retrieving relevant strategies from the arsenal to steer the dialogue toward vulnerability-inducing outputs. Experiments across multiple Code LLMs show that our approach outperforms prior single-turn and multi-turn red-team methods in inducing vulnerabilities in code generation, offering a scalable and effective tool for evaluating the security boundaries of modern code-generation systems.

A prerequisite for coding agents to perform tasks on large repositories is code localization - the identification of relevant files, classes, and functions to work on. While repository-level code localization has been performed using embedding-based retrieval approaches such as vector search, recent work has focused on developing agents to localize relevant code either as a standalone precursor to or interleaved with performing actual work. Most prior methods on agentic code search equip the agent with complex, specialized tools, such as repository graphs derived from static analysis. In this paper, we demonstrate that, with an effective reinforcement learning recipe, a coding agent equipped with nothing more than a standard Unix terminal can be trained to achieve strong results. Our experiments on three benchmarks (SWE-Bench Verified, Pro, and Lite) reveal that our models consistently achieve superior or competitive performance over 2-18x larger base and post-trained LLMs and sometimes approach performance provided by closed models like Claude Sonnet, even when using specialized scaffolds. Our work particularly focuses on techniques for re-purposing existing coding agent environments for code search, reward design, and RL optimization. We release the resulting model family, CodeScout, along with all our code and data for the community to build upon.

Real-world AI software engineering demands coding agents that can reason over massive repositories, maintain durable memory across and within long sessions, and robustly coordinate complex toolchains at test time. Existing open-source coding agents provide transparency but frequently fall short when pushed to these industrial-scale workloads, while proprietary coding agents offer strong practical performance but limited extensibility, interpretability, and controllability. We present the Confucius Code Agent (CCA), an open-sourced AI software engineer that can operate at an industrial scale. CCA is built atop the Confucius SDK, an open-sourced agent development platform designed around three complementary perspectives: Agent Experience (AX), User Experience (UX), and Developer Experience (DX). The SDK introduces a unified orchestrator with hierarchical working memory for long-context reasoning, a persistent note-taking system for cross-session continual learning, and a modular extension module for robust tool use. Moreover, a meta-agent automates the synthesis, evaluation, and refinement of agent configurations through a build-test-improve loop, enabling rapid agent development on new tasks, environments, and tool stacks. Instantiated on Confucius SDK with these mechanisms, CCA delivers strong performance on real-world software engineering tasks. On SWE-Bench-Pro, CCA achieves a state-of-the-art Resolve@1 performance of 54.3%, substantially improving over prior coding agents. Together, the Confucius SDK and CCA provide a transparent, extensible, and reproducible foundation for AI agents, bridge gaps between research prototypes and production-grade systems, and support agent development and deployment at industrial scale.

The proliferation of agentic AI coding assistants, including Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and emerging skill-based architectures, has fundamentally transformed software development workflows. These systems leverage Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external tools, file systems, and shell access through protocols like the Model Context Protocol (MCP). However, this expanded capability surface introduces critical security vulnerabilities. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across delivery vectors, attack modalities, and propagation behaviors. Our meta-analysis synthesizes findings from 78 recent studies (2021--2026), consolidating evidence that attack success rates against state-of-the-art defenses exceed 85\% when adaptive attack strategies are employed. We systematically catalog 42 distinct attack techniques spanning input manipulation, tool poisoning, protocol exploitation, multimodal injection, and cross-origin context poisoning. Through critical analysis of 18 defense mechanisms reported in prior work, we identify that most achieve less than 50\% mitigation against sophisticated adaptive attacks. We contribute: (1) a unified taxonomy bridging disparate attack classifications, (2) the first systematic analysis of skill-based architecture vulnerabilities with concrete exploit chains, and (3) a defense-in-depth framework grounded in the limitations we identify. Our findings indicate that the security community must treat prompt injection as a first-class vulnerability class requiring architectural-level mitigations rather than ad-hoc filtering approaches.

This paper introduces SecRepoBench, a benchmark to evaluate code agents on secure code completion in real-world repositories. SecRepoBench has 318 code completion tasks in 27 C/C++ repositories, covering 15 CWEs. We evaluate 28 standalone LLMs and 13 code agents across 3 state-of-the-art agent frameworks using our benchmark. We find that state-of-the-art LLMs struggle with generating correct and secure code completions. However, code agents significantly outperform standalone LLMs. We show that SecRepoBench is more difficult than the prior state-of-the-art benchmark. Finally, our comprehensive analysis provides insights into potential directions for enhancing the ability of code agents to write correct and secure code in real-world repositories.

Coding agents are increasingly used to build programs from scratch as software engineers do rather than to resolve issues within a repository or to generate a repository from a given requirements document. However, scalable verifiable training environments that force agents to discover what is required and to decide how the system should be designed remain scarce. Moreover, existing agent workflows also cannot sustain long-horizon development in which the agent explores the reference program before implementation. To address these challenges, we introduce ProgramGym, a framework consisting of Program-Env and Program-Agent for scalable training environments of long-horizon program reproduction agents. Specifically, Program-Env constructs verifiable training environments from repositories through a feedback-driven loop that repairs runtime sandbox builds and the quality of black-box tests. Using this novel pipeline, we obtain 1,648 training environments spanning C, C++, Go, and Rust. Program-Agent combines a role-isolated workflow of analysis, implementation, and review with revision management for compilation checks and failure recovery. Experiments on ProgramBench show that both Program-Env and Program-Agent improve performance on program reproduction. Fine-tuning on trajectories with these constructed environments raises the performance of Qwen3.8-27B from 34.87% to 42.84%. Program-Agent further raises the base and SFT models to 55.71% and 56.25%, both exceeding some flagship models. We will release the ProgramGym to support further research on coding agents that build programs from scratch.

As the production of software passes into the hands of software itself, coding agents are increasingly commissioned to build agents fitted to their users' own workflows. This delegation carries a quiet assumption, that the delivered agent will faithfully serve the requirement it was built for, rather than merely appear to. No existing benchmark tests that assumption. We introduce AgentSWE, a benchmark for agent software engineering spanning three stages of the agent development lifecycle: Creation of a complete agent from a natural-language requirement, Editing of production agent codebases, and Optimization toward a measurable target. Each of its 25 tasks is framed as a commission rather than an exam: the builder iterates against a handful of illustrative cases, while acceptance exercises the frozen submission on held-out cases designed to span the full requirement, grading behavior against requirement-derived rubrics under hard pass/fail gates or, for Optimization, against the source benchmark's own objective. Evaluating a range of coding agents across models and harnesses, we find that none comes close to delivering what a requirement asks for: the gap between what a builder demonstrates and what it delivers is the norm, not the corner case. An accompanying empirical analysis of the failure trajectories identifies recurring failure modes, among them overfitting to the visible cases, hollow runtimes behind code that looks complete, and unsupported claims of completion, each a signal by which coding agents can learn to build the agents they are asked for.

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenges, we propose to put the agent in a programming-language-based "safety harness": instead of calling tools directly, agents express their intentions as code in a capability-safe language: Scala 3 with capture checking. Capabilities are program variables that regulate access to effects and resources of interest. Scala's type system tracks capabilities statically, providing fine-grained control over what an agent can do. In particular, it enables local purity, the ability to enforce that sub-computations are side-effect-free, preventing information leakage when agents process classified data. We demonstrate that extensible agent safety harnesses can be built by leveraging a strong type system with tracked capabilities. Our experiments show that agents can generate capability-safe code with no significant loss in task performance, while the type system reliably prevents unsafe behaviors such as information leakage and malicious side effects.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in understanding and generating code, from competitive programming to repository-level software engineering. In emerging agentic systems, code is no longer only a target output. It increasingly serves as an operational substrate for agent reasoning, acting, environment modeling, and execution-based verification. We frame this shift through the lens of agent harnesses and introduce code as agent harness: a unified view that centers code as the basis for agent infrastructure. To systematically study this perspective, we organize the survey around three connected layers. First, we study the harness interface, where code connects agents to reasoning, action, and environment modeling. Second, we examine harness mechanisms: planning, memory, and tool use for long-horizon execution, together with feedback-driven control and optimization that make harness reliable and adaptive. Third, we discuss scaling the harness from single-agent systems to multi-agent settings, where shared code artifacts support multi-agent coordination, review, and verification. Across these layers, we summarize representative methods and practical applications of code as agent harness, spanning coding assistants, GUI/OS automation, embodied agents, scientific discovery, personalization and recommendation, DevOps, and enterprise workflows. We further outline open challenges for harness engineering, including evaluation beyond final task success, verification under incomplete feedback, regression-free harness improvement, consistent shared state across multiple agents, human oversight for safety-critical actions, and extensions to multimodal environments. By centering code as the harness of agentic AI, this survey provides a unified roadmap toward executable, verifiable, and stateful AI agent systems.

Training capable coding agents via reinforcement learning (RL) requires diverse tasks with reliable verifiers. Open-source codebases offer a rich source of such tasks, while existing methods typically rely on development artifacts such as issues and commits, limiting the range of tasks that can be extracted. To better scale RL environments, we present CodeMidas, an agentic pipeline that turns implemented functionality in existing codebases into executable RL environments using source code as its only task-specific input. CodeMidas allocates agentic compute to every stage of environment construction: agents explore implemented functionality to formulate behavioral specifications, construct tests grounded in execution of the original code, and validate and filter candidate tasks through execution checks and repeated solution rollouts. The resulting dataset has 5,545 training tasks from 3,185 open-source codebases spanning 23 programming languages and 15 technical domains. Training MiMo-V2.5 on these tasks with GRPO improves performance on all five diverse benchmarks, covering issue repair (DeepSWE + 11.7%), whole-program construction (ProgramBench +17%), and terminal work (Terminal-Bench v2.1 +8.5%). Ablations show that increasing the number of high-quality training tasks improves performance. Trajectory analysis shows the RL-trained agent demonstrates better behaviors like increasing codebase exploration and more diverse self-verification. These results establish source code as a scalable foundation for constructing RL environments that improve coding agents across diverse software tasks.

Coding agents are increasingly deployed for end-to-end software engineering tasks, where a readily available oracle evaluator that defines the success criteria is often absent. This motivates verifications for coding agents that can reliably judge and explain their behavior. However, verification is non-trivial as coding agents are increasingly capable of solving long-horizon software engineering tasks. Their execution trajectories can be extremely long, containing hundreds of iterative interactions with code repositories and external tools. Existing verifiers either rely on general-purpose LLMs without specialized training or train dedicated critics that predominantly focus on producing scalar rewards, highlighting the relatively limited exploration of training-based generalist verification. We introduce SWE-Critix, a post-training pipeline for training generalist verifiers of coding-agent trajectories. Given a task and its execution trajectory, the learned verifier predicts the completion label and generates a natural-language analysis that explains its judgment. Our pipeline combines supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with reinforcement learning (RL) and trains a series of 30B models on trajectories from CodeForge-Preview. On a held-out test set, SWE-Critix improves classification accuracy from 57% for the base Qwen3-30B-A3B reasoning model to 66% after SFT and 78% after RL. We release our models, datasets, and training code to facilitate further research.

Agentic coding -- software development workflows in which autonomous coding agents plan, implement, and submit code changes with minimal human involvement -- is rapidly gaining traction. Prior work has shown that Pull Requests (PRs) produced using coding agents (Agentic-PRs) are accepted less often than PRs that are not labeled as agentic (Human-PRs). The rejection reasons for a single agent (Claude Code) have been explored, but a comparison of how rejection reasons differ between Agentic-PRs generated by different agents has not yet been performed. This comparison is important since different coding agents are often used for different purposes, which can lead to agent-specific failure patterns. In this paper, we inspect 654 rejected PRs from the AIDev dataset covering five coding agents, as well as a human baseline. Our results show that seven rejection modes occur only in Agentic-PRs, including distrust of AI-generated code. We also observe agent-specific patterns (e.g., automated withdrawal of inactive PRs by Devin), reflecting differences in how agents are configured and used in practice. Notably, a large proportion of rejected PRs (67.9%) lack explicit reviewer feedback, making their rejection reasons difficult to determine. To mitigate this issue, we propose a set of heuristics that reduce the proportion of such cases, offering a practical preprocessing step for future studies of PR rejection in agentic coding.

We present KAT-Coder-V2.5, a coding-focused agentic model trained to act autonomously inside real, executable repositories rather than as a single-turn code generator. Its capability is bottlenecked less by model scale than by the scarcity of reproducible environments, verifiable rewards, and high-value trajectories, which we address with an end-to-end agentic post-training framework. AutoBuilder reconstructs multilingual repositories into sandboxed environments with fail-to-pass and pass-to-pass verification at scale, from which we regenerate self-contained task specifications, recover near-miss trajectories, and distill supervision through process-aware filtering, while KwaiClawEnv synthesizes large-scale tool-use trajectories from executable services and real task seeds. We further scale reinforcement learning with harness randomization, a reliability-hardened sandbox, an asymmetric actor--critic PPO with hindsight-augmented value estimation, and a harness-oriented reward framework, and unify SWE, Agent-Claw, and WebCoding experts via Multi-Teacher On-Policy Distillation. Across six software-engineering and agentic benchmarks, KAT-Coder-V2.5 delivers the best agentic tool-use result on PinchBench and ranks second only to the frontier Opus 4.8 on repository-level software engineering. Our service is available at https://streamlake.com/product/kat-coder.

Long-horizon coding agents operate over evolving repository states while increasingly relying on heterogeneous capabilities, delegated agents, and multi-agent coordination. These trends pose two complementary challenges for the agent harness. First, developers need to compose capabilities, reconfigure execution logic, and scale increasingly complex agent systems without repeatedly rebuilding orchestration. Second, complex coding tasks continuously produce new evidence---such as semantic diagnostics, execution outcomes, task progress, and changing context relevance---that should dynamically influence subsequent runtime decisions. We characterize these challenges as Structural Composability and Runtime Adaptivity. We present openJiuwen, an open-source harness designed for both developer composability and adaptive task execution. openJiuwen provides a shared execution substrate and Rail-based capability composition across single agents, delegated sub-agents, and Swarm Flow, enabling developers to construct sophisticated agent harnesses under common execution semantics. It further adapts framework-controlled runtime decisions around a fixed model policy, allowing evolving evidence to dynamically affect context, feedback, and task control toward successful completion. We systematically evaluate openJiuwen on SWE-bench Verified and Terminal-Bench 2.1, where it achieves 82.6% and 87.19%, respectively, exceeding the strongest selected official-leaderboard point estimates by 3.4 and 3.39 percentage points. These results show that openJiuwen achieves strong performance on complex coding tasks while providing a composable and adaptive harness design.

Coding agents and LLM-powered applications routinely send potentially sensitive content to cloud LLM APIs where it may be logged, retained, used for training, or subpoenaed. Existing privacy tooling focuses on network-level encryption and organization-level DLP, neither of which addresses the content of prompts themselves. We present a systematic empirical evaluation of eight techniques for privacy-preserving LLM requests: (A) local-only inference, (B) redaction with placeholder restoration, (C) semantic rephrasing, (D) Trusted Execution Environment hosted inference, (E) split inference, (F) fully homomorphic encryption, (G) secret sharing via multi-party computation, and (H) differential-privacy noise. We implement all eight (or a tractable research-stage subset where deployment is not yet feasible) in an open-source shim compatible with MCP and any OpenAI-compatible API. We evaluate the four practical options (A, B, C, H) and their combinations across four workload classes using a ground-truth-labelled leak benchmark of 1,300 samples with 4,014 annotations. Our headline finding is that no single technique dominates: the combination A+B+C (route locally when possible, redact and rephrase the rest) achieves 0.6% combined leak on PII and 31.3% on proprietary code, with zero exact leaks on PII across 500 samples. We present a decision rule that selects the appropriate option(s) from a threat-model budget and workload characterisation. Code, benchmarks, and evaluation harness are released at https://github.com/jayluxferro/llm-redactor.

Coding agents are rapidly becoming a major application of agentic LLMs, but serving them efficiently remains challenging. Progress on this challenge requires understanding real workload patterns, yet the data needed for such analysis is largely absent. Existing public traces and benchmarks do not capture real, day-to-day coding-agent usage across multiple agents and model families for serving-system analysis. To help fill this gap, we collect and release a trace of roughly 4,300 coding-agent sessions, containing about 350,000 LLM steps and 430,000 tool calls from our own day-to-day use of Claude Code and Codex. Our analysis shows that coding-agent workloads feature long autonomous loops, long contexts with short outputs, diverse and heavily-tailed tool calls, and high but imperfect prefix cache hit rates. These findings point to concrete opportunities for optimizing serving, including lower-overhead tool calling, append-length-aware prefill, semantic-aware tool-latency prediction, and improved KV-cache management around human-paced gaps. We release the dataset, trace collection pipeline, and analysis code at https://github.com/uw-syfi/TraceLab.git the project website is https://tracelab.cs.washington.edu.

Coding agents are increasingly used as iterative development partners, but most benchmarks still evaluate one specification followed by one final assessment. This leaves out a basic question: can an agent keep its own codebase working as requirements change? We introduce EvoCode-Bench, a benchmark of 26 stateful coding tasks and 227 evaluated rounds. Each task preserves the agent's workspace for 5-15 rounds, states requirements through observable behavior, and uses cumulative executable tests to check new requirements and still-active prior ones. We evaluate 13 coding agents with two metrics: MT@4, a four-attempt fail-stop multi-round score, and SR, a single-round score from a reference-completed prior state. For most agents, SR exceeds MT@4 by 22-40 points. The gap also changes rankings: the highest-SR agent (78.9) ranks only third in persistent execution (44.0 MT@4). Even the strongest agents achieve only about 50% success on multi-turn metrics, and aggregate pass rate drops below half of round-1 performance by round 5. Failure analysis shows tier-dependent behavior: weaker agents fail early, while stronger agents survive long enough to expose specification-tracking and regression failures. We release the benchmark data and Harbor multi-turn infrastructure.

We introduce ISO-Bench, a benchmark for coding agents to test their capabilities on real-world inference optimization tasks. These tasks were taken from vLLM and SGLang, two of the most popular LLM serving frameworks. Each task provides an agent with a codebase and bottleneck description, whereby the agent must produce an optimization patch evaluated against expert human solutions. We curated 54 tasks from merged pull requests with measurable performance improvements. While existing benchmarks heavily use runtime-based metrics, such approaches can be gamed to pass tests without capturing the actual intent of the code changes. Therefore, we combine both hard (execution-based) and soft (LLM-based) metrics to show that both are necessary for complete evaluation. While evaluating both closed and open-source coding agents, we find no single agent dominates across codebases. Surprisingly, agents often identify correct bottlenecks but fail to execute working solutions. We also show that agents with identical underlying models differ substantially, suggesting scaffolding is as important as the model.

Enabling continual learning in LLMs remains a key unresolved research challenge. In a recent announcement, a frontier LLM company made a step towards this by introducing Agent Skills, a framework that equips agents with new knowledge based on instructions stored in simple markdown files. Although Agent Skills can be a very useful tool, we show that they are fundamentally insecure, since they enable trivially simple prompt injections. We demonstrate how to hide malicious instructions in long Agent Skill files and referenced scripts to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as internal files or passwords. Importantly, we show how to bypass system-level guardrails of a popular coding agent: a benign, task-specific approval with the "Don't ask again" option can carry over to closely related but harmful actions. Overall, we conclude that despite ongoing research efforts and scaling model capabilities, frontier LLMs remain vulnerable to very simple prompt injections in realistic scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/aisa-group/promptinject-agent-skills.

As AI coding agents become more autonomous, they increasingly ship code iteratively, with the codebase persisting across sessions. This persistence creates a new attack surface: a misaligned or prompt-injected agent can distribute attacks across pull requests (PRs) and time its payload for the PR with the best natural cover. To study the resulting dynamics, we introduce Iterative VibeCoding, a setting for AI control, the study of safely deploying capable but potentially untrusted AI. In Iterative VibeCoding, a coding agent builds software over a sequence of PRs in a persistent codebase while pursuing a covert side task. Our benchmark includes two task families: CLI tools and Flask web services, across 20 total task variations. We use Claude Sonnet 4.5 as the attack agent and GPT-4o as the monitor. We compare gradual attacks, which distribute the side task across PRs, against non-gradual attacks concentrated in a single PR. No single monitor is robust to both: which strategy evades best (success while evading the monitor) depends on the monitor type, so a defender cannot close off both gradual and non-gradual attacks with any one monitor. High evasion (>= 65%) generalizes across model attack agent backends (Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Kimi K2.5), confirming this is a property of the persistent-state attack surface rather than a single model's capability. Evasion also remains high across state-of-the-art monitor models and the gap between gradual and non-gradual evasion widens for more capable models. We introduce a stateful link-tracker monitor that tracks suspicious buildup across PRs. On both task families, it detects gradual attacks substantially better than diff monitors that merely see more accumulated history. Combining this stronger monitor with trajectory monitors in a four-monitor ensemble reduces gradual-attack evasion from 93% under the weakest standard diff monitor to 47%.

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To better understand the limitations of such monitors against the diverse attack strategies that a coding agent could use, we present SLEIGHT-Bench (Subtle Low-itEration Insight-Guided Harmful Transcripts), a benchmark of synthetic transcripts containing 40 attacks across 11 categories, each showing a coding agent covertly pursuing a harmful objective (e.g. weight exfiltration, credential theft, unmonitored rogue deployment). We find that 20 of 40 attacks are never caught by an Opus 4.6 monitor with extended thinking across 10 trials at a 1% false-positive rate, while the overall catch rate is 32%. We identify several evasion strategies such as exploiting model priors, user instruction ambiguity, and state manipulation, which facilitate creating attacks that evade frontier monitors. We also elicit stronger monitor performance using coding agents as monitors versus regular prompted monitors, and for some evasion strategies show improved catch rates with targeted monitor prompts. Our dataset and evaluation framework are available at https://github.com/safety-research/sleight-bench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/sleightbench/SLEIGHT-Bench.

Autonomous coding agents built on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly being integrated into development workflows, yet their operational safety properties remain poorly understood beyond evaluations of explicitly malicious inputs. In practice, high-impact failures arise during benign, goal-directed use through environment breakage, fabricated success reports, etc. that current benchmarks do not capture. What categories of operational safety failures actually occur when coding agents are used for everyday development tasks and what is their impact? We present an incident-driven empirical study grounded in two complementary evidence streams. We screen 68,816 papers from 22 premier venues, curating 185 safety-relevant studies, and mine 16,586 GitHub issues from widely deployed LLM-powered coding tools, manually confirming 547 genuine safety failures. Applying systematic open coding over both corpora, we derive a multi-dimensional safety taxonomy of 33 operational risk types organized across seven dimensions, and annotate each incident with contributing factors, task context, severity, and downstream impact. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are often severe, with 326 of 547 incidents rated high or critical. The dominant risks are constraint violations, destructive operations, authorization bypasses, and deception, and over 65% of incidents arise in bug fixing and setup or configuration, patterns largely missing from prior literature. These results have direct implications for SE tool designers and benchmark developers: guardrails must go beyond adversarial-prompt defenses to enforce environmental constraints, failure transparency, and safe-halt behaviors.

Frontier coding agents are increasingly used in workflows where users supervise progress primarily through repeated improvement of a public score, namely the reported score on a public evaluation file with labels in the workspace, rather than through direct inspection of the agent's intermediate outputs. We study whether multi-round user pressure to improve that score induces public score exploitation: behavior that raises the public score through shortcuts without improving hidden private evaluation. We begin with a preliminary single-script tabular classification task, where GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4.6 both exploit label information within 10 rounds of user-agent interaction. We then build AgentPressureBench, a 34-task machine-learning repository benchmark spanning three input modalities, and collect 1326 multi-round trajectories from 13 coding agents. On our benchmark, we observe 403 exploitative runs, spanning across all tasks. We also find that stronger models have higher exploitation rates, supported by a significant Spearman rank correlation of 0.77. Our ablation experiments show that higher user pressure leads to earlier exploitation, reducing the average first exploit round by 15.6 rounds (i.e., 19.67 to 4.08). As a mitigation, adding explicit anti-exploit wordings in prompt mostly eliminates exploitation (100% to 8.3%). We hope that our work can bring attention to more careful use of coding agents workflow, and developing more robust coding agents under user pressure. Our project page is at https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/AgentPressureBench .

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

AI coding agents produce code faster than humans can review it. In our approach, the prover is the judge of whether the code is correct. Under a verifier-driven loop, AI agents wrote and verified bare-metal security software in Ada/SPARK spanning classical and post-quantum cryptography, TLS 1.3, IKEv2, X.509, and a Matrix client. GNATprove discharged 49,280 proof obligations, established functional correctness for selected primitives, and proved the absence of run-time errors for the rest, at roughly 20-40 times lower supervision cost than comparable hand verification. GNATprove alone was insufficient: some defects could not be detected and were resolved using known-answer tests, interoperability, or human review of specifications. Given weak checks, the agent tried to bypass them and reported success. We report where each layer caught faults and draw the central lesson: what an agent can be trusted to establish is bounded by the strength of its feedback.

Achieving dexterous robotic manipulation in the real world heavily relies on human supervision and algorithm engineering, which becomes a central bottleneck in the pursuit of general physical intelligence. Although emerging coding agents can generate code to automate algorithm search, their successes remain largely confined in digital environments. We conjecture that the missing abstraction to automate robotics research is a repeatable feedback loop for real-world policy improvement: reset the scene, execute a policy, verify the outcome, and refine the next iteration. To bridge this gap, we introduce ENPIRE, a harness framework for coding agents that instantiates this physical feedback routine with four core modules: an Environment module (EN) for automatic reset and verification, a Policy Improvement module (PI) that launches policy refinement, a Rollout module (R) to evaluate policies with one or multiple physical robots operating in parallel, and an Evolution module (E) in which coding agents analyze logs, consult literature, improve training infrastructure and algorithm code to address failure modes. This closed-loop system transforms real-world manipulation learning into a controllable optimization procedure, minimizing human effort while allowing fair ablations across training recipe and agent variants. Powered by ENPIRE, frontier coding agents can autonomously train a policy to achieve a 99% success rate on challenging, dexterous manipulation tasks, such as organizing a pin box, fastening a zip tie, and tool use, a process that further accelerates when we dispatch an agent team on a robot fleet. Our results suggest a practical and scalable path toward deploying coding agents to autonomously advancing robotics in the physical world.

Large language model-powered coding agents are increasingly used to modify existing code repositories, for example, by adding features or fixing bugs. Yet existing repository-level benchmarks typically evaluate only whether the final patch passes tests. Satisfying a user request requires a long chain of interdependent reasoning and decisions: an agent must recover explicit and implicit requirements, formulate a repository-grounded implementation plan, and translate it into correct code. A pass/fail outcome cannot characterize how an unsuccessful trajectory diverges from the requirements and implementation process needed for a correct patch. To address this gap, we introduce SWE-RPG, a repository-level benchmark that combines executable patch evaluation with validated ground-truth references (GTs) for (1) Requirement Clarification and (2) Implementation Planning. These intermediate GTs support retrospective, GT-aligned diagnosis of complete coding-agent trajectories across clarification, planning, code generation, and artifact submission. SWE-RPG comprises 163 tasks from 31 Python and Java repositories, including 113 bug fixes and 50 feature additions. We evaluate 3 coding agents, including Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode, with 6 large language model backends, including Claude-Sonnet-5 and GPT-5.6-Terra. Results show that the evaluated popular coding agents still struggle to implement user requests in existing repositories, achieving an average resolved rate of only 31.5% on SWE-RPG. Intermediate-GT diagnosis further identifies implicit requirement recovery as the main bottleneck, accounting for 24.5%--46.0% of agent runs. This result suggests implicit-requirement recovery as a key candidate direction for improving coding agents. The benchmark data and evaluation code are available at https://github.com/Xin-Zhou-smu/SWE-RPG-Bench.

Large language model (LLM) coding agents are increasingly deployed to autonomously perform software engineering tasks in terminal-based environments, making their reliability a growing concern. Existing empirical studies investigate why coding agents fail, yet they largely treat failure as a final outcome rather than a temporal process, providing limited insight into how failures emerge, evolve, and become unrecoverable. We present the first large-scale empirical study of CLI coding-agent failure trajectories, introducing a process-oriented framework that analyzes failure through its onset, evolution, and recovery across execution trajectories. We first collect 3,843 execution trajectories generated by seven frontier models across three coding-agent scaffolds (OpenHands, MiniSWE, and Terminus2) on Terminal-Bench, then carefully filter them to obtain 1,794 complete and valid trajectories for manual annotation (over 63,000 execution steps), from which we derive 14 findings spanning failure occurrence, root causes, recovery, and cross-system consistency. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are predominantly driven by epistemic errors, typically begin within the first few execution steps, and often remain hidden until recovery is no longer possible, suggesting that improving coding-agent reliability requires earlier validation and intervention rather than relying solely on final-outcome evaluation.

Coding agents increasingly act as codebase-scale collaborators that can assist with codebase conversion, but this progress has exposed a critical weakness: agents often over-trust their own local validation routines and declare success on artifacts that satisfy surface checks while violating the semantic contracts users actually care about. This problem is especially acute in codebase conversion, where prior evaluation is largely outcome-driven and therefore unstable: two implementations can match on a shallow outcome, such as a single forward loss, while diverging in gradients, optimizer behavior, or short-horizon training dynamics. We introduce T2J-Bench, a benchmark for codebase conversion that reformulates conversion as transfer under a fixed equivalence contract. A fixed verifier then compares source and converted codebases through three ordered stages: Spec (interface admissibility), Numeric (forward outputs, losses, gradients, and objective-specific tensors), and Behavioral (short training dynamics under fixed seeds). Across 355 blind conversion attempts, the best system reaches only 26.7--28.9% overall pass rate despite Spec pass rates up to 91.1%; a 4.7x token-budget spread yields only a 2.2x pass-rate spread; and all systems overestimate success by 66.6--97.8 points relative to the fixed evaluator. This suggests that failures stem more from contract-misaligned self-validation than from limited budget or backbone strength.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

LLM coding agents increasingly rely on third-party agent skills from public marketplaces, which execute with the agent's privileges and create a software supply-chain attack surface: a malicious skill can steal credentials, exfiltrate source code, or install backdoors. Existing defenses use static skill scanners based on pattern matching or LLM-as-judge analysis, but it remains unclear whether they withstand adaptive evasions that preserve malicious behavior while changing payload appearance. This paper first presents an adversarial study of existing skill scanners through SkillCloak, a payload-preserving evasion framework that keeps the attack semantics intact while transforming their visible form. SkillCloak uses two complementary strategies: Structural Obfuscation, which rewrites visible payload indicators into semantically equivalent forms, and Self-Extracting Skill (SFS) Packing, which hides malicious components from the install-time view and restores them during agent execution. Across eight scanners and 1,613 in-the-wild malicious skills, SFS Packing bypasses every scanner at over 90%, while Structural Obfuscation bypasses over 80% on most static scanners and reaches 96% on a hybrid scanner, showing that appearance-based auditing is insufficient. Motivated by this finding, we propose SkillDetonate, a behavior-centric runtime auditor that executes skills in a sandbox and detects malicious effects through OS-boundary information-flow evidence rather than install-time appearance. SkillDetonate combines on-demand closure lift, which observes instructions materialized during execution, with marker-based taint analysis, which tracks sensitive-data flows across the agent context, files, processes, and network operations. The results show that SkillDetonate detects 97% of attacks at a 2% false-positive rate and sustains 87% detection on real-world malicious skills.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in software development, yet their tendency to generate insecure code remains a major barrier to real-world deployment. Existing secure code alignment methods often suffer from a functionality--security paradox, improving security at the cost of substantial utility degradation. We propose SecCoderX, an online reinforcement learning framework for functionality-preserving secure code generation. SecCoderX first bridges vulnerability detection and secure code generation by repurposing mature detection resources in two ways: (i) synthesizing diverse, reality-grounded vulnerability-inducing coding tasks for online RL rollouts, and (ii) training a reasoning-based vulnerability reward model that provides scalable and reliable security supervision. Together, these components are unified in an online RL loop to align code LLMs to generate secure and functional code. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SecCoderX achieves state-of-the-art performance, improving Effective Safety Rate (ESR) by approximately 10% over unaligned models, whereas prior methods often degrade ESR by 14-54%. We release our code, dataset and model checkpoints at https://github.com/AndrewWTY/SecCoderX.

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI, agent data injection attacks (ADI). ADI injects malicious data disguised as trusted data, such as security-critical metadata (e.g., resource identifiers or data origins) or agent context data (e.g., tool call and response formats). As a result, agents unknowingly execute unintended actions based on attacker-controlled data. ADI has similar attack impacts as instruction injection attacks, because it causes agents to misbehave and execute unintended actions. Despite the similar impact, ADI remains underexplored and easily bypasses existing IPI defenses. We found several critical vulnerabilities in real-world agents that allow an attacker to launch various attacks: arbitrary click attacks on web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, and Nanobrowser), and remote code execution and supply-chain attacks on coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI). We evaluate ADI vulnerabilities across off-the-shelf models and AI agents, and find that ADI is effective in both standalone LLMs and AI agent settings. ADI exposes a critical gap in agent security, signifying that current AI agents do not employ a fundamental security principle: current agents do not isolate trusted data from untrusted data.

As large language models (LLMs) advance their mathematical capabilities toward the IMO level, the scarcity of challenging, high-quality problems for training and evaluation has become a significant bottleneck. Simultaneously, recent code agents have demonstrated sophisticated skills in agentic coding and reasoning, suggesting that code execution can serve as a scalable environment for mathematical experimentation. In this paper, we investigate the potential of code agents to autonomously evolve existing math problems into more complex variations. We introduce a multi-agent framework designed to perform problem evolution while validating the solvability and increased difficulty of the generated problems. Our experiments demonstrate that, given sufficient test-time exploration, code agents can synthesize new, solvable problems that are structurally distinct from and more challenging than the originals. This work provides empirical evidence that code-driven agents can serve as a viable mechanism for synthesizing high-difficulty mathematical reasoning problems within scalable computational environments. Our data is available at https://github.com/TarferSoul/Code2Math.

Autonomous coding agents solve repository issues by reading code, running commands, editing files, and submitting patches. Extra inference-time compute yields gains only when it produces a useful repair and supplies reliable evidence for choosing one. Three behaviors decide both, and we argue they are teachable rather than byproducts of scale, so a policy can carry them instead of a scaffold. Location diversity remains narrow, since attempts return to the same site and extra samples add no coverage. Edit diversity is left unexploited, since methodologies that differ resolve complementary issues no single run reaches. Verification misleads, since a test the agent writes for its own patch accepts many incorrect ones. Directing search by execution feedback and scoring each patch against its own reverted tree resolves 52.8% of SWE-bench Verified using 48.1% of the agent-steps an eight-sample baseline spends. Training moves these behaviors into the policy. On the 270 issues held out from SFT and RL training, weighted supervised fine-tuning raises pass@1 from 31.9% to 35.2% and pass@8 from 46.7% to 51.1%. A reinforcement objective then trains the verifier against gold-labeled repairs and incorrect variants, crediting the assertions that detect them. It raises pass@1 to 43.0% and pass@8 to 60.7%, lifts verifier precision from 26.8% to 41.7%, and more than halves false acceptance. Resolution improves on two of three out-of-distribution suites and verifier precision on all three, and the gains hold at 7B, 14B, and 30B against published coder baselines.

We propose SWE-Universe, a scalable and efficient framework for automatically constructing real-world software engineering (SWE) verifiable environments from GitHub pull requests (PRs). To overcome the prevalent challenges of automatic building, such as low production yield, weak verifiers, and prohibitive cost, our framework utilizes a building agent powered by an efficient custom-trained model. This agent employs iterative self-verification and in-loop hacking detection to ensure the reliable generation of high-fidelity, verifiable tasks. Using this method, we scale the number of real-world multilingual SWE environments to a million scale (807,693). We demonstrate the profound value of our environments through large-scale agentic mid-training and reinforcement learning. Finally, we applied this technique to Qwen3-Max-Thinking and achieved a score of 75.3% on SWE-Bench Verified. Our work provides both a critical resource and a robust methodology to advance the next generation of coding agents.

In this paper we introduce ResearchCodeAgent, a novel multi-agent system leveraging large language models (LLMs) agents to automate the codification of research methodologies described in machine learning literature. The system bridges the gap between high-level research concepts and their practical implementation, allowing researchers auto-generating code of existing research papers for benchmarking or building on top-of existing methods specified in the literature with availability of partial or complete starter code. ResearchCodeAgent employs a flexible agent architecture with a comprehensive action suite, enabling context-aware interactions with the research environment. The system incorporates a dynamic planning mechanism, utilizing both short and long-term memory to adapt its approach iteratively. We evaluate ResearchCodeAgent on three distinct machine learning tasks with distinct task complexity and representing different parts of the ML pipeline: data augmentation, optimization, and data batching. Our results demonstrate the system's effectiveness and generalizability, with 46.9% of generated code being high-quality and error-free, and 25% showing performance improvements over baseline implementations. Empirical analysis shows an average reduction of 57.9% in coding time compared to manual implementation. We observe higher gains for more complex tasks. ResearchCodeAgent represents a significant step towards automating the research implementation process, potentially accelerating the pace of machine learning research.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

Solving an NP-hard optimization problem often requires reformulating it for a specific solver -- quantum hardware, a commercial optimizer, or a domain heuristic. A tool for polynomial-time reductions between hard problems would let practitioners route any supported problem to any supported solver through a single interface. Building such a library at scale, however, has remained out of reach. We show that harness engineering, the practice of designing constraints, verification systems, and feedback loops that channel AI coding agents, can overcome this barrier. Our harness combines a no-code contribution route for domain experts, a multilayer verification stack ranging from type-level checks to agentic feature tests (AI agents role-playing as end users), and a fully automated implementation-review-integration pipeline. In about three months, we built a command-line tool backed by a library of 100+ problem types and 200+~reduction rules in over 170k lines of Rust. The result suggests that a well-engineered harness lets agents build well-tested software at a scale and pace beyond prior reduction-library efforts. Because the reduction graph composes transitively, a new solver registered for any single problem type instantly becomes available to every problem connected by a reduction path. The source code is available at https://github.com/CodingThrust/problem-reductions.

Large language models are increasingly embedded in software engineering workflows as coding agents that can inspect repositories, invoke tools, execute tests, debug failures, and generate patches. Yet most existing agents remain largely static after deployment, even though software development is a dynamic, feedback-rich process in which repositories evolve, dependencies change, tests fail, and repair attempts leave reusable experience. This tension has motivated a growing body of work on self-evolving coding agents, where the agent improves its future behavior by updating its framework, memory, skills, tools, models, or collaboration structures from prior coding interactions. In this survey, we provide a systematic synthesis of this emerging area. We first define self-evolving coding agents and distinguish them from conventional coding agents and general self-evolving agents. We then develop an object-centered taxonomy that characterizes what evolves in these systems, and complement it with two orthogonal perspectives: when evolution occurs and what software-specific evidence drives it. Across the literature, we find that executable feedback, repository-level context, and coding trajectories give software engineering a distinctive role as a natural domain for agent self-evolution, but also introduce new challenges in feedback reliability, benchmark overfitting, safety, maintainability, cost, and generalization. By organizing existing work around these dimensions, this survey aims to clarify the conceptual boundaries of self-evolving coding agents and provide a foundation for designing more adaptive, reliable, and software-aware agentic systems. The papers we collect can be found at https://github.com/zhouhao1024/Awesome-Self-Evolving-Coding-Agents.

Coding agents are typically evaluated with desired behavior specified through issues or instructions. In practical web development, however, agents may need to infer behavior from working software and implement it in an incomplete application. We introduce ProgramDistill, a benchmark evaluating coding agents on features discovered through interaction with fully functional reference applications. We build ProgramDistill by factorizing applications into features of different granularities, each associated with replayable behaviors executable via its gold patch. Our pipeline, mine-craft-patch, discovers 1,975 replay-verified behaviors across 26 applications and constructs 4,063 tasks without human intervention. Across nine frontier coding agents, GPT-6 Astra and Claude Opus 5 achieve 49.2% and 28.8% success on cumulative workflows in full-application reconstruction. In partial-application reconstruction, success falls from 100% to 64.0% and from 96% to 32% as restoration depth increases from 1 to 8. ProgramDistill thus provides a scalable benchmark with controlled difficulty for evaluating and diagnosing coding agents, and a natural basis for future curriculum-based training.

Existing datasets for coding agents evaluate performance on isolated, single pull request (PR) tasks in a stateless manner, failing to capture the reality of real-world software development where code changes accumulate, technical debt accrues, and test suites grow over time. To bridge this gap, we introduce an automated coding task generation framework, which helps generate our dataset SWE-STEPS, that evaluates coding agents on long-horizon tasks through two realistic settings mirroring actual developer workflows: Conversational coding with iterative requests, and single-shot Project Requirement document (PRD)-based coding. Unlike existing datasets that evaluate agents on disjointed Pull Requests (PRs), our framework assesses performance across chains of dependent PRs, enabling evaluation of sequential execution, regression verification, and long-term repository health. We discover that widely used isolated PR evaluations yield inflated success rates, w.r.t. our settings - overshooting performance by as much as 20 percentage points - because they ignore the ``spillover'' effects of previous inefficient or buggy code. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that even when agents successfully resolve issues, they degrade repository health by generating code with higher cognitive complexity and technical debt compared to human developers, underscoring the necessity for multidimensional evaluation.

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

Effective prompt design is essential for improving the planning capabilities of large language model (LLM)-driven agents. However, existing structured prompting strategies are typically limited to single-agent, plan-only settings, and often evaluate performance solely based on task accuracy - overlooking critical factors such as token efficiency, modularity, and scalability in multi-agent environments. To address these limitations, we introduce CodeAgents, a prompting framework that codifies multi-agent reasoning and enables structured, token-efficient planning in multi-agent systems. In CodeAgents, all components of agent interaction - Task, Plan, Feedback, system roles, and external tool invocations - are codified into modular pseudocode enriched with control structures (e.g., loops, conditionals), boolean logic, and typed variables. This design transforms loosely connected agent plans into cohesive, interpretable, and verifiable multi-agent reasoning programs. We evaluate the proposed framework across three diverse benchmarks - GAIA, HotpotQA, and VirtualHome - using a range of representative LLMs. Results show consistent improvements in planning performance, with absolute gains of 3-36 percentage points over natural language prompting baselines. On VirtualHome, our method achieves a new state-of-the-art success rate of 56%. In addition, our approach reduces input and output token usage by 55-87% and 41-70%, respectively, underscoring the importance of token-aware evaluation metrics in the development of scalable multi-agent LLM systems. The code and resources are available at: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CodifyingAgent-5A86

AI agents are increasingly used for programming, but do not provide any guarantee on the correctness of generated code. Verified code generation, in which an agent produces both an implementation and a machine-checked proof of its specification, offers a stronger path toward trustworthy AI-generated software. Existing benchmarks in this direction either focus on individual functions or only evaluate proof generation with provided implementations. It is still an open question whether agents can make coherent implementation and proof choices across real multi-module codebases. To bridge this gap, we introduce Vero, the first benchmark to evaluate joint implementation and proof synthesis at the repository level. Vero contains 43 multi-module instances sourced from real-world repositories spanning Python, Dafny, Verus, and Coq, and covering diverse domains from cryptographic protocols to distributed systems. Each instance consists of a multi-module Lean 4 repository with predetermined API interfaces, manually curated formal specifications, and reference implementations, supporting both proof-only and code-and-proof evaluation modes. To improve benchmark reliability, Vero also includes an audit mechanism where agents are allowed to formally prove unsatisfiability of provided specification or incorrectness of reference code, which surfaces and corrects latent code and specification errors during curation. We evaluate frontier coding-agent configurations with Lean toolchain access. The strongest agent fully solves only 27 of 43 instances and closes no specifications on the hardest repositories. Vero provides a concrete testbed for measuring progress toward repository-scale verified software synthesis, where current agents still fall short. We release the benchmark, curation pipeline, and evaluation harness at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/vero.

Coding agents are increasingly deployed in real software development, where a single version iteration requires months of coordinated work across many files. However, most existing benchmarks focus predominantly on single-issue bug fixes from Python repositories, with coarse pass/fail evaluation outcomes, and thus fail to capture long-horizon, multi-target development at real engineering scale. To address this gap, we present RoadmapBench, a benchmark of 115 long-horizon coding tasks grounded in real open-source version upgrades across 17 repositories and 5 programming languages. Each task places the agent on a source-version code snapshot and provides a multi-target roadmap instruction requiring it to implement the functionality introduced in the target version, with a median modification of 3,700 lines across 51 files. We conduct a systematic evaluation on thirteen frontier models and find that even the strongest, Claude-Opus-4.7, resolves only 39.1% of tasks, while the weakest achieves merely 5.2%, in stark contrast to existing bug-fix benchmarks, suggesting that long-horizon software development remains a largely unsolved problem.

Rigorous security-focused evaluation of large language model (LLM) agents is imperative for establishing trust in their safe deployment throughout the software development lifecycle. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on synthetic challenges or simplified vulnerability datasets that fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity encountered by security engineers in practice. We introduce SEC-bench, the first fully automated benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM agents on authentic security engineering tasks. SEC-bench employs a novel multi-agent scaffold that automatically constructs code repositories with harnesses, reproduces vulnerabilities in isolated environments, and generates gold patches for reliable evaluation. Our framework automatically creates high-quality software vulnerability datasets with reproducible artifacts at a cost of only $0.87 per instance. Using SEC-bench, we implement two critical software security tasks to rigorously evaluate LLM agents' capabilities: proof-of-concept (PoC) generation and vulnerability patching. A comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM code agents reveals significant performance gaps, achieving at most 18.0% success in PoC generation and 34.0% in vulnerability patching on our complete dataset. These results highlight the crucial steps needed toward developing LLM agents that are more practical, intelligent, and autonomous for security engineering.

We present Qwen3-Coder-Next, an open-weight language model specialized for coding agents. Qwen3-Coder-Next is an 80-billion-parameter model that activates only 3 billion parameters during inference, enabling strong coding capability with efficient inference. In this work, we explore how far strong training recipes can push the capability limits of models with small parameter footprints. To achieve this, we perform agentic training through large-scale synthesis of verifiable coding tasks paired with executable environments, allowing learning directly from environment feedback via mid-training and reinforcement learning. Across agent-centric benchmarks including SWE-Bench and Terminal-Bench, Qwen3-Coder-Next achieves competitive performance relative to its active parameter count. We release both base and instruction-tuned open-weight versions to support research and real-world coding agent development.

AI agentic programming is an emerging paradigm in which large language models (LLMs) autonomously plan, execute, and interact with external tools like compilers, debuggers, and version control systems to iteratively perform complex software development tasks. Unlike conventional code generation tools, agentic systems are capable of decomposing high-level goals, coordinating multi-step processes, and adapting their behavior based on intermediate feedback. These capabilities are transforming the software development practice. As this emerging field evolves rapidly, there is a need to define its scope, consolidate its technical foundations, and identify open research challenges. This survey provides a comprehensive and timely review of AI agentic programming. We introduce a taxonomy of agent behaviors and system architectures, and examine core techniques including planning, memory and context management, tool integration, and execution monitoring. We also analyze existing benchmarks and evaluation methodologies used to assess coding agent performance. Our study identifies several key challenges, including limitations in handling long context, a lack of persistent memory across tasks, and concerns around safety, alignment with user intent, and collaboration with human developers. We discuss emerging opportunities to improve the reliability, adaptability, and transparency of agentic systems. By synthesizing recent advances and outlining future directions, this survey aims to provide a foundation for research and development in building the next generation of intelligent and trustworthy AI coding agents.

A coding agent solving a software-engineering task spends dozens of steps reasoning, editing code, and running tests, yet little is known about what the underlying language model internally represents about the program it is working on. We show that the residual streams of language models under coding agents linearly encode properties of the evolving program: a logistic-regression probe on hidden states is able to decode whether the current code parses, passes its test suite, reduces the number of failing tests, and introduces regressions, reaching AUC up to 0.83 for correctness across two models and two benchmarks. Our second finding is more surprising: these representations run ahead of the agent's own edits. Probes trained to predict the outcome of future edits (before they are materialized and written on disk) achieve performance above chance up to roughly 25 steps in advance. We call this the agent's latent programming horizon. As a proof of external validity, we show that the probes transfer across benchmarks without retraining. Our positive results open calls for more research in mechanistic interpretability of coding agents.

Understanding large codebases is a long-horizon task for Large Language Model (LLM) agents: answering a single question can require building and running the software, tracing execution across files, and synthesizing evidence over tens of minutes. On SWE-Atlas QnA, a benchmark of long-horizon questions over production repositories, a single Claude Code agent (Opus 4.6) resolves only 32.3% of tasks. Dividing the work among agents with clean contexts mitigates this limitation. However, the subtasks of code comprehension are interdependent. One agent's findings can rewrite another's task, so agents must coordinate during execution, not only at phase boundaries. Existing multi-agent systems support such exchange only between phases, through staged handoffs or synchronized rounds. Communication and work remain mutually exclusive. A discovery made mid-execution cannot be shared until the next boundary. We present AgentRadio, an asynchronous message-passing layer that equips coding-agent harnesses with three primitives: threads, messages, and waiting for mentions. The last runs as a background task, surfacing teammates' messages without interrupting foreground work, so each agent remains passively aware of its peers and folds new findings into its ongoing task. Under a five-phase protocol of division of labor and negotiation, four agents organized by AgentRadio resolve 62.1% of tasks, 29.8 points above a single agent and above Claude Code with the newer Opus 4.8 (57.2%). Rubric-level analysis shows the gain growing with task difficulty, consistent with mid-course correction as the underlying mechanism. Our code is available at https://github.com/Coral-Protocol/AgentRadio.

Agentic coding harnesses - such as Agent-Skills, Superpowers, and Agent-Rigor - are increasingly deployed to augment underlying LLMs for real-world software engineering tasks. Existing benchmarks evaluate these agents almost exclusively on outcome correctness: whether generated code passes tests or resolves issues. We argue that this outcome-only lens is insufficient: an agent that arrives at a correct solution through reckless trial-and-error, without planning, verification, or graceful recovery, is fundamentally less reliable than one that follows sound engineering discipline. We introduce RigorBench, the first benchmark designed to measure process discipline in AI coding agents. RigorBench evaluates these harnesses across five pillars: Planning Fidelity, Verification Coverage, Recovery Efficiency, Abstention Quality, and Atomic Transition Integrity. A composite RigorScore aggregates these dimensions into a single metric via a weighted sum. We curate a suite of 30 tasks spanning five categories - Plan-Then-Build, Verify-Or-Die, Doom Loop Gauntlet, Know When to Fold, and Don't Break the Build-and evaluate leading harnesses in a controlled with/without experimental design against baseline coding assistants. Our results show that structured process discipline not only improves process quality scores by an average of 41% but also raises downstream outcome correctness by 17%, providing the first quantitative evidence that how agents code matters as much as what they produce. We release the full benchmark, scoring rubrics, and trajectory analysis tools as open-source artifacts.

Large language models (LLMs) have advanced code generation from single-function tasks to competitive-programming problems, but existing multi-agent solutions either rely on costly large-scale (>30B) models or collapse when downsized to small open-source models. We present MapCoder-Lite, a framework for distilling the complex reasoning of large, multi-agent coding systems into a single 7B model. Our contribution is a novel, three-pillar methodology that synergistically generates, refines, and encodes multi-agent knowledge: (i) pass-based trajectory distillation from strong LLMs fixes format fragility in retrieval and reduces failures in debugging, (ii) supervisor-guided correction with global feedback strengthens planning and coding agents, and (iii) agent-wise LoRA fine-tuning delivers memory-efficient specialisation. Comprehensive evaluation on xCodeEval, APPS, and CodeContests shows that MapCoder-Lite more than doubles xCodeEval accuracy (from 13.2% to 28.3%), eliminates all format failures, while reducing GPU memory and token-generation time by 4x compared to a 32B model. It also achieves over 10% gains on simpler coding benchmarks, demonstrating broad improvements beyond competitive programming. These results demonstrate that careful agent-wise fine-tuning unleashes high-quality multi-agent coding on a small language model. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/aiha-lab/MapCoder-Lite.

Generative AI coding agents are entering the open-source supply chain, yet their diverse and often invisible traces leave their prevalence poorly understood. We introduce a multi-layered detection framework that integrates configuration-file scanning, commit-message analysis, author-identity matching, and bot-signature lookup across World of Code (180M+ Git repositories), classifying agent traces into four behavioral types. No single method captures more than a fraction of activity: multi-method detection identifies 850,157 Claude Code commits in one snapshot, of which bot-account lookup_the signal most adoption studies rely on_recovers only 28,154 (3.3%), a 30x relative-recall gap, so single-signal prevalence estimates are biased low by at least this factor. Every detection pattern is hand-validated (495 labels) with per-cell precision and Wilson confidence intervals. Across snapshots from December 2024 to April 2026, commit-attributed agents generate over 320,000 commits per month; Claude Code leads (886,122 commits across 17,295 projects) and dominates silent, configuration-file-only adoption (21,078 projects). Compared against an independent pull-request census (AIDev), the two channels capture nearly disjoint agent populations_a PR census misses 79% of commit-detected Claude Code adopters and essentially all Codex adopters_and different kinds of work: PR-deployed cloud agents (Codex, Cursor) surface as feature work, while commit-deployed in-editor agents (Claude Code, OpenHands, Aider) surface as maintenance. The observed work profile follows deployment and detection mode rather than the tool itself, so no single channel is representative.

Coding agents are increasingly used as general-purpose problem solvers, but their flexibility does not by itself confer the domain expertise needed for specialized tasks. Recent work addresses this through agent skills: reusable workflows, and code, that augment agents with domain-specific capabilities. Most skills today are hand-crafted, and existing evolutionary approaches optimize low-level artifacts (e.g. prompts \& code) that are tightly coupled to specific models and tasks. We introduce EvoSkill, a self-evolving framework that automatically discovers and refines agent skills through iterative failure analysis. EvoSkill analyzes execution failures, proposes new skills or edits to existing ones, and materializes them into structured, reusable skill folders. A Pareto frontier of agent programs governs selection, retaining only skills that improve held-out validation performance while the underlying model remains frozen. We evaluate EvoSkill on two benchmarks: OfficeQA, a grounded reasoning benchmark over U.S.\ Treasury data, where it improves exact-match accuracy by 7.3\% (60.6\% to 67.9\%); and SealQA, a search-augmented QA benchmark with noisy retrieval, where it yields a 12.1\% gain (26.6\% to 38.7\%). We also investigate the zero-shot transfer capabilties of skills evolved on one task to the other; in particular: skills evolved from SealQA transfers zero-shot to BrowseComp, improving accuracy by 5.3\% without modification demonstrating that skill-level optimization produces transferable capabilities beyond the training task.

Agentic code assistants are a new generation of AI systems capable of performing end-to-end software engineering tasks. While these systems promise unprecedented productivity gains, their behavior and effectiveness depend heavily on configuration files that define architectural constraints, coding practices, and tool usage policies. However, little is known about the structure and content of these configuration artifacts. This paper presents an empirical study of the configuration ecosystem of Claude Code, one of the most widely used agentic coding systems. We collected and analyzed 328 configuration files from public Claude Code projects to identify (i) the software engineering concerns and practices they specify and (ii) how these concerns co-occur within individual files. The results highlight the importance of defining a wide range of concerns and practices in agent configuration files, with particular emphasis on specifying the architecture the agent should follow.

We present FrogNano, a 4B coding agent designed to tackle software engineering (SWE) tasks efficiently and effectively, even under resource-constrained environments. It is post-trained exclusively via RL on around 1,500 SWE environments with synthetic tasks. A key ingredient for improving performance is an online task synthesis pipeline that creates tasks calibrated to the frontier of learnability for the current checkpoint. This report provides evidence that competitive small coding agents can be trained with synthetic tasks alone, without traditional distillation from larger models, and that generating tasks at the learnability frontier of the current agent is important. We report details on the training methodology, evaluations across diverse environments, and in-depth analyses, serving as a foundation for our ongoing exploration of lightweight yet capable coding agents that can run on minimal hardware.

LLM-powered coding agents, which operate in iterative loops (turns) to solve software engineering tasks, are becoming increasingly powerful. However, their practical deployment is hindered by significant and unpredictable costs. This challenge arises from a combination of factors: quadratically growing token counts with each turn, the high price of models, the large number of turns required for real-world tasks, and the tendency of agents to take inefficient or unnecessary actions. While existing research focuses on optimizing individual turns, the strategic control of the total number of turns remains an underexplored area for managing agent performance and cost. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study on SWE-bench using three state-of-the-art models and evaluate the impact of three distinct turn-control strategies: an unrestricted baseline, a fixed-turn limit with reminders, and a novel dynamic-turn strategy that grants extensions on-demand. Our findings first reveal a fundamental trade-off in the unrestricted setting, where no single model excels across performance, cost, and turn efficiency. We then show that a fixed-turn limit, specifically at the 75th percentile of the baseline, serves as a "sweet spot", substantially reducing costs (by 24%-68%) with minimal impact on solve rates. Most significantly, the dynamic-turn strategy consistently outperforms fixed-limit approaches, achieving comparable or better solve rates while further reducing costs by an additional 12%-24% by intelligently allocating resources only to tasks that need them. This work provides the first systematic analysis of turn-control strategies, offering simple yet effective guidelines for developers to balance cost and efficacy. We demonstrate that dynamic resource allocation is a superior, easy-to-implement approach for deploying powerful yet economically viable coding agents.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise for automated patching, but their effectiveness depends strongly on how they are integrated into patching systems. While prior work explores prompting strategies and individual agent designs, the field lacks a systematic comparison of patching architectures. In this paper, we present a controlled evaluation of four LLM-based patching paradigms -- fixed workflow, single-agent system, multi-agent system, and general-purpose code agents -- using a unified benchmark and evaluation framework. We analyze patch correctness, failure modes, token usage, and execution time across real-world vulnerability tasks. Our results reveal clear architectural trade-offs: fixed workflows are efficient but brittle, single-agent systems balance flexibility and cost, and multi-agent designs improve generalization at the expense of substantially higher overhead and increased risk of reasoning drift on complex tasks. Surprisingly, general-purpose code agents achieve the strongest overall patching performance, benefiting from general-purpose tool interfaces that support effective adaptation across vulnerability types. Overall, we show that architectural design and iteration depth, rather than model capability alone, dominate the reliability and cost of LLM-based automated patching.

AI coding agents increasingly author pull requests (PRs), often under developers' own accounts, obscuring who actually produced a change. Reliable attribution is important for repository governance, empirical studies of AI-assisted software development, and measuring the impact of AI coding agents. Existing work focuses on closed-set identification of known agents, leaving the practical limits of open-world AI coding agent attribution largely unexplored. In this paper, we present AgenTag, a multimodal framework for open-world AI coding agent attribution, evaluated on AIDev, comprising 33,580 PRs from five AI coding agents and 6,618 human-authored PRs. We represent each PR using textual, behavioral, and code-based modalities, and compare conventional classification with supervised contrastive learning for open-set recognition and few-shot enrollment of previously unseen agents. AgenTag identifies authoring agents with a weighted F1 of 0.96 (macro F1 of 0.84), distinguishes AI- from human-authored PRs with a balanced F1 of 0.89, and detects previously unseen agents with an AUC of 0.84. We further show that PR descriptions and commit messages provide nearly all of the attribution signal, whereas code diffs contribute little across multiple representations, indicating that coding agents are distinguished primarily by how they communicate changes rather than by the code they generate. Moreover, these behavioral fingerprints persist after removing explicit self-disclosed markers, demonstrating that attribution relies largely on latent stylistic characteristics. These findings show that reliable attribution of AI coding agents is feasible and clarify the practical trade-offs between attribution accuracy and the information required to achieve it.

LLM-based coding agents can localize bugs, generate patches, and run tests with diminishing human oversight, yet the scaffolding code that surrounds the language model (the control loop, tool definitions, state management, and context strategy) remains poorly understood. Existing surveys classify agents by abstract capabilities (tool use, planning, reflection) that cannot distinguish between architecturally distinct systems, and trajectory studies observe what agents do without examining the scaffold code that determines why. This paper presents a source-code-level architectural taxonomy derived from analysis of 13 open-source coding agent scaffolds at pinned commit hashes. Each agent is characterized across 12 dimensions organized into three layers: control architecture, tool and environment interface, and resource management. The analysis reveals that scaffold architectures resist discrete classification: control strategies range from fixed pipelines to Monte Carlo Tree Search, tool counts range from 0 to 37, and context compaction spans seven distinct strategies. Five loop primitives (ReAct, generate-test-repair, plan-execute, multi-attempt retry, tree search) function as composable building blocks that agents layer in different combinations; 11 of 13 agents compose multiple primitives rather than relying on a single control structure. Dimensions converge where external constraints dominate (tool capability categories, edit formats, execution isolation) and diverge where open design questions remain (context compaction, state management, multi-model routing). All taxonomic claims are grounded in file paths and line numbers, providing a reusable reference for researchers studying agent behavior and practitioners designing new scaffolds.

Repository benchmarks (e.g., SWE-bench) for coding agents often assume that lines of code edited can predict task difficulty, but such datasets' poor control over code and task types makes it hard to know which abilities truly drive agent errors. We present CABRA: a Coding Ability Blueprint for Rigorous Agent evaluation. CABRA builds tasks from scratch as call graph transformations and scales difficulty via a task size parameter on four axes: function traversal, search, runtime resolution, and instruction following. We run eight LLMs and six coding agents on 6,840 CABRA tasks to show: 1) LLM accuracy falls as task size~grows, but agents stay near-perfect by offloading work to tools (e.g., grep); 2) Larger CABRA tasks elicit more tool calls for reading and analysis, while a separate study on SWE-bench Verified shows these tool call counts predict agents' accuracy better than lines of code edited, suggesting task difficulty for agents can lie in understanding code to edit, not just in making edits; 3) Extending CABRA to an intense understanding task where models analyze divergent logic across two classes backs this finding, as agent accuracy finally falls. More broadly, we argue for synthetic evaluations like CABRA to unmask LLM weaknesses trivialized by tools (e.g., needle-in-a-haystack) and abilities beyond just editing (e.g., understanding) that coding agents still find difficult, pairing SWE-bench-style tasks with controlled diagnosis.

AI coding agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by performing tasks such as feature development, debugging, and testing. Despite their growing impact, the research community lacks a comprehensive dataset capturing how these agents are used in real-world projects. To address this gap, we introduce AIDev, a large-scale dataset focused on agent-authored pull requests (Agentic-PRs) in real-world GitHub repositories. AIDev aggregates 932,791 Agentic-PRs produced by five agents: OpenAI Codex, Devin, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code. These PRs span 116,211 repositories and involve 72,189 developers. In addition, AIDev includes a curated subset of 33,596 Agentic-PRs from 2,807 repositories with over 100 stars, providing further information such as comments, reviews, commits, and related issues. This dataset offers a foundation for future research on AI adoption, developer productivity, and human-AI collaboration in the new era of software engineering. > AI Agent, Agentic AI, Coding Agent, Agentic Coding, Agentic Software Engineering, Agentic Engineering

Secure code review is critical at the pre-commit stage, where vulnerabilities must be caught early under tight latency and limited-context constraints. Existing SAST-based checks are noisy and often miss immature, context-dependent vulnerabilities, while standalone Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by context windows and lack explicit tool use. Agentic AI, which combine LLMs with autonomous decision-making, tool invocation, and code navigation, offer a promising alternative, but their effectiveness for pre-commit secure code review is not yet well understood. In this work, we introduce AgenticSCR, an agentic AI for secure code review for detecting immature vulnerabilities during the pre-commit stage, augmented by security-focused semantic memories. Using our own curated benchmark of immature vulnerabilities, tailored to the pre-commit secure code review, we empirically evaluate how accurate is our AgenticSCR for localizing, detecting, and explaining immature vulnerabilities. Our results show that AgenticSCR achieves at least 153% relatively higher percentage of correct code review comments than the static LLM-based baseline, and also substantially surpasses SAST tools. Moreover, AgenticSCR generates more correct comments in four out of five vulnerability types, consistently and significantly outperforming all other baselines. These findings highlight the importance of Agentic Secure Code Review, paving the way towards an emerging research area of immature vulnerability detection.

Multi-agent coding systems are designed to tackle complex software engineering tasks through collaboration. However, existing evaluations typically assume configured organizations are followed faithfully, whereas reality differs. This behavioral gap, combined with differences in underlying system components, prevents clear attribution of observed gains. To this end, we introduce OpenCollab, a multi-agent coding framework that provides a unified infrastructure for programmable collaboration and controllable runtime. Specifically, OpenCollab unifies organization design, enforces experimental control on a shared runtime, and tracks execution through fine-grained event streams. On this basis, we define Adherence to quantify whether the declared organization is actually realized. Our experiments reveal that agents collaborate very differently across configurations: changing any single dimension shifts Adherence, from 47.2% to as high as 97.2%. Furthermore, extensive agentic coding benchmarks show that a two-coder workflow built on OpenCollab establishes new SOTA performance compared to the mainstream harnesses such as Mini-SWE-agent, Codex CLI, and Claude Code, showing that a well-designed organization can outperform strong existing harnesses, while OpenCollab's single-agent configuration uses the fewest tokens across all evaluated suites. OpenCollab establishes a unified multi-agent infrastructure for easy programmable collaboration and controlled causal evaluation.

LLM-based code agents treat repositories as unstructured text, applying edits through brittle string matching that frequently fails due to formatting drift or ambiguous patterns. We propose reframing the codebase as a structured action space where agents operate on named AST entities rather than text spans. Our framework, CODESTRUCT, provides readCode for retrieving complete syntactic units and editCode for applying syntax-validated transformations to semantic program elements. Evaluated on SWE-Bench Verified across six LLMs, CODESTRUCT improves Pass@1 accuracy by 1.2-5.0% while reducing token consumption by 12-38% for most models. Models that frequently fail to produce valid patches under text-based interfaces benefit most: GPT-5-nano improves by 20.8% as empty-patch failures drop from 46.6% to 7.2%. On CodeAssistBench, we observe consistent accuracy gains (+0.8-4.4%) with cost reductions up to 33%. Our results show that structure-aware interfaces offer a more reliable foundation for code agents.

AI coding agents are increasingly acting as autonomous contributors by generating and submitting pull requests (PRs). However, we lack empirical evidence on how these agent-generated PRs differ from human contributions, particularly in how they modify code and describe their changes. Understanding these differences is essential for assessing their reliability and impact on development workflows. Using the MSR 2026 Mining Challenge version of the AIDev dataset, we analyze 24,014 merged Agentic PRs (440,295 commits) and 5,081 merged Human PRs (23,242 commits). We examine additions, deletions, commits, and files touched, and evaluate the consistency between PR descriptions and their diffs using lexical and semantic similarity. Agentic PRs differ substantially from Human PRs in commit count (Cliff's δ= 0.5429) and show moderate differences in files touched and deleted lines. They also exhibit slightly higher description-to-diff similarity across all measures. These findings provide a large-scale empirical characterization of how AI coding agents contribute to open source development.

Autonomous code agents built on large language models are reshaping software and AI development through tool use, long-horizon reasoning, and self-directed interaction. However, this autonomy introduces a previously unrecognized security risk: agentic interaction fundamentally expands the LLM attack surface, enabling systematic probing and recovery of hidden system prompts that guide model behavior. We identify system prompt extraction as an emergent vulnerability intrinsic to code agents and present \textsc{JustAsk}, a self-evolving framework that autonomously discovers effective extraction strategies through interaction alone. Unlike prior prompt-engineering or dataset-based attacks, JustAsk requires no handcrafted prompts, labeled supervision, or privileged access beyond standard user interaction. It formulates extraction as an online exploration problem, using Upper Confidence Bound-based strategy selection and a hierarchical skill space spanning atomic probes and high-level orchestration. These skills exploit imperfect system-instruction generalization and inherent tensions between helpfulness and safety. Evaluated on 41 black-box commercial models across multiple providers, JustAsk consistently achieves full or near-complete system prompt recovery, revealing recurring design- and architecture-level vulnerabilities. Our results expose system prompts as a critical yet largely unprotected attack surface in modern agent systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in automated code generation but typically excel only in simpler tasks such as generating standalone code units. Real-world software development, however, often involves complex code repositories (named repo) with complex dependencies and extensive documentation. To fill this gap, our research pivots towards evaluating LLMs in a more realistic setting -- real-world repo-level code generation. We introduce CodeAgentBench, a manually curated benchmark for repo-level code generation. This benchmark comprises five high-quality Python projects, encompassing a total of 101 samples. We assess nine leading LLMs on repo-level tasks and observe a decline in their performance. To tackle this, we present CodeAgent, a novel LLM-based agent framework that employs external tools for effective repo-level code generation. CodeAgent integrates five programming tools, enabling interaction with software artifacts for information retrieval, code symbol navigation, and code testing. We implement four agent strategies to optimize these tools' usage. Our experiments on CodeAgentBench show that CodeAgent enhances LLM performance significantly, with improvements ranging from 18.1\% to 250\%. Further tests on the HumanEval benchmark confirm CodeAgent's adaptability and efficacy across various code generation tasks. Notably, CodeAgent outperforms commercial products like Github Copilot, showcasing superior accuracy and efficiency. These results demonstrate CodeAgent's robust capabilities in code generation, highlighting its potential for real-world repo-level coding challenges.

Code agents spend much of their effort simply locating the right code inside a repository. Two approaches dominate current practice. In Semantic Search, the agent retrieves code blocks from a vector index built from the repository in advance. In Deep Agentic Search (also known as grep-search by subagent), a planning agent delegates the exploration to a separate subagent that works in an isolated context window and returns only a condensed result. The second design, which is considered good context engineering practice, exists to protect the main agent from context pollution (also known as context rot), the loss of accuracy that occurs as unrelated material accumulates in the context window. Recent code agents (such as Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, etc) have adopted it quickly, but there is little evidence on whether it produces better answers. We compare the two approaches on SWE-QA, a benchmark for repository-level code question answering. Semantic search answered 65.2% of questions correctly against 46.2% for deep agentic search, and it produced each correct answer at less than half the cost. To explain the gap, we then coded every failed run into a taxonomy of failure modes. The taxonomy shows that deep agentic search did not remove failures but introduced a new class of them: the single largest share of its failures, 41.8%, occurred at the hand-off between the planner and its sub-agent, and these were usually silent, ending in a fluent and confident answer that was wrong. Deep agentic search addresses a real problem and is now the preferred design in many code agents. However, our results show that the protection it offers may not be free, and that for read-only questions over a repository that can be indexed, retrieval was the stronger and cheaper option.

Recently, coding agents have emerged as a dominant paradigm for real-world software engineering (SWE) scenarios, which solve complex tasks through multi-turn interactions with development environments. However, frequent interactions with environments would inevitably introduce substantial token overhead, leading to high usage costs and latency. Although recent studies have explored reducing token usage by context manipulation and interaction limits at inference time, these approaches focus on improving token efficiency while overlooking the risk of discarding task-relevant information, thus struggling to balance the trade-off between resolution rate and token efficiency. In this paper, we study a more general paradigm without suffering from the limitation, i.e., training token-efficient coding agents with promising resolution performance, which is a highly-practical yet less-explored problem. To this end, we reveal two core observations in SWE scenarios: i) Efficiency Variation: successful resolution could be achieved with fewer tokens; ii) Entropy Correlation: unproductive behaviors are associated with turn-level entropy. Motivated by observations, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework, dubbed HERO. Specifically, HERO prioritizes task resolution over token efficiency during policy optimization and encourages efficient reasoning patterns at both trajectory and turn levels. Extensive experiments on SWE-bench Verified and SWE-bench Multilingual demonstrate that HERO achieves a favorable trade-off between resolution rate and token efficiency compared with state-of-the-art coding agents and reinforcement learning methods.

Code generation aims to produce code that fulfills requirements written in natural languages automatically. Large language Models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have demonstrated promising effectiveness in this area. Nonetheless, these LLMs often fail to ensure the syntactic and semantic correctness of the generated code. Recently, researchers proposed multi-agent frameworks that guide LLMs with different prompts to analyze programming tasks, generate code, perform testing in a sequential workflow. However, the performance of the workflow is not robust as the code generation depends on the performance of each agent. To address this challenge, we propose CodeCoR, a self-reflective multi-agent framework that evaluates the effectiveness of each agent and their collaborations. Specifically, for a given task description, four agents in CodeCoR generate prompts, code, test cases, and repair advice, respectively. Each agent generates more than one output and prunes away the low-quality ones. The generated code is tested in the local environment: the code that fails to pass the generated test cases is sent to the repair agent and the coding agent re-generates the code based on repair advice. Finally, the code that passes the most number of generated test cases is returned to users. Our experiments on four widely used datasets, HumanEval, HumanEval-ET, MBPP, and MBPP-ET, demonstrate that CodeCoR significantly outperforms existing baselines (e.g., CodeCoT and MapCoder), achieving an average Pass@1 score of 77.8%.

The increasing adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering necessitates rigorous security evaluation of their generated code. However, existing benchmarks often lack relevance to real-world AI programming scenarios, making them inadequate for assessing the practical security risks associated with AI-generated code in production environments. To address this gap, we introduce A.S.E (AI Code Generation Security Evaluation), a repository-level evaluation benchmark designed to closely mirror real-world AI programming tasks, offering a comprehensive and reliable framework for assessing the security of AI-generated code. Our evaluation of leading LLMs on A.S.E reveals several key findings. In particular, current LLMs still struggle with secure coding. The complexity in repository-level scenarios presents challenges for LLMs that typically perform well on snippet-level tasks. Morever, a larger reasoning budget does not necessarily lead to better code generation. These observations offer valuable insights into the current state of AI code generation, assisting developers in selecting the most appropriate models for practical tasks, while laying the foundation for refining LLMs to generate secure and efficient code in real-world applications.

The future of software engineering--SE 3.0--is unfolding with the rise of AI teammates: autonomous, goal-driven systems collaborating with human developers. Among these, autonomous coding agents are especially transformative, now actively initiating, reviewing, and evolving code at scale. This paper introduces AIDev, the first large-scale dataset capturing how such agents operate in the wild. Spanning over 456,000 pull requests by five leading agents--OpenAI Codex, Devin, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code--across 61,000 repositories and 47,000 developers, AIDev provides an unprecedented empirical foundation for studying autonomous teammates in software development. Unlike prior work that has largely theorized the rise of AI-native software engineering, AIDev offers structured, open data to support research in benchmarking, agent readiness, optimization, collaboration modeling, and AI governance. The dataset includes rich metadata on PRs, authorship, review timelines, code changes, and integration outcomes--enabling exploration beyond synthetic benchmarks like SWE-bench. For instance, although agents often outperform humans in speed, their PRs are accepted less frequently, revealing a trust and utility gap. Furthermore, while agents accelerate code submission--one developer submitted as many PRs in three days as they had in three years--these are structurally simpler (via code complexity metrics). We envision AIDev as a living resource: extensible, analyzable, and ready for the SE and AI communities. Grounding SE 3.0 in real-world evidence, AIDev enables a new generation of research into AI-native workflows and supports building the next wave of symbiotic human-AI collaboration. The dataset is publicly available at https://github.com/SAILResearch/AI_Teammates_in_SE3. > AI Agent, Agentic AI, Coding Agent, Agentic Coding, Software Engineering Agent

We introduce PurpCode, the first post-training recipe for training safe code reasoning models towards generating secure code and defending against malicious cyberactivities. PurpCode trains a reasoning model in two stages: (i) Rule Learning, which explicitly teaches the model to reference cybersafety rules to generate vulnerability-free code and to avoid facilitating malicious cyberactivities; and (ii) Reinforcement Learning, which optimizes model safety and preserves model utility through diverse, multi-objective reward mechanisms. To empower the training pipelines with comprehensive cybersafety data, we conduct internal red-teaming to synthesize comprehensive and high-coverage prompts based on real-world tasks for inducing unsafe cyberactivities in the model. Based on PurpCode, we develop a reasoning-based coding model, namely PurpCode-32B, which demonstrates state-of-the-art cybersafety, outperforming various frontier models. Meanwhile, our alignment method decreases the model overrefusal rates in both general and cybersafety-specific scenarios, while preserving model utility in both code generation and common security knowledge.

Prompt engineering reduces reasoning mistakes in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, its effectiveness in mitigating vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code remains underexplored. To address this gap, we implemented a benchmark to automatically assess the impact of various prompt engineering strategies on code security. Our benchmark leverages two peer-reviewed prompt datasets and employs static scanners to evaluate code security at scale. We tested multiple prompt engineering techniques on GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4o, and GPT-4o-mini. Our results show that for GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini, a security-focused prompt prefix can reduce the occurrence of security vulnerabilities by up to 56%. Additionally, all tested models demonstrated the ability to detect and repair between 41.9% and 68.7% of vulnerabilities in previously generated code when using iterative prompting techniques. Finally, we introduce a "prompt agent" that demonstrates how the most effective techniques can be applied in real-world development workflows.

AI coding agents have become central to developer workflows, yet every existing solution locks its reasoning capabilities within a specific delivery form, such as a CLI, IDE plugin, or web application. This limitation creates systemic barriers when enterprises attempt to reuse these capabilities across heterogeneous engineering environments. To address this challenge, we present Sema Code, an open AI coding framework built on the principle of being embeddable, pluggable, and framework-first. Sema Code completely decouples the core agent engine from all client layers, publishing it as a standalone npm library that any runtime can drive programmatically. Built around this architecture, we designed eight key mechanisms: multi-tenant engine isolation, FIFO input queuing with safe session reconstruction, adaptive context compression, multi-agent collaborative scheduling, intelligent Todo-based process management, four-layer asynchronous permission control, three-tier ecosystem integration spanning MCP, Skills, and Plugins, and a background task framework with separated execution and observation privileges. These mechanisms collectively address the engineering challenges of transforming a complex agent engine into a shared, programmable core. Demonstrating its architectural versatility, the same Sema Core engine simultaneously powers a VSCode extension and a multi-channel messaging gateway, which we name SemaClaw, to unify agent interactions across platforms such as Telegram and Feishu. These represent two fundamentally different product forms sharing an identical reasoning kernel, differing only at the client layer.

Although language model (LM) agents have demonstrated increased performance in multiple domains, including coding and web-browsing, their success in cybersecurity has been limited. We present EnIGMA, an LM agent for autonomously solving Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges. We introduce new tools and interfaces to improve the agent's ability to find and exploit security vulnerabilities, focusing on interactive terminal programs. These novel Interactive Agent Tools enable LM agents, for the first time, to run interactive utilities, such as a debugger and a server connection tool, which are essential for solving these challenges. Empirical analysis on 390 CTF challenges across four benchmarks demonstrate that these new tools and interfaces substantially improve our agent's performance, achieving state-of-the-art results on NYU CTF, Intercode-CTF, and CyBench. Finally, we analyze data leakage, developing new methods to quantify it and identifying a new phenomenon we term soliloquizing, where the model self-generates hallucinated observations without interacting with the environment. Our code and development dataset are available at https://github.com/SWE-agent/SWE-agent/tree/v0.7 and https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench/tree/main/development respectively.

Recent advances in coding agents have made them capable of planning, editing, running, and testing complex code bases. Despite their growing ability in coding tasks, these systems still struggle to infer and track user intent, especially when instructions are underspecified or context-dependent. To bridge this gap, we introduce ToM-SWE, a dual-agent architecture that pairs a primary software-engineering (SWE) agent with a lightweight theory-of-mind (ToM) partner agent dedicated to modeling the user's mental state. The ToM agent infers user goals, constraints, and preferences from instructions and interaction history, maintains a persistent memory of the user, and provides user-related suggestions to the SWE agent. In two software engineering benchmarks (ambiguous SWE-bench and stateful SWE-bench), ToM-SWE improves task success rates and user satisfaction. Notably, on the stateful SWE benchmark, a newly introduced evaluation that provides agents with a user simulator along with previous interaction histories, ToM-SWE achieves a substantially higher task success rate of 59.7\% compared to 18.1\% for OpenHands, a state-of-the-art SWE agent. Furthermore, in a three-week study with professional developers using ToM-SWE in their daily work, participants found it useful 86\% of the time, underscoring the value of stateful user modeling for practical coding agents.

Most coding-agent benchmarks are static: an agent receives a complete task description up front and is judged only by its final code. Real coding assistance is interactive, with users clarifying goals, adding constraints, and correcting mistakes over multiple turns. We introduce SWE-Together, a multi-turn benchmark reconstructed from real user-agent coding sessions. To make real interactions verifiable, we curate 109 repository-level tasks from 11,260 recorded sessions, selecting sessions with recoverable repository states, clear user goals, and observable outcomes. To replay these interactions across agents, we build a reactive LLM-based user simulator that preserves the original users' intents and provides feedback when the coding agent's progress requires it. To evaluate agents as collaborators, we measure both final repository correctness and the number of corrective feedback turns required during the interaction. Experiments with frontier coding agents show that stronger agents generally achieve higher final success rates while requiring fewer interventions, suggesting an improved user experience.

Repository-level coding benchmarks such as SWE-bench have driven a rapid surge in the capabilities of coding agents. Yet they usually treat coding tasks as a holistic, binary prediction problem (e.g., resolved or unresolved), neglecting fine-grained agent capabilities such as repository understanding, context retrieval, code localization, and bug diagnosis. In this paper, we introduce SWE-Explore, a benchmark that isolates the evaluation of repository exploration, a critical capability of coding agents. Given a repository and an issue, SWE-Explore asks an explorer to return a ranked list of relevant code regions under a fixed line budget. SWE-Explore covers 848 issues across 10 programming languages and 203 open-source repositories. For each instance, we derive line-level ground truth from independent agent trajectories that successfully solved the same issue, distilling the specific code regions their solution paths actually consulted. We evaluate exploration along coverage, ranking, and context-efficiency dimensions, showing that these metrics strongly track downstream repair behavior. Across a broad set of retrieval methods, general coding agents, and specialized localizers, we find that agentic explorers form a clear tier above classical retrieval. While file-level localization is already strong for modern methods, line-level coverage and efficient ranking remain the key axes differentiating state-of-the-art explorers.

AI coding assistants are widely used for tasks like code generation. These tools now require large and complex contexts, automatically sourced from various originsx2014across files, projects, and contributorsx2014forming part of the prompt fed to underlying LLMs. This automatic context-gathering introduces new vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to subtly poison input to compromise the assistant's outputs, potentially generating vulnerable code or introducing critical errors. We propose a novel attack, Cross-Origin Context Poisoning (XOXO), that is challenging to detect as it relies on adversarial code modifications that are semantically equivalent. Traditional program analysis techniques struggle to identify these perturbations since the semantics of the code remains correct, making it appear legitimate. This allows attackers to manipulate coding assistants into producing incorrect outputs, while shifting the blame to the victim developer. We introduce a novel, task-agnostic, black-box attack algorithm GCGS that systematically searches the transformation space using a Cayley Graph, achieving a 75.72% attack success rate on average across five tasks and eleven models, including GPT 4.1 and Claude 3.5 Sonnet v2 used by popular AI coding assistants. Furthermore, defenses like adversarial fine-tuning are ineffective against our attack, underscoring the need for new security measures in LLM-powered coding tools.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

LLM coding agents are increasingly deployed to act autonomously on real production infrastructure. They execute shell commands, modify repositories, and call operational APIs. However, completing a task is not sufficient for safety. A wrong action can cause severe consequences. Existing agent benchmarks largely emphasize task completion, leaving open how agents behave under benign but underspecified instructions. We present UnderSpecBench, a benchmark for measuring action-boundary violations in coding agents (i.e., Claude Code, Codex, and OpenCode) on DevOps tasks. UnderSpecBench includes 69 task families grounded in documented incidents, CVEs, or tool behavior and organized across four DevOps capability domains and nine operational control surfaces. To isolate underspecification from task difficulty, each task keeps the same environment and ground-truth safe action while varying the instruction along three axes: intent clarity, target certainty, and blast radius. The resulting 2,208 prompt variants are evaluated with deterministic, side-effect-based oracles that separate Safe Success, Wrong Target, and OverScope outcomes; non-action runs are further classified as clarification, refusal, or deferment. Across five agent x model configurations using OpenCode, Claude Code, and Codex, the evaluation results show that underspecification does not mainly make agents fail; it makes them guess. 55.8-67.8% of runs violate at least one boundary. Target underspecification sharply degrades action quality, while blast-radius cues barely reduce action propensity. These findings show that completion-centric evaluation can overstate safe autonomy and motivate mitigations at the model, harness, and system layer.

Coding agents solve repository-level software engineering tasks through long trajectories of code inspection, search, editing, and testing. As a task progresses, earlier exploration becomes stale, so managing context is more than avoiding overflow: an agent must decide when to compact, what working state to preserve, and how to continue from it. We introduce AutoCompact, which trains a coding agent to make these decisions as part of its policy. To collect training data, we run the base agent on coding tasks and use a judge to review its compaction decisions, summaries, and actions after compaction. Flawed outputs are replaced with corrected ones before being executed in the environment, so each trajectory continues from the corrected decisions. We use these trajectories for supervised fine-tuning, then jointly optimize coding and compaction through reinforcement learning with task-success rewards. Experiments on SWE-bench Verified and SWE-PolyBench Verified show that AutoCompact improves pass rates over the base model by an absolute 9.2\% and 5.0\%, respectively. The improvements hold across all evaluated inference budgets, with a 256K context window that never overflows and with a 16K window whose overflow triggers fallback compaction.

There has been growing interest in building agents that can interact with digital platforms to execute meaningful enterprise tasks autonomously. Among the approaches explored are tool-augmented agents built on abstractions such as Model Context Protocol (MCP) and web agents that operate through graphical interfaces. Yet, it remains unclear whether such complex agentic systems are necessary given their cost and operational overhead. We argue that a coding agent equipped only with a terminal and a filesystem can solve many enterprise tasks more effectively by interacting directly with platform APIs. We evaluate this hypothesis across diverse real-world systems and show that these low-level terminal agents match or outperform more complex agent architectures. Our findings suggest that simple programmatic interfaces, combined with strong foundation models, are sufficient for practical enterprise automation.

We present Mify-Coder, a 2.5B-parameter code model trained on 4.2T tokens using a compute-optimal strategy built on the Mify-2.5B foundation model. Mify-Coder achieves comparable accuracy and safety while significantly outperforming much larger baseline models on standard coding and function-calling benchmarks, demonstrating that compact models can match frontier-grade models in code generation and agent-driven workflows. Our training pipeline combines high-quality curated sources with synthetic data generated through agentically designed prompts, refined iteratively using enterprise-grade evaluation datasets. LLM-based quality filtering further enhances data density, enabling frugal yet effective training. Through disciplined exploration of CPT-SFT objectives, data mixtures, and sampling dynamics, we deliver frontier-grade code intelligence within a single continuous training trajectory. Empirical evidence shows that principled data and compute discipline allow smaller models to achieve competitive accuracy, efficiency, and safety compliance. Quantized variants of Mify-Coder enable deployment on standard desktop environments without requiring specialized hardware.

The advancement of natural language processing (NLP) has been significantly boosted by the development of transformer-based large language models (LLMs). These models have revolutionized NLP tasks, particularly in code generation, aiding developers in creating software with enhanced efficiency. Despite their advancements, challenges in balancing code snippet generation with effective test case generation and execution persist. To address these issues, this paper introduces Multi-Agent Assistant Code Generation (AgentCoder), a novel solution comprising a multi-agent framework with specialized agents: the programmer agent, the test designer agent, and the test executor agent. During the coding procedure, the programmer agent will focus on the code generation and refinement based on the test executor agent's feedback. The test designer agent will generate test cases for the generated code, and the test executor agent will run the code with the test cases and write the feedback to the programmer. This collaborative system ensures robust code generation, surpassing the limitations of single-agent models and traditional methodologies. Our extensive experiments on 9 code generation models and 12 enhancement approaches showcase AgentCoder's superior performance over existing code generation models and prompt engineering techniques across various benchmarks. For example, AgentCoder achieves 77.4% and 89.1% pass@1 in HumanEval-ET and MBPP-ET with GPT-3.5, while SOTA baselines obtain only 69.5% and 63.0%.

Assessing cybersecurity vulnerability awareness in coding agents requires evaluations that reveal capability gaps and remain informative as models evolve. Static benchmarks offer fixed coverage and difficulty, while scarce vulnerable repositories and costly expert authoring limit their renewal at scale. We introduce SecProbe, a framework for adaptive evaluation that combines Item Response Theory (IRT) with on-demand synthesis of repository-scale vulnerability-repair tasks. From observed performance, SecProbe estimates agent ability and identifies where additional evidence is most informative, selecting existing tasks or synthesizing new ones accordingly. As one use case, we construct 353 tasks spanning six programming languages and 151 CWE types and evaluate nine frontier models with two agent harnesses. Success rates peak at 28.33\%, highlighting substantial gaps in vulnerability recognition and repair. Compared with random and one-shot baselines, SecProbe achieves comparable agent ability estimates while requiring agents to solve up to 29.5\% fewer tasks. These results support adaptive evaluation as an efficient and discriminative approach to assessing cybersecurity vulnerability awareness.

Traditional pentesting uses reconnaissance at each step to uncover unseen weaknesses, build stronger attacks, and advance the objective; we argue that AI agents require the same treatment. We formalize agent reconnaissance by modeling the process and identifying the knowledge assets it seeks to extract: what they are, how they are used, and which agent weaknesses they exploit to give adversaries leverage in indirect prompt injection attacks. We instantiate these insights in Know Your Agent (KYA), a framework that automates black-box, reconnaissance-driven pentesting by probing agents, building target profiles, and using those profiles to craft stronger attacks. We evaluate KYA on agent-security benchmarks and a real-world coding agent, and release KYA, its benchmarks, and baseline implementations for reproducibility.

In this work, we study the risks of collective financial fraud in large-scale multi-agent systems powered by large language model (LLM) agents. We investigate whether agents can collaborate in fraudulent behaviors, how such collaboration amplifies risks, and what factors influence fraud success. To support this research, we present MultiAgentFraudBench, a large-scale benchmark for simulating financial fraud scenarios based on realistic online interactions. The benchmark covers 28 typical online fraud scenarios, spanning the full fraud lifecycle across both public and private domains. We further analyze key factors affecting fraud success, including interaction depth, activity level, and fine-grained collaboration failure modes. Finally, we propose a series of mitigation strategies, including adding content-level warnings to fraudulent posts and dialogues, using LLMs as monitors to block potentially malicious agents, and fostering group resilience through information sharing at the societal level. Notably, we observe that malicious agents can adapt to environmental interventions. Our findings highlight the real-world risks of multi-agent financial fraud and suggest practical measures for mitigating them. Code is available at https://github.com/zheng977/MutiAgent4Fraud.

As long-horizon coding agents produce more code than any developer can review, oversight collapses onto a single surface: the automated test suite. Reward hacking naturally arises in this setup, as the agent optimizes for passing tests while deviating from the users true goal. We study this reward hacking phenomenon by decompose software engineering tasks into three parts: (i) a natural language description of the specification (ii) visible validation tests that exercise specified features in isolation, and (iii) held-out tests that compose those same features to simulate real-world usage. Based on the specification and the visible validation test suites, a genuine agent would be able to generate a solution that can also pass all of the held-out tests. Therefore we use the gap in pass rates on these two suites to quantify reward hacking. Based on this methodology, we introduce SpecBench, a benchmark comprising 30 systems-level programming tasks ranging from short horizon tasks like building a JSON parser to ultra long horizon tasks like building an entire OS kernel from scratch. Large-scale experiments reveal a consistent pattern: while every frontier agent saturates the visible suite, reward hacking persists, with smaller models exhibiting larger gaps on holdout suites. The gap also scales sharply with task length: it grows by 28 percentage points for every tenfold increase in code size. Failures range from subtle feature isolation to deliberate exploits, including a 2,900-line hash-table "compiler" that memorizes test inputs. SpecBench offers a principled testbed for measuring whether coding agents build genuine working systems or merely game the test suites developers hand them.

Software increasingly functions as part of the scientific instrument itself, making failures in scientific code capable of compromising not only program behavior but also the evidence underlying scientific conclusions. Yet existing evaluations of coding agents largely emphasize aggregate task success, providing limited insight into why agents fail when repairing scientific software. We introduce SWE-bench Science, a repository-level benchmark for scientific software engineering comprising 119 tasks from 98 GitHub repositories across 20 scientific domains. Each task is organized into one of three paradigms: Issue-driven, Expert-exploratory, and Engineering-integration. Even the best-performing agent, Claude Code with Opus-5 (max), achieves a pass@1 below 50\%, highlighting the substantial challenges posed by scientific software engineering. We identify four recurring failure mechanisms: deficits in scientific knowledge or abstraction, misguided exploration or surface-level repair, incomplete repair coverage or system integration, and failures to generalize scientific knowledge beyond observed cases in our analysis. We further conduct a paired ablation that removes explicit scientific guidance while preserving the repository and executable engineering context. The results show that scientific knowledge is not uniformly beneficial: well-grounded information can constrain repair and improve average performance and token efficiency, whereas poorly aligned guidance can induce anchoring and does not necessarily improve exact repair success. Together, SWE-bench Science provides a broad testbed for studying both the capabilities and failure mechanisms of coding agents in scientific software engineering.

Reinforcement learning for coding agents increasingly relies on long-running agent harnesses to manage tool integration, repository contexts, and execution feedback. However, the native execution environments of these harnesses are inherently misaligned with policy-gradient training: environmental crashes and reward hacking corrupt outcome signals, while train-inference discrepancies decouple rollout behavior from policy updates. To address this, we present LEGO-RL, a framework that bridges native coding-agent harnesses with scalable policy-gradient optimization without modifying their internal control flow. LEGO-RL is built upon three pillars: (1) faithful optimization via in-process LLM proxying that captures raw generation streams for token-level alignment and robust trainer-side log-probability recomputation, even under harness-side compaction or re-serialization; (2) reliable execution via scalable sandbox orchestration featuring image caching and stage-wise defenses to mitigate reward hacking; and (3) observable training through an integrated plugin that automates validation and monitoring, paired with a Live UI for granular trajectory diagnostics. We evaluate LEGO-RL by training the sparse MoE model Qwen3.5-35B-A3B with GSPO across three native coding-agent harnesses. LEGO-RL improves Qwen3.5-35B-A3B across OpenHands SDK (64.0% to 70.4%), Claude Code (62.4% to 68.2%), and OpenCode (57.2% to 66.6%) on SWE-bench Verified, while maintaining a rollout-training probability correlation above 0.99.

The evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation relies heavily on the quality and robustness of test cases. However, existing benchmarks often lack coverage for subtle corner cases, allowing incorrect solutions to pass. To bridge this gap, we propose CodeHacker, an automated agent framework dedicated to generating targeted adversarial test cases that expose latent vulnerabilities in program submissions. Mimicking the hack mechanism in competitive programming, CodeHacker employs a multi-strategy approach, including stress testing, anti-hash attacks, and logic-specific targeting to break specific code submissions. To ensure the validity and reliability of these attacks, we introduce a Calibration Phase, where the agent iteratively refines its own Validator and Checker via self-generated adversarial probes before evaluating contestant code.Experiments demonstrate that CodeHacker significantly improves the True Negative Rate (TNR) of existing datasets, effectively filtering out incorrect solutions that were previously accepted. Furthermore, generated adversarial cases prove to be superior training data, boosting the performance of RL-trained models on benchmarks like LiveCodeBench.